

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 3D BDE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268

AVICTH-C

12 APRIL 1969

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division,  
1 February to 31 March 1969

A. GENERAL: During the reporting period the Brigade conducted RIF <sup>(PERSONALIZING IN POW)</sup> operations in the Trapezoid, Ban Qui, Crescent, Michelin, and Cau Koi areas. Some Plee land clearing and security operations were conducted in the vicinity of Cau Koi Rubber Plantation. In conjunction with VN Forces, the Brigade conducted search and clear/defoliation operations along the Saigon River. Route security of ASPs in the <sup>Area of Operations</sup> Brigade ~~AD~~ was conducted daily. During this period, the enemy stepped up his aggressive activities against base areas in this Brigade AD. One ground attack against the Dau Tieng Base Camp and three attacks on NUP of units OPCON to this Brigade. These attacks were repulsed with extensive loss to the enemy in equipment, weapons, and personnel. Only minor losses were sustained by friendly forces, ~~in relation to those of the enemy~~. Due to these aggressive operations and well planned defenses, this Brigade was able to prevent the enemy from launching successful

coordinated attacks on either of the Base Camp areas, FSB's or to interdict convey operations in this Brigade AO. The enemy's stepped foot offensive has been greatly hampered by this Brigade's ability to deny him staging supply/personnel infiltration routes and base camp areas in this area.

B. TASK ORGANIZATION: During the reporting period, OPFOR units of this Brigade were:

1 Battalion (Mechanized), 24th Infantry

1 Battalion, 27th Infantry

2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery

28th River Assault Group (RVAG)

501st Land Clearing Team (Base Plan)

D Company, 65th Engineers

National Police, 1st Battalion

4th Infantry, Platoon Scout Dog

C. MISSION: Conducts operations in the 3d Brigade portion of the 25th Infantry Division TAOI to:

1. Frustrate enemy plans and locate and destroy VC/NVA Forces, base camps and support areas.

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2. Defend Dau Tieng Base Camp and Dau Tieng Bridge.
3. Conduct clear and security of MSR's.
4. Execute pacifications programs.
5. Conduct anti-VCI Operations.
6. Develop targets for B-52 and persistent CS strikes.
7. Conduct combined offensive operations in conjunction with GVN Forces.

8. Interdict enemy movement throughout the TAOI.

#### D. EXECUTION:

1. Land Clearing Operations: During the latter part of January, through February 11, the Brigade in conjunction with the Land Clearing Task Force (RMS Flow) cleared 700 acres of growth. This area, located between Bao Dai and the Cau Khai Rubber Plantation has long been a base area for the Tay Ninh Province Communist Headquarters, the DIA Battalions and C33 Local Force Company. This operation has resulted in the forced abandonment of this base area by the enemy and a significant increase in the security of Bao Dai, Trung Mit Villages and has assisted in convoy security operations. Much of the enemy's base areas were detected and

destroyed. Reaction by the enemy was heavy during the latter period of the cutting.

2. Operation Hunk Film III. On 8 February Operation Hunk Film III was initiated in conjunction with the 28th River Assault Group (RAG) VNM. This Operation was conducted along the Saigon River between the Muahroon and Dau Tieng to locate and destroy VC/NVA installations and supply caches, <sup>and</sup> to defoliate the river banks. The Brigade element consisted of one company of the 1-27 Infantry. During the period 8-15 February, the task force defoliated 10 acres of heavy vegetation on both banks of the Saigon River. In addition, the force located and destroyed or evacuated 2.5 tons of rice, 800 rounds of small arms ammo, 100 ft of electric wire and an assortment of weapons and other equipment.

3. Preemption of Enemy Attacks. During February and March, the enemy attempted on four attacks installations in this Brigade AO.

A. On 21 February, an unknown force was detected while moving into attack position around the Night Lager position in Non Qui (XTL48445). This is the forward base for Bravo Company 2-22

Infantry Battalion operating in the Non Qui/Route 239 area. The

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movement was noticed at 0005H and engaged with small arms, 50 cal. Machine guns and 81mm mortars and subsequently the movement ceased. At 0115H movement was again detected and engaged with organic weapons resulting in one secondary explosion. The enemy launched their attack from three sides of the base with small arms, RPG and mortar fire. Artillery was called in from FSB Mahone II and F4B ships and gunships were on the scene at 0206H, with good illumination of the area, the enemy was clearly visible for friendly forces to engage easily. Due to the even terrain and lack of undergrowth, the enemy had no concealment from friendly forces. Gunships were able to easily engage the enemy pinned down outside the wire. At approximately 0300H the enemy broke contact and moved in a southeasterly direction. Enemy losses during this encounter were 28 NV KIA (BC), numerous RPG launchers, and other weapons and equipment. There were no friendly losses.

B. On 230035 hours, February 1969, the Dan Tieng Base Camp was attacked by a reinforced NV 1 Sapper Battalion. The ground attack was preceded by 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortar fire, and several 107mm rockets. The initial probe was against the Southeast and Northwest portions of the

perimeter, with heavy volumes of small arms and automatic weapons fire as well as RPG fire. At 0058H the Southern portion of the perimeter also came under heavy attack. Throughout this period, the enemy continued to employ a heavy volume of indirect fire, primarily on the air strip and the east side of the camp. The enemy penetrated the base camp eastern perimeter at about 0100 hours. Approximately 15-20 VC made their way into the 1-27 Artillery motor pool while 10 more entered the 2-77 Artillery motor pool and the aircraft revetments. The enemy penetrated the bunker line of the Southern sector at 0120 hours by cutting and crawling under the wire. Enemy forces within the base camp were isolated and eliminated by the employment of reaction forces. Defending forces of Ban Tieng Base Camp forced the enemy to withdraw at about 0400 hours toward the Michelin Plantation and to the South toward the Trapezoid. Sporadic RPG and sniper fire continued until 1000 hours. Even though the enemy was able to destroy or damage several aircraft on the air strip, he suffered extensive casualties. Enemy losses were 76 KIA, 14 POWs, 50 possible KIA, plus the loss of weapons and equipment. Base Camp forces suffered 18 KIA and 71 WIA in this operation.



2. On 230240 hours February, Fire Support Base Johnson I was attacked by an estimated NVA Reinforced Battalion. The enemy attacked from the North, west and Northeast with 82mm mortar, RPG and small arms fire, at short range. Friendly forces returned with organic weapons and artillery. A <sup>LF</sup> ~~flak~~ ship and gunships were called in to engage the attackers. Sporadic fire continued through the morning and terminated at approximately 0715 hours. This contact <sup>cost</sup> ~~costed~~ the enemy 38 NVs KIA (HC) with 30 KIA (possible). Friendly losses were minor with only 1 KIA and 13 MIA.

*March*  
3. At 150153 Hours March, FSB Johnson I was again attacked by an undetermined size enemy force. The enemy used 82mm mortar, RPG and small arms. Attacking from the Northeast, the enemy attempted to overrun the forward base of the 1-27 Infantry. Friendly forces returned fire with organic weapons and called in Miller Juniors from the local artillery. During the attack, the enemy blew a 10' hole in the defense wire but were unable to exploit the breach. When contact was broken, a search of the area revealed 21 NVs KIA (HC), 4 NVs FOW, with 32 NVs KIA (possible). Friendly casualties were only 1 MIA.

4. Presumption of Enemy Convoy Ambush Attempt: On 111200 March 1969,

the Co Chi-Dau Tieng convoy was again attacked at the approximate

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ON ROUTE 239 JUST WEST OF THE  
Ben Chu Rubber Plantation.  
location of the January ambush attempt. The last vehicle in the second

march unit was hit and forced off the road. The remaining vehicles of the  
convoy drove through the attack and arrived safely in Dau Tieng. B

Company of 2-22 Infantry (M), securing the road in that vicinity, immediately  
engaged the enemy with organic weapons. Artillery from Dau Tieng, FSB  
Wood II and FSB Mahons II was called in on the enemy positions. C Com-  
pany 2-22 Infantry (M) counterattacked from the West, while A Company  
drove in from the East. A flame track was employed against the enemy  
positions, causing elements to break and retreat to the North. The  
2-22 Infantry (M) pursued the enemy until contact was broken. During this  
period, artillery, air strikes, and army gunships were able to inflict heavy  
casualties upon the enemy. For his attempt to interdict Route 239, the  
enemy paid in losses of 76 NVA KIA (HC) and 2 POWs. Friendly losses were  
8 KIA. The convoy mission was completed without mishap.

5. Operation Barbara. During the period 16 through 18 March, the Brigade  
supported the GVN plan to relocate the population in the Michelin Rubber  
Plantation. Eight villages not under GVN control existed in the plan-

tation. These villages served as sources of supplies and recruits for  
the enemy units. The operation was designed to deny the enemy these



valuable assets by relocating the population to areas near Dau Tiang

where GVN Forces could establish control, GVN Forces conducted the

relocation with <sup>3rd Brigade</sup> US Forces providing security. A total of 2129 people

were relocated. During the operation, the enemy lost 30 KIA (HQ), while

US and GVN Forces sustained no casualties. ~~One civilian died due to~~

~~other than military action.~~

6. Operation Atlas Wedge. On 18 March 69, Operation Atlas Wedge was

initiated in a follow-up of Operation Barbara, to completely surround

the center and eastern portion of the Michelin Rubber Plantation. <sup>Units</sup>

<sup>OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION CONDUCTED OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE</sup>  
<sup>NORTH WEST GRID KING MOUNTAIN AREA. REINFORCED BY THE 2ND</sup>

<sup>While the 2-22 Infantry (B) with one OPOON Company from the 1-27 Infantry</sup>

<sup>the 1-27 Inf (A) performed the operation in</sup>  
the Michelin Rubber, the 1-27 Inf (A) performed the operation in

the Upper Trapezoid South of Dau Tiang. <sup>2-22 INFANTRY DIV</sup>

to locate possible VC/NVA storage, installations, and enemy forces in

the Michelin ~~area~~ <sup>the villages</sup> that had been visited by relocation

of villagers in Operation Barbara. <sup>Considerable</sup> <sup>HAU</sup> Many enemy equipment and ~~installations~~

<sup>During this operation</sup> plexes were located and destroyed. The remainder of March was spent on

RIF Operations in the Trapezoid and Michelin Rubber Plantation. <sup>WITH NOMINAC</sup>  
SUCCESS.

SUMMARY: During the months of February and March this Brigade

with its OPGON Units has been able to prevent such an attempt by the enemy to attack base camp areas or the MSI with any significant success.

The Units have pursued the enemy into previous sanctuaries of the Michelin Rubber Plantation, Trapezoid and Kau Cui areas, with the assistance of this Brigade, the GVN authorities have consolidated all the workers living throughout the Michelin into a few villages in the Southwestern portion of the plantation. This move has facilitated GVN control over these people and deprived the VC/PA of this source of personnel, intelligence and supply.

*Assessment* was opened  
The entire Michelin is now open to friendly forces and has been searched and cleared on the occasions since the workers were consolidated. Also ~~any~~ <sup>is the Michelin</sup> ~~any~~ <sup>is the Michelin</sup> may not be engaged with any chance of injuring the innocent civilians when necessary, ~~due to enemy presence~~ <sup>presence of the</sup> use of this area to launch rocket attacks against Dau Tieng City or Camp Mainier.

Defoliation of the Saigon River has uncovered much of the enemy's supplies intended for support of the second Tet Offensive. His inability to use this valuable line of communication for those periods have greatly hampered his offensive operations in this area.



His failure to inflict even minor damage is at least in part due to the failure of the Viet Cong Base Camp and convoy operations conducted by units of this Brigade. Surely is being considered by the U.S. Higher Authority. Not only has these attacks failed, but the enemy's loss of personnel and equipment should be of great concern of the enemy leadership.

These losses in these areas, along with personnel losses during attacks have been considerable and have contributed to denying the enemy any substantial success during his Spring offensive.