

By

JB/mg

NARA, Date

9/92

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED (V)

1.(v) Personnel: None

2.(v) Operations:

a. Launching MK-24 aircraft Flares.

(1) OBSERVATION: In a recent night operation, a MK-24 aircraft flare ejected when the safety pin was pulled just prior to launch.

(2) EVALUATION: The most probable cause of this malfunction was either improper flare settings or tension applied to the lanyard prior to extraction of the safety pin.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the following sequence be used for pre-launch inspection and launching MK-24 flares from UH-1 aircraft:

(a) Inspect each flare upon loading for safety pin in place, proper setting set, Lanyard taped to canister with no loose ends, weather cap taped in place and flares loaded so that the ejection end is pointed out the door.

(b) Use only the 50 foot lanyard (FSN 1370-937-7806). Discontinue use of the 27 inch lanyard.

(c) Just prior to launch, secure the lanyard to the aircraft by means of a "D" snap link, thereby providing an efficient means of launch and quick disposal of used lanyards.

(d) All flare launch personnel be equipped with asbestos mittens, safety goggles and an Air Force type, hooked, shroud line knife.

b. Aircraft Map Lights, C&C Aircraft.

(1) OBSERVATION: The airmobile task force commander and staff occupying the cabin of the C&C aircraft have a requirement for adequate lighting when conducting night airmobile assaults.

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(2) EVALUATION: At present, the only lighting in the aircraft that is available for use by the airmobile task force commander is the Aft Cabin Light. These lights adversely effect the night vision of aircraft crew members and also subjects the aircraft to anti-aircraft and small arms fire.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That from two to four aircraft map lights be installed in the Aft cabin area of C&C aircraft.

c. Split Control of Multiple Company Combat Assaults.

(1) OBSERVATION: Effective control of multi-assault helicopter company lifts may be attained by one C&C controlling the LZ area while another C&C controls the PZ area.

(2) EVALUATION: During a recent combat assault operation, the 187th Assault Helicopter Company was diverted from one mission to reinforce the 11th Assault Helicopter Company in the insertion of elements of two different infantry battalions in a area of contact. The unit in contact was being supported by the 116th AHC and the task force commander in that C&C was to receive OPCON the additional elements to be inserted. While the twenty airlift aircraft were refueling, the 187th AHC C&C aircraft picked up representatives of the infantry battalion to be moved. The 187th C&C then acted as Air Mission Commander for the pick-up's and the 116th C&C acted as Air Mission Commander for the insertions. Each had the infantry unit commander concerned in the back seat of their aircraft for direct coordination. The flight leaders merely contacted the PZ C&C on his UHF when inbound for pick-up and the LZ C&C on his UHF wen inbound for landing. The system worked extremely well and four widely scattered rifle companies were extracted and reinserted in less than two hours.

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(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the technique discussed above be brought to the attention of assault helicopter units for their consideration and possible use.

d. Search and Rescue Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: It is extremely difficult to locate the telephone number of the proper agency to initiate aircraft search and rescue operation.

(2) EVALUATION: A recent incident involving a missing aircraft from this battalion brought out the fact that there is no readily identifiable listing in the United States Government Agencies Vietnam Telephone Directory for Air-Sea Rescue Centers. After numerous telephone calls and two hours elapsed time, the correct telephone number was located.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the telephone numbers for Sector or Regional Search and Rescue Centers be added to the Emergency Telephone numbers listing (Pink Pages) of the United States Government Agencies-Vietnam Telephone Directory.

e. Trip Flares in Night Landing Zones.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some units burn trip flares in resupply LZ's to identify the landing zone to approaching aircraft.

(2) EVALUATION: The use of a trip flare to identify an LZ at night is a satisfactory procedure for initial identification. However, if the flares are continually ignited to provide illumination throughout the approach, the smoke produces a worse visibility hazard than no illumination at all.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Trip flares should be used sparingly at night and then only for initial identification. Units should obtain the battery

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operated emergency runway lights and strobe lights to mark resupply pads.

3.(v) Training:

a. CH-47 Enlisted Crewmembers.

(1) OBSERVATION: A large number of newly assigned flight engineers and crew chiefs require additional training on the routine flight aspects of their duties.

(2) EVALUATION: Although technically qualified in the areas of aircraft maintenance, many new flight engineers lack experience and training in their duties while in flight. Common deficiencies noted have been inability to judge sling load height above the ground, inspection of rigging, proper hook-up techniques etc. To correct this situation, this unit has selected experienced, senior flight engineers whose sole function is training new crewman. They ride with aircraft on a random basis checking crew performance, making on-the-spot corrections and insuring that flight crew standardization is being followed. This program has resulted in a marked improvement of crew performance.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the procedures discussed above be brought to the attention of other assault support helicopter units for their consideration and possible use.

4.(v) Intelligence: None

5.(v) Logistics:

a. Automotive Preventive Maintenance.

(1) OBSERVATION: Rust and corrosion on battery cases and fender or track wells of vehicles can be reduced or stopped by an application of peneprime soil stabilizer compound.

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(2) EVALUATION: By following the steps listed below, Peneprime may be coated over battery boxes and fender wells preventing rust and corrosion and deterioration of equipment.

(a) Refer to pertinent vehicle TM for removal and disassembly of the battery box and hardware.

(b) After the battery box and hardware have been completely disassembled, neutralize all residual battery acids by thoroughly soaking in a paste solution of baking soda and water.

CAUTION: Extreme care should be used to prevent this paste from entering any wet cell battery. This could result in an explosion of dangerous gases and rupture of the battery case.

(c) After a complete neutralization of battery acids, e.g., when soda stops foaming, rinse the battery box and all hardware thoroughly in water.

(d) Allow all parts to dry completely. Apply a thin coat of Peneprime heated to approximately 100°F to all metal parts. Two coats are usually sufficient. Extreme care must be taken to prevent any Peneprime from dripping on the rubber grommets or battery cable insulation.

(e) After thoroughly cleaning the underside of vehicles, apply two coats peneprime to the undercarriage and fender well.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the procedures discussed above be brought to the attention of all units for their consideration and possible use.

b. Class V Allocations.

(1) OBSERVATION: Certain monthly allocations of Class V ammunition that apply to operational loads, unit basic loads, and base camp defense stocks are not sufficient to meet the requirements for base camp defense.

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(2) EVALUATION: Monthly Class V allocations are received from II Field Forces down through aviation command channels to aviation units. In addition, separate allocations are given by IIFFV to divisions and separate major commands who ordinarily have overall responsibility for most base camp defense policies. Accordingly, major base camp commanders have OPLANS covering base camp defense with which tenant units, such as aviation support units, are required to comply; specifically in the amount of different types of ammunition required to be in each bunker and their employment. In some instances a command such as the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion has overall responsibility for ten defense bunkers at Cu Chi. This responsibility covers operational control over other non-organic tenant units, each of whom is responsible for complying with the base OPLAN and furnishing its own ammunition for its assigned bunkers. On the other hand, the 187th AHC, a subordinate unit of this command, also has operational control of ten defensive bunkers at Tay Ninh. Some of these bunkers are manned by other tenant units. However, the OPLAN under which the 187th is working requires that they furnish all ammunition for all bunkers. This in turn puts a drain on the battalion's monthly allocation, necessitating a recurring request for an increase in allocation. USARV Confidential Regulation 735-28 dated 30 August 1968, establishes maximum authorized quantities of ammunition for unit basic loads, and Appendix III lists those Class V items authorized for inclusion in base camp defense stocks, some of which are allocated items.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: That all base camp defense stocks be computed by the major command having overall responsibility for base camp defense and subject computation submitted on USARV Form 468-R, 8 July 1968, to one major

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command headquarters, such as II Field Forces, for approval. A separate monthly allocation be granted each major command responsible for base camp defense. All base camp defense stocks would then be drawn against this special allocation and not counted against individual unit basic loads and operational loads.

c. High Priority Issue Designators.

(1) OBSERVATION: Some units continue to abuse the use of high priority issue designators for normal stock replenishment of aircraft repair parts.

(2) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that lower priority requisitions (12 & 17) are processed and released for shipment in very adequate time when the item is stocked by the direct support unit.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS: It should be emphasized that each priority designator be used for its original intent. Too many units consistently using high priority requisitions puts an undue burden on the supply system.

d. Aircraft Oil Confusion.

(1) OBSERVATION: An inadvertent mixing of dl, MIL 7808 and oil, MIL 23699 reduces the lubricative quality of each oil.

(2) EVALUATION: To preclude inadvertent mixing of these oils in an aircraft engine oil tank, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company has stencilled a warning sign on the engine oil reservoir, naming the type of oil which should be added to the tank. This has eliminated confusion as to which oil to add to the reservoir and prevented the mixing of 7808 and 23699 oils.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That this procedure be adopted by all units subject to this oil mixture.

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f. Failure Of Bleed Air Fuel Pumps.

(1) OBSERVATION: Many fuel pumps, Bleed Air, FSN'S 2915-921-5660, 2915-903-1202, and 2915-012-8689, have failed between 50 and 100 hours of operation due to improper lubrication of the lower bearing of the shaft and nozzle turbine (2915-793-0028).

(2) EVALUATION: By following the steps outlined below, the Bleed Air Fuel pumps may be returned to a serviceable condition without changing parts.

(a) Remove panel bottom L/H side of fuselage below left pump.  
(b) Cut safety wires and remove screws from lower housing of pump (P/N RD12595-1).

NOTE: IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO DEFUEL AIRCRAFT.

(c) Pull down slightly on shaft and nozzle. Inject light weight oil between pump housing and shaft nozzle.

(d) Turn nozzle with fingers until nozzle and shaft turn freely.

(e) Start aircraft. (Do not reinstall lower housing at this time.) Check for normal operation at 6600 RPM with R/H boost pump circuit breaker pulled. If operation is not satisfactory, repeat lubrication as it often takes two or three oil applications to completely free the pump shaft.

(f) Shut down aircraft and reinstall lower housing and panel.

NOTE: Due to design of impeller and housing installation, a slight decrease in pressure is often experienced immediately after installation.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the procedures outlined above be brought to the attention of all aviation maintenance units for their consideration and possible use.

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6.(v)Organization: None

7.(v)Other:

a. Treatment of Ocular Trauma from Noxious Chemicals.

(1) OBSERVATION: A frequent injury observed in Vietnam is ocular trauma, from noxious chemicals. In aircraft mechanics and related personnel, solvents, JP-4 and other chemicals are frequently encountered and often are inadvertently splashed into the eyes while working.

(2) EVALUATION: Initial treatment of this type of injury is copious lavage with water or other bland liquid. This procedure can be difficult under the best of circumstances. Adequate supplies of potable water are not always readily available. Potable water is not the best thing to use in any case as infectious agents may be introduced into the eye. One method of insuring adequate sterile water in an easily applicable set up is the use of intravenous solution for ocula lavage. A one liter bottle of sterile saline is hung from the ceiling with the tubing attached but without the needle. Thus the setup is instantly ready for use. When the patient with a noxious chemical in his eyes comes in, he is placed on the examining table, immediately one assistant holds his eye open using both hands while another opens the stop cork on the IV tubing and directs the stream of fluid into the eye. Using this method, the introduction of the fluid into the eye is readily controlled.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the procedure discussed above be brought to the attention of all medical units supporting aviation units.

b. Treatment of Gastroenteritis.

(1) OBSERVATION: One of the most common causes of non-effectiveness in Vietnam is diarrhea. The great majority of these cases are not of

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unusual etiology such as vacillary dysentery or amebic dysentery and are a therapeutic problem rather than a diagnostic one.

(2) EVALUATION: Those cases of diarrhea that are present without fever, pyochezia, or hematochezia are usually of short duration and mainly a problem of discomfort to the person involved. Among aviation personnel this can be quite important when it interferes with rest patterns or if severe enough to preclude flying duty. An effective means of treating these cases is the use of polymagma and lomatil. The presumed etiology for these cases is bacterial and/or toxic contaminants although culture results are usually not helpful. The polymixin-dihydrostreptomycin mixture has the advantage of being non-absorbable and is therefore of the side effects of these drugs. It is effective in combating bacterial overgrowth and changing intestinal flora. The lomatil is an effective anti-diarrhea agent.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: The use of polymagma in the dose of one gram four times a day and lomatil 2.5 mg. four times a day can be very effective in the treatment of the common diarrhea found in Vietnam. When abdominal colic is severe, combid 10 mg. twice a day is an efficacious adjunct.

### SECTION III - ESCAPE, EVASION AND SURVIVAL (v)

1. (v) This Battalion has had only one incident that could be classified as an E&E or survival type situation. This incident occurred on 28 October 1968 in the vicinity of XT448617. At this time, an armed helicopter of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company was shot down by enemy fire and the aircraft crashed in heavy woods. There were only slight injuries as a result of the crash and the crew immediately evacuated the crash site as they thought the aircraft was going to burn.

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2.(v) The downed aircraft was immediately spotted by other gunships in the area and an attempt made to contact the crewmembers. However, the AN/URC-10 Survival Radio had been lost in the aircraft wreckage and was not available. After establishing visual contact with the crew, the gunships attempted to direct them to an area suitable for extraction by use of arm signals and dropping of smoke grenades. This caused some confusion to the crew members on the ground because they did not know the meaning of the smoke, ie, they did not know if the smoke was to be followed or whether it was marking enemy positions. Mainly through the use of arm signals, the downed crew followed the gunships until they were contacted by the friendly infantry unit on the ground.


3.(v) Lesson Learned.

a. Security of the AN/URC-10 Emergency Survival Radio.

(1) OBSERVATION: Quite frequently the AN/URC-10 emergency radio is lost in the debris of an aircraft crash.


(2) EVALUATION: Unless the emergency radio is secured to the person of one of the air crewmembers, it may become lost in an aircraft accident. Without communication rescue attempts are extremely difficult.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That emergency radios be carried by a designated crewmember and that crewmember attach the radio to his person.


  
DELYLE G. REDMOND  
LTC, IN  
Commanding

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



269TH CAB



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INCLOSURE 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Group 4; Downgraded at  
3 yr. intervals. De-  
classified after 12 yrs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~HEADQUARTERS 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION  
UNIT STRENGTHS as of 31 October 1968 (U)

<u>Military</u> <u>Subordinate Unit</u>	OFFICER		WO		ENLISTED		TOTAL		<u>Location</u>
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	
116th Assault Helicopter Co	15	18	52	42	149*	133	216	193	CU CHI
392nd TC Detachment	1	1	1	1	70	57	72	59	CU CHI
283rd Signal Detachment	1	0	0	1	8*	6	9	7	CU CHI
431st Medical Detachment	1	1	0	0	6*	8	7	9	CU CHI
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>268</b>	
187th Assault Helicopter Co	15	18	52	45	149*	123	216	186	TAY NINH
1st Signal Detachment	0	0	1	1	8	7	9	8	TAY NINH
602nd TC Detachment	1	1	1	1	70	65	72	67	TAY NINH
541st Medical Detachment	1	1	0	0	6*	7	7	8	TAY NINH
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>269</b>	
242nd Assault Spt Helicopter Co	13	8	25	16	140*	132	178	156	CU CHI
621st TC Detachment	1	1	1	1	80	65	80	65	CU CHI
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>221</b>	
HHC 269th Combat avn Battalion	21	21	2	2	80*	108	103	131	CU CHI
<b>TOTAL, 269TH CAB</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>766</b>	<b>711</b>	<b>969</b>	<b>889</b>	

\* Denotes changes in authorizations.

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INCLOSURE 2

Group 4; Downgraded at  
3 yr. intervals. De-  
classified after 12 yrs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~HEADQUARTERS 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION  
UNIT STRENGTHS as of 31 October 1968 (u) (Continued)Civilian

<u>Subordinate Unit</u>	TECH REP <u>AUTH</u> <u>O/H</u>	DAC <u>AUTH</u> <u>O/H</u>	VM <u>AUTH</u> <u>O/H</u>	CONTRACTOR <u>AUTH</u> <u>O/H</u>	3RD NAT'L <u>AUTH</u> <u>O/H</u>
HHC, 269th Cbt Avn Bn	1   1	0   0	9   7	0   0	0   0
116th Aslt Hel Co	0   0	0   0	10   8	2   2	0   0
187th Aslt Hel Co	0   0	0   0	10   8	2   2	0   0
242nd Aslt Spt Hel Co	0   0	0   0	9   6	7   7	0   0
<u>TOTAL, 269th CAB</u>	<u>1   1</u>	<u>0   0</u>	<u>38   29</u>	<u>11   11</u>	<u>0   0</u>

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INCLOSURE 2 (Cont'd)

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ECCLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND873541

By JB/mg

NARA, Date 9/92

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SUMMARY OF LOSSES FOR THE NEXT 90 DAY PERIOD  
HEADQUARTERS 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION (V)

	<u>30 DAY</u>	<u>60 DAY</u>	<u>90 DAY</u>
Officers	3	4	6
Warrant Officers	0	4	11
Enlisted Men	41	32	83

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Group 4; Downgraded at  
3 yr. intervals. De-  
classified after 12 yrs.

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ECCLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, MND 873541

By AB/106 NARA, Date 9/92

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AIRCRAFT STATUS (U)

HEADQUARTERS 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

31 October 1968

<u>SUBORDINATE UNIT</u>	<u>UH-1B</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>OH-23</u>	<u>OH-6</u>	<u>U6-4</u>
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>
HQ, 269th	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
116th AHC	0	0	8	7	0	20	0	0
187th AHC	0	0	8	8	0	6	0	0
242nd ASHC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL, 269 CAB</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>12</b>

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INCLOSURE 4

Group 4: Downgraded at  
3 yr. intervals. De-  
classified after 12 yrs

ECCLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, MVO 873541

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OPERATIONAL STATISTICS  
HEADQUARTERS 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION  
1 August - 31 October 1968

<u>SUBORDINATE UNIT</u>	<u>SORTIES FLOWN</u>	<u>TROOPS LIFTED</u>	<u>TONS CARGO LIFTED</u>	<u>VC KIA</u>	<u>STRUCTURES DAM DEST</u>	<u>SAMPANS DAM DEST</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT LOST</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT DAMAGE</u>	<u>FLYING HOURS</u>	<u>CL DAY</u>
116 AHC	30,334	49,915	120	93	0 0	0 0	1	34	9078	79
187 AHC	23,519	39,661	158	18	0 8	0 0	1	30	8412	79
242 ASHC	11,979	47,081	22,272	0	0 0	0 0	0	11	4779	0
TOTAL 269	65,823	146,657	22,550	111	0 8	0 0	2	75	21,969	158

INCLOSURE 5