


Republic of Vietnam map
TET '68 map
Military Area I,II,III&IV map
Tri Tam-Dau Tieng & Tay Ninh map
Michelin Rubber Plantation map
Aerial view POL-Dau Tieng
Aerial view of Dau Tieng
Aerial view of Tay Ninh West
Aerial view of Tay Ninh City(east)
Aerial view of Phu Hiep AAF
Aerial view of Song Be
Misc. maps of Vietnam
269th CAB pathfinder info
Black Baron newsletter
269th CAB misc. info
Hawk magazine story on 269th
269th stats 5/67-4/68
308th CAB photos & info
159th ASHB info
16th CAG station list 4/68
16th CAG op report 4/68
308th CAB MIA report 4/21/68
Only MIA's during the
existence of the 308th CAB

CONFIDENTIAL




DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: ORLL, II Full Force, April 1968 (TIME FRAME TET '68)

MILITARY AREA I



MILITARY AREA III



MILITARY AREA IV

Army Map Service 1968



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/2 x 2 1/2 in

111-CCV-12 CC 81184

CC 81184

VIETNAM

Aerial view of a POL bladder storage area located at Dau Tieng.

23 Sep 1967

Photographer unknown

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY cancelled on 29 May 75
by W.L. THOMPSON, Security Review Officer (Photo
USAAVA, IAW para 12, AR 340-16. wmf

SECURITY INFORMATION
USAAVA, IAW para 12, AR 340-16.

5200.10



DAU TIENG, VIETM XT491472 11°17'N 106°22'E (VVDG)
 VNA (A) 65 *L 31(LATERITE)Ⓣ 08/26 118' wide
 20(LATERITE)Ⓣ 03/21 50' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 AMMO - 7.62 2.75 40MM

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. No rwy markers or windsock. 15' houses, 20' poles and 3 6' fences on apch end Rwy 08. Apch to Rwy 26 over 75' trees 1/2 mi fr rwy. Heli and revetment 45' fr edge of rwy W end S side. Prkg area 210' X 210' (3 C-130s) W end N side. Recommend land Rwy 26, T/off Rwy 08. Type 1 for C-130, Type 2 for C-123 and C7A.
 Ⓣ Heli only. ASP treated. Ⓣ ASP treated.

TOWER - 301.4 40.9
ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3



DAU TIENG, VIETM XT491472 11°17'N 106°22'E (VVDG)
VNA (A) 65 *L 31(LATERITE)ⓐ 08/26 118' wide
20(LATERITE)ⓑ 03/21 50' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 **AMMO - 7.62 2.75 40MM**

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. No rwy markers or windsock. 15' houses, 20' poles and 3 6' fences on apch end Rwy 08. Apch to Rwy 26 over 75' trees 1/2 mi fr rwy. Heli and revetment 45' fr edge of rwy W end S side. Prkg area 210' X 210' (3 C-130s) W end N side. Recommend land Rwy 26, T/off Rwy 08. Type 1 for C-130, Type 2 for C-123 and C7A.
ⓐ Heli only. ASP treated. ⓑ ASP treated.

TOWER - 301.4 40.9

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3




DAU TIENG, VIETM XT491472 11°17'N 106°22'E (VVDG)
VNA (A) 65 *L 31(LATERITE)Ⓜ 08/26 118' wide
20(LATERITE)Ⓢ 03/21 50' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 AMMO - 7.62 2.75 40MM

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. No rwy markers or windsock. 15' houses, 20' poles and 3 6' fences on apch end Rwy 08. Apch to Rwy 26 over 75' trees 1/2 mi fr rwy. Heli and revetment 45' fr edge of rwy W end S side. Prkg area 210' X 210' (3 C-130s) W end N side. Recommend land Rwy 26, T/off Rwy 08. Type 1 for C-130, Type 2 for C-123 and C7A.
Ⓢ Heli only. ASP treated. Ⓜ ASP treated.

TOWER - 301.4 40.9

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3


TAY NINH WEST, VIETM XT168518 11°19'N 106°04'E

A 30 L① 39(LATERITE)② 02/20 100' wide

FUEL - A+J4

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 8' bunker 300' fr apch end Rwy 20, 125' N of centerline. Refueling pit W end N side, only 65' clearance fr edge of rwy when refueling O-1 and helis. O-1 prkd 77' fr edge, W end S side. 250' ovrn ea end. Prkg area 395' X 195' (4 C-130's), center of rwy S side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ① Flare pots 30 min PNR. ② ASP treated.

RADIO - 339.2 122.5 37.2 Opr 2300-1100Z

TOWER - 297.0 117.0 47.3

Rbn(W) MX 490 At Field

XOM ONG LINH
TAY NINH CITY



Rapid Fire II
with B-36 &
188th crews -
we staged out
of Tay Ninh
East as
it was
referred to
back then

TAY NINH CITY, VIETM XT203510 11°19'N 106°05'E

VNA (A) 39 L 19(PSP)① 02/20 100' wide

FUEL - A+ AMMO - 7.62 2.75

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE, S.F. Apch to Rwy 02 over city. Apch to Rwy 20 over 30' trees 300' fr end of rwy and 4' fence 50' fr end of rwy. Recommend land Rwy 20, T/off Rwy 02. 300' twr 600' W of S end of rwy. O-1 revetments 34' fr edge of rwy W end. Bldgs 31' and 46' fr edge of rwy S side. 4' fences ea side rwy. Not recommended for C-123. Turnaround W end S side. Type 2 for C7A. ① PSP warped and broken several places.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SO1.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3

XOM ONG LINH

TAY NINH CITY



TAY NINH CITY, VIETM XT203510 11°19'N 106°06'E

VNA (A) 39 L 19(PSP)⊕ 02/20 100' wide

FUEL - A+ **AMMO** - 7.62 2.75

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE, S.F. Apch to Rwy 02 over city. Apch to Rwy 20 over 30' trees 300' fr end of rwy and 4' fence 50' fr end of rwy. Recommend land Rwy 20, T/off Rwy 02. 300' twr 600' W of S end of rwy. O-1 revetments 34' fr edge of rwy W end. Bldgs 31' and 46' fr edge of rwy S side. 4' fences ea side rwy. Not recommended for C-123. Turnaround W end S side. Type 2 for C7A. ⊕ PSP warped and broken several places.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3

XOM ONG LINH

TAY NINH CITY



TAY NINH CITY, VIETM XT203510 11°19'N 106°05'E

VNA (A) 39 L 19(PSP)① 02/20 100' wide

FUEL - A+ AMMO - 7.62 2.75

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE, S.F. Apch to Rwy 02 over city. Apch to Rwy 20 over 30' trees 300' fr end of rwy and 4' fence 50' fr end of rwy. Recommend land Rwy 20, T/off Rwy 02. 300' twr 600' W of S end of rwy. O-1 revetments 34' fr edge of rwy W end. Bldgs 31' and 46' fr edge of rwy S side. 4' fences ea side rwy. Not recommended for C-123. Turnaround W end S side. Type 2 for C7A. ① PSP warped and broken several places.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3

XOM ONG LINH

TAY NINH CITY



TAY NINH CITY, VIETM XT203510 11°19'N 106°06'E

VNA (A) 39 L 19(PSP)① 02/20 100' wide

FUEL - A+ **AMMO** - 7.62 2.75

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE, S.F. Apch to Rwy 02 over city. Apch to Rwy 20 over 30' trees 300' fr end of rwy and 4' fence 50' fr end of rwy. Recommend land Rwy 20, T/off Rwy 02. 300' twr 600' W of S end of rwy. O-i revetments 34' fr edge of rwy W end. Bldgs 31' and 46' fr edge of rwy S side. 4' fences ea side rwy. Not recommended for C-123. Turnaround W end S side. Type 2 for C7A. ① PSP warped and broken several places.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 41.3

DOD
SPECIALIZED FLIGHT INFORMATION PUBLICATION

USAF RECORD SET
TACTICAL
AERODROME DIRECTORY

SOUTH VIETNAM

15 NOVEMBER 1967

SPECIAL NOTICE

SEE NEW FEATURE, PAGE 352

PUBLISHED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



Published by

7651ST AERONAUTICAL CHART AND INFORMATION SQUADRON
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, APO SAN FRANCISCO, 96553



PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 LI 35(M3A1)① 03/21 58' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acct. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ① With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8


PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 LI 35(M8A1)① 03/21 58' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acct. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ① With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8



188th Camped out
 here @ Song Be
 in Sept 1967 to
 support 5th Special
 Forces Teams -
BAD PLACE!
 infiltration route from Cambodia

SONG BE, VIETM YU141070 11°49'N 106°58'E

VNA 797 L H40(ASP) 05/23 100' wide

(VVPL)

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE SR-SS. S.F. 2405' hill 1 mi S apch end Rwy 23. Opposite end of rwy cannot be seen when landing. 3' hole 1389' down Rwy 05. 150' ovrn ea end. 350' X 200' prkg area center of rwy N side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 39.5

SONG BE, VIETM YU141070 11°49'N 106°58'E

VNA 797 L H40(ASP) 05/23 100' wide

(VVPL)

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE SR-SS. S.F. 2405' hill 1 mi S apch end Rwy 23. Opposite end of rwy cannot be seen when landing. 3' hole 1389' down Rwy 05. 150' ovrn ea end, 350' X 200' prkg area center of rwy N side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 39.5

210425



PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 L1 35(M3A1)⓪ 03/21 58' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 325' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acft. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ⓪ With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8


PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 L1 35(M8A1)⓪ 03/21 58' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acft. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ⓪ With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8



PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 L1 35(M8A1)ⓐ 03/21 55' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acft. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ⓐ With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.9


PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 L1 35(M8A1)ⓐ 03/21 58' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acft. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ⓐ With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8



SONG BE, VIETM YU141070 11°49'N 106°58'E

VNA 797 L H40(ASP) 05/23 100' wide

(VVPL)

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE SR-SS. S.F. 2405' hill 1 mi S apch end Rwy 23. Opposite end of rwy cannot be seen when landing. 3' hole 1389' down Rwy 05. 150' ovrn ea end. 350' X 200' prkg area center of rwy N side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 39.5

SONG BE, VIETM YU141070 11°49'N 106°58'E


VNA 797 L H40(ASP) 05/23 100' wide

(VVPL)

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE SR-SS. S.F. 2405' hill 1 mi S apch end Rwy 23. Opposite end of rwy cannot be seen when landing. 3' hole 1389' down Rwy 05. 150' ovrn ea end. 350' X 200' prkg area center of rwy N side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 39.5



PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 L1 35(M8A1)⊙ 03/21 55' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments, not aval for cargo acft. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ⊙ With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8

PHU HIEP AAF VIETM CQ245364 12°57'N 109°23'E

A 20 L1 35(M8A1)⊙ 03/21 58' wide

FUEL - A+, J4 limited

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE. 300' ovrn E end, 300' ovrn W end. Prkg area 406' X 336' filled with Mohawks and revetments; not aval for cargo acft. Full length parallel twy and four access twys to rwy might provide limited prkg space. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A. ⊙ With anti-skid coating.

TOWER - 281.1 118.3 37.8



SONG BE, VIETM YU141070 11°49'N 106°58'E

VNA 797 L H40(ASP) 05/23 100' wide

(VVPL)

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE SR-SS. S.F. 2405' hill 1 mi S apch end Rwy 23. Opposite end of rwy cannot be seen when landing. 3' hole 1389' down Rwy 05. 150' ovrn ea end. 350' X 200' prkg area center of rwy N side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A.

RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 39.5

SONG BE, VIETM YU141070 11°49'N 106°58'E


VNA 797 L H40(ASP) 05/23 100' wide

(VVPL)

AERODROME REMARKS - SECURE SR-SS. S.F. 2405' hill 1 mi S apch end Rwy 23. Opposite end of rwy cannot be seen when landing. 3' hole 1389' down Rwy 05. 150' ovrn ea end, 350' X 200' prkg area center of rwy N side. Type 2 for C-130, C-123 and C7A.


RADIO - Ctc as per S.F. SOI.

ARTILLERY ADVISORY - 39.5



THE MICHELIN RUBBER PLANTATION, BINH DUONG PROVINCE

III CORPS



1967 LEGEND

- + + - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
- CORPS BOUNDARY
- - - PROVINCE BOUNDARY
- DISTRICT BOUNDARY
- COASTLINE

- 1 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
- 2 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
- 3 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
- 4 196th Infantry Brigade

- 5 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division
- 6 173d Airborne Brigade
- 7 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division

- ① JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I
- ② JUNCTION CITY, PHASE II



Map by Shelby L. Stanton

JUNCTION CITY and CEDAR FALLS (War Zone C and the Iron Triangle)

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division | 5 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division |
| 2 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment | 6 173d Airborne Brigade |
| 3 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division | 7 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division |
| 4 196th Infantry Brigade | |

- 1 JUNCTION CITY, PHASE I
- 2 JUNCTION CITY, PHASE II




Map by Shelby L. Stanton

JUNCTION CITY and CEDAR FALLS (War Zone C and the Iron Triangle)

1st Infantry Division

-  Woodland
-  Swampland
-  Rubber trees
-  Rice fields/Wasteland


- 1 Ap Bau Bang
12 November 1965
- 2 Ap Nha Mat
5 December 1965
- 3 Ap Tau O
8 June 1966
- 4 Loc Ninh plantation
11 June 1966
- 5 Srok Dong
30 June 1966
- 6 Minh Thanh Road
9 July 1966
- 7 Operation Cedar Falls
8-26 January 1967
- 8 Prek Klok I
28 February 1967
- 9 Prek Klok II
10 March 1967
- 10 LZ George (also known as Ap Gu)
31 March-1 April 1967
- 11 Xom Bo
17 June 1967
- 12 Ong Thanh
17 October 1967
- 13 Loc Ninh
2 November 1967
- 14 Bu Dop
29-30 November 1967
- 15 An My
1-2 February 1968
- 16 Xom Moi
5-6 May 1968
- 17 Loc Ninh
18 August-15 Sept. 1968
- 18 FSPB Julie
26 October 1968
- 19 FSPB Rita
1 November 1968
- 20 Operation Atlas Wedge
15-28 March 1969
- 21 FSPB Thunder III
12 August-6 Sept. 1969




1st Infantry Division


-  Woodland
-  Swampland
-  Rubber trees
-  Rice fields/Wasteland

- 1 Ap Bau Bang
12 November 1965
- 2 Ap Nha Mat
5 December 1965
- 3 Ap Tau O
8 June 1966
- 4 Loc Ninh plantation
11 June 1966
- 5 Srok Dong
30 June 1966
- 6 Minh Thanh Road
9 July 1966
- 7 Operation Cedar Falls
8-26 January 1967
- 8 Prek Klok I
28 February 1967
- 9 Prek Klok II
10 March 1967
- 10 LZ George (also known as Ap Gu)
31 March-1 April 1967
- 11 Kom Bo
17 June 1967
- 12 Ong Thanh
17 October 1967
- 13 Loc Ninh
2 November 1967
- 14 Bu Dop
29-30 November 1967
- 15 An My
1-2 February 1968
- 16 Kom Moi
5-6 May 1968
- 17 Loc Ninh
18 August-15 Sept. 1968
- 18 FSPB Julie
26 October 1968
- 19 FSPB Rita
1 November 1968
- 20 Operation Atlas Wedge
15-28 March 1969
- 21 FSPB Thunder III
12 August-6 Sept. 1969





25th Division AO: Terrain




25th Division Area of Operations (AO): Administrative Boundaries and Lines of Communication

SOUTH VIETNAM




25th Division Area
Of Operations




- Base Camp
- Province Boundary
- Boundary of 25th Division Area of Operations



Provinces in Saigon area: III Corps Tactical Zone (III CTZ)







Gulf of Tonkin



South Vietnam

- Village
- Town
- ◎ City




South Vietnam

- International boundaries
- - - Province boundaries
- X-X- Corps boundaries

0 25 50 75
MILES


0 25 50 75 100
KILOMETERS

CHAZAUD




MAP 1

spectrum he merged into the civilian population as an agent or guerrilla or civil official wearing no uniform, unarmed, and supported by a military political organization. At the other end of the spectrum he was a uniformed member of the regular North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters possessed as much courage and motivation as any foe to face the American soldier. They proved a formidable adversary.




MAP 1

spectrum he merged into the civilian population as an agent or guerrilla or civil official wearing no uniform, unarmed, and supported by a military political organization. At the other end of the spectrum he was a uniformed member of the regular North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters possessed as much courage and motivation as any foe to face the American soldier. They proved a formidable adversary.



MAP 1

spectrum he merged into the civilian population as an agent or guerrilla or civil official wearing no uniform, unarmed, and supported by a military political organization. At the other end of the spectrum he was a uniformed member of the regular North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters possessed as much courage and motivation as any foe to face the American soldier. They proved a formidable adversary.



MAP 1


spectrum he merged into the civilian population as an agent or guerrilla or civil official wearing no uniform, unarmed, and supported by a military political organization. At the other end of the spectrum he was a uniformed member of the regular North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters possessed as much courage and motivation as any foe to face the American soldier. They proved a formidable adversary.

st monsoon from May through season in the mountain plateau cross the mountains to the west ie season brings heavy and fre- y, maximum cloudiness of the ly good visibility and, except eratures. In contrast the north- mid-March carries the wet sea- am while across the mountains . During the wet season in the ften drop to 45 degrees, requir- : troops—an important logistical

are short transitional periods. ountain plateau and northeast in," a period of low cloud, fog, reduces ceilings and visibility. the combination of torrential d flood conditions for units in . The floods cost lives, damaged ained a contingency that com- d to meet. In I Corps Tactical southeast monsoons exerted an mached elsewhere in Vietnam. region were poorly developed. , connected the coast of Quang untains. In Thua Thien an ex- 47, ran south and west from a major north-south road was High- ort of Da Nang in Quang Nam ss to Hue. From Hue the road of Quang Tri and Dong Ha to zed zone, thence on into North Pass there were no all-weather

y in the region was Hue, the in Thua Thien Province about city with a population of more a serious Buddhist uprising in


l one with no front lines. The us, and cunning. He possessed . mountain hideouts, and jungle nd identify. At one end of the



MAP 1

spectrum he merged into the civilian population as an agent or guerrilla or civil official wearing no uniform, unarmed, and supported by a military political organization. At the other end of the spectrum he was a uniformed member of the regular North Vietnamese Army. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters possessed as much courage and motivation as any foe to face the American soldier. They proved a formidable adversary.

The composition of the U.S. military forces opposing the North Vietnamese was heterogeneous. The U.S. Marine Corps units were the first committed. As the enemy threat developed, U.S. Army artillery units were deployed north to reinforce the marines. The artillery was followed by other tactical, combat support, and combat service support elements, including a chemical smoke generator company. These, like the artillery reinforcements, came under




MAP 15

Task Force joined the 101st in moves to position units for the coordinated airmobile and ground attacks.

The operation began on the morning of 19 April. Extensive B-52 tactical air and artillery fire paved the way for the initial air assault into the A Shau Valley by the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Nevertheless, the antiaircraft fires that met the helicopterborne troops were intense.

To the east, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, began its drive westward along Route 547, shifting out of CARENTAN II into Operation DELAWARE. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, attacked southwest along the road. They were followed by an air assault of




MAP 15

Task Force joined the 101st in moves to position units for the coordinated airmobile and ground attacks.

The operation began on the morning of 19 April. Extensive B-52 tactical air and artillery fire paved the way for the initial air assault into the A Shau Valley by the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Nevertheless, the antiaircraft fires that met the helicopterborne troops were intense.

To the east, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, began its drive westward along Route 547, shifting out of CARENTAN II into Operation DELAWARE. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, attacked southwest along the road. They were followed by an air assault of




MAP 15

Task Force joined the 101st in moves to position units for the coordinated airmobile and ground attacks.

The operation began on the morning of 19 April. Extensive B-52 tactical air and artillery fire paved the way for the initial air assault into the A Shau Valley by the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. Nevertheless, the antiaircraft fires that met the helicopterborne troops were intense.


To the east, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, began its drive westward along Route 547, shifting out of CARENTAN II into Operation DELAWARE. The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, attacked southwest along the road. They were followed by an air assault of



In 1966 the North Vietnamese Army 324-B Division marched south across the DMZ into the mountains of Quang Tri Province. On July 15, 1966, the Marines attacked the invading North Vietnamese Army in the mountains and jungles west of Dong Ha. The fighting would continue for three years.


Just below the DMZ the Marines set up artillery bases at Con Thien and at Gio Linh. In 1967 the huge rectangle formed by Marine bases at Con Thien, Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo became a no-man's-land and killing field known as Leatherneck Square. In the mountains to the west, The Rockpile, The Razorback, Mutter Ridge, and Helicopter Valley became focal points in the struggle. For the Marines, "The End of the Line" was their garrison at remote and isolated Khe Sanh.

(Adapted from a map published in *The Battle for Khe Sanh*, courtesy of History & Museums Division, Headquarters USMC)



The Marine helicopter base at Marble Mountain lay on the sandy seacoast by the South China Sea, southeast of Da Nang. Below Marble Mountain and Da Nang were the heavily populated and rice-rich coastal flatlands.

(Adapted from a map originally published in *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966*, courtesy of History & Museums Division, Headquarters USMC)



KHE SANH VALLEY

The rugged mountains and jungles in northwest Quang Tri Province concealed a North Vietnamese Army infiltration route into South Vietnam. The Marines set up the garrison at Khe Sanh to monitor and interdict the invading North Vietnamese. North and west of the Khe Sanh airstrip, the Marines manned observation outposts on the peaks of Hill 881 South and Hill 861. They also maintained a radio relay outpost atop lofty Hill 950.

Colonial Route 9, originally built by the French Army, had been a one-lane-wide dirt trail running west from Dong Ha into Laos. The Marines periodically tried to improve the road in an effort to establish a ground route to remote Khe Sanh. However, monsoon rains and hostile enemy action often made the twisting mountain trail impassable west of Razorback Valley.

(Adapted from a map published in *The Battle for Khe Sanh*, courtesy of History & Museums Division, Headquarters USMC)

SOUTH VIETNAM MAP KIT


SOURCES:

Military Assistance Command
Dept. of Defense
C.I.A.
Military Map Guild

Map dates from 1965 to 1972



Copyright 1981 by The Mesa Co.



PRINCIPAL CITIES MAP
ASIA

Scale of Miles
0 200 400 600 800

MILITARY MAP GUILD


P.O. BOX 212

WESTMINSTER, COLORADO 80030

POPULATION KEY	
●	Over 500,000
○	100,000 to 500,000
○	Under 100,000
○	Capital


Administrative Divisions and Military Regions

-  Military region boundary
-  Province boundary
-  Hue Autonomous municipality






Land Utilization and Vegetation

- CULTIVATED AREAS**
 -  Rice
 -  Tree crops, chiefly rubber
 -  Vegetable crops
- NONCULTIVATED AREAS**
 -  Forest
 -  Forest, with slash and burn
 -  Grassland
 -  Marshes and other inundated vegetation
 -  Mangrove



**MAP
KIT
1965**

ROAD MAP



Relief Map of Vietnam

Ethnic Groups

AUSTROASIATIC

- Vietnamese
- Mon-Khmer (Cambodian)
- Mon-Khmer (tribal groups)

MALAYO-POLYNESIAN


- Cham
- Tribal groups

MIXED GROUPS



- Vietnamese and Mon-Khmer (Cambodian)
- Mon-Khmer (Cambodian and tribal groups)
- Vietnamese and Mon-Khmer (tribal groups)

HRE Tribal name

NOTE: Chinese and other foreigners are concentrated principally in larger cities




Population






Economic Activity

- Cultivated area
- Noncultivated area
- Coal
- Oil storage
- Electric power
- Beer and soft drinks
- Cement
- Paper
- Pharmaceuticals
- Plywood
- Sugar refinery
- Textiles
- Tobacco processing






The Tet Offensive



Operation *Toan Thang*



Operation "Cedar Falls"




SOG's unofficial stomping grounds extended far beyond the territory recognized by the regular U.S. military as being within its "rules of engagement."



**MILITARY SPECIAL OPERATIONS:
AREAS of COMMAND and CONTROL**

-  Zone Alpha
-  Zone Charlie
-  Zone Bravo
-  Nickel Steel
-  Prairie Fire AO
-  Tri-Border Region
-  A.I.Z. Boundary
-  Mission Launch Sites





THE A SHAU VALLEY



Editor's Note: The A Shau Valley, located in southwestern Thua Tien Province near the laotian border, was a remote area that was ideal for the NVA to maintain base operations and to store their war materials.

Several U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations were conducted in the A Shau Valley in 1968 and 1969 to dislodge the NVA. The most publicized was the battle for Ap Bia Mountain in May 1969, better known as the battle for "Hamburger Hill." Everytime the U.S. and South Vietnamese would leave this area, the NVA forces would return and set up their base camps and storage facilities.

Inbox for [redacted] m

Yahoo! - My Yahoo! Options - Sign Out - Help

powered by
COMPAQ

Mail Addresses Calendar Notepad

[Click Here!](#)


[Download Attachments](#)

- Choose Folder -
From: "John E. Spillane" [redacted] | [Block Address](#) | [Add to Address Book](#)**To:** "Dick Detra" [redacted]**Subject:** 269th Memories**Date:** Wed, 18 Jul 2001 15:59:41 -0400

Hi Dick,

Well you have stirred up some old memories from all lot of years ago. It forced me to go digging into parts of the attic I haven't looked at for quite a while. (Both literally and figuratively) As I mentioned in my 1st e-mail to you, I was assigned to Headquarters & Headquarters Co, of the 269th from Jul of '69 to July of '70. When I got there, there was no officer in charge of the Pathfinder Detachment. It was run by the NCOIC, SFC Leslie L. George. The team had been reduced to 4 men plus the NCOIC. By the time my first 30 days was over, I was 2nd senior man in country. Two Pathfinders from the 173rd Airborne were sent to fortify our team in September of '69. The team then consisted of SFC George, Cpl's, Danny Lester, Lat Bowen & Danny Kahler (from the 173rd) & me. I have included some pics that I have found. Our team patch, was the Pathfinder insignia emblazend on the Black Baron Cross. It wasn't authorized for wear. Don't forget, we were assigned to Headquarters company. We were surrounded by rear echelon MF's. The officer types broke balls on a daily basis for chickenshit regs. The only time the "chckenshit" eased up was when we were in the field, or out working with the Crusaders, Rat Pack or units from the 25th Inf. We were allowed to wear the Pathfinder Insignia (photo attached) and the Black Baron Cross. But Dick, the only time we needed a wheel barrel, was to transport beer from the EM club to the hootch!! <grin>.....Nice of you to remember us though. Funny how after over 30 years, I am the first Pathfinder type to find your homepage. Maybe we weren't too good at finding paths after all!! I'll always have good memories of those who flew over there. Even today, when I hear the distant beat of rotors blades, I automatically try to determine, direction, size or number of craft, and altitude. Hope you can use the pics,... stay safe, Aim High, Brother. Attached are some pics (5 zipped) & descriptions. (7 more on the way.) Hope it helps you "fill out" the history a little.

John E. Spillane
[redacted]



#1



These photos were taken between July of '69 - '70.

1. **"1CrusaderInbound"** A 187th slick inbound to the chopper pad of H & H Co 269th Cbt.Avn.Bn.
2. **"2Crusader"**.....The same 187th ship landing
3. **"3MuleskinnerShip"** A 242nd ShitHook also on the pad.
4. **"4CobraGunShip"**.....A 116th RatPack bad boy.
5. **"5BlackBaron6"**..... The "Old Mans" bird.
6. **"6PathfinderHootch"**... John Spillane & Mark Westhoven outside the Cavaliers Luxury Suite at I
7. **"7PathfinderSign"**The sign outside the courier shack on the pad at H&H Co.
8. **"8PathfinderTeam"**... (left to right) SFC Leslie L. George, Cpl Danny Lester, Cpl Lat Bowen, Cpl Kahler, & Cpl John Spillane.
9. **"9PathfinderTeam1"**....Cpl's Kahler & Bowen (standing), Cpl's Lester & Spillane (kneeling).
10. **"10Pipesmoke"**.....This is a Hornet ship that went down and was recovered by a Muleskinner "h doing the hooking.
11. **"11Pipesmoke2"** Same recovery.
12. **"12Slingloading"**.....That's me rigging a lot of PSP fro a slingload. (note the authorized patches
13. **"13PathfinderFlash"**... Was worn on the left breast pocket. The Black Baron Cross was worn on breast pocket.

#2



#3



74



RAT PACK

#5



#6



#7



#8



#19



#10



#11



#12



#13



Pathfinder patch

NAME THIS BATTALION PUBLICATION


Black Baron Courier??

Black Baron Release??

269

COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

Knights - Errant??



THE BLACK BARONS

The Little BBC??

Baron's Decree??

Baron's Times??

Baron's Report??

Baron's Report??

The Baren's Maille??

COMMANDER'S NOTES

1 May 1967

The _____ is an authorized bi-monthly publication under the supervision of the Commanding Officer, 269th Combat Aviation Battalion.

LTC Henry J. Nagao
Major Dick E. Roach
1Lt Thomas C. Hatcher
SFC Richard L. Marvin

Commanding Officer
Executive Officer
Information Officer
Asst. to Information Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

BLACK BARON 6

Normally, this spot would be reserved for the Battalion Commander. However, due to his eminent departure, the Editor felt it appropriate that the comments found herein be more of a farewell from all the members of the Black Baron Battalion to its departing Commander.

Sir, although your tenure here has been a short one, your presence will be deeply missed. Your guiding hand has benefited each and everyone of us directly and most appreciably in the very structures we live, work and eat in, as well as the sidewalks we traverse the battalion area on.

Your constant reminders concerning area beautification, although the projects have not been completed, will be remembered and as time progresses they will certainly take shape. This is only one of many areas that your guidance has been placed. Other areas are, but are not limited to, the following: the O & F manual, the Battalion SOP, and the In-processing check list for new units, and many more to numerous to mention.

It is difficult to truly express our thanks to you, as I am sure you understand. However, we do want you to know that your guidance and efforts in our behalf are greatly appreciated and will be remembered long after your departure. With your departure we hope you will take with you our best wishes in your new assignment and our deepest thanks for everything you have done to make this one of the finest Combat Aviation Battalions in Vietnam. We hope that you will occasionally think of us in the future and will hold a warm spot in your memories for the Black Baron's of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. Aim High, Sir!!!!!!!

BLACK BARON 5

The psychologists claim that no rational animal commits himself of his own volition to any act, good or bad, without the hope of reward. Lt. Hatcher, the acting Battalion Information Officer is no exception. In the birth of this publication he has visualized a means to bring the many faces of battalion life before us, the readers, and in so doing assist us in becoming the best informed battalion in-country. In a sense a reader might justly remark inwardly that this is only another sign that the battalion is coming of age.

But the Commander, in granting his approval for this publication had another thought in mind, one which significantly underscores the purpose that was Lt. Hatcher's when he conceived the idea for this publication. That thought reminded us of some very sage advice which appears in the foreward of just about every worthwhile history book ever written, namely, "to know nothing of the past is to know little of the present, and to have no concept of the future". Sound familiar?

Of course, the rewards of being knowledgeable about what is going on within one's own unit are too obvious and numerous to mention here. But in order to succeed, the publication places heavy reliance on the many faces of our battalion life as lived by all its members.

Accordingly, I join with the Commanding Officer to encourage your support and participation in helping Lt. Hatcher realize his reward in this undertaking; namely, to make the 269th the best informed battalion in Vietnam.

WHAT DO WE DO?

The S-3 Section

Controlling the operations of the assigned companies of the Black Baron's-- and frequently other, as well--is the main responsibility of the Operations and Training (S-3) Section of the Battalion Headquarters.

With Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Dalone in charge, the "3 shop" is subdivided into five elements: the Battalion Operations Center (Major Edward P. Carroll), the Intelligence and Security (S-2) Section (Master Sergeant Benjamin F. Phillips), the Administrative Section (Sergeant First Class Kenneth C. Bork), the Flight Training and Standardization Section (Major Bobby G. Franklin), and the Liaison Section (Major Leonard J. Sharp).

The Battalion Operations Center--commonly called the BOC-- is the nerve center of the battalion. It receives all missions from higher headquarters and sees that they get to the companies for accomplishment. They keep track of everything that goes on in the Black Baron's area of interest(24 hours a day), and reacts to such emergencies as lost or downed aircraft and, of course, our old friend "Charlie" and his mortars.

The "2 Crew" provides some of the information LTC Dalone and his assistant, Major John F. Zugschwert, need to plan and conduct operations; basically where the enemy is and how the weather will act. They also keep track of the classified material necessary to the functioning of the headquarters and sees that everyone in the unit has the proper security clearance.

The administrative types provide the glamorous but very necessary support--typing, filing and office management-- that keeps the operation running. They also publish the brisk OPORD's (operations orders) that translate the commander's desires into times, places, and tasks to be accomplished that turn planned operations into split-second reality.

Aviator proficiency, and the requirement for each aircrew of the battalion to perform as expected at the designated time, are the problems of the Flight Training and Standardization Section. Not all pilots arriving in Vietnam are experienced in the procedures and techniques used to accomplish our mission. Any also every flying outfit does certain things in a certain way. Seeing that these problems are controlled, and that adequate records are maintained, keeps our standardization instructor pilot away much of the time.

The standardization mission doesn't compare with that of the Liaison Section in requiring frequent and extended absences; that's what the title implies. The LNO's, as they are referred to, work with the units we support, keeping us informed of their plans and intentions and advising them of our capabilities and procedures.. Successful liaison can mean the difference between success and failure in an operation.

----- NEXT ISSUE -----

The Voice of Command---our Communications Section and its operations..

USE THE ADMIN COURIER? WHY NOT?

Daily the S-1 Courier Aircraft (Black Baron 1 Delta) flies to various locations in the III Corps tactical zone, to include Saigon (H-3), Bien Hoa, Long Binh, Phu Loi, Tay Ninh West, Dau Tieng and other locations as needed. However, prior to nonchalantly jumping aboard and relaxing to the piped-in stereo music and pawing the beautiful stewardess be sure the aircraft is not on a banana tree mission. The admin courier picked up 4 banana trees for planting in front of the Battalion Headquarters 29 Apr 1967. SFC Marvin(Beautification NCO) has access to as many trees as needed. If anyone in the company desires any, send SFC Marvin 2 men with combat equipment and shovels and he will get them to the right plantation and will provide transportation home.

BLACK HATS COPY

Your Battalion Pathfinders had a rather busy month during April. They were in support of both the 25th Inf Division and the 9th Inf Division down south of Duc Hoa and also helped kick-off operation Manhattan, a multi-Divisional operation in the Boi Loi woods on 23 Apr 67.

Three teams of 2 to 3 Pathfinders each were inserted with 2 Mech. Inf Battalions the day prior to the operation and they went into each of 3 LZ's prior to the airmobile delivery of 4 Inf Rifle Battalions. There was also one team of 2 Pathfinders stationed at Cu Chi airfield which was the pick-up zone (PZ) for this operation. These men at Cu Chi had the difficult job of organizing and extracting over 1200 U.S. Infantrymen to the forward area.

(Continued on Bottom of page 6)

UNCLASSIFIED

HAIL & FAREWELL/PROMOTION

The officer of Battalion Hqs and the 116th Hornet held a Hail and Farewell/Promotion party on 29 April 1967 at the Bee Hive Officers Club.

The Party was held in honor of LTC Henry J. Nagao our departing Battalion Commander and to welcome all new officers of both Bn Hqs and the Hornets.


The Party was also for our newly promoted S-3 LTC Arthur Delone, who held open bar for everyone until approximately 2200 hours. Hearty congratulations to our newest LTC! Also thank you very much for the drinks.

A fine meal was also prepared and served by the Mess Steward's of the 269 and the 116th. A sincere pat on the back to you both for a job well done or was that medimum well?????

Entertainment was provided by a combo from the Division band and from the sensity of traffic on the dance floor, I'm sure all enjoyed their fine music.

Many out-of-town visitors were seen throughout the well mixed crowd. It appeared that all areas were represented, We were honored to have our Group Commander Colonel Paski in attendance as well as the CO, 25th Avn Bn LTC Bearden. The Air Force was represented, also the American Red Cross, The Army Nurse Corps and the civilian population as well in the form of some shapely sex-a-taries from the big city (Saigon).

Major Dick E. Roach Battalion XO and Major Harold I. Small CO, 116th Aviation Co sponsored the affair to which a cordial thanks is extended by all those in attendance; even by those whose heads didn't seem to fit just right the foallowing morning.



Where-da #?! in Dau Tieng????

"WELCOME ABOARD"


A hearty welcome is extended to our most recent addition the 188th Aviation Company (AML) and its attached units the 4th Signal Detachment, 154th Medical Detachment and the 603rd Transportation Detachment.

The 188th is Commanded by Major Bobby E. Wofford; Executive Officer is Major James L. Rungee.

An advance party of 7 Officers and 1 enlisted man. arrived at Battalion Headquarters on 27 April 67. They received a warm welcome from the Battalion Commander LTC Nagao and visited briefly with members of the Battalion Staff.

The remainder of the 188th AML will arrive shortly.

Again a warm welcome aboard to all members of the 188th and its attached units stationed at Dau Tieng, APO 96268.



This is our first installment of what we hope will be a growing publication of this Battalion Headquarters. This issue gives our readers a sampling of things to come. However, it must be remembered that only you can really make this publication an informative and useful media of dissemination. Your support in any form, whether it be creative or physical, will be greatly appreciated.

As you have seen by our front page, we are without a name for this publication. Your suggestions will be gratefully accepted or if you feel that one of the names already indicated on the front page is your choice, let your Section Leader or the Battalion Information Officer know.

Flowers are hereby sent to the personnel of our Headquarters & Headquarters Company Mess Hall for their fine efforts in preparation of the food and mess hall surroundings during the recent visit of our new Group Commander and our new Battalion Commander.

Our thanks also for the well prepared meals served daily since our mess became operational. Your careful attention to doing a good job each and everyday of the week deserves our warmest praise.

I don't believe a complaint has been heard from our mess personnel when they were asked to rise early to serve chow for the Pathfinder's or when asked to hold late chow for a crew who was forced to remain out after normal chow hours.

This personal service is a mark of distinction that shows our Mess Stewart and Cooks are real professionals and truly concerned about their team members of the Black Baron Battalion.

I wish to extend my personal "thanks" to all those who helped in the last minute, frantic effort to make this publication meet its 1 May deadline.

Cover design by PFC Edward Czapiga
Insert drawings by SSG Peter P.

Margelony
Ed.

Pathfinder's Cont.

It was 1100 hrs. when two teams returned to Cu Chi after inserting the troops successfully into LZ's 1 & 2, hoping to get some chow and rest, instead, they got aboard a UH-1D and were flown by Major Zugschwert and Cpt. Barton to Duc Hoa. Here they organized an additional 380 troops, this time members of the 34th ARVN Ranger Battalion, for a combat assault into the Manhattan operational area.

The first team operating in landing zone # 1 was Sgt Speights and Sgt. Demesme. They had the unfortunate experience of being left behind in the landing zone when the choppers had made their last drop at that time. Having a radio, called Black Baron 3A and was extracted later.

Team # 2 in LZ 2 was formed by Sgt Corella, Sp4 Brock, J. and SP4 Arkwright. After a 20 mile ride in an APC (Armored Personnel Carrier) that started at 0800 hrs 22 Apr at Cu Chi and ended at 1300 hrs that day
(Continued on page 7) Page 6

At Cu Chi, paved streets lined the once remote rest and refit grounds of the Viet Cong.

By Shelby L. Stanton

In the fall of 1968, an Allied convoy was ambushed while traveling through a rubber plantation near Cu Chi, South Vietnam. Heavy mortar fire barraged the vehicles, sending geysers of dirt exploding down the roadway. As trucks and jeeps careened through the smoke, the Viet Cong opened up with heavy recoilless rifles. Trucks began to burn while enemy machine guns clattered. As rocket-propelled grenades scored numerous direct hits, the entire convoy obviously was in serious trouble.

Within moments, however, the transportation crews and their military police guardians responded with the trained precision of combat veterans. Braving the hail of bullets, wounded drivers drove their damaged vehicles off the road to keep the highway clear for armored reinforcements. In cases where drivers were dead behind the wheels of their stalled trucks, others gallantly leaped into the cabs and restarted the stalled trucks, driving them to safety beyond the ambush zone.

Military police armored cars roared into action with their own machine guns blazing at the tree line. Tanks left their pre-positioned areas along the highway and started for the battle area. Observation helicopters buzzed over the tree tops as their co-pilots radioed for aviation and artillery support and described targets. As the last trucks still able to move cleared the killing zone, gunships and armed helicopters arrived to strafe and rocket the rubber plantation.

The battle was soon over. Several demolished trucks littered the roadway, but Allied troops counted 73 enemy bodies in the smashed vegetation nearby. Several weapons were left behind, and blood trails led into the deeper woods, signifying the probability of higher casualties. The threat of enemy action at another time or place along the highway



Cu Chi served the 25th Infantry Division above the abandoned tunnels of the Viet Cong. The base itself was relatively safe, but the road in and out never was.

persisted, however, for this was just one incident in a persistent Viet Cong campaign against a very important American target: Cu Chi.

Cu Chi was one of the largest U.S. Army base camps in Vietnam and the home of the 25th Infantry Division ("Tropic Lightning") during the Vietnam War. The camp was located northwest of Saigon, close to the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong bastion of War Zone C. Although Cu Chi was located in a very wide area cleared by bulldozers and other heavy engineer equipment, its deliberate placement in the heart of enemy-controlled countryside made it one of the most danger-prone major installations during the war.

The base was supplied largely by motor convoys, and attacking these convoys was just one way in which the Viet Cong tried to hamper Army operations in the Cu Chi area.

When the 25th Infantry Division was alerted to leave Hawaii and deploy to Vietnam, the commander was informed of the formation's projected area of operations and told to select a wartime base

camp. As the division commander conferred with his engineers, intelligence analysts and operations experts, carefully reviewing secret maps, all were looking for a good area offering terrain defensibility and water supply. An area near the Vietnamese town of Cu Chi was tentatively chosen as the best alternative, even though they knew it was in the heart of enemy country.

A base development committee under Brig. Gen. Edward H. de Saussure was flown into the Cu Chi vicinity. The party made the final choice on an exact location after carefully checking the land and adjacent villages. Infantry and mechanized forces then moved into the fields and began battling the enemy for possession of the ground. The fighting was

often heavy and often involved tunnel-clearing operations, since the 25th Infantry Division had chosen a major Viet Cong rest area and supply base as the division's future home. The enemy was very familiar with the area and used their intricate web of tunnels to harass and delay engineering and clearing parties.

The American pressure to consolidate control was intense, however, and soon the Viet Cong decided to retreat to safer territory. This was in line with Communist tactics, because in guerrilla warfare it is more important to keep one's units viable than to waste them in open, pitched battles for fixed positions. As soon as the area was relatively safe for American construction crews and support troops, they laid out road and wire systems. Engineers with bulldozers and like heavy machinery began to clear fields of fire and to erect defensive barriers. During this opening stage of construction, the Viet Cong periodically returned—often through their hidden labyrinth of tunnels—and mounted local attacks or set up sniper positions.

In the meantime, the main portion of

As the combat home of the 25th Infantry Division, Cu Chi served double duty—as both a forward staging post and a relatively secure, rear base area. The primary purpose of Cu Chi was to give the division a platform to mount major airmobile, mechanized and infantry operations into the surrounding countryside. Additionally, the base served as a rest and training center. Soldiers returning from the field were housed at Cu Chi in tents and wooden barracks while they cleaned weapons, relaxed between operations and prepared to go back out into the field. Many soldiers of the division and its supporting units worked at Cu Chi fulltime and rarely left the base.

Throughout the war, Cu Chi was such an exposed American outpost that it remained a top-priority Viet Cong target. Most Viet Cong efforts to hamper Cu Chi operations aimed at doing damage without taking heavy losses in return. For this reason, actual frontal attacks against the main post were extremely rare.

Instead, one of the most common Viet Cong tactics was to stage an ambush on the major roads and highways used to resupply the base. This strategy was especially lucrative because the 1st Logistical Command and 25th Supply and Transport Battalion usually sent four daily truck convoys, averaging 70 vehicles each, into Cu Chi. These long motor columns picked up supplies at the warehouses and depots in Saigon and Long Binh and then had to travel along open roads to reach their destination.

The Viet Cong campaign against the ground supply routes leading into Cu Chi never seriously threatened the base, but it did cause inconvenience and high cumulative losses. The division concentrated its efforts to make travel as safe as possible by placing mutually supporting artillery in range of the roads. Tanks and mechanized vehicles, such as armored personnel carriers, periodically made sweeps, but were vulnerable to mines. This threat forced the division to employ frequent infantry search and clear operations and foot patrols. The soldiers carefully probed the roads with minesweepers, checked the rice fields and moved in platoon lines through the clumps of jungle around the roads. As an extra security precaution, permanent checkpoints and armed stations were posted at bridges and known danger points.

Continued convoy attacks forced the 25th Infantry Division to adopt new convoy tactics during 1968. The trucks carrying fuel and ammunition were always kept in the rear of any convoys. In this manner they would not block the rest of the convoy if they were destroyed.

the 25th Infantry Division prepared to leave Hawaii and sail to Vietnam. Before they left, the troops were given tents and folding cots and building materials for the new base. Units received pre-packaged lumber and other necessities in order to rapidly assemble their new field camp—even latrine kits. In addition to supplies for living quarters, the division took many items that would be scarce in Vietnam. These included essential electrical components such as refrigerators and generators, but many “comfort” items were also loaded, among them a giant ice machine plant for manufacturing ice cream.

Once the division’s main elements landed in Vietnam, they were trucked and flown into Cu Chi. The construction of the base camp began in earnest. The pre-assignment of living and working areas helped the division to settle in quickly. The area blossomed with tents and temporary structures as 15,000 men worked day and night with shovels, hammers and other tools. Cement was poured, cranes swung metal hut frames into place, and scores of men strained under the weight of timbers being erected. From the air, Cu Chi sprang up like a small city. Within weeks, the jungle was replaced by a maze of roadways, troop facilities, maintenance shops, airfields, motor pools, helicopter pads, hospitals, support offices, storage points, ammunition depots, artillery positions and headquarters buildings.

The 25th Infantry Division was keenly aware that the Viet Cong might launch a major assault to overrun Cu Chi and retake the area—the capture of Cu Chi would have been a major enemy victory. To prevent this from happening, the division surrounded its base with a sophisticated “bunker line.” This network of fighting positions and reinforced bunkers was interspersed with a series of observation towers sporting heavy machine guns and powerful searchlights, rows of barbed wire and complex fences with additional lighting, and extensive mine fields in front of earthen berms. Sensors and counter-mortar radar devices were used to maintain continual surveillance and to discourage infiltration tactics by VC sappers.

The bunker line ringing the camp was defended by various 25th Infantry Division units, which were assigned different sections on a standard basis. The American defenders were given detailed instructions in case of attack and rehearsed their battle plans constantly. Artillery howitzers and cannon within the main camp remained on ready alert. Jeep patrols and infantry ambush teams monitored the no-man’s land beyond the bunker line to keep potential enemy scouts at a safe distance.

Wreckers and crane vehicles were added, and the military police received more armored cars and gun-trucks to protect them. Gunships and command helicopters flew above each convoy to monitor potential ambush sites and watch suspicious activity below. Finally, Rome Plow "dozers" cleared out large swaths of land to each side of the roads to deprive the enemy of potential hiding places. These measures never completely stopped the convoy ambushes, but it became increasingly costly for the enemy to initiate attacks on major truck columns.

Nearly unique among U.S. Army base camps in Vietnam was Cu Chi's deliberate location close to a major War Zone and the Cambodian border, a selection made despite the area's previous role as a Viet Cong rest and refitting center. Unknown to the American engineers and logisticians who selected this seemingly innocuous site, its excellent drainage and natural landscape advantages already had been recognized by the Communist insurgent movement. Over the years, a complicated tunnel and underground headquarters system was dug into the earth and manned by some of the most trusted Viet Cong units—far more extensive than at first appeared to the first American arrivals.

The tunnels of Cu Chi, however, never posed the major threat to the base that some writers have claimed. As already noted, once the Americans moved into Cu Chi in force, the Viet Cong decided to abandon the area rather than become involved in a protracted struggle to retain it.

The Viet Cong commanders were smart enough to realize that guerrilla warfare would be unsuccessful in an open contest against superior U.S. tanks, aircraft and mechanized troops. The VC resisted the first intrusions into their territory by the 25th Infantry Division, but once it became clear that the Americans were determined to occupy this particular parcel of ground, the Viet Cong abandoned it. They regrouped in War Zone C or across the Cambodian border and remained outside Cu Chi base camp for the rest of the war.

The tunnels, though, did pose a nasty surprise to the first 25th Infantry Division troops entering the Cu Chi area, but the soldiers still searched most of them out. There were few tunnel engagements because the enemy withdrew. They found it much cheaper and easier to build new tunnel complexes in other areas than to defend their existing system in that one location. The "tunnels of Cu Chi" actually refer to the tunnels away from the base camp. Once the division commanders became aware that

Continued on page 57

BASES & INSTALLATIONS

Continued from page 17

tunnels were in the area, human and canine tunnel experts, sensor devices, smoke generators, anti-tunnel weapons and flooding machines were used to completely scour the ground beneath Cu Chi. In a matter of months, all the tunnels underneath the base camp were flushed out.

While most of the tunnels were destroyed, a few were deliberately left intact. These were used as part of a division tunnel-fighting school that became famous throughout Vietnam with a number of command-wide seminars and courses taught there. Volunteer "tunnel rats" and engineers from Allied contingents throughout Vietnam trained in these tunnels. After the war, some communist propagandists claimed that they lived in tunnels right under the American base camp but, according to the Army Center of Military History, the claim is extremely doubtful. If those tunnels are indeed located within the old Cu Chi perimeter, then the communists are simply showing visitors the old 25th Infantry Division tunnel school!

During the course of the war, meanwhile, the Cu Chi base camp became increasingly more sophisticated. Paved streets and parking lots took the place of narrow dirt lanes and fields. Mobile electronic computer vans were moved into the camp and used for routine administrative management. Many building interiors began to look like stateside offices, complete with automatic data processors and other modern equipment. Huge hangars and aircraft maintenance shops were established. Large power plants and electrical facilities were linked into depots and warehouses. Sections of the base became specialized in airframe construction or electronics. The management of Cu Chi base itself became a big job and by 1970, the base camp was so large and complex that it looked, at first glance, like any normal Army post in the United States.

In late 1970, the 25th Infantry Division began preparing to depart from Vietnam and return to Hawaii. As a base inventory was conducted and some items were taken out, the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam decided that the post was so large and safe that it should be turned over intact to the South Vietnamese. In December 1970, Cu Chi was signed over to the South Vietnamese 25th Infantry Division and became a major installation for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Less than five years later, Cu Chi was surrendered to contingents of the victorious North Vietnamese Army. □

Attachment: image/jpeg



Remember: You need to scan and clean your attachments every time you download or open them.

Yahoo! Messenger - Send instant messages to your online friends.

- [Address Book](#) ·
 [Alerts](#) ·
 [Auctions](#) ·
 [Bill Pay](#) ·
 [Bookmarks](#) ·
 [Briefcase](#) ·
 [Broadcast](#) ·
 [Calendar](#) ·
 [Chat](#) ·
 [Classifieds](#) ·
 [Clubs](#) ·
 [Companion](#) ·
 [Games](#) ·
 [GeoCities](#) ·
 [Greetings](#) ·
 [Invites](#) ·
 [Mail](#) ·
 [Maps](#) ·
 [Member Directory](#) ·
 [Messenger](#) ·
 [My Yahoo!](#) ·
 [News](#) ·
 [People Search](#) ·
 [Personals](#) ·
 [Photos](#) ·
 [Shopping](#) ·
 [Sports](#) ·
 [Stock Quotes](#) ·
 [TV](#) ·
 [Travel](#) ·
 [Weather](#) ·
 [Yahoo!igans](#) ·
 [Yellow Pages](#) ·
 [more...](#)

[Privacy Policy](#) -
 [Terms of Service](#) -
 [Guidelines](#)
 Copyright © 1994-2000 *Yahoo! Inc.* All rights reserved.

Memorial Fund

We have had a great response since our last newsletter, requesting donations for our memorial fund. Since we are just getting started, we have a considerable way to go. But we need to keep the momentum rolling.

For the new members of our association that are unfamiliar with our memorial project, we are in the process of establishing a site and building a Vietnam Helicopter Crew Member Memorial in St. Louis at Jefferson Barracks. We are also in the process of raising funds through our membership, as well as private individuals and business. Any donation no matter small or large is greatly appreciated by our association.

We are also asking for any individuals or groups that would like to become involved with our fund raiser, or have ideas on raising contributions to please contact me.

Charlie Rains has also informed me that our start up cost will be considerably less than the \$30,000 we reported earlier. Those costs will be more the area of \$15,000.

We are on a mission here. Let's make it a success.

Send donations to:

VHICMA Memorial Fund
P.O. Box 752592
Memphis, TN 38175

For Information:

Pete Christy
Chairman, Financial Committee
VHCMA Memorial Fund
P.O. Box 121
Woodbridge, CA 95258
(209) 333-0143 (office)
(209) 334-2119 (home)

There are several Mini-Reunions planned by several unit organizations. Check with the Reunion Registration Desk for details.

If you missed **Chris Noel** at the last reunion, then take heart, she has been invited again. However, at press time, we do not know if she will be attending.



From Dave DeSloover,

In the March (1996) newsletter I read an article on a Vietnam Memorial Centering around a UH-1 from Grand Ledge, MI.

Several years ago in May, 1986, the Monroe, MI Chapter VVA dedicated The Monroe County (Heck Park) Vietnam Memorial. The center piece is a UH-1M Gunship (that served in 'Nam) raised on a 20' steel structure stand, looking as if it's making a gun run.

The gunship faces a living memorial to all Monroe County Veterans of Vietnam. A black granite memorial to those that died and our one MIA (Melvin Dye - a Door Gunner). A couple of years ago, a Cobra was purchased and added to the memorial site.

If you are ever in Michigan, remember that just 15 miles north of the Ohio line and just off I-75 at Exit 15, sets one of the Best Vietnam Memorials I have ever seen.

Reunion Odds 'n Ends

If you wish to share a room in Tucson, call Charlie at the main office and he will try to match you up with someone, who may want to share on the room expenses.

Again, a raffle will be held to help offset some of the reunion expenses. So, If you can, bring something that can be donated for door prizes. It's not required, but perhaps something representative of your state.

Gary Roush, who is the Data Base Administrator for the VHPA is expected to be in Tucson with his computer system. He has quite an extensive data base

of helicopter incidents, aircraft tail numbers, and crews (both pilots and enlisted, either living or KIA).

The Smithsonian Institute will have two of their people present to talk to our members about the UH-1 and the Cobra.

Several members have inquired about tours of the Grand Canyon. AIRSTAR HELICOPTERS, INC flies out of Grand Canyon, AZ and employes two VHCMA members. Rates range from \$60-150/person depending of type or tour selected and will offer a 10% discount to VHCMA members. They may be contacted by phone at (520) 638-2622.

The Pink Panther Story

This is a portion of the Unit History of the 361st Aviation Company, as it appeared in it's 1969-70 Yearbook. Thanks to VHCMA member Wade C. Scott for his contribution.

The 361st Aviation Company (Escort) "Pink Panthers" supported free world forces in the II Corps tactical zone out of Camp Holloway, Pleiku, Republic of Vietnam as a part of the 52nd Aviation Battalion (Combat), 17th Aviation Group (Combat) with AH-1G Huey Cobra armed helicopters. The 361st was organized and activated on November 1, 1967 at Fort Hood, Texas. At the same time, the 665th Transportation Detachment and the 621st Signal Detachment (Avionics) were formed and attached to the 361st as support units. The "Pink Panthers" were commanded by Major John L. Deryck, of Scio, Ohio. Major Deryck was formerly Chief of the AH-1G Standardization branch at Cobra Hall, Hunter Airfield for over a year. He was one of the first Army aviators to fly the AH-1G when it was introduced into the Army.

The "Pink Panthers" were originally organized as a Charlie model or UH-1C gunship company. In fact, the unit received some of the last UH-1C model aircraft produced by the Bell Helicopter Company. The "Pink Panthers" arrived in Vietnam on April 6, 1968 and was initially deployed to Di An with the 269th Aviation Battalion. While at Di An the company received in-country training, local area orientation and underwent an infusion program and had its baptism of fire. The unit had arrived at an opportune time and quickly established a reputation as a 'Can Do' outfit in May of 1968 during the Tet II Counteroffensive in the Saigon area. The aviators in the unit were eager and highly motivated to do the job they been trained for and it wasn't long until radio transmission like, "Panther 36, Arrowhead 6, we have a fifty cal in that white house on the west side of the street, third floor, last window on the left. All the friendlies are on the east side of the street. Panther 36, Roger! going hot!"

That was the way those early battles were fought, street to street and house to house. It required calm nerves, sound judgment and a bit of courage and skill; The "Pink Panthers" proved more than equal to the challenge.

From Di An the 361st moved to Camp Holloway, Pleiku, in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. The dense jungle and treacherous mountain terrain was in complete contrast to the wide open and flat rice paddies of the southern III Corps area. The new area required completely new tactics: however, the 361st quickly adjusted to the new situation and mastered techniques for finding and fighting the elusive enemy.

Upon arriving in the Central Highlands one of the missions, a high percentage contact mission, assigned to the unit was the convoy escort of logistics along route 19 through the Mang Yang Pass to An Khe. The "Pink Panthers" foiled many an enemy ambush attempt with their accurate and devastating armed helicopter fire. The convoy usually reached their destination unscathed because the 361st were always there to see that the enemy could not threaten the critically needed supply lines.

On September 1, 1968, the "Pink Panthers" began supporting the 5th Special Forces, becoming their primary mission. Supporting the Special Forces, the unit participated in many operationaly successful missions, dangerous, demanding and highly complex missions, which only a highly trained unit could cover. The mission, because of its very dangerous nature and the high percentage of the battle damage sustained by the Cobras because of the crafty and much to be respected enemy forces encountered, had meant many long and arduous hours of maintenance. But all of the "Pink Panthers" prided themselves in the knowledge that the maintenance and safety records of the unit were unexcelled anywhere in Vietnam.

The "Pink Panthers" are probably best known and remembered for the outstanding armed helicopter support provided during the Ben Het-Dak To battles in May-July of 1969. Almost daily, the 361st aided entrapped ARVN units to break out of the enemy encirclements and suppressed or destroyed enemy automatic,

RPG firing and anti-aircraft weapons positions. Confirmed kills were difficult to corroborate, but the 361st is credited in official records with well over one hundred enemy kills. By this time, the unit had been flying Cobras for quite some time. The Cobra in the sky was feared and hated by the enemy. The simple presence of a "Pink Panther" cobra over an entrapped positions rallied flagging offensive section in friendly forces and caused the enemy to be extremely cautious.

During December 1969, the "Pink Panthers" supported the 23rd ARVN Division operations, aiding that unit in the defense on Duc Lap and Bu Prang in the southern portion of the II Corps zone. The unit performed the gamut of missions, escorting combat missions, protecting resupply aircraft flying vitally needed supplies into the surrounded troops in the infamous Volcano just outside of Duc Lap and responding to aerial observers requests for fire in the Viet Cong controlled Happy Valley to the southwest of Ban Me Thout.

In Saigon, on F.O.B., at Duc Lap-Bu Prang and at Ben Het-Dak To the "Pink Panthers" displayed the heroism that has become commonplace in this unit. Not only in their flying and maintenance, but in everything that the "Pink Panthers" undertake professionalism and esprit, loyalty and teamwork are characteristics. Ask anyone who has been supported by the 361st, what armed helicopter unit they would pick to support them from all the weapons companies in Vietnam and that answer would be the story of the true worth and ability of the 361st Aviation Company.

173rd AHC Yearbook

I was a "Gunrunner" with the 173rd AHC in 1970-71. During that period, I served under Major Barrbody as the Company Commander at Lai Kay. I have since lost my copy and have been searching for a replacement. If anyone has any advice or even a copy that might be copied, please reply.

Juan Eiguera
4125 Guadalupe Court
Orlando, FL 32817

Glossary of Terms

Airmobile Combat Assault (CA): The lifting of combat troops by helicopter into an unsecure landing zone. Enemy resistance is probable.

Airmobile Extraction: The lifting of combat troops by helicopter from terrain in which the enemy has the capability to resist. Resistance can be expected to increase as each lift is made and the friendly force's perimeter becomes smaller.

Airmobile Task Force (AMTF): The air lift and ground maneuver elements required to conduct an airmobile operation.

Airmobile Task Force Commander: The commander who exercises control of all elements of an Airmobile Task Force; usually the ground force commander.

Airmobility: Tactical mobility afforded a ground maneuver force by helicopters; the capability of a ground force to tactically deploy through the air, implies tactical integrity in loading.

Army Aviation Element (AAE): A liaison element from the supporting unit for coordination and planning of aviation operations. This element is found at I Field Force Vietnam, II Field Force Vietnam, and at ARVN Corps.

Armed Helicopter (Gunship): A helicopter equipped with an attached weapons system which is fired by the pilot or co-pilot.

Company Lift: A unit of lift helicopters, capable of lifting the assault elements of a rifle company in one lift.

Eagle Flight: Heliborne infantry troops on air alert to perform immediate reaction missions for a ground commander.

Flight: Two or more aircraft with a common mission under the command of a designated flight leader.

Heavy Gun Team: Three armed helicopters operating as a tactical element.

Landing Zone (LZ): A specified area for landing helicopters to debark troops and/or cargo in, or in support of, an airmobile assault.

Lift Helicopter (Slick): A helicopter used for the purpose of lifting troops and/or cargo.

Light Gun Team: Two armed helicopters operating as a tactical element.

Air Mission Commander: An officer designated to command aviation elements on a specific mission or operation.

Platoon of Aircraft (Plat): Two sections or more of aircraft under command of a platoon commander.

Release Point (RP): A geographic point, recognizable from the air, at which a flight arrives in proper formation and then proceeds to designated area under less centralized control.

Smoke Ship: A UH-1 helicopter especially equipped with a smoke generator capable of laying a thick cylinder of smoke along the aircraft's flight path.

Surveillance: A continuous and close watch over a specific route, area, or point for information on the enemy.

FACILITY	INITIAL	FACILITY
FIELD MILITARY 201 FILE AND ALLIED RECORDS	<i>in</i>	23. PROVOST MARSHAL
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING OFF (Communications Account)	<i>X</i>	24. QUARTERMASTER
FINANCIAL DATA RECORDS FOLDER (Personnel Officer)	<i>AK</i>	25. QUARTERMASTER
LIBRARY	<i>X</i>	26. SIGNAL
MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY	<i>X</i>	27. SPECIAL UNIT CHANGE OF STATUS
ORDNANCE OFFICER	<i>X</i>	28. SPECIAL SERVICES OFFICER
PERSONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER (A.F.R.)	<i>de</i>	29. UNIT AND REGIMENTAL SUPPLY
PERSONNEL REGISTER (Sign Out)	<i>X</i>	30. ...
POSTAL OFFICER (Notice of Change of Address)	<i>15</i>	

9299909

you are in, Monday 25 5224

Change

January 31,

Aviation History

22nd Assault Company
Cranes from
Platoon of
Company the
Corps, were
22nd Bat-

tion's base at Vung Tau, specifically for the operation. During "Yellowstone" over 100 Huey, 30 Chinook and the giant Cranes were utilized to support the ground troops sweeping through the Katun area.

EFFICIENCY

The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion is the primary support element servicing the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. There are three Assault Helicopter Companies (Aslt Hel Co) in the 269th. Each Assault Helicopter Company has "slicks", which are primarily troop carrying helicopters, equipped with two side-mounted machine guns. Gunships are outfitted with an arsenal of assorted weapons and ordnance. (50 cal., 40mm, 2.75 and 3.5 in. rocket, 7.62mm mini-gun.) The mission of an Assault Helicopter Company is to provide tactical air movement of combat troops in airmobile operations, and to provide tactical air movement within the combat zone. To fulfill these missions the 269th has the 116th Aslt Hel Co (Hornets) and its gunship element the "Stingers", located at Cu Chi. The 187th Aslt Hel Co (Black Hawks) with their gunships the "Rat Pack", located at Tay Ninh, and the 188th Aslt Hel Co (Black Widows) with their gunships the "Spiders".

AND "PINK HOUSE"
Using World War II magnesium incendiary bombs, ... has tried to burn large ... forests

Land/Clear

SAISY CUTTER" AND "C
15,000-pound concussion
helicopter landing zones
everything that grows in a

Ground

ROME PLOW
Bulldozers
800,000

ASSAULT HELICOPTER CO.

ON 28 APRIL 1968

NE SALLY, NORTH OF (WAG) HUE,
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET NAM.

WIRD
FLIGHT
GUNS
PLATOON



DECORATIONS

Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967 (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 269th Aviation Battalion, cited; DA GO 48, 1968)

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967 (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 269th Aviation Battalion, cited; DA GO 22, 1968)

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1968 (269th Aviation Battalion cited; DA GO 21, 1969, as amended by DA GO 46, 1969)

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968 (269th Aviation Battalion cited; DA GO 48, 1971)

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968-1970 (269th Aviation Battalion cited; DA GO 5, 1973, and DA GO 6, 1974)

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1970 (269th Aviation Battalion cited; DA GO 51, 1971)

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1970 (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 269th Aviation Battalion, cited; DA GO 55, 1971)

269TH AVIATION BATTALION BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kambrod, Matthew R. "Black Barons." *United States Army Aviation Digest* 14 (October 1968):32-33.

Rottman, Larry, ed. *The 25th Infantry Division "Tropic Lightning" 1 Oct 66-1 Oct 67*. Doraville, Georgia: Albert Love Enterprises, 1967.

269th

THE BLACK BARONS—VIETNAM'S DISCIPLINED PROFESSIONALS

A weather ship searches the skies of Vietnam at 0400 hours. Artillery preparations flash sporadically in shadowed rice fields far below while a dark mass slowly gathers, billows, and soon looms eerily over the landing zone. In an operations bunker northwest of Saigon, an Air Mission Commander receives reports from the airborne weather crew and scrupulously commits his airmobile assets to a long day of war. Within minutes he boards a command and control aircraft carrying an Airmobile Task Force Commander and himself aloft to guide the conduct of the assault.

↑
In a base camp pick-up zone not far away, sixty crews cautiously ignite the turbines of their helicopters. Darkness still shrouds the aircraft as ground forces, mounting the waiting lift ships, quickly lean against the bulkheads, nervously hoping for a final rest before the landing zone. Chopper pilots bite anxiously on unlit cigars as a flight leader's order cracks the helmetted pre-dawn silence. The slick ships, in sequence, rise slowly and tilt forward, their rotors viciously straining to lift the heavy loads over the thick canopy which now too rapidly approaches the dimly lit cockpits. Some apprehension, a hopeful pull for power, a tightness in each pilot's stomach as his skids brush through the tree tops, and then relief, as the flight lifts and all ships are reported airborne. Another day thus begins for the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, Vietnam's "BLACK BARON" Battalion, which daily fights the most intense airmobile war in the Southeast Asian combat theater. This is the story of that battalion.

↑
Activated in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in July of 1966, for deployment to the combat zone, the 269th arrived in the Republic of Vietnam in January of 1967. Designated as the primary aviation support battalion to the 25th Infantry Division, the 269th consistently has been committed to the execution of airmobile operations in all the major exercises conducted in the III Corps Tactical Zone. During the airmobile insertions of U.S. Forces into the landing zones of JUNCTION CITY II, KOLE KOLE, DIAMONDHEAD, BARKING SANDS, MANHATTAN, ATLANTA, YELLOWSTONE, and innumerable other significant operations, BLACK BARON mettle, severely tested, proved its strength against the strongest of enemy forces. Heavily committed in the terrain of War Zone "C", the "Parrot's Beak," the "Iron Triangle," and the "Hobo Woods," the 269th has earned the distinction of repeatedly flying more combat hours,¹ conducting more combat assaults,² hauling more troops, cargo, and med-evacs, than any other combat aviation battalion in the war today.

1. Each assault helicopter company of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion consistently averages over 3,000 flying hours per month.
2. During the entire period of 1 August 1967 through 31 October, the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion conducted battalion size combat assaults, comprised of from two to six assault helicopter companies, once every eighty-nine hours.

The employment of BLACK BARON aircraft in these hotly contested areas, however, has taken its toll. The intensity of the combat of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion's operations can readily be attested to by the damage received from hostile fire by over 296 ships in a span of six months.³ These statistics serve as tangible evidence that the BLACK BARON Battalion is daily fighting the most aggressive airmobile war in the Vietnamese combat zone.

↑
The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion has been proudly led through eight months of intense operations by LTC JAMES H. MERRYMAN of Hot Springs, Arkansas. The battalion headquarters is located thirty miles northwest of Saigon, at Cu Chi, also the home and base camp of the 25th TROPIC LIGHTNING Division. In fulfilling its tactical missions the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion has six subordinate units: a headquarters company, three assault helicopter companies, one assault support helicopter company, and one reconnaissance airplane company. The assault helicopter companies base camps, strategically located to afford the best tactical support to each of the three brigades of the 25th Division, span the entire western breadth of the III Corps area.

↑
The airmobile companies, the 116th, the 187th, and the 188th, better known in their tactical environment as the HORNETS, the BLACKHAWKS, and the BLACK WIDOWS, respectively, are located at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh, and Dau Tieng. Each is comprised basically of two types of aircraft, troop carrier helicopters and gunships, both of which are models of the now famous Bell-UH-1. All the aircraft are armed for protection. (sticks) The gunships, however, as primarily offensive machines, are heavily laden with many varied ordnance systems. Included in the arsenal are .20 and .40 mm guns, 2.75 and 3.5 inch rocket launching systems, and 7.62 "mini-guns." The achievements of the BLACK BARON assault helicopter companies in combat operations have become legendary in their time. Each assault company has on numerous occasions been subjected to the heaviest fire Charlie could deliver. This included automatic weapons, RPG's, ^{rockets} and mortars. In all cases each man did his job and accomplished his mission. Formations were maintained--disciplined professionalism was obvious everywhere. The valor displayed by the helicopter crews and their dedication to the support of ground forces has been unparalleled in aviation history. The respect, admiration, and gratitude of infantry soldiers has further been evidenced by the presentation to the officers and men of the 269th awards to include the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Stars, Distinguished Flying Crosses, Purple Hearts, Bronze Stars, and innumerable Air Medals for Valor.

↑
Rewriting Chinook tactical history in Vietnam is the BLACK BARON CH-47 unit, the MULESKINNERS of the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company. Flying from Cu Chi, the crews of these medium cargo helicopters daily resupply forward field positions with rations, heavy weapons, ammunition, and all other forms of logistical requirements. The huge Chinooks also insert and

3. Most of these aircraft were recovered by CH-47 or were able to return to base under their own power. Very few were total loss.

extract large troop units, often while the ground forces are still in heavy enemy contact. The true value and capability of the CH-47, daily being further explored, greatly expands the resources of the BLACK BARONS.

The battalion's fixed wing unit, the 21st Reconnaissance Airplane Company, BLACK ACES. Located at Tay Ninh, provides a visual reconnaissance capability to the many units in the III Corps area. Day and night the low drone of an O-1 can be heard above, as pilots and observers methodically search the ground for the elusive enemy. The access of these crews to voluminous and brutal artillery barrages makes the BLACK ACES Bird-dog one of the most formidable and deadly weapons in Veitnam.

The 269th also has its own ~~specialy~~ smoke ship, "Smokey Baron." This aircraft is used extensively on all airmobile operations, be they battalion or company size. Daily, "Smokey" can be seen shuttling from one operational area to another in support of the battalion's aviation elements. Upon special request from infantry ground commanders, smoke screens have been layed to support an infantry ground move or assist on urgent med-evac. The employment of the smoke ship has been heartfully appreciated by all who have received its assistance. Denying the enemy a point target capability, the smoke ship has substantially decreased the number of aircraft losses normally assessed as damage from enemy fire. In fact, not once has an aircraft been shot down in a landing zone which was smoked by "Smokey Baron."

The Aviation Battalion has assigned to it its own organic Pathfinder Detachment, the CAVALIERS. This unit provides navigational assistance and terminal guidance to all of the battalion's aviation elements. Primarily, however, pathfinder personnel have been utilized in the control of infantry elements in pickup and landing zones. Normally inserted into forward field locations hours before an airmobile operation, pathfinders have been responsible for insuring the correct placement of loads in suitable locations for an airmobile pick-up. Most recently the CAVALIERS have also been heavily committed to the control of logistical moves by Chinooks. The monumental successes achieved by the 269th in the conduct of airmobile operations has in no small measure been due to the efficiency of its pathfinder personnel.

The "BLACK BARONS" conducted their first combat assault on 14 April 1967. Today, 46 battalion size and hundreds of company size combat assaults later, the 269th has rightfully earned the title of "Disciplined Professionals." Its operations have supported not only the U.S. 25th Infantry Division, but also the U.S. 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, the 5th U.S. Special Forces Group, the 1st Australian Task Force, and the Tiger and the White Horse Divisions of the Republic of Korea Army. BLACK BARON airmobile operations have required the frequent attachment of complete aviation battalions, placing over 100 aircraft in the air at one time in the conduct of a combat assault. In fact, on the 42nd battalion operation over 100 UH-1's and 30 CH-47's and CH-54's were used in what was probably the largest airmobile assault ever conducted. BLACK BARON statistical compilations of combat troops transported, cargo tonnage hauled, and sorties flown for a six month period, constitute impressive figures.⁴

4. During a six month time frame the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion transported 266,621 combat troops and hauled 19,401 tons of cargo in over 201,438 sorties flown. Not included herein are the statistics of the most recently conducted OPERATION YELLOWSTONE, during which, in the first three days, 4,581 troops were inserted into landing zones and 912 tons of cargo moved into forward locations.

Of great satisfaction to all personnel of the unit are 748 emergency med-evacs returned to hospital areas from the front lines by BLACK BARON aircrews. A satisfaction of an entirely different nature is found in the 458 Viet Cong killed by BLACK BARON gunships in a six month time frame. This is far more than most infantry brigades have accounted for.

Regardless of the facet of airmobile operations considered, the 269th is in all respects a thoroughly professional combat aviation battalion. Its accomplishments are vast in scope and quite varied in nature. Certainly persons may readily be identified for individual achievements. The full success of the battalion, however, must be attributed to the men who formed it, who comprise it, and who have fought and continue to fight to make it what it is. The 269th is more than a unit in Vietnam. It is a constant endeavor toward professionalism and further excellence. It is a belief in the certain success of a disciplined unit. Above all these things, however, it is a lasting tribute to the spirit of Army Aviation in the Republic of Vietnam. The BLACK BARONS can best be summed up by their motto and the goal of every man assigned--"AIM HIGH."



269A

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, composed of two assault helicopter companies at the onset of the time frame covered by this report, has increased in size to its present composition of three assault helicopter companies, one reconnaissance airplane company, and one assault support helicopter company. The Assault Helicopter Company gained, the 188th, was assigned to the Battalion on 2 May 1967. The 21st Reconnaissance Airplane Company, a fixed wing unit, had its main body close in the Republic of Vietnam on 29 June 1967. Finally, the 242d Assault Support Helicopter Company, a CH-47 unit, had its advanced party arrive in country on 27 July 1967. These units, all new in country, trained for overseas deployment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Lewis, Washington; and Fort Benning, Georgia, respectively. The 188th was subsequently assigned to DAU TIENG, the 21st to TAY NINH, and the advanced party of the 242d to BIEN HOA. The location of the 242d is temporary, pending engineer completion of its ultimate location at CU CHI.

2. The 187th Assault Helicopter Company, whose arrival in Vietnam and assignment to this Battalion occurred in March of this year, is

CONFIDENTIAL

July 67

stationed at TAY NINH.

The 116th Assault Helicopter Company, the oldest company in the Battalion, remains at CU CHI.

During the period under discussion, the 116th and 187th Assault Helicopter Companies primarily supported the three brigades of the 25th Infantry Division. Major operations in which the Battalion's assault helicopter companies participated included Operations MANHATTAN, BARKING SANDS, KOLE KOLE, and DIAMOND HEAD. Infrequent requirements sent both assault helicopter companies to the southern portions of the III Corps Tactical Zone and northern portions of the IV Corps Tactical Zone, in support of the 9th Infantry Division.

Numerous operations were conducted in conjunction with ARVN troops as well as CIDG personnel. All operations supporting our own forces and Vietnamese troops proved highly successful from an airmobile standpoint.

During the period of interest, the 188th Assault Helicopter Company, operational on 15 June, sustained considerable damage to its aircraft while under a heavy mortar attack on 24 June at DAU TIENG. Immediately upon becoming operational again, the unit was moved to the II CTZ on a temporary basis in direct support of Korean units located in the TUY HOA-PHU HIEP area, just north of NHA TRANG. The date of movement was 7 July, with a return date estimated to be on or about 1 September 1967.

6.(c) The 21st Reconnaissance Airplane Company became operational on 15 July. The last two weeks of the month found this unit's aircraft dispersed throughout the III CTZ in support of numerous tactical situations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The advanced party of the 242d Assault Support Helicopter Company arrived in Vietnam during the last week in July. The key personnel that this unit sent forward are establishing the basic unit functions necessary as a foundation for supporting the main body due to close in early August.

The units established in country and presently operational, i.e., the 116th, 187th, and 188th Assault Helicopter Companies and the 21st Reconnaissance Airplane Company, supported ground forces to an extent well worth noting. A composite tally of the Battalion's efforts follows. The figures, it is felt, warrant close scrutiny since they are directly indicative of the proud accomplishments of this Battalion for the quarter of interest. Further statistics for the period, on a "per company" basis, will show that the companies of this Battalion are second to none in the entire 1st Aviation Brigade. Efforts expended and successes achieved are borne out below. Your attention is invited to the following.

During the quarter of concern, 1 May to 31 July, the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion flew 68,885 sorties, logging a total of 23,819 accumulated flying hours. 119,637 passengers were carried and 4,247 tons of cargo have been moved in support of ground forces. 232 Viet Cong were killed during the period by Army Aircraft of this Battalion. The 269th evacuated a total of 433 medical casualties.

During the period the Battalion itself suffered 13 KIA and 26 WIA. 147 aircraft received combat damage, while the total number of hits received from ground fire was 118. Most of the hostile fire taken was so taken during a total of 101 days of combat assault

July 67

missions in support of ground forces.

The statistics indicated substantiate an indisputable fact. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, in support of ground offenses launched against the PARROT'S BEAK, and WAR ZONE C, both in the 25th Infantry Division's Area of Operations, is supporting operations in two of the most hotly contested areas in the Republic of Vietnam. Both are recognized geographically as well fortified and well defended Viet Cong strongholds.

Further, the figures shown are evidence that the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion is supporting the most aggressive action in the war today. A study comparing the Battalion's statistics with those of any other battalion in the 1st Aviation Brigade will indicate that the 269th is far more involved in airmobile operations, has carried more troops, has flown more hours, carried a greater tonnage, has physically accounted for more VC forces killed, and has evacuated more wounded from its tactical operational area, than any other aviation unit in the entire 1st Aviation Brigade. This Battalion takes deep satisfaction from these accomplishments.

289#

Class V support for tactical operations is provided from SKYBOLT refuel and re-arm points located at CU CHI, TAY NINH, DAU TIENG, and DUC HOA. These points are operated by the 25th Infantry Division. On operations outside of the 25th Division's area, support is furnished by the supported unit. ASP are located at each major installation in the 25th Division area.

July 67

INTRODUCTION

The success of ground operations in VIETNAM is directly proportional to the prudent management of aviation assets. Never in the history of modern warfare have ground forces been so completely dependent on air mobility as they are today on the helicopter in this ASIAN environment. The employment of helicopters and heliborne forces is predicated on a doctrine which is still in the formative stages even today. Army Aviation has taken immense strides forward in brief increments of time. Its growth has been at least hyperbolic. With a concept so new and so extremely vital to the success of the tactics of ground commanders in VIETNAM, it is of paramount importance that an understanding of aviation management and air mobility be possessed not only by aviation officers, but also, and in equal depth, by the commanders and staffs of the supported units of the combat arms.

It is my sincere hope that the comments included in this document will benefit aviation and ground commanders and staffs, both those here in the combat theater, and those training in the deployable units in

the continental UNITED STATES. The topics of discussion reflect problems encountered through the last three months of continuous combat operations by this command. I assure you that no topic is fictional. Rather, our "lessons learned" have been taught us by the wisest of mentors, experience.

It is with immense pride and satisfaction that I invite your attention to the Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. It is, by far, the Combat Aviation Battalion most intensely committed to the conduct of airmobile operations in the REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

LTC JAMES MERRYMAN

LOGISTICS

269#

Units at CU CHI, TAY NINH, and DAU TIENG receive a majority of Class I supplies by motor convoy. This is true for all classes. This method has proven satisfactory for CU CHI and TAY NINH; DAU TIENG, however, is a problem area. DAU TIENG is in a comparatively isolated location in relation to highway transportation. The only route out of DAU TIENG is open only to armed convoys. The route is subject to hostile fire and acts of sabotage as well as frequent flooding and washouts during the rainy season. The use of this route involves excessive time and mileage because the route is via TAY NINH. All vehicles making the supply runs to CU CHI or SANGON must take this circuitous route. In a like manner all supplies destined for DAU TIENG must follow this route, thus placing DAU TIENG on the very end of the supply line. As a result fresh produce and dairy products are very scarce. Convoys normally do not go through to DAU TIENG. Supplies must be trans-loaded at TAY NINH to 25th Division trucks. This accounts for another day of in-transit time, increasing the spoilage of produce. Lack of refrigerated transportation between TAY NINH and DAU TIENG is another factor contributing to spoilage of Class I supplies. This has caused a sizable allocation of unit resources to the task of obtaining and transporting suitable produce. DAU TIENG's remote location has further caused commitment of man-hours and vehicles to ports and supply runs far in excess of the other units of the Battalion.

All units maintain supply accounts with 1st Log Command supply and service units for Class II and IV. Units at CU CHI have drawn Class IV supplies through the 25th Division supply office. Increased USARV control of bunker and fortification materials has forced 25th Division to cancel all non-divisional requisitions for materials. Units of the Battalion stationed at CU CHI have established, or are in the process of establishing, Class IV accounts with the 267th Supply Battalion, LONG BINH. This has caused a delay in obtaining materials and has slowed progress in revetment and shelter construction.

Class III and V support is obtained through 25th Division or 1st Log Command units at the respective base camps. MIL-I-7506 oil proved to be in short supply during the early weeks of the quarter. Supplies since that time have remained good. Companies within the Battalion possess the resources to establish temporary refuel/rearm points to support Battalion operations from field locations. Supplies at these points must, however, be furnished by the ground units supported by the assault companies.

July 69

269k

ORGANIC FLARE SHIP

An organic capability for dropping flares is required in each assault helicopter company.

On numerous occasions this unit has been involved in operations requiring either the insertion or extraction of ground elements during periods of darkness. It has been established policy to request a flare-drop aircraft through channels from either the Air Force or another assault helicopter company. When available, organic flare ships and crew have been used to cover that period of time prior to the arrival of the requested flare ship, to provide a larger area of coverage with flares, and to act as a standby in the event of possible delays or mishaps. In one typical case, an Air Force "Spooky" was requested by the ground commander through his channels. At the same time, the air mission commander placed one of his aircraft on immediate standby with a load of 30 M-24 aircraft flares. As darkness began to fall, the Air Force ship had not arrived and the standby UH-1D was called out. Due to the foresight of the air mission commander, the organic flare ship was able to provide enough light for an insertion of Pathfinders into the PZ and LZ, the extraction of three-ten ship lifts from a PZ to a night location, the extraction of the Pathfinders, and the return of ground commander and his party to the night location by the C&C ship. The Air Force aircraft never reported on station.

An organic flare ship be utilized only if all aviators and crews are trained in the proper operation and use of flares, because it is not feasible to set aside one aircraft and crew on a permanent basis.

SOURCE: ORLL's, 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, April 1968

Aircraft Ground Fire/Hit Report: In early November 1967, the format and reporting procedure for the daily Ground Fire/Hit Report was changed and a requirement was placed on each major subordinate unit for the daily submission, by electronic means when possible, of a report of all ground fire incidents giving the following information:

- Date/time group of the incident
- Coordinates
- Type of Aircraft
- Altitude of aircraft
- Airspeed of aircraft
- Intensity of fire
- Type of fire, (SA/AW/.50 Cal/Other)
- Number of hits sustained, if any
- Extent of Damage, if any

269th

269th AVIATION BATTALION

HERALDIC ITEMS

DISTINCTIVE INSIGNIA (BADGE)

Description: A silver distinctive insignia consisting of an equilateral triangle one angle up formed by three yellow bars with overlapping ends surmounted by a vertical crossbow-quarrel with a lightning flash radiating diagonally outwards and upwards from each side of the quarrel shaft immediately above the feathers and crossing the side bards of the equilateral triangle all on a blue cinquefoil shaped base.

Symbolism: The golden colored triangle represents a three runway complex on an airfield. The quarrel symbolizes aircraft using these runways, while the two flashes allude to an aviation battalion's capability to provide a ground control approach and aircraft communication and control facilities. The blue represents the sky. It is also associated with aviation units.

FLAG DEVICE

The flag device is the same as the distinctive insignia (badge).

LINEAGE AND HONORS

LINEAGE

RA
(nondivisional)

Constituted 7 April 1966 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 269th Aviation Battalion. Activated 1 July 1966 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Reorganized and redesignated 1 December 1968 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 269th Aviation Battalion.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

Vietnam

- Counteroffensive, Phase II
- Counteroffensive, Phase III
- Tet Counteroffensive
- Counteroffensive, Phase IV
- Counteroffensive, Phase V
- Counteroffensive, Phase VI

- Tet 69/Counteroffensive
- Summer-Fall 1969
- Winter-Spring 1970
- Sanctuary Counteroffensive
- Counteroffensive, Phase VII



SOURCE: INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY, WASHINGTON DC

(A)

DECORATIONS

Meritorious Unit Commendation, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967. ✓

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1968 ✓

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968 ETC

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1968-1970

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1970 ETC

Republic of Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1970

~~269TH AVIATION BATTALION BIBLIOGRAPHY~~

Kambrod, Matthew R. "Black Barons." *United States Army Aviation Digest* 14 (October 1968):32-33.

Rottman, Larry, ed. *The 25th Infantry Division "Tropic Lightning" 1 Oct 66-1 Oct 67*. Doraville, Georgia: Albert Love Enterprises, 1967.

single line per decoration please

269th

Significant Events

The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, composed of the three assault helicopter companies and one assault support helicopter company at the onset of this report, has decreased in size to its present composition of two assault companies and one assault support helicopter company. Since the termination of the last quarterly report, the 188th Assault Helicopter Company, formerly stationed at DAU TIENG, has been reassigned to the 16th Aviation Group in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The 361st Aviation Company (Aerial Weapons), arriving in-country during April 1968, has been assigned to DI AN, and is under the control of the 269th for training. The 269th Combat Aviation Battalion Headquarters, the 242d Assault Support Helicopter Company, and the 116th Assault Helicopter Company remain at CU CHI, with the 187th Assault Helicopter Company continuing its support from TAY NINH.

↑
Due to the loss of the 188th Assault Helicopter Company from DAU TIENG, the 269th has lost the capability of mission assignments of one assault helicopter company continually to each Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division. (In many instances the Battalion will provide one company for the support of two infantry battalions of separate Brigades in one day during different time periods.) Although this type support has created some minor problems in coordination between the supported units and the aviation element and their effective release times, it has in no way affected the excellent rapport now existing between the ground commanders and aviation commanders.

April 68

269th

Center

←

Transportation and Troop Movement

←

The 188th Assault Helicopter Company was moved to another Corps area for an extended period of time. Because of the undetermined time length, the move was made as a complete PCS. Alert orders were given in sufficient time to make adequate preparation and alert the proper agencies as to the fact that there would be a move. However, pertinent data was withheld until the last moment which resulted in many changes and crash programs. It is necessary to know the final destination as soon as possible so that a unit can have an idea what they should carry with them. As it turned out, their final destination had absolutely no facilities of any type and they were required to carry more than just TOE equipment in order to properly sustain themselves. This increased the total sortie requirement from 35 to 60. Fortunately, the TALO adjusted to the additional requirement. Also, this move was made under a combat essential priority which allowed the complete air portion of the move to be completed in less than 72 hours. Over-size vehicles and five low-boys loads of general cargo were convoyed to New Port, Saigon where they were loaded aboard LST's and dispatched by surface transport. The convoy arrived three days before the ship was ready for loading and the main problem which resulted was billeting of the personnel in the Saigon area until they departed. The surface movement was completed by 30 March 1968. The unit flew their organic aircraft to their final destination leaving a maintenance aircraft and two UH-1C's which were not flyable at the time they departed. Two aircraft were flown out two weeks later and the last aircraft is still undergoing maintenance at the 20th Transportation Company. The aircraft will be picked up by the 188th AHC when maintenance is completed.

April 68

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 873541

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

269TH
COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Merryman
Commanding Officer

116TH
ASSAULT
HELICOPTER
COMPANY

Major Harold I. Small
Transportation Corps
Commanding

187TH
ASSAULT
HELICOPTER
COMPANY

Major William F Bauman
Infantry
Commanding

188TH
ASSAULT
HELICOPTER
COMPANY

Major John H. McWhorter, Jr
Infantry
Commanding

21ST
RECONNAISSANCE
AIRPLANE
COMPANY

Major Ernest C. Strum
Corps of Engineers
Commanding

242D
ASSAULT SUPPORT
HELICOPTER
COMPANY

Major Paul L. Stansel
Armor
Commanding

THE 269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

Inclosure 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HEADQUARTERS
269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION

STRENGTH STATUS

UNIT	LOCATION	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH				ASSIGNED/ATTACHED STRENGTH			
		OFF	WO	EP	AGG	OFF	WO	EP	AGG
HHC 269TH	CU CHI	21	2	86	109	26/1	2	129/10	157/11
SUB TOTAL		21	2	86	109	26/1	2	129/10	157/11
116TH ASLT HEL CO	CU CHI	15	52	152	219	19	35	169/9	223/9
283D SIG DET	CU CHI	1	0	9	10	1	0	8	9
392D TC DET	CU CHI	1	1	70	72	1	1	54	56
431ST MED DET	CU CHI	1	0	8	9	0	0	10	10
SUB TOTAL		18	53	239	310	21	36	241/9	298/9
187TH ASLT HEL CO	TAY NINH	14	53	152	219	15	39	166/8	220/8
1ST SIG DET	TAY NINH	0	1	8	9	1	0	7	8
602D TC DET	TAY NINH	1	1	71	72	1	1	71	73
SUB TOTAL		15	55	230	300	17	40	244/8	301/8
188TH ASLT HEL CO	DAU TIENG	14	53	152	219	24	32	161/4	217/4
4TH SIG DET	DAU TIENG	0	1	8	9	1	0	7	8
154TH SIG DET	DAU TIENG	1	0	8	9	1	0	7	8
603D TC DET	DAU TIENG	1	1	70	72	1	1	63	65
SUB TOTAL		16	55	238	309	27	33	238/4	298/4
21ST RECON CO	TAY NINH	32	1	95	128	26	2/1	103/2	131/3
622D SIG DET	TAY NINH	0	0	8	8	1	0	7	8
SUB TOTAL		32	1	103	136	27	2/1	110/2	139/3
GRAND TOTAL		102	166	896	1164	118/1	113/1	962/33	1193/35

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Inclosure 2

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 873541
 By AB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

By JB/MG NARA, Date 9/92

Summary of Major Accidents

- 8 May UH-1D - Tail rotor failure on take off at 50 feet altitude. Aircraft landed on road sustaining major damage.
- 14 May UH-1B - On short final into refueling area, aircraft started settling from about 40'. Aircraft landed hard sustaining major damage.
- 26 May UH-1D - During tactical emergency into single ship LZ requiring a 100 vertical ascent, aircraft rotor blades struck trees upon departure, aircraft landed on nose low altitude causing major damage.
- 4 Jul UH-1D - Engine failure after completion of climb out - 1500' 60K. Aircraft autorotated into trees.
- 5 Jul UH-1D - On final approach, aircraft landed hard causing major damage to skids and tail boom.
- 6 Jul UH-1B - Aircraft making low level recon, went into steep right turn, settled into ground - Major damage.
- 7 Jul UH-1D - Aircraft found burning after being overdue at destination.
- 15 Jul UH-1D - Engine failed on take off - major damage to all components.
- 16 Jul UH-1D - Engine failed on take off - major damage to skids and tail boom.
- 31 Jul UH-1C (2) Mid air collision.

(1967)

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

Inclosure 2

Resume of Accidents

Aug			
5	01-G	Pilot in-country checkout; ground loop on landing.	(Pilot Factor)
13	UH-1C	Gunship had refueled and rearmed while hovering for takeoff; air- craft struck ground and rolled inverted.	(Pilot Factor)
21	UH-1D	Engine failure on approach to landing zone.	(Material Factor)
Sep			
12	UH-1D	Aircraft No 2 ship in trail formation landing in pick-up zone; excessive flare caused tail rotor to strike ground; hard landing resulted.	(Pilot Factor)
27	UH-1D	Aircraft on resupply mission to NUI BA DEN Mountain (elevation 3300'); aircraft began losing RPM on final, attempted go- around and crashed.	(Pilot Factor)
Oct			
5	UH-1D	Aircraft landing in LZ on troop extraction; tail rotor struck partially hidden dike, result- ing in hard landing damage.	(Pilot Factor)

ECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND 873541

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

269TH AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1-31 MAY 1967

	<u>187TH AHC</u>	<u>116TH AHC</u>
SORTIES	10073	9766
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	3479	3452
FLIGHT HOURS D MODEL	2915	2840
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	564	612
PASSENGERS CARRIED	16176	18898
CARGO TONS	958	839
VC KBAA	23	20
VC WBAA	-	-
VC CAPTURED	-	-
STRUCTURES/EQUIPMENT DESTROYED	36*	5
ACFT COMBAT DAMAGE	17**	30**
ACFT HITS	17	30
US KIA	0	2
US WIA	1	9
MED EVAC	51	100
DAYS OF COMBAT ASSAULT MISSIONS	10	14

*INCLUDES 9 SAMPANS AND 1 BRIDGE.

**INCLUDES 2 ACFT COMBAT LOSS: 1 ACFT OPERATIONAL LOSS FOR THE 116TH.

1 ACFT OPERATIONAL LOSS FOR THE 187TH.

CONFIDENTIAL

ECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND873541

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

CONFIDENTIAL

269TH AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1-30 JUNE 1967

	<u>116TH AHC</u>	<u>187TH AHC</u>	<u>188TH AHC</u>
SORTIES	10174	9916	4165
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	2603	3216	1949
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2171	2607	1583
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	432	609	366
PASSENGERS CARRIED	16254	15718	8704
CARGO TONS	250	438	178
VC KBAA	49	29	32
VC WBAA	-	-	-
VC CAPTURED	-	-	-
STRUCTURES/EQUIPMENT DESTROYED	25/6*	21/13*	13/1*
ACFT COMBAT DAMAGE	4	16	60**
ACFT HITS	4	16	11
US WIA	0	1	4
US KIA	-	-	-
MED EVAC	16	71	23
DAYS OF COMBAT ASSAULT MISSIONS	17	19	8

*STRUCTURES/SAMPANS

**INCLUDES 29 LOSS AS A RESULT OF MORTAR ATTACK 24 JUNE.

DECLASSIFIED PER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12356, Section 3.3, NND873541

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

CONFIDENTIAL

269TH AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1-31 JULY 1967

	<u>116TH AHC</u>	<u>187TH AHC</u>	<u>188TH AHC</u>	<u>21st AVN</u>
SORTIES	8239	8425	7799	328
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	3160	3156	2422	382
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2549	2548	2114	
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	611	608	308	
PASSENGER CARRIED	16542	15980	11365	
CARGO TONS	171	290	1123	
VC KBAA	51	28	0	
VC WBAA	0	0	0	
VC CAPTURED	2	0	0	
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	7	7	1	
SAMPANS DESTROYED	1	7	0	
ACFT COMBAT DAMAGE	22	13	4	1
ACFT HITS	22	13	4	1
US KIA	0	4	7	
US WIA	5	2	3	1
MED EVAC	74	77	21	
DAYS OF COMBAT ASSAULT MISSIONS	19	13	1	

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

<u>1-31 AUGUST 1967</u>	<u>116TH</u>	<u>187TH</u>	<u>188TH</u>	<u>21ST</u>
SORTIES	8337	8403	7519	2345
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	3050	2991	2247	3121
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2427	2317	1990	0
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	623	674	257	0
PASSENGERS CARRIED	18211	15182	10885	5
CARGO TONS	114	97	1106	0
VC KBAA	77	34	2	0
VC WBAA	0	0	0	0
STUCTURES DESTROYED	1	20	0	16
SAMPANS DESTROYED	2	3	0	0
AIRCRAFT COMBAT DAMAGE	9	42	14	9
AIRCRAFT HITS	9	42	14	9
US KIA	0	0	1	0
US WIA	5	15	8	0
MED EVAC	24	44	38	0
COMBAT ASSAULTS	28	29	3	0

CONFIDENTIAL

By JB/mG NARA, Date 9/92

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY (v)

<u>1-30 SEPTEMBER 1967</u>	<u>116TH</u>	<u>187TH</u>	<u>188TH</u>	<u>21ST</u>	<u>242D</u>
SORTIES	7458	7402	8379	2347	2599
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	2719	2753	2797	2653	937
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2125	2098	2225	0	0
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	594	655	570	0	0
PASSENGERS CARRIED	16271	11488	13194	0	9733
CARGO TONS	42	120	119	0	3564
VC KBAA	20	1	12	0	1
VC WBAA	0	0	1	0	0
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	1	16	20	0	0
SAMPANS DESTROYED	0	14	2	0	0
AIRCRAFT COMBAT DAMAGE	14	20	9	4	8
AIRCRAFT HITS	14	20	9	4	8
US KIA	0	1	1	0	0
US WIA	5	2	1	1	4
MED EVAC	50	21	22	0	2
COMBAT ASSAULTS	26	23	24	0	3

CONFIDENTIAL

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

<u>1-31 OCTOBER 1967</u>	<u>116TH</u>	<u>187TH</u>	<u>188TH</u>	<u>21ST</u>	<u>242D</u>
SORTIES	9590	10793	9399	2358	5624
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	2862	3222	3197	3150	1562
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2234	2546	2373	0	0
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	628	676	824	0	0
PASSENGERS CARRIED	19792	15623	19608	0	24992
CARGO TONS	117	135	151	0	9596
VC KBAA	28	24	16	1	0
VC WBAA	0	0	0	0	0
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	0	2	9	23	0
SAMPANS DESTROYED	0	0	4	5	0
AIRCRAFT COMBAT DAMAGE	11	16	6	9	7
AIRCRAFT HITS	11	16	6	9	7
US KIA	0	0	0	0	0
US WIA	10	3	5	0	0
MED EVAC	43	20	26	0	25
COMBAT ASSAULTS	23	13	20	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

<u>1-30 November 1967</u>	<u>116TH</u>	<u>187TH</u>	<u>188TH</u>	<u>21ST</u>	<u>242D</u>
SORTIES	6491	3482	6614	2149	4211
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	2754	2613	2336	3113	1157
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2292	2026	2257	0	1175
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	462	587	469	0	0
PASSENGERS CARRIED	12432	13964	12695	0	15426
CARGO TONS	123.0	107.4	178.0	0	7362.0
VC KBAA	8	9	1	0	0
VC WBAA	0	0	0	0	0
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	0	7	12	0	0
SAMPANS DESTROYED	0	6	2	0	0
AIRCRAFT COMBAT DAMAGE	9	4	12	2	2
AIRCRAFT HITS	9	4	12	2	2
US KIA	1	1	1	0	0
US WIA	6	1	0	0	0
MED EVAC	12	15	11	0	1
COMBAT ASSAULTS	18	21	21	0	0

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92**CONFIDENTIAL**

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

<u>1-31 December 1967</u>	116TH	107TH	108TH	21ST	242D
SORTIES	8108	6987	7528	2249	5519
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	2879	2924	2574	2738	1465
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2338	2074	2106	0	0
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	541	750	468	0	0
PASSENGERS CARRIED	15875	13996	14068	0	15773
CARGO TONS	89	99	92	0	9705
VC KBAA	10	14	8	0	0
VC WBAA	0	0	0	0	0
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	1	5	3	0	0
SEMPANS DESTROYED	6	0	9	0	0
AIRCRAFT COMBAT DAMAGE	15	3	15	3	10
AIRCRAFT HITS	24	3	32	3	24
US KIA	0	0	0	0	0
US WIA	2	0	1	2	2
MED EVAC	33	8	32	0	7
COMBAT ASSAULTS	22	20	23	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

By JB/mg NARA, Date 9/92**CONFIDENTIAL**

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

269TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

1-31 January 1968	<u>116TH</u>	<u>137TH</u>	<u>158TH</u>	<u>21ST</u>	<u>242D</u>
SORTIES	7717	8320	5257	430	4949
FLIGHT HOURS TOTAL	2984	2636	2052	539	1456
FLIGHT HOURS D (H) MODEL	2579	1987	1647	0	0
FLIGHT HOURS B (C) MODEL	406	648	404	0	0
PASSENGERS CARRIED	15453	14458	7147	0	15127
CARGO TONS	44.7	56	268.5	0	9474
VC KBAA	92	19	7	0	0
VC WBAA	0	0	0	0	0
STRUCTURES DESTROYED	0	2	1	0	0
SAMPANS DESTROYED	0	0	2	0	0
AIRCRAFT COMBAT DAMAGE	18	23	15	0	3
AIRCRAFT HITS	32	38	42	0	4
US KIA	0	1	0	0	0
US WIA	7	12	6	0	0
MED EVAC	30	39	72	0	13
COMBAT ASSAULTS	27	22	3	0	0

CONFIDENTIAL

By AB/mg NARA, Date 9/92

95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
269th Combat Aviation Battalion
Quarter Ending 30 April 1968

SUBORDINATE UNIT	SORTIES FLOWN	TROOPS LIFTED	CARGO LIFTED (TONS)	ENEMY KIA	STRUCTURE		SAMPAWS		AIRCRAFT		HRS
					D/M	DES	D/M	DES	CONFIRM	LOSS	
116th AHC	25481	46281	749	125		109		2	3	49	8128
187th AHC	25163	40136	815	34		33		38	4	30	7935
188th AHC (Through 10 Mar 68)	9754	14418	169	47		24		2	1	27	3785
242d ASHC	11067	15320	21889	0		0		0	0	14	3488
HHC											
269th CAE	71465	116105	23622	206		166		42	8	120	23336

Group 4; Downgraded at 3 yr. intervals. De-classified after 12 yrs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HAWK MAGAZINE salutes

269th Aviation Battalion (Cbt)

269th

June 9, 1918, American "Dough-boys" prepared to make their second assault on the entrenched Ger-

man forces, after being repulsed in a bitter battle three days previously. The Germans had made a bas-

tion of a small patch of trees called "Belleau Wood" and had to hold to preserve their offensive momentum. The entire Allied Forces watched the outcome of this battle, for the American troops were relatively new to the business of war and their mettle was yet to be tested. After two weeks of fearfully bloody, close quarter fighting, a simple message was relayed to the American's Headquarters which read, "The wood is entirely ours."

Belleau Wood was a testing ground for U.S. troops during WWI, and now, so many years later, Vietnam has its own version of those famous woods.

Located approximately 24 miles northeast of Saigon is an area of land called Ho Bo Woods. Tall trees stood on this location once, but now only scrub brush, rocks and battle scarred earth can be seen.

For years now, the VC in-

filtrators have been using this, and nearby areas, for a halfway point between the Angel's Wing (a section of the Cambodian border directly east of Cu Chi which resembles the shape of an Angel's wing) and Saigon.

Time and time again U.S. and ARVN forces have tried to dislodge the entrenched VC. The combined forces have torn, and ripped, and gouged, and swept Ho Bo Woods, reducing them to an ugly boil on the earth's surface. And yet the VC somehow continue to hold, rebuilding their fortifications and forming new plans to infiltrate Saigon.

The unit which performs the role of air support to the Ho Bo Woods, as well as many other areas of III Corps, and some of IV Corps, is the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion.

The Black Barons are comprised of three helicopter companies, two of which, the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company and the 116th Assault Heli-

copter Company, are located in Cu Chi. The third company, the 187th Assault Helicopter Company, makes Tay Ninh its home.

The mission of the 269th is to provide tactical airlift of combat units, resupply, aerial escort, ground combat operations, medevacs and direct fire support.

The 25th Infantry Division is the main recipient of the Black Barons' support, but the 269th is also involved with the 5th Special Forces, ARVNs, Royal Thai Volunteers and the Australians.

Of his battalion, LTC William A. Lawrence says, "Every man in our entire battalion knows and appreciates the fact that he is getting his job done to support the man on the ground."

The 269th not only provides air cover and aircraft with which infantry units can insert troops, but also quickly transports the food, ammunition, weapons and sundry supplies needed to keep the infantry supplied in the field. The task of supplying the different infantry units falls to the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Company, commanded by MAJ Allan W. Hammerbeck.

The 242nd Muleskinners use the CH-47 Chinook as their "pack mule" and haul everything from sling-loaded artillery to an occasional water buffalo or pregnant ARVN wife who decided that a Chinook was a fine place to have her baby.

The fact that the 242nd is a professionally run outfit can be seen by the 10,000 accident-free hours that they have accumulated since

The 25th Infantry Division's famous patrol bases near the Angel's Wing section of the Cambodian border, "The Diamonds" and "Frontier City", were constructed and defended with invaluable assistance from the Muleskinners.

Artillery pieces, ammunition, sand bags, C-rations and even the observation towers were brought in by the 242nd's Chinooks.

The Muleskinners' home at Cu Chi also is the residence of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company. The 116th "Hornets" range from Ho Bo Woods to the southern boundaries of III Corps, and are commanded by MAJ Alvin T. Jones.

Since January 1969, the Hornets have accumulated an enemy kill total of 317 VC. Commenting on his company's success at picking the VC out of his hiding places, Major Jones said, "These men know their areas of operation and they know what they are looking for. They are willing to go all out to cover and support the ground troops."

The people who insert the in-

fantry for the 116th are the "Yellow Jackets" and the "Wasps." Flying a tight formation, the two slick platoons transport various ground troops into and out of their mission site.

The 116th's "Stinger" platoon flies the "Charlie" model gunships, which they believe to be the best helicopter for low level air

coverage.

"The Charlie models are better for close ground work with troops because you have four extra eyes, the door gunners, back there spotting for you," says WO1 Ken Young, a Stinger pilot. "The trick is in close team work between the door gunner and the pilot. Once spotted, you can't let the door gunner lose sight of the enemy in the heavy foliage."

The 187th Assault Helicopter Company, located in Tay Ninh, and commanded by Major Purvis L. Parker, has their own gunship platoon called the "Rat Pack", which is made up entirely of AH-1G Cobras. It is the first Assault Helicopter Company in Vietnam to be all Cobra.

"They can do at high altitudes what Charlie ships have to come to the ground to do," says MAJ Parker. "Thus they suffer fewer hits."

The 187th "Crusaders" fly more hours than any Assault Helicopter Company in Vietnam. But after all those long hours of flight, the Crusaders often find themselves spending sleepless nights. Being only eight miles from the Cambodian border, Tay Ninh is a favorite target for VC rockets, thus giving the Crusaders ample reason to call their home base "Rocket City East".

In a recent extraction operation, "Red Ryder" and "Maggot," the 187th's slick platoons, demonstrated the coolness and professionalism that is required of Crusader personnel. After making a dusk pick up of infantry and proceeding to transport the troops back to their base, the plans were reversed by the infantry unit's CO. He not only wanted his men reinserted into the area that they were taken out of, but wanted additional troops inserted also.

Although it was by then quite dark, an extremely hazardous condition in which to make a helicopter insertion, the Red Ryders and Maggots returned and inserted the troops, after rearranging their formation in flight in order to place each unit of the infantry into its correct spot on the LZ. They then proceeded to insert the additional troops.

First Lieutenant Dewey McCullen relates the feeling that his

187th Company and the rest of the 269th have in regards to their job of supporting the people on the ground when he says, "I was

flying with our gunships, covering some infantry up around Ho Bo Woods. Charlie had the guys pinned down pretty bad but their CO was directing me and my Cobra to the enemy positions that were keeping them pinned. I spotted the target and squeezed off a couple of rockets. Their CO didn't say anything at first, then I heard over my earphones, 'Yes ... YES, that's it! They've stopped FIRING!!' That was one of the greatest sounds that I have ever heard."

Maybe someday Ho Bo Woods of Vietnam will be as famous as the Belleau Wood of WWI. This is an entirely different war with many different goals, but the men of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion, and the men that they support from the air, know that Ho Bo Woods, and similar areas can only be taken with the same team work, and calm determination as was demonstrated by our men at Belleau Woods.


308TH CBT AVN BN



BLACK ADLER

ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT P. 100 DAI RVN
HIST. OF HHC, 308TH CAG, 1ST AVN ODE. 20 DEC 67 - 31 DEC 67
APO 96383

308TH CBT AVN BN



BLACK ADLER

✓

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 308th AVIATION BATTALION

HERALDIC ITEMS

~~None approved.~~ DESCRIPTION AND VISUAL ATTACHED.

LINEAGE AND HONORS

LINEAGE

Constituted 20 December 1967 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 308th Aviation Battalion, and activated in Vietnam. Inactivated 1 July 1968 in Vietnam.

CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase III
Tet Counteroffensive
Counteroffensive, Phase IV
Counteroffensive, Phase V

DECORATIONS

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Streamer embroidered VIETNAM 1967-1968 (308th Aviation Battalion cited; DA GO 21, 1969)

308TH AVIATION BATTALION BIBLIOGRAPHY

No published histories.


2

CONFIDENTIAL

308TH CAB

OFF 67
WO 157

EM 781
AGG 985



Incl 2

308th Battalion Organization
as of 9 March 1968 to present.
Bien Hoa, and Camp Eagle RVN
APO 96383

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVG-LB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 July 68, RCS, CS FOR-65(R1)

- (2) Capt James M. West, 05329852, assumed duties as En S2 on 2 May 1968
- (3) Major Bernard M. McInerney, 089252, En S4, reassigned to CONUS on 5 June 1968.
- (4) Major Floyd (NMI) Campbell, 04044797, assumed duties as En S4 on 5 June 1968.
- (5) Major Henry E. Dreher, 077368, Battalion Executive Officer reassigned on 10 June 1968.
- (6) Major Jack O. Johnson, 077484, CO, 188th Assault Helicopter Company reassigned on 10 June 1968.
- (7) Major Jack O. Johnson, 077484, assumed duties as Battalion Executive Officer on 10 June 1968.
- (8) Major Henry E. Dreher, 077368, assumed command of the 188th Assault Helicopter Company on 10 June 1968.
- (9) Major Donald G. Andrews, 077254, CO, 17th Assault Helicopter Company, reassigned to CONUS on 11 June 1968.
- (10) Major Daniel A. Addiss, 04030789, assumed command of the 17th Assault Helicopter Company on 11 June 1968.

d. (C) Unit Strength as of 31 July 1968:

(1) Military:

Subordinate Unit	Officer		WO		EM		TOTAL	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
Hqs & Hqs Co	14	18	2	4	73	135	89	157
Company "A" *	10	8	28	22	201	234	239	264
Company "B" *	10	11	28	17	201	236	239	264

* Totals include the supporting KF detachment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 873541
By: [Signature] NAVA, Date:

ADVG-LE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68. RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1)

(2) Civilian:

Subordinate Unit	D.C		VN		3d Natl		Contractor	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
Hqs & Hqs Co	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Company "A"	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Company "B"	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

e. (C) Aircraft status as of 31 July 1968 (Tab A)

f. (C) Operational results as of 31 July 1968 (Tab B)

g. (C) Casualties:

(1) Casualties sustained by the units of the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion and 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion during the period 1 May - 31 July 1968 are as follows:

	MAY	JUN	JUL
Died not hostile	2	0	0
Died hostile action	1	0	0
Wounded not hostile	7	2	9
Wounded hostile	3	0	6
Missing *	0	0	0

* 6 personnel listed as missing since 21 April 1968 on preceding ORLL are still missing.

h. (U) Re-enlistment: Re-enlistment statistics for the quarter report period are:

1st Term	CAREERIST	AUS	FR/NG
15 - 0 %	10 - 7 = 70%	0 - 0	0 - 0 %
TOTAL: 25 - 7 for 28 %.			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDC-LB-C

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1)

i. (U) Awards and Decorations: During the period 1 May 68 thru 31 Jul 68, 240 recommendations for award were submitted and 110 awards were received. The following is a breakdown of awards:

AWARD	SUBMITTED	RECEIVED
LM	2	0
SS	3	2
DFC	23	7
DFC 1st OLC	3	0
BS "V"	8	2
AM "V"	1	2
BS	9	5
BS 1st OLC	2	1
SM	7	3
ACM	23	5
BAM	94	38
OLC to AM "V"	9	9
OLC to AM	48	27
PH	4	5
ACM "V"	4	4

j. (U) Education: There have been no education accomplishments due to non-availability of an Education Center in the area.

k. (U) Rest and Recuperation:

(1) The R&R utilization rate for the period of this report is 100%.

(2) The battalion utilization rate remains high and approximately 20 more quotas each month could be filled during the next quarter.

(3) All requests for R&R are being satisfactorily filled. There are increased requests for R&R quotas to Sydney and Tokyo.

l. (U) SPECIAL SERVICES: Volley ball courts have been built in the HHC and Company B areas. Full length films are shown to all units of the battalion at least 5 days a week. In addition, athletic equipment and games are available to personnel of all units through their unit supply.

m. (U) CIVIC ACTION:

(1) During the reporting period all units were engaged in Civic Action activities.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 873541
By: [Signature] RMA, Date: [Blank]

AVDG-LB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1)

(2) Headquarters and Headquarters Company has initiated a program to restore the mess hall at the University of Hue. This project is almost completed. Additional repair work has been made on the students living quarters.

(3) 62,290 VN\$ has been contributed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(4) Contributions of 6,000 VN\$ were received from St John's Luthern Church, Mendota, Illinois.

n. (U) CIVILIAN PERSONNEL:

(1) Currently the employment of direct hire of local nationals remains unauthorized in the Camp Eagle area due to 101st Air Cavalry Division policy.

(2) Daily hire of local nationals has been used effectively by all units for filling sandbags. From 1 May thru 31 July 1968, a total of 535,435 piasters were expended for this purpose.

o. (U) Sundry Funds, Clubs, and Messes. There has been no significant accomplishment or problem areas in this field due to the fact that no unit within the battalion has a sundry fund.

p. (U) Information:

(1) The command information program has been enhanced with the receipt of the 101st Air Cav Div Daily Bulletin, the Airborne Date Line Newspaper, and the publication of a battalion weekly newspaper and weekly bulletin. The weekly newspaper highlights the past week's significant events within the battalion. In addition, battalion policy letters have been used extensively to establish battalion procedures for this area.

(2) The PIO program has shown a marked improvement in its activities. During the period 1 May - 31 July 1968, 56 stories were released and 156 hometown releases were submitted. The PIO section also works closely with the awards and decorations section to insure news releases are submitted when awards are presented.

q. (C) Combat Operations:

(1) During this period the battalion continued its support of the 101st Air Cavalry Division's operation NEVADA EAGLE. The companies were committed to tasks varying from combat support missions to reinforced battalion size combat assault operations. During this period, daily

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDG-LB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS FOR-65 (R1)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: **873541**
By: **SPM** NAVA, Date:

(2) Company A, located at Huo-Phu Bai Airfield, provides a 10 man augmentation to MAG-36 each night for perimeter defense. Company A also maintains an eighteen man reaction force to reinforce the perimeter defense when necessary.

t. (C) Intelligence:

(1) During the reporting period the 308 Combat Aviation Battalion was reassigned from the 16th Combat Aviation Group to the 101st Air Cavalry Division and redesignated the 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion. In conjunction with performing the normal S2 function i.e, processing security clearances, maintaining liaison with other battalion S-2's and Division general and special staff sections, and maintaining the aircraft hit analysis on a monthly basis (Tab "C") the section was involved with the administrative changes and procedures incurred in the reorganization and reassignment.

(2) With the new posture of the 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion the S-2 section will be predominately engaged in personnel and document security, map requisitions, maintaining a current aircraft hit map, and the locations of automatic weapons/anti-aircraft sites, intense fire areas, and the latest helicopter landing zone studies, along with remaining cognizant of the general enemy situation and providing subordinate units with all intelligence information and data required by them in the performance of their mission.

u. (C) Supply

(1) The battalion receives logistical support from the 101st Air Cavalry Division Support Command for Class I through V items. Each Company maintains a property book and requisitions all supplies directly from the Division Support Command. All vehicle and generator repair parts are requisitioned through the 801st Maintenance Battalion. All PLL and ASL items are requisitioned through the 801st Maintenance Battalion also.

(2) The S-4 Section has supervisory responsibility for supply actions of each company and provides advice and guidance when necessary. This section arranges for Battalion conveyance through Division Support Command to DaNang, secures engineer support for the companies, and processes Reports of Survey.

(3) Self service accounts for the battalion are established through the Division Support Command. Each company may submit its requirements to the Support Command, Class II & IV Officer by the 25th of each month for the following month. The Support Command Class I and IV Officer is responsible for purchasing all self service supplies for divisional units.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 873541
By: [Signature] NAVA, Date:

AVDG-LB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS, FOR-65 (R1)

(4) Engineer support is provided by the 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Air Cavalry Division. The Engineer unit provides equipment for bunker construction, defense perimeter improvements, road improvement, and dust suppression. Penoprine machines are required frequently to suppress dust along the battalion access road and aircraft parking areas.

(5) Company A and B, are constructing CH-47 revetments. Company A is constructing 19 revetments with M3A1 matting and using laterite as filler material. The unit has completed 10 revetments. Laterite filler will be placed in the revetments when engineer dump trucks become available to the unit. Company B is constructing aircraft revetments by using 55 gallon drums filled with sand or water.

v. (C) Maintenance (aircraft)

(1) The units of this battalion continued to improve their work areas throughout the period. The improved ramps and work areas have been very beneficial to the maintenance program; however, sand and dust erosion to engines, bearings, and actuators continues to be a problem. The wear is obvious by the numerous replacement items required by the units. The unit commanders and maintenance officers continue to stress the FOD and stand down programs to lessen the damage to the aircraft. Particle separators were installed on all aircraft possible to minimize the sand and dust problem in the engines of the UH-1 aircraft. Penoprine has been applied to the helipads and maintenance work areas, when available. More penoprine is needed on a continuing basis to maintain sand and dust control.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

requirements for aircraft were 10 lift, 1 command and control, and 4 armed helicopters each for two assault companies. Support rendered the division included company size assaults, combat resupply, command and control, pacification and psychological operations, chemical dispersion, long range patrolling, security reaction force, armed convoy escort, reconnaissance, and close air support, in addition to aircraft recovery and parts transport for the division's organic aviation.

(2) Cargo helicopters played a prime role in the logistical support of the division. Maintenance and cost considerations in CH-47 operations make maximum efficiency desirable. Every effort was made to insure useful rotor time. To establish proper planning and coordination, a battalion liaison officer, CH-47 qualified, and well versed in its employment, was assigned to work in the Division's Army Aviation Element. The best logistical support was rendered when priorities were established by the division G3 which insured that cargo was transported in the order of importance. Initial planning and subsequent changes to tactical requirements required constant monitoring for best results to be obtained. The use of a battalion liaison officer between the division and the battalion with knowledge of both supported unit requirements and cargo helicopter operations proved invaluable.

(3) Statistical data for the reporting period is shown in enclosure 3 for activities in the I Corps Area.

r. (U) Training

(1) The battalion is making maximum use of the AMTAP school located at Vung Tau. Two CH-47 Airframe Courses were received for the month of July and two for the month of August which will be met. One quota was received for escape and evasion training in the Philippines.

(2) M16 training program has been implemented at company level. All personnel zero their weapons twice monthly and receive classroom instruction on sight adjustment, loading and unloading, stoppages, immediate action, care and cleaning of the rifle, magazine and safety.

(3) DECCA Training and Assistance: A qualified DECCA Instructor has been attached to the battalion for the purpose of instructing units in use of the DECCA System. This training is expected to start the week of 4 August 1968.

s. (C) Physical Security:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Company B, located at Camp Eagle, have security responsibility for a portion of the Camp Eagle outer perimeter defense plan. IHC occupies two fighting bunkers at night manned by four personnel per bunker. Company B, mans two fighting bunkers with four personnel per bunker.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 873541
By: [Signature] NAVA, Date:

AVDG-IB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS, FOR-65 (R1)

This unit has an average of 1000 air frame hours on the aircraft assigned. The high aircraft time corresponds with the heavy equipment for repair parts. This unit is presently conducting 11th Preventive Management Periodic inspections on 3 aircraft with 7 scheduled shortly. This requirement will lead to the 12th Preventive Management Periodic which is quite extensive because of the numerous time compliance component changes. The maintenance officer has requisitioned the required components and has scheduled the work load for the inspections. The availability of the required repair parts and components will continue to determine the down time for each aircraft.

(4) The battalion has been re-organized into an assault support helicopter battalion during this reporting period which has of necessity caused realignment of the maintenance office. The maintenance effort will be directed to the CH-47 in the following reporting periods.

(5) Aircraft availability for the reporting period was:

(a) CH-47A - 33%

(b) CH-47B - 86% (16 June 1968 thru 31 July 1968)

(c) UH1C - 72% (1 May 1968 thru 20 July 1968)

(d) UH1H - 79% (1 May 1968 thru 20 July 1968)

(6) Aircraft status as of 31 July 1968: (Tab. I.)

x. Safety:

(1) Monthly safety briefings are presented to all flight personnel. In addition safety is stressed at all command and pre-flight briefings.

(2) Emphasis is being placed on standardization by the use of quarterly standardization check rides. In addition instructor pilots ride daily with personnel of their unit with a view of improving standardization and training.

(3) The Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade eleven point program has been made the central theme of an intensive effort directed toward elimination of all preventable accidents. Each company commander and safety officer participated in a free exchange of ideas concerning the eleven points, and what methods or means could be used to incorporate them into the planning and execution of every mission. The battalion safety officer is assembling a check list which is manageable and will be distributed to each of the companies. The aim of the program is to introduce a ten minute check of an operational area or procedure which will take little time each day but when summed up will total a sizeable

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

program of inspection. An intensified command interest has been directed toward the safety program. Emphasis has been placed in achieving a more professional approach toward the flying duties and greater participation on the part of the intermediate leaders.

y. Medical:

(1) The medical section has the responsibility of providing aviation support to the units of the 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion. In addition, due to its location, the medical section is continuing to provide medical attention for Company B, 101st Assault Support Battalion formerly (17th Assault Helicopter Company). Company A, 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion is located at Huc-Phu Bai and to render effective medical care it was necessary to supplement the company with 3 aidmen. The aidmen can conduct sick call, render aid to the battlefield casualties and accidental injury victims.

(2) The battalion medical section has completed the construction of an aviation field dispensary to provide direct medical support to HHC and Company "B" which are collocated.

(3) The problems of medical supplies, air evacuation, communications, emergency care and flight physicals have been solved by this section establishing close coordination and cooperation with other medical sources in the vicinity. Medical supply requisitions are filled by the 326th Medical Battalion. Air evacuation is coordinated with, and handled by "Dust Off", 326th Medical Battalion.

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commanders's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. (U) Personnel:

(1) OBSERVATION: Assignment to the 101st Cavalry Division with a subsequent loss of the personnel section has caused problems not previously encountered by this battalion.

(2) EVALUATION: Although the work load in the battalion S-1 section has been reduced, problems have been encountered in the area of reassignments, pay, promotions, and officer efficiency reports due to the increased reaction time of 2 to 3 weeks on personnel actions between this battalion and 101st Air Cav Div AG (Rear). This problem is further aggravated by the lack of efficient communication to the rear and an apparently high loss factor in the distribution system. There have been many man hours lost due to the necessity of sending personnel to the rear with personnel problems (pay, dependent ID

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **823541**
By **SP5** NAVA, Date

AVDC-LB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter
Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS, FOR-65 (R1)

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) The reaction time at AG rear must be reduced to a reasonable time period of no longer than one week.

(b) A more efficient distribution system must be initiated to speed distribution and reduce the loss factor.

(c) Telephone communication should be improved and /or teletype should be initiated.

(d) A forward team should be set up to alleviate personnel problems.

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Armed Escort for Cargo Helicopters

(a) OBSERVATION: When CH-47 helicopters are operating in areas of intensified anti-aircraft activity, the presence of a helicopter fire team has both a deterring and penalizing effect on enemy anti-aircraft gunners.

(b) EVALUATION: The size and utility of the CH-47 make it a lucrative and vulnerable target for the enemy. Evasive action is limited because of externally carried loads. The related weapons systems provide inadequate self protection. These factors combine to encourage and aid the enemy gunner to direct fire by all types of weapons against this aircraft. Experience has shown a reluctance by the enemy to take, under fire, a cargo helicopter if it is escorted by an armed helicopter fire team.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That armed helicopter escort be provided for cargo helicopter operations into areas of known enemy activity.

(2) Aircraft Vulnerability

(a) OBSERVATION: Most incidents of aircraft being hit by ground fire occurred at intermediate altitudes.

(b) EVALUATION: Statistics gathered by the battalion within the 101st Air Cavalry Division area of operations show that the predominance of anti-aircraft hits are sustained between 50 feet and 1500 feet near sea level. Helicopters flying within 1500 feet of the ground are within effective range of small arms sniper fire. The risk increases with a decrease in altitude until the aircraft is so near the ground that reaction time is denied the enemy. This point was proven to be below 50 feet.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **NND 873541**
By **SPM** NAVA, Date

AVDG-LB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 159th Assault Support Helicopter Battalion for period ending 31 Jul 68, RCS, CS, FOR-65 (RM)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Aircraft should not operate between 50 feet and 1500 feet unless transitioning for landing or climbing to cruise altitude. If weather conditions preclude flight above 1500 feet, nap-of-the-earth techniques should be utilized to reduce hit probability.

- c. Training. None
- d. Intelligence. None
- e. Logistics. None
- f. Organization. None
- g. Other. None



CHARLES S. STUEN, JR.
LTC, Inf
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

159TH ASHB AIRCRAFT ST. TUS

31 July 1968

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **873541**
By **SPM** NVA, Date

UNCLASSIFIED

Subordinate Unit	UH-1D		LCH		CH47A		CH47B	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
Hqs & Hqs Co	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0
Company "A"	0	0	0	0	16	16		
Company "B"	0	0	0	0			16	16

Tab A.

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB C, (INTELLIGENCE ANNEX to ORILL)

AIRCRAFT HIT ANALYSIS 1 MAY - 29 JULY 1968

During the period 1 May - 29 July 1968 aircraft hit data revealed the following:

1. A total of 49 aircraft sustained hits, broken down by aircraft type and mission activity as follows:

	<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>ON GRD</u>	<u>LAND/TK-OFF</u>	<u>ENROUTE</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>% - LTR</u>
UH1H	Resupply/Trp-lift	3	23	1	55.1%	53%
UH1C	Arm Escort			4	8.1%	
	Tgt Atk/withdraw			11	22.5%	
CH47	Resupply/Trp-lift		5	2	14.3%	10.2%
	Total	3	28	18	100 %	63.2%

	<u>HRS FLOWN</u>	<u>HITS</u>	<u>% HIT ON GRD</u>	<u>HITS/HRS FLOWN</u>	<u>CULULATIVE</u>
MAY	5763	24	54.1%	1 / 240.1	
JUN	4685	10	60 %	1 / 468.5	1 / 354.3
JUL	4164	15	80 %	1 / 277.6	1 / 328.7

2. From the above data it can be determined that:

a. The majority of aircraft hits are sustained as a result of resupply missions (69.4%), and the majority of these hits are sustained while the aircraft is on the ground or engaged in landing or take-off (63.2%).

b. Only 3 aircraft sustained hits while enroute during the reporting period.*

c. The high number of aircraft hit during July is attributable to the lack of properly secured landing zones and pick-up zones, with 11 of the 15 hits during July occurring while the aircraft was on the ground or engaged in landing or take off.

* UH-1C aircraft hits are considered sustained while enroute, however these hits are not considered as sustained while enroute for comparative purposes.

UNCLASSIFIED

STATION LIST
16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP

Chu Lai:

14th CAB	APO 96374
21st RAC (212th CSAB)	APO 96374
71st AHC	APO 96374
176th AHC	APO 96374
178th ASHC	APO 96374

Da Nang

16th CAG	APO 96337
212th CSAB	APO 96337
245th SAC	APO 96337
282nd AHC	APO 96337

Duc Pho:

174th AHC	APO 96374
-----------	-----------

Hue Phu Bai:

131st SAC (212th CSAB)	APO 96308
220th RAC (212th CSAB)	APO 96308
Corps Prov Avn Co (212th CSAB)	APO 96308
308th CAB	APO 96383
17th AHC	APO 96383
188th AHC	APO 96383
200th ASHC	APO 96308



16TH AVIATION GROUP
NONCOLOR BEARING UNITS

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DESIGN IN
COMMERCIAL ITEMS IS PROHIBITED
WITHOUT PERMISSION IN WRITING
FROM THE INSTITUTE OF HERALDRY,
U. S. ARMY.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (15 May 68) 2d Ind CPT Arnold/dls/LBN 4485
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 28 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group.
2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl
nc

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain. ACC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 1st Avn Bde
HQ 16th Cbt Avn Gp

MFR: ORLL was not staffed due to lack of significant unresolved problem areas.

CPT Arnold/4485 - ACTION OFFICER

RECORD COPY--RETURN TO AVHGC-DST

Handwritten: 100-888
028-03

CH DST DIV	4
CH MS BR	
CH DOC BR	
CH TNG BR	
A/O	

THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCL

Handwritten: Feb 1968

Handwritten: RAT dls

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **873541**
By **EM** NAVA, Date

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO San Francisco 96337

AVGM-SC

15 May 68

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for
Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development
DA (ACSFOR, DA)
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) SECTION I, OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) GENERAL

(1) The quarter commenced with the 16th Group's two battalions, the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion and the 212th Combat Support Battalion heavily engaged in providing aviation support to suppress the enemy's Tet Offensive in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The heaviest fighting was concentrated in and near the City of Hue, which was one of the main objectives of the VC and NVA forces. The gunships of the 212th Combat Support Aviation Battalion were extensively instrumental in providing support to the ground forces during this battle.

(2) In addition to the many extra flying hours required, each unit was required to increase its internal security to protect their assets against enemy ground and stand off fire attacks. Additionally, concurrent effort was applied to improving the defensive posture and alert procedures of all units.

(3) A warning order attaching the 308th Combat Aviation Battalion was received on 9 March 1968. The order called for the 308th Battalion to be detached from its parent unit, the 12th Combat Aviation Battalion and be attached to the 16th Combat Aviation Group effective 15 March 68, with operational control invested to the 101st Airborne Division. Attachment became effective as the units passed North of 14 degrees 30 minutes North latitude. The 308th Combat Aviation Battalion completed its move from the III Corps area to the vicinity of Hue Phu Bai in the I Corps area and was declared fully operational on 12 April 1968.

(4) C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was redesignated F Troop, 8th Cavalry on 1 April 68. With the change of designation, the unit became organic to the Americal Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC 15 May 1968
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for
Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFCR-65 (R1) (U)

(5) Corps Aviation Company (Provisional) was assigned to the 16th CAG on 12 March 1968. It was further attached to the 212th CSAB on 14 March 1968. The unit is stationed at Hue Phu Bai with the mission to provide aviation support for the headquarters element of the Provisional Corps Viet Nam.

(6) Throughout the quarter, the Group Headquarters continued to fill its personnel vacancies and improve its facilities. As equipment became available, the need to depend on subordinate units was decreased. Due to the Group having command less operational control of the assigned battalions, planning of operational activity was minimal. Primary effort continued to be directed towards the development of complementing OPIANS in support of those issued by higher headquarters. Key staff officers and non-commissioned officers continued to visit each of the assigned units to obtain first hand information relative to problems, status and condition of equipment and overall personality of the commands.

(7) Army Aviation Elements (AAE's). The Group's three AAE's continued to provide necessary liaison and timely recommendations concerning the most effective and appropriate utilization of Army Aviation to the CG III Marine Amphibious Force, CG First Marine Air Wing and the CO I Corps Advisory Group.

(8) Utilization. With the exception of the time spent in moving the 308th CAB from III CTZ to I CTZ, the Group's units were continually engaged in combat aviation support activities. Other items such as civic action projects and training were integrated into daily activities.

(9) Enemy activities. On 25 Feb and 4 Mar 68, Marble Mountain Air Facility, location of the 16th Combat Aviation Group Headquarters, was attacked by fire with 64 122mm rockets. Fire was accurate and damage consisted of the complete destruction of five (5) buildings, to include the 212th Battalion Headquarters, one (1) OV-1 and one (1) UH-1D destroyed, 19 aircraft and 21 vehicles damaged to varying degrees.

b. (U) TRAINING. The 16th CAG, in coordination with First Marine Air Wing, has initiated a program to qualify O-1 pilots as Tactical Air Controllers Airborne (TACA). This is accomplished by on the job training with qualified personnel from the 1st and 3rd Marine Division and is accomplished in 3 to 4 weeks. The TACA qualification of O-1 Army Aviation adds versatility and flexibility to the visual reconnaissance program.

c. (U) AVIATION SAFETY. The Group has flown 52,677 hours during the quarter, with an accident rate of 15.2 per 100,000 flying hours. There were

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

15 May 1968.

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April, NCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

eight (8) major accidents; seven UH-1s and one O-1 type aircraft. Five were caused by poor pilot technique and two by suspected material failure.

Total accident experience is as follows: R/W F/W TOTAL


Major Accidents	7	1	8
Minor accidents	0	0	0
Incidents	5	1	6
Forced Landings	6	0	6
Precautionary Landings	6	0	6

d. (U) CASUALTIES. The Group casualties during this quarter were:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MISC</u>	<u>CROWN</u>
7	7	60	10	3

e. (U) ORGANIZATION.

(1) The 16th Combat Aviation Group is organized as follows: See Inclosure 1 for station list:



(2) Key Personnel:

(a) Group Headquarters.

- CO COL Daniel G. Gust 036330
- DCO LTC Thorveld R. Torgersen 069818
- S1 MAJ James A. Boyd 04021916
- S2 MAJ Herndon Godfrey Jr 01935345
- S3 LTC Charles S. Steen 066513 from 1 Jan 68 thru 9 Mar 68
- LTC Rennie M. Cory 065207 from 13 Mar 68 to present
- S4 MAJ Franklin R. Harris 089499

(b) Unit Commanders:

- 14th CAB LTC Carroll C. Issacs OF100091 from 7 Aug 67 to 6 Feb 1968
- LTC Ray M. Carson OF0106541 from 7 Feb 1968 to present

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGH-SC 15 May 1968
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group
 for Period Ending 30 April, MCS CSFOA-65 (R1) (U)

212th CSAB LTC Wilbur A. Middleton 070141
 308th CAB LTC Onore E. Case OF0108132 from 22 Dec 1967
 to 9 Mar 1968
 LTC Charles S. Steen 066513 from 10 Mar 1968
 to present

(c) Unit strength as of 30 April 1968:

(1) Military:

Subordinate Unit	OFF		WO		EM		TOTAL	
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
HEC	17	23	2	2	51	84	70	109

(2) Civilian:

Subordinate Unit	DAC		VN		3D NATL CONTRACTOR			
	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H	Auth	O/H
	0	0	5	3	0	0	0	0

(d) Aircraft status of 30 April 1968:

	UH-1D	U-21
Auth	2	1
O/H	2	1

(e) Operational results as of 30 April 1968. See Inclosure 2.

2. (U) SECTION II LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. (U) PERSONNEL:

(1) Personnel Qualification.

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel received for the Group Headquarters were in some cases recent school graduates, and others not proficient in their MOS.

(b) EVALUATION. The problems involved in activating a new headquarters requires trained and experienced personnel to accomplish this mission in minimal time. A trained and experienced cadre was provided, but filler personnel, to a large extent, were non-qualified and inexperienced. This experience gap created unnecessary problems in establishing an efficient functioning headquarters.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period ending 30 April, MCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That replacement centers exercise more care in the selection of personnel for newly formed units.

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) Fly Away Program.

(a) OBSERVATION. During the Tet Offensive, OV-1 aircraft were operated from safe haven airfields out of country. In addition, O-1 aircraft stationed at outlying ARVN strips were flown to more secure bases.

(b) EVALUATION. During the periods of intensified enemy mortar and rocket threats, the removal of aircraft from the threatened area is desirable. Whenever this can be accomplished and still perform the mission, the aircraft should be evacuated. During the Tet Offensive, the Group's OV-1 aircraft operated from safe haven airfields with no deterioration in mission performance.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Evacuation plans commensurate with mission requirements be formulated and executed.

(2) Alert Status.

(a) OBSERVATION. During periods of increased tension, alert conditions often vary numerous times during the night.

(b) EVALUATION. It is a common occurrence for the alert condition to change numerous times during the night. This creates unnecessary movement of troops to and from the bunkers. Consequently, this creates increased fatigue of individual soldiers, increased confusion and an increased vulnerability to hostile attack. Bunkers at fixed locations should be constructed so that off duty personnel will have space in which to rest.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When troops are sent to bunkers where conditions permit sleeping, they should remain there for the remainder of the night.

c. (U) TRAINING.

(1) Tactical Air Controller Airborne (TACA)

(a) OBSERVATION. The 16th CAG, in coordination with the First Marine Air Wing, has developed a program to qualify Army O-1 aviators as Tactical Aircraft Controllers Airborne, or TACA's as they are referred to. Thus far, there are 24 who are qualified on orders to direct marine tactical air strikes. During the reporting period, 107 strikes were conducted by Army TACA's.

(b) EVALUATION. Army O-1 aviators trained as TACA's add to

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

the depth, versatility and flexibility of the visual reconnaissance program. The program also assists the Marines in filling their shortage of TACA's, and provides responsive and timely heavy firepower to be applied against targets of opportunity.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all O-1 aviators assigned to the Visual Reconnaissance Program operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone be qualified as TACA's.

d. (U) INTELLIGENCE. None.

e. (U) LOGISTICS.

(1) Unit Moves.

(a) OBSERVATION. There was a lack of coordination and information involved in the movement of the 308th C.A.B.

(b) EVALUATION. The lack of sufficient planning time, knowledge of port facilities, adequate material handling equipment caused unnecessary delays in the movement and operational status of this battalion. Additionally, essential items of equipment were temporarily misplaced or lost when off loaded at other than the destination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION.

1 That units prepare loading plans for PCS moves to include air, land and sea movement.

2 That these plans be approved by the unit's higher headquarters.

3 That higher headquarters advise moving units as to transportation and material handling limitations.

f. (U) ORGANIZATIONAL. None.

g. (C) OTHER.

(1) Radio Relay.

(a) OBSERVATION. The U-1A aircraft retrofitted with AN/ARC-121 Repeater Set Radio has experienced excessive loss in performance.

(b) EVALUATION. The installation of the AN/ARC-121 Repeater Set Radio in the U-1A, caused the aircraft's performance to become critical at altitude. The aircraft took excessive time to climb, causing the engine

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group for Period Ending 30 April, NCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

to overheat, decreasing the obtainable airspeed while increasing the stall speed. This resulted in an aircraft that was a near hazard to fly. The suspected cause was the parasite drag of the antennas installed on the wings. A letter was initiated by the Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, 18th Aviation Company describing, in detail, the problems involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the AN/ARC-121 antenna installation on the U-1A, be reevaluated in view of the decreased performance experienced with the current installation.

(2) Publications.

(a) OBSERVATION. Necessary Army and intermediate headquarters publications are very slow in reaching newly arrived units to RVN. For those units formed within RVN, this also applies plus there is excessive delay in acquiring DA publications.

(b) EVALUATION. The lack of proper publications hampers the accomplishment of the mission for both newly assigned or formed units. Units receive some publications upon arrival or when formed, but have to rely on requisitions, which they must submit for the majority of the necessary publications. This is both time consuming and difficult because of the lack of proper references from which to order.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When new units are to be formed or to arrive in RVN, that appropriate publication packets be established.

3. (U) SECTION III. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION. None.

Daniel G. Gust

DANIEL G. GUST
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

- 3 Incl
- 1. 16th CAG Station List
- 2. 16th CAG Operation Results
- 3. Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

DISTRIBUTION:
CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT 2 cys
CG USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DST 3 cys
CG 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: S3 2 cys
CG 1st Avn Bde, ATTN: AVBA-MH 3 cys
FILE 15 cys

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: **873541**
By: **SPM** NAVA, Date: _____

AVBA-C (15 May 68) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group
Period Ending 30 April 1968, RGS CSFDR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

JUN 27 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OE, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This Headquarters has reviewed this report, considers it to be
adequate, and concurs with the contents.

2. (C) The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Paragraph 2a(1), page 4. This problem is not peculiar to 16th
CAG. All 1st Aviation Brigade units have experienced this problem to
some degree. The problem, however, has been particularly evident in
newly formed units which do not have an established base of experienced
personnel to compensate for and assist in training of the unqualified or
inexperienced members. In many cases, improper classification and re-
classification actions have resulted in personnel being awarded MOS's
for which they are not qualified. Additionally, the recent rapid growth
of the Army has resulted in a large influx in inexperienced personnel.
The need for fully qualified experienced personnel in hard skill MOS's
is generally recognized, particularly in units of the Brigade, since
Brigade unit TOE's and MTOE's contain a preponderance of hard skill MOS's.
More selective screening of personnel qualifications at training and re-
placement centers prior to awarding MOS's would be a definite assist in
reducing the number of unskilled or unqualified personnel. Moreover, it
behoves unit commanders to be more selective in awarding MOS's to OJT
personnel in their units and to devote additional attention to OJT for
currently assigned unqualified personnel.

b. Paragraph 2b(1), page 5. The 1st Aviation Brigade concurs that
the fly away program is a suitable means of passive defense in some cases
and will direct subordinate units to make contingency plans for evacuation
of aircraft. It must be realized, however, that these plans should be
judiciously implemented since designated safe haven airfields may them-
selves become lucrative targets. Commanders must carefully weigh the
advantages and disadvantages in each particular situation before implementing
such plans. It may frequently be more desirable to remain at some station
even during an attack when adequate revetments and personnel bunkers are
available rather than to move to a "safe haven" where these facilities are
not adequate for transients.

8

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Unclassified after 12 years.
DOD Dir. 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **873541**
By **SPM** NAVA, Dale

AVEA-C (15 May 68) 1st Ind

JUN 27 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 16th Combat Aviation Group
for Period Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

c. Paragraph 2e(1), page 5. 1st Aviation Brigade concurs with the recommendation. It is further recommended that O-1 aviators in all four GTZ's become knowledgeable in procedures for directing tactical air strikes. Army aviators have effectively directed air strikes in all GTZ's when Air Force FAC's were not immediately available to control strikes. In April 1966, COMUSMACV directed that Army O-1 pilots become familiar with these procedures and be allowed to direct the TAC when AF FAC's were not reasonably available to perform the functions. Additionally he directed that AF O-1 pilots become familiar with procedures for directing artillery fires when Army O-1's were not reasonably available to perform that function.

d. Paragraph 2e(1), page 6. 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters is requiring all units to prepare movement plans for movement by air or surface and a combination of both.

e. Paragraph 2g(1), page 6. "Blade" or "Shark's Fin" type antennas have been procured from Collins Radio Inc and arrived in RVN during the first week of June 1968. One radio relay (ARC-121) U-1A will be retrofitted with these antennas and emission tests and flight tests will be performed during June. The drag problem will be solved. There is a high probability that the emission test will be successful with a minimum of directional effect due to the omnidirectional characteristics of this antenna.

f. Paragraph 2g(2), page 7. Acquisition of publications for newly arriving units is a function of the host unit. Activation of new units in-country will require designation of a unit to requisition necessary publications.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incl
nc

JOHN D. MIXSELL, JR.
CPT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Unclassified after 12 years.
DDP 2-72010

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 87354
By 87354
Date

16TH CAG OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
QTR ENDING 30 APRIL 1968

<u>Subordinate Unit</u>	<u>Sorties Flown</u>	<u>Troops Lifted</u>	<u>Cargo Lifted (Tons)</u>	<u>Enemy KIA</u>	<u>Structures Dam</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Sampans Dam</u>	<u>Dest</u>	<u>Acft Cnfmd Loss</u>	<u>Aircraft Damaged*</u>
HQ, 16th CAG	521	401	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

* Aircraft Damaged: 1 UH-1D, 1 U-21

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 16TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO San Francisco 96337

AVGM-SC

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

TO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
ATTN: AVBA-C
APO 96348

LESSONS LEARNED -- VC/NVA TET OFFENSIVE

SECTION I - Planning and Preparation Which Affected the Command's Readiness Posture upon Initiation of the TET Offensive.

a. Item: Physical Security Plans

b. Discussion: This command was not at any increased condition of readiness upon the start of enemy activities. The group was engaged in routine operational and administrative functions. The only significant enemy activity prior to 29 January in any area occupied by elements of this group was at Chu Lai on 27 January when an enemy mortar attack was conducted at 2300 hours on the cantonment area of Headquarters, 14th CAB. There were no casualties and no significant damage was reported. Each unit of the group is tenant at a U.S. installation except for one O-1 platoon located at Quang Ngai and one O-1 platoon located at Hue Citadel. All units had standing operation procedures to be taken in event of alert. All units had defensive plans integrated into area defense plans. Most areas had been exposed to enemy mortar and rocket attacks in the past so when the TET offensive commenced the units had sound, workable plans and procedures to guide their actions. It should be noted; however, that there was no indication on the evening of 29 January that an increased readiness posture was necessary. When the first rounds landed that evening the alert conditions went from normal to attack in progress. Although the attack was sudden, personnel responded in a calm manner and within minutes after the mortar attack, the interior perimeter was manned. Exterior perimeters are always manned so defense against ground attack is always present.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.20

Incl 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

c. Lesson Learned: Responsiveness to quick changing conditions of alert status is an essential training goal, but there is no substitute for prior warning of suspected enemy activity. Although few casualties were sustained during the surprise mortar and rocket attacks on installations, there could have been many if the attacks had been directed toward the cantonment areas. Fixed installations are dependent upon notification from intelligence agencies so that conditions of increased readiness can be initiated.

d. Recommendation: That intelligence collection agencies provide timely information to units advising them of probable or possible enemy activity in the area so that units can increase their readiness posture as required by the enemy situation.

SECTION II - Conduct of Operations During the TET Offensive.

1. (U) Personnel.

a. Item: Replacements

Discussion: During the period there was a noticeable drop in the flow of personnel in the replacement stream because of the shortage of air transportation from the replacement center. Replacements began to arrive again after the four day period.

Lesson Learned: The temporary loss of replacement personnel caused no hardship to the command because of the short duration involved.

Recommendation: None

b. Item: Morale

Discussion: It was expected that the requirement to man perimeters during alerts at night coupled with the normal daily work requirements during the day would reduce efficiency of the units. No noticeable degradation of capability was noted during the period or during the following week while constant vigil was continued. It was noted that the general esprit was improved during the period of tension and morale seemed to be higher than ever.

Lesson Learned: The threat of immediate danger provided a common bond among the troops. Headquarters personnel were eager to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

accept the challenge of ground combat when reports indicated a ground attack was imminent.

Recommendation: None

2. (C) Operations:

a. Item: Spot Reports

Discussion: Reporting damage assessments after enemy attacks presented a problem. The information to be reported was classified and secure teletype circuits were either overloaded or inoperative. A secure HF capability to brigade does not operate. Use of the telephone proved to be the fastest method of reporting; therefore, a special aircraft damage report was devised using lines and columns to report information:

Lesson Learned: Common user secure teletype is not responsive during periods of increased operational activity. Telephone and radio is the fastest means of reporting information of an urgent nature.

Recommendation: That line item type telephonic reports be included in the brigade SOP to expedite reporting procedures during periods when area wide secure communication systems are over committed.

b. Item: Physical Security

Discussion: During the numerous mortar and rocket attacks on installations few casualties were sustained. The existence of personnel shelters within cantonment areas contributed to this result. Although shelters were considered adequate prior to attacks, units improved their shelters the day after the first attack and continued to do so throughout the period of increased readiness.

Lesson Learned: Although adequate protective shelters were constructed in advance of the attack, the importance of sound shelters was dramatically emphasized during the attack. After an attack it is always evident that improvements can be made to existing facilities.

c. Item: Fly Away Plans

Discussion: During the period when enemy mortar and rocket attacks were a constant threat, OV-1 aircraft were flown out of country

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC

14 February 1968

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

to safe havens. No degradation of surveillance mission resulted and security of these expensive aircraft was assured.

Lesson Learned: A fly away plan for all types of aircraft is not always possible; however, OV-1 is capable of being flown out of country and should be evacuated during periods of increased enemy threats.

Recommendation: That OV-1 aircraft continue to be flown to safe havens during periods of increased enemy activity.

d. Item: Frequent Changes to Alert Status

Discussion: It is noted that area defense coordinators were frequently changing the alert status in response to the enemy situation. At times units would go from a normal condition to full alert three or four times during the night. Personnel were moving from barracks to bunkers throughout the night and were losing more sleep than was necessary.

Lesson Learned: During the periods of heightened tension it is better to man bunkers at dark and remain on positions throughout the night than to have personnel moving in and out of shelters. Personnel are able to sleep more and are protected from surprise attack.

Recommendation: That unit commanders maintain a readiness posture which is always equal to or higher than that established by the area defense coordinator, but that frequent changes in alert status be discouraged.

e. Item: Counter Mortar Operations

Discussion: In all cases of mortar attacks on group airfields, emergency standby gun teams were launched for counter mortar operations. When used in conjunction with base defense plans these light fire teams provide a constant retaliatory threat to enemy mortar crews.

Lesson Learned: Although the effort expended in maintaining emergency standby gun teams is considerable, these aircraft provide a valuable means for active defense of installations.

Recommendations: That continued use of standby light fire teams be emphasized as an integral part of all base defense activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGM-SC
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned During VC/NVA TET Offensive

14 February 1968

3. Logistics


Item: Aircraft Revetments

Discussion: Although an extensive revetment building program had been completed, extensive damage to parked aircraft was sustained during mortar and rocket attacks. Almost all damage to helicopters was to rotor blades and wind shields which is, of course, to be expected.

Lessons Learned: Aircraft revetments will minimize the effects of shell fragments to the major portion of parked helicopters; however, rotor systems and windshields remain vulnerable.

Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on construction of aircraft revetments as necessary protective requirement for all parked aircraft.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


J.A. BOYD
Maj, AGC
Adjutant

Record Group No. 1
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
COPY

CONFIDENTIAL



NATIONAL LEAGUE OF FAMILIES
OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST, SUITE 919
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-5504

UPDATE LINE: 202/659-0133

202/223-6846

November 2, 1999

Mr. Dick Detra
202 Visitacion Avenue, #3
Brisbane, CA 94005

Dear Mr. Detra:

I appreciate your October 24th fax requesting information related to the April 21, 1968 helicopter incident in South Vietnam, referred to by the US Government as REFNO (Reference Number) 1138. You are correct that LTC Floyd Warren Olsen, USA, was involved; in fact he was the aircraft commander. There were a total of six US Army personnel on the UH1H. In addition to LTC Olsen, their names are:

Creamer, James Edward, E4, passenger
Johnson, Frankie Burnett, E5, crewchief
Mackedanz, Lyle Everett, E6, passenger
Jamerson, Larry Carl, E4, door gunner
Link, Robert Charles, W1, pilot

All of these Americans are still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. The National League of POW/MIA Families is not an office of record; however, we try to be responsive to the degree that family members and others have provided unclassified information. In addition, in many cases, with the permission of the next-of-kin, incident information has been released publicly through the Library of Congress, a likely place for research into the circumstances and current status of US efforts to account for these men.

I'm enclosing some information on this case that we had in our files and current data on the issue that you may find of interest. LTC Olsen's sister is a League member, and other families of the crew may be as well. Should you have further questions, please feel free to fax, write or call.

Sincerely,

Ann Mills Griffiths
Executive Director

Enclosures



JOINT TAILOR FORCE - FULL ACCOUNT. JG
CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025

CASE 1138-0-01 THROUGH 06

NARRATIVE

ON 21 APRIL 1968, CAPTAIN FLOYD W. OLSEN, WARRANT OFFICER ONE ROBERT C. LINK, SPECIALIST FIVE FRANKIE B. JOHNSON, JUNIOR, SPECIALIST FOUR LARRY C. JAMERSON, STAFF SERGEANT LYLE E. MACKEDANZ, AND SPECIALIST FOUR JAMES E. CREAMER, JUNIOR, WERE CREW MEMBERS ABOARD A UH-1H HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER, SERIAL NUMBER 66-16209, WAS REPORTED MISSING WHILE ON A MAINTENANCE SUPPORT MISSION IN THE HUE-PHU BAI AREA, THUA THIEN PROVINCE. SEARCH AND RESCUE FORCES FAILED TO LOCATE THE MISSING AIRCRAFT. ON 25 MAY 1968, U.S. FORCES LOCATED THE TAIL BOOM OF THE MISSING AIRCRAFT IN THE VICINITY OF GRID COORDINATES YD481033, APPROXIMATELY 30 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF HUE AND FIVE KILOMETERS WEST OF ROUTE 547, THUA THIEN PROVINCE. ON 27 MAY 1968, A GROUND TEAM FOUND THE MAIN ROTOR BLADES ABOUT 200 METERS WEST OF THE TAIL BOOM BUT COULD NOT LOCATE THE MAIN CABIN SECTION OF THE HELICOPTER. ON 8 MAY 1968, ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FORCES FOUND SPECIALIST JOHNSON'S IDENTIFICATION TAG IN A TRUCK APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETERS SOUTH OF THE TAIL BOOM WRECKAGE.

AMG note from conversation with DPMO: In July, 1993, the incident was investigated by JTF-FA. Two witnesses were interviewed and led the joint team to the site where the tail boom had originally been seen. Very little wreckage was remaining. In that area, during wartime, the local population departed and those now present were not living in the area at the time of the incident. This incident is mentioned in the Group 559 Vietnamese document, accurately noting the number of people in the UH-1H helicopter and that all 6 were dead. The Group 559 document also listed the Vietnamese unit which shot down the helicopter; thus the follow-up is unilateral for the SRV to locate documents and/or witnesses related to the incident.

OLSEN, FLOYD WARREN

September 3, 1938

April 21, 1968

South Vietnam

Thua Thien

161810N 1071956E (YD481033)

1

UH1H



On April 21, 1968, Capt. Floyd W. Olsen, aircraft commander; WO1 Robert C. Link, pilot; Sp5 Frankie B. Johnson, Jr., crew chief; SP4 Larry C. Jamerson, door gunner; SSgt. Lyle E. MacKendanz and Sp4 James E. Creamer, passengers; were aboard a UH1H helicopter (serial #66-16209) which was flying a combat mission with other aircraft in South Vietnam. The aircraft remained with the assault aircraft during most of the operation until it was required to depart from Phu Bai, South Vietnam with rigging equipment for a recovery from LZ Zeghel. During the flight, Capt. Olsen acknowledged a radio transmission which stated the aircraft's secondary mission, the recovery operation at LZ Zeghel, had been canceled because of the tactical situation and inclement weather conditions. Following acknowledgment of the canceled mission, the aircraft was lost. Although there were several unsuccessful attempts to contact him, and ramp checks of all airfields and camps in the area were conducted, no further contact was made with Capt. Olsen.

