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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96240

AVGB

1 September 1967

SUBJECT: 5th Special Forces Group Personnel Requirements, Personnel Status and Assigned Missions.

TO: See Distribution

1. The purpose of this letter is to transmit to interested headquarters and agencies an accurate report on the relationship of the strength requirements of the 5th Special Forces Group to its assigned missions. The status of personnel assets assigned to the Group as of 18 August 1967 is also provided.
2. The attached report has been presented by detailed oral briefing to:
 - a. Chief of Staff, US Army.
 - b. Deputy CQMUSMACV, J-1 and J-3 MACV.
 - c. Deputy Commanding General, G-1 and G-3 US Army Vietnam.
 - d. Chief MACSOG and several members of the SOG staff.
3. The requirement for the study was generated on receipt of notification from DCG, USARV that the 5th Special Forces Group would be required to reduce its strength to that authorized by 31 December 1967. Action is currently being taken by USARV to expedite the forwarding of the 5th SFG MTO&E and MTDA originally submitted on 11 January 1967.

1 Incl
es

JONATHAN F. LADD
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

DA	5	CISO	1
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INCLOSURE

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Incl 5 to 5th SFGR ORLL, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 67

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ANALYSIS OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES (ABN) PERSONNEL STRENGTHS. (U)

1. (U) Purpose: This study addresses the current and projected personnel strength of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) and its relationship to currently assigned missions and to the campaign plan for CY 1968.

2. (S) Assumptions:

a. The CIDG program and programs related to MACSOG are considered to be the principal mission of Special Forces Units in South Vietnam.

b. COMUSMACV considers US/Indigenous Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol assets such as Project Delta and the MACV Recondo School to be highly desirable activities.

c. Minor organizational adjustments to current programs will occur as the situation changes in RVN. Those changes will not, however, markedly affect authorized strength ceilings discussed in this study.

3. (S) Discussion:

a. An analysis of assigned missions and other requirements placed on the 5th SFGA reveals the following programs have been and are all now manned principally with the Special Forces Operational personnel (medics, 91B; communicators, 05B; operation-intelligence specialists, 11F; heavy weapons infantry men, 11C; light weapons infantry men, 11B; and engineers, 12B):

- (1) Civilian Irregular Defense Program (CIDG).
- (2) Project Daniel Boone/Flaming Arrow (Omega and Sigma).
- (3) Project Delta.
- (4) MACV Recondo School.

(5) Other requirements, such as furnishing personnel for assignment to province reconnaissance units (PRU).

b. In addition to the missions shown in paragraph 3a the 5th SFGA is responsible for requisitioning personnel for SOG.

c. To place 5th SFGA personnel requirements in proper perspective detailed analysis of the following is necessary:

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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
BY AUTHORITY OF COMMANDING OFFICER
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
1ST SPECIAL FORCES 1 September 1967

GROUP 4-DOWNGRADED AT YEAR
INTERVALS, DECLASSIFY AFTER 12
YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

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ANALYSIS OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES (ABN) PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (U)

UNCLASSIFIED
NND 87354
Auth by *[Signature]* NAVF Data

(1) Directed strength level (present mission requirements).

(2) Authorized to requisition strength.

(3) Present strength.

(4) Required future strength level (MTOE) which includes future mission requirements for calendar year 1968.

Note: A series of charts are attached as inclosures and should be referred to as indicated in the following discussion.

d. Directed strength level, 3109 spaces (column I, Incl 1) is derived from those missions/tasks assigned by COMUSMACV and the approved campaign plan, calendar year 1967.

(1) The spaces for the 5th SFGA, 2048, includes the spaces required for the deployed Special Forces Operational Detachments C, B and A (See Incl 2, USASF Operational Detachments, totals column, 1967), Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Signal Company.

(2) Military Intelligence augmentation (110 spaces). The standard Special Forces TO&E (Headquarters and Operational Companies) was designed and staffed for the conduct of unconventional warfare missions, therefore only a limited number of MI spaces are provided. The MI augmentation provides those additional specialists required for augmentation of the intelligence effort at the Headquarters (Special Forces Operational Base) and Operational Detachments B and C.

(3) Signal augmentation (16 spaces - four teams of four spaces each). The standard Special Forces TO&E (Signal Company) was designed and staffed for the conduct of UW operations. For internal development/defense operations, the Signal Company requires specialists to provide the following services to each of the four Operational C Detachments:

(a) Communications facility construction.

(b) Antenna orientation.

(c) Telephone and intercommunications systems.

(d) Electronic maintenance facilities.

(e) Signal Supply System.

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ANALYSIS OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES (ABN) PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (U)

(f) Crypto security and administrative management procedures.

(4) Detachment B-52 (Project Delta). This is a joint US Army Special Forces (USASF) and Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) detachment established in early 1964 with the mission of conducting Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (See Incl 3, organization chart). When deployed, Project Delta is placed under the OPCON of III NAF (US) and I CTZ (VNSF) and conducts operations as directed by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. COMUSMACV directed the strength be increased from 69 to 93 spaces, none of which are requisitionable (COMUSMACV Msg 54196 (S) DTG 220923Z Dec 66).

(5) MACV Recon School. COMUSMACV directed the school be established in September 1966. Its mission is to instruct selected personnel of US and FWMF units in the techniques of Long Range Reconnaissance patrolling (See Incl 4, organization chart). The school is staffed with a total of 46 spaces, none of which are requisitionable (COMUSMACV Msg 46356, DTG 200820Z Oct 66).

(6) SOG. The 5th SFGA has the mission of requisitioning personnel for MACSOG. Recently MACSOG was assigned additional missions and was required to expand current operations which requires a total of 598 spaces. Of this total, 234 spaces are officially authorized. JCS Msg 8695 (TS) DTG 181235Z Apr 66 provides for 127 spaces and DA Msg 770891 provides for 107 spaces. The Commanding Officer 5th SFGA has been advised by MACSOG that the JCS has, by messages not available to the 5th SFGA, authorized the additional 264 spaces and that USARV has placed requisitions with DA for personnel to fill these spaces.

(7) Project Daniel Boone/Flaming Arrow (DB/FA). This is a unilateral operation and is assigned the mission of conducting Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols.

(a) Initially DB/FA was authorized, by JCS Msg 5374 (TS) DTG 260012Z Mar 66, a total of 156 spaces, organized as shown in inclosure 5 (the figures in parenthesis on inclosure are for flaming Arrow operations and the others are for Daniel Boone operations). COMUSMACV directed the 5th SFGA (COMUSMACV Msg 54196 (S) DTG 220923Z Dec 66) to provide 42 additional spaces out of 5th SFGA assets in order to increase the Headquarters element of Detachments B-50 (OMEGA) and B-56 (SIGMA) by 5 spaces each and the total number of recon teams from 8 to 16 for each project, an increase of 16 spaces each as shown in inclosure 6 (the figures in parentheses are for Flaming Arrow operations and the others are for Daniel Boone operations). The increase was only for Project Flaming Arrow operations and the 42 spaces will remain with the 5th SFGA when Project Daniel Boone is implemented.

(b) For Flaming Arrow operations Detachments B-50 (OMEGA) and B-56 (SIGMA) operate under the OPCON of IFFV and IIIFV respectively. Detachment C-5 remains inactive and Detachment B-57 (assigned the mission of

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ANALYSIS OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES (ABN) PERSONNEL STRENGTH (U)

covert intelligence collection) operates under the command and control of the 5th SFGA.

(c) Upon implementation of Project Daniel Boone all DB/FA assets (156 spaces, See Incl 5) will be placed under OPCON of MACSOG and will not be available to provide a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Force to IFFV or IIFFV.

(d) Recently 12 Recon Teams (8 from Detachment B-50 OMEGA and 4 from Detachment B-56 SIGMA), a total of 24 spaces, were provided to MACSOG for partial implementation of Project Daniel Boone. The strengths of Detachments B-50 and B-56 have been reduced accordingly.

(e) A comparison of the total directed strength of 3109, inclosure 1, column I and 5th SFGA present strength, 2697 personnel, inclosure 1, column II reveals a shortage of only 412 personnel. Of this total SOG has recently submitted requisitions for 264 personnel. Sufficient time has not elapsed for DA to fill the requisitions. Therefore, the actual shortage is 148 personnel.

(1) USARV has recognized mission requirements of the 5th SFGA and has validated requisitions based on current mission requirements. The result is a current favorable strength level. However, even though the totals reflect a favorable comparison there does exist a shortage of personnel with those operational MOS required for operational detachments. At the present time, the average USAF A Detachment deployed in the 64 CIDG camps has 88% of its authorized strength, there are often personnel temporarily absent from the camp on R&R, in the hospital, or on business at the B and C Detachment. Although the USAF A Detachments can and do function with reasonable efficiency when they are at 88% of their authorized strength, undesirable strains are often placed on operational specialists such as communicators, medics, operations sergeants and detachment officers when strength shortages reduce the detachment to only one man in a particular skill.

(2) USARV has granted the Group authority to recruit at the 90th and 22nd Replacement Battalions Special Forces trained EM not on assignment to the 5th SFGA. In addition, the 5th SFGA has been granted authority to recruit non-special Forces trained EM who are MOS qualified and possess other qualifications required for assignment to Special Forces. This authority has, in part, alleviated the problem.

(f) The required strength level of 3322 spaces, inclosure 1, column III, is derived from missions/tasks assigned in the proposed campaign plan, CY 1968, inclosure 2, total column for 1968, is a recapitulation of the number of operational detachments required for proposed future operations. The

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~~SECRET~~ ANALYSIS OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES (ABN) PERSONNEL STRENGTH (U)

total reflected for the 5th SFGA in inclosure 1, column III, includes these operational detachments, HHC, Signal Company, 8 special A Detachments (Mike Forces/Mobile Guerrilla Force), and 42 spaces in the Flaming Arrow portion of Project Daniel Boone/Flaming Arrow. The remaining totals are required for the operation of the projects/activities listed, as directed by COMUSMACV or JCS. The required strength level is, in fact, the level requested in the 5th SFGA MTCE submitted 11 Jan 1967. The MI and Signal Augmentation are not included since separate requests for these augmentations were pending at the time the MTCE was submitted. This augmentation is required and separate MTCE's will be submitted.

(g) The authorized to requisition strength level, 2418 spaces, inclosure 1, column IV, is derived from General Order or JCS/DA authorization. See legend at bottom of inclosure 1.

(1) A comparison of each unit, project or activity (with the exception of MI and Signal Augmentations) reveals that current 5th SFGA authorized base is less than the directed strength (current mission requirements), present strength, or required strength (proposed future requirements).

(2) A reduction in strength to the currently authorized base would limit the 5th SFGA capability to perform all missions/tasks effectively.

(h) The 5th SFGA is now required to apply its current assets (present strength, inclosure 1, column II) against all of the missions/tasks outlined in paragraph 2. This results in an understaffing of operational detachments A (88% of authorized personnel presently assigned) and the other key projects/activities (Project Delta, Detachment B-52; MACV Recondo School; and Project Daniel Boone/Flaming Arrow).

(1) Primary shortages are the Special Forces operational MOS's discussed in paragraph 3, page 1 of this study. After a detailed study of the entire situation, discussions with the commanders concerned (Project Delta, Project Daniel Boone/Flaming Arrow, MACV Recondo School and PRU) and members of the 5th SFGA staff, it has been determined that all of the personnel required need not necessarily be qualified in a Special Forces operational MOS.

(2) From personnel resources available to him, it is the intention of the CO, 5th SFGA to send non-Special Forces MOS personnel to the Recondo School and to apply those men who successfully complete the course against certain shortages in both the A Detachment Camps and special operations projects.

(3) A study is currently being conducted by the staff of the 5th Special Forces Group to identify positions within the Group itself and

ANALYSIS OF 5TH SPECIAL FORCES (ABN) PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (U)

in the several projects underway which could be adequately filled by personnel whose MOS's are other than Special Forces operational MOS's. Recondo School graduates, for example, should be able to perform efficiently in many of those positions

(4) However, filling positions with non-Special Forces trained personnel does not reduce the total space requirements. It only alleviates the problem of a shortage of Special Forces operational MOS's. To staff the missions/tasks presently assigned requires a strength level greater than that actually authorized at the present time. A reduction of strength to the authorized base (2418) would not permit effective accomplishment of all missions/tasks assigned. Therefore it's imperative that a priority of missions be established so that the Special Forces operational MOS personnel assigned to the 5th SFCA can be applied against the missions which absolutely require their specific skills.

(i) The following is considered to be a list in priority order of the missions currently assigned to the 5th SFCA.

- (1) CIDG Program.
- (2) MACSOG (SOG and Project Daniel Boone/Flaming Arrow).
- (3) Project Delta.
- (4) MACV Recondo School.

(5) Other requirements for Special Forces trained personnel (i.e., Provincial Reconnaissance Units).

4. (C) Recommendations:

a. The priority of missions listed in paragraph 3d (7) (i) above be approved.

b. Action be taken to obtain Department of Army approval of the 5th SFCA MTCE at the earliest possible date.

REF ID: A627354
DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: RAVIA, DIA
IN 1967

RECAPITULATION OF PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	COLUMN I				COLUMN II				COLUMN III				COLUMN IV			
	DIRECTED STRENGTH LEVEL				PRESENT STRENGTH (19 AUGUST 1967)				REQUIRED STRENGTH MTOE				AUTHORIZED TO REQUISITION			
	OFF	WO	EM	ACG	OFF	WO	EM	ACG	OFF	WO	EM	ACG	OFF	WO	EM	ACG
5TH SFCA	406	12	1630	2048	357	13	1669	2039	507	12	1910	2429	400	7	1495	1902
WING Augmentation	18	12	80	110	18	11	76	105	-	-	-	-	18	12	80	110
SIG Augmentation	4	0	12	16	3	0	7	10	-	-	-	-	4	0	12	16
P-52 (DELTA)	11	0	82	93a	11	0	53	64	11	0	82	93	-	-	-	-
RECONDO	5	0	41	46b	6	0	33	39	5	0	41	46	-	-	-	-
MANTEL, BOOMIE / FLAMING ARROW	32	0	166	198d	36	0	150	186	32	0	124	156	32	0	124	156f
SOC	109	0	489	598c	36	0	218	254	109	0	489	598	46	0	188	234e
TOTAL	585	24	2500	3109	467	24	2206	2697	664	12	2646	3322	500	19	1899	2418

LEGEND:

(a) Directed by COMUSMACV Msg 54169 (S), DTG 220923Z Dec 66 (non-requisitionable).
 (b) Directed by COMUSMACV Msg 46356, DTG 200820Z Oct 66 (non-requisitionable).
 (c) 234 spaces authorized, 107 spaces by DA Msg 770891 and 127 spaces by JCS Msg 8095 (TS), DTG 181235Z Apr 66. Remaining 264 spaces not officially authorized by JCS/DA Msg (non-requisitionable).
 (d) 156 spaces authorized by JCS/Msg 5374 (TS), DTG 260012Z Mar 66. Remaining spaces directed by COMUSMACV Msg 54169 (S) DTG 220923Z Dec 66 (non-requisitionable).
 (e) See c above.
 (f) See d above.

GROUP 4 - DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YEARSSPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASEABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
BY AUTHORITY OF COMMANDING OFFICER
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ARM)
1ST SPECIAL FORCES, 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

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5-8

TNCT. #1

USASF OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT

USASF OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT												
TYPE DETACHMENT	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ		IV CTZ		OTHER		TOTALS	
	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968
C(C&C)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	4
TOTAL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	4	4
P(C&C)	0	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	5	6
P(C&C/S)	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	0	6	6
P(SPECIAL)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2
TOTAL	0	2	3	2	4	4	4	4	2	2	13	14
A(CIMC)	1	9	9	7	4	4	3	9	0	0	17	29
A(CIMC/BS)	2	2	10	13	5	7	1	1	0	0	18	23
A(CIMC/SS)	6	3	5	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	15	7
A(CIMC/SS/BS)	0	0	0	0	4	4	7	5	0	0	11	9
A(TNG/CTR)	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	1
A(RADIO RELAY)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
A(MF)	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	7	10
A(MGF)	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	6	8
TOTAL	11	18	27	24	20	23	17	20	2	3	77	88


GROUP 4 - DOWNGRADE AT 3 YR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY AFTER 12 YRS D D DIR 5200.10

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USSF
11-82

DELTA
LLDB CIDG
34-87 1-31

UN RANGER
43-763




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MACV RECONDO SCHOOL

5 OFF 41 EM 132 CIDG



REF ID: A62354
AMERICAN
INSTITUTE
OF
MINES
DATA
SERIAL

~~SECRET~~

DANIEL BOONE / FLAMING ARROW

10
(4-6)

C-5

74
(6-68)

B-50
OMEGA

53
6-47

74
(6-68)

B-56
SIGMA

40
(10-30)

B-57

Inclosure #5


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
GROUP 4 - DOWNGRADE AT 3 YR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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USSF/CIDG

53(74) 348(548)





US Functions (Plain type)

Corresponding ILDB FORVAR Functions (Underlined)

Addition to the MTOE (Asterisks)

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF CIDG CANTEENS.

ESTABLISHMENT (U)

1. There are presently six camps in I Corps with civilian-operated canteens--Tien Phuoc, Gia Vuc, Ha Thanh, Kham Duc, Ba To, and Tra Bong.
2. During the month of September, canteens will be established in the three camps--Lang Vei, Minh Long, and Thuong Duc--that presently do not have any.
3. Three of the civilian-operated canteens will be reorganized and incorporated into the I Corps CIDG Canteen System. The three remaining camp canteens will be reorganized in Ku Nao Duoc.
4. In the meantime, the present civilian-operated canteens may continue their operations, but must follow the rules established in the headquarters plan.

5. Funds for initial purchase: The VNSF S-4 will make the initial purchase to start a canteen. The terms will be thirty-days billing from date of purchase. This will allow the supplies to be shipped to the camps and a portion sold before the bill is due. If necessary, the USASF S-5 will make up the deficit and continue to do so until the canteen has an operations fund sufficient to sustain itself.

ORGANIZATION (U)

1. A committee will be formed in each camp to govern the operations of the canteen. It will consist of the CIDG company commanders, the reconnaissance platoon leaders, and one VNSF officer. Its mission will be to:
 - a. Insure that the rules established in this plan are followed and directives from the headquarters committee carried out.
 - b. Hire and pay the CIDG canteen employees.
 - c. Write the monthly requisition.
 - d. Secure funds and deliver the money for orders to the headquarters committee.
 - e. Submit a monthly financial report to the headquarters committee.
2. Each camp will employ two civilians to work in the canteen. Invalid CIDG veterans and widows of CIDG soldiers killed in action should be hired if possible. Each will receive a salary of \$3,000VN a month to be paid out of the canteen profits.

3. The headquarters canteen committee will consist of the VNSF Detachment C-1 S-4 and S-5 and the USASF Company C S-5. Its mission will be to:

Incl 7 to 5th SFCA ORLL, 1 Aug - 31 Oct 67

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF CIDG CANTEENS (CONT'D)

- a. Supervise the operation of all the CIDG canteens in I Corps.
- b. Establish canteens in CIDG camps where there are none.
- c. Periodically inspect the camp canteens to insure that the instructions are being followed.
- d. Review orders submitted by the camp canteens.
- e. Purchase and ship canteen supplies to the camps.
- f. Establish prices and print approved price list.
- g. Approve items to be sold in CIDG canteens.
- h. Report to respective commanders on operation of canteens.

RULES (U)

1. All canteens must post the approved Corps price list.
2. The canteens will not sell on credit.
3. The canteens will not sell any item not on the approved price list.
4. The sale of any medicine is prohibited.
5. The resale of any item purchased in the canteen is prohibited.
6. Violations of the above rules will be reported to the headquarters canteen committee. For a violation of the rules, a canteen may be closed for fifteen to thirty days. Repeated violations will result in closing it permanently.
7. The CIDG canteen is a collective organization. All CIDG soldiers may benefit from it and all soldiers are responsible for its honest operation.

OPERATION (U)

1. The camp canteen committee will order supplies each month and deliver order and funds to the VNSF S-4.
2. The headquarters committee will review the order list and compare it with the camp strength report.
3. The VNSF S-4 will purchase the items and deliver them to the USASF Company C S5 warehouse.
4. The USASF S-5 will have the items palletized and arrange for their shipment to the camps.

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF CIDG CANTEENS (CONT'D)

5.. To insure delivery, one VNSF or USASF will accompany each shipment to the camp and obtain a receipt for the supplies delivered.

6.. Based on the purchase price of the items, the headquarters committee will determine the sale prices, print the approved price list, and distribute it to the camp canteen.

7.. The canteen profits will be used to pay the civilian employees and establish an operations fund. Any additional profits will be used for projects beneficial to the CIDG.

APPROVED ITEMS (U)

The items that may be sold in the canteens are:

CIGARETTES (Ruby Queen and Bastos) not to exceed 25 packs per man per month.

BEER (San Miguel Beer in cans) not to exceed 10 cans per man per month.

SODA POP (preferably in cans) not to exceed 10 cans per man per month.

The following items are not rationed.

MATCHES
CANDY
WASHCLOTH
TOWEL
SOAP
TOOTHBRUSH
CANDLES
SANDALS
STATIONARY

APPROVED.

BANG KE KHAI GIA CAC MON HANG CUA CAU LAC BO

LIST OF ITEMS SOLD IN THE CLUB

APPROVED PX PRICE LIST			
MON HAN	ITEM	GIA TIEN	SO LUONG
		COST	QUANTITY
RUBY CIGARETTES	~ RUBY	35,00	1 Goi (1 pack)
BASTOS CIGARETTES	~ BASTOS	18,00	1 goi "
BEER	~ BIERE	50,00	1 Chai (1 bottle)
ORANGE	~ CAM	30,00	1 Chai
SUGAR	~ DUONG	40,00	1 kilo (1 kilo)
CONDENSED MILK	~ SUA	45,00	1 lon (1 can)
FISH SAUCE	~ MAM	70,00	1 lit (1 litre)
SOY SAUCE	~ XI DAU	30,00	1 chai (1 bottle)
GREEN BEAN	~ DAU XANH	120,00	1 kilo (1 kilo)
COOKIES	~ BANH	100,00	1 kilo (1 kilo)
CANDIES	~ KEO	100,00	1 kilo (1 kilo)
SHOWER SHOES	~ DEP NHAT	60,00	1 doi (1 pair)
PENCIL	~ BUT CHI	7,00	1 cay (1 each)
RUM	~ RHUM	98,00	1 lit (1 litre)
COFFEE	~ CAFE	200,00	1 kilo (1 kilo)

DANANG ngay 16 thang 10 nam 1967
DANANG, DATED 16 October 1967

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CIVIC ACTION SUCCESSES

1. (U) A-333, Chi Linh, 20 August 1967

Shortly after the establishment of the CIDG dependent housing area, the Special Forces Detachment at Camp Chi Linh purchased and distributed rice and sweet corn seed to the villagers. They were encouraged to plant small plots next to their dwellings. This modest initial effort proved to be so successful that the people began cultivating entire fields. Late this month the first crop will be ready for harvest and the area surrounding Camp Chi Linh will be well on its way to becoming a productive region once again. With the USASF camp providing local security and medical and material assistance as needed, the program has been enlarged to include the civilians, who are returning now to the area which the Viet Cong had once forced them to leave. With the continued efforts of the Special Forces Detachment to assist and advise these people, the re-establishment of villages and hamlets in this area can be foreseen.

2. (U) B-34, Phuoc Binh District, 24 July 1967

During the past three months, vegetable seeds were distributed to the hamlets in Phuoc Binh District. The seeds have matured into plants and the plants are doing fine. The significance of the project is that the people have shown a great interest in improving and supplementing their diet. The people have taken great pride in their gardens and they are in fine shape. Within the next few months the vegetables will be ready for harvest and should be on their dinner tables.

3. (U) A-351, Hiep Hoa, 15 August 1967

The Hiep Hoa market place was once a very muddy and quite unsanitary place due to the heavy rains turning the market place floor into a thick black mud. Through the cooperation of the United States Special Forces, the Office of Civil Operations, the District Chief of Duc Hue District and the Village Council of Hiep Hoa Village, a shelter with a concrete floor has been constructed in the market place. The shelter will provide the people who use the market a place to sell their goods, a place where they can be out of the weather and their goods will be off the mud on a floor that is clean and dry. This shelter is a very good beginning in the campaign to "clean up" the market place. The second part of this story is about the road leading to the market place. The road is heavily used by buses, carts and taxis. The road had many large ruts and potholes in it that impaired travel on this road. On rainy days the buses are unable to travel on the road and the passengers, most of whom were going to the market place, had to walk and carry their goods. The road was repaired by filling in the ruts and potholes and then graded so that a crown existed to let the water run off. The important aspect of these projects, other than their completion, is that they were accomplished with a minimum of United States help. Local civilians aided the workers on both projects. The projects were completed with Vietnamese labor and equipment, and this is a big step forward in this area toward convincing the District and Village leaders to rely more on the Government of Vietnam and less on United States aid.

Incl 8 to 5th SFCA ORLL, 1 Aug - 31 Oct. 67

CIVIC ACTION SUCCESSES (CONT'D)

4. (U) A-101, Gia Vuc, 13 September 1967

In early June, 912 Hre Montagnards were moved from Viet Cong controlled territory to the secure area near the Special Forces camp at Gia Vuc. Due to the remoteness of the Gia Vuc camp--the District Chief in Ba To, which is isolated itself, seldom visits Gia Vuc on the border of the province. The lack of GVN officials, and activities in other parts of I Corps, little attention could be given to the refugees. Everything has had to be done by Special Forces, the CIDG, and most important, the refugees themselves. There is a Truong Son team in Gia Vuc which was inactive at the time of the refugees arrival. After being motivated by proving that they could get support for projects if they would work and warning them that a report would be sent to province recommending their pay be discontinued if they didn't, the team is now active. The man most responsible for coordinating support from government agencies and Company C in Danang is 1LT Warren R. Orr, CA/PO officer of Det A-103. The first requirement was to provide the immediate necessities--food and clothing--for the newly arrived refugees. A total of 48,595 pounds of CA supplies were shipped from Danang in June. This was followed by 13,503 pounds in July and 31,675 pounds in August. The refugees were allowed to return to their original homesites accompanied by security forces to bring in the large quantities of rice that they had stored. To build temporary storage bins in Gia Vuc, 110 rolls of rattan and 400 feet of three-foot wide screen were sent from Danang. The temporary bins consisted of a cylinder of rattan or screen three feet in diameter. Approximately 250 cylinders were made and stored in the village dispensary, village chief's house, and school. Rather than live in the tin-roof communal dwellings typical of refugee camps in Vietnam, the Montagnards preferred to build individual houses on stilts, a design they are accustomed to. Bamboo and thatch were purchased by Special Forces from local villagers using salt and rice as a barter item. Rattan and resettlers kits were shipped from Danang. The refugees began construction on 15 June and to date have completed 163 homes. The Hre work in teams of ten to twenty men to erect a house in a single day. While the men put up the framework, their wives tie the bundles of thatch for the roofing. The rapid rate of construction is slowed by the fact that on the day following the completion of each house, the workers do nothing but admire their accomplishment and celebrate. Nevertheless, in addition to completing their homes, the refugees have also helped repair a bridge and refurbish a school. One of the major problems now is to obtain textbooks and secure a GVN-recognized teacher who will instruct the Montagnard children. The refugees are presently receiving commodities support under the Catholic Relief Service program and will receive enough rice to satisfy thirty percent of their total rice needs under a new CARE rice assistance program. Support from CORDS in Quang Ngai Province has been infrequent and irregular. Self-sufficiency is the ultimate aim and a demonstration farm project is being planned with AGR/ CORDS and SCHA (Highland Affairs)/CORDS. All this was not accomplished without numerous threats to the refugees, especially prior to the national elections, that their new homes would be mortared or burned. None of the threats have materialized as yet. One unfortunate incident did occur at election time. After a PSYOPS campaign encouraging the people to vote, the detachment reported that no ballot box was sent to Gia Vuc, therefore no voting could take place.

PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF TRA BONG SAWMILL

1.(U) After four months of operation, it is possible to make an evaluation of the progress of the Tra Bong sawmill and some of the problems that must be solved to insure its continued operation. Mr. Jay H. Cravens, Chief of the Forestry Branch/CORDS/Saigon returned to Tra Bong on 17 August for a follow-up evaluation.

2.(U) Mr. Cravens reported on 1 September that although the sawmill was operable and in good condition, it was shut down due to a lack of money to pay the mill operators and loggers. A load of lumber delivered to the Quang Ngai Province Chief by armed convoy had never been paid for while marketing and transportation difficulties were holding up lumber sales. Urgently needed operating capital was unavailable. Tin roofing sheets and cement to complete construction of a shed for the mill, promised three months ago by CORDS/Quang Ngai Province, were never delivered. Members of the cooperative had completed the framework of the shed. The loggers also needed a trailer to ease the task of bringing heavy logs down to the mill.

3.(U) Captain Jenkins, the Company C S5, discussed these problems with Mr. Cravens at Tra Bong and the following steps have been taken:

a. Despite Mr. Cravens' appeal to CORDS officials in Quang Ngai, by 1 September, the tin and cement had not arrived in Tra Bong. We have subsequently sent the materials from Danang. Additional tin will be sent to construct covered drying racks.

b. The lightweight log trailer which was designed by the forestry branch and built by the Danang Technical School was completed on 17 August and picked up the following day. Due to a lack of aircraft, it was not delivered to Tra Bong until 9 September.

c. Subsequent to the conversation with Mr. Cravens, an order for \$70,000VN worth of lumber was placed by the S5. This lumber was backloaded on the Caribou which brought the cement, tin, and log trailer, and delivered to Minh Long for the construction of two schools. The order was paid for on 16 September.

d. The S5 will continue to place orders as needed for CA projects. Payments will be made in piastres and gasoline ensuring the sawmill of an adequate supply of fuel.

4.(U) Based upon a regular production capacity of 1,200 board feet a day or approximately sixty cubic meters a month, the sawmill needs about \$600,000VN worth of sales monthly to maintain production. Local requirements do not exceed \$30,000VN worth a month and we are buying about \$70,000VN worth. Another half million is needed.

5.(U) The S5 is making an effort to publicize the sawmill and attract customers. The US Marines have placed a tentative order for 150,000 board feet for the construction of bunkers for their rubber fuel tanks. This would keep

PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF TRA BONG SAWMILL (CONT'D)

the sawmill in production for several months. The order was disapproved, however, by the USMC procurement office which quoted MACV Directive 715-2 prohibiting the purchase of lumber on the local market. The Marine project officer and the S5 have requested that an exception be made on the basis of the necessity of the bunkers, the Tra Bong price is lower than the prevailing price, and spending piastres in Tra Bong which is isolated and where the sawmill is the sole source of employment will improve the economy of the area while not greatly adding to inflation in Vietnam.

6.(U) The Company C S5 has assumed the role of unofficial agent for the sawmill in Danang. He will continue his campaign to publicize the sawmill, secure orders and convert them to cubic meters in order to give cost estimates, and send confirmed orders to Tra Bong.

7.(U) Transportation of the cut lumber will continue to be a problem. There are two methods open. The first is armed convoy to Quang Ngai. Two convoys have reached Tra Bong already and have carried back lumber. This method is preferable to air transport and certainly closer to a normal economy, however, the necessary troops and coordination to secure the route may be considered too costly to effect frequent operations of this type. The second method is to backload all Caribous arriving at Tra Bong with supplies. A banding machine has already been sent and a ramp with rollers should be designed to facilitate the loading of the larger size cuts. The major objection of the pilots is not the cargo, but the amount of time lost in loading, which cuts down the number of sorties.

8.(U) It is strongly recommended that action be taken to except the Tra Bong sawmill from the restrictions established in MACV Direction Number 715-2 "Procurement", Restricted Purchase of Commodities in RVN (RGS: MACJ4-29), 8 October 1966. The exception which would require the approval of the MACV General Purchasing Agency Council could be justified on the following basis:

a. The Tra Bong sawmill was established by CORDS/Region I as a project to develop the economy of the area.

b. The Tra Bong sawmill cooperative was formed with the assistance of Mr. Archie Hogan, the cooperative's advisor, CORDS/Region I. It consists of 110 members who share the profits and employs a total of 800 workers and loggers, half of whom are Montagnards.

c. The majority of the cooperative members and employees are refugees who cannot return to their land. The sawmill is their sole source of income.

d. The price charged by the sawmill in Tra Bong is lower than the prevailing prices in I Corps.

e. The convenience and savings offered by purchasing lumber in Tra Bong as opposed to shipping it from the Philippines or the United States are obvious.

PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS OF TRA BONG SAWMILL (CONT'D)

f. The introduction of this sawmill is an experiment based upon the proposition that a lumber industry could become a major contributor to the economy of Vietnam.

g. Based upon the above considerations, it is felt that the advantages to the Free World Military Armed Forces as well as local economic development outweigh the remote inflationary threat to the Vietnamese economy.

9. (U) Any comments or inquiries regarding information contained in this report should be directed to: Commanding Officer, Company C, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, APO US Forces 96337, ATTN: S5.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT OF 165TH NVA REGIMENT ATTACK ON TONG LE CHON 7 AUGUST 1967 (U)

1. (C) General

a. Camp Mission.

- (1) To aid, advise, support and assist the VNSF (LLDB).
- (2) To conduct border surveillance.
- (3) To organize, equip and train the CIDG forces.
- (4) To establish bases to interdict VC routes of communication.
- (5) To conduct special operations as directed by higher headquarters.
- (6) To conduct operations based on known intelligence.

b. Camp Location: XT 622812.

c. Major Infiltration Routes: See Incl 1. It appears that trails A, Al, and B were most heavily used.

d. Significant Terrain Features: See Incl 1. Natural vegetation and hours of darkness both provided excellent concealment. Foxholes along trail Al did not have overhead cover, but bunkers built close to the camp had good overhead cover.

e. Weather: Weather was clear, visibility good, and temperature 78° F.

f. Attitude of Local Populace: The camp is isolated, with no civilian populace in the surrounding area.

g. Other: None

2. (C) Friendly Situation Prior to Attack

a. Disposition of Patrols and Local Security: No patrols were out at the time of attack. An operation had closed at 062030, and another was scheduled to depart 070500. Local security measures were the below listed ambushes and LP's:

- (1) Ambushes (Incl 2): XT 614822, XT 636816
- (2) Listening Posts (Incl 2): XT 617784, XT 657802, XT 623806.

GROUP - 4 DOWNGRADED AT
3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASS-
IFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

Incl 10 to 5th SFGA ORLL, 1 Aug 67, 31 Oct 67

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After Action Report of 165th NVA Regiment Attack on Tong Le Chon 7 August 1967 (U)

b. Early Warning Device: Trip flares were placed in the wire barriers, but did not give early warning as mortar rounds, small arms fire opened the attack.

c. Status of Camp Defensive Positions: See Incl 4. CIDG personnel live on the outer perimeter, and maintain constant OP/LP's on the outer wall. These OP/LP's are checked by USSF/LLDB at least once every two hours.

d. Intelligence Reports of Impending Attacks. Though the 165th Regiment was located between Tong Le Chon and Prek Kloc, and SPAR Reports verified the presence of a large unit in their estimated location, there was no indication that the 165th intended to attack Tong Le Chon. The indications were that Hon Quan, Quan Loi, and Tan Hung (1/9) were to be attacked again (as on 11 July 1967), but this time by more than one regiment. The 101st was thought to be in War Zone C. The 141st was reported to be moving Northwest from its previous location vic XT 9587 (after 11 July 1967 attacks on Tan Hung), but believed to be waiting in Northeast An Loc for another attack in An Loc District. Tong Le Chon was always considered vulnerable to attack and a choice target, being astride one of the enemy's major infiltration routes (Route 900), but due to the heavy troop build-up in An Loc, Loc Ninh and upper Chon Thanh Districts, the primary objective was believed to be in An Loc with a diversionary attack on either Tong Le Chon or Chi Linh. The VC tended to confirm this theory with excessive vaunting of their future attacks on Hon Quan and Quan Loi. Battalion size and occasional regimental size sightings in central, east, and southeast An Loc District tended to confirm this theory. It is possible that the heavy and effective H&I program by both ARVN and US units in An Loc District, and which reportedly caused the enemy many casualties and hindered their massing, encouraged their commanders to try for another, less lucrative, target outside An Loc District. It is known the enemy was looking for a significant victory prior to the 3 September 1967 election, for propaganda exploitation. A POW from the 141st Regiment stated that his unit attacked Tan Hung 11 July 1967 without making adequate reconnaissance because a "quick" victory was desired. For a listing of enemy unit movements from 7 July - 7 Aug 67, See Incl 1.

e. Previous Combat Support Requests.

(1) Airstrikes on suspected targets: 5 strikes on targets in the Southern portion of Tong Le Chon TAOR the week prior to the attack on the camp were requested and 4 were flown. Combat operations from Tong Le Chon during the same week received 3 immediate TAC airstrikes.

(2) Artillery H&I fires: H&I missions are fired nightly by 105mm Howitzers at Tong Le Chon and by 175mm cannons at Quan Loi. The 175mm cannons fired approximately twenty concentrations in the Tong Le Chon TAOR the evening of 06 August prior to the attack. It is not known how many H&I concentrations were fired by the ARVN 105mm Howitzer platoon at Tong Le Chon.

(3) Combat Sky Spot: 15 pre-planned missions were requested and flown in Tong Le Chon TAOR the week prior to the attack.

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(4) Red Haze: No missions were requested.

(5) Aerial reconnaissance: FAC/ALOFT aircraft (Air Force and Army) based at Hon Quan (Det B-33) fly daily VR missions over Tong Le Chon TAOR. No significant sightings were made prior to the attack.

(6) B-52 strikes: One strike was requested in Tong Le Chon TAOR the month prior to the attack, but it was not flown.

f. Status of camp logistics: There were no shortages of critical items (ammunition, weapons, rations, communications) at the time of the attack.

g. Troop morale and discipline: Tong Le Chon has had a history, since construction began in March 1967, of high AWOL and desertion rates. Morale has always been poor, because of the camp's isolation, the lack of recreational facilities, uncomfortable living conditions, and camp construction labor requirements. Discipline was almost non-existent.

h. Absenteeism among civilian employees. Both interpreters and skilled construction foremen were obtained only by the offer of premium wages, and usually quit there jobs after a few days to a couple of weeks on-the-job. Reasons are the same as reflected for troop morale and discipline.

i. Other significant situations: Tong Le Chon had only 61 CIDG (in two CRP) assigned to the camp. The other forces on site were TDY from other camps/locations for 20-30 day periods.

3. (C) Narrative description of attack.

a. Description of combat activities during attack of camp: On 070019 Aug, Camp Tong Le Chon began receiving 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds just outside of the Southern wire perimeter, vic XT 623805. Information of Tong Le Chon's mortar attack was immediately passed to Co A, Bien Hoa, SA 5th Div at Lam Son and 3rd Bde, 1st US Inf Div at Quan Loi. At 070023, counter mortar and counter artillery fires from Tong Le Chon's 60mm, 82mm and 105mm Howitzers and Quan Loi's 175mm cannons were initiated. At 070039 VC mortar fire increased, and small arms fire was received at the Southeast portion of the camp. At 070040 the following support had been dispatched in support of Camp Tong Le Chon: 1 flare ship (5th Div), 1 FAC (5th Div) 1 flare ship (US 1st Div), 1 FAC (US 1st Div), 2 light fire teams (US 1st Div), and TAC Air.

b. At 070050 an estimated reinforced VC company began firing 60mm and 82mm mortars, small arms, 40mm anti-tank rockets, and 75mm recoilless rifles at the city of Hon Quan (XT 753891), location of Det B-33, apparently as a diversion. The VC increased the intensity of the mortar and small arms to the Southeast of the camp perimeter. Moving under the cover of this increased fire support, the VC breached the wire on the Southeastern portion of Tong Le Chon's perimeter by employing wire cutting squads with very large (US) type wire cutters. Sapper squads followed with bangalore

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torpedoes and satchel charges. These elements were then followed by infantry. The Sapper squads marked the breaches in the wire by tying white rags to both sides of the breach. At 070105 a light fire team from the 3rd Bde (Quan Loi) and an additional FAC (Quan Loi) arrived on station. The artillery shifted fires to the North while the light fire team began firing at VC troop concentrations on the Southeast portion of the camp perimeter. At 070111 a second light fire team began to work the Southeastern perimeter of the camp. At 070122 82mm mortar rounds began falling on the inner perimeter of the compound. The supply tent received a direct hit, starting a fire, whose smoke forced abandonment of the adjacent commo bunker. The mortar and small arms fire continued to increase as the VC penetrated the Southeast portion of the camp at 0157. By 070207 the Mike Force (2 plats) counterattacked on converging axes and expelled the VC from the camp by close combat before the VC could take advantage of the penetration by committing reserves located to the West (suspected location) and Southwest of the camp. See Incl 2 and 4. Reserve commitment was intended as indicated by trail markers leading from the Reserve Assembly Area to the breaches in the wire and the outer perimeter wall of the camp. It is believed that the untimely explosion of the 4.2 in. mortar ammo storage area at the time of the counterattack greatly assisted the counterattack force to contain the penetration (50 percent of the 46 VC bodies found within the area of the penetration were dismembered).

c. Even through small arms fire had diminished by this time, the enemy mortars continued to harass the camp defenders until 070222 when small arms fire began again at the Southern portion of the camp. At 070311, even with the increase of airstrikes to the South and East of the camp, the VC assaulted the South and East walls of the camp. Heavy automatic weapons fire from camp defenders and several extremely effective airstrikes stopped the VC assault by 070358. At 070411 the VC again attacked the Southeast wall. One (1) VC squad occupied a conex bunker on the outer perimeter until all but two were killed at 070535. The two, badly wounded, were CIA, and later evacuated to Hon Quan.

d. During the above period Hon Quan received a total of 44 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar. Final mortar attack on Hon Quan was finished by 070455. Medevacs from 3rd Bde began at 070820. A MILPHAP medical assistance team consisting of one (1) doctor and three (3) Air Force medics, and one (1) USSF medic, arrived to assist in treating, collecting, sorting and evacuating the casualties. At 070948 VC small arms fire was received from the West. The VC were silenced by an airstrike and a light fire team. By 071010 the casualties had been evacuated to Bien Hoa. At 071550 the US 1st Bn, 2nd Inf had closed at Tong Le Chon and at 071401 the two (2) Mike Force companies from Nha Trang closed at Tong Le Chon. By 071445 the two (2) Mike Force companies from Bien Hoa closed into Hon Quan and began preparation for operations in the Tong Le Chon TAOR.

e. Enemy Highlights.

(1) Main Force: The enemy is believed to have attacked in regimental strength. The 165th NVA Regiment was believed to have had 1,850 men as of 14 July

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1967. A POW of dubious veracity, stated that one battalion attacked from the Northwest, one from the Southeast and one from the West (Camp Tong Le Chon was surrounded with the major attack from the South). It is believed that another regiment (unidentified) was in reserve to the West and Southwest of camp, but was never committed, instead being used for evacuation of casualties suffered by the attacking 165th NVA Regiment.

(2) Weapons: The 165th is armed with the usual TOE NVA Regiment small arms and crew served weapons, including the B-40 rocket launcher. A Mike Force operation to the East-Northeast of Tong Le Chon on 08 August 1967 is believed to have heard three (3) 120mm mortars firing one round each at Tong Le Chon. They later found the mortar positions. There is no record in our OB of 120mm mortars being organic to CT7 or the 165th NVA Regiment. It is not known if these mortars were fired during the 7 August 1967 attack.

(3) Tactics: The only significant tactic noted was that squad size sapper units and wire cutter teams were in the forefront of the assault. The enemy also appeared to be interested in CIDG prisoners. During one penetration, at least 7 (and an estimated 20) were observed being led away from the South wall. They interrogated the prisoners, and then killed them about 20 hours later (source was escaped CIDG).

(4) Locations of indirect fire weapons: See Incl 2 for only known locations of crew served weapons discovered 07-08 August 1967.

(5) Withdrawal routes: Trails A1 and B are suspected withdrawal routes (Incl 1). FAC reported seeing a squad sized unit going North on trail A1 on 08 August. One (1) VC CIA stated his unit planned to withdraw to the South (possibly trail B), and the CIDG who later escaped, stated he was led Southwest and then Northeast (possibly using trail A1).

f. Camp Response.

(1) Discipline and morale of troops in heavy contact: An estimated twenty (20) CIDG from the Minh Thanh company were believed to have surrendered when the NVA penetrated the outer wall. The Loc Ninh Company held its positions as best it could. Mike Force units had no discipline problems at all.

(2) Locations of key personnel (See Incl 4).

(a) USASF: The Det CO was initially in the SF Commo Bunker, moving to the LLDB Commo Bunker and the Medical Bunker when the SF Commo Bunker could not remain occupied due to smoke. He was often outside of these positions supervising resupply of ammunition and directing airstrikes. The Det XO was wherever his presence was needed, and was particularly active in directing artillery fire and airstrikes. He led the Mike Force counterattack along with a Mike Force advisor. Four

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(4) other SF were primarily occupied with firing the two (2) 81mm mortars in the inner perimeter. The Intel Sgt accompanied the CO, acting as radio operator and messenger. The medics were in the medical bunker, and the Heavy Wpns Spec saw to it that 81mm mortar and small arms ammunition resupply was being conducted. The Ops Sgt supervised mortar and small arms ammunition resupply in addition to firing the 50 cal HMG.

(b) LLDB: The LLDB Team Sgt was everywhere, heroically active. He positioned himself at points of greatest threat, returned with reports to the LLDB Camp Commander, carried ammunition to the outer perimeter, removed CIDG wounded from the outer perimeter, etc. The remainder of the LLDB remained in the inner perimeter, and took relatively no positive action to contribute to the camp defense until approximately 070300. At this time, two (2) LLDB assisted the USSF in firing the 81mm mortars. The RTO did send CW steadily, but apparently was not received. The LLDB Camp Commander remained with the Det CO a majority of the time.

(c) CIDG: The Minh Thanh Company Commander was killed in his company's positions. The Loc Ninh Company Commander was observed at both the outer perimeter with his company and in the inner perimeter with the LLDB. Mike Force commanders remained with their companies.

(3) Contingency plans in effect.

(a) Alert Plans: These proved effective.

(b) Counterattack Plans: Least heavily engaged troops would counterattack threatened positions on order. This proved effective.

(c) Destruction Plans: These plans were not used.

(4) Effectiveness of communications:

(a) Internal: Good communications (AN/PRC-25) and liaison existed between Mike Force units and the USASF Detachment Commander. Although HT-1's were in the hands of both Minh Thanh and Loc Ninh companies and the LLDB, they were not used, with communications depending on personal liaison and observation of the situation from atop the berm of the inner perimeter.

(b) External: Communications was strictly by FM voice from A-334 to B-33. After evacuating the commo bunker, this communications was spotty and difficult to receive. CO A-334 encountered great difficulties in operating one (1) FM net with Det B-33 and supporting artillery while having to communicate with support 1st Div Commanders and with air support on another frequency.

(5) Request for support - and response to - by higher headquarters: Requests were promptly made and support promptly received, with the exception noted below.

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(a) Flareships: Flareships usually arrive on the scene in 20 - 30 minutes. For some reason, it took almost 40 minutes for the first flare-ship to arrive on-station. The second flareship took its directions from TACAIR support aircraft, rather than from the USAF FAC coordinating air support, thereby rendering his support inadequate for approximately 40 minutes since he dropped his flares from too great a height.

(b) TACAIR and Artillery Support: Outstanding, with the only problem area being the communications difficulties previously mentioned.

(c) Reaction Forces: No difficulties at "A" or "B" Detach-ment level. The arrival and subsequent employment of Mike Force units from Company "A" Bien Hoa and SFOB Nha Trang was both timely and effective (Mike Force SFOB arrived 071401; Mike Force Bien Hoa arrived 071445).

(d) Logistical Support: Outstanding, especially considering that Company "A" worked with very little knowledge of the logistical situation at Tong Le Chon between 070600 and 071430. SOP emergency resupply items (ammunition, food, water, medical supplies and communications equipment) arrived at Tong Le Chon at 070930. The insecurity of the airstrip coupled with the mop-up action on the Southern slopes of the camp precluded earlier arrival of resupply aircraft (C7A).

(e) Medical Evacuation: The medical assistance team from Hon Quan arrived via medevac chopper. At the time, there were many casualties pre-positioned at the South end of the airstrip, as well as many walking wounded milling about. These had all received first aid and were bandaged in the camp by the Det A-334 medics. As each medevac chopper arrived, the most seriously wounded litter patients were loaded and the remaining space was used for as many patients as possible who could sit up. Evacuation of all patients was essential-ly completed by 1030 hours. The biggest problem that emerged was that quite a few soldiers (CIDG & Mike Force) who had received either very superficial, non-dis-abling wounds or no injury at all tried to sneak onto the medevac choppers. Quite often they had placed bandages over areas of their bodies which had no wounds in an attempt to deceive the medics. As a result it was necessary to temporarily remove all dressings from the wounded in order to prevent desertions. At times, it was necessary to forcibly evict malingeringers from the medevac air-craft. All in all, the casualties were handled very efficiently, with an espe-cially fine job being done by SSG Morganfield, the Det A-334 medic. As for the problem of malingeringers, it is mainly one of discipline and crowd control. In the future, after each patient is examined by a medic, he should be placed in an iso-lated area near the pick-up point, and no one but bona fide patients and auth-ORIZED personnel should be allowed in that area. Of course, under extreme duress, as was the case at Tong Le Chon, this may not always be possible.

(6) Reporting Procedures: Reporting SOP's were in being and un-derstood, but they were not followed due to the readily understandable inability

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of the "A" Detachment members to both carry out urgent tasks and concurrently obtain and correlate statistics required by these reports.

4. (C) Enemy Withdrawal

a. Pursuit of enemy: A heliborne assault to be conducted by Mike Force units from Bien Hoa was scheduled for 071630 but negated due to the non-concurrence of the plan by the US Div elements deployed to Tong Le Chon earlier that morning. It was scheduled for 080900 but due to bad weather and unavailability of helicopters, the operation was finally cancelled. Sweep operations in the vicinity of the camp on 7 and 8 August did find both NVA and CIDG bodies, weapons, equipment, documents, etc.

b. Actions of covering force: No information available, other than a statement by one NVA CIA that another unit was used to evacuate NVA casualties.

c. Effect of friendly reactionary forces, tactical air, and artillery on enemy withdrawal: Unknown, although it can be assumed that TACAIR and artillery hastened the withdrawal, and caused casualties.

d. Routes of withdrawal, pre-selected assembly areas, way stations, medical facilities, weapons positions: See Incl 1. Patrols subsequent to the attack also discovered the following positions (See Incl 2):

- (1) XT 617805: Four (4) 82mm mortar positions.
- (2) XT 615809: Four (4) 82mm mortar positions.,
- (3) XT 619811: Two (2) 75mm RR positions.,
- (4) XT 622808: Suspected CP location, due to abundance of WD-L wire in area.
- (5) XT 6080: Hasty trench system capable of protecting two or more companies.

e. Disposition of enemy dead and wounded: One NVA CIA stated that he was part of a thirty-man unit charged with evacuating wounded to the Long Nguyen Secret Zone near the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Elements of a regiment other than the 165th NVA Regiment are also believed to have evacuated dead and wounded. No NVA graves were subsequently found, although many bodies were found in the open. Bodies found by CIDG after the attack were buried with quicklime or burned, and the NVA CIA were evacuated through channels.

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5. Results:

a. Friendly.

(1) Casualties

	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PFD</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USASF	A-334	10	0	3	0	
	A-302	3	0	0	0	
Nha Trang Mike Force:		4	0	4	0	Arr TLC 071401
	<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	

LLDB:	A-167	10	1	1	0	
	W/A-302	1	0	0	0	KIA 070830
	<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	

ARVN Arty Plat:		31	0	0	0	
CIDG: TLC CRP #1:		22	0	0	0	
TLC CRP #2:		29	1	4	0	
Loc Ninh Company:	66	2	13	3		
Minh Thanh Company:	76	15	20	10	One CIA Rtn	110830
	<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>13</u>	

Bien Hoa Mike Force:	326	7	42	1	
Nha Trang Mike Force:	247	0	7	0	
	<u>573</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>1</u>	

(2) Weapons and equipment: lost, damaged, destroyed or captured.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u> <u>LOST</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u> <u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u> <u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Mortar, 4.2"	0	0	2	2
Mortar, 82mm (Tubes)	0	2	0	2
* Mortar, 60mm	0	2	6	8
Recoilless Rifle, 57mm	0	0	1	1

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After Action Report of 165th NVA Regiment Attack on Tong Le Chon 7 August 1967 (U)

Grenade Launcher, M-79	2	0	1	3
MG Cal 50	0	1	0	1
LMG Cal 30	0	4	0	4
Shotgun, 12 Guage	0	2	0	2
SMG, M-3	0	1	0	1
Rifle, Cal 30, M-1	6	0	0	6
BAR	0	0	4	4
Carbine, M-1	7	0	9	16
Carbine, M-2	16	0	2	18
Rifle, M-16 (USSF)	0	1	0	1
Pistol, Cal 45	2	0	0	2
* Dehumidifier	0	0	2	2
Brick Machine	0	0	1	1
* Tent, GP	0	0	1	1
Antenna, RC-292	0	0	4	4
Water Trailer	0	0	1	1
* Rations, PIR	0	0	136 Cases	136 Cases
* Web Gear, complete	0	0	190 Sets	190 Sets
* Boots, Bata	0	0	900 Pr	900 Pr
* Trousers, Asiatic Jungle	0	0	200 Ea	200 Ea
* Shirts, Asiatic Jungle	0	0	30 Ea	30 Ea
* Tool, Entrenching	0	0	8 Cases	8 Cases
* Tin	0	0	400 Sheets	400 Sheets
* Flashlights	0	0	10 Ea	10 Ea
Radio HT-1	0	2	0	2
Heater, Immersion	0	0	2	2
Mogas	0	0	35 Barrels	35 Barrels
Generator, 5 KW	0	1	0	1
Radio, FRC-9	0	1	0	1
Freezer	0	1	0	1
Refrigerator	0	1	0	1
Radiator, Truck M35A2	0	1	0	1
Truck, 1/4 ton, M151	0	1	0	1
* Water Pump	0	0	2	2

* Items stored in supply tent which was destroyed by fire.

(3) Installation defense positions and facilities damaged or destroyed.

FACILITIES/DEFENSES

PERCENTAGE OF DESTRUCTION

4.2 IN MORTAR POSITION (2 ea) and ammunition storage bunker	100%
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After Action Report of 165th NVA Regiment Attack on Tong Le Chon 7 August 1967 (U)

Conex bunkers on South and Southeast portion of outer perimeter (sand bag reinf torn; conexes perforated with small arms fire)	75%
Wire barriers on South and Southeast portion (2 large breaches)	40%
Supply Room Tent	100% (Destroyed by Fire)
POL Storage Area	100% (Destroyed by Fire)
CIDG Mess/Club	50%
Commo Bunker (TOC)	10%
Generator Shed	20%

b. Enemy.

(1) Casualties: 152 (USBC) KIA and two (2) CIA. The KIA figure also includes one of the CIA that died of wounds shortly after capture.

(2) Weapons and equipment captured.

Type	Quantity
Russian 7.62mm AK-47 (Chicom 7.62 assault type 56)	24
Russian 7.62 Carbine SKS (Chicom 7.62 Carbine Type 56)	7
Russian 7.62 Heavy MG SMG (Chicom 7.62 MG Type 52)	2
Russian 7.62 LMG RP-46 (Chicom 7.62 LMG type 58)	1
Russian 7.62 LMG RPD (Chicom 7.62 LMG type 56)	6
Russian 12.7mm Heavy MG DSHK 38 (Chicom 12.7 Heavy type 54)	2
Russian Launcher RPG-2 (Chicom Anti-Tank Launcher type 56)	4

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After Action Report of 165th NVA Regiment Attack on Tong Le Chon 7 August 1967 (U)

Russian RPG-7	1
US M-1 Rifle	2
75mm Recoiless Rifle w/Russian Sights	1

(3) Captured Documents: Miscellaneous documents, a flag bearing the number "564" (no O3 record) and personal items identifying bearers as members of the 165th NVA Regiment were evacuated to Co A S2.

(4) Other: None.

(5) Remarks: None.

6. (U) Lessons Learned: (See section 2 of ORLL, Commander's Observations and Recommendations)

RONNIE A. MENDOZA
MAJ INF
Commanding

10-12

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Location of Enemy Units

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOURCE/EVAL</u>
8 Jul	1	165th NVA Inf Regt.	Unloc War Zone C	II FFORCEV
8 Jul	2	141st NVA Inf Regt.	XT 3885	Rallior (II FForceV)E/2
8 Jul	3	101st NVA Inf Regt.	XT 3976	II FForceV B/2
11 Jul	4	141st NVA Inf Regt.	XT 855 880	II FF OB Summary B/3
12 Jul	5	141st NVA Inf Regt.	XT 667 873	B-33 Source F/3
18 Jul	6	141st NVA Inf Regt.	XT 9096	II FFORCEV B/3
30 Jul	7	7th NVA Div. HQTS	XT 6298	Company "A" OB
30 Jul	8	165th NVA Inf Regt.	FISHHOOK AREA	Company "A" OB
30 Jul	9	141st NVA Inf Regt.	XT 8996	Company "A" OB
8 Aug	10	141st NVA Inf Rgct.	XT 8487	Various Source II FFORCEV C/3

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Enemy Contacts between 071200 Jul and 071915 Aug 67

1. 071200 - 081200 Jul, Opn China Boy 1/7 made contacts with small VC unit XT 577837. Friendly casualties were 1 MF slightly wounded. Enemy casualties were 3 VC KIA, 6 VC WIA.

2. 080700 Jul, Opn China Boy 1/7 made contact with one VC Squad XT 553862. After exchange of SA, VC withdrew North. Negative Friendly casualties. Enemy casualties unknown.

3. 081130 Jul, Opn China Boy 1/7 made contact with one VC platoon XT 550850. VC was moving East when VC SA fire was exchanged VC withdrew South. Negative friendly casualties. Enemy casualties 1 VC KIA.

4. 091150 Jul, Opn China Boy 1/7 made contact with 1 VC platoon XT 536838. After exchange SA fire, VC withdrew Northeast, with Mike Force in pursuit. Negative friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown.

5. 122230 Jul, 1 PF Squad made contact with est 1 VC Company at XT 787904. Friendly casualties 5 PF KIA, 5 PF WIA, 1 HT-1 Radio and 7 individual weapons were lost. Enemy casualties unknown.

6. 121000 Jul, CIDG made contact with est 1 VC Régiment XT 675862. Friendly casualties 3 CIDG KIA, 3 CIDG WIA, 3 CIDG MIA. Enemy casualties unknown.

7. 142025 Jul, a Province Recon Unit ambush made contact with 1 VC platoon XT 773886. VC fired S/A, MG and threw hand grenades. Friendly unit returned fire and VC withdrew West. Contact broken 142040. Negative friendly casualties. Unknown enemy casualties.

8. 181635 Jul, Opn Tong 2/7 made contact with est VC Platoon during body recovery mission XT 676864 contact lasted 15 minutes. Two friendly were WIA by friendly artillery.

9. 212013 Jul, China Boy 3/7 spotted 4-6 VC on trail and called in 12 rounds 105mm. Enemy withdrew North at 212016 with unknown casualties. Friendly casualties negative.

10. 231340 Jul, Opn China Boy 2/7 hit an enemy mine XT 568849. Friendly element moving in column when the friendly point squad hit an enemy mine. Friendly casualties were 1 MF KIA, 5 CIDG WIA.

11. 251600 Jul, Opn Minh 7/7 contact with 1 VC Company at XT 550645. Enemy fired S/A and friendly withdrew NE, enemy fired S/A, contact broken 251630. Friendly casualties were 1 CIDG KIA, 2 CIDG WIA, 20 CIDG MIA, 1 interpreter MIA. Enemy casualties: 1 VC KIA, 1 Carbine CIA.

12. 280945 Jul, SF Opn from A-334 made contact with est 2 VC platoons XT 566834, S/A and Artillery fired. Enemy broke contact 280950 and withdrew North. Negative friendly casualties. Enemy casualties unknown.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Enemy Contacts between 071200 and 071915 Aug 67 (Cont)

13. 311000 Jul, Opn Tong 4/7 made contact with 1 VC platoon XT 585827. VC walked into friendly ambush, after exchange of SA, VC broke contact and withdrew West. Negative friendly casualties. Unknown VC casualties.

14. 031305 Aug, China Boy made contact with one VC Co XT 565880. Friendly was moving on operation route when friendly point discovered VC base camp. S/A fire exchanged, VC broke contact and withdrew Northwest. Contact broken 031400. Friendly casualties were 1 USSF KIA, 1 MF KIA and 2 MF WIA. Enemy casualties were 11 VC KIA, CIA 5 AK-47, 2-40mm Grenade launchers, 1 Russian Rifle, 15 Anti-Tank mines, Fuses and 2,000 feet firing wire, 15-20 Grenades and documents, food, ammo and clothing destroyed in base camp by China Boy.

15. 041445 Aug, China Boy 1/8 made contact with reinforced platoon XT 583868. After exchange S/A, VC broke contact at 041516, and VC withdrew North-east. VC fired when friendly troops were 60 meters distant. Negative friendly casualties. 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA.

16. 070050 Aug, Special Forces Camp A-334 (Tong Le Chon) came under mortar, RR and SA attack. The enemy over ran part of camp. About 070730 camp was cleared. estimated friendly casualties 2 SF WIA slightly. Other friendly approx 200 WIA or KIA. VC casualties (see all this report).

17. 080115 Aug, 1/2 US Infantry Division located outside Tong Le Chon perimeter received 25 to 40 rounds of mortar fire from the West. Negative friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown.

18. 081020 Aug, South portion of Tong Le Chon received approx 20 rounds of 60mm and 82mm coming from the East. Immediate counter mortar and counter Arty plans were fired to the East vic XT 624 819. On 082045 a flare-ship from 1st US Infantry Division arrived and began firing to the East XT 624819. VC stopped firing and withdrew to the North East. 082310, China Boy 3/8 received 3 rounds of 60mm from the Northwest XT 670860, 3 rounds landed in the vic XT 670872 but negative friendly casualties. 105mm from Tong Le Chon and 175mm Quan Loi returned fire and will continue H&I both along North South trail vic XT 665864 and in support of China Boy 3/8. VC mortar fire stopped at 082315 and VC withdrew West. Unknown VC casualties. Friendly casualties negative.

19. 071915 Aug, 1/28 1st US Infantry Division located vic Minh Duc hamlet XT 715817 conducted hasty ambush. 1 VC KIA, 1 AK-47 CIA, Negative friendly casualties. 072207, 1/28 began an receiving mortar rounds. At 072240 est VC Co penetrated 1/28 perimeter. 4 VC KIA. Friendly 6 US KIA, 23 US WIA.

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Enemy Sightings between 19 Jul - 8 Aug 67

19 Jul	1 VC Battalion	XT 570570 to XT 592539
11 Jul	500 VC	XT 701838
23 Jul	100 VC	XT 602627 to XT 580630
24 Jul	100 VC	XT 664884
24 Jul	60 VC	XT 602627 to XT 580630
24 Jul	VC Company	XT 550645
24 Jul	170 VC	XT 680904
26 Jul	VC Company	XT 794537
26 Jul	150 VC	XT 740796
26 Jul	VC Battalion	XT 754805
27 Jul	400 VC	XT 720819
1 Aug	40 VC	XT 680,877
2 Aug	VC Battalion	XT 725838
3 Aug	VC Platoon	XT 585827
4 Aug	100 VC	XT 687947
7 Aug	100 VC	XT 770790
7 Aug	1 VC Battalion	XT 719928 to XT 796935
8 Aug	100 VC	XT 683864
8 Aug	500 VC	XT 660950 to XT 690950 to XT 690930 to XT 660930.
31 Jul	VC Battalion	XT 668863.

NET A-325, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ABN), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO U.S. FORCES 96225

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NNU 873541
By *DM* NAVIA, DATA

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT CPN TRAI 9/10 5 November 1967

SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF PATROL

30 CRP, 2 Companies CIDG, 3 LLDB, 3 USSF, 2 U.S.F.O. Party

MISSION OF PATROL

Heliborne assault, Search and Destroy and Night Ambush

TIME OF DEPARTURE/TIME OF RETURN

Departed: 310900/Returned 022200 (Operation Patrol Leader III)

CONDUCT OF PATROL

a. Patrol Route

XT 116697 to LZ ALPHA XT 072835 via Heliborne Assault to
XT 041822 on heading of 260 deg mag az to XT 045815 on
heading of 141 deg mag az to XT 072807 to XT 073778 to Hwy
22 on heading of 110 deg mag az, south on Hwy 22 vic
XT 096764 to TRAI BI XT 116697.

b. Terrain:

Jungle, swamp, double canopy

c. Obstacles:

Vehicular type mine field XT 098764 to XT 102753, river
XT 096763

d. Mines and Booby traps:

Claymore type mines at VC base camp (XT 040822), vehicle
type mines on road XT 098764 to XT 102753, CBU vic XT 068807.

e. Action upon encounter with enemy forces:

Lead friendly element fired upon by enemy claymore type
mines and small arms and automatic weapons fire. Friendlies
immediately returned small arms and automatic weapons fire
and attempted assault. Enemy detonated two more claymore
type mines and repulsed the assault.

ENEMY INFORMATION

a. Location:

XT 040822

b. Strength:

Estimated enemy platoon reinforced with heavy weapons (HMG's).

c. Composition:

Typical VC Infantry "G" type unit.

d. Activity:

Eating or preparing meal.

e. Equipment:

Claymore type mines, AK 47 rifles, 12.7 or 50 cal HMG.

f. Uniform:

Black pajamas with camouflage prcht cloth scarfs.

RESULTS OF ENCOUNTER WITH ENEMY.

a. Friendly Losses:

- (1) KIA: 7 (5 upon initial contact, 2 died of wounds).
- (2) WIA: 29 WIA, 1 USSF
- (3) MIA: None
- (4) Equipment: None

b. Enemy Losses:

No assessment, 5 possible KIA as reported by CRP personnel.
No USSF confirmation.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES:

a. Propaganda analysis: Negative

b. Hamlets Encountered: None

c. Change in Tactics: See Inclosure 1.

d. Suspected infiltration routes:


Trail running NE & SW vic XT 074784. Heavily traveled.
VC rubber tire type shoe foot prints very prevalent.

e. Miscellaneous: Negative

WAS MISSION ACCOMPLISHED:

No. Not to the extent of following original plan of action.
None of the objectives scheduled were reached. There was
negative assessment of the enemy base camp at XT 040822.
However, the base camp reported during operation TRAI 18/7
reported at coordinates XT 070780 was located at XT 073778.
Positive assessment was made (See Inclosure 1).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: (See Inclosure 1).


LOUIS LOPEZ JR.
Captain, Infantry
Commanding

1 Incl: as

1. At approximately 1500 hours, 31 October 1967, during Operation TRAI 10/9, as the lead personnel of the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon (CRP) approached the vicinity of coordinates XT 042822, a claymore type enemy mine was detonated. Simultaneously, small arms and automatic weapons fire was placed on the CRP causing heavy friendly casualties (4 KIA, 7 WIA, 1 USSF WIA). An immediate attempt was made to deliver a heavy volume of fire and assault the enemy, who were in a trenchline. Two more enemy claymore type mines were detonated inflicting further friendly casualties. The additional enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire, identified as AK-47 and/or 12.7mm HMG or 50 cal HMG, caused further friendly casualties. The total friendly casualties were: 29 walking wounded, 8 stretcher, 7 KIA (2 of which died of wounds during the night after contact had been broken), and 1 USSF walking wounded.

2. The report relayed back to the command element was that the CRP platoon had spotted the enemy in the act of eating or preparing a meal. A decision was made by the LLDB to enter the base camp with the CRP and attempt to gain the element of surprise and assault the enemy. Evidently, the enemy had heard the friendly unit approaching and waited for a lucrative target to get within killing range of his claymore type mine. The USSF Sergeant had been with the lead elements advising on tactical employment when the contact was suddenly initiated by the enemy. The USSF Sergeant attempted to rally one of the CIDG company lead platoons to join in the assault, as the CRP was receiving heavy casualties. Only a few of those personnel joined the battle, they themselves receiving many casualties.

3. An immediate call was attempted to higher headquarters for a FAC and gunships in order to attempt evacuation of the wounded to a PZ for MEDEVAC extraction. Initial communications attempts were negative even after placing a long antenna on the PRC-25 radios, shifting to several frequencies, and relocating the radios. Eventually, communications were established with the relay site at Nui Ba Den. The relay system caused further delay in transmitting information when the operators did not relay the information as received. The context of the messages were changed many times. Another reason given by the operator at the relay site was that he had just come on duty and was not aware of what was going on. Further problems in communications were: elements of the support not having points of origin or the latest assigned frequencies to the operational unit (as much of the communications was effected on a different channel than that assigned). Fortunately, the FAC had a base frequency ~~WAC~~ had established before the operation in order to shift him to the latest operational frequency assigned to us after the operation had commenced and insertion on the initial LZ had been completed. The friendly location had to be

(1)

Inclosure #1

Given in the clear to supporting elements after we had reached the PZ (XT 044815) for extraction of the wounded because they did not have our point of origin. Relay was continued the remainder of the night through the FAC and an artillery aerial observer, as later attempts to contact NUI BA DEN were negative. The forward observer party had similar problems in communications. There was negative direct contact with Camp TRAI BI until the unit reached vicinity coordinates XT 072 807. Several stations received information which were requested to relay to Camp TRAI BI Det A-323. Not all of the information was relayed.

4. The support rendered by the FAC was timely, however, it took about an hour and a half to receive gunship support, as they had to fly from CU CHI and refuel at TAY NINH West. Artillery fire was called in west of the contact location with plans to walk it east towards the enemy location. Checkfire had to be called on the artillery fire as the FAC had an airstrike available to deliver on the target. As I recall, they were ALE Skyraiders with ordnance in the form of 500 pound bombs. Consequently, the artillery fire which had been available from Camp TRAI BI was no longer available as the guns were displaced back to TAY NINH West. After the air strike, the FAC called in supporting artillery from TAY NINH West but was short of the area of contact by approximately 1000 meters, because of the limitations of range of the weapon.

5. The call for the MEDEVAC was to have the MEDEVAC ships on stand by until we reached a PZ due to the proximity of the enemy at the CP location. After the airstrike, the wounded and KIA were removed to the location of the CP XT 042822, where they were treated with available medical supplies. Preparations were initiated to carry the wounded and dead to the PZ at XT 044815. This was time consuming as poles had to be cut under fire and hammocks tied to them to make improvised stretchers. It was very difficult to effect organization as my counterpart was an aspirant lieutenant with no control over the CIDG whatsoever. He refused to accept most of my advice and made dangerous tactical mistakes. He did not work through CIDG leaders to control the troops. Finally, upon breaking contact with the enemy at approximately 1730 hours, we moved southeast on an azimuth of 140 degrees. The FAC was still above us and assisted in navigation. The march was slow because of the weight of the wounded and bodies and the thick jungle and swamp. The gunships arrived on target shortly after we broke contact with the enemy and delivered their ordnance. A flashlight was shone to the FAC through the canopy to indicate our progress. As darkness fell upon the column the lead company became separated from the remainder of the column. A halt was called by the LLDB aspirant. He was advised to continue

moving the column to the PZ in order to extract at least the most seriously wounded. His reply was that he would try to establish physical contact with the lead company by having them send men back with a flashlight to guide us forward. After 15 to 20 minutes, there was still no contact as the men were never sent back. I urged the counterpart to move the column forward but by then he said he couldn't get the men to move. Meanwhile, the MEDEVAC was called off and a perimeter was established where the remainder of the night was spent. The FAC left and communications was maintained through an artillery AO relay. Knowing that we had critically wounded personnel but not having personally checked each wounded individual, I was not aware of the extent of the wounds. One man had his legs severed almost completely by automatic weapons fire and also had a stomach wound. Another man had a stomach wound. Both men bled to death during the night.

6. As reported by survivors of the CRP platoon, there were five VC bodies counted. All had been armed with AK 47 or 50 assault rifles and wore parachute cloth scarves. One squad leader said he personally killed two with a hand grenade and as he attempted to capture their weapons, he was shot in the right arm. It is very probable that the five VC bodies were counted as the CRP personnel are highly reliable and the best fighting troops in Camp TRAI BI. By the time the friendly bodies and wounded personnel had been retrieved, the enemy had dragged away his casualties. Therefore, the USSF personnel could not make a confirmation of enemy killed.

7. At first light, the march continued to the PZ to conduct the MEDEVAC. The confusion and disorganization there was as bad as during the enemy contact. Eventually some form of control was established and total casualty counts reconfirmed. The wounded were sorted by walking wounded, critically wounded, lesser wounded and dead bodies. Weapons and equipment of the dead and more seriously wounded were gathered, bundled and assigned to one man to return them to Camp TRAI BI. MEDEVAC commenced about 0800 hours, 1 November 1967. The more seriously wounded eight stretcher cases were extracted first followed by three sorties of the lesser wounded and walking wounded. The fourth sortie extracted the seven bodies and the USSF Sergeant. Three sorties of replacements, to include the LLDB camp commander, and ammunition resupply were flown after the MEDEVAC.

8. The LLDB camp commander took command of the operation and regained control of the troops. Before continuing the movement south, both he and I agreed not to go north due to lack of immediate artillery or air support, low morale of the troops and lack of sufficient strength to assault or envelope a strong enemy base camp. I had requested a reinforcement of one company and replacement of the LLDB counterpart and the entire

(3)

Inclosure #1

CRP platoon in order to return north to the base camp to make an assessment. We received replacements only for the wounded personnel. I advised the LLDB commander, after learning of his proposed plan and route, that we assess the base camp which had been contacted during operation TRAI 10/7 at coordinates XT 040822. He agreed and we proceeded south. The formation was in three axis. Artillery fire was placed on each successive objective soon after leaving.

9. We arrived at vic coordinates XT 068807 where we found a CBU bomblet. It was left in place due to its sensitive nature. The coordinates were recorded. The route of march shifted to the northeast where we arrived at vic coordinates XT 070803. A perimeter of defense was established and night ambushes set up along the LOGO road, the north south trail vic coordinates XT 073087, and the trail running north east-south west vic coordinates XT 074798. No contact was established although the road had signs of recent bicycle and foot traffic and the trails had signs of recent foot traffic. This location was where initial direct contact was established with Camp TRAI BI. The morning of 2 Nov 67, we moved in a southerly direction to make an assessment of the enemy base camp reported coordinates XT 070780. During the crossing of the clearing at coordinates XT 074785, a report was received by the right flank security that they had spotted one VC who ran west into the jungle. Artillery fire was called for by the LLDB commander and placed vic coordinates XT 071785. The crossing was made at the clearing because the water was not as deep (chest high to Vietnamese) in the center as it was on the flanks. This clearing is definitely not a good LZ. Upon reaching the south side of the clearing we crossed a north east- south west trail vic coordinates XT 074784, indicating signs of recent VC use. Square rubber tire type shoe footprints were very prevalent. The move continued south to the coordinates where the enemy base camp was reported. Upon reaching the area, it was evident that the location had been thoroughly saturated by artillery fire. I advised the LLDB commander to send out patrols to try and find trenches. About 15 minutes later, a report came back from the patrol to our east that they had found the camp. It was at coordinates XT 073778. It had been entirely missed by artillery fire. Evidently, during the contact by the TRAI BI 10/7 operation, the supporting artillery fire had been placed to the east side of the camp for fear of bringing 175mm artillery rounds too close to friendlies. This placed the camp between the artillery fire on the east and the friendly force on the west. Subsequent artillery strikes missed the base camp also. A FAC was called to the area. A smoke grenade pinpointed the center of the base camp allowing the FAC to get a definite fix.

(4)

Inclosure #1

A thorough assessment of the base camp provided the following:

- a. Twenty foot well with smooth sides and wood planking at opening, centrally located.
- b. Three rings of trenches each about 100 meters in diameter. The entire base camp was about 400 meters in diameter.
- c. The trench system was up to four feet deep with niches carved in the inner walls to allow one man to curl up tight. Probably used as air raid shelter. Two-man fighting positions with overhead cover and niches carved into the inner wall were constructed about every 20 meters. The niches appeared to be cut out up to two feet into the walls to allow firing into the inner perimeter after an enemy had crossed the trenches. There were one-man fighting positions dug on the outer rung of the trenches. These were 10 meters outside of the trenchline.
- d. The trenchline connected with the cooking area which was dug off to the side of the trench. It was about 4 feet deep, 10 feet long and 10 feet wide. A dirt shelf was cut out in one wall where barbecue type pits were dug. Firewood was stacked close by. A raised camouflage overhead cover was the only type structure found.
- e. There were bicycle rims, front wheel forks, water earthenware jugs, a pile of old hardwood pungi stakes, 5 gallon metal containers, a jungle type pith helmet very well weathered, and various odds and ends of junk.

The camp showed no signs of very recent use. It was probably abandoned after the contact made during Operation TRAI 10/7, 24 October 1967. The FAC was requested to place an airstrike on the camp the following day.

10. The move continued south east to vicinity coordinates XT 096764 on Highway 22. Here a total of three vehicular mines were found on the road. They were wrapped with cardboard and had clover leaf type pressure plates. They were placed on both sides of the road in position where wheeled vehicles would roll over them. They were buried not more than three inches in the ground. Two were destroyed by USGF personnel and the coordinates of all others reported. Mines were found from the above coordinates north of the river to coordinates XT 102753 south of the river.

(5)

Inclosure #1

11. The movement continued south to Camp TRAI BI/termina^l 022200 hours November 1967. The LLDB commander became ill from internal disorders.

12. Recommendations:

- a. That all personnel attending the briefings for a heliborne operation ensure that all personnel involved with the operation, directly or indirectly, at the time of the execution of the operation or at a later time during the operation, be thoroughly briefed and receive current and accurate information. Examples are: not receiving the proper points of origin or operational frequencies and call signs.
- b. That personnel assigned to the relay site at NUI BA DEN be only highly experienced and skilled radio operators. They must be instructed and oriented not to change the context of a message.
- c. That plans be firm and concrete for the supporting elements of a heliborne operation to be available on call within a reasonable minimal time. Particularly in a very remote area. There was supporting artillery prior to the contact, however, upon displacement of the guns to TAY NINH West, there was a time lapse before the gunships arrived and after the air strike had been delivered leaving the unit without any type of fire support. This could have been disastrous.
- d. That all personnel relaying, or receiving information, relay all information to the base camp of the operational unit involved.
- e. That a closer scrutinization of LLDB personnel assigned to lead operations be effected by higher LLDB channels. They must be capable of aggressively controlling the CIDG troops. They must be oriented to accept the advice of USSF personnel particularly when unsound tactics and practices are employed. True, we must not compare them to our "occidental" ways. However, when the advisor's role becomes one of "going along for the walk" then the advisory program is a wasted effort down at the level of the advisor in the field.

(6)

Inclosure #1

- f. That base camps not be assaulted frontally in only one direction. The size should be determined by probes. Artillery, when available, should be placed on possible escape routes to contain the enemy. Once the approximate size is located, the friendly unit should pull back to allow gunships, heavy artillery and air strikes to hit the target. Then an assault can be made to conduct a final sweep and assessment. This method will limit the number of friendly casualties.
- 9. That all camps be ensured of obtaining a polaroid camera without delay. Many items of valuable intelligence information is lost because of the need to word describe objects and base camps.

Inclosure #1

(7)



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Authority
By *ADM* NADA, Date

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (21 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674204

4 March 1968

SUBJECT: Extract from Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

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2. This extract, while directed primarily toward Special Forces operations, has numerous items which are of concern to the Army as a whole. This extract is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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