

~~Confidential~~

# Operation Dolan

19 April to 17 May  
1968

CLASSIFIED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 74

30-8-68  
228-03



**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~Confidential~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

File

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 927623  
AT NARA Date 10-16-99

~~Confidential~~

## OPERATION DELAWARE AFTER ACTION REPORT

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Intelligence.....	P. 1
Mission.....	P. 7
Concept of Operation.....	P. 7
Commander's Analysis.....	P. 12
Deployment of Forces .....	TAB A
Major Unit CP Locations.....	TAB B
Significant Enemy Caches and Enemy Contacts.....	TAB C
Task Organization.....	TAB D
Organization of Binh Tram 7.....	TAB E
Intelligence Support Activities.....	TAB F
G-1 Operations.....	TAB G
Key Personnel Roster.....	TAB H
Casualty Statistics.....	TAB I
Rotates and Replacements.....	TAB J
Postal Activities.....	TAB K
R&R Statistics.....	TAB L
Judge Advocate Activities.....	TAB M
Military Police Activities.....	TAB N
Finance.....	TAB O
Chaplain Activities.....	TAB P
Surgeon's Activities.....	TAB Q
Inspector General Activities.....	TAB R
G-4 Operations.....	TAB S
Logistics.....	TAB T
Civil Affairs.....	TAB U
Psychological Operations.....	TAB V

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 5200.10

~~Confidential~~

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB C: Significant Enemy Caches and Enemy Contacts

<u>NR</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ACTIVITY</u>
A	21 Apr	YD 306097	1-7 Cav	Found and destroyed 2 Bulldozers
B	23 Apr	LZ Tiger	5-7 Cav	Reinf plt atk LZ Tiger. Results 6 NVA KIA
C	25 Apr	YD 312075	1-7 Cav	Fd 3 flat bed trucks and 3x37mm AA guns
D	26 Apr	vic YD 239068	D/5-7 Cav	Eng en plt; res 4 US KIA, 11 WIA, 12 NVA KIA
E	25 Apr	YC 385977	D/2-8 Cav	Fd large cache-electronics equipment
F	25 Apr	YD 358018	1st Bde scouts	Spt'd large truck park
G	27 Apr	YC 389971	2-8 Cav	Discovered PT-76 Tank destroyed by air.
H	28 Apr	YD 365013	D 1-8 Cav	1st Contact Punch Bowl area
I	29 Apr-	YD 351017	2-8 Cav	Battle for the Puch Bowl
J	30 Apr	YD 286084	C 1-7 Cav	Found 4x37mm AA guns
K	3 May	YD 262105	B 5-7 Cav	Captured 3x37mm AA guns
L	30 Apr	YC 437942	2-3 ARVN	Found large ammo cache
M	1 May	YC 444934	2-3 ARVN	Found large ammo cache
N	2 May	YC 447909	2-3 ARVN	Found large ammo cache
O	9 May	YD 490030	1-12 Cav	Conducted link up w/3 ARVN Abn TF
P	2 May	YD 358032	2-7 Cav	Captured 2x37mm AA guns

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential***UNCLASSIFIED**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96490

AVDACG

11 July 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report: OPERATION DELAWARE (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216; Reconnaissance in Force and Area Denial.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 190001 April 1968 to 171100 May 1968.
3. (U) LOCATION: Southwest Thua Thien Province, RVN. References: Maps, South Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series I7014, Sheets 6441 I, II, III, IV.
4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
5. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

A. Weather. The operation began with exceptionally good weather. A cold front with attendant low stratus and fog coupled with intermittent drizzle and showers passed through the AO on D+2. After four days of gradual improvement, typical transitional weather ensued. The general pattern was scattered clouds during mornings and late evenings, broken ceilings based 2500-3000 feet with attendant thunderstorms and shower activity during afternoons, and moderate to occasionally heavy fog between 2400 hrs and mid-morning. Weather conditions, while not optimum much of the time, were somewhat better than anticipated. The period from early morning to approximately 1300 hrs daily was generally best for air operations into the valley. Conditions for continuous day-long air operations existed on only two days during the operation. Rainfall amounts were not measured; however, they were less than the normal amount for the area. Ceilings associated with the showers tended to obscure the higher peaks along the valley. The weather in the vicinity of Camp Evans was characterized by a clearing trend with general daily ceilings of 10,000 feet or greater. Precipitation was minimal. Temperatures ranged from a maximum of 100° to a minimum of 65°. The mean maximum temperature was 94°, while the mean minimum was 68°. The mean relative humidity was 83%, and the estimated rainfall was 4.20 inches.

## B. Terrain

(1) General: The area surrounding the A Shau Valley is a region of high hills with slopes averaging 40 percent (a 100 percent slope equals a 45 degree angle with the horizontal) and varying locally to over 100 percent. The steepest slopes and most rugged terrain were found on the western flanks of the valley, while those slopes on the eastern flanks of the valley were lower and somewhat less rugged. The valley floor was between 500 to 600 meters above mean sea level with ridge elevations rising approximately 380 to 450 meters above the valley floor. Spot elevations in the northeast and southwest hill masses exceeded 600 meters above mean sea level. The average width of the valley was 1.5 kilometers with the topography consisting of flat

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

undulating plains, local relief of approximately 50 meters, and slopes from 2 to 15 percent. The dominant vegetation on the ridges in the area was found to be multi-canopied dense undergrowth forest with sections of clear forest, brushwood, and bamboo scattered throughout the area. The valley floor was covered with a mixture of brushwood and clear forest with elephant grass growing to 10 feet in many areas of the valley floor. Drainage in the valley was found to be progressively poorer towards the central and southeastern portions.

(2) Military Aspects:

(a) Cover and Concealment. Good to excellent cover and concealment was provided by the dense vegetation and irregular, rugged terrain along the flanks of the valley. Brushwood-type vegetation on the valley floor generally provided good to excellent concealment and fair to good cover.

(b) Observation and Fields of Fire. Generally poor observation and fields of fire were evident throughout the valley area due to the vegetation and irregular terrain patterns. Fair to poor conditions existed locally near A Luoi and Ta Bat airfields and in proximity to bomb craters. Stands of 10 foot high elephant grass severely restricted observation along much of the valley floor.

(c) Key Terrain. Signal Hill (YD 407037), established helicopter landing zones, and the airfield at A Luoi were considered as key terrain. Additionally, control of the two major LOC's in the valley was considered vital. These LOC's were Route 548 entering the valley near La Out from the west, and running along the floor of the valley, and Route 547A which begins near Ta Bat and runs generally east towards Hue.

(d) Avenues of Approach. The major avenues of approach were from the west along Route 548 (new Rt 922) to La Nam (YD 2908) and along Route 923 to Ta Bat (YD 413950). The road to La Nam was considered a relatively high speed avenue of approach while the trail towards Ta Bat was primarily for personnel only. Avenues of approach from the north and south along feeder roads and trails into Route 548 were considered as well as an approach from the east generally along the Route 547-547A axis.

(e) Obstacles. The combination of multiple-canopied dense undergrowth forest, roughly dissected terrain, and numerous bomb craters made the major portion of the area unsuited for cross-country vehicular movement. However, movement by foot troops was possible on the valley floor, although movement on the flanks was generally restricted to existing trails, ridgelines, and intermittent streams. Muddy ground conditions caused by poor drainage made movement difficult after rain-showers. This was particularly prevalent at A Luoi Airfield and towards the valley regions to the south.

(3) Lines of Communications. Two major and numerous secondary routes of land communication traversed the valley area.

(a) Route 548 and its extension were found to be a fair weather, improved earth road in relatively good condition. Corduroy and PSP reinforcements were found on the road where ground conditions required such support to sustain vehicular traffic. Road width varied from 3 to 6 meters and proved to be capable of supporting heavy vehicular traffic. Numerous bypasses had been constructed to negotiate the extensive cratering. Numerous fords were found near the small streams in the area. The Route 548 extension exited the valley near La Nam and ran generally west, south, and west towards the Laotian border. The road exhibited the same general characteristics as the main valley route.

(b) Route 547A (NVA Route 73) was a fair weather, improved, earthen road 2 to 3.5 meters wide. The road exited the A Shau Valley at YD 428963 and ran generally east towards Hue. The road was capable of sustaining 2 1/2 ton vehicular traffic.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB D: Task Organization (Cont)

4-31 Cav  
 3-82 Arty (-)(DS)  
 F Trp, 17th Cav  
 A Co, 26 Engr

Div Arty  
 2-20 Arty  
 1-30 Arty  
 6-33 Arty  
 2d Plat (+), D 1-44 Arty (ADA)(AW)  
 1st Plat (-), C 4-60 Arty (ADA)(AW)  
 2d Plat (-), B-29 Arty (SLT)  
 Plat, G-29 Arty (SLT)

Division Troops  
 2-12 Cav  
 1-9 Air Cav Sqdn  
 8th Engr Bn  
 11th Avn Gp  
 Det (-), 5th Weather Sqdn  
 13th Sig Bn (-)  
 545th MP Co  
 371 RRC  
 191st MI Det (-)  
 Co D, 52 Inf Co (-) (LRRP)  
 184th Cmp Plat


4. (C) The 3d Regt, 1st Infantry Division (ARVN) participated in cooperation and close coordination with the following Task Organization for Combat:

3d ARVN Regt  
 1st Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN)  
 2d Bn, 3d Regt (ARVN)  
 2d Bn, 1st Regt (ARVN)  
 C Btry, 1-12 Arty (ARVN)(DS)  
 A Btry, 6-33 Arty (US)(GSR)  
 Arty LNO & FC Tms, 1 ACD Div Arty  
 AT Sect (106RR), D 1-9 Cav  
 Plat, C Co 14th Engr (DS)  
 Fwd Spt Tm (VHF), 13th Sig Bn

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB E: The Organization of Binh Tram 7, as estimated from intelligence indicators



*Confidential*

*Confidential*

(c) Trail density was heavy throughout the valley area with a few improved trails in the northern end of the valley showing evidence of activity northeast towards Base Area 114.

(d) Waterway density was considered light with one primary waterway, the Rao Lao (A Sap). The stream varied in width from 5 to 40 meters and had a sand, clay, and gravel bottom with clay and sand banks. It would be navigable to pirogues, and in some parts to small sampans, the year round.

#### C. Enemy.

(1) Enemy Composition, Disposition, and Strength prior to Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216. Initial estimates located the following type units in the valley:

- (a) A command and control headquarters.
- (b) An engineer regiment.
- (c) A transportation battalion.
- (d) A signal battalion
- (e) An air defense battalion
- (f) Unidentified armor elements.

The presence of security troops sufficient to protect the suspected large logistical facility in the valley was also considered. The major enemy anti-aircraft defensive belts were located from Ta Rat to A Luoi and along the flanks of the extreme north and northwestern portions of the valley. Additional AAA defensive lined the valley ridges south to the A Shau Airfield. Anti-aircraft weapons included numerous 37mm anti-aircraft guns, suspected 23mm guns, 12.7mm, 14.5mm, and 50 caliber machine guns. Other intelligence sources reported the presence of truck parts, POL points, storage sites, and extensive vehicle repair facilities. The major complex was suspected to be northwest of A Luoi airfield vicinity YD 358018. No identified combat infantry troops or units were suspected of occupying the A Shau Valley. The strength of the combat support and combat service support troops committed against 1 ACD elements was anticipated to be approximately 3000 or approximately seven battalions including air defense artillery elements. Reinforcement capability was estimated at between 12-14 battalions within 24-48 hours.

(2) Enemy Activity: Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 was unique in many respects. Not the least of these was the conspicuous absence of large scale contacts with enemy forces. The enemy chose to conduct a sporadic ground defense during the initial stages of the operation. This should not be construed to minimize the enemy's antiaircraft defenses, for these were certainly extensive. On the first day of the operation, 23 helicopters were struck by enemy anti-aircraft fire in the valley. The enemy's antiaircraft defense was the most formidable yet faced by 1 ACD in Vietnam. Prior to the commencement of the operation, elements of the 1/9 Cav had conducted extensive aerial reconnaissance to confirm suspected AA positions and determine additional positions for USAF aircraft and ARA strikes to reduce enemy ground-to-air fire. In spite of this, the enemy forces successfully engaged many of the 1 ACD aircraft during the first days of the operation. Initial ground contact with enemy elements was sporadic as 3d Brigade forces combat assaulted into the northwestern areas of the valley. As 3d Brigade elements advanced along the flanks of the valley towards the south, they seized two Soviet manufactured bulldozers one of which had been heavily damaged by friendly airstrikes. This was but one of many materiel sites to be discovered by the 3d Brigade. The first contact with an organized enemy force occurred on 23 April as an estimated enemy reinforced platoon supported by 60mm mortars probed 3d Brigade units on LZ Tiger. The enemy force was repulsed with an estimated six NVA killed. Three enemy 37mm antiaircraft weapons were seized on 25 April as units of the brigade continued south. Enemy contact continued

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-91*



*Confidential*

to be sporadic with the largest unit engaged being a platoon. Third Brigade firebases were subjected to intermittent mortar and rocket attacks throughout the remaining days of April as relatively light resistance characterized the ground activity. Elements of the 3d Brigade continually encountered enemy resistance as they tried to conduct reconnaissance along trails in the vicinity of YD 3306. On 29 April elements of 1-7 Cav received heavy AW fire while attempting to move along a trail in that vicinity. On 1 May contact was made with an unknown size enemy force vic YD 338066. This contact was initiated with a command detonated mine and AW fire was received from at least four positions. On 2 and 3 May contact was again made, this time with an estimated 15-20 NVA in bunkers at YD 336064. Communications wire was found along this trail vic YD 338067 on 4 May and contact was once again made with an unknown size enemy force vic YD 338066. This was the deepest penetration along the trail by elements of the 1-7 Cav. A study by PCV of documents captured in the A Shau Valley revealed the existence of a large storage area/supply point at YD 332052. The importance of this cache was attested to by the stiff resistance deployed along the trails, preventing elements of the 1 ACD from discovering the cache. First Brigade elements, probing areas to the south of the 3d Brigade, encountered an estimated reinforced company on 28 April near YD 365013. The results of this contact were inconclusive with negative enemy assessment. This was the largest enemy unit contacted throughout the operation by any 1 ACD elements. Except for the contact just mentioned, 1st Brigade operations in the valley featured primarily light enemy encounters and numerous findings of enemy cache sites and miscellaneous logistical and base complexes. On 26 April, 1st Brigade elements captured a large enemy weapons and supply cache (YD 3701) containing 315 individual weapons and considerable quantities of assorted artillery, antiaircraft, and small arms ammunition. A large storage area and truck park (vic YD 362012) were seized by 1st Brigade elements on 29 April as enemy forces continued to avoid decisive contact. The discovery of this large logistical complex confirmed intelligence reports processed and received prior to the operation. The continuing discoveries of hospitals, administrative, and logistical sites in the general vicinity of YD 3601 lent further support to the theory that this was a major support complex for the A Shau Valley command and control element. As the operation continued into May, both the 1st and 3d Brigades continued to encounter scattered enemy resistance while uncovering additional storage sites containing food, ammunition, and weapons. ARVN units from the 3d ARVN Regiment, operating near Ta Bat airfield and south, encountered sporadic, light resistance as they seized enemy cache sites and logistical areas. The 4 May discovery of a suspected battalion size engineer storage site, containing large numbers of assorted tools and equipment, by the 3d Brigade seemed to confirm the presence of hostile engineer units of at least battalion size in the valley. Beginning on approximately 5 May, enemy indirect fire attacks against 1 ACD LZ's became more frequent and intense. Rockets, mortars, and medium artillery were employed by the enemy forces. Fire against 1 ACD valley units was suspected from the west near Base Area 611, while rocket attacks against Camp Evans were conducted from the northern portions of Base Area 114. The largest single attack occurred on 6 May when LZ Tiger (3d Bde) received 250-300 rounds of mixed medium artillery, 122mm rockets, 82mm mortars, and 75mm RR. As friendly elements initiated withdrawal operations from the valley, enemy indirect fire attacks increased and were concentrated on the A Luoi airfield and 1st Bde units. Camp Evans and vicinity generally experienced mining incidents and rocket attacks during the Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 period.

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

(3) Major Ground Contacts:

DATE	COORD	FRIENDLY UNIT	ENEMY UNIT	ASSESSMENT
21 Apr	YD 394023	B 2-7	Est Plat	Neg
24 Apr	YD 237088	D 5-7	Est Plat	Neg
25 Apr	YD 235088	D 5-7	Unk	12 NVA KIA
28 Apr	YC 371998	C 2-8	Unk	Neg
28 Apr	YD 351985	C 2-8	Unk	18 NVA KIA
28 Apr	YD 348024	C 2-7	Unk	13 NVA KIA
28 Apr	YD 236086	D 5-7	3 small gps	3 NVA KIA
28 Apr	YD 365013	D 1-8	Co (+)	Neg
29 Apr	YD 366053	D 1-7	Unk	Neg
29 Apr	YC 263072	B 5-7	est sqd	2 NVA KIA
30 Apr	YD 336014	D 1-8	Unk	Neg
1 May	YD 367014	D 1-8	Unk	Neg
1 May	YD 351009	A 2-8	Unk	Neg
1 May	YD 304013	A 1-7	Unk	Neg
1 May	YD 338062	A 1-7	Unk	3 NVA KIA
1 May	YD 338066	A 1-7	Unk	Neg
1 May	YD 367014	D 1-8	Unk	Neg
2 May	YD 364012	D 1-8	12-15 Indiv	Neg
2 May	YD 336064	B 1-7	15-20 Indiv	Neg
2 May	YC 460910	2-3 ARVN	est plat	Neg
3 May	YD 262105	B 1-7	"small en force"	2 NVA KIA
4 May	YD 348014	B 2-8	Unk	3 NVA KIA
4 May	YD 266117	B 1-9	Sqd size	Poss 3 NVA KIA
4 May	YD 348017	B 2-8	Unk	3 NVA KIA
4 May	YD 358039	2-7	Est sqd	Neg
5 May	YC 338940	1-12	plat	Neg
6 May	YC 331998	C 1-9	Sqd size	6 NVA KIA
6 May	YD 336003	C 1-9	Unk	9 NVA KIA
6 May	YC 333948	A 1-12	Unk	4 NVA KIA
6 May	YC 331945	C 1-12	Unk	Neg
7 May	YD 312043	A 2-7	plat (-)	3 NVA KIA
7 May	YD 231076	C 5-7	Unk	Neg
7 May	YD 311043	A 2-7	Est Co (-)	Neg
9 May	YD 311043	A 2-7	Poss plat	Neg
9 May	YD 311043	A 2-7	plat	1 NVA KIA
9 May	YC 501829	2-1 ARVN	Est Sqd	1 NVA KIA
9 May	YD 513843	1-3 ARVN	Est Sqd	Neg
9 May	YC 334996	B 1-8	Unk	Neg
9 May	YC 332058	A 1-12	Unk	Neg
10 May	YC 467897	2-3 ARVN	Est Sqd	Neg
10 May	YC 559816	C 1-9	10-20 Indiv	7 NVA KIA
13 May	YD 352013	D 1-8	plat (+)	Neg
13 May	YD 357019	A 1-9	Est Co	1 NVA KIA
13 May	YD 343017	1-12	Unk	Neg

(4) Enemy Composition, Disposition, and Strength subsequent to Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216: The large number of documents and electrical and radio equipment discovered in the vicinity of YD 355005, west of A Luoi, reflect a probable forward Headquarters of Binh Tram 7 (BT-7). BT-7 is held as a regimental sized logistical and transportation subordinate of the 559th Transportation Group and was responsible for transportation through the A Shau Valley to the vicinity of Base Area 114 and south towards Base Area 607. Further intelligence indicators suggested that the BT-7 Command and Control headquarters was located near YD 355005. The 55th Bn was identified through

*5 Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
60mm Mortar	0
75mm RR	8
82mm Mortar	2
122mm Rocket Launcher	1
RPG-2 (B-40) Launcher	0
RPG-7 (B-41) Launcher	0
Flamethrower	31
140mm Rocket Launcher	10
Explosives (lbs)	2182
Blasting Caps	5994
Small Arms Ammo	134,757
12.7 Ammo/50 cal	34,140
14.5 Ammo	0
23mm AA Ammo	34,332
37mm AA Ammo	5850
57mm Gun Ammo	300
57mm RR Ammo	675
60mm Mortar Ammo	16
75mm Gun Ammo	0
75mm RR Ammo	121
76mm Gun Ammo	229
82mm Mortar Ammo	18
85mm Gun Ammo	66
122mm Gun Ammo	698
122mm Rocket Ammo	0
Mines, AP	4
Mines, AT	31
Grenades, Hand	1680
Grenades, Rifle	806
RPG-2 (B-40) Ammo	42
RPG-7 (B-41) Ammo	0
Bulldozer	2
Wheeled vehicles	73
Tracked vehicles	3
Tanks	1
Radios	6
Mine Detectors	36
Food Stores	71,805 lbs

6. (C) MISSION: 1st Air Cav Div (-)(Reinf) air assaults into the northern A Shau Valley, seizes A Luoi airstrip and conducts recon in force, throughout the A Shau Valley.

7. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

A. Maneuver: The 1st Air Cav Div (-)(Reinf) in coordination with the 3d Regt, 1st ARVN Div, air assaults into the A Shau Valley, seizes the A Luoi airstrip and conducts reconnaissance in force operations. On D-Day the 3d Bde air assaults with 3 Bns and supporting Arty north of A Luoi airfield; establishes fire bases, places indirect fire on enemy positions vic A Luoi airfield and conducts a reconnaissance in force. D+1 3d Bde cont operations and signal relay site becomes fully operational. On D+2 1st Bde air assaults 3 bns and supporting arty to seize A Luoi airfield and conduct reconnaissance in force. On D+3 engineer equipment, signal and initial logistical elements airlift to A Luoi airfield, and commence work on airstrip. On D+4 the 3d Regt, 1st ARVN Div airlifts/assaults south of A Luoi airfield and conducts reconn-

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

aissance in force. On D+5 airfield is open for C-7A aircraft and on D+6 airstrip receives C-123 aircraft. Reconnaissance in force ~~continues~~ through out the A Shau Valley until terminated by CG, 1st ACD.

B. Fires: Priority of fires on D-Day to 3d Bde. Air assaults supported by tube artillery, ARA and TAC air. Air Cap on station during air assaults.

8. (C) EXECUTION:

A. D-5 to D-1 (14 April-18 April). The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, (1-9 Cav) initiated extensive aerial reconnaissance in the A Shau Valley to select flight routes, locate enemy anti-aircraft (AA) positions, develop intelligence for tactical air and Arc Light targeting, and locate suitable landing zones for the initial assault by the 1 ACD. The aerial reconnaissance by the 1-9 Cav continued on 16-17 April, after bad weather restricted opns on the 15th, and developed an extensive pattern of AA positions. Concentrations were confirmed in the central portion of the Valley, centered generally in the vicinity of A LUOI Airfield (YD 385002). A lack of suitable landing zones was confirmed and extensive use was made of "Daisy Cutter" fuzing on Air Force delivered ordnance to open the heavy jungle on ridges above the Valley floor. During the reconnaissance and preparation of the Valley (D-5 to D-1) a total of 209 Tactical Air Sorties and 21 B-52 strikes were placed on selected targets in the Valley.

B. D-Day (19 April): The 3d Bde made the initial air assaults into the A Shau Valley. Supported by the 11th Aviation Group (11th Avn Gp), the 5-7 Cav air assaulted and established LZ Tiger. The 1-7 Cavalry air assaulted to LZ Vicki (YD 281116). The direct support artillery battery for 5-7 Cav was air landed on LZ Tiger. Enemy AA defenses proved effective despite the extensive preparation by air strikes and surveillance of the flight routes by elements of the 1-9 Cav. Twenty three helicopters were hit by ground to air firing. Ten aircraft were destroyed. The 5-7 and 1-7 Cav were virtually unopposed by ground action. Due to the intense AA fire, the late hour of completion of the 1-7 Cav's air assault, deteriorating weather conditions and extensive engineer effort required on the LZ, the decision was made not to insert a DS artillery battery on LZ Vicki.

Concurrent with air assaults by the 3d Bde, Co E 52d Infantry (-) (D-52 Inf), two squads of engineers (one squad from B and one squad from C Co, 8th Engineer Bn) and elements from the 13th Signal Bn rappelled from helicopters to establish the SIGNAL HILL relay site (YD 407035).

C. D+1 to D+2 (20-21 April): Deployment into the northern A Shau Valley continued as B Co (+), 2-7 Cav, air assaulted to establish LZ Pepper (YD 337026). The build up of thunderstorms resulted in severe turbulence and reduced visibility. The deteriorating weather prevented further airlift of units into the Valley and restricted resupply of elements on LZ Tiger.

1-7 Cav commenced an attack overland from LZ Vicki to secure LZ Goodman (YD 325078). The force on SIGNAL HILL continued construction of a landing zone and improvement of facilities. Bad weather prevented further resupply. The enemy probed the SIGNAL HILL defenses resulting in 4 US KIA and 3 US WIA. The 5-7 Cav initiated ground operations in the vicinity of LZ Tiger concentrating on completing the interdiction of Route 548 which enters the valley from Laos in the vicinity of LZ Tiger. Aggressive search was initiated to seek out and silence enemy AA positions. The weather continued to prevent air operations in the Valley on 21 April. The 1-7 Cav, operating over extremely rough terrain, continued the attack to LZ Goodman, capturing and destroying two Soviet built bulldozers enroute. The 5-7 Cav continued with its companies initiating systematic search operations from LZ Tiger. Efforts to improve SIGNAL HILL progressed well. A D-4 dozer was airlifted to the

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623

By AT NARA Date 10-16-94

*Confidential*

clearing to complete the expansion of the landing zone. Late in the afternoon of 21 April a platoon of A Battery, 1st Bn 21st Artillery (two 105 howitzers) occupied a firing position on SIGNAL HILL and fired throughout the night in support of B/2-7 (+) on LZ Pepper.

The 1st Bde completed deployment by truck convoy and airlift from vic LZ Betty-Sharon to a marshalling area established immediately south of Camp Evans.

D. D+3 to D+4 (22-23 April): With improved weather, the 3d Bde completed its insertion into the A Shau. 2-7 Cav (-) and the Bde CP air landed on LZ Pepper. 1-7 Cav completed its attack securing LZ Goodman during the late afternoon of 22 April. The 5-7 Cav continued operations searching mainly to the west and south of LZ Tiger. Taking advantage of the improving weather conditions on 23 Apr, the deployment of the Arty units was completed with the airlift of a DS 105mm Battery to LZ Goodman and a DS 105mm Battery (-) to LZ Pepper. A general support (GS) battery (155mm How) was airlifted to LZ Goodman with the lift being completed early the following morning.

E. D+5 to D+6 (24-25 April): The 3d Bde having completed deployment continued an aggressive reconnaissance in force operation with companies ranging out from LZ's Tiger, Goodman and Pepper. 1-7 Cav found three flat-bed trucks and three 37mm AA guns; the guns were evacuated. The 1st Bde insertion was initiated with the air assault of the 2-8 Cav to seize LZ Cecile (YD380981). A DS Battery (-) (3x105mm howitzers) was airlifted to LZ Cecile before increasing turbulence, low ceiling and restricted visibility curtailed air operations on 24 April. The 1st Bde took advantage of improving weather on 25 April and quickly completed the insertion of the remaining maneuver battalions with the 1-8 Cav air assaulting to A LUOI Airfield, establishing LZ Stallion (YD 385002). The 1-12 Cav immediately followed, air landing on LZ Stallion. Reconnaissance in force commenced immediately with the 2-8 Cav conducting operations to the south and west from LZ Cecile. The 1-8 Cav (+) assumed the base defense mission of LZ Stallion sending companies to the north from Stallion, while 1-12 Cav (-) operated to the south and east.

F. D+7 to D+8 (26-27 April): The reconnaissance in force operations continued throughout the 1st and 3d Bde AO's. D Company, 5-7 Cavalry, searching west from LZ Tiger, engaged an estimated platoon. The contact continued for several hours resulting in 12 NVA KIA; D Company had 4 KIA and 11 WIA. The Company commander was among the wounded and a platoon leader was among those killed in action.

1-8 Cav in the 1st Bde AO, exploiting sightings by D Trp, 1-9 Cav, found a large equipment cache. 2-8 Cav elements working south from LZ Cecile found a large cache of electronics equipment.

The airlift of artillery units to LZ Stallion continued. The introduction of the 1st Brigade's Forward Support Element (FSE) from the Division Support Command was initiated.

The resupply effort by C-130 Heavy Drop on the south end of A LUOI airfield started on 26 April. The joint operation, with a USAF Tactical Air Control party working closely with the FSE, continued to conduct daily resupply by heavy drop until 5 May. The reduced flying time required to complete unit distribution within the Valley, as compared to flying time from Evans, reduced the demand on the division's aviation assets. However, a great amount of supply for the 3d Brigade elements continued to be lifted from Camp Evans by organic aircraft.

G. D+9 to D+14 (28 April-3 May): The Bns of the 3d Bde continued detailed reconnaissance of the assigned AO. The 1-7 Cav found four more 37mm AA guns in good condition. On 2 May, the 2-7 Cav found two more 37mm AA guns. Enemy resistance throughout the period continued with only sporadic light contact.

*CONFIDENTIAL*

*Confidential*

The enemy began an ever increasing reaction to the dominating position of the 5-7 Cav on LZ Tiger. On 2 May the 5-7 Cav received the first heavy stand-off attack by the enemy consisting of ten rounds of 122mm rockets. The search by the 3d Brigade continued with the 1-7 Cav finding three more 37mm AA guns on 3 May, one of which had been damaged by an air strike.

On 28 April the 1st Bde's C Co, 1-8 Cav, having completed the police of a cache site, made contact with an estimated NVA company vicinity YD 365103 and advanced far enough to determine evidence of a major cache area. In the engagement, the enemy suffered 3 KIA and the 1-8 Cav had 1 WIA. The contact proved to be the beginning of a tenacious defense by the NVA of the principle cache area uncovered in the valley. The area, nicknamed the "Punchbowl," extended from YD 351017 to YD 366012. D 1-8 was placed OPCON to the 2-8 Cav to fully exploit the new findings while 1-8 Cav continued as the base defense battalion for the logistical facilities complex being built at LZ Stallion. The action by the 2-8 Cav to penetrate the major cache area continued during the period 29 Apr-2 May 68. Extensive air and artillery fires were used to counter the advantage held by the enemy entrenched in strong positions with overhead cover and supported by numerous well placed snipers and observation posts. The 2-8 Cav skillfully continued the pressure on the defending force, taking advantage of superior firepower, until the enemy broke and organized resistance in the area collapsed on 3 May. Contacts in the "Punchbowl" resulted in 6 US KIA, 38 US WIA and 30 NVA KIA. The enemy forfeited tons of material of all classes of supply.

Concurrent with operations by the 2-8 and 1-8 Cav, the 1-12 Cav had been conducting company and platoon size air assaults covering a wide area of the 1st Bde AO with detailed search and reconnaissance operations. The principle area of operations was northeast astride Route 547A from the junction with Route 548 north of TA BAT. On 29 April, the 1-12 Cav secured an LZ at YC 423946 and the 3d ARVN Regiment commenced insertion by air, landing the 1-3 ARVN Bn followed by the Regimental CP. The 1-3 ARVN Bn assumed security and established LZ Lucy. The regiment completed its insertion with 2-3 ARVN Bn air landing on 30 April, the 2-1 ARVN Bn and the regiment's DS Arty Battery air landing on LZ Lucy on 1 May.

The build-up of support elements continued at LZ Stallion. The 8th Engineer Battalion (8th Engr) initiated rehabilitation of the A LUOI Airfield. Working day and night, the airfield was rehabilitated and opened to C7A type aircraft by 0700H 1 May. It was further upgraded, marked and extended for C-123 aircraft by 1300H of the same day. The completed airfield, 150' by 3100' was open to C-130 aircraft on 3 May.

The Division TAC CP, supported by elements of the 13th Signal Battalion (13th Sig) became operational at LZ Stallion 1800H 29 April.

H. D+15 to D+18 (4 May-7 May) The 3d ARVN Regiment having completed a detailed search and reconnaissance of the areas surrounding LZ Lucy commenced an attack to the southeast astride the RAO LAO with the 2-1 ARVN Bn on the north and 2-3 ARVN Bn on the south. The 1-3 ARVN Bn continued with security of LZ Lucy. The ARVN attack met light to sporadic contact, finding several significant caches. By 7 May the 3d Regt had advanced to the limit of support by 105mm howitzers located at LZ Lucy. "A" Battery, 6th Bn, 33d Arty (A-6-33) had been airlanded on LZ Lucy 4 May to reinforce the fires on the ARVN DS Battery. On 7 May the 1-12 Cav relieved the 1-3 ARVN Bn of security of LZ Lucy. A DS Battery was airlifted from LZ Stallion to LZ Lucy. The 2-8 Cav continued a detailed search and selected evacuation and destruction of the cache in the "Punchbowl." The 1-8 Cav

10

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*



*Confidential*

continued security of LZ Stallion sending platoon and company size elements to search to the south and east.

The 3d Bde continued operations finding several small caches and extensive enemy power and telephone lines in the draws leading east and west from the Valley floor. The enemy continued standoff attacks against 3d Bde LZs with B-40 rockets, 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets.

I. D+19 to D+20 (8-9 May): The 3d ARVN Regt airlifted its DS and reinforcing Arty Btry to LZ Lillian (YD 479868), the LZ having been secured by the 2-3 ARVN Bn the previous day. This move extended coverage of the supporting Arty from LZ Lillian. The 3d ARVN Regt commenced the attack to carry the reconnaissance in force south of A Shau airfield, completing coverage of the valley. The 1st and 3d Bde continued operations in their assigned AOs. In addition to reconnaissance in force operations, the 3d ARVN and 3d Bde, 1 ACD initiated extensive denial measures to maximize disruption to the enemy's activities after extraction. The DS Engr Company of the 3d Bde executed 32 separate denial targets in the Bde's AO, completely dropping the road (Route 548) south of LZ Tiger. The DS Engr Plat supporting the 3d ARVN Regt executed 16 separate denial targets.

J. D+21 to D+27 (10 May-16 May) With the completion of reconnaissance in force operations and denial plans, the 3d Bde, 1 ACD and 3d ARVN Regt initiated extraction on 10 May. The 5-7 Cav and 1-7 Cav with supporting Arty were airlifted from LZ's Tiger and Goodman on 10 May. Concurrently, the 3d ARVN Regt commenced extraction by airlifting the 2-1 ARVN Bn to LZ Stallion and further airlifting to Quang Tri, the latter by USAF lift. The 3d Bde completed extraction back to Camp Evans on 11 May with the airlift of the 2-7 Cav (-), the Bde CP, and a DS Arty Battery from LZ Pepper. The 3d ARVN completed extraction with airlift of the 1-3, and 2-3 ARVN Bn, the Regt CP and DS Arty back to PK 17. The 1st Bde continued to conduct operations and to complete its portion of the denial plan during the period 10-15 May. The logistical elements on LZ Stallion began movement back to Camp Evans. An effort was made to use USAF airlift during the back haul of air items and other logistical support items. However, the increasingly heavy afternoon rains made it impossible to keep the A LUOI Airfield operational after 11 May. After completion of the denial plan (26 separate denial targets), the 1st Bde continued to provide security for LZ Stallion during the extraction of logistical and support elements. The Div TAC CP with elements of 13th Sig was airlifted to Camp Evans on 12 May. The 1st Bde commenced extraction on 15 May with the airlift of the 1-8 Cav, 1-12 Cav, Bde CP and supporting Arty from LZ's Lucy and Stallion. The extraction from the Valley was completed on 16 May with the airlift of 2-8 Cav (+) and its DS Arty Btry from LZ Cecile. The 13th Sig elements and security force were airlifted from Signal Hill closing to Camp Evans.

K. D+28 (17 May) The 1st Bde having airlanded to a secure marshalling area immediately south of Camp Evans completed redeployment to LZ Betty-Sharon during the morning of 17 May. All Bdes were redeployed and ready to assume new missions as Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 was terminated at 1100H 17 May 1968.

L. Other Operations:

(1) General: Concurrent with the operations in the A Shau Valley, the 1st Air Cav Div retained a relatively large area of operations on the Piedmont between the Song Bo and a line extending southwest from QL-1 on the Song Nhung. The 1 ACD was given OPCON of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (196 LIB) which was the primary unit operating in the division AO outside the A Shau Valley.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

## (2) Operations by 196th LIB

(a) The 196th LIB was deployed by a combination of air movement and truck convoy from the Americal Division AO (south of DA NANG). The 4th Bn, 31st Inf (-) arrived at Camp Evans 18 April and assumed the mission of base defense on 19 April relieving elements of the 1 ACD, 3d Bde which deployed into the A Shau Valley on the same day. The 196th LIB continued movement into the assigned AO and completed movement on 22 April with the closing of the 2d Bn, 21st Inf.

(b) The 196th LIB was assigned an area of operations and the basic mission to secure Camp Evans with at least one Bn, screen Camp Evans from the south, east and west and secure QL-1 in assigned AO. Additionally, the 196th LIB was designated as Corps reserve and given the mission to be prepared to be committed into the Khe Sanh area, the A Shau Valley, Delta Junction (vic YD 527030) or the Coastal Plain North of Hue. The 196th LIB deployed its Bns with the 4-31 Inf at Camp Evans, 2-1 Inf at LZ Jack (YD 494287) and the 3-21 Inf at LZ Belcher (YD 463338). The 196th LIB continued operations in assigned AO with no significant contacts. The 3-21 Inf was placed OPCON to 3 Mar Div and deployed to the vic of DONG HA on 1 May. The 2-1 Inf was placed OPCON to the 101st on 6 May and deployed to LZ Nola. Upon extraction of the 3d Bde from the A Shau on 11 May, the 196th LIB (-) was relieved from security of Camp Evans and commenced redeployment back to the Americal Div AO on 13 May. The last elements departed Camp Evans on 14 May; the 3-21 Inf and 2-1 Inf deployed directly from Dong Ha and LZ Nola. OPCON of the 196th LIB terminated on 141630 May.

(3) Operations of 2d Bn, 12th Cavalry: The 2-12 Cav was released OPCON 2d Bde and placed OPCON 1 ACD on 15 Apr, assuming the mission for the security of LZ Jane and QL-1 in its assigned AO. The 2-12 Cav continued operations without significant contacts during Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. Upon the return of the 2d Bde from 3 Mar Div at 171100H May, the 2-12 Cav was released OPCON 1 ACD and returned to the 2d Bde.

## 9. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS

## A. General.

(1) The enemy buildup in the A Shau Valley since the US Special Forces Camps were overrun and withdrawn in 1964 is well known. The decision for the timing of the assault was based on the availability of suitable forces in ICTZ, the relative decrease in enemy activity following his TET Offensive, the relief of Khe Sanh and the annual weather patterns that affect the A Shau Valley.

(2) The preparation for the assault into the A Shau Valley actually started during the last phase of Operation Pegasus with the deployment of the Division (-) from the Khe Sanh area to the Jeb Stuart II Area of Operations. The capability of the Airmobile Division to quickly reorient its effort, re-deploy and marshal was a decisive factor in the success of Operation Delaware-Lam Son 216.

## B. Preparation and Reconnaissance Phase.

(1) The capability of the Division's Air Cavalry Squadron to perform area reconnaissance as well as low level, detailed, point reconnaissance was another decisive element in the successful assault into the A Shau.

(2) The capability to immediately employ supporting artillery and air strikes while performing the initial reconnaissance was used with great effectiveness by the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cavalry. The intelligence which resulted from this reconnaissance was also the basic targeting criteria for Arc Light strikes during the preparation phase. The requirement to have at least three full days of reconnaissance by 1-9 Cav in the Valley was considered so.

*Confidential*



*Confidential*

essential that D-Day had to be slipped from 17 to 19 April after weather interrupted the 1-9 Cav's operations.

C. Insertion Phase

(1) The feats of airmanship required of the Division's aircrews in overcoming the problems of IFR weather and mountainous terrain were exceptional. With the added consideration of the enemy antiaircraft defenses, the initial air assault by the lift aircraft and support rendered by other divisional air assets produced a magnificent performance.

(2) Once in the valley with the initial Bde, and offensive operations begun, the remainder of the insertion was accomplished smoothly despite marginally suitable Landing Zones and weather conditions.

D. Reconnaissance in Force Operations.

(1) As was expected, the ground operations never met determined resistance, with the exception of the enemy defense of the large cache northwest of Landing Zone Stallion. The Bdes were able to conduct extensive and detailed searches of the entire valley, moving at will to all areas. Only the extremely rough terrain limited the tempo of operations.

(2) The 3d ARVN Regt's performance in the operation was outstanding. All Bns of the Regiment maneuvered well and covered extensive portions of the Valley. The ever improving ability of the RVN Armed forces to operate in coordination with US forces was emphatically demonstrated by the performance of the 3d ARVN Regiment. The capability of the ARVN forces to adjust to and perform well in fast moving airmobile operations is proof of the 1st ARVN Division's capacity and desire to assume an ever increasing role in offensive operations.

E. Extraction Phase.

(1) The operations in the A Shau Valley commenced without a specific termination date in mind. The decisive element was the weather. Throughout the operations, the northerly advance of the inter-tropical convergence zone was closely monitored. Based on the weather information available and historical precedence, it was estimated that 15 May was the latest date that airmobile operations could be safely planned without undue regard for the southwest monsoon season. The decision to initiate the extraction on 10 May was made on 7 May.

(2) The extraction operations went very smoothly and could have been completed well ahead of schedule except for the time required to reduce the logistics facility which had been established at LZ Stallion.

F. Accomplishments.

(1) The major accomplishment of Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 was the disruption and denial of a principal supply area and infiltration route to the enemy. 1 ACD captured and destroyed large amounts of ammunition, weapons, and equipment which will obviously be denied the enemy. The timing of his present and future plans will certainly be disrupted as a result of this action.

(2) 1 ACD accomplished detailed reconnaissance on how the enemy organized and used the area. This information continues to be of assistance in further disrupting his operations with more accurate and precise targeting for future USAF bombing in the area.

(3) An accomplishment that cannot be measured is the psychological impact on the enemy. 1 ACD has effectively demonstrated to the enemy that he has no sanctuaries. His operations are constantly under threat of assault by airmobile infantry. His planning and operations will undoubtedly be effected in the future by this knowledge. 1 ACD has the capability and the will to pursue, seek out and destroy the enemy in the most remote reaches of the land.

13

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Conrad L Stansberry*  
 CONRAD L STANSBERRY  
 COL, GS  
 Chief of Staff

22 Incl

TAB A: Deployment of Forces into  
 A Shau Valley

TAB B: Major Unit CP Locations

TAB C: Significant Enemy Caches and  
 Enemy Contacts

TAB D: Task Organization

TAB E: Organization of Binh Tram 7

TAB F: Intelligence Support Activities

TAB G: G-1 Operations

TAB H: Key Personnel Roster

TAB I: Casualty Statistics

TAB J: Rotatees and Replacements

TAB K: Postal Activities

TAB L: R & R Statistics

TAB M: Judge Advocate Activities

TAB N: Military Police Activities

TAB O: Finance

TAB P: Chaplain Activities

TAB Q: Surgeon's Activities

TAB R: Inspector General Activities

TAB S: G-4 Operations

TAB T: Logistics

TAB U: Civil Affairs

TAB V: Psychological Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - USARV ATTN: AVHG (D&T) APO 96375

2 - FCV ATTN: G-3 D&T APO 96308

2 - III MAF ATTN: G-3 FPO 96602

2 - 1st ARVN Div

1 - USARV Command Historian APO 96375

1 - OCMH Washington, D.C. 20315

1 - 196th LIB ATTN: G-3 APO 96256

1 - 101 Abn Div ATTN: G-3 APO 96347

1 - ea Gen Staff Sec

1 - 14th MHD

14  
*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-91*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB D: Task Organization

1. (C) Detached Units: The 2d Brigade with 2d Bn, 5th Cav and 1st Bn, 5th Cav was placed OPCON to the 3d Marine Division, and further placed OPCON to TF Glick on 15 April 68 and remained in the Pegasus Area of Operations vic KHE SANH as the 1st Air Cav Div redeployed to CAMP EVANS, and the LZ BETTY and LZ SHARON complexes to marshal for Operation Delaware. The 2d Bde continued OPCON to 3d Mar Div and was deployed to vic of DONG HA RVN on 10 May 1968. The 2d Bde was released OPCON from the 3d Mar Div to the 1st Air Cav Div upon completion of Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 at 171100H May 1968.

2. (C) Attached Units: The following units remained attached to the 1st Air Cav during the execution of Opn Delaware/Lam Son 216:

- A. Detachment, 5th Weather Sqdn (USAF)
- B. 371st Radio Research Company
- C. 191st Military Intelligence Co
- D. 184th Chemical Platoon
- E. 196th Light Infantry Brigade (OPCON)

3. (C) Task Organization for Combat:

1st Bde, 1 ACD

1-8 Cav

2-8 Cav

1-12 Cav

2-19 Arty (DS)

A Btry, 1-30 Arty (GSR)

A Co, 8th Engr (GSR)

2 Sqds, 25th Inf Plat

Det, 11th Pathfinder Plat

Fwd Spt Tm, 13th Sig (DS)

Tm, 191 MI Co

Tm, 5th Weather Sqdn

Plat, 545 MP Co

Tm, 246 Psyop Co

Det, Co D 52 Inf Co

FSE, Div Spt Cmd (DS)

3d Bde, 1 ACD

1-7 Cav

2-7 Cav

5-7 Cav

1-21 Arty (DS)

C Btry, 1-30 Arty (GSR)

C Co, 8th Engr (DS)

2 Sqds, 34th Inf Plat

Det, 11th Pathfinders Plat

Fwd Spt Tm, 13 Sig

Tm, 191 MI Co

Tm, 5th Weather Sqdn

Plat, 545 MP Co

Tm, 245th Psyops Co

FSE, Div Spt Cmd (DS)

196th LIB

3-21 Inf

2-1 Inf

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB F: Intelligence Support Activities

1. (FOUO) Counterintelligence: Because of the geographic location of the reconnaissance in force, supporting counterintelligence activities were limited in scope. The CI Section increased its security surveillance of Camp Evans by frequent spot checks of Division and brigade headquarters areas to insure that classified information was being properly safeguarded and destroyed. Although there were few violations, it is felt that the increased effort enhanced the security of the operation and had a definite influence in the tightening of security within division elements. During the entire operation, the CI Section continued its operations and collection effort in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Although intelligence reports received during the operation had little direct bearing upon operations in the A Shau Valley, they provided necessary information concerning movements of NVA/VC units with reinforcing capabilities and helped establish priorities for the Division upon extraction from the Valley and commencement of JEB STUART III.

2. (FOUO) IPW

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| A. Detainees interrogated:                          | 37  |
| (1) PW  | 3   |
| (a) NVA   | 2   |
| (b) VC  | 1   |
| (2) Returnee  | 7   |
| (a) NVA   | 4   |
| (b) VC  | 3   |
| (3) CD  | 6   |
| (4) IC  | 21  |
| B. Documents Screened                               |     |
| (1) Packets   | 45  |
| (2) Linear inches                                   | 437 |
| C. PW's were from following units:                  |     |
| (1) NVA - 2d Co, 1st Bn                             |     |
| (2) NVA - 1st Co, 9th Bn, 559th Regt, 4th Div       |     |
| (3) VC - An Xuan Hamlet guerrilla                   |     |
| D. Returnees were from the following units:         |     |
| (1) NVA - 7th and 8th Co, Thu Do Regt (all four)    |     |
| (2) VC -  |     |
| (a) Village Finance Chief, Hai Que (V) Hai Lang (D) |     |
| (b) Asst Finance Chief, Hai Que (V)                 |     |
| (c) Hamlet Guard, Kim Long (H)                      |     |

3. (C) Surveillance: The ASTA Platoon, 11th GS Company supported the operation with 99 photo missions flown prior to and during the operation. Sixty-eight of these photo missions were for BDA of 1st Cav and PCV requested B-52 strikes. There were eight camouflage detection photo missions flown to detect enemy positions and possible new road construction. As a part of the surveillance program, 39 Infra-red missions were flown in support of the operation by the ASTA Platoon. These missions were supplemented by IR and SLAR missions flown nightly in accordance with the In-country reconnaissance plan.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623By AT NARA Date 10-16-99

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
TAB G: G-1 Operations

1. General: During Operation Delaware, G1 Activities remained centralized at Camp Evans. Although a small forward CP was established in the A Shau Valley, neither G1 nor any of the Special Staff were represented.
2. Maintenance of Unit Strength: Throughout the operation the division strength remained at approximately one hundred percent of authorized. Critical shortages included Infantry and Armor Captains, Warrant Officer Aviators (especially CH-47 qualified), Signal Officers, Infantry 11B's and Artillery 13A & B's.
3. Key Personnel Losses: Two battalion commanders were medically evacuated during the operation. One position was filled from division resources the other LTC was reassigned within USARV.
4. Development and Maintenance of Morale: Morale in the division remained high. All In and Out-of-Country R&R allocations were filled. Mail movement was slower than normal due to the maximum utilization of fixed and rotary wing aircraft for resupplying forward elements.
5. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order: There was no noticeable problem in this area in that most of the division strength was located at forward landing zones.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623

By AT NARA Date 10-16-99

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB H: Key Personnel Roster, 19 Apr 68-17 May 68

POSITION	NAME	FROM	TO
CG	MG John J Tolson III		
ADC-A	BG Richard L Irby		
ADC-B	BG Oscar E Davis		
C/S	COL George W Putnam		30 Apr 68
	COL Conrad L Stansberry	1 May 68	Present
G1	LTC George C Horton		27 Apr 68
	LTC Fletcher K Ware	28 Apr 68	Present
G2	LTC Alfred E Spry		
G3	LTC Marion C Ross		
G4	LTC Robert D Vaughn		20 Apr 68
	LTC Eugene J Ringel	21 Apr 68	Present
G5	LTC Horry L Rumph		
CIAH	MAJ William Witters		
AG	LTC Donald W Connelly		
CMLO	LTC Robert C Effinger		
FINO	LTC Harold McCormack		
IG	LTC Deryck G Christy		
PM	LTC Angelo J Harageones		
SJA	LTC Zane E Finkelstein		
SURG	LTC W Rex Davis		
ADAO	LTC John E Bell		
CHAP	LTC James F Heffernan		29 Apr 68
	LTC Horace Sams	30 Apr 68	Present
AAIB	LTC Lester D Kerfoot		
SAFETY OFF	LTC Edward R Waldron		
1st BDE	COL John F Stannard		
2d BDE	COL Joseph C McDonough		2 May 68
	COL Robert N MacKinnon	3 May 68	Present
3d BDE	COL Hubert S Campbell		14 May 68
	COL Charles H Curtis	15 May 68	Present
1/8	LTC Christian Dubia		24 Apr 68
	MAJ Robert Bass	25 Apr 68	27 Apr 68
	LTC George C Horton	28 Apr 68	Present
2/8	LTC John V Gibney		
1/12	LTC Robert C Kerner		
1/5	LTC Clarence Jordan		
2/5	LTC Arthur J Leary		
2/12	LTC Richard S Sweet		
1/7	LTC Joseph Wasiak		
2/7	LTC Roscoe Robinson Jr		
5/7	LTC James Vaught		19 Apr 68
	MAJ Joseph V Arnold	19 Apr 68	20 Apr 68
	LTC Thomas W Stockton	21 Apr 68	Present
DIV ARTY	COL William R Wolfe Jr		
2/19	LTC Arnold L Boykin		
2/20	LTC Robert M Tyson		
2/21	LTC James J Coughlan		
1/30	LTC John G Klocke		

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NNN 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-97*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB H: Key Personnel Roster

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
1/77	LTC James White		
E/82	MAJ William E Horton		
11th Avn Gp	COL Joseph L Gude		
227th	LTC Willie F Dixon		
228th	LTC Richard H Speedman		
229th	LTC Gene E Brown		
SPT CMD	COL Conrad L Stansberry		30 Apr 68
	LTC Grady R Poole	1 May 68	4 May 68
	COL William C Dysinger	5 May 68	Present
15th TC	LTC Vaughn C Emerson		
15th S&S	LTC Clarence Metz		
27th MAINT	LTC Frank P Ragano		
15th MED	LTC W Rex Davis		
13th SIG	LTC Paul Gentry		
8th ENGR	LTC Edwin S Townsley		
1/9	LTC Richard W Diller		

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623

By AT NARA Date 10-16-99

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB I: Casualty Statistics

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>NHD</u>	<u>NHI</u>
1/8	4	27	0	0	0
2/8	9	38	1	1	0
1/12	3	39	1	0	0
2/12	0	19	2	0	0
1/7	10	89	2	1	0
2/7	10	40	3	1	0
5/7	8	62	8	1	0
1/9	3	13	5	4	0
other units	<u>22</u>	<u>203</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
Division Totals	69	530	47	17	0
2d Bde during same period					
1/5	31	110	5	1	0
2/5	2	73	2	1	0
Other	<u>10</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	<u>43</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>

*Confidential*



*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB J: Rotatees and Replacements

1. There were 16 ITT's, 6 curtailments and 202 extensives of foreign service tours. There were also 6 school applications and 1 special assignment request processed during the period 19 April - 17 May 1968.

2. Following is a breakdown of incoming and outgoing personnel for the period 19 April-17 May 1968:

	<u>Replacements Received</u>	<u>Rotatees</u>
Officers	125	55
Warrant Officers	85	17
Enlisted Personnel	<u>2068</u>	<u>1538</u>
Total	2278	1610

3. Following is a breakdown for personnel who departed during the period 19 April - 17 May 1968, for return to CONUS for separation from the service:

<u>TYPE OF SEPARATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Normal Discharge (AR 635-200)	<u>253</u>
Elimination (AR 635-212)	1
Retirement (AR 635-200)	1
Early Release (AR 635-200)	1
Hardship (AR 635-200)	<u>7</u>
Total	263

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
TAB K: Postal Activities

During the period 19 Apr to 17 May 68 the following business was transacted:

- a. Money Order Sales: \$343,383.67
- b. Stamp Stock Sales: 0
- c. Postage Meter Funds: 0
- d. Total pieces of incoming mail: 7,977
- e. Weights of incoming mail: 468,382 (234 tons)
- f. Total pieces of outgoing mail: 2,790
- g. Weights of outgoing mail: 72,012 (36 tons)
- h. Average weight of mail distributed daily: 16,151 (8 tons)
- i. Average weight of mail dispatched daily: 2,483 (1 ton)
- j. Number of days mail was received: 29
- k. Number of days mail was dispatched: 29
- l. Pieces of accountable mail received: 1,095
- m. Pieces of accountable mail dispatched: 1,287
- n. Total pieces of mail receiving directory service: 66,036
- o. Postal Inspections conducted: 16
- p. Unsatisfactory mail room inspections: 1

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
TAB L: R&R Statistics

R&R allocations and destinations are as listed below. Occasionally more seats than allocated are used due to using standby personnel to assure maximum utilization.

<u>OUT-OF-COUNTRY</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>USED</u>
Bangkok	225	225
Hawaii	354	357
Tokyo	117	119
Australia	192	203
Manila	22	25
Hong Kong	175	184
Penang	45	47
Taipei	208	221
Kuala Lumpur	41	40
Singapore	78	73
TOTAL (106.6% utilization)	1457	1524

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: Operation Delaware After Action Report  
 TAB M: Judge Advocate Activities

1. Statistical summary of courts-martial and other activities of the 1st Air Cavalry Division units:

A. General Courts-Martial-	0
B. Special Courts-Martial	21
C. Summary Courts-Martial	6
D. Nonjudicial Punishments	130
E. Claims processed	93
F. Legal assistance cases	493
G. Military Affairs cases	62

2. The Office of the Division Staff Judge Advocate provided assistance and advice to all units as required at their tactical location. Every effort was made to reduce the number of courts-martial by early isolation of developing problem areas, e.g., guard offenses and marijuana, and suggesting preventive law programs designed to reduce the number of incidents by eliminating temptations and sources of difficulty. Each officer and enlisted man newly assigned to the Division received instruction at the Division Training Center, conducted by the Staff Judge Advocate or his Deputy in order to acquaint every member of the Division with the standards of conduct expected by the Division Commander particularly with regard to enemy personnel and the civilian populace.

3. Draw down on personnel was reduced by vigorous controls on pre and post-trial confinements. Other forms of punishments were used wherever possible.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623By AT NARA Date 10-16-91

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELMAR after Action Report  
TAB N: Military Police Activities

1. The 545th Military Police Company provided the following support for the subject operation.
  - a. 20 military policemen and 1 officer provided CP security for the Division Jump CP and provided traffic control around the airstrip at IZ Station throughout the operation.
  - b. 5 military policemen were attached to and deployed with the 1st Brigade and provided DTOC and PW security.
2. Equipment utilized:
  - a. 1-  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck w/trailer.
  - b. 1-  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton (mule) truck.
3. No major problems from a military police standpoint were encountered during the operation.
4. Observation:
  - a. Strict accountability should be maintained on captured weapons.

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB O: FINANCE

1. Statistical Summary:

a. Regular monthly payments	16,816
b. Partial and advanced payments	3
c. Travel payments	1,215
d. Piaster sales	791
e. Sales of Government Checks	632
f. Processed in personnel	2,290
g. Processed out personnel	1,772
h. Total cash and check payments	\$6,114,277.84

2. Savings Program Participation:

Bonds	82.5%
Bonds and Savings Deposit	4.5%
Savings Deposits	2.5%
TOTAL PARTICIPATION	89.5%

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report

TAB P: Chaplain Activities

1. This report covers chaplains' activities in support of Operation Delaware Lam Son 216 from 190800 April to 171200 May 1968.
2. Four Chaplains were assigned to each of the two brigades directly involved in the operation in the A Shau Valley. These eight chaplains held 167 religious services in the A Shau Valley during the operation.
3. In addition other chaplains visited their personnel as transportation and opportunities were available and provided pastoral counseling, guidance, encouragement, and assistance.
4. Outstanding cooperation was given by 15th Med Bn units in the field. The Battalion and Brigade S3's often notified chaplains when casualties were still in the field, and the chaplains were waiting at the aid stations when the casualties arrived. Often chaplains were with the units when the men were wounded.
5. Lessons learned:
  - a. Plans for religious services must be closely coordinated with the unit S3's and CO's.
  - b. Transportation and travel to units in the field using logbirds must be coordinated with unit S4's.
  - c. Chaplains need to attend briefings at all levels to receive information on the mission and concept of the operation in order to prepare for adequate chaplain support and coverage.
  - d. Full command support must be given to the chaplains activities, services and transportation.
  - e. The Brigade chaplains should provide religious services on an area coverage basis for artillery and other support troops in their AO. This would relieve the division transportation requirements and avoiding duplication of services in the same LZ's and areas.
  - f. Command emphasis should be placed on the importance of the unit chaplain's presence with the combat battalions.
  - g. If at all possible a helicopter from each major subordinate organization should be assigned to their chaplains for one day each week in order to facilitate their transportation to scattered units to perform their duties.
6. Additional major activities of the chaplain's section during the period of the operation.
  - a. Ch (CPT) Hoard visited Cav patients in the hospitals in Japan.
  - b. A total of 416 services were held in the division AO, other than those (reported above) for the A Shau Valley. Total attendance for all services during the period was 20,623.
  - c. Special offerings (\$519.25) were received by the chaplains at services for destitute widows and orphans of slain ARVN soldiers.
  - d. A Jewish religious program was instituted at Camp Evans.
  - e. One chaplain's training conference was held, with an attendance of 23 chaplains.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB Q: Surgeons Activities

1. During Operation Delaware-Iam Son 216, continuous medical support was provided to the "First Team" by organic medical units. During the period 19 April-1 May medical company support was provided from Camp Evans. During this time, the battalion aid stations located in the A Shau Valley were augmented with extra personnel and medical supplies to take care of casualties that could not be evacuated immediately. On 1 May 1968, A Company, 15th Medical Battalion, moved into the valley and provided division level medical care. Rearward evacuation from 1 May to 3 May was provided by division Medevac; after this time the mission was accomplished by "Dust-off".
2. During the operation, A and C Companies, 15th Medical Battalion, treated 463 injuries resulting from hostile action. Of this total 112 were treated and returned to duty.
3. The other two major sources of admission during the operation were 116 non-battle injuries and 225 disease cases.
4. Medical diseases of significance during the operation were as follows:
  - a. Malaria - 7 cases of malaria were reported.
  - b. FUO - 52 cases of fever of undetermined origin were reported. Lack of laboratory facilities precluded a positive diagnosis in most cases.
  - c. Gastroenteritis - 29 cases of gastroenteritis were reported. During this epidemic a large outbreak of Shigellosis, involving approximately 7000 persons occurred. This was traced to contamination of the water supply. As a result, all units involved received gamma globulin as a prophylaxis against infectious hepatitis.
  - d. Heat Exhaustion - 7 cases of heat exhaustion were reported.

*Confidential*



*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB R: Inspector General Activities

1. During Operation Delaware the Inspector General Section remained at Camp Evans with elements of the Division Headquarters. The IG liaison office at Camp Radcliff continued to operate thus permitting continued immediate access to personnel and finance records and a capability for providing quick response and resolution of individual problems.

2. Pre-USARV AGI inspections of the command were continued during Operation Delaware. The following units were inspected:

23 April	HHC, 1st Cav Div
25 April	HHC, 13th Sig Bn
29 April	HHC, 227th AHB, HHC, 228th Avn Bn
1 May	HHC, 8th Engr Bn
2 May	HHC, 2/8th Cav; HHC, 229th AHB
6 May	HHC, Div Arty
9 May	HSC, 15th Med Bn
10 May	HHC, 2/12th Cav

3. The USARV Annual General Inspection of the 1st Air Cavalry Division commenced on 11 May 1968 and ended on 17 May 1968. Units were inspected at An Khe, Red Beach, Phu Bai, Camp Evans, LZ Sharon and LZ Jane. The division received a satisfactory rating.

4. Statistical data for 19 April - 17 May 1968.

- (1) Requests for assistance - 116
- (2) Complaints - 8 (Justified-2)
- (3) Investigations and Inquiries - 0
- (4) Nonappropriated Funds Inspections - 11
- (5) Classes given at Division Training Center:
  - (a) Officers, WO's and Sr Enl - 1
  - (b) Enlisted - 1
  - (c) Combat Leaders Course - 1

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB S: G-4 Operations

a. General. Operation DELAWARE which began on 19 April and ended 17 May involved the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 3d Regiment 1st ARVN Division, and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

b. The 1st Brigade base was established at LZ Stallion with the 1st FSE collocated with the Brigade Trains to provide combat service support. The 3d Brigade set up a forward base at LZ Pepper, but the Brigade Trains and helicopter from the division base. The 3d Regiment 1st ARVN Division established its base at LZ Lillian and received combat service support from the 1st FSE at LZ Stallion. The 196th Light Infantry Brigade established its base at Camp Evans and operated in an AO southwest of Camp Evans. Combat service support was provided by the organic FSE. The 1st Provisional FSE provided support to the 1st Air Cavalry Division units based at Camp Evans.

c. FSA support consisted of Task Force Langley at Camp Evans and in the A Shau Valley a small augmentation was provided to the FSE to assist in the operation of an ASP at LZ Stallion and to provide Graves Registration Service. This small augmentation was not satisfactory because the FSE does not have the manpower or the equipment to run an ASP.

d. Operation DELAWARE was supported completely by an air LOC during a period of marginal weather. In spite of low ceilings, thunderstorms, and heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire division helicopters and Air Force C-130's flew repeated missions into the A Shau Valley to deliver the large tonnage of supplies that was necessary to sustain the operation. During the first two days of the air drop the GCA had not become operational at A Luoi and the C-130 crews were forced to fly the IFR air deliveries relying entirely on their nose radar for terrain avoidance. During the operation 2252 short tons of supplies were delivered to the valley by organic helicopters and 2212 tons were delivered by airdrop. After the runway at A Luoi was completed 617 tons were air landed by Air Force air craft.

e. The A Luoi air field was rehabilitated by the 8th Engineer Battalion to C7A and C-123 capability in five days and expanded to receive C-130's a few days later. Following the completion of the runway it was used to air land supplies and to retrograde the air items from the air drops. It was planned that the air strip would play an important role in the extraction of supplies, troops, and equipment at the conclusion of the operation. However after the first day of the extraction heavy daily rains made the runway non-operational and it had to be closed for the remainder of the operation. The remainder of the extraction included the back haul of 307 tons of supplies was accomplished by organic aviation assets.

f. The drop zone which was used at A Luoi presented considerable problems in recovery because of the high elephant grass which made the bundles extremely difficult to locate and retrieve. The problem was compounded by a shortage of trucks and HHE. The truck shortage was solved by use of captured Russian trucks. The CH-47 helicopter with its cargo hook on a 150 ft cable was successful in recovering many of the bundles which dropped in otherwise inaccessible locations.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NNN 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB S: G-4 Operations (CONT'D)

g. DISCOM installed an aircraft refuel site at A Luoi with capacity for 1000,000 gal JP-4 and 10,000 gal each of AVGAS, KOGAS & diesel fuel. The site had the capability of refueling 4 slick ships, 4 gun ships, 4 CH-47's and one CH-54 simultaneously. Fuel was resupplied by air in 500 gal collapsible drums. This refuel capability enabled helicopters to operate in the AO for extended periods without reliance on Camp Evans for fuel. The refuel capability in the AO was essential to the runway construction because some of the engineer equipment necessary for the construction was so heavy the CH-54's could not bring the equipment in and carry sufficient fuel to return to Evans.

h. The extraction phase of the operation went smoothly in spite of the fact that the rains closed the runway after the first day. The back hauling of supplies became a problem because the operation was terminated sooner than planned and supplies for the extra days had already been brought into the AO. In addition a large supply of ammunition remained on the drop zone which had to be recovered and back hauled. There were two 10,000 lb Air Force work lifts which because of the untimely closing of the airfield had to be dismantled and hauled out by CH-54. These unforeseen difficulties delayed the extraction somewhat, but the diligence and hard work of all involved enabled the extraction to be completed successfully in a minimum of time. No supplies or equipment were left behind and the operation terminated a complete success. It was a classic from the stand point of logistic support of a totally airmobile force operating without benefit of a land LOC.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
TAB T: Logistics.

1. Supply and Services.

a. Class I Activities.

During Operation Delaware 1,557 tons of Class I were issued.

b. Class II & IV.

(1) Thirty-seven lifelines were received, processed and shipped to forward areas.

(2) A total of 481 tons of clothing, equipment and barrier materials were issued in support of the operations.

c. Class III.

(1) Seven lifelines were received, processed and shipped for a total of 37.1 tons.

(2) A total of 337 fuel samples were analyzed; 240 were on grad 32 met use limits, and 65 were off specification.

d. Class V.

(1) A total of seven lifelines were processed and shipped to forward units.

(2) Division Class V personnel assisted attached EOD teams in the destruction of 41 tons of unserviceable ammunition.

(3) Two malfunction reports were received and processed.

e. Food Service Activities. Food Service personnel continued to conduct inspections and liaison visits to mess facilities throughout the division with emphasis on sanitation and field messing procedures.

f. Aerial Supply Activities.

(1) Riggers at Camp Evans sling loaded 3,993,709 lbs in 619 sorties in support of the operation.

(2) The rigger team completed its mission in the A Shau Valley recovering approximately 4,000,000 lbs of heavy drop equipment. Approximately 987,000 pounds were sling loaded for return to Camp Evans.

g. The following supplies were issued to the division:

(1) Class I - 1,557 tons.

(2) Class II & IV - 481 tons.

(3) Class III (gallons)

(a) J14 - 2,142,450

(b) AVGAS - 93,150

(c) ROCAS - 465,750

(d) DF2 - 404,202

(4) Class V - 6,287 tons.

2. Transportation and Maintenance.

a. Air transportation movements during the period 19 April 68 to 17 May 68 were as follows:

(1) Air Drop.

DATE	SORTIES	S/T	CLASS OF SUPPLY
26 April	15	220	V
27 April	16	235	V
28 April	22	316	I, III, V
29 April	22	308	I, III, V
30 April	17	237	V
1 May	27	378	I, III, V
2 May	13	182	I, V
3 May	17	238	I, III, V
4 May	14	186	I, V
TOTAL	164	2,300 S/T	

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
 TAB T: Logistics (CONT'D)

## (2) Air Land.

DATE	SORTIES	S/T	PASSENGERS
2 May	1	1.6	
4 May	10	34.5	
5 May	29	140.2	
6 May	18	257	
7 May	7	98	
9 May	10	56	
10 May	5		575
12 May	12	138	
TOTAL	92	725.3	575

(3) Total air land/air drop for Operation DELAWARE was 256 sorties with 3.025 S/T and 575 passengers delivered or extracted.

## (4) Airlift and courier service.

(a) During the operation dedicated C7A's made minor contributions to air landings at A Loui. The major use of C7A's was to continue courier service throughout the 1st ACD AO and An Khe.

(b) Daily C-130 missions were flown from An Khe to Phu Bai and Quang Tri. These missions were used to move R&R, PCS, and replacement personnel and cargo into and out of the 1st ACD AO.

b. Ground Transportation. The 26th General Support Group continued to provide line haul transportation for the movement of supplies from supporting activities. Major point of pick up continued to be Wunder Beach and Dong Ha.

c. Ground Maintenance. Ground maintenance was provided by A Detachment 27th Maintenance Battalion at LZ Stallion during the period 18 April 68 to 14 May 68.

(1) The operational readiness by commodity for the period was as follows:

CATEGORY

Vehicles	96.8
Trailers	99.9
Artillery	99.3
Small Arms	99.8
Generators	90.1
Communications	94.6
Office Machines	97.3

(2) The total Direct Support Work Requests completed during the period were as follows:

CATEGORY

Automotive	384
Engineer	407
Electronics	1,339
Office Machines	177
Small Arms	524
Artillery	75
Instruments	215
Allied Trades	594

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-99*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
TAB T: Logistics (CONT'D)

running over by a truck.

3. Limiting Stockage.

a. OBSERVATION. A considerable stockage of supplies, particularly Class V, was built up. When the order came to begin extraction, a significant effort was required to back-haul this stockage.

b. RECOMMENDATION. In all operations, particularly ones which are of limited duration in remote areas, the supply stocks must be closely monitored and controlled so that excessive stockages do not occur which could cause problems in tactical redeployment.

4. Runway Surface.

a. OBSERVATION. The Camp Evans Airfield has required constant closing for maintenance and repairs due to usage and to erosion caused by thunder showers. Each time the runway is closed, aerial resupply and troop movement are curtailed for several days. During the NE Monsoon (rainy season) this problem will become much worse.

b. RECOMMENDATION. During good weather a heavy duty all weather surface should be placed on the runway so that reliable all weather air operations will be possible at Camp Evans throughout the year to sustain frequent C-130 and C-123 flights.

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
TAB T: Logistics (CONT'D)

(3) A total of 15,287 repair parts were requisitioned with a total of 104.28 S/T of repair parts used.

(4) An interesting development in Operation DELAWARE was the necessity of repairing captured equipment for use by the 1st ACD units. This was particularly true of the automotive items when several Soviet trucks were repaired for moving supplies vicinity A Loui airfield. This effort was especially helpful due to the small number of trucks lifted by the 1st ACD into the A Shau Valley.

### 3. Aircraft Maintenance.

a. The following number of aircraft by type were dropped from accountability during the operation:

<u>ACFT TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
OH-6A	2
OH-13S	10
UH-1B	6
UH-1C	7
AH-1G	4
UH-1D	8
UH-1H	10
CH-47A	9
CH-54A	1
TOTAL	57

b. The following aircraft by type were picked up during the operation:

<u>ACFT TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
OH-6A	1
UH-1B	4
AH-1G	10
UH-1H	16
CH-47B	6
OV-1B	1
TOTAL	38

### E. Logistics.

#### 1. FSA Support.

a. OBSERVATION. An FSA was requested to support the two brigades and the ARVN regiment operation in the A Shau Valley. This request was not granted by 1st Log Cmb; the only support provided was augmentation for the FSE. This arrangement was completely unsatisfactory as the FSE had to perform both wholesale and retail supply functions.

b. RECOMMENDATION. Whenever a brigade or large size element of the division operates in a new area, an FSA must be provided to supply wholesale delivery of Class I, III, and V supplies as a minimum.

#### 2. Clearance of Drop Zones.

a. OBSERVATION. Supplies were air dropped on a drop zone which was overgrown with elephant grass and underbrush. As a result bundles were extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to recover. Many were lost and never found or recovered.

b. RECOMMENDATION. Prior to using such an area for a drop zone it should be cleared either by burning, bulldozing, or simply

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623

By AT NARA Date 10-16-99

This interview is being conducted by CPT JWA Whitehorne; 14th Military History Detachment on 27 May 1968 with MG John J Tolson, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division. The subject is Operation Delaware (19 April-17 May 1968).

Q. When was an operation into the A Shau Valley first conceived?

A. To say when an operation into the A Shau Valley was first conceived is a little difficult to answer. What I'm saying is that we had, for example, done studies on possible operations in the A Shau Valley last fall when we were working on a series of operations in this area, (ICTZ) called the York Series. However, not a lot of detailed work had been done by the Division. For this particular Operation, I was told on 10 April 1968, at LZ Stud, during a visit of LTG Rosson, the commander of Provisional Corps Vietnam, to plan for and prepare to go into the A Shau Valley. At that time, we were heavily engaged in Operation Pegasus. I was also told that we would immediately initiate extraction from the Pegasus AO to prepare ourselves as soon as we possibly could for an assault into the A Shau Valley. As I said, this was around noon on 10 April. We first, of course made our plan for extracting out of the Khe Sanh area. At that time, it must be remembered that the whole division with the exception of the 2/8 battalion was committed in this operation. So on 11 April we started our extraction back into our base areas at Quang Tri City (LZ Sharon and Betty) and Camp Evans. When this was initiated, I started my planning on just how I would assault into the Valley. Initially, I was told I would have to leave one brigade of two battalions in the Khe Sanh area and that I would be given an ARVN Regiment in addition to my two Brigades for employment in A Shau. I was told that I would have an ARVN Airborne Task Force, the same one I had in the Pegasus Operation, to employ in the operation. I'm sure an operation into A Shau Valley was conceived by HQ, MACV and hopefully executed during the past two years; but when I was specifically told to plan and prepare to go into the A Shau Valley, it was noon on 10 April.

Q. What directives did you receive from higher headquarters on the subject?

A. Actually, I've hit on this in answering the previous question. My directives initially were received verbally from my Corps Commander. The directives that I mentioned before were basically all I had with the exception that I was incorrect in stating "all the brigades" because on 12 April I was told I would not have my Second Brigade and two of its battalions. I initially had started my planning with the assumption that I would only have two brigades in the operation, but not that one brigade would remain at Khe Sanh. On 14 April, I had to present my plan to the Corps Commander, General Rosson, III MAF Commander, General Cushman, and General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, at Hue-Phu Bai. At this time, I indicated how I was going in with the ARVN Regiment and our 1st and 3d Brigades. And also at that time, I had the understanding that I would have the ARVN Airborne Task Force which I was committing initially into the operation north of Base Area 114. I presented my concept of the operation in which I was going to make my assault right from Camp Evans using it as my main base area with the 1st Brigade leading the assault into the center of the valley around A Luoi Airstrip. This brigade was to be followed subsequently by the 3d Brigade to the north and the regiment from the First ARVN Division to the south. And, as I said before, a push simultaneously into Base Area 114.

File  
40



by the ARVN Airborne Task Force. At the same time of course, you must remember that Operation Delaware also included the 101st Airborne Division in operations down Highway 547A from Hue in towards the A Shau Valley. This operation was entirely under the tactical control of Provisional Corps, so we were half of the entire Operation Delaware as contrasted to Pegasus where the whole tactical part was under the Division. We had Marines and all the rest, a total of 20 (4 of which were ARVN) battalions directly under the tactical control of the division. As a result of the discussions at Hue-Phu Bai in the Corps headquarters, my concept of how I was going to do the operation including the details of bringing in Engineers to make A Luoi Airstrip operational and all the other facets of the operation were approved. But General Westmoreland introduced some rather drastic changes into the overall concept of the operation which resulted that day in the ARVN Airborne Task Force being used by the 101st Airborne Division along Highway 547A and not by me to go into Base Area 114. Also a brigade of the Americal Division, the 196th LTB would be deployed north to the Camp Evans area to assist in the defense of our base at Evans and also to be a general reserve unit for the Corps and III MAF in this whole northern part of I Corps Tactical Zone. My concept of how we would assault in the valley was bought and no alterations were made. The one thing that wasn't set firmly was D-Day. We had tentatively set our D Day as 17 April, but I made the condition that it was really contingent on my having three full days of operations in the A Shau Valley by the 1/9th Cav in conjunction with an Air Cap and B-52 Arc Lights working out and determining where the enemy AA concentrations were and of course trying to neutralize these concentrations.

Q. Why did the operation begin so soon after the conclusion of Pegasus?

A. Of course really, Pegasus was summarily concluded in order to start Delaware is what it amounted to, with no specific date set for the conclusion. Because of our extreme success in Pegasus and the speed and rapidity with which we achieved it, I feel sure that higher headquarters felt it imperative to move into the A Shau Valley as soon as possible. The important thing here is that April had previously been determined as the one good month to operate in the A Shau Valley. Since we were already well into April, it was imperative, in my opinion, that if any air assault was going to be made in to this area, it had to be done as expeditiously as possible. Of course, the importance of the A Shau Valley, I won't go into that, because everyone knows that it is a key logistical base and way station for the NVA in the northern part of South Vietnam.

Q. Would you describe the steps taken to re-align the Division from its concentration in the Pegasus AO to a posture in which it would operate against the enemy in the A Shau Valley?

A. The steps taken, of course, really were: first, we had to make an extraction from our operational areas in the Pegasus AO. Part of this problem was eliminated in that on the 12th I was told that a brigade with two battalions would remain in the Pegasus AO and it would be under the OPCON of the 3d Marine Div which was to take over the Pegasus AO from me. The date of the actual transfer of the Pegasus AO by me to the 3d Marine Division was, as I recall, the morning of 15 April at which time the Second Brigade went OPCON to the 3d Marine Division. As I said before, we started out with our extraction, our withdrawal, on the morning of the 11th.

And as fast as we could make the ships available, we moved our 3d Brigade on back to Camp Evans and we moved the 1st Brigade back to the LZ Sharon area near Quang Tri City. Then we also had the responsibility of getting the ARVN Airborne Task Force extracted back to the area of PK 17 so it would be available for use in Operation Delaware. Of course, when we got all our forces back here, we started getting them ready for the operation and actually the 1st and 3d Brigades were ready for the assault into the A Shau on 17 April. However, we did not make the assault then because as of the 16th of April, I still had not had 3 full days of good weather in the A Shau. The weather had been very poor. Actually we had started our first operations into the A Shau Valley with the 1/9 on 13 April. But as of the 16th I still had not had 3 full days and so I recommended to General Rosson that D Day be postponed to the 19th, in which he concurred. The 1st Brigade would also be assaulted from the Camp Evans area, and that meant that it had to be moved from the LZ Sharon area to this area where it was given a rear base. Most of the movement was made by truck on Highway One to the Evans area. That meant that the forces that I was going to assault into the valley in essence were assembled in the Camp Evans area with the ARVN Regiment that was going to participate in the operation (3d ARVN Regiment, 1st ARVN Division) which was composed of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 3d ARVN Regiment and the 2d Battalion, 1st ARVN Regiment at PK- 17.

Q. Was there any special reason the 3d Brigade was selected to spearhead the assault?

A. Actually, the 3d Brigade was not selected initially to lead the assault and this brings up a very important point in the whole operation. In my initial plan as I stated previously, I had decided I would go into the heart of the valley--the middle first--going into the area around A Luoi and I had selected the 1st Bde to make the initial assault, the 3d Brigade having made the initial assault into Operation Pegasus. They both had made all the plans and reconnaissance for this as the 3d Brigade had made plans for assaulting and occupying the northern third of the valley. However, during the latter days of the reconnaissance by the 1/9, I could not get any assurance that an assault into the A Luoi area would not be very costly because the heaviest anti-aircraft encountered was in that area; and although a lot of it had been neutralized, there were still new positions that appeared each day and it became obvious that I should have some alternate plans. Actually, I had two alternative plans. The one I selected was going into the northern part of the area first because the anti-aircraft had not been as intense there and I felt going in there first would be less of a risk. I could not buck the hard facts of anti-aircraft positions in the vicinity of A Luoi. By going up north first, I would immediately cut off the entrance into the valley of the new highway coming from Laos which the enemy had constructed. But most of all, in addition to the anti-aircraft encountered having been less there, it would also place artillery in my LZ's there that could also work on neutralizing the enemy anti-aircraft in the center of the valley around the A Luoi Airstrip. This would be in addition to having the fire-power available from the Air Force. As you see in the initial plan I presented, I had put considerable emphasis on that area after the assault and after it had been secured by the 1st Brigade so that I could bring in heavy engineer equipment in order to expedite the attaining of a fixed wing airstrip so we could start resupply as early as possible by fixed wing. Now, on the second alternative which

I didn't use, which called for a Brigade of 4 Battalions into A Luoi by D + 1 and the ARVN Regt into vicinity of TA BAT by D + 3. I was going to start in earlier with parachute resupply, and delay the bringing in of heavy equipment and bring in my combat troops faster for the northern third (D+4) and the bottom third (D+3). Because of the enemy anti-aircraft situation as presented by the 1/9, on 18 April I made the decision to go into the north. That was the only reason why the 3d Brigade was the first to go into this attack.

Q. What were the tactical considerations in placing the assaulting units beyond supporting artillery fires?

A. The tactical situation was first; you place the whole force here beyond supporting artillery fires of our light and medium artillery. I didn't make any fire base jumps from Camp Evans to the A Shan Valley because I wanted to achieve surprise and felt, number one, surprise would more than offset that advantage, and number two, really we did have some supporting artillery fires. We had six 175mm guns at LZ Bastogne along Highway 547 that were secured by the 101st Airborne Division and which could and did place fires into the objective area. Also, I had a considerable amount of air support. I had all the air support I could use from the 7th Air Force and the 1st Marine Air Wing plus a very high priority for the use of Arc Lights, B-52's from SAC, just as I'd had in Pegasus. In view of the nature of this division, I would say this is the type air assault this division is designed to do. With our initial forces, we took in artillery and thus had our own supporting artillery from D Day on. We had artillery with the 5/7 Cav, which was the first battalion to go in. As the 3d Brigade was put in, we had mutually supporting artillery and artillery fires for all units as they subsequently assaulted. The only units which had no supporting artillery fires in the assault were really the 1/7 at Vicky and the 5/7 at Tiger and of course artillery was brought in on D Day at Tiger. We did have ARA gun ship coverage and an air cap for each assault.

Q. Would you describe your actions during Operation Delaware; were any changes made in the plan, what coordination did you undertake with participating non-Divisional units?

A. Operation Delaware commenced on 19 April and concluded on 17 May. My positioning, as far as where I physically was, I watched most of the assaults from my helicopter and we controlled the operation from our CP at Camp Evans until the 1st Brigade had gotten in and we put a jump or tactical CP in the vicinity of A Luoi near the 1st Brigade. The initial coordination there was controlled by the personnel in the CP and relayed back to my FOC at Camp Evans. Either I or one of my ADC's was at the forward CP on a 24 hour basis. That is how we controlled it; just like a normal operation. Coordination with non-Divisional units; the particular one in this operation was the 3d ARVN Regiment, actually not under my OPCON but participating on a coordination basis. BG Truong, of course, is the ARVN Division Commander and he and I worked together on a daily basis; he had Liaison Officers here at my headquarters at Camp Evans and I have had a Liaison Officer with his headquarters since prior to the TET Offensive and the counter offensive starting in last January. Coordination with the regiment commanded by Col Hoa, was handled through daily visits by me or one of my ADC's and members of my staff. I'd say there was nothing unusual about it. There were no great changes made in our plan, after we once started. The 3d ARVN Regiment came in actually in the vicinity of the TA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623By AT NARA Date 10-16-99



BAT Airstrip. Their LZ had been secured by one company of the 1/12 Cav and they moved and established their first fire base there and brought in their other two battalions, then moved on their search through the southern third of the valley and down through A Shau and the old airstrip there, and followed out the planned set up. Coordination with the 101st was the normal coordination you make with a Division on your flanks or adjacent to you. The overall activity was coordinated by the commanding general of Provisional Corps Vietnam.

Q. Were any limitations or restrictions placed on the Divisions' actions in the Valley?

A. I can't think of any important limitations or restrictions. We were not permitted to go beyond the border into Laos which affected the actions in the northern part around LZ Tiger. You must remember that this operation was a reconnaissance in force. We knew that we were not going to stay there. We did not attempt to make the airstrip we had operational an all weather airstrip or any thing of that nature. The only restriction on that of course was that we were leaving, but there was no particular restrictions or limitations that I can recall.

Q. What do you feel were the results of the operation? Do you think it will be necessary to return to the Valley in the near future?

A. The major accomplishment initially achieved in the operation was that we cut the main supply route through the A Shau Valley from Laos, Highway 547 which comes to the west of Hue. And of course, the supply route goes down the valley on into South Vietnam; this was cut off. In addition we destroyed large amounts of ammunition, weapons and equipment that will obviously be denied enemy use. And his timing on present and future plans was certainly disrupted as a result of this action. In addition, we now have detailed intelligence on the lay out of this large depot area. We have a very good picture of just how he had this place organized. You must remember, this was a big scale logistical operation comparable to, one of our big depots. This was his Cam Ranh Bay, so to speak. However, to my personal reaction, one of the greatest fallouts of the operation was psychological; you can't measure this in any tangible numbers for anything like that. But what this operation did, in my opinion, was show the North Vietnamese that actually they have no sanctuary that the 1st Cavalry Division can't get into. They are not immune. Here is the A Shau Valley that they've been in for the last two years, and other than bombing attacks, they have felt pretty secure--and we showed them that we can go right in to this place and take over; we have that capability and we demonstrated it--proof positive. Assuredly this has had an effect on this enemy of ours, and he certainly realizes that he is not secure--and doesn't have sanctuaries, particularly in South Vietnam, that we can't get into. Now, even going further, it certainly indicates to me that if we really want to end the situation was such that it was necessary, we could leap by bounds and go right on up to Hanoi. He realizes that too. So psychologically, I think the A Shau Valley has a tremendous dividend. The matter of going back in there is one that gets out of my purview, to a much higher level in the theater and obviously the theater considered it necessary to return to the Valley in the near future.

5

A. The major accomplishment initially achieved in the operation was that we cut the main supply route through the A Shau Valley from Laos, Highway 547 which comes to the west of Hue. And of course, the supply route goes

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 927623*

By *AT* NARA Date *10-16-94*

was not justifiable to maintain a base there because of the location and the weather: so we came out. If and when anybody goes back? I personally don't feel that will be in the near future: it would otherwise have been a whole lot more logical to stay there. I would like to say that the weather has proven that actually May would have been a better month for helicopter operations than April. But you don't win them all. In regards to weather, terrain and enemy anti-aircraft fire, this was certainly the toughest operation the Cav has ever had. The weather was horrible: in the initial parts of the operation, our timing was way slow on our assaults solely because of the weather. Starting on the 19th, it wasn't until the 23d of April that I closed the 3d Brigade and only on the 24th of April was I able to start in the 1st Brigade. However, starting then, the weather started to ease up a bit except for the 26, 27, and 28th and towards the end we had pretty good weather. The airstrip is a key thing that you will want to develop in the history of this operation. Remember that all the equipment that came in there was basically brought in by crane. And we brought in some very heavy engineering equipment. Work actually started on the airstrip on 29 April when the 8th Engineer Battalion, organic to this division, started repairing and rehabilitating the A Luoi Airstrip. As I said, all the equipment came in by crane and the field actually was ready for landing by Caribous at noon on 1 May and had been inspected and accepted by the Air Force. However, it was not until 2 May that Aircraft did come in. We actually extended the strip so it was operational not only for Caribous and C-123's but also C-130's which accounted for a great deal of the traffic. However, the thunderstorm season started in May and this is one part of the weather that is unbeatable using a dirt fixed wing airstrip. When the thunderstorms start, that means every afternoon you usually have an hour or so of very heavy rains. This meant that after we started our extraction our airstrip was out and we were not able to use it—not out physically—but we had to stop using fixed wing for our extraction because of the intense rain and the lack of opportunity for the strip to dry out. But other than that, the weather in May, particularly if you start real early in the morning, daybreak, was much more conducive to airmobile operations than that encountered in April. The weather we encountered in April included heavy clouds, fog, low ceilings; clouds that hang in the mountains on each side of the valley. The feats of airmanship performed by the young warrant officer aviators and the junior officer aviators in this Division were probably the greatest part of the whole operation. They actually got people into that valley on assaults made possible only by unbelievable feats of airmanship. I on occasion climbed through ceilings of 9,000 feet, leaving Evans and breaking out on instruments and then looking out over the cloud tops and seeing gaggles of six Hueys, loaded with troopers, piloted by these young men. They had done the same thing individually, reformed, then they worked their way over to the Valley, found holes in the clouds and somehow got on down through. This was done day after day in the initial phase by not only Huey pilots, but the crane pilots, our hook pilots, the ARA gunships pilots and those of the 1/9. It was just a phenomenal piece of flying and it was sheer agony seeing what they had to go through to get people and materiel there. A flight which normally takes on a good day only 15 minutes or less would take up to an hour from leaving Evans to either conduct an assault with troops or bring in supplies. It was not until 2 May that Aircraft did come in. We actually extended the strip so it was operational not only for Caribous and C-123's but also C-130's which accounted for a great deal of the traffic. However, the thunderstorm season started in May and this is one part of the weather that is unbeatable using a dirt fixed wing airstrip. When the thunderstorms start, that means every afternoon you usually have an hour or so of very heavy rains. This meant that after we started our extraction our airstrip was out and we were not able to

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623By AT NARA Date 10-16-99

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
TAB U: Civil Affairs:

a. General: There were no civilians in the "Shau Valley" and CA activities were restricted to projects near LZ's Evans, Jane and Betty.

b. Civic Action: Activities were directed toward the repairs and renovation of existing schools in Phong Dien and Hai Lang Districts. Also MEDCAPS were continued in areas generally around the LZ's named in para 1a. Thirty three MEDCAPS were held with over 4200 patients treated.

c. Rice Control: Plans were made during this period for rice denial operations to commence in mid May. The division AO during the current operation contained only a limited rice growing area in Phong Dien district and rice denial operations were minimal.

*Confidential*

*Confidential*

SUBJECT: OPERATION DELAWARE After Action Report  
TAB V: Psychological Operations:

a. General: Psychological operations were conducted in support of tactical operations throughout the Division AO with emphasis on operations in the A Shau Valley. An intensive Chieu Hoi campaign was conducted in the vicinity A Shau Valley and directed solely at the NVA. This campaign emphasized advantages of the Chieu Hoi Program, family separations, heavy casualties, lack of adequate medical treatment, and superiority of allied firepower. A campaign to explain good treatment of PW's was also conducted. In the AO vicinity Camp Evans and LZ Jane psychological operations were conducted to cause defection and reduction of combat effectiveness of NVA/VC forces. A civilian rewards campaign was conducted to gain information about locations of enemy forces, rockets, mines, booby traps, weapons caches, and LOC's. A campaign was conducted to exploit the peace initiative taken by President Johnson.

b. Support:

(1) The 9th Air Commando Squadron flew 287 of 767 tape and leaflet missions requested. Employing O2B and C-47 aircraft, 18,974,000 leaflets were dropped, and 24.3 hrs of loudspeaker appeal time were broadcast. Adverse weather conditions in the A Shau Valley caused cancellations of many 9th ACS Psyops missions.

(2) The 7th Psyops Bn located at Da Nang provided printing and tape support, one (1) HB team to each Brigade, and liaison with the 9th ACS. The quality of printing was good. Continuous planning by Division Psyops personnel was required to insure a sufficient quantity of appropriate leaflets and tapes to support sustained operations.

(3) Each HB team provided psyops support using a 250 watt ground loudspeaker and a 1000 watt loudspeaker system mounted on a UH-1 helicopter. The Brigade teams broadcast 13 hours heliborne loudspeaker time and 31 hours ground loudspeaker time and disseminated 42,000 leaflets by helicopter. The HB teams accompanied the 1st and 2nd Bde TAC CP's to the A Shau Valley and operated at the company level.

(4) The use of Armed Propaganda Teams in the A Shau Valley was not considered feasible.

(5) Twenty-five (25) Kit Carson Scouts were assigned to the Division. They were employed with the infantry companies and rifle platoons and "D" Troop, 1/9th Cavalry. Their employment continued to be effective.

c. Chieu Hoi Program: An intensive Chieu Hoi campaign was continued throughout all operations. Four (4) NVA Hoi Chanhs rallied to the Division during this period. They were immediately exploited for psyops by live broadcasts appealing to their comrades to rally to the GVN. Their messages were broadcast by heliborne loudspeaker. A leaflet message with the same appeal was written by the Hoi Chanhs and produced and disseminated by the 7th Psyops Bn and 9th ACS, respectively.

*Confidential*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 927623

By AT NARA Date 10-16-99