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AVGB-SFA (25 Jan 68)

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SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation RAPIDFIRE V

Commanding Officer, Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces, APO 96227 17 February 1968

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: G3, APO 96266

Transmitted herewith is one (1) copy of subject after action report Operation RAPIDFIRE V.

*Donald H. Barrell*  
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Major, Infantry  
S3

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By I M. NATA, DA 2/10

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5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96227

AVGB-36

25 January 1968

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT, OPERATION RAPID FIRE V  
08 December 1967-24 January 1968

TO: See Distribution

1. (C) SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OPERATION:

a. Detachment B-36 (Command and Control)

Comd (Maj), S-2 (Cpt), S3 (Cpt); Ops Sgt, Intel Sgt, S4 Sgt, Commo Section (Includes Commo Supervisor, two (2) RTT Operators, and two (2) Radio Operators).

b. Det A-361/MSF 957 consisting of:

(1) 14 man Special Forces "A" Detachment.

(2) 6 LRRP NCO's (II FFV assets)

(3) (104 VNN) Cambodian Company (Recon Plt and three (3) main force platoons).

c. Det A-362/MSF 966 consisting of:

(1) 6 man Special Forces Detachment

(2) 7 LRRP NCO's (II FFV assets)

(3) (132 VNN) Cambodian Company (Recon Plt and three (3) main force platoons).

d. Special Augmentation - Attached

(1) II FFV

(a) Arty FS Coord and two (2) Radio Oprs (6/67 Arty).

(b) Two (2) USAF FACS w/one (1) FAC acft.

(c) Two (2) Radio Relay Acft Pilots w/two acft (11th Avn Bn).

(d) Six (6) UH1D Slick Acft (One (1) Acft C&C), four (4) UH1C (UTT) Gunships, (188th Assault Helicopter Company).

2. (C) MISSION:

Special Task Force Rapid Fire conducts special operations commencing D Day, 08 December 1968, in designated AO's to develop combat intelligence and to satisfy EEI.

3. (C) SPECIAL TASKS (EEI) AO's BEAR, MONGOOSE AND CUB:

a. Summary of Enemy Situation:

Current order of battle does not indicate the presence of any major VC/NVA units in the AO's, however, the Hqts 7th NVA Div with supporting elements and the 271st VC Regiment are all located in the vicinity of XT5993 and it is probable that elements of these units may be in or near the AO's.

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(1) What is enemy strength, disposition, composition, and unit identification within the AO's.

(2) What are the locations of base camps, command and control facilities and logistical support activities within the AO's?

(3) Will the enemy fight to preserve base camps or will they withdraw? If they will fight, determine with what forces, when and with what supporting arms. If they will withdraw, determine to where and by what routes using what means of transportation.

(4) Will the enemy reinforce his forces within the AO? If so, when and where, and with what forces?

(5) Determine the use of trails, roads, and waterways with respect to type of traffic, volume and frequency of use.

(6) What activities are being carried out within the AO's by VC/NVA units, where, in what strengths, and with what effectiveness.

c. Additional mission assignments as required by the 25th Infantry Division.

(1) Target against units capable of attacking Thien Ngon (XT0881) with fires and or ground forces.

(2) Locate enemy base areas and report details of size, fortifications, tunnels and trails.

(3) Destroy VC/NVA forces located within capability. Report all contact immediately.

(4) Determine the presence of COSVN, with emphasis in northern half of AO BEAR (traditional COSVN base area).

(5) Develop combat intelligence and satisfy EEI.

d. Additional EEI as required by the 25th Infantry Division:

(1) What VC/NVA units operate within AO BEAR and MONGOOSE, particularly in the vicinity of LOGO (WT9757), XA MAT (XT0879) and junction THIEN NGON (XT0881)?

(2) Do enemy forces attacking THIEN NGON (XT0881) infiltrate from Cambodia, and return upon completion of attack? If so, what are their routes?



(3) How recently have located major enemy base areas been used?

(4) How are VC/NVA forces supplied in the area and from where? How well are main force units equipped, uniformed, armed? How is their morale?

4. (c) TIME OF COMMENCEMENT/TERMINATION: Operation Rapid Fire V was conducted from a Forward Operations Base (FOB) located at Tay Ninh east airfield. The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was activated at 061400 December 1967 and deactivated at 241130 January 1968. Troop moves from Long Hai to Tay Ninh and from Tay Ninh to Long Hai were made by C130 aircraft, CH 47, and organic wheeled vehicles. A CH 47 was used to move the detachment RTT van.

## 5. (c) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Operation Rapid Fire V began with the issuance of a written OPORD, prepared by CO Detachment B-36, submitted to Co A, 5th SF GA, 1st SF, Bien Hoa, and approved by the CG, II. FFV 4 December 1967. Detachment B-36 S2 and S3 visited Co A and obtained the current intelligence on the assigned area of operations (AO). The RTT van was airlifted by CH 47 on 5 December from Long Hai to Tay Ninh ~~East~~ (FOB site). The first C130 lift departed Vung Tau airfield at 051300 with troops and equipment and the last lift closed Tay Ninh West at 051930 December 1967.

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The camp site was established and liaison visits were made with Detachment B32 and advisory elements of US Army installations in Tay Ninh and the TOC was officially opened for operations on 6 December 1967. The fire support coordinator and radio relay pilots made visits and were briefed on 6 December 1967. At 091600 December 1967 the CO, B-36 conducted a briefing of all elements and detachments who would be working on Operation Rapid Fire V and warning orders were issued to the first two team commanders. Det B-36 deployed the following type sub-units in area of operations throughout the duration of operations:

(1) Recon Missions: Normally consisting of six (6) men (not more than four (4) US and two (2) indigenous soldiers).

(2) Recon/Ambush Missions: Normally consisting of twelve (12) men (not more than six (6) US and six (6) indigenous soldiers).

(3) Ambush Missions: Normally consisting of twenty (20) men (not more than six (6) US and fourteen (14) indigenous soldiers).

(4) Armed Aerial Recon Missions: Normally consisting of thirty five (35) men (not more than ten (10) US and twenty five (25) indigenous soldiers).

(5) Mobile Strike Force Company: Consisting of one (1) thirty five (35) man indigenous recon platoon and three (3) fifty (50) man indigenous main force platoons. The company is commander and led by a Special Forces twelve (12) man A Detachment supplemented by ten (10) IRRP's from II FFV assets.

## (6) SUMMARY OF MISSIONS:

(a) Mission Nr 1 was an armed aerial recon mission and was infiltrated at XT181978 in which vicinity the team found a recently constructed bunker and two wells. Trails in the area had been recently used by foot traffic and ran N to S. A small garden was also located in the general area. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(b) Mission Nr 2 was an armed aerial recon and was infiltrated at XT 129712 and apprehended four woodcutters who were questioned and released. The patrol also discovered a N to S trail on which a truck had recently passed. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(c) Mission Nr 3 was an ambush mission and was infiltrated at XT 125949 and moved SW for 400 meters to a SW to NE trail and were establishing an ambush when the patrol sighted four VC and engaged them. Results of the encounter were 1 VC KIA (probable). For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(d) Mission Nr 3A was an ambush patrol infiltrated at XT 096923 from which location the patrol moved E for 50 meters to a N-S trail and established an ambush position from which they observed 3 VC traveling from N to S on bicycles and engaged them killing one and capturing 1 US M-16 rifle and numerous small items of equipment and documents. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(e) Mission Nr 4 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 185968 and did not engage the enemy or observe any unusual activities. For complete details of this mission see Annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(f) Mission Nr 5 was an armed aerial recon and infiltrated at XT 087881 where it was challenged by 7 to 10 VC just after arriving on the LZ. The VC were engaged with organic weapons and gunship fire, there were no friendly casualties in the engagement and enemy casualties are unknown. For complete details of this patrol see Annex B, Debriefing Reports.

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(g) Mission Nr 6 was an ambush mission infiltrated at XT 157846 where they discovered a E-W trail which was approximately 4' wide and had been recently traveled by ox-carts. Patrol was to have infiltrated a different LZ however they received small arms fire on their attempted landing and infiltrated the above LZ. The patrol did not observe any enemy and were extracted without incident. For complete details of this patrol see Annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(h) Mission Nr 7 was an ambush mission infiltrated at XT 153880 where they established an ambush and observed six NVA personnel travelling on a N-S trail. The team was unable to engage the enemy due to the distance from the friendly position to the enemy. The enemy was armed with AK 47 and SKS weapons. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(i) Mission Nr 8 was an armed aerial recon which made a reconnaissance of AO Mongoose without landing. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(j) Mission Nr 9 was an armed aerial recon which infiltrated at XT 095767 after observing numerous persons on a road which had been declared an unauthorized area for civilian personnel. The team apprehended 14 persons who were later released as innocent civilians after being warned against traveling in the area. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(k) Mission Nr 10 was an ambush mission infiltrated at XT 185965 in which vicinity they established an ambush on a N-S trail and encountered two VC with unknown results. The patrol was then infiltrated at XT 203964 and established an ambush on a N-S trail. Throughout their stay in this ambush position the patrol heard numerous warning or signal shots being fired both to the N and S of their position. Team observed an estimated 5 VC traveling on the trail, the enemy was engaged, resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1 VC KIA (probable), 1 VC captured, and 1 VC WIA (probable). Captured VC revealed he was a liaison agent for the 141st NVA Regiment and was escorting newly arrived personnel to their new camp. Also captured in the engagement was one AK 47 and numerous items of equipment. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(l) Mission Nr 11 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 096923 and the patrol established an ambush at XT 094922 where they observed 3 VC moving S on a N-S trail. The patrol engaged the VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 VC KIA (probable) and the capturing of 1 SKS and numerous items of equipment and personal possessions. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(m) Mission Nr 12 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at WT 983656 where they engaged an estimated 17 VC who were attempting to evade the patrol and the armed helicopters. In the engagement there were 5 VC KIA and 1 VC KIA (probable) and 2 VC WIA by ground troops and 5 VC KIA by gunships and TAC air. One type 53 Chicom carbine and 1 SKS were captured in the engagement. For complete details of this mission see annex B, debriefing Reports.

(n) Mission Nr 13 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at WT 970722 from where the patrol moved NW to river line and then N along river where by discovered a weapons manufacturing area and housing area for approximately 15 personnel. Numerous spider holes and enemy fortifications were discovered along the river bank as well as a sampan docking area with one sampan. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(o) Mission Nr 14 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at WT 967758 and did not observe any enemy activity. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(p) Mission Nr 15 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 054858, in the general vicinity the team observed numerous trails but did not observe any enemy though they heard signal shots throughout their patrol. For complete details of this patrol see Annex B, Debriefing Reports.

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(q) Mission Nr 16 was an armed patrol mission which was infiltrated at WT 940870 where they established an ambush on a E-W trail and encountered 2 VC on bicycles, wounding both VC who then escaped. The patrol captured numerous documents and small items of equipment. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(r) Mission Nr 17 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at XT 036730 where they apprehended 3 VC suspects who were later released as innocent civilians. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(s) Mission Nr 18 was a special mission to destroy a bridge at XT 084730 which was approximately 10 meters long and 3 meters wide, constructed of heavy logs. The bridge was approximately 75% destroyed. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(t) Mission Nr 19 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at WT 944784 where they heard talking and other activities which indicated the presence of a force larger than one enemy company traveling on a N-S trail near the LZ. Because of the size of the enemy force the patrol did not engage. Tactical air and gunship runs were placed on general area with unknown results. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(u) Mission Nr 19A was a reinsertion of mission number 19 which was infiltrated at WT 950080 and did not observe any enemy activity. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(v) Mission Nr 20 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at WT 265652 and moved N along the rivers edge. The patrol encountered enemy huts and fortifications approximately every 8 to 10 meters and observed numerous loaded sampans along the western edge of the river. The team was extracted when the gunships observed an estimated 25 to 30 enemy going toward the friendly location from the S. Three sorties of TAC air and numerous rounds of artillery were fired into the area. Only small items of personal equipment were captured. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(w) Mission Nr 21 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at XT 100930 where they detained 7 VC suspects which were later released as innocent civilians. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(x) Mission Nr 21A was infiltrated at XT 084745 with the special mission of destroying a bridge in that vicinity. The bridge was approximately 80% destroyed by the patrol who also captured 3 bicycles of unknown origin. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(y) Mission Nr 22 was a special mission to destroy a bridge vicinity XT 083729 which was 85% destroyed. In the vicinity of the bridge the patrol captured 4 VC suspects who were later released as innocent civilians. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(z) Mission Nr 23 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 086883 and while establishing an ambush on a N-S trail in that vicinity the patrol was attacked by an estimated VC platoon (20-30 enemy), resulting in 8 VC KIA, 2 VC KIA (probable), 2 VC KBA, 1 VC WIA (probably) and 1 AK 47 captured. Friendly losses were 2 US KIA, 1 indigenous KIA, 2 US WIA, and 5 indigenous WIA. While searching area prior to establishing the ambush the team leader and one indigenous found WDL communications wire which nearly paralleled the N-S trail. The N-S trail bisected an E-W trail N of the ambush position. It is felt that this area is the site of a major enemy base camp. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, debriefing Reports.

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(aa) Mission Nr 23a was a reinforcement mission for mission number 23 and helped secure the LZ for extraction. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(bb) Mission Nr 24 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT112963 and moving N toward an ambush position the patrol saw numerous bunkers and enemy installations in the vicinity of XT 113964. The patrol saw an old enemy base camp with an E-W trail winding through it. It was at this location that the team established their ambush. While watching the trail the patrol observed 3 VC traveling E to W and engaged the enemy, capturing one and wounding the other two. When the patrol had moved to the exfiltration LZ and while the first helicopter was landing, the patrol was taken under heavy automatic and semi-automatic weapons fire resulting in 1 US KIA, 1 indigenous KIA, 2 US WIA, 2 indigenous WIA, 2 air crew WIA and 2 VC KIA (probable) and 1 VC WIA (probable). During the engagement the VC who was captured was struck by enemy fire and later died. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(cc) Mission Nr 24A was a reinforcement mission for mission no. 24 to secure the LZ for extraction. For complete details see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(dd) Mission Nr 25 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at XT102755 and apprehended 6 VC suspects who were later released as innocent civilians. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(ee) Mission Nr 26 was an armed aerial recon which did not engage any enemy from ground positions, however 3 VC were sighted from the air and taken under fire with unknown results. For complete details see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(ff) Mission Nr 27 was an ambush mission to capture POW's and documents which infiltrated at XT 149864. Results were one (1) VC wounded and captured and one (1) VC WIA (Possible). For complete details see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(gg) Mission Nr 28 was a special mission to engage enemy personnel by sniper fire who might be traveling on the road vicinity XT103758. During the conduct of the patrol the team engaged a total of 6 enemy, killing one and wounding one. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(hh) Mission Nr 29 was an ambush mission which was aborted because of ground haze and the pilots of the helicopters could not establish the proper LZs. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(ii) Mission Nr 29A was a special mission to investigate a reported VC rice cache in the vicinity of WT990640. The patrol moved N along the river line and became heavily engaged with an estimated enemy company who were occupying a fortified base camp in the vicinity WT991643. After numerous TAC air strikes and reinforcements the patrol was extracted. Results of this engagement were 15 VC KIA, 10 VC KIA (probable), 3 VC WIA (probable), 2 indigenous KIA, 7 US WIA, 13 indigenous WIA. It was established from captured enemy documents that this was the location of the headquarters of the 80th Training Regiment and some of the documents were classified by the enemy as being Top Secret. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(jj) Missions Nr 29B and 29C were reinforcement missions for mission nr 29. Enemy casualties and friendly casualties have been included in the above statistics. For complete details of these missions see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(kk) Mission Nr 30 was an armed aerial recon which infiltrated at WT 972659 and moved N along the river engaging one VC swimming from Viet Nam to Cambodia possibly killing him. The patrol also discovered numerous trails, enemy fortifications, and sampan docking areas. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

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(ll) Mission Nr 31 was a Special Mission team infiltrated at XT 245952 to assess the damage done to a suspected VC base area by a B-52 air strike. The patrol observed approximately 40 enemy bunkers, numerous spider holes and one hut in the area. 2 VC were sighted leaving the area but were not observed by friendly forces on the ground. Complete details of this patrol annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(mm) Mission Nr 32 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 011770 and established an ambush in this area. The patrol observed 6 to 10 VC traveling on the trail N to S who were engaged, killing one and capturing miscellaneous small items of equipment. In the engagement no friendly casualties were sustained. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(nn) Mission Nr 33 was an armed aerial recon which did not land. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(oo) Mission Nr 34 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 125954 and established an ambush on an E-W trail in this vicinity. Shortly after establishing the ambush the patrol observed an estimated 25 to 30 VC running slowly down the trail from E to W. The enemy was engaged, killing 6 and wounding 2 and capturing 1 SKS. In the engagement 1 US and 1 indigenous were slightly wounded. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(pp) Mission Nr 35 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at XT 046837 and established an ambush at WT 946838. The patrol observed enemy movement in the area and were able to engage 2 VC killing one and capturing one AK47 and numerous items of small equipment. For complete details of this patrol see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(qq) Mission Nr 36 was a sniper mission which was aborted due to the higher priority of impending missions. For additional details see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(rr) Mission Nr 37 was a recon mission which was infiltrated at XT 043616 and was extracted at XT 057658 without making contact with or observing the enemy. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(ss) Mission Nr 38 was a recon mission which was infiltrated at XT 043616 and observed one VC vicinity of XT 013619 carrying an AK 47 and wearing NVA web gear. This patrol was then extracted at XT 013619 after hearing approximately 10 VC parallelling their line of advance. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(tt) Mission Nr 39 was a recon team which was infiltrated at XT 023699 and extracted at XT 027695 after negative enemy sightings or contact. For complete details see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(uu) Mission Nr 40 was cancelled.

(vv) Mission Nr 41 was an ambush mission which was infiltrated at WT 944850 and established an ambush on a N-S road in that vicinity. The patrol observed 2 VC travelling on the road from S to N and engaged them. Immediately the patrol came under heavy fire and TAC air was called on the enemy, estimated to be a reinforced platoon. As a result of the encounter the enemy suffered 4 KIA, 1 KIA (possible) and friendly losses were 2 US WIA, 1 indigenous WIA. For complete details of this mission see Annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(ww) Mission Nr 42 was an armed aerial recon with the additional mission of assessing a TAC air strike in the vicinity of WT 974624. During the conduct of the sweep of the area the patrol observed numerous huts, enemy fortifications, tunnels, and other evidence of enemy activity. During the extraction of the patrol one helicopter door gunner

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observed 1 VC and engaged him with machine gun fire. Possible KIA. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(xx) Mission Nr 43 was a recon mission which was infiltrated at XT 042607 and swept to XT 013593 without observing any enemy although the team feels that 2 enemy were WIA on hearing a booby trap left by friendly elements detonate. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(yy) Mission Nr 44 was an armed aerial recon which was infiltrated at XT 033720 and observed unused enemy huts which they destroyed, no contact with the enemy was made. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

(zz) Mission Nr 45 was a search and destroy mission which was infiltrated in the vicinity of WT 972659 in three separate lifts. The patrol moved from S to N and from N to S along the river line being proceeded in both directions by TAC air and artillery. Numerous enemy installations and garden areas were destroyed though only one enemy was observed swimming from Viet Nam to Cambodia and was engaged by the gun ships killing him. For complete details of this mission see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

6. (C) Area Assessment (Intel): Annex A.
7. (C) Debriefing Reports: Annex B
8. (C) Read-Outs of Enemy Documents: Annex C
9. (C) Interrogation Reports: Annex D
10. (C) Results of Encounter with the enemy:

a. Friendly Losses:

(1) KIA: Three (3) US, Pfc Toboda, Sgt Simmons, Sp4 Taylor and four (4) indigenous.

(2) WIA: Sixteen (16) US, twenty seven (27) indigenous.

(3) MIA: None.

(4) CAPTURED: None.

b. Enemy Losses:

(1) KIA: 46

(2) KIA: (probable): 22

(3) KBA: 7

(4) WIA: 10

(5) WIA: (probable): 6

(6) CAPTURED: 2

(7) Captured equipment: see annex B, Debriefing Reports.

11. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes. Special Task Force Rapid Fire was given the mission of establishing enemy disposition, composition, and unit identification and to determine the level of VC/NVA activity within the AOs. The Special Task Force accomplished all of its missions and satisfied all of the EEI with the exception of the requirement from the 25th Infantry Division to determine the presence of COSVAN in the AO. The Special Task Force continually interdicted main VC/NVA supply routes and infiltration routes and

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forced the enemy to expend his forces in defending his base camp locations. The Special Task Force did irreplacable damage to the security of the 80th Training Regiment with the capture of enemy documents and the destruction of the safe haven for that organization. Enemy prisoners captured were interrogated and revealed valuable information of their units and their activities. Throughout the conduct of Operation Rapid Fire V TAC air strikes and artillery strikes were placed on the enemy both day and night severly interdicting his ability to reinforce his positions or to effectively react to friendly operations.

## 12. (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. General: Due to the type of AO and the enemy activity found therein, many situations developed which allowed new innovations to be tried. They are listed below.

b. In destroying enemy huts which are usually constructed of bamboo and thatched roofs, the use of white phosphorous grenades is an excellent means. However, it should be pointed out that due to the volitity of white phosphorous extreme care should be exercised in its handling. This detachment suffered two indigenous killed when a white phosphorous grenade detonated on the belt of one of the personnel. These grenades do not have the safety pins spread as do fragmentation grenades and this lends them to the possibility of accidental detonation.

c. In destroying enemy fortifications and structures such as bridges an 8" artillery projectile will do maximum damage with a minimum of weight and inconvenience. As in the destruction of large quantities of rice (After Action Report Rapid Fire IV) the fuse well of the 8" projectile should be filled with C4 and detonated with electrical or time fuse detonation.

d. In the use of rope ladders, rappelling ropes, and McGuier rigs it is essential that the helicopter descends from a height greater than the length of the rope and that it descends straight down. If the helicopter is not at a height sufficient to allow the ropes to completely straighten out when they are thrown from the aircraft, they will tangle and valuable time is lost in attempting to straighten them out.


e. Claymore mines when used as a device to capture prisoners should be aimed low so that the person against whom the mine is used will be wounded and not killed. This procedure is effective only if the ambush force is sufficiently greater in size than the enemy force to insure the safety of the friendly elements.

f. Extreme care should be exercised in the use of fire producing products such as white phosphorus when a unit is attempting to break contact or be exfiltrated. In one incident during the conduct of this operation a patrol was forced to move from their primary position because a rocket from a gun ship started a grass fire which moved toward the patrol. Because of this fire the patrols position was revealed to the enemy who delivered effective fire on the team.

g. The use of tactical air strikes and artillery as a blocking force is most effective on a search and destroy mission. Tactical air and artillery can also be plotted to proceed the friendly search operation which will open up the jungle canopy making travel easier and revealing enemy installations to a greater degree than only a ground search.

h. Great care must be taken to insure that reaction forces from other units, (i.e. divisional units, ready reaction unit), are fully apprised of their responsibility to this detachment in that the size of the force which is internally available to the Special Task Force is not of sufficient size to engage in a major enemy contact. Considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining additional helicopter support when this unit was engaged in a major contact and needed to reinforce its ground troops in

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order to evacuate wounded and dead personnel.

i. It is possible to rig a claymore mine with a wire and tape device which allows the claymore to be thrown toward enemy fortifications or personnel. When the detonating wire is pulled toward the person who threw the mine it is pulled to a position which faces the instrument towards the enemy. This device is excellent in breaking contact and destroying enemy fortifications without exposing the friendly personnel to enemy fire.

j. White phosphorus is an excellent means of marking enemy positions for artillery and air strikes in that the smoke rises much more quickly than that from a normal smoke grenade. This technique should only be used when a severe time factor is involved and immediate reaction is needed.

k. Flares carried on the shackles of radio relay & FAC aircraft can be used to start fires in enemy gardens and rice fields. When used the altitude must be such that the flare ignites but hits the target before deployment of the parachute.

l. When using an aerial observer to mark targets for ground troops, white phosphorus grenades are more practical than smoke or WP rockets. If dropped from an altitude of 400 feet or less the grenade will explode on the ground. This conserves the marking rockets for use with the TAC aircraft.

m. Often it is practical for a commander to control ground units from a FAC aircraft. This leaves the C&C helicopter free for the Arty FS coordinator, aircraft commander, and ground unit S3. In the C&C ship one of the two FM radios is tuned to the command net, the other to the artillery frequency. The aircraft commander controls his assets by use of UHF/VHF. The commander controls the ground elements from the FAC aircraft by FM on command frequency. This allows the commander to insure TAC air is placed exactly where he wants it. It allows him to stay on target during the strike --- normally the C&C must clear the Target Area for high performance aircraft. The S3 monitors the command net and can easily relay information to the FOB without disturbing the command net by changing his FM set from low band to high band (vice-versa). The FOB monitors and high/low band frequencies.

n. In selecting alternate frequencies it is convenient and easy to remember if the alternate frequency is obtained by changing the band selector switch, i.e. high to low/low to high.



o. When directing close air support using either UTT's or TAC always include the following:

- (1) Azimuth from your position to the target.
- (2) Distance from your position to the target.
- (3) Direction you desire firing passes to be made (your position must be known by supporting aircraft).

If the direction of fire passes is not given all too often the aircraft will come in on the azimuth given from your position to the enemy. This results in the aircraft firing over or into the friendly positions and could cause friendly casualties.

p. When ascending a rope ladder, it is best to climb it from the side, inserting the heels in each rung - toes out. This reduces the inward swing and need for ground personnel to hold the bottom rungs steady. This technique also allows the leg muscles to do the work and takes the strain off the arms. When practical have a snap link attached to a secure piece of webbing or belt. In the event the climber becomes fatigued the snap link can be snaped on to a rung and secure the climber.

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q. When extracting using the McGuire Rig (more than one person). It is an added safety precaution to use the safety wrist strap on a buddies rig - this way if the McGuire rope fails the rider is still secure to the other soldier's rig.

r. When assaulting enemy bunkers and trench lines it is necessary to over run enemy positions as quickly as possible in order to capture WIA's and documents. If stubborn resistance is met, napalm has been found best in quickly neutralizing the enemy. It can be delivered within 20 meters of the friendly forces without causing harm. It is necessary to mark the front and rear of the friendly line so that the napalm can be delivered by TAC air without endangering friendly positions.

## 13. (C) Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Conclusions: The missions accomplished in the assigned AOs proved to be well suited to the capabilities of Project Rapid Fire. The variety of enemy situation and the strength of enemy activity again provided ample opportunity for the Special Task Force to exercise to the fullest its ability to strengthen its ground positions by rapid reaction to the changing situation. The Special Task Force was limited in its night operations because radio relay aircraft were only available for 7 hours of flying time per day and it is not advisable to have teams on the ground at night if there is any possibility that continuous radio communications cannot be maintained.

### b. Recommendations:

(1) That future Rapid Fire Operations be given a more definite support agreement with reaction elements.

(2) That the same supporting elements be kept together if at all possible to allow for the quickest response and maximum efficiency of the Special Task Force. Each change in supporting elements necessitated a training period which delays the employment of the Special Task Forces.

## 14. (C) OPLAN/OPORD Rapid Fire V: See Annex F.

## 15. (C) Close Air Support Rapid Fire V:

a. II FFV provided two USAF FACs and two L-19 FAC aircraft in support of Rapid Fire V. Both aircraft were located at Tay Ninh West airfield and the FACs lived at the FOB where they were available for planning purposes. Normal utilization of the FAC's were to have them provide coverage during all infiltrations and exfiltrations. The experience of both pilots proved invaluable to the Special Task Force in that they quickly adjusted to our operations as one FAC had supported us in the past. During enemy contact the FAC pilots employed the gunships as they would TAC air, guiding them onto the targets and marking targets with rockets and smoke. TAC air was used to the fullest extent and was always quickly responsive to our needs. Because of past participation by the FACs in similar operations, it was possible for them to judge the severity of an engagement and to request TAC air support without being directed to do so by the commanding officer.

b. Radio relay aircraft were only permitted to provide 7 hours coverage of the operation per day and to some extent limited the night operations that were conducted as a patrol in the field must have continuous contact with the FOB. During the operation some difficulty was encountered in coordinating the activities and flying times of the radio relay aircraft.

c. The 188th Assault Helicopter was to provide 5 slicks, (4 for troop lift and 1 C&C), and 2 gunships, for continuous coverage of insertions and extractions. Because of heavy enemy ground fire it was

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normally impossible for the gunships to remain at their desired strength and the usual procedure was to employ 3 gunships with 2 on station and the other to serve as a filler while the ships on station refueled or rearmed. 2 gunships are inadequate for our operations.

#### Annexes and Inclosures:

JAMES G GRITZ

#### Annex A: Area Assessment (Intel)

Major, Infantry

## Annex B: Debriefing Reports

Major, MM  
Commanding

**Annex C: Declassified Reports**  
**Annex C: Readouts of captured  
Enemy Documents**

Annex D: Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports

Annex E. Aerial Photographs of items of interest in AO's (Original Copy Only)

**Annex E: Operational Plan**

#### Annex G: Operations and Intelligence Overlay

#### Annex H: Supplemental Information

#### DISTRIBUTION:

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1 ea CG 11 FFV  
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1 ea 00, 5th SFGA, 1st

1 ea 50, 60 R, 5th SEGA

1 ea Det B32, 60 A, 3rd SFG  
1 ea 25th Infantry Division

1 ea 250H Mortar  
5 ea USAF Bien Hoa

1 ea 3d Bde., 25th Infantry Division

1 ea 269th Avn Bn

1 ea 250th AVN BN  
1 ea Dir of Instr. Uw Dept. USAJFKCENSPWAR, Ft Bragg, N.C.

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5 ea File

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ANNEX A TO AFTER ACTION REPORT RAPID FIRE V

25 January 1968

SUBJECT: AREA ASSESSMENT AND INTELLIGENCE

REFERENCES: AO BEAR, MONGOOSE, CUB, MAP VIETNAM 1:50,000 Sheet numbers 6131I, 6132II, 6231IV, 6232III, 6232IV, Series L7016.

AGENCIES AND SOURCES: Agencies included: Company A, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, II Field Force Vietnam, 188th Assault Helicopter Company, USAF Forward, Air Controller, 6/27th Artillery, Detachment B-32, 5th SFGA.

1. MISSION: Special Task Force Rapid Fire conducts special operations commencing D Day, 08 December 1967, in designated AO's to develop Combat Intelligence and Satisfy EEI.

2. AREA OF INTEREST BOUNDED BY THE VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER ON THE WEST AND NORTH AND GRID LINE 54 TO THE SOUTH AND 23 TO THE EAST.

a. Weather: During the period of Rapid Fire V 08 Dec through January, the temperature was generally from 75 degrees in the early morning to a high of 90 degrees in the early afternoon.

(1) Cloudiness: Infrequent early morning haze usually dissipating by 1000 hours, some heavy clouds in the early to late afternoon but with a general ceiling of unlimited.

(2) Visibility: For the most part visibility is unlimited throughout the day, no operations were severely affected by lack of visibility though occasional ground fog in the early morning made infiltrations difficult.

(3) Precipitation: No precipitation occurred during the period of Rapid Fire V.

(4) Advantage to Enemy: Occasional ground haze made it possible for the enemy to move under cover while our helicopters were on approach.

(5) Disadvantages to Enemy: The generally excellent weather made infiltrations and reinforcements comparatively easy during the entire period. The generally good weather made aerial reconnaissance an effective tool and tended to restrict the movement of the enemy in open areas.


b. TERRAIN:

(1) Relief: AO's Bear, Mongoose, and Cub were flat to rolling with Nui Ba Den serving as an excellent reference point for most areas of the AO's.

(2) Drainage: The AO's generally drained into small streams which flow to the Song Vam Co Dong which serves as the border between Vietnam and Cambodia on the western and northern sides of the AO's, the Vam Co Dong flows west and south. Streams in the area which were encountered by the operational elements were dry.

(3) Vegetation: Undergrowth in the AO's varied from open rice paddies to dense undergrowth. Most of the area is primarily jungle with single and double canopy. Much elephant grass is evident throughout the open areas in the AO's. Bamboo is sparsely located throughout the AO's with the preponderance being located on the river area in the western portion of AO MONGOOSE. Because of intense GVN-US artillery and bombing much of the area is heavily pock marked and the jungle has grown back over the damage making many areas difficult to travel.

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c. TRAFFICABILITY: Movement in most areas is difficult but not restrictive with the exception of the river banks where the movement is restricted because of the heavy underbrush. All of the area is adaptable for the use of wheeled and tracked vehicles. Throughout the area there are numerous landing zones. Streams in the area at this time do not pose a problem in that they are generally dry and easily forded. Cross country movement by foot is practical within the area.

d. Lines of Communications: Within the area there are two main north-south roads, Highway 13 and 22 with a well defined trail running basically East to West in the most northern part of AO Bear. Trails are numerous throughout the area and most are trafficable by ox carts.

e. Cover and Concealment: Cover is limited in some areas due to the lack of relief and is limited to ant hills and similar protection. Concealment in the area is generally good to excellent and in the areas along the river concealment is superior.

f. Observation and Fields of Fire: Because of the lack of relief, fields of fire are generally excellent with the only limiting factor being the dense undergrowth in some areas. Observation is excellent if high ground is available. Indirect fire weapons can be utilized but it is recommended that artillery be adjusted by air in the areas of primary jungle.

g. Obstacles: The area is generally considered passable by infantry troops and tracked vehicles with no obstructions.

h. VC Booby Traps: During the entire period of Operation Rapid Fire V no mines or booby traps were encountered by friendly elements.

i. Critical Terrain: Generally speaking the most critical terrain feature in the area would be the Vam Co Dong which affords a rapids means of transport to NVA/VC units and may be a major infiltration means from Cambodia to Viet Nam. Other critical terrain features are roads and trails which if controlled by enemy forces provide a means of rapid reinforcement and could result in friendly forces being encircled and destroyed.

j. Enemy: VC/NVA units in the AO's are well equipped, well trained, well fed and excellent fighters. They will fight to preserve their base camps and do not hesitate to engage friendly forces and will use trails and roads to rapidly reinforce their positions and to search for friendly elements. The area along the Song Vam Co Dong is literally a fortress from the southern most portion of the area to Logo located at WT 9775, it was impossible for this detachment to insert a team into this area without engaging in a major contact. The area of the Vam Co Dong is used as a garden area and resupply storage as well as a training area for newly arriving troops from North Viet Nam and Cambodia.

k. Answers to EEI and OIR:

(1) Main force units reported in AO Mongoose is the 80th Training Regiment. VC/NVA captured indicate elements of the 141st NVA Regiment and C-25 Engineer Company are located in the AO.

(2) The 80th Training Regiment base camp was located in the vicinity of WT 991648 on 7 January 1968. Garden areas were located vicinity WT 980750 to WT 970620 along the Song Vam Co Dong. Captured documents and POW's indicate base camps in the following vicinities: WT 9678, WT 9944, XT 0164, XT 0069, XT 1297, XT 1785 and XT 0888.

(3) The 80th Training Regiment base camp was defended by three reinforced platoons using small arms and automatic weapons. Base camp vicinity XT 088881 was defended by a platoon, using small arms and grenades. Indications are enemy will defend his base camps in this area. If enemy withdraws it is generally towards Cambodia and by foot.

(4) Enemy forces attacking Thien Ngon are locally based units receiving logistical support from Cambodia.

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(5) The units located in the AO's are supplied by using the trails in the area and by sampans navigating the Song Vam Co Dong. Logistical support comes from Cambodia and from the gardens along the Song Vam Co Dong. The main force units are well equipped weapons and uniforms wise. Individuals have been observed wearing black pajamas, grey shirts and black pants, khaki uniforms and several mixtures of clothing. Enemy has been armed with AK47's, SKS's, Chicom Carbines, AK50's, RPG's and pistols. The enemy is aggressive and willing to fight, he is well fed and clothed, all general indications of high morale.

(6) The enemy has the capability to reinforce his units in the AO at will.

(7) The main infiltration routes into War Zone "C" are located here and along the Song Vam Co Dong, i.e. Operational Area Mongoose. For detailed study of trails, roads and waterways see paragraph "1". For additional information see Operations and Intelligence Overlay, Annex G.

1. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON ROAD AND TRAIL ACTIVITY, MAP REFERENCES SEE FORMAT THIS ANNEX:

(1) Trail shown on map as a road starting XT0991 and leading NE is a foot size path from that location to XT1597 and is used only by foot traffic it's entire length.

(2) Trail shown on map at XT1393 leading E, SE, and NE is in existence and well used by foot traffic.

(3) Trail shown on map at XT 0388 and leading S, SE, and NE is well used and in the vicinity of XT 0387 night movement of vehicles has been observed. Approximately 17 vehicles parked on one occasion vicinity XT0488.

(4) Trail shown starting at WT9890 and leading SW exists and continues SW and W to the Cambodian border vicinity WT9186 and is well used by ox cart traffic.

(5) A trail starts vicinity WT9186 just N of shown clearing and proceeds E to vicinity WT9286 and then SE to intersect above mentioned trail vicinity WT9386.

(6) A trail starts vicinity WT9787 and proceeds SW to vicinity WT9586 where it branches with one trail going due W and intersecting trail mentioned in line 5 vicinity WT9486. Other branch proceeds SW to vicinity WT9485 where it turns nearly due S and terminates at the Cambodian border vicinity WT9478, this trail is heavily used by foot and ox cart traffic.

(7) Trail shown on map starting vicinity WT9489 and leading S-SW to vicinity WT9485 is old and not used.

(8) A trail starts vicinity WT9485 and leads due W.

(9) A trail branches off the trail mentioned in line 6 vicinity WT9484 and leads SE to vicinity WT9382 where it splits with one branch leading S around the shown clearing to WT9281 and the other branch leading W-SW to vicinity WT9082.

(10) Highway 24 starting at WT8882 and leading N-NE is heavily used by vehicles traveling at night with their lights on.

(11) Highway 20 starting vicinity WT9775 and leading NE is lightly used by foot traffic only.

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(12) Highway 24 in the vicinity WT9368 is well used and has several branch roads (trails) leading N off of it. Also in the vicinity of WT9668 and leading N along the wood line is a vehicle parking area.

(13) Highway 13 from WT9960 to XT0059 is heavily traveled but trail from XT0059 to XT0159 is not used to any extent.

m. SUMMARY OF ENEMY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES, MAP REFERENCES SEE FORMAT THIS ANNEX.

(1) A trench and bunker system starts vicinity WT941868 and following the west edge of the clearing shown for approximately 800 meters. On the southern end the system extends around the clearing for approximately 200 meters. On the north end of the system it leads east for approximately 200 meters.

(2) Garden plots exist along the banks of the Vam Co Dong starting vicinity WT990640 and leading north to vicinity WT970750. Most of these areas have defensive positions around them and also protective cover from air strikes.

(3) A regimental headquarters base camp of the 80th Training Regiment was discovered vicinity WT991648 extending N for approximately 400 meters and E approximately 200 meters.

(4) A base camp is suspected to be located vicinity XT088881 at the southern edge of the clearing shown on the map.

*John E. Nunemaker*  
JOHN E. NUNEMAKER  
Captain MI  
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1. ACTION REPORT OPERATION RAPID FIRE V

SUBJECT: PATROL DEBRIEFING REPORTS

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1. DET A-361 Mission # 1 (Recon)

a. Size and composition: SFC Newman, SSG Martin, SGT Kovaleski, SFC Brown, SGT Simons, NO Edwards, plus 6 Cambodes.

b. Mission of patrol: To conduct aerial observation and engage targets of opportunity.

c. (1) Time of departure: 101245 Infiltration LZ XT 181978

(2) Time of extraction: 101330 Exfiltration LZ XT 181978

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved NW for 100 meters to a bunker which was constructed within the past 90 to 120 days. The bunker was constructed of logs 8" in diameter topped with soil. The bunker was 3' deep and had two openings, one facing north and the other facing south. The bunker was 6 ft long. Two wells were also in the area and were approx 30 meters from the bunkers. One well was 6ft deep and had water in it. The other well was 3ft deep and also had water in it. The trails in the area had only been used by foot traffic and were 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  ft wide and were running north to south. The trails in the area had been traveled in the last 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  hrs. Team also found a rice bowl with a full supply of rice inside which had not turned brown. A small garden was in the vicinity and contained the following vegetables: Peppers, onions, radishes and other misc vegetables.

(2) Terrain: Flat, open, many thorn bushes, and no canopy. Soil could support wheeled and track vehicles. No streams were crossed by the team.

(3) Obstacles: None.

(4) Mines or boobytraps: None.

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: None.

e. Enemy Information: None.

f. Results of encounter with enemy: None.

g. Significant Activities:

(1) Change in Tactics: None.

(2) Disc: None.

(3) Suspected infil routes: None.

h. Was Mission accomplished: Yes.

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Team feels that area was used for small vegetable gardens. Area where bunkers were found was used for air cover.

2. DET A-361 MISSION # 2 (Recon)

a. Size and Composition: SFC Newman, SSG Martin, SGT Kovaleski, SFC Brown, SGT Simons, plus 6 Cambodes.

b. Mission of Patrol: To conduct aerial reconnaissance and engage targets of opportunity.

c. (1) Time of Departure: 101400 Infiltration LZ XT 129712

(2) Time of Extraction: 101810 Exfiltration LZ XT 129712

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4. DATE: 2/10/2000

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) From LZ team moved 50 meters east and then proceeded to Woodcutters who were evacuated by C & C ship to Trai Be. Team then proceeded to north on a North-South trail for 250 meters and investigated trail and the general area. Team noticed that a truck had been in the area in the last week. The patrol then proceeded to LZ and was extracted without further incident. 2

(2) Terrain: Gently rolling, thick underbrush which is approx 6 to 8 ft high and no canopy because area had been defoliated. Trail was a North to South trail, approx 8 ft wide and had been traveled within the past week. Soil is suitable for track and wheel vehicles and team did not cross any streams.

(3) Obstacles: None.

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Team captured 4 VC suspects (Woodcutters).

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 129712

(2) Strength: 4

(3) Composition: Woodcutters

(4) Activity: Cutting Wood

(5) Equipment: None

(6) Uniforms: Civilian clothing

f. Results of encounter with enemy: Friendly losses: None Enemy losses: 4 VC suspects captured and were evacuated to Trai Be.

g. Significant activity:

(1) Change in Tactics: None

(2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: None.

(3) Propaganda Analysis: None

(4) Miscellaneous: None

(5) Unusual activities: Wood cutters were in an area off limits to this type of activities.

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: None.

3. DET A-362 Mission # 3

a. Size and Composition: MSG Wolf, CPT Kransoff, SP4 Ruiz, SGT Stark, SP5 Wiskow, PFC Taboada, plus 6 Cambodes.

b. Mission: To capture POW's and Documents.

c. (1) Time of Departure: 110610 Infiltration LZ: XT 125919  
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(2) Time of Exfiltration: 111000 Exfiltration LZ: XT 125910  
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d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ team moved SW for 400 meters and were in the processes of establishing an ambush on a SW to NE trail when right security saw 4 VC coming from the NW on the trail. Small arms fire was exchanged and the VC fled to the east. Patrol was then extracted and was infiltrated at XT 095926.

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(2) Terrain: Flat, sparse underbrush, heavy single canopy, visibility was 30 to 35 meters. Team feels that soil is capable of supporting wheel and track vehicles. The trail ran NE to SW and was 3 ft wide. The surface of the trail was hard packed red clay. The team noticed that 1 VC had been on the trail very recently. Trail in vicinity of XT 121948 ran NW to SE and was 1 ft wide but had not been used recently.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines or Boobytraps: None

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Right security engaged enemy with small arms and enemy fled to the east.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 121948

(2) Strength: 4

(3) Composition: Scout party

(4) Activity of VC: VC were traveling SW on the trail.

(5) Equipment: Automatic weapons (Possibly AK 47's)

(6) Uniforms: Unknown

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Enemy Losses:

(a) KIA: None

(b) KIA POSS: 1

(c) WIA: UNK

(d) Equip Captured: None

g. Significant activities:

(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Suspected infiltration routes: Trails previously mentioned.

(3) Propaganda analysis: None

(4) Misc: None

(5) Unusual activities: None

h. Mission accomplished: No

i. Conclusions and recommendations: Patrol feels area is extensively used by VC/NVA as route of infiltration.

4. DET A-362 Mission # 3A

a. Size and Composition: MSG Wolf, CPT Krasnoff, SP4 Ruiz, SGT Stark, SP5 Wiskow, PFC Taboada, plus 6 Cambodes.

b. Mission: To capture POW's and Documents.



c. (1) Time of Infiltration: 111005 Infiltration LZ: XT 096923

(2) Time of Extraction: 111320 Exfiltration LZ: XT 096923

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ patrol moved east 50 meters to trail an established an ambush position. At approx 111150 patrol saw 3 VC on bicycles traveling north to south on the trail and engaged them with small arms and claymores, killing 1 VC while 2 VC went into the tree line to the west. Patrol

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moved forward to search the body and received heavy automatic weapons fire which was returned and contact was broken. Team captured 1 bicycle and were extracted and then reinserted in same area and captured 2 additional bicycles. The C C ship then went into the ground area and captured 3 additional bicycles in the same area. Team then returned to FOB.

(2) Terrain: Flat, thick underbrush, single canopy, terrain is capable of supporting wheel and track vehicles. Trail which team ambushed on was 2 ft wide and was a hard packed surface which had been extensively traveled by bicycles.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Patrol engaged enemy with small arms and Claymores.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 096923

(2) Strength: 3

(3) Composition: Possibly messengers

(4) Activity of VC: Traveling north to south on bicycles.

(5) Equipment: 1 M-16 2 AK47's

(6) Uniforms: Black PJ's, VC who was KIA was wearing blue undershorts, blue hat, rubber sandals, and one VC had a white pith helmet.

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly losses: None

(2) Enemy losses: 1 VC KIA

(3) Equipment Captured: 17 UNK documents, 9 pictures, 1 wallet, 1 spoon, 1 rice can, 1pr of VC sandals, 1 VC lantern, 1 black ground cloth, 2 VC hats (1 green and 1 white), 1 grey cloth bag, 1 canteen cover and cup, 1 M-16 rifle (serial number 112072), 1 can of oil, 1 first aid pouch, 1 green cloth case with toothpaste and toothbrush, 1 knife w/ scabbard, carrying case for 10 M-16 mags, 1 NVA newspaper, 1 fingernail clipper, 1 black leather belt, 9 full mags, 6 bicycles, 37 loose 5.56 rounds, 10 tents cambodian money, 1 tool for making straps for VC sandals.

g. Significant activities:

(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Suspected infiltration routes: North to South trail.

(3) Propaganda analysis: None

(4) Misc: Enemy was clean shaven, very neat, clean and appeared healthy.

(5) Unusual activities: Enemy was traveling in three man groups during the day and were traveling on bicycles. Also team did not leave area of engagement. Team noticed no foot traffic on the trail.

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Conclusions and recommendations: The presence of heavy traffic (Bicycle) and the lack of foot traffic on the trail during the daylight hours indicates that a major unit headquarters may be in the area.

5. DET A-361 Mission # 4 (Ambush)

a. Size and Composition: SFC St Laurent, SGT Burr, SSG Handwerk, SSG Aleo, CPT Olivera, plus 7 Cambodians.

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- b. Mission: To capture POW's and documents:
- c. (1) Time of Infiltration: 110700 Infiltration LZ: XT 185968
- (2) Time of Exfiltration: 112243 Exfiltration LZ: XT 185968
- d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ team moved east for 50 meters, then north for 150 meters then west for 50 meters and south for 50 meters to ambush position. At 111630 the team established ambush position at XT 185968. Team stayed in ambush position until extraction time.

(2) Terrain: Flat, secondary growth, many dikes in the area, heavy thorn bushes, single canopy. Trail in the vicinity was 1 meter wide and had been used heavily by motorbike very recently.

- (3) Obstacles: None
- (4) Mines and Boobytraps: None
- (5) Action upon encountering enemy: None

- e. Enemy information: None
- f. Results of encounter with enemy: None

- g. Significant Activities:
  - (1) Change in tactics: None
  - (2) Suspected infiltration routes: None
  - (3) Propaganda Analysis: None

(4) Miscellaneous: Team heard hammering and some chopping in the vicinity of XT 183967 the sounds were similar to construction sounds. Two rounds of small arms fire were heard approx 100 to 200 meters north of the ambush position.

- (5) Unusual activities: None
- h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team feels route is used as a courier route.

6. DET A-362 Mission # 5 (Armed Aerial Recon)

a. Size and Composition: SSG Pounder, SP5 Reborg, SGT Patterson, SGT Farmer, SGT Danzer, SGT Aiello, plus 6 Cambodes.

- b. Mission: To engage targets of opportunity
- c. (1) Time of Infiltration: 111450 Infiltration: XT 087881
- (2) Time of Exfiltration: 111610 Exfiltration LZ: XT 087881
- d. Conduct of Patrol

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved north east for 15 meters and heard voices from the right asking in Vietnamese "Who is there" VC immediately engaged patrol with small arms fire which was returned by patrol. The point element of the patrol received a round in the upper hand guard of the M-16 but was not injured. Gunships suppressed the area and team was extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, sparse undergrowth, single and double canopy, soil is capable of supporting wheel and track vehicles. Trail vicinity XT 087881 runs N to S and is approx 1 1/2 ft wide, foot traveled and has been used recently.

- (3) Obstacles: None
- (4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

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(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Tex returned fire with small arms and then directed gunships into the area.

e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: XT 087881

(2) Strength: 7-10 VC

(3) Composition: Possible LZ watchers.

(4) Activity: UNK

(5) Equipment: Small arms and automatic weapons.

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

- (1) Friendly losses: None
  - (2) Enemy losses: Unk

6. Significant activities:

- (1) Change in tactics: None
  - (2) Suspected infiltration routes: None
  - (3) Propaganda analysis: None
  - (4) Misc: None
  - (5) Unusual activities: VC called to team asking who they were.

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Patrol feels that VC were LZ watchers.

7. DET A-362 Mission #6 (Ambush)

- a. Size and composition: SGT Pounder, SP4 Aiello, SGT Patterson, SGT Farmer, SGT Danzer, SP4 Reberg, plus 6 Cambodians.
  - b. Mission: To capture enemy POW's and documents.
  - c. Time of Departure: 120645 Infiltration LZ: XT 157846  
Time of Exfiltration: 121200 Exfiltration LZ: XT 159848
  - (d) Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ (Primary) second element received fire and team was extracted and infiltrated XT 158845 and moved 200 meters to NW trail which was 1 to 2 ft wide, heavily travelled by foot traffic within past 48 hours. Moved east paralleling the trail for 50 meters, crossed trail and proceeded north for 150 meters to trail vicinity XT 159848. Trail ran East west and was 4 ft wide, hard packed dirt, with two lanes of oxcart tracks. Established hasty ambush and were extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, sparse to heavy underbrush, single and double and triple canopy, soil is suitable for wheel and track vehicles. Patches of bamboo are scattered throughout the area. Trail vicinity XT 157846 ran East-West and had been used within past 12 hours by oxcarts. Trail was approx 4 ft wide.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Booby traps encountered: Patrol booby trapped  
bicycle vicinity XT 158845 with liner mine.

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: On pr received fire which was returned and team was extracted.

#### e. Enemy information

Primary IED AT 12 YR AND INTERVALS  
Secondary IED AT 12 YR AND INTERVALS  
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- e. (1) Location: XT 157846
- (2) Strength: Unknown
- (3) Composition: LZ watchers
- (4) Activity: Observing LZ
- (5) Equipment: Small arms
- (6) Uniforms: Unknown
- f. Results of encounter with enemy: None
- g. Significant activities:
  - (1) Change in tactics: None
  - (2) Suspected infiltration routes: Trail previously mentioned may be commo-liaison route or route of infiltration.
  - (3) Propaganda analysis: None
  - (4) Miscellaneous: None
  - (5) Unusual activities: None
- h. Was mission accomplished: No
- i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team feels area is extensively used as commo-liaison, infiltration and perhaps resupply.

8. DET A-361 Mission # 7 (Ambush)

a. Size and composition: SFC Newman, SSG Martin, SFC Brown, SGT Simons, SGM Edwards, SGT Kovaleski, plus 6 Cambodians.

b. Mission: To capture enemy POW's and documents.

c. Time of Departure: 120645 Infiltration LZ: XT153880

Time of Exfiltration: 121200 Exfiltration LZ: XT 153880

d. Conduct of patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ patrol moved NE for 15 meters and established ambush on N-S trail which was 1 ft wide and in recent use by foot troops. Trail went to both sides of LZ. At 120915 patrol sighted 6 NVA personnel traveling from the west who turned south. Enemy was carrying 4 AK 47's 13KS, and 1 RPD. Team was approx 150 meters from the enemy and were not able to ambush them. Team returned to LZ and were extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat to gently rolling, thick underbrush, single canopy, soil is capable of wheel and track vehicles.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Booby traps: None. Patrol left a booby trapped bicycle in vicinity XT 153880 and some M-14 mines were also left in same area.

(5) Action on encountering enemy: None



e. Enemy information:

(1) Location: XT 153880

(2) Strength: 6 NVA

(3) Composition: Unknown

(4) Activity: Traveling along trail.



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(5) Equipment: Web gear of WVA troops to include canteen, ammo packets, harnesses, belts, military shovels, no rucksacks. One enemy carried a white flag.

(6) Uniforms: Three wore black long sleeve shirts and long black trousers with black flop hats, one wore long sleeve khaki shirt, long khaki trousers, no hat, one wore khaki shirt long sleeve, black trousers, and one enemy wore black long sleeve shirt, long black trousers and brown cowboy type hat.

f. Results of encounter with enemy: None

g. Significant activities:

(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Suspected infiltration route: Trail previously mentioned.

(3) Propaganda analysis: None

(4) Miscellaneous: Enemy seemed to be relaxed and were talking and had their weapons slung.

(5) Unusual activities: None

h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Conclusions and Recommendations: Team thinks the booby trap detonated after they were extracted. Team also feels the area is used as a commo-laision route, and possibly an infiltration route.

9. Mission / 8 Aerial Observation, Targets of Opportunity.

a. Size and Composition: 4 slicks, 1 CAC, 1 light fire team.

b. Mission: Aerial observation and to engage targets of opportunity.

c. Time of departure: 121430

Time of return: 121645

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Made aerial observation of AO Mongoose.

(2) Terrain: N/A

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action encountered with enemy: N/A

e. Enemy information:

(1) Location: WT890820

(2) Strength: UNK

(3) Composition: UNK

(4) Activity: UNK

(5) Uniforms: UNK

(6) Equipment: UNK

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly: Gunship received ground fire (Not serious)

(2) Enemy: Unk

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enemy, friendly personnel and equipment.

Time of departure: 290630 Infiltration LZ: XT 185968

(2) Time of Return: 301050 Exfiltration LZ: XT 203964

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Team infiltrated 1st LZ and moved east for meters to XT 186967 and then changed direction to the north for another meters. This is the area where the team set up their first ambush. The team stayed in ambush position until 291420 and at this time 2 VC came walking down the trail from the north, the 2 VC walked past the teams right security then stopped and sat down to take a rest. Team then took the enemy under fire and immediately after firing ceased team moved up to search area and found no signs of the VC (Friendlies line of fire towards the VC was hindered by thick underbrush). After action the team was instructed to move back to the infiltration LZ. Team was extracted from 1st ambush site without further incident and was reinfiltrated into 2d ambush position at 291500 hrs. Team set up second ambush at XT 203965. Team heard many signal shots to their north and north west throughout the remainder of the afternoon. Team remained in this position and during the course of events that followed throughout the night the team heard mortar fire to their north east, and many signal shots to their north and south. Team moved out of ambush position at 300645. The team moved due west for about 150 meters to XT 204963, team then set up ambush at this position. At approx 0920 the team heard gunships in the area and the team noticed that the gunships were firing close to their position (Team did not notice the gunships tail number). At about 0945 team heard approx 5 VC to the rear of the ambush site. At approx 1030 WO Cahill saw 3 VC approx 10 paces apart and in the ready position. The lead VC then heard WO Cahill's radio and was about to turn and shoot WO Cahill when Cahill blew the Maymore with his right hand and fired a burst of automatic fire with his left. WO Cahill then received fire from the north side of the trail this being the direction in which the VC came from. The wounded VC then attempted to crawl into the bush but WO Cahill took him under fire again. When WO Cahill assaulted the wounded VC he came under withering automatic fire. The team leader then asked if he could be of any assistance to Cahill. Cahill asked the team leader to come down the trail to check out the wounded VC. When team leader arrived he administered first aid to the VC, and called for immediate exfiltration. While TL was checking the wounded VC he came under heavy automatic weapons fire also. At this time SP4 Taylor moved out onto the trail to see if any more VC were in sight. At this time he took one VC in a checkered shirt under fire, possibly hitting him. Team then moved out to exfiltration LZ and was extracted under enemy fire.

(2) Terrain: Flat to gently rolling, thick underbrush, double canopy jungle,

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines or booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: See conduct of patrol.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 203964

(2) Strength: 5 VC

(3) Composition: Squad


(4) Activity of VC: Searching for Team

(5) Equipment: 5 AK 47's


(6) Uniforms: Black PJ's both shirts and pants, one wore checkered shirt

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly losses: None



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(b) KIA(Poss): 1

(c) WIA: 0

(d) WIA(Poss): 1

(e) Captured: 1(taken to the 45th MUST at Tay Ninh West)

(f) Enemy equipment captured: AK 47 (SM 13467), 4 AK 47 magazines, 3 pounds loose ammo, 1 scarf, 1 small pack of peppers, 1 small mirror made in China, 1 NVA hat, 1 medical release slip, 1 pen, 1 thermometer made in China, 1 black handkerchief, list of medical equipment, handwritten song, 1 note book.

g. Significant activities:

(1) Hamlets encountered: None

(2) Suspected infiltration routes: Large complex of trails in the area of the ambush which are not on the map are well used by bicycle and foot traffic.

(3) Propaganda analysis: None

(4) Unusual activities: None

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Team feels there is a need for a more silent type radio to be used by ambush team. Team does not advise wheel or track vehicles to go through this area. Trails in the area are mostly running North to South.

DET A-362 Mission # 11

a. Size and composition: GPT Krasnoff, CWO Edwards, S2h Luis, PFC Taboada, SGT Wirkov, SF4 Fawcett, SSG Do, plus 7 others

b. Mission: To capture POW's and documents.

c. Time departed: 220700 Infiltration LZ: XT 056923

Time returned: 221500 Exfiltration LZ: XT 056923

d. Conduct of patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Team departed LZ and moved on a 160 degree azimuth for 75 meters. Team then headed on a 310 degree azimuth for 80 meters then changed direction to a 15 degree azimuth for 35 meters to ambush position at XT 054222.

(2) Terrain: Thick undergrowth, double canopy, thorn bushes throughout the area. Soil is capable of supporting wheel and track vehicles. Area contains dense underbrush.


(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines and booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Kill Zone of the ambush sighted 3 VC moving down trail from north to south. Kill zone loader let 1 VC go by the ambush site and then activated a claymore killing 1 VC. Team then opened fire on remaining VC possibly killing one more VC and the third VC escaped to the west. The team then moved forward searching the area for more enemy. Then the patrol searched the dead VC taking documents, equipment and weapons from his body.

e. Enemy information:

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(2) Strength: 3 VC

(3) Composition: UNK (Team feels that VC were just a travel party coming from Cambodia into Vietnam.

(4) Activity of VC: Moving from North to South approx 6 meters apart.

(5) Equipment: VC were carrying 2 Chinese SKS and the 3rd VC's weapon could not be seen.

(6) Uniforms: Black PJ's bottoms, grey shirts, no headgear.

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly losses: None

(2) Enemy losses:

(a) KIA: 1

(b) KIA (Poss: )1

(c) WIA: None

(d) Equipment: 1 SKS Carbine SN 7054477, 1 map, 40 mm modified grenade, 3 waterproof ground sheets, 1 Blanket, 1 T Shirt, 1 pr of blue trousers, 3 oil cloths, 1 handkerchief, 4 underdrawers 3 meters of suspension line, 1 chow bowl, 1 brassiere, 1 white mosquito net, 1 water and 1 summer hammock, 1 entrenching tool with case, 1 bag of spices, 3 shirts blue and black, 52 unk documents, 8 negatives, 3 notebooks, 1 carrying case, 1 bl waterproof pack, 1 universal pouch, 1 grey bag, 1 nail clipper, 1 toilet kit, 1 ammo belt, 1 pr sandals, 1 bottle of penicillin, 1 belt with 2 stars on the side, 13 clips of SKS ammo, and 1 sewing kit.

g. Significant activities:

(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Suspected infiltration routes: Team feels that area is used for infiltration and exfiltration routes, going from Cambodia to Vietnam.

(3) Propaganda analysis: None

(4) Misc: Trail has not been used by bicycle tracks since last operation in the area. Team feels that area is being used very heavily by foot traffic.

(5) Unusual activities: Trails that the team saw in immediate area of ambush were not used in approx 2 to 3 weeks. The trail had been used by foot traffic approx 2 to 3 weeks ago.

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: None

13. DET A-361 & A-362 Mission #12

a. Size and Composition: 12 US

b. Mission: Armed Aerial Recon

c. Time of departure: 201030 Infiltration LZ: WT 983656

Time of return: 201130 Exfiltration LZ: WT 983656 1 YEAR INTERVALS

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Team started LZ and moved south east for 50 meters and then moved back to exfiltration LZ and were extracted without further incident.

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(2) Rain: Flat open area with tall grass throughout area. A tree line about 15 meters in width is located along the river. The trees in the area are 50 to 60 ft high and the canopy is double canopy. Visibility in the area is good to excellent. The team did not cross any streams or rivers in the course of action that occurred.

(3) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(4) Obstacles encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Team departed helicopter and assualted enemy position. Team suppressed enemy gunfire and chased them to the national boundry line. Team then searched area where VC had been and uncovered a small amount of equipment (1 type 53 Chicom carbine, 2 SKS SM respectively A8055 and 55488.) Team took enemy under fire and were extracted w/out further enemy sightings.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: VT 980657

(2) Strength: 17

(3) Composition: VC supply personnel (Est plt size)

(4) Activity of VC: Evading friendly personnel.

(5) Equipment: 1 hammock, 1 mosquito net, 1 grey cloth bag, 1 blue shirt, 1 hat white in color, and 2 above mentioned weapons.

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly casualties:

6 US WIA (3 of the WIA are being hospitalized at the 45th  
MUST (Not serious) and remaining 3 are back at FOB with wounds taken care of  
by medics)(Slight wounds)

(2) Enemy losses:

(a) KIA: 5 5 KIA by gunships  
(b) KIA (posis) 1  
(c) WIA 2

g. Significant activities: None

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Team feels that area is a supply point used by VC bringing supplies into Vietnam from Cambodia. Team members feel that area could also be a company size base camp.

Note: 20 rds of 175 were dropped into the area of contact. 2 sorties of F-100 were called in after the Arty was called off. Damage done by both is as follows: 8 Punks destroyed, 2 military hootches destroyed, 100 meters of trench line uncovered, 2 tanks damaged.

14. DET A-362 Mission: # 13

a. Size and composition: SGT Martin, SSG Handwerk, CPT De John, SGT Simons, SGT Linderman, SP4 Ryon, plus 6 Indigenous.

b. Mission: To Engage Targets of Opportunity

c. Time of departure: 291520 Infiltration LZ:

Time of return: 291845 Exfiltration LZ: ~~WT 970712ALLY DECLASSIFIED~~

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ team moved NW for 100 meters to river line. Team followed path which was parrell to the river for 30 meters north

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(2) Terrain: Thick underbrush, double canopy jungle, soil is capable of wheel and track vehicles. Throughout the area of operation the team was hindered by thorn bushes and thick underbrush. The team did not cross any streams or rivers. Visibility in the area was from 10 to 15 meters.

(3) Obstacles: Team was constantly hindered by bushes.

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: Team destroyed 2 CBU which were placed on the trail.

(5) Action upon encountering enemy: Team did not come in sight of any VC due to their mission of evacuating enemy intell and enemy documents. Team was constantly under fire from all sides during course of operation.

e. Enemy information:

(1) Location: WT 965718

(2) Strengths: Company size (70)

(3) Composition: Company

(4) Activity of VC: Team feels that area is used as a training and resupply area. Before pursuing the enemy team believes the enemy were holding classes and making weapon parts.

(5) Uniforms: UNK

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly losses:

(a) KIA: None

(b) WIA: None

(c) MA: NONE

(d) Equipment: None


(2) Enemy losses:

(a) KIA: None

(b) WIA: None

(5): Charge None

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Equipment: Approx 40 lbs of weapons machinery,  
Approx 10 lbs of VC documents and ~~ma~~  
Approx 25 lbs of VC uniforms and clothing

g. Significant activities:

(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Propaganda analysis: None Note: Team feels that area would be a prime target for a US GVN propaganda leaflet drop or propaganda broadcast.

(3) Infiltration route: Team feels that area is a resupply and also a docking area for supplies and troops coming into Vietnam from Cambodia. Also all east to west trails in the area are well used by foot traffic. Team noticed that area is well used by VC sampans and also contains many sampan docking areas.

(4) Misc: Team feels that area is a general rest area and resupply area. The area of the operation is also used as a training and observation site. Team also noticed that the area is covered by sniper and bunker holes.

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Team recommends that a large scale friendly force should operate in the area. Also team feels that area should be swept in the near future before the harvesting season is over.

Note: After operation, 35 rounds of 175 were dropped into the area. Results of arty will follow.

Note: After operation, air strikes were called in with following ordnance dropped on AO: 6 MK.32 Hi drags, 2 Napalm bombs, 20 mm strafe, 100% ordnance in target area. Results of air strike, 4 bunkers destroyed and 6 uncovered.

Team on the ground destroyed 2 large hootches (1 of the hootches was a two story house). Team also destroyed 2 sampans and a docking area. Team also destroyed 4 bunkers and caved in 11 spider holes. Reason team did not destroy remainder of fortified positions was due to their running out of ammo.

In the course of events that occurred during the operation 4 helicopters were taken under fire by the VC and 4 of the craft were hit. Results of the hits were as follows: 2 Gunships hit and were pulled out of the operation, 2 slicks were hit, causing one slick to return to the FOB and the other ship crashed in the jungle at coordinates XT 0462. The craft was immediately secured and pulled out by a CH-47.

During the course of action by the ground troops the team was forced to destroy in place the following items: 2 partially made shovels, 2 55 gal drums of gasoline, 1 large vice, 21 lbs of C-4. Note: some of the items were thrown into the river due to the intensity of the ground fire.

List of captured documents and equipment:

92 personnel documents and newspapers (including 2 notebooks)  
72 documents (consisting of field manuals and training aids and notes)  
22 Personnel documents which contained LBN's  
59 photographs  
3 hammocks  
3 mosquito nets  
6 trousers (Blue and black)  
1 A7A strap 2 meters long  
1 radio with case (6 battery's)  
2 AK magazines  
1 bottle of yellow pills  
3 bandages  
4 ground sheets  
5 meters of inner tube strips  
suspension line (2 meters)  
1 pr sandals  
3 homemade gas masks  
7 pr of black PJ (shorts)  
1 sweat shirt

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blank paper  
5 ounces of UNK matter (Marajuana ?)  
4 rucksacks  
5 blankets  
13 shirts (11 black, 1 green, 1 white)  
2 indigenous lighters  
1 pouch made from parachute material  
1 5.56 rd  
2 small plastic bags  
1 french watch (brand "Cytas")  
1 bic pen, 1 papermate, 1 chinese pen  
1 tape measure (7 ft long)  
1 container of insect repellent  
1 indigenous lighter  
1 first aid dressing (US)  
7 rds of 7.62 ammo  
1 small bottle  
1 tube of toothpaste  
1 razor blade  
2 1¢ pieces (Vietnamese)  
2 packs of snake bite medicine  
3 cut off brass rds (5.56)  
2 ammo cans (7.62)  
1 tool box made of wood  
1 screw driver  
1 empty San Miguell can  
1 hand turned grinding stone  
1 small ball peen hammer  
1 brace w/assorted size and bits (hand drill)  
1 youth freedom badge  
1 jewelers tool  
1 small can of oil  
2 copper plates  
1 bellows (home made)  
1 small cloth bag w/assorted transistor parts  
1 home made torch with fuel container inside  
1 sledge hammer  
3 parts of homemade grenades made of 40mm brass & smoke igniter  
1 small metal cup  
1 7.62 ammo can of assorted batteries and transistor parts  
1 monkey wrench  
1 cole chisel  
1 light switch  
5 meters of fishline  
1 pr of dividers  
2 copper tubes  
3 rat tail files  
1 wood file

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Note: LPN's which S-2 personnel at this location found in documents captured are as follows: HT-8, HT 2891, HT 2613XB-19, HT 86402YB30A, HT 2613XB-19, HT 2835, HT 2830, and HT 9160.

15. DET A-361 MISSION # 14 Ambush

a. Size and Composition: SSG Martin, SSG Handwerk, SSG Lopez, SP4 Ryan, SGT Simons, plus 7 cambodes.

b. Mission: to capture enemy POW's and documents.

c. Time of departure: 310655 Infiltration LZ: WT 967758  
Time of return: 311755 Exfiltration LZ: WT 967758

d. Conduct of patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ team moved due east for 25 meters and set up a listening post for approx 10 minutes. Team then moved north for 25 meters and new ambush site. Team then stayed in the ambush position until instructed from the FOB to move to the exfiltration point. Team was exfiltrated without further incident.

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(2) Terrain: Thick underbrush, marshy areas throughout the area. Team feels that area can be used by wheel and track vehicles. Visibility was poor to medium. The area also contained thick thorn bushes and many patches of bamboo. The team did not cross any streams or rivers.

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(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: None

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: UNK

(2) Strength: Unk

(3) Composition: UNK

(4) Activity of VC: UNK

(5) Equipment and Uniforms: UNK

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly losses: None

(2) Enemy losses: None

g. Significant activities:

(1) Team feels that base area was located behind them across the river due to hearing many noises throughout the day in that direction. Team heard: dog barking, gun shot signals and banging of metal.

(2) During the infiltration of the mission 2 slicks received automatic weapons fire from coordinates WT 961771. These ships were flown back to Wrai Be and upon inspection 1 ship was out of commission

h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

16. DET A-362 Mission # 15 Ambush

a. Size and Composition: SGT Aiello, SGT Stark, SGT Patterson, SSG Aleo, SSG Hooper, S Lebatard, plus 6 Indigenous

b. Mission: To capture enemy POW's and documents.

c. Time of departure: 300720 Infiltration LZ: XT 054858

Time of Return: 311728 Exfiltration LZ: XT 052854

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ team traveled north for 50 meters across road and set ambush. At about 0930 team heard cows 250 meters toward their south west. Team also heard warning shots starting at 1000 and ending at about 1200. These shots were approx 250 to 500 meters away in a north and west direction from their position. Team then moved back into the jungle approx 30 meters and set up RON at approx 1900 hrs. During the night team members Hooper heard a truck approx 2 kilometers to the south east. On the morning of the 31st the team moved on a azimuth of 115 degrees for a prox 100 meters when team came across a complex of trails. 2 of the trails had been heavily used and were approx 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  meters wide, and traveling in a east to west direction. Team also noticed in the area 3 air raid shelters which had not been completed. Team then continued for another 150 meters in a south east direction and came across 2 more defensive bunkers at coordinates XT 056758. Two trails were running near the bunker. Both of the trails were 1 to 2 meters wide. Team then continued for another 50 meters in a southernly direction to ambush position located at XT 051853. Team stayed in ambush position until 1600 hrs until instructed by

FOB to move to exfiltration LZ. Team was extracted without further difficulty.

(2) Terrain: Flat with many ant hills located throughout the area. Canopy was very sparse. Trails in the area have not been well used. Visibility in the area is good to excellent.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: None

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly losses: None

(2) Enemy losses: None

g. Significant activities:

(1) Hamlets encountered: None

(2) Propaganda analysis: US and GVN propaganda leaflets were found in the area.

(3) Unusual activities: Much wild life was found in the area.

(4) Misc: None

h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team feels that army should be kept up all through the night. Team feels that maps of the area are incorrect.

17. DET A-362 Mission # 16 Ambush

a. Size and Composition: WO-2 Edwards, SP5 Wiskow, SSG Dec, SP4 Wilkinson, SP5 Panzica, plus 8 Indigenous

b. Mission: To capture enemy POW's and documents.

c. Time of infiltration: 030700 Infiltration LZ: WT 940870

Time of Exfiltration: 031054 Exfiltration LZ: WT 940870

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Enroute from LZ to ambush position team set up a perimeter 60 meters north of the proposed ambush site. Team then heard movement 40 meters south west of their position and then movement 30 meters south of their position. Team then remained in this position for 2 hrs then moved to ambush position. Team was in process of setting up ambush when left security noticed 2 VC coming down the trail from east to west. Left security initiated ambush, after ambush was completed team regrouped and searched the area with following results: 2 bicycles, documents, equipment and uniforms captured. Team then moved back to exfiltration point and upon reaching exfiltration point, the team was instructed to go back to ambush site and search area again. Team moved back to ambush site and after negative sightings moved back to exfiltration LZ and was extracted with negative further incidents.

(2) Terrain: Flat open country, on north side of trail was open and grassy, on the south side of the ambush site area was lightly wooded and single canopy. Terrain was capable of wheel and track vehicles. Visibility was good to excellent. Team did not cross any streams or rivers.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: See conduct of Patrol.

f. Enemy

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**e. Enemy information:**

- (1) Location: WT 942869
- (2) Strength: 2 VC
- (3) Composition: Unk
- (4) Equipment: See captured equipment.
- (5) Uniforms: Black PJ's

**f. Results of encounter with enemy:**

- (1) Friendly losses: None
- (2) Enemy losses:

WIA: 2 VC (Prob) (Due to team hearing moaning sounds in the jungle)

Equipment captured: 2 Bicycles, 3 lbs of documents, 1 pump for tire, 2 hammocks, 1 flashlight with green filter, 5 meters of suspension line, 2 shirts (black & blue), 1 rice sack with 2 kilo's of rice, 3 meters of tubing, 2 pouches for 9mm ammo, 2 pouches, 1 cigarette box with tobacco, 3 meters of black cloth, 1 checked blanket, 1 map case, 3 meters of green cloth, 1 iodine bottle, 8 meters of heavy suspension line, 2 meters of camouflaged parachute, 4 undershorts, 1 pr of women's underwear, 2 rucksacks, 5 waterproofed sacks, 2 mosquito nets, and 5 different colored trousers.

**g. Significant activities:**

- (1) Hamlets encountered: None
- (2) Propaganda analysis: US & GVN propaganda was found on the ground.
- (3) Unusual activities: Team members noticed a lot of movement and noise after the ambush took place. Noise and movement came from west of the ambush position.

**h. Was mission accomplished: Yes**

**i. Recommendations and conclusions:** Team feels that area is being heavily used as a supply and infiltration route.

**18. DET A-362 Mission # 17 Armed Aerial Recon**

**a. Size and composition:** SSG Handwerk, PFC Taboada, SP5 Panzica, SSG Deo, SP4 Ruiz, SSG Martin, plus 14 Cambodes.

**b. Mission:** Armed aerial recon

**c. Time of departure:** 301523 Infiltration LZ: XT 036730

**Time of return:** 301712 Exfiltration LZ: XT 035730

**d. Conduct of Patrol:**

**(1) Patrol route:** Team was infiltrated at above coordinates and moved 25 meters north to area where they picked up 3 VC suspects. Team questioned suspected VC and returned to exfiltration LZ with 3 suspects. Team was extracted without further difficulty.

**(2) Terrain:** Area was surrounded with thick underbrush and had single and double canopy. Visibility was fair to excellent. Area could hold wheel and track vehicles. Team did not cross any streams or rivers.

**(3) Obstacles encountered:** None

**(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered:** None

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## (5) Activity of VC suspects: Cutting wood

e. Enemy information: The 3 suspects were brought back to the FOB and interrogation was conducted with the following results:

(1) Ha Van Tuong, age 14, presently living is Dinh Hoa Village, captured in the area of Mo Cong Village on 30 Dec, sisters boyfriend is a CIDG Soldier at Trai Be Camp.

(2) Le Van Tho, age 15, presently living at Thai My village, cousin is a Company Commander of the CIDG troops at Trai Be, his name is Chuc.

(3) Mai Van Choi, Age 27, lives in Tay Ninh city, POB Can Tho ((IV Corps)). This man reported that while he was staying in Mo Cong Village, unk number of VC came into village at 100100 and started to recruit workers.

f. Results of encounter with enemy: Team destroyed 1 2½ ton truck and captured 11 power chainsaws.

g. Significant activities: None

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: None

## 19. DET A-362 Mission # 18 (Bridge Destruction)

a. Size and Composition: CPT Krasnoff, Wiskow, PFC Taboada, plus 2 indigenous.

b. Mission: To destroy a bridge located at coordinates XT 083730

c. Time of infiltration 311355 Infiltration LZ: XT 084730

Time of exfiltration: 311400 Exfiltration LZ: XT 084730

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Team landed on LZ and moved south for 100 meters to bridge. During the course of movement to the bridge the team moved 45 to 50 meters of open area and then traveled through dense underbrush to the bridge. Upon arriving at the bridge the team members posted security and SGT Wiskow proceeded to conduct the destruction of the bridge. When SGT Wiskow finished setting the charge he gave CPT Krasnoff the sign that everything was ready and the team moved back to the exfiltration LZ and was extracted without further incident. The slicks and gunships stayed in the area for approx 5 minutes when the charge that was set blew. The explosion destroyed 75% of the bridge. The bridge was approx 10 meters long and 3 meters wide, constructed of heavy wooden logs.

(2) Terrain: Thick underbrush in areas and low grass and shrubs. Visibility was from good to excellent. Terrain can hold wheel and track vehicles. The team did not cross any streams or rivers.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: None

enemy information:

(1) Strength: UNK

(2) Location: UNK

(3) Composition: UNK

(4) Activity of VC: UNK

(5) Uniforms and equipment: UNK

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f. Results of encounter with enemy:

- (1) Friendly losses: None
- (2) Enemy losses: 1 VC constructed bridge 75% destroyed

g. Significant activity:

- (1) Hamlets encountered: None
- (2) Propaganda analysis: None
- (3) Change in tactics: None

Note: The total time from infiltration to blowing of the bridge was 7 minutes

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

20. DET A-361 Mission # 19 (Ambush)

a. Size and Composition: SGT Burr, SFC Newman, WO Cahill, SP4 Taylor, SFC Wyatt, plus 7 indigenous.

b. Mission: Capture enemy POW's and documents

c. Time of infiltration: 030630 Infiltration LZ: XT 944784  
Time of Exfiltration: 031030 Exfiltration LZ: XT 944784

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ patrol moved east for 100 meters to a north to south trail. The trail was approx 2 meters wide and had been used by foot troops in the last 2½ hours. Team heard a dog barking, wood chopping, and people talking south of their position near the river edge. Team moved back to edge of the LZ and heard an estimated 3 Platoons of people talking and moving on a trail which was running from north to south (This was the trail that team was to put ambush on). Trail started Ben Re and moved directly north. This trail is not shown on the map. Team also heard a sound similar of wood on wood (like oars being used). Team then heard more people traveling from north to south on same trail. The people were spread out approx 200 - 300 meters on the trail. Team also heard wood chopping approx 150 meters north of their position. Team moved to LZ and were extracted with negative further incident.

(2) Terrain: Flat to slightly rolling, dry dead jungle, thick underbrush. Soil is capable of wheel and track vehicles. Visibility is from poor to medium.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: Team did not engage enemy due to size of force. Team requested airstrikes and artillery.

e. Enemy information:

- (1) Strength: Estimated at more than 1 company, probably a Bn minus unit.
- (2) Location: XT 944784
- (3) Composition: Bn minus
- (4) Activity of VC: Moving to river on north to south trail.

f. Results of encounter with enemy: None

g. Significant activity: None

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(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Propaganda analysis: None

(3) Unusual activities: VC were talking and laughing, and at least 1 female was with them. VC did not engage helicopters though the helicopters landed 20 meters from their position.

h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: A large enemy unit was crossing the river from the Cambodian to RVN side. Numerous cooking fires were observed at XT 938780 which was on Cambodian side of the border. Bomb strike was called into the area with the following results: At WT 946783 uncovered 3 bunkers approx 4x6 ft, At WT 946787 opened up 60 meters of trench lines. Arty was called into the area with 56 rounds of 175 put on the target at WT 946788 the arty opened up 20 meters of trench line which seemed to connect to previous mentioned trench line.

Note: The following information has been taken from Mission # 19 which was infiltrated into their alternate LZ after being extracted from their primary LZ.

21. DET A-361 Mission # 19A

a. Size and composition: SGT Durr, SFC Newman, WO Cahill, SFC Wyatt, SP4 Taylor, plus 7 indigenous.

b. Mission: To capture enemy POW's and documents.

c. Time of departure: 031030 Infiltration LZ: WT 950807

Time of return: 031145 Exfiltration LZ: WT 950807

d. Conduct of patrol:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ team moved west for 20 meters and then when informed of exfiltration moved back to exfiltration LZ.

(2) Terrain: Soil is capable of wheel and track vehicles. Flat single canopy, sparse underbrush, trail in area was 5 meters wide and ran east to west. Trail had not been in recent use.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: None

e. Enemy information: None

f. Results of encounter with enemy: None

g. Significant activities:

(1) Change in tactics: None

(2) Hamlets encountered: None

(3) Propaganda analysis: None


(4) Miscellaneous: On infiltration team observed camp fire at north end of LZ. Team also heard weapons firing NE of their position at about 600 meters.

(5) Unusual activities: None

h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

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22. DET A-361 Mission # 20

a. Size and composition: SGT Burr, SFC Newman, WO Cahill, SP4 Taylor, SP4 Grant, plus 7 indigenous.

b. Mission: Armed Aerial Recon

c. Time of departure: 311445 Infiltration LZ: WT 965652

Time of return: 311515 Exfiltration LZ: WT 965692

d. Conduct of patrol:

(1) From LZ patrol moved west to river bank where they encountered 1 hootch at the river edge. Team destroyed the hootch and then moved north up the river. During the course of the march the team encountered many bunkers and hootches every 8 to 10 meters. The team noticed approx 35 to 40 bunkers which they either destroyed or damaged. Team also noticed many sampans on the west side of the river and all the sampans were loaded down with enemy supplies. Team also noticed many spider holes and gardens throughout the area. Team was ordered back to the exfiltration LZ due to expenditure of ammo and that enemy forces were approaching there location from the south to south east. (This information concerning the approaching VC will be brought out in paragraph i.)

(2) Terrain: Flat, bamboo patches throughout the area, single and double canopy was noticed by the team on both sides of the river. Visibility in the area was from poor to medium.

(3) Obstacles encountered: Team encountered 4 strands of barbed wire fence which was blocking there way to the river edge.

(4) Mines or Booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encounter with enemy: None (VC had been in the area approx 5 minutes before team hit the ground.)

e. Enemy information:

(1) Location: N/A

(2) Strength: N/A

(3) Composition: N/A

(4) Activity of VC: N/A

(5) Uniforms: N/A

(6) Equipment: N/A

Note: The team on the ground did not encounter any VC but the gunships and slicks did sight and take under fire approx 25 to 35 VC. The VC were sighted south of the teams location approx 1200 meters. The VC were running north towards the friendlies location. (This info will be in paragraph i.)

f. Results of encounter with enemy;

(1) friendly losses: None

(2) Enemy losses:

(a) KIA: None


(b) WIA: None

(c) CIA: None

document losses: See paragraph i.

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(2) Propaganda analysis: The team on the ground picked up VC propaganda signs which consisted of the following information:

- (a) A sign telling the people to protect the area.
- (b) A sign telling the people to support the VC Movement with donations.
- (c) A sign telling the old men and women in the area and also the young men and women to unite and fight for the cause.

(3) Change in tactics: None

(4) Misc: The bunkers and trench lines which the team did discover were L shaped with overhead cover.

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions:

(a) The team feels that the area is a resupply route and resupply area for VC coming into Vietnam from Cambodia.

(b) Team feels that area is a large complex or base camp due to the many trail systems which cover the area.

List of documents and equipment captured:

Small wooden box	1 pr of needle nose pliers.
2 bottles of streptomycin	1 lb of documents
1 container of distilled water	10 fish hooks
1 can opener	3 triangular lines with hooks (fish attached)
1 spool of black thread	1 metal saw

Team feels that they either destroyed or damaged 1 sampan on the far side of the river. Team also destroyed 40 to 60 chickens and ducks.

The following information concerns the VC which were sighted by gunships south of patrol's location approx 1200 meters. They were sighted approx 3 minutes after patrol infiltrated into the area north of the VC.

When patrol touched down at coordinates mentioned above the C&C ship and gunships noticed 20 to 35 VC approx 1200 meters to their south at coordinates WT 967687. The VC were running north towards patrol's location, at this time the gunships engaged the VC with rockets and machine gun fire. The VC were dressed in light colored uniforms and all were armed with individual weapons. The gunships when taking the VC under fire came under intense enemy fire from all directions including emplacements from the Cambodian side of the border. After the gunships expended all of their ammo the arty was called into the VC's location. During the firing of arty the gunships returned to Tay Ninh to refuel and reload. Upon arriving at Tay Ninh the gunships noticed many hits in the aircraft. Upon contacting the FOB at Tay Ninh East, the gunships reported that only 2 of their ships could return to the scene of the action. FOB immediately requested a heavy fire team from Dau Tieng and within 15 minutes a light fire team and a heavy fire team returned to the scene of the action. During this time Smokey III had called in TAC Air. TAC air was then called off due to the gunships returning to the point of contact. The gunships worked the area over for a second time and then noticed a large sampan in the middle of the river at coordinates WT 965723. The sampan had one person in it who escaped to the shore line, the sampan was sunk after the gunships made their run. In the course of this action the gunships came under intense automatic weapons fire from the Cambodian side of the border. (The pilots feel that this sampan was a decoy so that the gunships would fall into a cross fire) During the course of the action the FAC pilot and the gunships noticed many bunkers and spider holes through the area. From sightings in previous days the people involved in Rapid Fire V believe the area is occupied by a large enemy unit (Probably a Regiment).

List of Aircraft that took hits and were put out of action:

5 gunships took hits

1 gunship was put out of action due to armament trouble.

1 gunship was put out of action due to holes in the aircraft.

List of Arty that was put in on VC in coordinates WT 967687:

35 rounds of 8"

122 rounds of 175

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FAC intell:

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1st Strike: Rap 01 Mission # 10603 2 T-37's  
Ordinance:  
8MK 82 Hi Drags (500lbs)  
4 CBU's  
2 Pistols  
100% ordinance in target area

2d Strike Boker 03 Mission # 10607 2 FHC's  
Ordinance  
12 MK 117's (750lbs)  
2 Pistols  
Time of target: 1725  
Time off: 1740

3d Strike Blade 05 Mission # 10605 2 F-100's  
Ordinance  
2 Lau 3 Rockets  
4MK 82 (500lbs)  
2 Napalms  
20mm strafe

All TAC Air ordinance was in target area. Area heavily cratered. Several fires started and one possible secondary explosion. (White smoke)

23. DET A-361 Mission # 21

a. Size and Composition: SSG Martin, SSG Lopez, SP4 Ryan, SSG Handwerk, SGT Simons, SSG Lebatard, plus 7 indigenous.

b. Mission: Armed aerial recon.

c. Time of infiltration: 020947 Infiltration LZ: XT 100930

Time of exfiltration: 021001 Exfiltration LZ: XT 100930

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol route: Team was conducting a armed aerial recon flight when gunships sighted personnel at the above coordinates. Team hit the ground and moved west for 100 meters conducting a search of the area. (It was in this area that gunships received heavy automatic weapons fire causing a WIA to one of the gunships crewman). After a through search of the area the team was exfiltrated without further incident. (Note: Half of the marauder team was infiltrated into the following coordinates due to further sightings of personnel on the ground) Part of the Marauder team wasreinfiltrated at the coordinates XT 104743 at 021150 and was exfiltrated out at the same coordinates at 021200 hrs. Team hit the LZ and moved 10 meters south where they intercepted 2 suspects on bicycles, and one suspect on a motorcycle. Team then waited in ambush position after being notified by gunships that more personnel were moving their way. When personnel were in hearing distance team called them to a halt and conducted a search of their belongings. Team called in to the C&C ship and evn the situation, that the 7 personnel they had detained did not have cards in order. Team was then instructed to move to exfiltration area where team and suspects were exfiltrated without further incident.

(2) Terrain: 1st infiltration by Marauder was a clearing which contained thick scrub and scattered trees, area contained no canopy. Terrain was capable of supporting wheeled and tracked vehicles. Visibility was good to excellent. 2nd infiltration of Marauder was area that was dense woods and single and double canopy. Area could contain tracked and wheeled vehicles. Team did not cross any streams or rivers. Road which team landed on was of a hard surface.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and booby traps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering the enemy: See patrol route.

e. Enemy information: VC Suspects

(1) Location XT 104743

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(3) Composition: UNK

(4) Uniforms: Black PJ's and assorted civilian attire.

(5) Equipment: None

f. Friendly losses: None  
Enemy losses: 7 suspected VC Captured

g. Significant Activities: None

h. Was mission accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: None

#### Initial Interrogation Report

Number of Personnel: 7 Number of personnel detained FOB: 3

Coordinates: XT 104743

Time of capture: 021153

1. Nguyen Van Mung

AGE: 43

Now living in: Thien Ngon, Phu Khuong  
Mung stated: VC come to Mo Cong Village

Brother fired mortar at Duc Hue

Brother belongs to 269th VC Bn

269th now in Hau Nghia province

Major Mung is his brother

His brother died 4 years ago (VC killed his brother)

He saw Major Mung 4 years ago

Major Mung in charge of 269th VC Bn

He saw Major Mung in Ha Tien Province (NVN) 1 month ago

2 days ago someone fired mortar at Trai Be Camp

His brother walked from Trai Be to Duc Hue in 3 days

Interrogator mentioned names and places before suspect did in two fold questions. Example: Does your brother belong to the 267th or 269th VC Bn?

2. Nguyen Duc Minh

AGE:

Address: Trai Cua, Dinh Thanh, Tay Ninh Province

ID Card Number: 007540

Wife's Name: Tran Thi Xuong

Occupation: Woodcutter

He stated following:

- A. He works for Trung Tuc La Hung who is a good VC (This man owns logging trucks in Tay Ninh)
- B. He was a French soldier for six Months as a medic (Verified)
- C. Woman who works for Mr Hung (Item#1) is named Lan and she pays the VC money so that Mr Hung's trucks will not be bothered by VC
- D. He stated Mr Hung pays VC 5000OP's for each truck for one month
- E. The VC stop trucks 200 meters before Mo Cong near a stream that crosses a large road so that they can collect their taxes. This is done approx 4 O'Clock in the afternoon every day.
- F. Approx 5 VC.

3. Chau Van Hai

Born: 1924

Now living in Mo Cong

Occupation: Woodcutter

ID Card Number: 026354

24. Det A-361 Mission #21A Bridge Destruction

a. Size and Composition: SSG Handwerk, Maj Gritz, SSG Aleo, Spec4 Ryan, and 10 indigoneous.

b. Mission: Destroy Bridge

c. Time of departure: 021510 Infil LZ XT 084730

Time of return: 021625 Exfil LZ XT 084730

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east for 50 miles and

(2) Terrain: Single and double canopy, with thick underbrush along the river shore. Traffic was accessible to wheeled and tracked vehicles. The bridge was located on a river which was approx 15 meters wide and approx 10 ft deep. the river was flowing at approx 15 knots. Banks on the river were approx 9 ft high with a 75% slope to them.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or boobytraps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering the enemy: None

e. Enemy information: None

f. Friendly Losses: None

1. Friendly Losses: None  
Enemy Losses: Captured three bicycles of unknown origin.  
Team destroyed bicycles at XT 084730. Team also found 4 page document at same coordinates and this document will be forwarded to CO Co A 5th SFG(Abn) on next available transportation. Bridge which was encountered by friendly forces was 80% destroyed.

g. Significant Activities:

(1) Change in tactics: none

(2) Suspected infiltration routes: none

(3) Hamlets Encountered: none

(4) Misc: Trails in the area run east to west to the site of the bridge and on the other side of the bridge trails head in a south-southeast direction. Trail was 3 meters wide and had been in heavy use by foot troops.

h. WAS mission accomplished: YES

i. Recommendations and conclusions: none

NOTE: Team was infiltrated into LZ by repelling and was extracted out by McQuire rig. Team was infiltrated into area on target.

25+ AD062A-362 Mission #22

Sgt. Sargeant and Company 1st Lt. Bradbury, ASgt. 1st Lt. H. M. P. GeM. 1st Lt. G. Wiskow, Sp5 Wiskow, Sp4 Wesson plus 6.

b. Mission: To destroy bridge at Coordinates XT 083729.

c. Time departed: 021510 Thifil LZ XT 083729  
Time returned: 021645 Exfil LZ XT 083729

d. Conduct of patrols:

(1) Patrol route: From LZ patrol moved north for 30 meters to bridge. Team then sighted 4 VC suspects in the area. (Team had placed 2 175mm arty shells on bridge.) Suspects were 2 men and 2 woman who were interrogated at the FOB and 3 of the suspects were released as innocent civilians and one was turned over to sector. (Initial interrogation will follow on VC suspect) Team then moved 150 meters south and waited for detonation of shells. Team then moved back to bridge site and assessed damage.

(2) Terrain: Double canopy, heavy underbrush, and soil was trafficable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. The river was 15' wide and ran west to east at 15 knots. Banks of the river were 15' high and had a 45% slope to them. Trail to the bridge was 3 meters wide and had been in recent use by foot and bicycle traffic.

(3) Obstacles encountered: None

(4) Mines or boobytraps encountered: None

(5) Action upon encountering the enemy: VC suspects surrend-  
ered without contact.

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e. Enemy info v n:

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- (1) Location of VC suspects: XT083729
- (2) Strength: 4
- (3) Composition: VC suspected woodcutters
- (4) Activity of VC suspects: Hiding in jungle
- (5) Uniforms: N/A

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

- (1) Friendly losses: None
- (2) Enemy losses: 4 VC suspects were picked up (2 men and 2 women) One man was released as an innocent civilian, 1 was turned over to sector, and the 2 women were released.

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in tactics: None
- (2) Suspected infiltration routes: Trails mentioned above
- (3) Propaganda Analysis: None
- (4) Misc: Bridge was 85% destroyed

h. Was mission a accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: None

#### Initial Interrogation Report

Place of Capture: XT 083729

Time of Capture: 021525

NAME: Pham Dac Cuong

AGE: 18

Father's Name: Pham Dac Thi

Mother's Name: Huy thi Kim

This man stated the following:

1. His mother and father disowned him after he was caught stealing 23,000 piasters from his father. (He states his father is a bank manager in Saigon)
2. He stated he had been working as a woodcutter for 2 weeks, then stated he had been working for three months as a woodcutter.
3. He stated he worked at B-56 CIDG under a Captain Dat
4. He stated he saw 20 VC approx 17 days ago near Trai Be. They were wearing yellow trousers and black shirts, with a blue patch on the sleeve. These VC had AK 47's and Chinese Carbines. He stated they blew up a civilian truck 7 days ago in the woods near Trai Be. He stated there were approx 30 VC bunkers along the road that the bridge was located. (See Mission # 22)

26. Det A362 Mission #23 (Ambush)

a. Size and Composition: SSG Handiwerk, SGT Simmons, SSG Lopez, SP4 Ryan, SP4 Taylor, and 7 indigenous.

b. Mission: To capture enemy POW's and documents

- c. (1) Time of departure: 040615 Infil LZ XT 086882
- (2) Time of Return: 041145 Exfil LZ XT 086882

d. Conduct of patrol:

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(1) Patrol Route: From LZ team moved north 20 meters to trail running east-west which was one meter wide and not in use. Team then proceeded north-east for 75 meters to a north-south trail which was 1 meter wide and in current use. Patrol observed 3 bicycles and established a hasty ambush. Team leader and one indig crossed trail and encountered WD-1 com-

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munications wire, which was approx 3'-5' off the ground, supported by a single pole, bipod, and wrapped around bushes. WD-1 wire ran approx parallel to trail and was 5-10 meters from trail. Team leader and 1 indig followed wire for approx 25 meters where they discovered another trail running east-west and bisecting the north-south trail. Trail was 1 meter wide and in current use. On west side of trail was a coil of steel wire (stainless). Coil of wire was approx 3" in circumference 0.5" high, and 3<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub>" around. Team leader and indig returned to ambush site and started to close into defensive position when team was hit from rear (west) by an estimated platoon (possibly armed recon). Team engaged enemy from defensive position and enemy maneuvered to surround team who returned fire and enemy broke contact at approx 041045. Team moved to LZ after being reinforced by one 14 man team and after TAC air support and gunship support.

(2) Terrain: Thick underbrush, single canopy, soil is suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and boobytraps encountered: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Engaged with organic equipment, TAC Air, gunships, and reinforced with one 14 man team.

e. Enemy information:

(1) Location: XT 085883

(2) Strength: Estimated Platoon (30-35)

(3) Composition: Armed Recon Platoon

(4) Activity: Searching for team

(5) Equipment: Small Arms (AK47's), Grenades

(6) Uniforms: Black Pajamas, rubber sandals, blue and white checkered scarf around neck. One VC KIA was approx 14 years old, in good health, hair was combed and cut, carried AK47 with NVA webbing.

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly Losses:

(a) KIA One (1) USASF, One (1) LRRP, One (1) INDIG.

(b) WIA Two (2) USASF, Five (5) INDIG

Note: Reaction Force had two (2) INDIG slightly WIA

(c) MIA None

(d) Equipment: None

(2) Enemy Losses:

(a) KIA 8 (USASF Body Count) (To include reaction force kills)

(b) KIA (Poss) 2 by reaction force and primary team could not count or estimate.

(c) WIA 0

(d) WIA (Poss) 1

(e) KIA 2 by USASF body count and unknown possible as enemy fled on the TAC Air run.

(f) CIA None

(g) Equipment: 1 AK47 (M22N006952) Land Selector, KAB code is stamped on it, 1 pistol belt (NVA), 4 magazines, 1 comb, 20 piastres, several small strings.

g. Significant Activities:

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Normal encirclement

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(2). Suspected infiltration routes: Trails at XT 085883 used by foot troops and bicycles.

(3) Propaganda Analysis: None

(4) Misc: Vic of XT 085883 low brush had been cut approx 2'-3' from ground and tops were allowed to stay on ground.

(5) Unusual Activities: Enemy covered LZ which was comparatively small.

h. Was mission accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Large base camp is probably located in the area because of direct communications link.

2. Det A362 Mission #24 Ambush

a. Size and Composition: SP4 Ruiz, PFC Taboda, SGT Patterson, SGT Stark, SSG Hooper, PFC Miller, and 8 Indigenous

b. Mission: To Capture POW's and Enemy Documents

c. (1) Time of Departure: 040645 Infil LZ XT 112963

(2) Time of Return: 041435 Exfil LZ XT 112963

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved north for 115 meters following old trail. Along the way team observed numerous bunkers constructed of logs and dirt. Vic of XT 113964 team observed old base camp consisting of approx 20 bunkers, which could hold 5 people each and were constructed of logs and dirt. Camp had not been in recent use. Team continued north for 20 meters where they found 2 huts in the process of being built. Huts were 10' square with poles in corners with tin roofs. Team found 10-15 20 gal empty cans (tar), 40-50 black boxes 1' high 2' wide and 3' long. These were stored in the open approx 10 meters from the huts. An east-west trail wound through the huts and the storage area. Trail was 1 meter wide, and in recent use by foot and bicycle traffic. Team established ambush on trail vic XT 113964 and observed 3 VC (2 women and 1 man) traveling east to west on trail. 1 woman carried a carbine and had a bicycle, 1 woman was unarmed and walking, man had a carbine and a bicycle. Woman wore white blouses black pajama trousers, and rubber sandals. Man wore brown pants, and white (possibly green) shirt, and white pith helmet. Team engaged VC with claymore mines and small arms, wounding one woman (CIA), and one man. The other woman escaped uninjured. Immediately after engaging VC right security was taken under fire by unknown size force which was approaching on same trail. Team moved south to clearing for possible extraction. As rear security moved toward clearing, they observed 1 VC with carbine. Before leaving area rear security boobytrapped a bicycle with instantaneous grenade. Team established perimeter defense and then moved toward LZ. When first helicopter touched down it was struck by RPG rounds killing 1 INDIG and wounding 2 USASF, 2 INDIG, and female POW. 3 Air crew were also injured and SGT Patterson administered first aid to wounded personnel, and was then taken under fire by AK47 from east and RPG from south east. Aircraft commander was struck in head by unknown caliber weapon. Team began receiving heavy fire from east and south east and received TAC Air and was reinforced by one company who secured the LZ and the downed helicopter and all personnel were extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, light undergrowth, double canopy, soil was capable of wheeled and tracked vehicles.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps Encountered: None

(5) Actions on Encountering the Enemy: Engaged the enemy with small arms and claymores, and was reinforced by one company.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Troops: XT 113964 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2) Equipment: (not reinforced)

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(4) Activity of VC: Traveling on trail and watching LZ

(5) Equipment: RPG, RPD, AK47, and carbines.

f Results of Encounter with enemy:

### (1) Friendly Losses:

(a) KIA 1 USASF, 1 indigenous.

(b) WIA 2 USASF, 2 indigenous, 2 air crew.

(c) MIA None

(d) Equipment: None

(2) Enemy Losses:

(a) KIA 0

(b) KIA (Poss) 2

(c) WIA 2

(d) WIA (Poss) 1

(e) Captured: 1 Evacuated to 45th MUST (Later died).

(f) Equipment: None

#### g Significant Activities:

(1) Change in Tactics: None

(2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: Trails previously mentioned.

(3) Propaganda Analysis: None

(4) Misc: None

(5) Unusual Activities: None

h Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and conclusions: Team feels that there is a currently used base camp in the area.

28 Det A-361 Mission #25

a Size and Composition: SSG Martin, SSG Handiwerk, SSG Lopez, and 3  
- indigenous.

b Mission: Armed Aerial Recon

c Time Departed: 031530 Infil LZ XT 102755  
Time Returned: 031535 Exfil LZ XT 102755

d Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: Team landed at Infiltration LZ and moved 20 meters south to point where VC suspects were. Team picked up 1 woman and 3 male suspects. Team spread out in wood and searched area. Team picked up 10 more suspects. Out of these following suspects the team detained 2 of them. Team picked up assorted tools and exfiltrated with 6 suspects.

(2) Terrain: Flat single undergrowth, thick canopy. The main trail was a north to south road. Many trails crossed the road running east to west.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines or Boobytraps Encountered: None

(5) Actions upon Encountering Suspects: Team searched immediate area and searched suspects for anything of military value.

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## OPERATION REPORT

b. Mission: To capture POW's and documents

c. (1) Time of Departure: 060657 Infil LZ XT 149864  
(2) Time of Return 061127 Exfil LZ XT 150870

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved north west for 40 meters, north for 100 meters, north east for 300 meters, to a north south trail which was 1 - 1 1/2 meters wide, in recent use by foot traffic. Team established ambush and observed 2 VC teams moving north to south. Team engaged enemy with claymores and small arms, wounding 1 VC, possibly wounding the other. Team moved forward and secured wounded VC and equipment and moved to the LZ for extraction.

(2) Terrain: Flat to rolling terrain, some defoliation, single and double canopy, thin to heavy underbrush. Team crossed numerous south west to north east trails which were 1' wide and used within past 3 days by troops.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Engaged with claymores and small arms fire.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 150870

(2) Strength: 2

(3) Composition: Unknown

(4) Activity of VC: Walking on trail

(5) Equipment: AK50's and work equipment

(6) Uniforms: Khaki shirts, black trousers, rubber sandals, grey flop hat.

f. Results of Encounter with the Enemy:

(1) Friendly Losses: None

(2) Enemy Losses:

(a) KIA 0

(b) WIA (Poss) 1

(c) Captured: 1 (sent to 45th MUST)

(d) Equipment: 1 AK50, 1 pistol belt with 5 AK50 magazines, 32 loose rounds of AK50 ammo, oily rag, vial of oil, 1 new hammock, 1 4X6 piece of cloth(cotton), 1 mosquito net made from artillery parachute flares, 1 pair of rubber sandals, 1 grey flop hat, 1 pair of black trousers, 1 green shirt, 1 cartridge belt.

g. Significant Activities:

Downgraded at 12 year intervals

Not automatically declassified

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(1) Change in Tactics: None


(2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: None

(3) Propaganda Analysis: None.

(4) Misc: Team smelled Human feces and Marijuana

(5) Unusual Activities: Much woodcutting was heard north east of friendly position.

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h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Conclusions and Recommendations: Team feels a larger unit is located near the area of contact. Preliminary interrogation reveals the following:

Name: Cu  
Age: 22  
Unit: B2/23/5  
Platoon Sgt: Hong  
Commander: Nha  
Mission: Digging Fighting Holes  
Strength of Unit: 40 Men at Base Camp  
Unit has wells for water supply  
POW is NVA and claimed to be hunting

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31. Det A-361 Mission #28

a. Size and Composition: SSG Martin, SSG Aleo, SGT Deo, SSG Lebatard, SP4 Grant, and 2 INDIG.

b. MIssion: Sniper

c. Time of Departure 060703 Infil LZ XT 103758  
Time of Return 061140 Exfil LZ XT 103758

**d. Conduct of Patrol:**

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved east for 50 meters and listened for movement, then continued 10 meters north 25 meters northwest and established a sniper position. Team observed 3 personnel moving North to south on road between Thien Ngon and Trai Bi. Team brought 3 individuals under fire, killing one and wounding one, recovering 1 rucksack and 1 sandbag, contents following below. Team heard signal shots moving from north to south on same road, then received light caliber automatic weapons fire from north, observed one individual traveling south on road. Helicopter passed over individual who hid in woods. Team moved forward to find individual, when they observed 2 different individuals in woodline to the north. Team requested run by gunships and were extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, grassy, few scattered trees. Soil is capable of supporting wheeled and tracked vehicles. Patrol did not cross any streams or trails.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Booby traps Encountered: None

(5) Action on Encountering Enemy: Engaged with small arms.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 103758

(2) Strength: 3, 1, 2

(3) Composition: Unknown

(4) Activity of VC: Traveling Road

(5) Equipment Unknown

(6) Uniforms: 2 had Fatigues, 1 had tiger fatigues

f. Results of Contact with Enemy:

(1) Friendly Losses: None

(2) Enemy Losses:

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- (a) KIA 1
- (b) WIA 1
- (c) Equipment: (see below)

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in Tactics: None
- (2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: None
- (3) Propaganda Analysis: None
- (4) Misc: None
- (5) Unusual Activities: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

Captured Enemy Equipment Mission #28

2 7oz cans half and half tobacco  
1 us issue hammock  
1 OD hat  
1 US towel  
2 US blankets  
4 shorts various colors  
1 pair US socks  
2 OD shirts  
1 OD trousers  
1 checked towel  
4 containers wood chips  
1 smoking pipe  
1 INDIG rations  
1 pair shower shoes  
1 package razor blades  
1 wallet with 2 snapshots  
1 flashlight with green filter

32. Det A-361

a. Size and Composition: SSG Martin, SSG Aleo, SSG LeBatard, SSG Deo, SP4 Grant, and 7 INDIG

b. Mission: To capture POW's and documents

c. Time of Departure 070630 Infil LZ N/A  
Time of Return 070715 Exfil LZ N/A

d. Conduct of Patrol: Mission was aborted due to pilots unable to establish proper LZ due to haze and light conditions.

e. Enemy Information: None

f. Negative Encounter with Enemy

g. Significant Activities: Numerous fires, thought to be cooking fires discovered in area of LZ's examined.

h. Was Mission Accomplished: No

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

33. Det A-361 Mission #29A

a. Size and Composition: SFC Newman, SSG Martin, SSG Aleo, SSG Deo, SFC LeBatard, SP4 Grant, SSG Handiwerk, SP4 Wright, SP4 Fitzgerald, SGT Burr, and 26 INDIG.

b. Mission: To investigate a reported VC rice cache vic

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c. Time of Departure: 070826 Infil LZ WT 990640  
Time of Return: 071645 Exfil LZ WT 991647

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved west toward river. Elements of the patrol observed approx 12 parapits, built as fighting positions facing LZ. Patrol continued west to river observing approx 14 6' x 8' huts with 4' deep 2' wide and 6' long bunkers built underneath the huts. Openings of bunkers faced east and team destroyed approx 4 huts. Team assaulted a spider hole with unknown results. At this time team came under heavy automatic weapons fire from east, north east, and north. Team returned fire. Patrol formed defensive perimeter and awaited reinforcements. Team was under fire from a bunker 10 meters east of their position. This bunker was finally silenced by LAW's and hand grenades. After reinforcements linked up both elements moved north through the base camp toward the LZ, and as waiting for extraction received automatic and small arms fire and helicopter was shot down. Additional reinforcements were infiltrated and linked up and secured the LZ. Patrol moved to extraction LZ and were reffilitated.

(2) Terrain: Flat with primary jungle and heavy underbrush, and many ant hills. Soil was capable of supporting wheeled and tracked vehicles. Team crossed a north south trail which was 1 meter wide and in recent use by foot troops. Also, team crossed 2 east west trails approx 1/2 meter wide and in recent use by foot troops.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: Trench lines, bunkers, fortified positions, and spider holes. Base camp (way site), had a trench system around it. Trench was 1 meter wide and 1 1/2 meters deep. Trench ran in 12 meter sections and then broke at 45° angles. Numerous bunkers, spider holes, and fortified positions were in the base camp. Southern end of base camp was at edge of defensive perimeter. Patrol swept east and north through center of base camp counting 8 VC KIA, and capturing numerous documents and much equipment.

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering Enemy: Engaged with small arms, machine guns, LAW's, hand grenades, TAC Air, and reinforcements.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: WT 991643 (base camp and /or way site)  
(2) Strength: Two platoons reinforced  
(3) Composition: Defensive security platoons  
(4) Activity of VC: Defending Base camp  
(5) Equipment: RPD, AK47, carbine pistols  
(6) Uniforms: Black pajamas, green fatigues, various civilian attire.

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy

(1) Friendly Losses:

(a) WIA 4 USASF, 4 INDIG



(b) KIA 2 INDIG

(2) Enemy Losses:

(a) KIA 8 (USASF BC)

(b) KIA prob 10

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(c) WIA prob: 3 (blood trails)

(d) Equipment: See attached readouts

g. Significant Activities:

(1) Change in Tactics: Defended base camp to fullest extent

(2) Suspected Infiltrations Routes: Area is probably way site for infiltration from Cambodia.

(3) Propaganda Analysis: Unknown

(4) Misc: None

(5) Unusual Activity: Team received fire from Cambodia

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team feels area is a headquarters of some type and a major infiltration point from Cambodia.

34. Det A-362 Mission #29B

a. Size and Composition: SGM Edwards, SSG Pridemore, SP4 Wellon, SGT Patterson, SSG Morrisson, SGT Wiskow, and 30 INDIG.

b. Mission: To reinforce Mission #29

c. Time of Departure: 071120 Infil LZ WT 992648  
Time of Return: 071650 Exfil LZ WT 992648

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved south and linked up with Mission #29C and moved further south assaulting bunker complex, moving through it and linking up with Mission # 29A. Team Observed numerous bunkers, trenches, ventilated tunnels, and spider holes. Bunkers were 6' deep, 3-4' wide, 6' long with 18" overhead cover. Team observed approx 10 huts which were 16' long and 12' wide with tin roofs with thatched material on top, and with bunkers underneath. Team also observed 1 cage which was 6' square and 7-8' high made of bamboo sticks and tin roof and had an additional cage made of bush timber inside, which was 2' high, 4' long and 3' wide. Team feels this was a POW area. Team observed approx 10 5 gallon cans filled with a thick liquid. One bunker had 6 barrels filled with approx 2 dozen eggs in each. Team proceeded south and linked up with Mission # 29A and went east assaulting enemy bunkers and then returned west approx 50 meters and then north where team observed a hole approx 5' in diameter. Also observed a barrel filled with approx 30 lbs. of rice. Also there was a kitchen area with ovens made by digging into the ground and a cooking area with many cooking utensils.

(2) Terrain: flat, primary jungle, single canopy, thick to thin underbrush. Soil is capable of supporting wheeled and tracked vehicles.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: Trenches, bunkers, spider holes and foxholes.

(4) Mines and Boobytraps Encountered: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Engaged with small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: From 992646 south.

(2) Strength: Platoon Reinforced

(3) Composition: Defensive Platoon

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(4) Activity of VC: Defending base camp.

(5) Equipment: AK47's, RPD, pistols

(6) Uniforms: Black Pajamas

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

(1) Friendly Losses: WIA 1 Indigenous

(2) Enemy Losses:

(a) KIA 6 (USASF BC)

(b) WI A prob: Unknown

(c) Equipment: See attached readout

g. Significant Activities: Same as Mission #29

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

5. Det A-362 Mission #29C Reinforcement

a. Size and Composition: CPT Krasnoff, MSG Wolf, SP4 Ruiz, SP5 Panzica, LT Bradley, and 30 Indigenous

b. Mission: To reinforce Mission # 29A.

c. Time of Departure: 071100 Infil LZ WT 992648  
Time of Return: 071700 Exfil LZ WT 992648

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved west to river and then south for 50 meters and encountered sniper fire by 1 VC on the river bank. VC jumped into river and was killed. Continued south and destroyed sampan. Continued south and began receiving machine gun fire from vic WT 991645. Team linked up with reinforcements and continued south toward enemy, receiving intermittent fire, and wounded were extracted. Team secured LZ and received additional reinforcements. Reinforcements linked up with Mission #29A. Patrol withdrew to infiltration LZ and were extracted. During Patrol, team encountered approx 10 - 12 enemy bunkers vic WT 992648 and south, approx 7-8' deep, some having tunnels 5' wide, 4-5' long, and with 18" overhead cover made of logs and dirt. Some bunkers contained tables and chairs. Team observed 2 huts, 8x 8' with thatched roofs and camouflaged. Team saw 2 or 3 bottles which looked like wine bottles on floor of bunker. Team observed numerous foxholes and spider holes in the area, concentrated on the edge of the LZ's.

(2) Terrain: Flat, primary jungle, single canopy, heavy to light underbrush, and soil is capable of supporting wheeled and tracked vehicles.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: Bunkers, trenches and foxholes.

(4) Mines and Booby traps Encountered: None



(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Engaged with small arms, machine guns, TAC Air and reinforcements.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: WT 992646

(2) Strength: Platoon reinforced

(3) Composition: Defensive Platoon



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- (4) Activity of VC: Defending base camp
- (5) Equipment: AK47's, RPD, pistols and medical Equipment
- (6) Uniforms: Unknown

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Losses: WIA 3USASF, 8 Indigenous
- (2) Enemy Losses:
  - (a) KIA 1 (USASF BC)
  - (b) WIA Unknown
  - (c) Equipment; See attached readout.

g. Significant Activities: Same as Mission #29A

h. Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Conclusions and Recommendations: None

37. Det A-361 Mission #30

a. Size and Composition: SFC Newman, SSG Handiwerk, SP4 Wright, SP4 Grant, PFC Henry.

b. Mission: Armed Aerial Recon to Engage Targets of Opportunity

c. Time of Departure: 061400                   Infil LZ WT 972659  
Time of Return:           061540                   Exfil LZ WT 972659

d. Conduct of Patrol:


(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved west to river where they encountered 1 VC in river swimming north west to Cambodia. Team took VC under fire as long as he was in river. Team found 5-6 bunkers on river with openings facing Cambodia, designed to defend river line. Bunkers were approx 6'x4'x4'. Top cover was 4" thick. All of the ant hills in that area were dug under to afford protection to a depth of 4'. Team encountered 8 huts constructed of bamboo and straw appx 8'x8'x12' with thatched roof. One hut was a boat docking area and had a 4 log foot bridge leading to it, which crossed a 4' man-made canal. One hut was used as a rice grainery. Team recovered one 200 lb sack of rice in it. Team saw a well, 3' in diameter. Water looked good and not stagnant. Numerous chickens were in the area, as well as one ox drawn plow, and many cooking utensils. A 20'x30' Garden was also in the area, 4 raised gardens appx 5'x10' were in the area. Team also discovered several new rice baskets. Team discovered north east south west trail which was in recent use by foot and ox cart traffic. Approx 25 meters up the trail from WT 972659 team found a well used oxen trail approx 3 meters wide leading westward a clearing. Trail had been heavily used during last rain as footprints were imbedded in the trail. Appx 35 meters north of this area on a north south trail, team discovered a communications trench running east and west and started back north. Trench was appx 2' deep and was grown over with weeds. In this area team found another well 3' in diameter and 20 ft deep, and again holes had been dug under ant hills. Patrol moved to LZ and was extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, open rice paddies, with small line of trees. Canopy was single and sparse underbrush. Soil was suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps Encountered: None

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(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Took under fire with small arms.

e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: WT 972659
- (2) Strength: 1
- (3) Composition: Unknown
- (4) Activity of VC: Swimming from Viet Nam to Cambodia.
- (5) Equipment: Unknown
- (6) Uniform: Unknown

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Losses: None
- (2) Enemy Losses: KIA (poss) 1

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in Tactics: None
- (2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: None
- (3) Propaganda Analysis: One 2'x2' box of US-GVN propaganda which also contained 1 woman's blouse, 1 piece of cloth, 2"x 2" with Red Cross hand sewn on it, 1 woman's indoctrination booklet dated to time of Nam My Diem, 6 pieces of paper.
- (4) Misc: 1 dozen eggs destroyed.
- (5) Unusual Activities: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

38. Det A-362 Mission # 31 BDA

a. Size and Composition: MAJ Gritz, PFC Miller, SGT Aiello, SGT Wilkenson, SSG Pridemore, SGT Greenberg, SP4 Wesson, SP5 Wiskow, SP4 Wright, and 20 Indigenous

b. Mission: To Assess damage to possible base camp by B52 strike.

c. Time of Departure: 081431 Infil LZ XT 245952  
Time of Return: 081642 Exfil LZ XT 2 45952

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved west appx 100 meters where patrol encountered a trench line, and then continued through an unused base camp containing appx 40 bunkers which were appx 8' by 15' and had overhead cover made of logs 18" in diameter with mud on top. Bunkers had rifle racks inside. Bunkers interlocked with trenches. Numerous spider holes were in this area, also there was one grass thatched hut used as a cooking area and two other cooking areas. C & C ship spotted 1 VC at southern edge of base camp, fleeing south and patrol observed 1 VC wearing a hat and NVA web gear and also fleeing south.

(2) Terrain: Flat, thick underbrush and vines, single canopy. Numerous north south trails were in the area, appx 1/2 meter wide and in recent use. Also there were numerous east west trails and not in recent

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use.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Team was unable to engage the enemy due to the thick underbrush.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: XT 244952

(2) Strength: 2

(3) Composition: Unknown

(4) Activity of VC: Fleeing south

(5) Equipment: Unknown

(6) Uniforms: Black pajamas and one wore hat with NVA webgear

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy

(1) Friendly Losses: None

(2) Enemy Losses: One torn document (fowarded to Co A on first available aircraft)

g. Significant Activies: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Conclusions and Recommendations: Area had been a large base area appx 100 meters in diameter and well fortified. B 52 Strike was 85% effective on the base area.

## 39. Det A-362 Mission 32

a. Size and Composition: MAJ Gritz, WO Edwards, SSG Pridemore, SGM Patterson, SP5 Wiskow, SP4 Wilkinson, PFC Miller, and 14 Indigenous SP5 Patterson

b. Mission: Capture documents and POW's

c. Time of Departure: 090652 Infil LZ XT 011770  
Time of Return: 091407 Exfil LZ XT 011770

d. Conduct of Patrol: Upon infiltration team traveled north and set up ambush at XT 010771. At 0730 team heard warning shot east at about 500 meters. At 0815 right security heard movements to his left, right, and rear. The team leader called in all his security and swept area, with no results. Team then moved north east apprx 100 meters to XT 012770, at 1145. Team remained at this position until 1332. At this time left security reported 6-10 VC traveling north to south, wearing black uniforms, one having a red scarf, and one wearing a black hat. This group appeared to be positioning themselves between right and rear security. Team then lost sight of this group. At appx the same time, MAJ Gritz and SGM Edwards smell human waste from their right front. At 1346 right security saw 1 VC without weapon at about 2 meters. At this time PFC Miller took his rifle off safety. The VC heard this click and saw PFC Miller, who immediatly shot him.

Immediately, PFC Miller Received RPD round from across the road, at appx 5 meters. Team immediatly regrouped on right security. Team supressed the area which the enemy were firing from. Team received fire from RPD and small arms. Team then brought in gunships which supressed area with guns and rockets. Team then was extracted from the LZ.

(2) Terrain: Flat, with many trails for foot and bicycle.

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Sparse underbrush, single canopy with medium visibility. Very suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles.

- (3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Actions on Encountering the Enemy: Supressed the enemy and killed one.

e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: XT01177Q
  - (2) Strength: 10 - 12
  - (3) Activity: Probable search for team
  - (4) Equipment: RPD, RPG, SKS's, Carbines
  - (5) Uniforms: Black pajamas

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Losses: None
  - (2) Enemy Losses:
    - (a) KIA 1 (USASF BC)
    - (b) WIA None
    - (c) Equipment: See attached list

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in Tactics: None
  - (2) Misc: None
  - (3) Suspected Infiltration Routes: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team feels that the enemy encountered was highly disciplined and possesses high morale.

40. Det A-361 Mission #33

a. Size and Composition: SFC Newman, SSG Handiwerk, SSG Parker, SGT LeBatard, SP4 Fitzgerald, SP4 Wesson.

b. Missich: Armed Aerial Recon

c. Time of Departure:

Journal of Polymer Science: Part A: Polymer Chemistry, Vol. 31, 221-224 (1993)  
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112 *Journal of Health Politics*

(5) Activity on Encountering the Enemy: Supressed the area with Gunships

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e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: XT 225937
  - (2) Strength: UKN
  - (3) Composition: UKN
  - (4) Equipment: UNk
  - (5) Uniforms: UNK

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Casualties: None  
(2) Enemy Losses: Unknown

g. Significant Activities

- (1) Change in Tactics: None
  - (2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: None
  - (3) Misc: Fired at by automatic Weapons
  - (4) Unusual Activities: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Negative

41. Det A-362 Mission #34 Ambush  
a. Size and Composition: SSG Pridemore, SGT Aiello, SFC Berry,

berg, SPC Wesson, SPC Morrison and 14 Indigenous

c. Time of Departure: 110708 Infil LZ XT 125954

d. Conduct of Patrol:  
(1) Patrol Route: From the LZ the team moved south for 200 meters to the east west trail which was 1 meter wide and in recent heavy use by bicycles and foot troops. Team established ambush and heard movement to the left rear and also to the front. To the front appx 3 VC sat down across the trail from the left security. At appx 0940 an estimated 25-30 VC came running down the trail from east to west. Point man of the enemy was to the front and stopped directly in front of the ambush, was taken under fire and killed. Team then received fire from the east, south, and north. Fire from the north was from at least 3 automatic weapons. Team pulled security in and gunships made runs and team was extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, double canopy, heavy underbrush of bamboo. Soil was suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. At XT 125954 team crossed north south trail which was 2 1/2 meters wide not in recent use. Numerous north east- southwest trails were in area of ambush, some of which had fresh cuttings. Trails were 1 meter wide and some in recent use.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy  
arms, claymores, hand grenades, and machine guns.

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25954 team  
in recent use.  
h, some of  
in recent use.

REF ID: A6492

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e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: XT 125949
- (2) Strength: 25-30
- (3) Composition: Platoon
- (4) Activity: Running on Trail
- (5) Equipment: AK47, SKS, Grenades and Wb Gear
- (6) Uniforms: Black Pajamas (point man), balance wore black and grey tiger trousers, black scarves, and black flop hats.

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Losses: WIA 1USASF, 1 INDIG
- (2) Enemy Losses:
  - (a) KIA 6 (USASF BC)
  - (b) WIA (prob) 2
  - (c) Captured: 1 SKS (new), 7 rounds of ammo

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in Tactics: None
- (2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: East west trail previously mentioned.
- (3) Propaganda Analysis: None
- (4) Misc: Patrol received fire from north, south, and east and it is estimated that in addition to the 25-30 VC engaged, an equal number were not seen.
- (5) Unusual Activities: VC were trotting on trail

h. Was Mission Accomplished: No

- i. Recommendations and Conclusions: It is felt that VC may be moving from east to west because of increased allied pressure to the east. Trails in the area were newly formed and paralleled the main trail. It is felt that the infiltration LZ may have been compromised and that the VC were running trying to find team. TAC Air was placed on the target after extraction.

42. Det A-362 Mission #35

a. a. Size and Composition: SSG Pridemore, SFC Berry, SP4 Greenberg, SGT Morrison, SP4 Wilkinson, Capt Schmus, SGT Patterson, and 14 INDIG.

b. Mission: Recon

c. Time of Departure: 170630 Infil LZ XT 046847  
Time of Return: 171045 Exfil LZ XT046847

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ team moved north 50 to 75 meters then changed course west a distance of 165 meters to the north south road. Ambush set up at coord WT 946838. From this point team moved to exfil LZ

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subsequent to contact and were exfiltrated without further contact.

(2) Terrain: Single canopy jungle along sides of road, double canopy starting 20 meters off the road. North south road appx 7 feet wide at widest point then narrows considerably as it moves south.

Sandy soil with numerous foot trails run off the main trail. No streams were crossed in the area, but numerous ant hills were in evidence.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: AT 0920 the left security sighted a VC moving along the main road from north to south on a bicycle. He rode off the road about 100 meters from the friendly left flank security and went down a trail to the south west. At 0940 2 VC approached appx 75 meters north of the right flank security, but disappeared into the jungle. At 1030 one VC appeared to the south of the right security element. He was allowed to move closer as it was observed that 2 additional VC were appx 50 meters behind him. The closest enemy was shot at a distance of 5 meters, equipment recovered, while the other 2 VC engaged friendlies in fire fight. Team blew their claymores and were exfiltrated without further contact at 1045.

e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: WT 046838
- (2) Strength: Unknown but 4 sighted
- (3) Composition: Unknown
- (4) Activity offVC: Moving through way station
- (5) Equipment: See below
- (6) Uniforms: See below

f. Results of contact with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Losses: None
- (2) Enemy Losses:
  - (a) KIA; 1 (USASF BC)
  - (b) KIA (poss) UNK
  - (c) WIA UNK
  - (d) WIAM(poss) Unk
  - (e) Captured: None

(f) Equipment: VC KIA was armed with a Soviet 7.62mm rifle, M1981/30 w/grenades launcher. Serial A5107 Chinese # on bolt 6329. 4 rifle grenades w/4 crimp cartridges, 20 rounds 7.62mm ammo, ammo belt, 1 sack, 1US canteen with pouch, 1 small bag fried rice. He was dressed in black shirt and trousers, rubber sandals. Unusually large for a Vietnamese. Name: Le Hoang Minh, age 22, home Dung Lap. Assigned to a unit titled B-13. Had in his possession 3,633 reals Cambodian money (appx 128 American dollars) and a receipt from B-15 unit. Also two small photos, not identifiable, except photographed in Viet Nam.

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in Tactics: None

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(2) Suspected Infiltration Route: North south road at ambush site is a known infiltration route, area of ambush near way station.

(3) Propaganda Analysis: None

(4) Activity in Area: Infiltration Way Station

(5) Misc: Fresh boot marks (NVA) and bicycle tracks on secondary road and trails mentioned above. Old OP bunker to cover road network at WT 946837. Logs fallen to block main road above way station. Unidentified wooden ammo case 8" long, 2' wide, green color scattered through area. VC killed and other sighted large for VN. Strong smell of human excretion throughout area. Also water buffalo dung. Domestic cattle sighted from the air in general location. It is believed the main body of troops are located in a transient station status north of the infiltration LZ.

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: B-36 will continue to recon this area for purpose of determining exact locations and strengths.

43. Det A-361 Mission #36

This Mission, (#36), was aborted due to the higher priority of impending missions.

44. Det A361 Mission #37

a. Size and Composition: SFC ST Laurent, SSG Parker, Lt Jaeger, and 3 Indigenous

b. Mission: Recon

c. Time of Departure: 180630 Infil LZ XT 043616  
Time of Return: 201300 Exfil LZ XT 057658



d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: Infiltrated on LZ indicated above at 0655 hrs and traveled south east about 400 meters. From XT 046614 went due north to XT 061645. From the LZ until arriving at the last mentioned coordinate no sign of enemy activity. At this point a boat ramp was discovered on the main river. It was cut into the bank and was designed for two boats. Had not been used since last rainy season. Team traveled north to XT 060646, where a man made stairway was found going down into the river. This also had not been used since last rainy season. Team continued north to XT 058654. At this point there was a well used trail about 1 foot wide, also inactive since last Monsoon. At XT 058658, there was a trail which led directly to the teams exfiltration point, but it also had not been used recently. Patrol walked appx 7 kilometers in the 2 1/2 days.

(2) Terrain; Thick underbrush, flat terrain, sparse trees. The Suoi Ben Da which flowed to our general right flank moved at a speed of appx 1 to 2 knots. The banks anywhere from 0 to 8 feet high, and 180' slope to 0'. Average width 8-10 ft or more. River in this area of operations is more than adequate to handle the largest of Sampans, and overhanging vines and bamboo stands afford good cover for these crafts. Has been used by boats of fairly large size in the past, but not recently. Due to the large number of open areas, suitable for LZ's in the area, it was difficult to move with concealment. Only bisecting stream of any importance was crossed at XT 063638, flowing from north west to south east. Very old trails in area indicate that a base camp might have been located in the area in the past. Old tree markers were found.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps Encountered: None



(5) Action upon encountering the enemy: Negative

e. Enemy Information: None

f. Results from encounter with enemy: None

g. Significant Activities:

(1) NEG

(2) NEG

(3) NEG

(4) Misc: Wild game and fish in the area are abundant.

The fact that these animals and fish are available in large quantities is indicative of the fact that little or no activity of any type has taken place in this area for a long time.

(5) Unusual Activities: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team believes it is unnecessary to patrol this area in the immediate future. No enemy activity now, but VC possibly will move into this area during the rainy season.

45. Det A-361 Mission #38 Recon

a. Size and Composition: SSG Handiwerk, SSG LePartard, Sfc Delfamy and 3 ENDIG.

b. Mission: Observe and report in assigned area

c. Time of Departure: 180655 Infil LZ XT 018618  
Time of Return: 181705 Exfil LZ XT 013619

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved north for 50 meters, 2 men moving 100 meters east to check a trail, negative results. Trail was 1 meter wide, had one man traveling east to west but not recently. Team moved west and north west for 550 meters. During this movement team found numerous foot paths which ran mostly north south. Team continued west north west to vic XT 013617, where team observed 1 VC traveling east to west carrying an AK47 and wearing NVA web gear with 2 magazines. Team permitted the VC to pass. Team continued to move west - south west and felt that VC were moving parallel to the team, apx VC strength of 10 men and team requested that they be extracted as their mission had been compromised. Team returned to the LZ and they were extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, soil is hard and sandy, undergrowth varies from elephant grass in the open areas to thick undergrowth in the primary jungle areas. Soil is suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles. Trails in the area were mostly 1 to 2' wide, but not in heavy use.

(3) Obstacles Encountered: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

Action on Encountering the Enemy: Allowed to pass

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Locations: XT 013637

(2) Strength: 1

(3) Composition: UNK

(4) Activity: Walking on trail from east to west

(5) Equipment: AK47, NVA web gear and 2 magazines

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- (6) Black pajamas with no hate.

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy: None

g. Significant Activities

  - (1) VC ran parallel to team rather than trailing them.
  - (2) Suspected infiltration routes: None.
  - (3) Propaganda Analysis: None
  - (4) Misc: Area is difficult to move in because it is extremely thick undergrowth or completely open.
  - (5) Unusual activities: None.

h. Was mission accomplished? Yes.

i. Conclusions and Recommendations: Area is not extensively used for either foot or oxcart.

Det A-362      Mission #39

a. Size and Composition: Sgt Aiello, Pfc Miller, Lt Hogg, and 3 indigenous.

b. Mission: Recon



c. Time of Departure: 200630      Infil LZ XT 023699  
Time of Return: 201330      Exfil LZ XT 027695

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: Patrol infiltrated at 200700 and proceeded west for about 50 meters into the woodline. Voices were heard from the North East and patrol moved north. Paths, recently made, were noticed in the grass, and an old house elevated off the ground about three feet. It was well built, about 8' by 10' with no roof, general state of disrepair. About 3 meters off the north end of the LZ a bunker was found facing in the opposite direction of the LZ. It was dug out of an ant hill, about four feet deep, apparently a shelter from artillery and air raids. At 0807 the rear security indicated a VC was sighted to the west at a distance of about 40 meters. Could not identify weapons or equipment as he disappeared into the underbrush. Team continued moving north and then changed direction due east. After moving about 40 meters another house about 20' by 20' was found, also in a state of disrepair, apparently hit by artillery. At this time the rear security spotted 2 more VC moving past the friendly location in an easterly direction, and the rear security also heard a element moving up from the rear. Team set 2 M-14's in a clearing to their front and then moved south east from 1100 to 1130, covering about 100 meters, where they halted and set up security. Immediately movement was heard in all directions and between 3 to 5 VC were seen in various areas about 20 meters away. Request for extraction was relayed by radio to FOB. At 1300 gunships arrived. Team leader ignited a WP grenade to mark position and gunships made two initial runs to cover withdrawal to the LZ. In moving to the LZ the rear security spotted a VC behind an ant hill. VC was killed with M-16 rifle fire, at a distance of about 15 meters. He was clothed in a brown uniform, weapons and equipment not identified. Along the route smoke was popped so that the gunships could keep track of direction and progress. Team was extracted at 1330. Gunships placed supressing fire on the LZ during exfiltration.

(2) Terrain: Single canopy jungle with thick undergrowth under the trees. Many areas suitable for LZ's, sandy soil would support track vehicles in the undergrowth, but not in the open area. Grass is about

# CONTINUOUS EMISSIONS



1 1/2 feet high.

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(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: One VC sighted to the rear of the withdrawal route at a distance of appx 15 meters, shot and killed, and team continued to move to LZ to effect exfiltration as mission had been compromised.

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: En route infil LZ to exfil LZ

(2) Size: Appx 5-8

(3) Composition: Apparently elements of a squad

(4) Equipment: 1 bolt action rifle

(5) Uniform: Brown or Dark green

f. Results of Enemy Contact:

(1) Friendly Casualties: None

(2) Enemy Losses: 1 VC KIA (probable)

g. Significant activities:

(1, 2, 3) Negative

(4) Misc: VC appeared to be locals due to their mixed clothing, lack of equipment, and weapons.

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Suggest further recons in area not to be conducted unless armed aerial recon.

Note: TAC Air strike placed in area at 1400.

47. Det A-362 Mission #40

This mission was aborted due to decision of detachment commander.

48. Det A-362 Mission # 41 Ambush

a. Size and Composition: SSgt Ridenore, SFC Berry, SP4 Greenberg, SGT Morrison, SP4 Wilkinson, Capt Schmus, SGT Patterson, and 13 indigenous

b. Mission: To assess the area and surveil traffic on trail and attempt to capture a prisoner.

c. Time of Departure: 171400 Infil LZ WT 944850  
Time of Return: 171555 Exfil LZ WT 944850

d. Conduct of Patrol

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ due west 100 meters when team started to set up ambush site along the north south road at coord. WT 941850

(2) Terrain: Single canopy jungle. Old French road parallels north south road about 20 meters to the east. Deeply rutted and overgrown by jungle, but used recently by foot traffic and bicycles.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

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(5) Action on encountering the enemy: At 1425 while moving into position for ambush the left security spotted the VC were approaching from the south on the north south road. Although the ambush was not in place it was necessary to open fire due to the fact that the enemy was within very close range. The VC were shot in an attempt to take them prisoner at about 5 meters. Apparently they were the point of a reinforced platoon, and the enemy immediately returned a heavy volume of fire from the north, south, and the east. The rear element and right security assaulted while the team leader called for extraction, IFT, and TAC Air. Outstanding support rendered by gunships allowed contact to be broken and team moved to the exfil LZ at 1505. Friendlies received some fire from the north as they entered the LZ, but boobytraps left on the trail no doubt slowed the enemy advance.

e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: WT 941350
- (2) Strength: Estimated reinforced Platoon
- (3) Composition: UNK
- (4) Activity of VC: Appeared to have been in the process of setting up a counter ambush subsequent to team's infiltration.
- (5) Uniforms: Mixed with different colored shirts and trousers some troops having red scarves.

f. Results of Contact:

- (1) Friendly Casualties: WIA: 3USASF, 1 INDIG
- (2) Enemy Casualties:
  - (a) KIA: 4 (USASF EC)
  - (b) KIA (poss) 1
  - (c) WIA: UNK
  - (d) Captured: None
  - (e) Equipment: None

g. Significant Activities:

- (1) Change in Tactics: None
- (2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: North south road at point of ambush and maze of trails adjacent and parallel to this road.
- (3) Propaganda Analysis: None
- (4) Misc: Old bunkers and VC kitchen area was passed through on west side of LZ enroute to ambush site. Had not been used recently.

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes. Although documents or a prisoner were not exfiltrated due to heavy contact the additional assessment resulted in what is felt conclusive evidence that this is a major infiltration route into this area.

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: TAC Air and artillery to uncover way station and suspected base camp in this area.

49. Det A-361 and A-362 Mission #42 Area Assessment

a. Size and Composition: SFC Newman, SSG Pridemore, SFC Berry, SP4 Wesson, SP4 Harris, SP4 O'Connel, and 29 Indigenous

b. Mission: To engage targets of opportunity and to assess damage done to area by on call 105.

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c. Time of Departure: 120835 Infil LZ WT 974624  
Time of Return: 181010 Exfil LZ WT 974624 and  
WT 974620

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ patrol moved to river and discovered 8.200 lbs bags of rice which were opened and destroyed. Team then split and one element moved north and one south. Southern element discovered a hut 8x8' with thatched roof and two sides which had a small sleeping platform. Team continued south for 50 meters and discovered 2 10"x24" concrete blocks sunk into the ground each of which had 2 5/8" steel anchors embedded in each block. A third concrete block of the same size had a pulley like device anchored to it consisting of a piece of machinery with 1 10" diameter wheel on either side of the piece. Machinery was not operable. In same area team discovered fresh animal waste and a new ox cart which was destroyed. Also in the area were numerous small trenches with overhead cover to be used as protection against air attacks. One tunnel was dug under an ant hill and had a fox hole at the entrance to be used as a fighting position. Team continued 40 meters south and found a latrine and heard voices, team fired M79 into the area and swept the area with no active results. Team returned north to the LZ and were extracted. Northern element moved north from the LZ and discovered a small docking area with one 8' x 20' hut and 2 8'x 10' huts, all with thatched roofs and no sides, and all were destroyed. Team continued north and discovered another hut and a 3'x2'x12' bunker with one entrance facing the river and 1 facing down river. Team also discovered an ox cart tongue in the river which was tied to a tree, and when the rope was cut it sank into the river. Team continued north 50 meters and discovered a garden area 1/4 acre in size, in the area also were 2 8x8' huts with thatched roofs. One hut had a table, various eating tools and fish nets. All huts and equipment were destroyed. Team continued north 20 meters and discovered a sampan which was destroyed. Team continued north to WT974620 where another sampan was discovered and destroyed. Also discovered and destroyed were appx 500 lbs salt, 100 lbs rice, and 4 huts. Huts in this area were more sturdy constructed than those previously mentioned. Team received automatic weapons fire from the Cambodian side of the river which was returned and MAC Air was called in with unknown results. Team was then extracted.

(2) Terrain: Flat, dry rice fields, primary jungle, single canopy, thick undergrowth. In one area appx 70 meters south of the LZ area, it was marshy with thick undergrowth. Numerous trails were in the area with ox cart trails running from the river east and all trails were in recent heavy use. Soil was suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles except for the marshy area.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Boobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the Enemy: Door Gunner saw 1 VC and engaged with door gun.

e. Enemy Information:

- (1) Location: WT974620
- (2) Strength: 2
- (3) Composition: UNK
- (4) Equipment: Rifle
- (5) Uniform: UNK

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy:

- (1) Friendly Losses: None

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2/20

(2) Enemy Losses: KIA (prob): 1

g. Significant Activities:

(1) Change in Tactics: None

(2) Suspected Infiltration Routes: Area along river is used to transport supplies and perhaps personnel.

(3) Propaganda Analysis: None

(4) Misc: Gardens had been watered on morning of patrol as the area was still wet.

(5) Unusual Activities: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: Team feels the area where machinery was found is a ferry crossing site. Also team feels the rice was awaiting further transportation as it was lying unprotected.

50. Det 361 Mission: #43 (Ambush)

a. Size and Composition: SPC Newman, SSG Handiwerk, SSG LeBatard, SP4 O'Connell and 10 indigenous.

b. Mission: Area Recon, Route Recon, and Ambush in force

c. Time of Departure: 190630 Infil LZ XT 042607  
Time of Return: 191945 Exfil LZ XT 013593

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: From LZ to coord XT 034597. Moved into general area at this coord, checked trails, all cold. None of the trails had been used in the past three months. Evidence in area such as indig cigarettes which had been recently smoked, indicating trail watchers may have been in the area. Emplaced 2 mines with time pencils at 0715 which went off at 0930. Put in two more mines with time pencils at coord XT 036 605 at about 0930 which exploded at appx 1130. Evidence in both of these areas where mines were left that trail watchers were in the area and had left upon approach of friendly element. Moved about 100 meters from previous position north and found indigenous PIR rations and C ration cans. About 1400 contacted Co and told him that area was not worthwhile. Directed to move to coord XT 019597. Moved out on a 240 az and stopped after moving 1500 meters and sent 6 man recon element forward to check area. Enroute crossed many north south trails which had not been used in months. Remainder moved toward exfiltration LZ at XT 013593. Arrived at LZ at 1915 and assessed this area to be a farm production unit. Extracted at 1930 without incident.

(2) Terrain: Single canopy jungle with very heavy undergrowth. Soil was sandy and would support track vehicles during dry season.

(3) Obstacles: None

(4) Mines and Deobytraps: None

(5) Action on Encountering the enemy: Neg

e. Enemy Information: None



f. Results of contact with Enemy:

(1) Friendly Losses: None

(2) Enemy Losses: WIA (prob) 2 (from mines)

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g. Significant Activities:

(1 2,3):None

(4) Misc: Around both infil and exfil LZ's numerous foxholes were found. They were very old and did not appear to be used in the past 3 or 4 months.

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: It is recommended by the team leader that further operations not be conducted in this general area as there has been no VC activity in this area in at least 3 months. The trails in the areas have been used as infiltration routes, however, there has been no preparation made on the trails by local VC for movement of large units.

51. Det A-362 Mission #44

a. Size and Composition: SGT Patterson, SGT Danzer, SGT Morrison, SP4 Wesson and 24 Indigenous

b. Mission: Armed Aerial Recon

c. Time of Departure: 200830 Infil LZ XT 033720  
Time of Return: 200930 Exfil LZ XT 033720

d. Conduct of Patrol: 2 Helicopters with 2 USASF and 12 INDIG landed on infil LZ while other 2 helicopters stayed aloft. Patrol moved north into woodline appx 20 meters then proceeded east 30 meters finding 2 thatched roof houses with ground beneath dug out appx 3 ft deep. Another house was found a few meters away with some conification. Houses were burned. Had not been used for appx 3 months. Team moved west to exfil LZ. On LZ they found a trench, L shaped, 8 ft long, 2 ft wide, 3 ft deep, with 4 foxholes around the trench provided with aiming stakes. None of the positions appeared to have been used recently, however a trail adjacent to the area running northeast into the woodline had foot traffic in the last 2 or 3 days, (4 or 5 persons). Team exfiltrated at 0930 without incident.

e. Enemy Information: None

f. Results of Encounter with Enemy: N/A

g. Significant Activities: None

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: None

52. Det A-361 Det A-362 Mission #45

a. Size and Composition:

(1) SGT Alcallo, LT Hogg, SP4 Wesson, SP5 Panaica, SGT Morrison, PFC Miller, SGT Danzer, and 30 Indigenous

(2) SSG Pridemore, SP4 Wilkinson, SGT Totten, SGT Patterson, SP4 Greenberg, SGM Hillman, and 30

(3) SFC Berry, SP5 Wiskow, and 33 Indigenous

b. Mission: Search and Destroy

c. (1) Time of Departure: 220745 Infil LZ WT 972659  
220905 WT 970661  
221135 WT 966666

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(2) Time of Return: 221630 Exfil LZ WT 959668  
WT 962667  
WT 961674

d. Conduct of Patrol:

(1) Patrol Route: The first element landed at time indicated above and immediately discovered four houses about 10 meters from their imfil point which they destroyed. Moving into the main woodline they found a small complex covering a space of appx 40 meters composed of bunkers and 6 houses. Houses were destroyed, bunkers numbered 6, and were 4x4'. Continuing to move along the river to the north the team found numerous air raid type shelters along the river, and large garden plots. Garden plot was destroyed by uprooting plants and throwing them into the river. Nearby another complex of houses and bunkers were found. This was an obvious VC farm as it contained pens for animals and a large cooking area for farm workers. At 0930 the C&C ship informed team to circle wagons as a TAC bomb run was coming in to the south at 500 meters. At this time team received small arms fire from the Cambodian side of the river. The fire was ineffective and not returned. Team remained in general area until link up with 2d element at 1030. During the interim other houses and bunkers were discovered about 15 meters away. The bunkers and houses were the same size and configuration as others previously found. The houses were destroyed. At 1035 another TAC bomb run was made about 500 meters south of the 2 elements. During movement of element 2 from the LZ to link up the 1st element the following actions took place. It had become apparent that the entire area running north to south along the river and the woodline was a huge VC farm. Team moved into the woodline off the LZ to the northwest destroying dozens of houses as they left. Team was in the process of destroying houses when 1 VC popped out of a spider hole and was killed by M16 fire. The enemy fell in the river and a grenade was thrown to confirm his death. He did not have a weapon. There were 6 small 2 man bunkers along the river at this point, with entrances pointing west and south. Patrol moved 25 meters farther north and found a 15' sampan against the bank of the river containing a compartment of fresh fish. Sampan was sunk with rifle fire. An empty RPD ~~ammunition~~ can was found in the boat also. More houses were found and destroyed enroute to linkup with first element. At about 1045 the bomb run mentioned above was terminated and both elements moved out, 1st element in the lead and 2nd in the rear with the mission of destroying such facilities as the first element might find. About 100 meters farther north an indig soldier accidentally discharged a T-6 grenade which was attached to his pistol belt resulting in the death of 2 indig, 2 indig WIA, and 1 USA SF WIA. Medevac arrived at 1130 followed by the 3rd element at 1135. Medevac was fired on from the north east as it lifted off the LZ. The small arms fire was answered by an air strike of 20mm cannon and CBU's and a rocket run by gunships. At 1145 the 1st and 2nd element moved out in the lead in line with the third element in the rear as security and destruction party. Direction of movement was northwest. Immediately an ox cart was found on the right flank. It was designed to carry heavy loads such as logs or weapons and ammunition. It was destroyed with a LAW. The team moved on a distance of 350 meters where a nearby VC cow was destroyed with M16 fire. During the movement of the patrol over the previously 350 meters, over 30 houses were discovered and burnt to the ground. At least 60 protective type bunkers were also in the same area. Old three strand barbed wire fences were prominent, believed to be constructed to delay movement from nearby LZ's to the farm area. At 1300 all 3 elements again linked up and, circling wagons, ate lunch. During this period it was noted that gunships making runs on the Vietnamese side of the river were receiving fire from the Cambodian side of the river. At 1320 the team moved out following the river north, about 150 meters. Another area was found and 15 houses destroyed. Numerous wells were also found which had been hit by artillery sweeps laid in ahead of the team. At WT 962676 2 M-14 mines were placed in a large garden which was peared ready for harvest. This garden was 250 meters long and 150 meters wide surrounded by fences with 10 houses which contained farm harvesting equipment. The houses were destroyed with the 500 lbs of rice that they contained. It should be noted here that these gardens were in two stages of cultivation, one ready for harvest and partially gathered and the other in the growing stage. At 1445 the patrol moved out north along the river in a column formation to

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maintain cover during the movement due to the lack of vegetation adjacent to the river. At about 1500 the team reached a junction where it found that a finger along the river was to the rear of its left flank. The patrol leader broke his command into 2 elements, one which fanned to the northeast and provided security for the main element. The main element conducted a wheeling sweep to the northwest and southwest to search the area at WT 960670. At this location the rear element joined the main element. The 1st and 3rd elements moved south into the finger and the 2nd element went north along the river. Both elements found a mixture of defensive positions composed of trenches and bunkers. One third of these positions had been in recent use, and they all faced east across the open rice paddies. At 1600 the commander in the air made the decision to effect extraction of the patrol. At this time the 3d element stayed in position along the river, the 2d element continued sweeping north, and the 1st element continued sweeping south. It was during this time that the 1st element uncovered one of the most important finds of the day. In the southern part of the finger area, a large headquarters complex was located. It was composed of houses, kitchens, machine shops, briefing rooms, poultry and livestock compounds, and a sophisticated docking point. At the same time the 2d element to the north found a complex almost identical to the southern one within a distance of 500 meters of each other. The complex to the south was in the general vic of WT 961667. The complex to the north was in the vic of WT 961675. The 3d element was extracted at 1615. The decision was made at this time to continue the sweep north by the 2d element while awaiting extraction. At WT 966678 a canal running east to west was discovered, about 3 meters wide and 150 meters long. 2 bunkers covered the entrance to the canal. It lead to a rice paddy which was ready for harvest. A well used trail from the canal to the rice paddy was laid with M-14 mine. It was not possible at this time to continue destruction activities due to limited time and material. It was possible however to remove the bulk of machinery items and throw them in the river. Both elements then moved to infiltration LZ's and were returned to the FOB.

(2) Terrain: The soil confirmation in this area varies from mud on the river bank to hard packed sand directly adjacent to the river bank itself. Generally the area is open and farmed, but circumvented and paralleled on the east and west by heavy jungle and the river. With the exception of some marshy areas track vehicles could move easily in a north south axis with ample support and maneuver space.

(3) Negative

(4) Negative

(5) Action upon encountering the enemy: See Para d (1)

e. Enemy Information:

(1) Location: Appx 200 meters north of infil LZ on river bank

(2) Strength: 1

(3) Composition: N/A

(4) Equipment: UNK

(5) Uniform: Brown Khaki

f. Results of encounter with enemy:

(1) Friendly Losses:

(a) KIA 2 INDIG

(b) WIA 1 USASF, 2 INDIG

(2) enemy Losses:

(a) KIA 1

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g. Significant Activities:

- (1) N/A
- (2) N/A
- (3) N/A


(4) Misc: This search and destroy mission has confirmed the fact that the area patrolled is a maze of farms emplaced to feed VC elements training in the area.

h. Was Mission Accomplished: Yes. Size of the patrol limited the amount of materials available to complete comprehensive and long lasting destruction.

i. Recommendations and Conclusions: If the VC and VA operating here cannot feed their trainees and infiltrating elements the value of maintaining their complexes in this area will be greatly reduced. It is sometimes difficult to destroy base camps and troop concentrations; this is not the case with gardens and farms which have existed unmolested in War Zone "C" for the last two years, if not longer. The machinery, buildings, and docking points, plus varied and sundry other points in the AO are directed towards the production of food crops throughout the year, with transportation means available both by water and overland at harvest time. Situation reports and debriefings prepared and forwarded by Det B-36 during Operation Rapid Fire V has pinpointed not only these VC farm areas but the training complexes and troop concentrations that they support to the north and south along the river from below the Logo road to WT 974977. An all encompassing list of recommendations and conclusions will be included in the AAR for this operation, however it is sincerely felt that a massive air and land operation should be launched as soon as possible to destroy and deny this area to use by the enemy once and for all.

Note: A minimal amount of captured documents left behind in the area have been forwarded by Safe Hand to Co A.

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN NO. 8834

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

DOC#	Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	01-1355-68 (1 page original, handwritten.)  (2)	<p>(C) District Unit 17</p> <p>(C) Letter, dated 26 Nov 67, signed by Ngoc Kieu of District Unit 17 [ Ta Bang Dist Unit 7], informs Ba Tie and Bay Hung of U/I Convalescence Center that "it" [ pose Mi / Hq 7 would send a number of patients to that camp between 1 and 3 Dec [ 67 ]. Addressees were requested to return personnel from it who were fully recovered to their unit prior to admission of the new patients from it.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMM: No Further Significant Information.</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991614 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
	01-1355-69* (32 page original, handwritten.)  (2)	<p>(C) Defense Organization in Ta Bang Dist, Tay Ninh Prov, MR 1.</p> <p>(C) Notebook with entries dated from 13 Jul 67 to 2 Jan 68 by Ngoc Kieu contains notes on defense organization and missions of [ poss Ta Bang ] District Unit HQ as of Aug 67, [ the Cambodia - VN ] border problem, minutes of meeting, training lessons on weapons, and political subjects.</p> <p>Discussed in the meeting held on 13 Jul 67 by Ta Bang District unit HQ was the organization of [ Ta Bang ] District, Villages and Hamlets Command Committees. The Village Unit HQ is described as an organ of [ VC ] Army designed to carry out the missions assigned by District Unit HQ.</p> <p>Document reveals the composition of the following Command agencies:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. <u>Ta Bang</u> [ District Command Committee ]<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Le Van Thu, District Unit Leader</li><li>- Bay So [ poss Nguyen Van So ], District Polit Off.</li></ul></li></ol>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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CLASSIFICATION: GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADING: WITHIN 1000 KM AND  
12.5% I.M. ACCORDINGLY.

DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE TO  
ARMED FORCES AND FREE  
CIVILIANS AS SERVICE FORCES.

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADING AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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By I.M. NAVA, DIA 2/12

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BULLETIN No. 8834

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
	<p>- The subordinate Sections of Tà Bàng District Command Committee are:</p> <p>- The Staff Section of <u>Group 7</u> 80C which would serve as a <u>Staff</u> Section for Tà Bàng District Unit, Hq.</p> <p>- <u>Hospital</u> K.77 of Rear Svc Gp 827; the dispensary of 80C and the dispensary of Chau Thành <u>District of Tây Ninh Province</u>, which will provide medical support for Tà Bàng District Unit.</p> <p>- The Rear Service of Doan <u>Group 7</u> 155 which is responsible for the support of Tà Bàng District Unit as required.</p> <p>- The workshop of Chau Thành District <u>Tây Ninh Prov</u> which will provide technical assistance and guidance in manufacturing weapons for Tà Bàng Dist Unit.</p> <p>2. <u>Village Unit Hq 72 (Hòa Hiệp):</u> Not listed.</p> <p>3. <u>Command Committee of Village Unit 73:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Village Unit Ldr = Bé (C8)</li><li>- Asst Village Unit Ldr = Sáu Việt</li><li>- Polit Off = Long (Dispensary)</li></ul> <p>Village 73 consists of four hamlets: Hamlets 1, 2, 3 and 4, which will be responsible for the joint defense of K77, C8, an unspecified dispensary and H16 respectively.</p> <p>4. <u>Command Committee of Village 74:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Village Unit Ldr is Nguyễn Tân</li><li>- Asst Village Unit Ldr is Sáu Quán, and Sơn (from Admin Staff of Group 155)</li><li>- Polit Off is Sáu Quán (of B2/155)</li></ul> <p>Village 74 consists of three Hamlets: Hamlets 5, 6 and 7, which will be responsible for the joint defense of B2/155, BTS / poss <u>Group 7</u> of Cp 7 80C; the Admin Staff of B2/155 and B7/155 respectively.</p>	

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PHILIPPINES, 1934.

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BULLETIN No. 453a

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200

### Summary

### Capture Data

- <u>Vill Unit 77: Group 16 HQ</u>	Hamlet 15
14/Đoàn 16	Hamlet 16
C1/Đoàn 16	Hamlet 17
C2/Đoàn 16	Hamlet 18
C3/Đoàn 16	Hamlet 19/1009

### Independent Hamlets:

FC7 4104300 Hamlet 13

Die zweite [sic!] Reihe ist

It is also revealed that Hòa Tiến and  
Tả Bàng Village Units are designated Village  
Unit 72 and 76 respectively.

In undated entry concerning the IVN - Cambodian border policy, the author recorded that Cambodian territory is a safe rear base area for VC/NVA, a supply resource for Area C and a "diplomatic means" for the VC/NVA.

In addition, document contains several personnel rosters and formats prescribing regulations governing the issue of passes to personnel on BIV in the District.

(4) CDPC CONFIDENTIAL: \* Extract translation will follow under the # 6224 C34 A2

11. The person has an intellectual disability

Q1-1351-68  
(10 page  
original,  
handwritten).

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(b) The Weapons Issue Registers, both originated by Team 82 /, Rear Service Group, Hq, SVNL, revealed the types and amounts of weapons and ammunition issued to individuals from various units during the period 21 Aug - 11 Sep 67. Each entry in the registers mentions name and unit of the recipient, issue date, and signatures of both the recipient and the Armorer, / of Team 82 /, these registers were signed by Nguyen Duc Non, Armorer, and Le Hoang Ich, member of the Military Personnel Section of "Linh", Rear Svc Gp 82 /. Recipient units listed included 100C, 204, A530, 200C, 501C, 4510, A510, 304, 306, K77A, B2, B6, A520, F71E, A580, 100C, 206, B2, B3 and B5. Recipient cadre consisted of Nguyen Van Triet from

7 Jan 68  
WT9916.4 (Opp  
Rapid Fire Five)  
Received CDSC:  
8 Jan 68

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WHD-698133

TM ~~1990~~ DATA 7/10

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Doc Log No. 1

Summary

Capture Date

61, Nguyen Van An from 16, Nguyen Van Nghi from 20, Cai Ngoc from 45, Nguyen Trung Kien, a Co 10 from 371B, Nguyen Tram Son from A530, Chau Khoen Nha from 226, Le Van Son and Nguyen Van Day, Rear Co 10's from 85 and 142.

Weapons issued during the above period included one RPG 7, 17 assault rifles, 66 RPG, 52 C80 rifles, 30 pistols and two AT mines.

(b) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

01-1318-68

65 pages

original, handwritten)

(b)

(c) Elias of Group 800 and Ta Béng Dist Unit.

(c) Item #1: Low-quality of paper, undated and unsigned, pertains to the organization of Ta Béng Dist Unit, and Unit 17 poss in various villages of Ta Béng Dist, in Tuy Ninh Prov. Document reveals that Ta Béng Dist Unit was activated on 6 Mar 67. The assignment of personnel as follows: Ta Béng Dist Unit is as follows: Le Van Huu, Staff Unit CO, B750; Polit Off, and Nguyen Van Loc Dist Unit AG. The assignment at Staff Sec, Ta Béng Dist Unit is as follows: Kieu, Staff Assistant for Current Affairs, 1 Member of 7 C100; Polit Off, and 1 a Member of Unit 515; Member of Rear Svc Sec. Ta Béng Dist Unit is designated as Unit 17.

Two Vill. Unit Bqs are listed as follows: Vill. Unit 72 (Kien Kieu, led by Kien Duyet, and Vill. Unit 73 led by Bx at Long Viet.

Annotation on the document reads: "7th Co: Huy dinh and Hui Nguyen, 11th Co: Tam Nhac, 14th Co: Hui Yang, 10th Co: Tuy Duong, and 300th Co: Tuy Linh."

(c) Item #2: notebook, with entries dated 12-13 Jan 68, made by Kieu, Staff Assistant for Current Affairs of Ta Béng Dist Unit 515, in Tuy Ninh Prov, contains schedules of meetings, and a roster of 14 of 17 poss 800 C100.

(c) Document reveals that a meeting was held on 12 Jan 68 of southern area 22 at the Central Staff Sec on 13 Jan 68. The purpose of the meeting is unknown. The meeting held on 3 Jan 68 discloses that combat equipment was issued to the following units: A, C7, C8, C9, C11, Recon Sec, Tuy Linh, Rear Sec, Crypto Sec, and Polit Sec.

7 Jan 68  
NT-91611 (Opn  
Reactive Fire Fire  
6-56, "A" Co,  
15th US SPCR  
Received CDEC  
8 Jan 68

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By I.M. HNW, Date 7/10

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BULL. PIA No. 824

CDEC Doc. Lot No.	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>Following is a list of names of 48 members of Sq of 1 poss 80 C/7 Group: Lê Văn Thủ, Nguyễn Trọng Lิêm, Nguyễn Văn Sở, Hoàng Hải, Phạm Ngọc Kiết, Nguyễn Văn Bé, Hoàng Nieu, Nguyễn Văn Cú, Lương Văn Hầu, Phạm Văn Bé, Nguyễn Đức Tiết, Nguyễn Danh Té, Phạm Ngọc Thinh, Nguyễn Văn Dân, Lê Văn Hùng, Võ Ngọc Sáu, Nguyễn Văn Lí, Nguyễn Văn Bé aka Sơn, Nguyễn Văn Mồ, Trần Văn Phi, Phan Ngọc Thuận, Nguyễn Văn Ngón, Trương Văn Sinh, Nguyễn Thanh Cám, Phạm Văn Biển, Hồ Văn Vũ, Trần Văn Bùi, Nguyễn Văn Mùi, Châu Thành Long, Nguyễn Văn Hải, Nguyễn Hoài Minh, Nguyễn Văn Tân, Võ Ngọc Thành, Nguyễn Văn Tri, Nguyễn Thành Lập, Nguyễn Văn Lê, Trịnh Văn Chinh, Phạm Văn Bành, Huỳnh Văn Quynh, Mai Văn Đức, Hoàng Minh, Đặng Thành, Lê Văn Cúi, Phuông, Võ Văn Hộc, Phạm Vănbach, Nguyễn Tai Tân, Nguyễn Tiết Chí, Trần Văn Đèn, Huỳnh Văn Bảo, Nguyễn Văn Thủ, Nguyễn Văn Ty, Nguyễn Sô Linh, Nguyễn Văn Côn, Trần Văn Tri, Nguyễn Văn Sinh, Nguyễn Văn Sinh, Nguyễn Văn Út, Lê Văn Hùng, Nguyễn Văn Phú, Hồng Văn Thủ, Nguyễn Văn Ngòi, Lê Văn Tạo, Nguyễn Công Khán, Nguyễn Văn Hòa, Huỳnh Ba, Huỳnh Hưng, Phạm Văn Nha, Thạch Kinh, Cao Sơn Ngọc, Phạm Nguyễn Sở, Nguyễn Văn Lai, Phạm Văn Hải, Nguyễn Tuyết Dân, Lê Văn Vang, Dương Phú, Thị Văn, Đặng Thị Đề, Phan Thị Thành Hải, Nguyễn Văn Tú, Nguyễn Thị Châm, Nguyễn Văn Thúy, Nguyễn Văn Mùi, Nguyễn Văn Út, Đinh Văn Cao, Huỳnh Cám Chưởng, Lư Thị Hoà, Võ Thị Hồng, Nguyễn Thực Thông, and Nguyễn Tùng Hoc. They were equipped with three B10, five LMG, 34 Rifles, and nine Pistols.</p> <p>(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.</p>	

*RECORDED AND  
A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC*

6

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NWD-898133  
By I.M. NNAU, DIA 2/10

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HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MAC/5261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8835

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CBEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1359-62 (1 page original, handwritten.)	(C) Unit A515 of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
(B)	(C) Report, dated 13 Jun 67, signed by Nguyễn Văn Sở, CO of A515, LBN86402YK [prob LBN of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA], addressed to CO of Bоn 82 [prob Rear Service Group 82], reveals names of eight personnel of A515, assigned to reinforce A530: Đỗ Văn Hiệp, Nguyễn Văn Nhã, Lê Chí Thiên Trường Thành Sơn, Nguyễn Văn Phùng, Chau Ngan, Lê Chí Hả and Bùi Thị hoa. The group was led by Asst Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Phùng.	
	(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information	
01-1360-62 (2 page original, handwritten.)	(C) Crit A515, Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five). B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
(B)	(C) Report, dated 17 Apr 67, signed by Nici- Hô for A515 of Bоn 82 [Rear Service Group 82, HQ SVNLA], addressed to CO of Rear Service Group 82/ reveals names and positions of 20 personnel of A515 who were reassigned to reinforce A530.	
	One Plat Ldr, Phạm Văn Xun; one Asst Plat Ldr, Nguyễn Văn Phùng; five Sod Ldr, Bùi Ba, Lê Tiêu, Trần Bường, Nguyễn Lai, Đặng Mồng; and 13 combatants, Lê Sở, Phạm Hiep, Hồ Long, Nguyễn Ba, Lê Dẹp (Cambodian), Đoàn Văn Hiệp, Nguyễn- Văn Nhã, Lê Chí Thiên, Trưởng Thành Sơn, Chau Ngan, Lê Chí Hả and Bùi Thị hoa.	
	(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information	
01-1361-62* (6 page original, handwritten.)	(U) Unit C410.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
(B)	(C) Item 7 1: Account Settlement Report, undated and unsigned, reveals names and positions of 63 members of Unit C410 who were issued sub- sistence allowances for Jan [year unknown]. Key personnel listed on the document are: Bn X0 Phạm Công Qua, Cо X0 Nguyễn Văn Chấn, Polit Off and Cо Cо Vđ Trương Bửu	

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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Authority MAC-290133

IN 1M. NINA. DIA. 710

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REF ID: A6200

Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
01-1362-68 (1 page original, handwritten.)	<p>(C) Item # 2: Account Settlement Report, dated 31 Mar 67, signed by Adjacent Anh and countersigned by Bn XO Mai Du, aka Pham Cong Qua, CO of Unit 0410, discloses names and positions of 48 members of Unit 0410 who were issued subsistence allowances for Mar 67.</p> <p>Key personnel listed on the document are: Bn XO Pham Cong Qua and Co CO Ho Thanh Su. The total amount issued is 19,443\$.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: * Full Translation will follow under Ltr # 6-027 0235-68</p>	
01-1363-68 (2 page original, handwritten). (B)	<p>(C) Elements of Doan 80C</p> <p>(C) Incomplete Letter, written, prepared by U/I member of Doan 80C /poco Replacement Training Sq of Group 80, H., CVNLA, addressed to the Command Committees of 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th Companies, directed to meet with personnel from Ltrn 100 [Troy] and Nhaf 29 [Bog]. In the afternoon plan to prepare row boats and motor boats to pick up B40 and B41 [rocket launchers] and ammunition in the near future.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
01-1364-68* (7 page original, handwritten.) (B)	<p>(C) Doan 80C and Rear Service Group 82</p> <p>(C) Item # 1: Message, dated 17 Dec 67, signed by Thu for Doan 80C, sent to Doan 149 [Prob Rear Svc Staff Dept, H., CVNLA], requests addressed to have Doan 82 [Rear Service Group 82] loan Doan 80C 400,000 to 500,000 Rials by early Jan 68 and to send a copy of the SOI to permit them to contact Doan 82 directly.</p> <p>(C) Item # 2: Undated Message, signed by Ba Dang of Doan 82, sent to Doan 80C, informs addressee that on 15 Dec 67, Doan 82 sent Nguyen Chi Trung to the Rear Service [Staff Dept] Trung took 4,000,000\$ with him. Doan 82C is requested to assign representatives to contact Trung and 7 So in Area 1515.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: Original passed to Tru.</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five). B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
	<p>(C) Elm of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA</p> <p>(C) Item 1: Roster, dated 21 Jul 67, prepared by VD Thanh Hai for 200.C [Prob Elm of Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA] Command Committee, lists names, positions and POS of 114 personnel of Unit 200.C as of Jul 67. Of the 114 personnel there are: one Co XO (VD Thanh Hai), nine Plat</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five). B-36, "A", Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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BULLETIN No. 8835

CDEC

Doc Log No.

Summary

Capture Data

cadre (Nguyen Van Viem, Nguyen Thanh Khan, Dinh-Van Cuoc, Bui Van Khainh, To Phuoc Ha, Pham Van Buong, Vo Van Nghiep, Nguyen Ngoc Be and Nguyen-Cong Trach), 57 Sqd cadre, and 67 combatants.

(C) Item 2: Roster, dated 30 Nov 67, prepared by Thanh Long, Polit Off, lists names and positions of 31 personnel of Unit C9, who participated in a political examination. Of the 31 personnel, 16 were Sqd cadre and 15 Combatants.

The reverse side of the roster contains a report dated 30 Dec 67, signed illegibly, which reveals that 209 personnel of Units C6 through C11, and Doan [Group] HQ, participated in a political examination.

(C) Item 3: Undated Roster, prepared by Ho Sung Mieng, lists names and positions of 30 personnel of 8th Co, who participated in a [political] examination. Of the 30 personnel, ten were Sqd cadre and 20 Combatants.

The reverse side of the roster contains a report, undated and prepared by an [U/I] individual reveals that 187 personnel of Units [U] through C11, and Doan [Group] HQ, participated in the political examination.

(C) Item 4: Undated Roster, prepared by an [U/I] individual, lists names and positions of 34 personnel of Units Q1 through Q4, B1, B129 (Cong-Truong 7: [prob 7th VC Div, HQ, SVNL]), Cong-Truong 9 [prob 9th VC Div, HQ, SVNL], C5-80A [prob 5th Co of ROK Replacement Training Bn, HQ, SVNL], and [LBN] 86, 200YK-A26 [prob Elm of Mil Staff Dept, HQ, SVNL], who were wounded and treated at C8, D 69 [prob An Duong 69: 69th Convalescence Camp].

(U) CDEC COMMENT: \* Full Translation will follow under IIR #....6 027 0236 68

A.L. GALL  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US. Blm, CDEC

3

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Authority NWD-398133  
By I.M. NWD, DIA 7/10

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

356.136.1

9 January 1968

BULLETIN NO. 8238

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
CI-1374-68 (1 page original, handwritten.) (1)	<p>(U) Accounting Voucher.</p> <p>(C) Accounting Voucher, undated, prepared by an S/1 in <del>Aviation</del>, records contingent assets and liabilities of [1962] year-end by the following units:</p>	<p>7 Jan 68 W991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) P-36, "A" Co., 5th US SFG. Received CDEC: 7 Jan 68</p>

Unit	Owed On	STATUS	Riels	South VN	Riels	Liabilities
			Riels	piasters	Riels	South VN
	Riels	Cambodian currency?				piasters
Co	12,549	43,671	2,690	2,714	93,698	
Co		not listed				
Co	11,954	35,508	3,995	814	51,296	
Co		not listed				
Co	1,495	23,185	775	14,123	24,303	
nd Co 100's		not listed				
Co element		"				
expenses		"				
and 100's		"				
mining	Dec 7	"				
rent 100	Dec 7	"				
rent 100	Dec 7	"				
rent 100	Dec 7	"				
rent 100	Dec 7	"				

(b) REGRESSION: No Further Significant Indication.

— 1972-1981 — of the Communication Station.


(3) Certificate dated 11 Dec 67, signed by  
S. G. Gao, for the CIC of Y-21 (2100) 1st Co, 113  
Infantry Regt, No. 2001, 7, states that their unit  
had stopped at Y-21, from 2 to 21 Dec 67, on its  
way to 113 Inf Regt HQs, Tianshui, Gansu 9th Regt, 7,

THE SIGHTS OF THE CHINESE CAPITAL  
THE WINTER OF THE LAST KING OF  
THE BEIJING COUNTRY.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER TO  
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1977.  
THE STATEMENT OF THE NEW ECONOMIC  
POLICY.

W. H. F. 1  
PC. NO. 1000 - 12-17-1917, 11:15 A. M.,  
NEWCASTLE, DE. 19720

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Bulletin No. 8838

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data																																																																																																								
	<p>and that an FMAF/RVNAF sweep on opn had delayed its movement. Document reveals that the cited Unit should return to its base area to get more subsistence allowances.</p> <p>(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.</p>																																																																																																									
01-1376-68 (LO page original, handwritten.) (B)	<p>(C) Rear Svcs Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(C) Record, dated from 22 Aug to 18 Oct 67, maintained by Đặng Hoàng Sơn and Nguyễn Đức Hòa, records weapons issued to individuals of [Đoàn 82 aka Rear SVcs Group 82, HQ, SVNLA]. Following are names, ranks, and units of receivers, and weapons issued during the cited period:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Name</th> <th>Rank</th> <th>Weapon</th> <th>Unit</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>Nguyễn Văn Triết</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>B9 [ poss Trans Sec ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Văn Ám</td><td>Co XO</td><td>"</td><td>B6 [ poss Financial Affairs Sec ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Văn Nhí</td><td>Co XO</td><td>"</td><td>25A [ poss Hospital ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Sáu Ngó</td><td>Co XO</td><td>"</td><td>1520 [ poss QM depot ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Trung Kiên</td><td>Co XO</td><td>"</td><td>20A [ poss Mil Hospital ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Lê Quang Bay</td><td>Co XO</td><td>"</td><td>20A</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Trung Sơn</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>1530 [ poss QM depot ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Tú Ký</td><td>Co CO</td><td>one K54</td><td>1520</td></tr> <tr><td>Út Sứ</td><td>Co CO</td><td>one K54</td><td>1520</td></tr> <tr><td>Bay Mùng</td><td>Co CO</td><td>one K54</td><td>B6</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Văn Dũng</td><td>Co CO</td><td>one K54</td><td>100 [ poss Security Guard Co ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Thành Văn</td><td>Polit Off</td><td>"</td><td>100C</td></tr> <tr><td>Chau Hồng Nam</td><td>Co CO</td><td>"</td><td>226 [ poss Ordnance Shop ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Đường</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>82 [ poss Polit and Security Guard Sec ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Nguyễn Văn Đồng</td><td>Co CO</td><td>"</td><td>H24B [ poss Med School ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Cao Văn Sinh</td><td>Co XO</td><td>"</td><td>H24B</td></tr> <tr><td>Lê Văn Tôn</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one K54</td><td>B5 [ poss Med Sec ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Lê Văn Cốp</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>226</td></tr> <tr><td>Sáu</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>P3 [ poss QM Sec ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Đặng Trương Khâm</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>25A</td></tr> <tr><td>Phạm Văn Tri</td><td>Vn IC</td><td>one K54</td><td>25A</td></tr> <tr><td>Sanh Dân</td><td>Fr. XO</td><td>one K54</td><td>20A [ poss Mil Hospital ]</td></tr> <tr><td>Lê Hiên Bao</td><td>Co XO</td><td>one P38</td><td>1530</td></tr> <tr><td>Lai Thành</td><td>First Ldr</td><td>one P38</td><td>1530</td></tr> <tr><td>Tú Hậu</td><td>Unk</td><td>one K54</td><td>Unk</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Receipt, dated 2 Oct 67, signed by Hầu Lý, reveals that Lý and Mười Tân received two K54, two pistol holsters, two pistol belts, and 80 rd of ammo in compliance with the order of Tú Khoa. Attached is a travel pass # 65, dated 10 Apr 66, signed illegibly, which authorizes Phuynh Dang to proceed to 1st dialect of Tân Thành Vill. Subject was armed with P38. Red seal reads: P.2734, SVNLA. Notes</p>	Name	Rank	Weapon	Unit	Nguyễn Văn Triết	Co XO	one P38	B9 [ poss Trans Sec ]	Nguyễn Văn Ám	Co XO	"	B6 [ poss Financial Affairs Sec ]	Nguyễn Văn Nhí	Co XO	"	25A [ poss Hospital ]	Sáu Ngó	Co XO	"	1520 [ poss QM depot ]	Nguyễn Trung Kiên	Co XO	"	20A [ poss Mil Hospital ]	Lê Quang Bay	Co XO	"	20A	Nguyễn Trung Sơn	Co XO	one P38	1530 [ poss QM depot ]	Tú Ký	Co CO	one K54	1520	Út Sứ	Co CO	one K54	1520	Bay Mùng	Co CO	one K54	B6	Nguyễn Văn Dũng	Co CO	one K54	100 [ poss Security Guard Co ]	Nguyễn Thành Văn	Polit Off	"	100C	Chau Hồng Nam	Co CO	"	226 [ poss Ordnance Shop ]	Đường	Co XO	one P38	82 [ poss Polit and Security Guard Sec ]	Nguyễn Văn Đồng	Co CO	"	H24B [ poss Med School ]	Cao Văn Sinh	Co XO	"	H24B	Lê Văn Tôn	Co XO	one K54	B5 [ poss Med Sec ]	Lê Văn Cốp	Co XO	one P38	226	Sáu	Co XO	one P38	P3 [ poss QM Sec ]	Đặng Trương Khâm	Co XO	one P38	25A	Phạm Văn Tri	Vn IC	one K54	25A	Sanh Dân	Fr. XO	one K54	20A [ poss Mil Hospital ]	Lê Hiên Bao	Co XO	one P38	1530	Lai Thành	First Ldr	one P38	1530	Tú Hậu	Unk	one K54	Unk	<p>7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire 5) B-36, ". " Co, 5th US SFOR. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68</p>
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Tú Hậu	Unk	one K54	Unk																																																																																																							

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Collection No. 8028

Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
	on the reverse side of the Pass, signed by <u>Tu Khoa</u> , direct Sdn and <u>Hor</u> [members of Rear SVcs Group 82] to issue two K54 to <u>Ly</u> and <u>Muoi Tan</u> .	
	An Issue Slip # 001-TP, dated 5 Sep 67, signed by <u>Đặng Hoàng Sơn</u> for CO of <u>Đoàn 82</u> [aka Rear SVcs Group 82, HQ, SVNLA], instructs T25 to issue 720 rds of 4K ammo, and two T mines to <u>Unit</u> 50%.	
	The document further reveals that 22 AK, 45 CKG, one RPG, and 46 K56 were issued to the following units [subordinate to Rear SVcs Group 82]: 100C, 200C [poss Trans Co], 20A, B112, 4520, 4530, 46120, 4510 and 4615 [poss QM depots] and 90E [poss Clothing Items Depot].	
	(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.	
Q1-1377-68 (4 page original, handwritten.)	(U) Personal letter, IBN 86,200YK/Đoi 6  (C) Personal Letter, dated Oct 67, signed by <u>Luân</u> , member of IBN 86,200YK/Đoi 6 /Unit 6 of Mil Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA], addressed to <u>Kiều</u> of an unspecified unit, inquires about the health of <u>Kiều</u> , <u>Ba Văn</u> , <u>Ba Diệu</u> , and <u>Thuân</u> , and informs the addressee that <u>Ba Phuoc</u> was KIA during an air strike conducted by the enemy [FWNAF/RVNAF] in Aug 67. Luân discloses that his unit had to support the <u>Công Trưởng</u> [Div] and the main force Units. Luân states that he and other personnel of his Unit had to endure hardships and cope with increasing "enemy" activities. Luân states that during his recent TDY at MR 6, he had to continue to move even though he had a serious fever. Luân further informs Kiều that he met the friends who formerly infiltrated SVN with him. Of these individuals, <u>Bình</u> was reassigned to <u>Đoàn 15</u> [Q761 Regt, 9th VC Div, HQ, SVNLA] and others to <u>Đoàn 80D</u> and <u>Đoàn 80A</u> . Regarding their health, Luân affirms that they all suffered from a serious fever.	7 Jan 68 WT391644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
(C)	(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information	

*Aug 1967*  
A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8230

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC	Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	01-1378-68 (1 page original, typewritten.) (U)	<p>(U) Financial Estimates by Đoàn 80C.</p> <p>(U) Financial estimates, dated 30 Dec 67, signed by Lê Văn Thủ, CO of Đoàn <u>Group</u> 80C, addressed to the Commanding Officers of Mil Staff Department, Rear Svc Staff Department and Mil Personnel Office of R [Hq, SVA], and to the CO of Đoàn 82 [Rear Svc Group, HQ, SVA], requests issue of 40,423 piasters as operating funds for the Staff Svc of Đoàn 80C in 1968, broken down as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Combat expenses ..... 20,810\$</li><li>- Training expenses ..... 5,150\$</li><li>- Maintenance expenses ... 6,990\$</li><li>- Signal expenses ..... 22,976\$</li><li>- Expenses for Crypto ... 4,500\$</li></ul> <p>Document reveals that: (1) at the present time, subordinate to Đoàn are six Co-size units and an agency concurrently functioning as a District Unit; (2) the Signal <u>Sec</u> of Đoàn with a 15W radio set has to insure communication between three separate nets; (3) the filing of PMS will be increased due to large influx and outflow of troops in convalescents and straggler recovery elements.</p> <p>(U) CLEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire 5) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
	01-1378-68 (2 pages original, handwritten.) (U)	<p>(U) Personal Letter.</p> <p>(U) Personal Letter, dated 12 Sep 67, signed by Khoát aka Đắc, addressee to his brother Vinh of an unspecified Unit, inquires about Vinh's health. Document further reveals that his address was changed as follows: Khoát aka Đắc, P.A. 101 Cao Miền (Hue).</p> <p>(U) CLEC COMMENT: 1. No Further Significant Information.</p> <p>2. Document captured with others referring to Rear Service Group 82 and Group 80C Replacement Training Unit.</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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Authority NWD-898153  
By T.M. NAVA, DIA  
7/10

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Bulletin No. 8639

CEDEC

Doc. Log. No.

Summary

Capture date

01-1380-68 \*

(5 page

original,  
handwritten.)

(P)

- (U) Unit A530 of Rear Service Group 82,  
(C) Item #1: Undated Roster, made by an U/1  
individual, reveals names of 61 Co Cadre of units  
Group HQ & TIC, 165, K70, 422, C41, T24, 175, C2, C3,  
170, 150, 153B, B28, E27, Y71, 167, K77A, Y77B, 224,  
21, C4, 240 and T25, each of whom was armed with a  
pistol (12 Canadian [sic], 12 colts and 37B [pass "p"]  
38 pistols). Annotation on the left of the document  
discusses that 45 345 pistols were issued to a number  
of Interdiction Cadre of various units.  
(C) Item #2: Roster, dated 31 Mar 66, signed  
by Adjutant Ngoc Anh and countersigned by Ba Phao,  
Co of Unit 6410, reveals names of 61 individuals of  
6410 who were issued clothing items for Mar 66.  
(C) Item #3: Roster, dated 17 Sep 67, made by  
an U/1 person, lists name and position of 169  
members of Unit A.530.

Key personnel listed on the document are: Lt  
Co Phan Van BiSu, Co AQ Tran Van Phuc, and Dao Van  
Nhan, Plat Ltrs Luong Van Chinh, Ltr Van Phan, Say  
Bat Khuat, Tran Van Huyet, Nguyen Van Uydt, Huynh  
Van Hat and Lt Van Khoai, and Plat Ltrs Vo Van  
Khanh, Le Van Ha, Nguyen Van Thuan, Duong Van Nghia,  
Leu Van Rieng, Pham Van Xem, Le Van Minh and Nguyen  
Van Thang.

- (C) CEDEC COMMENT: (U) 1. Full translation will  
follow under LIR #6 027  
0253 68  
(C) 2. Document captured with  
others referring to Rear  
Service Group 82.

01-1381-68

(2 page

original,  
handwritten.)

(P)

(C) Shortage of medicine in Group 800.

- (C) Items 1 and 2: Letter, dated 4 Jan 68,  
signed by Tranh Long, Chief of Medical Section of  
Group 800 [pass Replacement Training on of Group 800,  
Ht, C41, 175], informs B5/86,402 [pass Rear Service  
Group 82, Y71, SVIEN] that the supply of medicine,  
including antibiotics, anti-malaria pills, and com-  
monly used medicines of P30A is inadequate. Ad-  
dresser also requested to send personnel to  
Tranh Long's unit to investigate and solve this  
problem.

The envelope bears the following address:

From: Medical Section, B5/86,404 YK  
To : B5/86,402 YK.

- (U) CEDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

*A. L. Galli*  
A. L. Galli  
LTC, USA  
2 Dir, MI Bldg, CEDEC

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Authority NWD-298133  
By I.M. NWA, DIA 2/10

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 364

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date		
Name	Position	Unit	Reassigned To	
01-1385-68 (7 page original, handwritten, typewritten.)	(C) Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA (C) Seven Orders, dated Sep 67, signed by <u>Vin</u> <u>Van Bang</u> and <u>Nhat Quang</u> for <u>Doan 82</u> (prob Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA), concerning reassignment of the following individuals: (B)		7 Jan 68 WF991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B/56 "A" Co 6th US SFCA. Arrived CDEC: 8 Jan 68	
Nguyen Thi Hieu aka Ngang	Combatant	A.529	40.1	
Nguyen Thi Van aka Huong.	"	"	"	
Nguyen Van Tai	Squad Leader	90B	25.	
Nguyen Van Hoang	Asst Squad Ldr	T.24	T.25	
Truong Hung Hiep	Combatant	"	"	
Medic Nguyen Van De	Asst Squad Ldr	100L	2000	
Le Thi Em aka Huong	Combatant	B.21	K.71C	
Medic Nguyen Thuc Tien	Asst Squad Ldr	B.21	Unit 7 10.	
Nguyen Van Choi	Combatant	C4/102	B.27	
(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.				
01-1387-68 (14 page original, handwritten, typewritten.)	(C) Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA (C) Fourteen Orders, dated between Nov 67 and Jul 68, signed by <u>Vu Khuu Khoa</u> , <u>Nguyen Huu</u> , <u>Nguyen Dang</u> and <u>Nguyen Binh Dan</u> for <u>Doan 82</u> (prob Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA), concerning reassignment of the following individuals: (B)		7 Jan 68 WF991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B/56 "A" Co, 6th US SFCA. Arrived CDEC: Jan 68	
Luu Van Co	Combatant	A.529	25.102	
Do Van Duc	"	"	"	
Ho Van Hoang	Asst Sqd Ldr	1.112	Unit 7 10.102	
Nguyen Van Ho	"	"	"	
Nguyen Van Ton aka Moi	Combatant	100B	"	

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By J.M. HADA, DAD  
7/10

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Bulletin No. 8841

CDEC

Doc. Log No. | Summary

Capture Dates

Truong Van Minh	Combatant	A15	Medic Training class of Doi [Unit] 20. 20.A (71 B)
Medic Hoang Xuan Chau	Asst Sod Ldr	Doi [Unit] 7 6 (35A)	"
Medic Ho Van Be Luong Thi Hong	Combatant	35A	Pharmacist Training (Unit 80B). HQ Group 82(3d, 6th, 9th Elm)
Duong Kim Lien	"	"	"
Nurse Nguyen Thi Tuyet	Asst Sod Ldr	35A	"
Nguyen Thi Thuy	Combatant	90B	B.5, Drug Preparation Course.
Nguyen Thi Cuc, Nguyen Van Luoc To Minh Canh	Squad Ldr Asst Sod Ldr	100C B.5	Doi [Unit] 20 Doi [Unit] 20 Medic Training Course.
Nurse Le Thi Ngoc Thu	"	30A	A.515

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

01-1387-68  
(3 page  
original,  
typewritten,  
printed.)

(B)

(C) Group 80C

(C) Item #1: Speech, delivered in Dec 67 by Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRV at the 23d anniversary of the NVA and the "National Resistance Day" reproduced by Doan [Group] 80C, praises successes of the NVA and the exploits of a number of guerrillas in SVN. Ho Chi Minh states that he was so impressed by the success of the [VC] Liberation Army against 120,000 [sic, prob 1,200,000] US Troops and their lackeys that he felt he was 20 years younger. The speech affirms that the US "egressors" will certainly be defeated. The fact that US Secretary of Defense MacNamara was recently compelled to resign proves that they are being defeated. Ho Chi Minh further appealed to 31 million people in North and in SVN to strive to gain a final success.

7 Jan 68  
WT991644  
(Opn Rapid  
Fire Five)  
B/36, "A", Co,  
5th US SFGA.  
Received CDEC:  
8 Jan 68

(C) Item #2: Order #790D/XT, dated 29 May 67, prepared for the signature of Vo Trang, Deputy Chief of the Polit Staff Dent, for HQ, SVNLA, reproduced by Nguyen Troi Lien, Polit Off, for the Command Committee of [man] 80C, awards medals, Certificates of Commendation and Letters of Appreciation to the following units and individuals for their military exploits and outstanding fulfillment of duties.

- The 11th C/ of Doan 80C.
- Asst Sod Ltr Luu Van Doi of C11, Doan 80C.

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Authority NAD-898133

2/20

by T.M. NADA, DAB

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Bulletin No. 8841

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data:
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Asst Sqd Ldr Pham Ngoc May of CIL, D<del>o</del>m 80C.</li><li>- Bui Toat, Asst Polit Off of D<del>o</del>m 80A.</li><li>- Bn XO Pham Cau, Staff Asst for Cadre Svc of D<del>o</del>m 80A.</li><li>- Bn XO Hoang Duy Hoa, Staff Asst for Indoctrination [Sec] of D<del>o</del>m 80A.</li></ul> <p>(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.</p>	

*A. Chadwick*  
cc A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No 8842

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1388-68 (3 page original, handwritten, typewritten)	(U) Medical Treatment Report, LBN 86, 554YK. (C) Item # 1 & 2. Two empty envelope addressed from Medical Section LBN 86, 554 [poss Replacement-Training Group, HQ, SVNLA] to b5/86, 102YK [Element of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA]. (S) (C) Item # 3 & 4. Two Medical Treatment Reports, dated 15 Nov and 20 Dec 67, signed by Truong Minh Chau, Chief of Med Sec, and Medical Technician Thanh Long of Doan 80 [poss Replacement-Training Group, HQ, SVNLA], reveals that during the reported period, a total of 135 wounded and sick personnel received medical treatment at the dispensary [of Doan 80] including 28 patients and two wounded personnel who were evacuated to the dispensary in Nov, and 60 patients in Dec 67, as follows:	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Fire) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFGA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68.

IN NOV 67:

CLASSIFICATION	TOTAL	RELEASED FROM DISPENSARY	EVACUATED TO OTHER DISPENSARIES	TOTAL UNDER MEDICAL TREATMENT AT THE DISPENSARY BY THE END OF NOV 67.
Patients	48	17	6	26
WIA	2		1	1
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>27</u>

IN DEC 67:

TOTAL PATIENTS	RELEASED FROM DISPENSARY	UNDER CONVALESCENCE	EVACUATED TO OTHER DISPENSARIES	TOTAL UNDER MEDICAL TREATMENT AT THE DISPENSARY BY THE END OF DEC 67.
65	45	10	2	28

The report in Nov 67 reveals that Med Sec of Doan 80 encountered serious difficulties in the treatment of malaria. In addition, medicine preparation at the Unit did not meet the required quality.

Document further discloses that the Dispensary is capable of handling 50 patients.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

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By I.M. NNA, DIA 7/10

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Bulletin No.8842

CDEC Doc Log #	Summary	Capture Data
01-1389-68 (26 page original, handwritten, typewritten.) (B)	<p>(C) Personnel of Rear Service Group 82.</p> <p>(C) Item # 1. PHS dated 9 Feb 65, prepared by Trần Thị Vững aka Thành Tuyết, member of Unit A.520, reveals the Vững was born in 1948 in An Thành Vill, Mỏ Cày Dist, Bến-Tre Prov, enlisted in Unit A.103 on 2 Jan 65, and was assigned to Đoàn 40/aka Group 827 on 7 Feb 65. Parents Trần Văn Thông and Nguyễn Thị Do resided at Vững's P/B.</p> <p>PHS was countersigned by Khâm Văn Tu, Co CO, and endorsed by Lưu Văn Sú for the Executive Committee of Unit A.520 Party Chapter on 2 Sep 67.</p> <p>(C) Item # 2. PHS dated 1 Sept 65, prepared by Đỗ Thị Bé Tu aka Út Tu, PVI of Unit D.200, reveals that Tu was born in 1947 in Trường Long Hòa Vill, Duyên Hải Dist, Trà Vinh Prov, joined the Revolution [VC] on 28 May 60, was admitted to the Youth Group on 6 Sep 62, and enlisted in Unit D.200 on 26 Apr 65. Her husband Nguyễn Văn Dân is presently serving in C.67, Đoàn / Group 82. Parents Đỗ Văn Minh and Nguyễn Thị Thuận resided in Nhà Mát Hamlet, Trường Long Hòa Vill, Duyên Hải Dist, Trà Vinh Prov.</p> <p>PHS was countersigned by Lưu Văn Sú on 2 Sep 67.</p> <p>(C) Item # 3: PHS dated 6 Aug 67, prepared by Nguyễn Ngọc Cử aka Hồng Phong, SGT, Asst Plat Ldr of Unit B83129 / poss Crypt Sec, Mil Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA, reveals that Cử was born in 1937 in An Định Vill, Duyên Nǎ Dist, Thái Bình Prov, joined the Revolution [VC] in 1956, was admitted to the Youth Group in Jun 66 and enlisted in Unit C12/D3/E48 / poss 12th Co, 34-Bn, 48th Regt, 320th NVA Div on 6 Feb 60. Subject attended an NCO course in 1960, the Technical School on 1 Apr 65, and infiltrated RVN on 3 Feb 66. He received many letters of appreciation and certificates of commendation from B48/B320 and Thái Bình Prov Unit [in RVN].</p> <p>(C) Item # 4: PHS dated 12 Aug 67, prepared by Lương Văn Hân aka Hồng Vũ, WGT, Sqd Ldr of Đoàn 80C / poss Replacement Training Bn, reveals that Hân was born in 1938 in Hùng Thắng Vill, Tiên Lang Dist, Hải Phòng Prov, and was admitted to the Youth Group on 12 Jun 64. Subject attended a Coast Guard Tng Course in 1966 and a Naval Officer Tng Course in 1961. Due to physical unfitness, he was reassigned to Local Forces and attended the Technical School in 1965. He infiltrated RVN in Aug 65 and successively served in B83129, Đoàn 70, B18/C129 and the Crypt Sec of Đoàn 80C, from Dec 65 to Aug 67.</p>	<p>7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68.</p>

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BULETIN No. 8842	Summary	Capture Data
01-1390-68 (1 page original, 1 handwritten.)	(C) Item # 5: Letter dated 15 Nov 67, prepared by Nguyen Duc Tien, Sqd Ldr of an U/I Sig Unit, addressed to U/I Group <u>Party</u> Committee, pledges to surmount hardships to accomplish any mission assigned by the Party.  (U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
(B)	(C) Request for issue of mines by Unit 100C, Rear Svc Group 82.  Letter, dated 27 Aug 67, signed by Van of Unit 100C <u>poss</u> Security Guard Co of Rear Service Group 82, HQ SVNLA <u>7</u> , informs Nhut Quang that Van had already returned to his unit on 23 Aug <u>sic</u> and Hai Dang stopped at Unit B175 <u>poss</u> QM Depot of Rear Service Group 82 <u>7</u> in Soc Moi to see his son. Document further reveals that B1, B2, Administrative Staff and Reconnaissance Section did not complete construction of trenches and shelters. Addressees was also informed that most of B2/100C personnel were stricken by malaria. Finally, Nguyen Van requested issue of DH5 and DH10 <u>directional mines</u> and anti-vehicle mines <u>number U/I</u> for the coming counter-sweep operations.  Annotation signed by Nhut Quang informs Anh Sau to contact B4 for the mines.  (U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opm Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
01-1391-68 (4 page original, typewritten.)	(C) Doan 80C  (C) Item # 1: Report, dated 1967, signed by Phan Van Thuon, Staff Asst for Propaganda and Training of Unit 80C, pertains to the transfer of the Propaganda and Training <u>facilities</u> to Doan 82.  The report relates documents used for indoctrination, propaganda and training activities in 1967, the Emulation, Mess and Education Tasks.  Document used for indoctrinating recruits are also <u>referred</u> . The report reveals that recruits including Vietnamese nationals residing abroad.  In addition, the report discloses that "the former Doan <u>Group</u> 80 A" had turned in a radio set, and C.6 was a Co assuming the training of recruits.  (C) Item # 2: Report, dated 1 Jan 68, signed by Phan Van Thuon, Staff Asst for Propaganda and	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opm Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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9 January 1968

BULLETIN NO. 2643

## ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
01-1392-68 (1 page, original handwritten.) (B)	(C) Weapons of Unit B4-A520.  (C) Weapons Inventory, dated 17 Sep 67, signed illegibly, lists types and amounts of weapons and ammo on hand in Unit B4-A520 during Sep 67. The list includes six CCK rifles, eight AK assault rifles, two K50, two AT44, one Carbine and two B40 rocket launchers. Document also reveals weapons lost and ammo expended for anti aircraft activities during a counter-sweep opn on 30 Jul 67, and during an U/I attack against FWMAF/RVNAF vehicles on 28 Aug 67. This includes two K50, five AT44 and 334 rds of assorted ammo.  (U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
01-1393-68 (2 page, original typewritten.) (B)	(C) Doan 80C.  (C) <u>Item #1:</u> Account Settlement Report, dated 5 Apr 67, prepared by Trần Phượng, certified by Trưởng Văn Tuyết in charge of Financial Affairs [Sec] and Bùi Toát [Asst Polit Off of Doan 80 A] records a credit of 84,228\$ for the Propaganda and Training [Sec] of an unspecified Doan [Group 80] in 1966. A part of this sum was transmitted to D41, T15 and a Motion Picture Unit. The remainder was expended for the purchase of radio sets for Doan 80 A and 80 C.  A footnote reveals that the invoices for the radio purchases have been transmitted to U 82.  A handwritten note indicates that this copy was sent to 80 C and Ngô Súóng for information.  (C) <u>Item #2:</u> Communiqué, dated 18 Dec 67, prepared for the signature of Ngọc Kiều for the CO of Doan 80 C, instructs subordinate units that due to the "enemy" [FWMAF/RVNAF] activities on Roads #22 and #20, there would be certain changes in the previous military training schedule.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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By I.M., NWD, DM 2/10

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Bulletin No. 8643

CDEC

Doc Log No.

Summary

Capture Data

Firing exercises would be postponed until next month. Study on techniques of night attacks on "enemy" bivouacs by squad units should take place.

The ammunition supply point of Đoàn 80 C7 is presently located at the former location of Ngoc Anh's depot 410.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

01-1394-68  
(3 page,  
original  
handwritten,  
typewritten.)

(B)

(C) Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.

(C) Three Orders, dated Apr 67, signed by Tinh Dân, CO of Đoàn 82 [prob Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA], reveal the name and position of 29 personnel of Đoàn 82 who were assigned to the Contagious Diseases Hospital, to K.77A and to K.71B.

7 Jan 68  
WT991644  
(Opn Ra-  
bid Fire Five)  
B-36 "A" Co  
5th US SFCA  
Received CDEC:  
8 Jan 68

Name	Position	Reassigned to
1. Nguyễn Văn Thành	Plat Ldr	Contagious Disease Hospital
2. Đỗ Hồng Tâm	Asst Plat Ldr	" " "
3. Lê Văn Lui	Asst Plat Ldr	" " "
4. Võ Văn Thành	Combatant	" " "
5. Huynh Văn Tiên	Combatant	" " "
6. Đỗ Thị Kim Cúc	Sqd Ldr	K.77A
7. Nurse Võ Kim Tuyết	Combatant	"
8. Nurse Đinh Thị Kiênh	Combatant	"
9. Medic Nguyễn Văn Hiệp	"	"
10. Nurse Nguyễn Thị Cúc	"	"
11. Nguyễn Văn Sau	"	"
12. Nguyễn Thị Tú	"	"
13. Nguyễn Thị Hòn	"	"
14. Nguyễn Thị Thu	"	"
15. Nguyễn Thị Xuân Thanh	"	"
16. Lê Văn Tri	"	"
17. Nguyễn Trung Thành	"	"
18. Medical Off Lê Hoàng Dũng	Sqd Ldr	K.71B
19. Medic Thành Thu	Assistant Sqd Ldr	"
20. Medic Nguyễn Văn Chinh	Combatant	"
21. Medical Off Huu Quang Diêu	Plat Ldr	"
22. Nurse Nguyễn Thị Liên	Combatant	"
23. Medic Tân Việt	"	"
24. Cái Văn Lê	"	"
25. Phan Văn Nhiêu	Asst Squad Ldr	"
26. Phạm Thị Minh	Combatant	"
27. Ngô Thị Hồng	"	"
28. Đoàn Thị Tuyết Mai	"	"
29. Nguyễn Văn Út	"	"

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

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Bulletin No. 8843

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1395-68 (3 page, original handwritten.)	(C) Elements of Rear Service Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA.	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five)
(B)	(C) Item #1: Personal letter, dated 27 Jul 67, from Đô Liet Hung of P6 [ poss Financial Affairs Section of Rear Service Group 62, HQ, SVNLA ] to Ba Dang, informs Dang that Doan [ Group ] 149 [ poss Rear Services Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA ] decided to assign 30 Category "C" recruits to the Group [ poss Rear Services Group 82 ]. These men will be recei- ved by the Group [ 82 ] not later than 29 Jul 67. In addition, C.68 [ poss Transportation Co of Rear Service Group 82 ] has been designated to receive the cited replacements from Đội [ unit ] 9, Group 149 and to guide them to a location situated near C68's [ poss bivouac ] area. Document further reveals that Hung was present at A530 [ poss CM depot of Rear Service Group 62 ].	B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
	(C) Item #2: Letter of Introduction #005/A, dated 17 Jul 67, signed by Lê Văn Ngà for CO of Đoàn [ Group ] 149, introduces comrade ..., Cadre of Group 82, to Đoàn 85 [ Rear Service Group 85 ], who is to receive 30 category C recruits (these men were temporarily assigned to Đoàn 85 and should be released to Group 82 on 20 Jul 67).	
	Group 85 was urgently requested to solve the 30-recruit problem for Group 82 to meet operational requirements of Rear Service Department [ Hq SVNLA ]	
	(C) Item #3: Letter of Introduction, dated 22 May 67, signed by Lê Tân Phát for CO of Đoàn [ Group ] 149, introduces Lê Văn Hoàng, cadre of Đoàn 139 [ poss Polit Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA ], to Group 82 Command Committee to solve the following problems:	
	1. The [ poss Rear Service Staff ] Dept has temporarily approved the assignment of two mecha- nics and two embroiderers to Đoàn 139 for carrying out a special task.	
	2. These men would be assigned to Đoàn 85 [ poss Rear Service Group 85 ] when the special task was accomplished in compliance with the order of [ poss Rear Service Staff ] Dept. The selected men should have a good political background.	
(U) CDEC COMMENT:	No Further Significant Infor- mation.	

Stephen A. Mygelski

A.L. GALLI

LTC, USA

Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
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MACI261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN NO. 8845

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
Unit	Strength	Cadre
01-1398-68 (56 page original, handwritten.)	(C) Elements of Rear Service Group 62, Rear Service Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA  (C) Personnel record with entries dated from Dec 66 to Dec 67 by an U/I individual [ poss of Rear Service Group 62 ] contains notes on person- nel strength status and personnel rosters of Units and Staff Sections of the Group. The document first reveals the following personnel strength status:	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SMA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
B1 [ poss Staff-Plan and Admin Section ]	9	Three Bn XO, one Co CO, two Co XO
B2 [ poss Organization - Polit and Security Guard Sec ]	10	One Bn XO, four Co CO, two Co XO
B3 [ poss QM Section ]	13	One Co CO, one Co XO, three Plat Ldr
B4 [ Ordnance Section ]	16	Two Co CO, one Co XO, one Plat Ldr
B5 [ poss Medical Section ]	19	One Bn CO, one Bn XO, three Co CO,
B6 [ poss Financial Affairs Section ]	12	One Co CO, two Co, two Co XO and one Plat Ldr
B7	Not listed	
B9 [ poss Transportation Section ]	4	One Bn XO, one Co CO and two Plat Ldr
90B [ poss Supply depot ]	43	Three Asst Plat Ldr, six Sqd Ldr
100B	45	One Co CO, one Plat Ldr and three Asst Plat Ldr.
Z40 [ poss Ordnance shop ]	41	one Co CO
B27 [ poss Medicine depot ]	50	two Co CO
50B [ poss Ordnance shop ]	75	not listed

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Bulletin No. 8645

CBEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture date
Unit	Strength	Grade
60B + 70B [ poss Ordnance shops ]	133	two Co CO and five Co XO
73A [ Repair shop ]	not listed	
82B [ poss Supply depot ]	63	Two Co CO and two Co XO
100C [ poss Security Guard Co ]	93	Two Co CO and two Plat Ldr
200C [ poss Transportation Co ]	136	Two Co XO and two Plat Ldr
1520 [ poss QM depot ]	177	One Co CO, three Co XO, 11 Plat Ldr
A530	92	Two Bn CO and one Co XO
A510	76	One Co CO, three Co XO and three Plat Ldr.
B525	83	One Bn CO and two Co CO
B515	Not listed	
155B	Not listed	
30A [ poss Dispensary ]	Not listed	
K71B [ poss Military hospital ]	136	Three Bn CO, two Bn XO, three Co CO two Co XO and 13 Plat Ldr
K71A [ poss Military hospital ]	131	Not listed
K77A [ poss Military hospital ]	136	one Bn CO, four Bn XO, six Co CO, seven Co XO,
K77B [ poss Dispensary ] aka 30A	119	one Bn XO
35A [ poss Dispensary ]	83	one Bn XO, two Co CO and two Co XO
C2 Convalescence [ camp ]	67	one Bn XO, two Co CO
C3 Convalescence	not listed	
C1 Convalescence Camp	37	one Co CO and three Plat Ldr
T25 [ weapons depot ]	28	one Co XO
B4 [ 4th Plat ] Transportation	71	two Bn XO, five Co CO
H24b [ poss Medic Training school ]	23	one Bn CO, one Bn XO, two Co CO, two Co XO
B112 [ poss Command Committee of Gp 82 ]	150	two Regt XO, four Bn CO, six Bn XO, nine Co CO and 14 Co XO

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Subject in No. 545

CDEC

Doc Log No. 1 Formary

Daytime data

Unit	Strength	Cadre
A36 aka K79 [ poss Dispensary ]	92	not listed
B28	62	one Co XC
90B	38	
805	39	one Bn XC and Co CC

The document also contains personnel rosters listing name and rank of 1777 individuals of Sections and units of Rear Service Group 82. Key personnel recorded are:

- Tinh Dan [ poss Nguyen Tinh Dan, CO of rear Service Group 82 ], Regt XC.
- Muoi Tan, Regt XC
- Bn CC Ba Trung, Ba-Bang, Tu-Shoa, Hoc-Long (Doctor)
- Bn XC Nhut Quang, 82.

The last page of document contains a personnel roster listing name of 78 individuals of Bn 149 (including members of armored Section, Chemical Section, Research & Transportation Section and Repair Section) who were assigned to Bn 82.

(3) CDEC COMMENT: Extract transmission will follow under IIR pt 07 040 68.

01-1370-68  
(21 page  
original,  
handwritten.)

(B)

(U) Personnel and Weapons of Rear Service Group 82


(C) Notebook with entries made by an individual from front 82 [ poss Rear Service Group 82, Ho, SVNLA ] reveals personnel actions and various amounts of weapons received and issued from front 82 to units A51C, A515, A53C, 20A, 50B, 90B and Doi 20.

An entry dated 15 Aug 67, discloses that, as decided during a meeting between Hoan 82 and "Cuc" [ poss Service Staff Department, Ho, SVNLA ], front 82 will receive 105 small arms, each of them to be accompanied by 40 to 150 rds of ammunition. In addition, "Cuc" has approved for issue to the unit 1,000 rifle grenades, 350 B40 rockets, 500 rds for 12mm MG, and 146,000 rds for small arms. Still, the unit had to request "Cuc" for 2,000 kg of explosives and 250 detonators.

7 Jan 68  
W199154  
(on Rapid  
Fire Five)  
B-36, "A"  
Co, 5th US  
BFGA  
Received CDEC:  
8 Jan 68

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Bulletin No. 8845

CDR Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture data
	<p>It is noted that the number of female combatants of Đoan 82 in Aug 67 was 323. The unit had 210 cadre with rank of Sqd Ldr and 382 others with rank of Asst Sqd Ldr. Unit 510 is reported as having just buried ten K44 rifles [location unspecified]. Unit 100C sustained one killed and three injured during a US airstrike on 7 Aug 67. 12 Co and Plat-level cadre were issued pistols: Phạm Quang Huy, Mai Quyên, Nguyễn Văn Nhi, Nguyễn Văn Tòng, Nguyễn Trung Kiên, Nguyễn Trung Sơn, Bàng Trường Khảm, Sáu Ngó, Cao Văn Sinh, Triết, An, and Sơn.</p> <p>A subsequent entry is undated and contains a list of cadre recommended for promotion to Asst Plat Ldr and Cb XO. These included Trần Văn Khuẩn, Trương Văn Ông, Nguyễn Văn Nem, Quách Thiện Toản, Lê Hoang Đức, Bùi Thị Kim Cúc, Lê Văn Đức, Nguyễn Thái Hoc, Nguyễn Lý Tán, Phan Văn Khiều, Phạm Văn Mai, Nguyễn Văn Sau, Văn Công Nhật, Phan Văn Hoa, Bùi Văn Mến, Nguyễn Dân Chủ, Nguyễn Văn Tre, Phạm Văn Trung, Lý Trung Việt, Phạm Thị Hạnh, Đặng Si U, Trần Hiếu, Phạm Văn Buông, Nguyễn Văn Đức, Lê Hoang Tô, Hồ Văn Năm, Nguyễn Văn Phò, Nguyễn Hữu Đức, Đoàn Chí Sáu, Lê Văn Trinh, Trần Định Dương, A Su, Nguyễn Văn Ám, Trần Văn Máy, Nguyễn Văn Mieh, Nguyễn Văn Đề and Võ Văn Hương. Also listed was Đặng Nhữ Hoàng, promoted to Deputy Regt Cdr; and Nhót Quang, promoted to Bn Cdr.</p> <p>Another entry provides a list of small arms presently available in various units [date unspecified]: B27, 50B, 200C, 20A, A510, A520, A530, A515, Doi 20, Bl12, B27, 50B, 60B, 80B, 90B, B88, C2, C4, 100C, 200C, 20A, 25A, 30A, 40A, 50A, T25, T24, H24, and 5a. Weapons listed consisted of 167 assault rifles, 251 C80 rifles and 243 K50 SMG.</p> <p>(B) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant information.</p> <p>(B) Group 80C, 7 Jan 68 (C) Notebook, containing entries dated Mar 67 to Sep 67 by a Cadre of Unit 80C [poss Group 80C, HQ, SVNLA], reveals notes on training, personnel strength, and rosters of Party chapters and Executive Committee members and cadre of Unit 80C. WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire 5) Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68</p> <p>(B) An undated entry reveals the personnel strength of Unit 80C as follows: - 06 [poss 6th Co] had 163 men including 22 recruits &amp; 109 non-organic members.</p>	
SI-1400-68 (30 page original, handwritten.)		
(B)		

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By I.M. NAVF DATA 2/10

Bulletin No. 8245

QUBC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture data
	C8 [ poss 8th Co ] had 148 men including 76 recruits and 31 non-organic members.	
	C9 [ poss 9th Co ] had 37 men including 8 non-organic members.	
	C10 [ poss 10th Co ] had 116 men including 70 recruits.	
	C11 [ poss 11th Co ] had 159 men including 61 recruits and 59 non-organic members.	
	B [ poss Group 80C ] Hq had 92 men including 19 non-organic members.	
	The total number of organic personnel of Unit 80C was 297 individuals including four Bn Cadre, 19 Co Cadre, 43 Plat Cadre, 102 Sqd Cadre, and 139 Combatants.	
	Following is the roster listing the names of cadre of Unit 80C:	
	Đoàn [ Group 80C ] Hq: Bn CO Liêm, Bn XO Số, Bn XO Hả, Co CO Thích, Co CO Phạm Ngọc Kiều, Co XO Trương Văn Sinh, Co CO Long, Plat Ldr Kiều Sáu, Asst Plat Ldr Lý Hoàng Diệu, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Tahn, Plat Trần Văn Bui, Co XO Trịnh Văn Biên, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Bé, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Nui, Plat Ldr Ngọc, Asst Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Đặc.	
	Dispensary [ of Unit 80C ]: Plat Ldr Trương Minh Châu, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Hồng Thành, and Co XO Long.	
	C8: Co XO Nguyễn Bi, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Nam, Plat Ldr Minh, Co CO Miêu, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Trang, Asst Plat Ldr Nguyễn Hữu Cò, Plat Ldr Trần Văn Thể, Plat Ldr Trần Sinh, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Thành Doan, Plat Lien, Asst Plat Ldr Ngọc Anh, Asst Plat Ldr Đê Văn A, and Asst Plat Ldr Hoàng Đô.	
	C6: Co CO Võ Năng Lực, Co XO Nguyễn Nam Hồng, Co XO Kham, Plat Ldr Chung, Asst Plat Ldr Trần Văn Bán, Asst Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Tùng, Asst Plat Ldr V Văn Tú, Plat Ldr Thành Bình, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Chung Thành, Asst Plat Ldr Vũ Hưng, Sqd Ldr Nguyễn Văn Hồi, and Plat Ldr Lê Văn Sắc.	
	C7: Co CO Lê Văn Juết, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Trường, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Hưng, Co XO Nguyễn Chung Nguyễn aka Tắc, Plat Ldr Võ Huy Đức, Plat Ldr Đoàn Văn Giang, Asst Plat Ldr Võ Thành Xuân, Asst Plat Ldr Hồ Văn Thành, Asst Plat Ldr Long, and Asst Plat Ldr Xuong.	

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Bulletin No. 8845

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>Cll: Co XO Đào Ngọc Thành, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Sở, Co XO Châu Quang Nhạc, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Văn Hiển, Asst Plat Ldr Phạm Nguyễn Sơn, Asst Vo Văn Tú, Plat Ldr Trương Văn Bé, Plat Ldr Nguyễn Giai Phong, Plat Ldr Hà Ninh Dũng, Asst Plat Ldr Nguyễn Thành Ngo, and Plat Ldr Phương Dũng.</p> <p>Convalescence Camp: Co CO Nguyễn Hữu Chính, Plat Ldr Phạm Văn Cai, Co XO Thủ, Co XO Đoàn, Co XO Xuân, Plat Ldr Tam Huy, Asst Plat Ldr Phú, Asst Plat Ldr Đoàn, Bn XO Đức, Bn XO Long, Bn XO An, Co XO Mao, Plat Ldr Quang, Asst Plat Ldr Thắng, Plat Ldr Sinh, Plat Ldr Chính, Plat Ldr Điện, Asst Plat Ldr Mùi, Asst Plat Ldr Hưng, Asst Plat Ldr Sơn, and Asst Plat Ldr Phước.</p> <p>(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.</p>	

*Approved for release under E.O. 13526*  
by A. L. GALLE  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Nam, CDEC

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9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8846

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
01-1401-68* (8 page original, handwritten.)  (B)	<p>(C) Unit Clip</p> <p>(C) Item #1. Account Settlement Report, undated prepared by a <u>/U/I/</u> person, reveals the names of 49 members of a <u>/U/I/</u> unit who were issued subsistence allowances for Jan and Feb <u>/year</u> unit <u>/</u>.</p> <p>(C) Item #2. Estimate, dated 31 Mar 66, signed by Adjutant Ngoc Anh and countersigned by Trung Duong, CO of Unit C.410, reveals that clothing was issued to 48 individuals of Unit C.410 for Mar 66.</p> <p>(C) Item #3. Roster, dated 21 Apr 67, signed by Lê Tan Hùng for the Armament Sec of a <u>/U/I/</u> Group, reveals the names of 163 Flat and Co Cadre of Units B5, 175, K70, K71A, 179, K71B, H24, Group HQ, B2, 160, K77A, K79, Z40, B3, B4, C2, T24, 155 K77B, B6, 150, C67, 226, B27, 5A, B1, B7, 175, C68 Z1, T25, B28, B5, D20, and 68, who were armed with K54, and Canadian rifles, and PR8 and Colt 12 pistols. The total number of pistols issued is 163.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: Full Translation will follow under IIR # 6 027 0241 68</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opm Rapid Fire Five) B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
01-1402-68 (6 page original, handwritten.)  (B)	<p>(C) Đoàn 80C.</p> <p>(C) Item #1. Message, dated 11 Nov 67, signed Thủ for Đoàn 80C, sent to Đội 4 Đoàn 129 / prob Mil Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA / and Đội 3 / Đoàn 139 / prob Polit Staff Dept, HQ, SVNLA /, informs addressees that on 10 Oct <u>/67</u> Trung Tuong, Deputy Chief of Wounded Soldiers Ward #4, left for MR 4 without notification. On 9 Nov <u>/67</u> Dõlong returned with an Order from MR 4 transforming weapons and 18 cadres and members from Ward #4, to MR 4. Thủ therefore suggests that Đoàn 129 notify MR 4 that Đoàn 80C could not comply with the order since Ward #4 is no longer subordinate to MR 4. Furthermore, this Ward would be turned over to Đoàn 82 in the very near future.</p> <p>(C) Item #2. Message, dated 13 Nov 67, signed</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opm Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th U. SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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Bulletin No. 8846

Code Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
	<p>by Thủ for Đoàn 800, sent to Thủ &amp; Đoàn 129 and Thủ 3-Dân 139, informs addressee that pursuant to a message dated 11 Nov 67, Trung Dương brought back with him 26 promotion orders signed by Nguyễn Văn Nhị, Chief of Cảnh Thanh [not] Mil Affairs Committee [of MR 4] for 26 wounded and sick cadre and members who were previously assigned to ChiLô, Nhị. This promotion was made by Trung Dương himself and without the consent of the Party Committee, or of the Command Committee of the Wounded Soldiers Ward #4 and that of Đoàn 800.</p> <p>With reference to the 129 and 139 to give proper instructions to relevant Mil Affairs Committee concerning its action, to proceed with the merger of Đoàn 800 into Đoàn 800.</p>	
	<p>(C) Item #3: Message, dated 17 Nov 67, signed by Thủ for Đoàn 800, sent to Thủ &amp; Đoàn 129 and Thủ 3-Dân 139, informs addressee that on 26 Nov 67 Trung Dương left for Nhị again without notification, taking with him seven cadre and members, a pistol and a sum of money. This has more or less caused problems to the Wounded Soldiers Ward #4 which was only activated recently. The further direction that he was instructed to send 100 type recruits to Nha Ba [not] Sân Region, Nhị, and the first group of 50 men should report to Đoàn 800 on 16 Nov 67.</p>	
	<p>(C) Item #4: Message, dated 23 Nov 67, signed by Thủ [not] to Đoàn 800, informs the addressee that Order for transfer of personnel from ChiLô was probably given by Lê Thành to Trung Dương and not by MR L. [not] Nhị. Đoàn 800 should retain all promotion orders distributed by Trung Dương and wait for instructions from Nhị [not] Nhị. Nhị further asks Đoàn 800 to inform him of the status of Lê Trung from this unit, and to report the strength status of his cadre and the actual number of personnel in convalescence and its replacement capability to enable him to plan for replacements. Nhị finally informs Đoàn 800 that, by recommendation of Thủ 2/ Đoàn 129, Nhị and Nhị would be reassigned to this unit to carry out a special task.</p>	
	<p>(C) Item #5: Undated Message, signed by Thủ sent to Đoàn 800, informs the addressee that MR 4 was asked to check Trung Dương's and Lê Thành's illegal actions and take appropriate measures. Thủ finally urges Đoàn 800 to settle the problem of sending 75 recruits to Nha Ba as replacements and report to Nhị upon completion of mission.</p>	
	<p>(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT</u>: Originals passed to TRU.</p>	

for A. S. Chastain  
A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8847

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

TYPE	Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	01-1403-68 (7 page original, handwritten.)  (B)	<p>(C) Elements of Đoàn 82.</p> <p>(C) Item #1 : Transfer Report dated 28 May 67 prepared for the signature of the CO of Chi 10, concerns the personnel, weapons and equipment to be transferred to Đoàn 800 / poss Training - Replacement Bn of Group 80, Hq, SVNLA 7. Đoàn 800 was henceforth in charge of supervising Chi 10, as directed by higher Hq. Weapons listed consisted of 25 small arms plus 3,073 rds of assorted ammunition. In addition, there were three boats and some medical equipment. Copies of the Report were addressed to Đoàn 800, Đoàn 82 and Th 7 MR h 7. The number of personnel transferred was not listed.</p> <p>(C) Item #2 : Loose sheets, maintained by an U/I individual / prob from Đoàn 82 7 contains fragmentary notes pertaining to the strength status of various units such as 30A and A515 on 21 Oct 67 as follows :</p> <p>- / Unit 7 30A: Consisted of two Doctors, 11 Medical Officers, 12 nurses, six first aidmen, and four pharmacists. In addition, there were 13 individuals sent from / Đoàn 7 800.</p> <p>- / Unit 7 A515: Assigned strength, 184, including 54 persons who recently arriving from Đoàn 800, one from HuyỀN / Dist 7 and another from Bến 85. Weapons received by A515 on 21 Oct 67 consisted of five assault rifles, five RPD LMG, and eight CVC rifles. Also mentioned were two rifles plus 300 rds lost on an unk date.</p> <p>(U) <u>CDIC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
	01-1404-68 (26 page original, handwritten.)  (B)	<p>(U) Elm of Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(U) Personnel Roster, dated 21 Dec 67, records names, bio-data, position and PCB of 36 Party members / poss of element of Rear Svc Group 82 7 as follows :</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire 5) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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BULLETIN No. 8847

CODEC Doc. Log. No.	Summary	Capture Date
	1- Phạm Ngọc Kiều aka Thanh Bình, Lt, Bn CO. Kiều was born on 12 Apr 28 at Minh Lâng, Thủ Đức, Thái Bình / North VN /, enlisted on 1 Apr 49 and was admitted to the Party on 4 Aug 57.	
	2- Nguyễn Văn Bé aka Đức Long, Flat Ldr. Bé was born in 1937 at Long Tuyền, Chau Thành, Cần Thơ, enlisted on 15 Feb 54 and was admitted to the Party on 21 Apr 65.	
	3- Lê Văn Thủ aka Hưng Thành, Bn CO. Thủ was born in 1923 at Tân Khanh, Lai Vung, Tân Châu Sa, enlisted on 21 Jun 47 and was admitted to the Party on 17 Oct 48.	
	4- Lương Văn Hậu aka Lương Hồng Vũ, Sgt, Sqd Ldr. Hậu was born in 1938 at Hưng Thắng, Tiên Lãng, Hải Phòng / North VN /, enlisted on 15 Mar 59, was discharged on 1 Dec 62 and re-called to active duty on 1 Mar 65. He was admitted to the Party on 23 Oct 65.	
	5- Nguyễn Ngọc Cù aka Hồng Phong, Asst Flat Ldr. Ngọc was born in 1937 at An Định, Duyên Hà, Thái Bình / North VN / enlisted on 6 Feb 60, was discharged on 8 Apr 64 and re-called to active duty on 1 Apr 65. He was admitted to the Party on 3 Mar 64.	
	6- Hoàng Diệu, Asst Flat Ldr. Diệu was born in 1926 at An Xuyên, Cà Mau, Bạc Liêu, enlisted on 19 Apr 62, and was admitted to the Party on 7 Aug 63.	
	7- Nguyễn Đức Tiến, Sqd Ldr. Tiến was born in 1944 at Vĩnh Niêm, Hải An, Hải Phòng / North VN /, enlisted on 12 Apr 62, and was admitted to the Party on 12 Nov 67.	
	8- Phan Văn Bé, Asst Sqd Ldr. Bé was born in 1947 at Ném Mạnh, Nam Cung, Cà Mau, enlisted in Feb 63 and was admitted to the Party on 4 Oct 65.	
	9- Nguyễn Văn Mô, Asst Sqd Ldr. Mô was born in 1941 at Long Tuyền, Chau Thành, Cần Thơ and enlisted on 10 Sep 65.	
	10- Nguyễn Trọng Liên aka Nguyễn Đức Trinh, Bn Polit Off. Liên was born in 1930 at Hưng Đạo, Hưng Yên, Nghệ An / North VN /, enlisted in Aug 49 and was admitted to the Party on 16 Nov 49.	
	11- Hoàng Hà aka Nguyễn Mười, Bn XO. Hà was born in 1922 at Hồi Bình, Chau Thành, Bến Tre, enlisted in Dec 45 and was admitted to the Party in Jun 47.	

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BULLETIN No. 8647

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	12- Phan Ngoc Thuân, member of Bn Party Committee. Thuân was born in 1924 at Mê Linh, Tam Nông, Phu Tho / North VN /, enlisted in Feb 48 and was admitted to the Party in Apr 50.	
	13- Nguyễn Văn Ngon aka Nguyễn Tân Tru, Plat Ldr. Ngon was born in 1935 at An Khánh, Cà Mau, Bạc Liêu, enlisted on 12 Aug 59 and was admitted to the Party on 15 Oct 65.	
	14- Kiều Sanh.	
	15- Phạm Văn Biên aka Phạm Hải, Plat Ldr. Biên was born in 1935 at Hoa Tu, Mỹ Xuyên (Thanh Tri), Sóc Trăng, enlisted in Jan 51, was discharged in Aug 58, and re-called to active duty on 20 Sep 61. He was admitted to the Party on 11 May 58.	
	16- Trần Văn Bùi aka Trần Thái Hồng aka Trần Văn Điều, Plat Ldr. Bùi was born in 1927 at Tân Tây Phước, Tân Trụ, Long An, enlisted on 15 Jul 47 and was admitted to the Party on 10 Oct 53.	
	17- Châu Thành Long aka Châu Sâm Nhung, Co QO. Long was born in 1928 at Hòa Khương, Hòa Vang, Quang Nam, enlisted on 1 Nov 46, discharged in Mar 48, re-called to active duty on 8 Feb 49, discharged for the second time in Mar 60 and re-called to active duty for the second time in Mar 63. He was admitted to the Party in Jan 51.	
	18- Nguyễn Văn Mùi aka Hoàng Việt, Asst Plat. Mùi was born in 1935 at Tân Định, Châu Thành, Cần Thơ, enlisted in Feb 48 and was admitted to the Party on 15 Dec 62.	
	19- Trương Văn Sinh, Hai Sinh, member of Co Party Committee. Sinh was born in 1923 at Phố Sông Cầu, Đồng Xuân, Phu Yen / North VN / enlisted on 10 Sep 45 and was admitted to the Party in Jan 49.	
	20- Hồ Văn Vũ, Asst Plat Ldr. Vũ was born in 1942 at Mỹ Thành Trung, Tam Bình, Vĩnh Long, enlisted on 25 Jun 61 and was admitted to the Party on 10 Mar 65.	
	21- Nguyễn Văn Hải aka Linh, Asst Plat Ldr. Hải was born in 1926 at Mỹ Hiệp, Lai Thieu, Bình Dương, enlisted on 1 Jun 53, was admitted to the Party on 25 Dec 49 and returned to South Viet Nam from regroupment to North VN in Nov 62.	

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BULLETIN No. 8647

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Doc Log No.

Summary

Capture Data

22- Nguyễn Văn Sở, Secretary of Bn Party Com-  
mittee. Sở was born in 1925 at Tân Phu Đông, Thị Xã  
Sa Đéc, enlisted on 2 Jun 47 and was admitted to the  
Party in Sep 48.

23- Nguyễn Công Nhàn aka Mùi Tinh, Asst Sqd  
Ldr. Nhàn was born in 1943 at Vinh Hảo, Vinh Thuan,  
Rạch Giá and enlisted on 19 Oct 65. He was admitted  
to the Party on 18 Aug 63.

24- Phạm Văn Hải aka Hải Túp, Polit. Off. Hải  
was born on 11 Mar 62 at Trung Mỹ Tây, Hóc Môn, Gia  
Dinh, enlisted on 11 Mar 62 and was admitted to the  
Party on 25 Nov 66.

25- Phạm Nguyễn Sơn, Asst Plat Ldr. Sơn was  
born in 1935 at Trịnh Xá, Bình Lục, Nam Hà / North  
VN, enlisted in Jul 53, was discharged on 20 Oct  
58 and re-called to active duty on 10 Apr 65. He  
was admitted to the Party as a probationary member  
on 15 Aug 67.

26- Huỳnh Văn Nam, Sqd Ldr. Nam was born in  
1936 at Châu Thành District Seat, Bình Dương enlis-  
ted on 27 Mar 63 and was admitted to the Party on  
9 Aug 65.

27- Nguyễn Văn Út aka Út Gầm, Sqd Ldr. Út  
was born in 1928 at An Bình, Châu Thành, Cần Thơ,  
enlisted in Jun 65 and was admitted to the Party  
in Oct 66.

28- Nguyễn Tân aka Nguyễn Mười, Plat Ldr. Tân  
was born in 1934 at Mỹ Long, Cao Lãnh, Sa Đéc, en-  
listed on 25 Jun 54 and was admitted to the Party  
on 19 Mar 60.

29- Võ Hoàng Thành, Sqd Ldr. Thành was born  
in 1945 at Phường Bình, Long Mỹ, Cần Thơ, enlisted  
13 Sep 65 and was admitted to the Party on 15 Jun 61.

30- Nguyễn Thành Lập, Sqd Ldr. Lập was born  
in 1946 at An Phú Tân, Cửu Kế, Trà Vinh, enlisted  
on 14 Aug 64 and was admitted to the Party on 1 Jul  
66.

31- Bàng Thành aka Châu Hà, Sqd Ldr. Thành  
was born in 1944 at Ấp Khánh, Châu Thành, Bến Tre,  
enlisted on 23 Jun 61 and was admitted to the Party  
effective 27 Sep 67 as a probationary member.

32- Lê Văn Hoàng aka Lê Văn Hải, Asst Sqd Ldr.  
Hoàng was born in 1943 at Mỹ Khánh, Châu Thành,  
Cần Thơ, enlisted on 11 Aug 65 and was admitted to  
the Party on 6 Jun 66.

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BULLETIN No. 8847

Code Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
	33- Lê Văn Cùi, Asst Sqd Ldr. Cùi was born in 1947 at Thủ Đức Thành, Chợ Thành, Cần Thơ, enlisted on 15 Sep 65, and was admitted to the Party on 15 Oct 66.	
	34- Nguyễn Văn Tri, Asst Plat Ldr. Tri was born in 1942 at Trung Hiệp, Dung Liêm, Tra Vinh, enlisted on 20 Feb 62 and was admitted to the Party on 24 Mar 66.	
	35- Nguyễn Văn Cảm, Asst Plat Ldr. Cảm was born in 1929 at Phước Đồng, Cần Đức, Long An, enlisted in Feb 48 and was admitted to the Party on 11 Oct 49.	
	36- Nguyễn Trung Đắc aka Sơn Phụng aka Nguyễn Văn Sau, Asst Plat Ldr. Đắc was born in 1933 at Sơn Đinh, Chợ Lách, Bến Tre, enlisted on 13 Aug 54 and was admitted to the Party on 26 Jan 62.	
(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.		

Mr. A. L. Calli

A. L. CALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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By I.M. NAVF. DIA  
7/10

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8948

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1405-67 (2 page original, handwritten.)	<p>(C) Elm of Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(C) Roster, dated 28 Apr 67, signed by Nhu Hoan, Chief of Med [Sec] of [Rear Svc Group] 82, lists names and positions of 39 personnel who were to be reassigned to C4 [Tuberculosis and Leprosy Hospital], Ta Bang Dispensary, Pharmacist Training School, Med Sec of Doan [Group] 82, Doan 139 (Polit Dept), Boi 20, B27, 424, K71A and K71B [prob Elm of Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA]. These 39 personnel were assigned from K77b [prob Hospital of Rear Svc Group 82]. The following are their names and position:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Two Co XO: Le Quang Bay and Tran Hieu</li><li>- Five Plat. cadre: Do Hong Tam, Le Van Lui, Tran Van Kha, Do Gia Chanh and Nguyen Van Thanh.</li><li>- Five Sqd cadre: Cai Van Le, Le Hoang Dung, Nguyen Thi Thanh Thu, Phan Van Nhieu and Do Thi Kim Cuc.</li><li>- 27 Combatants: Nguyen Tan Viet, Nguyen Van Hiep, binh Thi Kich, Vo Thi Yen, Nguyen Thi Lien, Nguyen Thi Hong, Vo Van Thanh, Nguyen Van Sau, Nguyen Thi Thanh, Nguyen Thi Hoi, Ngu Thi Hong, Nguyen Thi Thu, Nguyen Van Chinh, Ly Thi Huu, Tran Van Chanh, Pham Tri Minh, Nguyen Van Ut, Phan Thi Cuc, Nguyen Thi Le Thu, Nguyen Truoc Thanh, Dang Van Quan, Le Van TV, Huynh Van Dien, Doan Thi Tuyet Mai, Huynh Be Thanh, Doan Thi Mai Hoa and Vo Thi Kim Tuyet.</li></ul> <p>On the reverse of the roster is an undated note, prepared by an [U/I] individual, reveals names and positions of 35 personnel who were reassigned from one unit to another during 3 to 27 May 67:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Units: 100C, 200C, 100b, 112, b1 Radio Comm Site, b19, b3/A515, A530, a57/175, C54, 51/530, Doan [Group] 85, Doan 149, b1 and b3/82 [prob Elm of Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA].</li></ul>	7 Jan 68 WT991644(Obj Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFUA Received CDEC: 9 Jan 68

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By T.M. NWW, DA  
7/10

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Bulletin No. 8848

CDIC Doc. Log. No.	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>- Personnel: One CC.C [Sic] (Ma Ngoc Duong)  11 Sqd cadre: Nguyen Van Hong,  Nguyen Van Hoa, Nguyen Van Tap, Nguyen Kim Nao,  Nguyen Hong Chan, Le Van Chien, Vo Thanh Cong,  Nguyen Thi Minh Tam, Nguyen Van Dung, Nguyen Thi Ngoc  and Pham Van Due.</p> <p>- 23 Combatants: Pham Van Kem, Nguyen Thi  Duyen, Pham Thi Thu, Tran Thi My Kieu, Huynh Thi  Mai, Pham Thi Hoa, Van Nhieu Tuyen, Nguyen Thi Tuyet  Sinh, Nguyen Van Lao, Nguyen Thi Tien, Nguyen Thi  Lien, Nguyen Thi Hong, Nguyen Thi Be, Tran Thi Kim  Hong, Nguyen Thi Tuyet, Nguyen Thi Do, Phan Thi Tru,  Nguyen Thi Hong Tam, Nguyen Van Lap, Nguyen Van Moi,  Nguyen Van Quyet, Lam Chanh and Suoi Chinh.</p> <p>(U) <u>CDIC COMMENT:</u> No Further Significant Information.</p>	
01-1406-68 (9 page original, handwritten.)	(C) Elms of 80th Replacement Training Rext and Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVMLA,	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDIC: 8 Jan 68
(B)	(C) Item 1: Roster, dated 8 Sep 67, signed by Le Van Hung, lists names and positions of ten personnel of a [U/1] Engr Sqd: Sqd Ldr Le Van Hung and Trinh Minh Quan, Asst Sqd Ldr Nguyen Van Duc and Huynh Cao Tu, combatants Le Van Mai, Le Van Dan, Le Quang Chau, Tran Van Tuoi, Truong Van Sau and Nguyen Van Ngon.	
	(C) Item 2: Roster, dated 23 May 67, signed by Tran Nhu for Command Committee of T24, reveals names and positions of 13 personnel of Boan 80 [prob Replacement Training Rext, HQ, SVMLA], who were reassigned to B4: Asst Sqd Ldr Le Van Bien, combatants Tran Van Hoa, Le Van Ten, Nguyen Van Xu, Nguyen Dinh Bao, Pham Ngoc Lang, Nguyen Ngoc Minh, Truong M. Hiep, Nguyen Tu Cuong, Nguyen Van Nghia, Pham Van Nghia, Nguyen Hong and Van Thanh.	
	(C) Item 3: Roster, undated, signed illegibly for Chief of Med Sec of [Rear Service Group], 82, lists names and units of six individuals who were recommended to be sent to attend first-aid training at Doi [Unit] 20 (formerly H24) on 10 Jul [67]:	
	- Do Cong Tam, T25, Son, 100C, Nam Moi (female), A510, Hieu, A520, Hung, 5A and Van, A515.	
	(C) Item 4: Roster, dated 23 Jul 67, signed illegibly for A510/82 [prob Elm of Rear Service Group 82], lists names of 11 convalescent personnel of A510, who were recommended for reassignment to a mission suitable for their poor health: Sqd Ldr Do Van Tho, Asst Sqd Ldr Nguyen Van Ne and Huynh Van Siep, Co XO B21 Dut Men, combatants Nguyen Van Xoai, Nguyen Duc Loc, Pham Thi Xang, Pham Thi Hoang, Nguyen Thi Nga and Vo Thi Nehe.	

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Bulletin No. 8848

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>(C) Item 5: Roster, undated, unsigned, lists names and positions of 24 individuals who are armed with pistols: Phạm Văn Trí, BFF [poss Bn XO] of [Unit] 7A, Co CQ Nguyễn Văn Đồng, Co XO Đặng Trương Kham, Cao Văn Sinh, Lê Quang Bay, Thái Văn Minh, Ngô Sĩ Sung, Ngô Văn Túi, Út Sú, Lê Văn Cói, Nguyễn Văn Triết, Nguyễn Văn Ám and Nguyễn Văn Nhì, Nguyễn Sanh Dân, Nhút Quang, Châu Hồng Nam, Tú Ky, Út Sú [Sic], Hải Dũng, Văn Bay Hứa [position unk], Co XO Dương, Plat Ldr Phê and Phong.</p> <p>Of the 24 individuals, 17 are cadre of R [HO SVNLA].</p>	
	<p>(C) Item 6: Roster, undated, unsigned, lists names and positions of seven personnel of a [U/I] unit: Sqd Ldr Huynh Văn Bửu, Asst Sqd Ldr Võ Hải Bằng, Combatants Lê Văn Thảo, Trần Phước Quang, Nguyễn Văn Quới, Thị Văn Thị and Phạm Thị Liên. Annotation on the roster, dated 28 May [67], signed by Dân, reveals that these personnel were recommended for reassignment to [Unit] 175, but the recommendation was disapproved due to their poor health.</p>	
	<p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.</p>	

*Mr. Garrison*  
A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 3249

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1407-68* (3 page original, handwritten.)  (B)	<p>(C) Unit C10 of Deán 80C</p> <p>(C) Item #1. Estimate, dated 31 May 66, signed by Adjutant Ngoc Anh and countersigned by Trung Duong, CO of Unit C410, reveals quantity of clothing items issued to 48 members of C410 during May 66.</p> <p>(C) Item #2: Undated Roster, prepared by Unit C10 D80C [prob Elm of Replacement Training Bn Group 80, HQ, SVNLA], reveals names and rank of 71 war invalids and sick soldiers of [U/I] units. Key personnel listed on the document is Co Xo Vo Trung Duong.</p> <p>(C)* CDEC COMMENT: Full Translation Will Follow under TIR #6 027 0242 68.</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFGA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
01-1408-68* (73 page original, handwritten.)  (B)	<p>(U) Elements of Rear Services Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(C) Item #1: Notebook with entries dated from 19 Feb 67 to 16 Jun 67, by a member of Group 80C contains mostly minutes of meetings and Political Training lessons. An undated entry discloses position of the following cadre of the Group [poss Group 80C]:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Tam Thu, CO</li><li>- Liêm, Political Off</li><li>- Muoi Ha, Asst Polit Off</li><li>- Nam Xo, XC</li><li>- Kieu, Chief of Staff [Section]</li><li>- Mai Xinh, in charge of Rear Services [Section]</li><li>- Thuan, Chief of Political [Section]</li></ul> <p>The document further contains a personnel listing of names and bio-data of the following 14 individuals of Group 80C:</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th SFGA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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by I.M. NAVW. DIAH 2/20

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Bulletin No. 8849

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	1/- Nguyen-Dinh Chau, born in Jan 42 in Mai Tuy, Ha Hoa, Phu Tho Province, enlisted on 20 Feb 61 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group in Feb 60.	
	2/- Tran Thanh Hung, born in 1942 in Thanh Hoa, Cai Lay, My Tho, enlisted on 24 Apr 61 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 8 Feb 62.	
	3/- Nguyen Van Hoe, born in 1949 in Phuoc Hau, Can Giuoc, Long An, enlisted in Jul 65 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group in Oct 66.	
	4/- Le Minh Duc, born in 1948 in Banteylek Village, Koki District, Kandal Prov [poss Province in Cambodia] enlisted on 11 Jul 65 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 12 Oct 66.	
	5/- Pham Van Chuong, born on 13 Oct 43 at Vinh Loc, Binh Tan, Gia Dinh, enlisted on 5 May 62 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 10 Sep 64.	
	6/- Nguyen Thi Gieng; born on 2 Oct 48 in Ky Thanh Trung, Duc Huie, Long An, enlisted in Apr 65 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 7 Oct 64.	
	7/- Le Hong Hanh, born on 15 Jan 43 in Vinh Huu Go Dong, My Tho, enlisted on 5 Feb 62 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 24 Feb 63.	
	8/- Nguyen Danh Tu, born on 18 Jun 42 in Dien Minh, Dien Chau, Nghia An NVN Prov, enlisted on 20 Feb 61 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 6 Mar 57.	
	9/- Nguyen Duc Tien, born on 25 May 39 in Vinh Liem, Hai An, Hai Phong Prov NVN, enlisted on 12 Apr 62 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group in Feb 63.	
	10/- Nguyen Van Sau, born in 1946, in My Thanh Dong, Cai Lay, My Tho, enlisted on 30 Oct 64 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 8 Nov 65.	
	11/- Duong Ngoc Thanh, born in 1946 at Huyen Doi, Cai Long, Tra Vinh Province, enlisted on 28 Mar 63 and was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 25 Sep 64.	
	12/- Nguyen Van Ky, Sqd Ldr, was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 24 Feb 65.	
	13/- Thai Van Toa was admitted to the [Youth] Group in Feb 67.	
	14/- Tran Binh was admitted to the [Youth] Group on 23 Apr 61. Author further recorded the LBN: 86554/VL/142.	

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Bulletin No. 8849

CDEC Doc Log #	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>(C) Item #2. Assignment Record, with entries dated 8 Jan 66 to 8 Jul 67, made by an U/I individual possibly of Rear Services Group 82 listing names and positions of 421 persons of Sections and units of Group 82 who were assigned to various units which were also subordinate to Group 82.</p>	
	<p>(C) * <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> Full Translation Will Follow Under IIR #6 027 0243 68.</p>	

A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 3850

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1109-68 (2 page original, typewritten.)  (B)	<p>(C) Mil Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(C) Item #1: Communiqué, #166/N1, dated 12 Oct 67, original signed by Trần Ba, CO of Đoàn 129 / Mil Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA, reproduced and signed by Phan Tất Thành for Đội 1, Đoàn 129, directs subordinate Dist Units to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Search and destroy enemy <u>FVN</u>AF/RVN<u>AF</u> CIDG elements operating in the local areas in compliance with the Resolution passed by the meeting of the Prov Units on 25 Sep 67.</li><li>- Reconnoiter the pattern of activities of "enemy" recon planes.</li><li>- Heighten vigilance against "enemy" MI agents.</li></ul> <p>Document further reveals that during the night of 7, 8 and 9 Oct 67, the areas from Saigon River to Route #4 was reconnoitered by <u>enemy</u> aircraft and as a result, an air raid was subsequently directed at the <u>VC</u> Base Areas. The captured copy was sent to Dist 17. Handwritten caption on upper left corner of document reads, "IBN 86.554VK".</p> <p>(C) Item #2: Communiqué, #153/N1, dated 20 Sep 67, signed by Phan Tất Thành for Đội 1, Đoàn 129, informs subordinate Units and agencies that the enemy <u>FVN</u>AF/RVN<u>AF</u> CIDG elements were helilifted to Sóc Trăng, Tà Phìn, Cần Đăng, Bầu Xà Nông, Sóc Con Trăng, Tà Bat and Cà Tum to discover friendly <u>VC</u> depots and reconnoiter the <u>VC</u> Troop movement. On 14 Jun 67, one <u>VC</u> person was captured by the "enemy" CIDG element at B' Túc and on 11 Sep 67 another one was captured at Cửu Long Bray. Therefore, Units and Agencies subordinate to Đoàn 129 were directed to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Set up AA emplacements</li></ul>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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
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
Bulletin No. 6850

Doc Log #	Summary	Capture Data
01-1110-68 (2 page original typewritten)  (B)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Attract the "enemy" aircraft to the area where AA emplacements were established shoot them down.</li><li>- Search and destroy "enemy" CIDG elements.</li><li>- Dig shelters to neutralize "enemy" arty fire along the paths leading from the location of Units and Agencies to the main routes in the Dist.</li><li>- Document further directs that the reports pertaining to the military activities of the Dist must be submitted to Bđi 1, Đoàn 129, for consideration.</li></ul> <p>(U) CDEC Comments: No Further Significant Information.</p> <p>(C) Dist 17, Đoàn 80C.</p> <p>(C) Item 1: Communiqué, #147/MI, dated 15 Sep 67, classified VC 7 "TOP SECRET", originated by Bđi 1, Unit 71, Đoàn 129, informs Units and Agencies subordinate to Đoàn 129 of the following recognition signals on Travel Orders issued by Đoàn 129:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- In Nov 67: The letter "V" is added to the number "3".</li><li>- In Dec 67: The letter "P" is added to the number "9".</li></ul> <p>The recognition signals are described as follows:</p>  <p>(C) Item 2: Communiqué, #129/MI, dated 23 Aug 67, classified VC 7 "TOP SECRET", originated by Bđi 1, Đoàn 129, informs Units and Agencies subordinate to Đoàn 129 of the following recognition signals on Travel Orders issued by Đoàn 129:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- In Aug 67: The letter "P" is added to the square #1.</li><li>- In Sep 67: The letter "A" added to the square #2.</li><li>- In Oct 67: The letter "O" added to the square #8.</li></ul>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SPA (Opn Rapid Fire) Received CDEC 8 Jan 68

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Bulletin No. 8850

CDEC Doc Log #	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>The recognition signals are described as follows:</p> 	
	<p>The captured documents were sent to Dist 17, Doan 800.</p>	
	<p>(U) CDEC Comment: No Further Significant Information.</p>	
01-1411-68 (4 page original handwritten)	<p>(C) Doan 800, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(C) Item 1: Message, dated 7 Nov / year unspecified /, from Thanh to an U/I Unit, reports that on 29 Oct an attack was launched on Loc Ninh Sector in Binh Long Prov by friendly / VC/NVA / forces. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the puppet / RVNAF / elements defending the Sector and four aircraft were destroyed.</p> <p>(C) Item 2: Message, dated 15 Nov 67, signed by Lê an Thu, CO / of Doan 800 /, addressed to Đội / Unit 7 1, Doan 129 / Mil Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA /, reports that the enemy / FMAF/RVNAF / forces stationed at Trại Bi shelled Dist 17 daily. On 31 Oct and 13 Nov 67, "enemy" arty fire hit RK34, NT24 and Quít / sic / which were subordinate to Doan 800 and were located in the areas adjacent to LH72. One member of the Convalescence Center was WIA and 5,000 liters of rice were destroyed.</p> <p>(C) Item 3: Message, dated 26 Nov / year unspecified /, from Phat to Hậu, Cadre of Cảnh 155 subordinate to Doan 82, c/o Doan 800, reveals that 3,000 liters of rice stored at Ninh Biên were discovered by the "enemy". Therefore, Cảnh / Element / 155 was requested to ship the 3,000 liters of rice to another place.</p> <p>(C) Item 4: Message, dated 9 Dec 67, from Nghiem to Doan 800, pertains to the "enemy" situation in Cà Tum, Sóc Môi and areas adjacent to Route #22. Nghiem directs Doan 800 to be ready to counter enemy operations in areas adjacent to Route #22.</p>	<p>7 Jan 68 WT991644 (0pn Rapid Fire Five ) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC 8 Jan 68</p>
(B)	<p>(U) CDEC Comment: 1. No Further Significant Information. 2. Originals passed to TRU.</p>	

A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
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MACV261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8851

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
01-1412-68 (6 page original handwritten, typewritten.)	<p>(C) Medical Section of Đoàn 80C.</p> <p>(C) Item 1: Empty Envelope was addressed from Medical Section of LBN 86,554YK [ poss Replacement Training Regt, HQ, SVMLA ] to LBN 86,402 YK/D5 [ poss element of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVMLA ].</p> <p>(B)</p> <p>(C) Item 2 thru 6: Five reports, dated 20 Nov and 20 Dec 67, signed by Medical Technician Thanh Long, Chief of Med Sec of Đoàn 80C, and countersigned illegibly by the CO of Đoàn 80C, provide information pertaining to health statistics and sanitary activities of the Medical Section during the reported period as follows:</p> <p>Item 2: Physical Health Statistical Report discloses that during the period 16 Oct to 16 Nov 67, a total of 15 patients received medical treatment at the Dispensary and two others at the Convalescence [ Camp of Đoàn 80C ]. Document points out that among these patients, 33.6% of them received treatment for common diseases, 24% for malaria, 2.2% for rheumatism and beriberi, 0.7% for diarrhea, and 9.8% for other diseases.</p> <p>Item 3: Patients' Status Report reveals that during Nov 67, 302 patients, including 57 individuals evacuated to the Medical Section of Đoàn 80C from Units 7, 8, 10 and 11, received medical treatment at a Convalescence [ Camp ] as follows:</p>	<p>7 Jan 68 WT991644 B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFGA (OPn Rapid Fire 5) Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68</p>
UNIT	NUMBER OF PATIENTS EVACUATED TO MED SEC IN NOV 67	NUMBER OF PATIENTS RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT
7	24	87
8	8	69
10		73
11	25	74
TOTAL:	57	303
NUMBER OF PATIENTS RELEASED	NUMBER OF PATIENTS EVACUATED TO OTHER HOSPITALS	NUMBER OF PATIENTS UNDER MEDICAL TREATMENT AS OF THE END OF NOV 67
31	1	55
23	4	42
12	4	73
76	9	58
		228

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Bulletin No. 8851

CDEC Doc. Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	<p>Document further reveals that the average number of patients receiving medical treatment at the Dispensary on any given day was 139 men.</p> <p><u>Item 4.</u> Patients' Status Report reveals that during Dec 67, a total of 351 patients received medical treatment at the Convalescence [Camp of Doan 80C] including 123 men evacuated to this Convalescence [Camp] from Units 7, 8, 10 and 11 in Dec 67 as follows:</p>	
UNITS	NUMBER OF PATIENTS EVACUATED IN DEC 67	TOTAL NUMBER OF PATIENTS RECEIVED TREATMENT
7	43	98
8	41	83
10	1	74
11	38	96
TOTAL:	123	351
	NUMBER OF PATIENTS RELEASED IN DEC 67	NUMBER OF PATIENTS EVACUATED TO OTHER HOSPITALS
	25	
	14	8
	16	1
	55	9
		NUMBER OF PATIENTS UNDER MED TREATMENT AS OF THE END OF DEC 67
		73
		69
		66
		79
		287
		Document further reports that the average number of patients receiving medical treatment at the Convalescence [Camp] on any given day was 276 men.
		<p><u>Item 5.</u> Health Statistical Report discloses that during the period 16 Nov to 15 Dec 67, nine patients received medical treatment at the Convalescence [Camp], 13 at the Dispensary and two others at the Hospital. Document points out that 37.7% of the unit strength were treated for common diseases, 23.6% were off duty, 8.2% were treated for malaria, 1.5% for rheumatism and beriberi, 1.5% for diarrhoea, 5.9% for contagious diseases and 27.9% for other diseases. Document further discloses that during the last month [Nov] contagious influenza was noted in Unit C10 and Hq of Doan [80C] which resulted in 60 patients during a 10 day period.</p>
		<p><u>Item 6.</u> Preventive Medicine Achievement Report reveals that during Dec 67, the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Campaign were emphasized among [VC] personnel and 75 to 80% of the unit strength received vaccinations. Document also reveals that during the reported period, personnel of Unit [Doan 80C] were divided into two parts to move to unspecified bivouac areas. Document further reports that due to the supervision of Chapter [Party] Committee members,</p>

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Bulletin No. 8851

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-1413-68 (10 page original handwritten) (B)	<p>Co CO's and members of Med Sec, the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Missions were successfully carried out by subordinate units.</p> <p>(U) CDEC Comment: No Further Significant Information.</p> <p>(C) Elm of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(C) Ten Individual Issue Control Slips, dated 20 Jun 67, signed by Lai Văn Út, Adjutant of C2-82 [prob Elm of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA], reveal name and position of ten members of C2-82 who were reassigned to an [U/I] unit:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Mai Hồng Văn, Plat Ldr of C2 Đoàn 82.</li><li>2) Trần Văn Bảy, Asst Sec Ldr "</li><li>3) Huỳnh Văn Thành, Combatant of "</li><li>4) Phạm Văn Danh, Asst Sec Ldr of "</li><li>5) Hồ Minh Tiết, Combatant of "</li><li>6) Ngô Văn Tân, " "</li><li>7) Lê Văn Chiên " "</li><li>8) Nguyễn Văn Tho " "</li><li>9) Nguyễn Văn Đô, Asst Sec Ldr of "</li><li>10) Nguyễn Trung Tiên, Combatant of C2 Đoàn 82.</li></ol> <p>The new unit was requested to continue to issue allowance to these individuals, beginning 1 Jul 67.</p> <p>(U) CDEC Comment: No Further Significant Information.</p>	<p>7 Jan 68 WT991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36 "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68</p>

A. L. CALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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MACJ 261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8053

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
01-1419-68 (5 page original, handwritten.)	(C) Messages sent <u>Đoàn 80C</u> .  (C) Item #1. Undated message, signed by <u>Đức</u> , sent to <u>Đoàn 80C</u> , informs the addressee that representatives of <u>Đội 3, Đoàn 129</u> [prob Mil Staff Dept HQ, SVNLA] will proceed to Group 80 to (1) recruit 35 additional men among sick and wound personnel and (2) recruit the remaining 35 men of the last trip's quota ( <u>Đội 3, Đoàn 129</u> was authorized to recruit 50 men during their last trip but only selected 15 men). <u>Đoàn 80C</u> was directed to assist in the recruitment of required personnel among its nonorganic personnel, stragglers and convalescent personnel.  (C) Item #2: Undated message, signed by <u>Ba Trần</u> , sent to <u>Đoàn 80C</u> , read by <u>Thủ</u> , CO of <u>Đoàn 80C</u> on 23 Jun 1967, reveals that <u>Đoàn 129</u> granted 26,000\$ to the Combat, Mil Trng, Crypto and Mil Pers Secs [of <u>Đoàn 80C</u> ] as funds for the Second and Third Quarters of 1967.  (C) Item #3. Undated message, signed by <u>Ba Trần</u> , sent to <u>Đoàn 80C</u> , read by <u>Thủ</u> on 26 Aug 1967, reveals that <u>Đoàn 80C</u> was granted 24,000\$ as Staff expenditures for 1967 not including 26,000\$ issued in the Second and Third Quarters of 1967. <u>Trần</u> further asks <u>Đoàn 80C</u> to submit a Statement of Accounts for the first nine months of 1967 to <u>Đoàn 129</u> by Oct 1967.  (C) Item #4. Message signed by <u>Ba Lưu</u> , sent to <u>Thủ</u> [CO of <u>Đoàn 80C</u> ] and <u>Liêm</u> , urges the addressee to send <u>Bi</u> and <u>Nguyễn</u> to the Dispensary for treatment and informs them that <u>Trần Hồng Khanh</u> reported to <u>Đoàn 80B</u> . <u>Lưu</u> further discloses that <u>Đội</u> , an Asst Plat Ldr of the former <u>Đoàn 70</u> , was sent to <u>Đoàn 80C</u> and <u>Đoàn 170</u> for convalescence, but had not arrived at <u>Đoàn 170</u> . As a lesson learned, from now on, cadre from deactivated units should be sent to [Unit] 620 for further disposition.  (C) Item #5. Message, dated 10 Oct 67, signed by <u>Hoàng Hà</u> for <u>Đoàn 80C</u> , sent to <u>B4</u> [C 129], recommends that the Mil Personnel Office discharge <u>Nguyễn Văn Rê</u> , <u>Nguyễn Văn Định</u> , <u>Phan Văn Rám</u> ,	7 Jan 68 AT991644 (Opr. Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA. Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
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By I.M. NADA, DIA 7/10

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Bulletin No. 8853

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Doc Log No.

Summary

Capture Data

01-1420-68  
(66 page  
original  
handwritten)

(B)

Nguyễn Văn Lunt, Nguyễn Văn Phùng and Nguyễn Văn Rồng, who, after two years of indoctrination, still wanted to go home.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: Originals passed to TRU.

(C) Activities of Group 80C.

(C) Notebook, entries from 27 Mar 67 to 2 Jan 68 by Hiep, HT 86557YK, contains minutes of conferences by Party Chapter and 80C Bn of 80th Tng and Replacement Regt, HQ, SVNLA concerning the development of "Three Good Quality" Party Chapter, Party Chapter resolutions, construction of base area, security maintenance, military training, indoctrination, emulation campaign, and unit situation. The document lists name, rank, position, and date admitted to the Party of 23 personnel as follows:

Name	Rank	Date admitted	Position
Pham Ngoc Kiem	unk	14 Aug 57	Bn Party Committee member.
Kiem, Sanh	unk	unk	unk
Nguyen Cong Nhien	unk	18 Aug 63	Party Member
Nguyen Van Thoi aka Chi Cong	unk	2 Apr 64	Party Member
Lam Thanh Hong aka Lam Quang Khai	unk	7 Nov 67	Party member
Vu Hung	unk	3 May 64	Probationary Party Member
Nguyen Van Hoi	unk	unk	Party member
Le Van Cuong	unk	unk	Probationary Party Member
Le Van Sau	unk	u unk	Probationary Party Member
Ho Van Hay	unk	unk	Probationary Party Member
Pham Van Y	unk	unk	Probationary Party Member
Trinh Van Bui	Polit Off	10 Oct 53	Party Chapter Member
Hong Thanh	Med Off	unk	Party Member
Thai	Medic	unk	Party Member
Dong	Medic	unk	unk
Tan	Production Cadre	unk	Party Member
Nguyen Trung Chinh	Plat Ldr	26 Mar 63	Party Chapter Member
Nguyen Van Tung	Asst Plat Ldr	30 May 64	Party Member
Phan Van Hai aka Tan	Pvt	25 Nov 66	Party Member
Nguyen Van Cong aka Dong	Medic	3 Aug 63	Party Member
Le Van Hai aka Hoang	Unk	unk	unk
Le Thanh Binh	unk	Dec 63	Probationary Party Member
Truong Minh Chau	unk	unk	Party Chapter member

The document reveals that the unit [80C] was newly activated, and its base area was continually harrassed by "enemy" airstrikes and sweep operations. Most of cadre and combatants had different tactical and educational knowledge, and were always physically unfit for combat missions; some of them wanted to be transferred to other units due to the poor living

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Bulletin No. 8863

CDEC

Doc Log No.

Summary

Capture Data

conditions. The unit was assigned the missions of providing medical support for wounded and sick personnel from T2 and T4 ~~/~~ poss MR 2 and MR 4, Unit 72 aka 9 and Unit 34 aka 7 ~~/~~ poss 9th and 7th Div 7; reception and training of recruits from the lowland, and providing replacements for the front lines. It was also responsible for thought reform for ~~/~~ VC 7 deserters.

An entry dated 20 Apr 67 lists name of members of five Party Cells as follows:

- 1st (Staff) Cell: Kiều, Bé, Thủ, Luôn.
- 2d (Polit) Cell: Ngọc, Huân, Kiêm, Hả.
- 3d (Rear SVCS) Cell: Bùi, Mùi, Sách, Biết, Số, Vũ, Long, Bình, Nô.
- 4th (Recon) Cell: Nâm, Hoàng, Thành, Thành, Cửu, Tường, Thach.
- 5th (Support) Cell: Đắc, Út, Nhán, Cao.

A minutes on conference held on 9 Nov 67 reveals that Unit 80C was reassigned to the Rear SVC Group 62.

Speaking of the situation of cities in SVL, the document states that to cope with the present situation, a supplemental Resolution for the 1966 Resolution was adopted by the Central ~~/~~ Lao Dong Party Committee ~~/~~ to urge ~~/~~ VC/NVA ~~/~~ Units to improve their tactics and to carry out continuous attacks on the "enemy" regardless of difficulties encountered in Rear SVC activities.

The document also criticizes the shortcomings of the unit in the support of troops, production and animal husbandry, and poor maintenance of equipment. Document also states that, everyone desiring to take refuge in "friendly country" ~~/~~ prob Cambodia ~~/~~ should contact the Border Operation Section.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

(C) Elms of Đoàn 80-C.

01-11421-68  
(7 page  
original  
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typewritten)

(S)

7 Jan 68  
WT991644 (Opn  
Rapid Fire  
Five)  
B-36, "A"  
Co, 5th US  
SFGA  
Received CDEC:  
8 Jan 68

(C) Item #1: Letter dated 18 Apr 67, signed by Nguyễn Hồng Thành, Medical Officer of Đoàn 80-C Dispensary, addressed to C.410, recommends that Huynh Văn Hổng and Trần Đặng, wounded personnel of C.410 each be issued 10\$ a day as special food allowances. Hổng suffered skull concussion and Đặng was blinded by grenade fragments.

(C) Item #2: Letter dated 29 Apr 67, signed by Nguyễn Hồng Thành, Medical Officer of Đoàn 80-C Dispensary, addressed to C.410, recommends

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Authority NWD-899133

By I.M. Huda, DIA

7/10

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Bulletin No. 8853

CDEC

Doc Log No.

**Summary**

Capture Date

that Sqd Ldr, Co Polit Off of C-4107 be issued special food allowances due to head wounds.

(C) Item #3: Letter dated 17 Jun 67, signed by Tú Ngát for the CO of Convalescence Unit, U/5- prob Tây Ninh Prov, MR 17 addressed to the Convalescence Camp of R prob HQ, SVNLAY recommends that Sqd Ldr Phan Minh Đặng, hospitalized eight months in Convalescence Unit, U/5, for treatment of wounds, be operated on and given further treatment.

(C) Item #4: Hospital Release dated 28 Oct 67, signed by Nguyễn Hồng Thành and countersigned by Trương Minh Châu, Chief of Dispensary LBN 8655LYK poss Đoàn 80-C reveals that Nguyễn Hữu Thủ of D Bn 80-C prob Bn HQ 7 admitted to the Hospital on 15 Aug 67 for treatment of malaria and seabies was released on 28 Oct 67.

(C) Item #5: Hospital Release dated 21 Nov 67, signed by Huynh Thinh, Medical Student and countersigned by Trương Minh Châu, chief of 80-C Dispensary, reveals that Nguyễn Miền Chi, age 24, Asst Sqd Ldr of Đoàn 80-C, admitted to the Hospital on 4 Nov 67 for treatment of paraparesis and pneumonia, was released on 22 Nov 67.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

A. A. Gaddis  
per h. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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9 January 1968

BULLETIN NO. 10054

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CODE	DESCRIPTION	Capture Data
01-24-2-68 (56 page original handwritten)	<p>(U) File of Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA.</p> <p>(.) Personnel Roster, lists name and position of members of various elements of <u>Group Rear Svc Group 82, HQ, SVNLA</u> as follows:</p> <p>(B)</p> <p>1- <u>B175</u> / Unit of Quartermaster of Group 82-7 with a strength of 74 individuals. Key personnel recorded are: Nguyen Van Phu (Co Cdr in the Command Committee), Dr Le Phien (Co XO, Major of the Surgery), Dr Ngan (Co XO), Medic Ba Ngan Phuoc Van (Co XO, Chief of Sec 2 of Dispensary), Dr Dang Van Doang (An Co, Capt of Medical Sec), Pharmacist Bac Tuong (Co XO), Tran Van Ten (Co XO), Nguyen Si Sieu (Co XO, Dr Phu Ba Phu (Co XO), Dr Le Van Hieu (Co CO of Finance Adm), and Nguyen Van Phu (Co XO).</p> <p>2- <u>B175</u> / Quartermaster Depot of Group 82-7 with a strength of 113 individuals. Key personnel recorded are: Pham Hong Thinh (BN XO), Truong Van (Co Polit Off). Among them, seven members are listed as KIA and two as defectors.</p> <p>3- <u>B175</u> / Quartermaster Depot of Group 82-7 with a strength of 32 individuals. Key personnel recorded are: Dang Van Phu (BN XO, in the Command Committee), Phan Van Hiep (Co XO, in the Command Committee), Tran Van Laooc (Co XO), Luu Ngan Trung Chinh (Plat Ldr), Bui Van Phuoc (Plat Ldr, in charge of the construction of Navy Depot), and Nguyen Van Thanh (Plat Ldr, Supply Co..</p> <p>4- <u>477B</u> / Hospital of Group 82-7 with a strength of 71 individuals. Key personnel recorded are: Dr Tran Van A aka Hung (An Co), Medic Quan Minh Linh (Co CO), Polit Off Huynh Mai Dien (Co XO), Medic Le Cong Dinh (Plat Ldr), Medic Do Gia Chan (Plat Ldr), adjutant Vo Hoang Long (Plat Ldr), Nguyen Van Thanh (Plat Ldr), Dr Nguyen Thanh Thoi (Co XO), and Dr Le Quang Tay (Co XO).</p> <p>5- <u>TN</u> / Clothing Civil Shop of Group 82-7 with a strength of 20 individuals. Key personnel recorded are: Dang Hoang Son (Polit Off), and Tan Thy (Plat Ldr).</p>	7 Jan 68 WT 7/164 (Opr Rapids Fire S) B-36, "A" Co, 5th PIR AFMA Acquired 0000 7 Jan 68

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Authority NWD-698153  
By I.M. NINA, DIA  
7/10

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Bulletin No. 8854

CEEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
01-11423-68 (14 page original handwritten) (B)	<p>14- K77A [Dispensary of Group 82] with a strength of 80 individuals. Key personnel recorded are: Dr Nguyễn Tân Hải (Bn XO, in the Command Committee of Unit), Dr Bui Văn Võ (Bn XO), Medic Nguyen Văn Đóng (Co CO) and Dr Nguyễn Văn Thu (Co XO).</p> <p>(U) <u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> Full Translation will follow under IIR# 6 027 0245 68</p> <p>(C) Elements of Group 80C.</p> <p>(C) Notebook, entries dated from Apr to Oct 67, by a member of Đoan 80C [poss Training Replacement Bn, Group 80 HQ, SVNLA 7], contains notes on the daily situation covering the enemy [VMAF/RVNAF] activities from 28 Apr to 25 Oct 67 in Village 73 (Ta Lam), 74 and 75, and in the areas of Lò Cò, Cao Su (Nang Ra), Sóc Thít, Ta Bang, Tam Thái, Hòa Đức, and Bang Dung. A Situation Report dated 9 May 67, prepared for the signature of the CO of Đoan 80C, informs C7, C8, C11 and T13 that the enemy would possibly patrol the areas of Bau Nguyễn and Tam Thái (former location of C7 and 410) and directs units to prepare for counter sweep operations. Another Situation Report, dated 12 May 67, signed by Ngọc Kieu for the CO of Đoan 80C [80C] informs H16, 77, 4, 155, 410, Ba Dũng, and C14 that from the 11th to the end of May 67, Đoan 80C would coordinate with the forces of two [U/I] villages, to establish a night ambush along Road #13, Thông Nhát Road and in the area of Ta Bang and indicates that addressees should not authorize their personnel to enter these areas. Two other situation Reports, dated 22 May 67, signed by Ngọc Kieu for Đoan 80, informs C7, C8, C11, T13, 410, 155, Dispensary, 77, H16 and ATK that, according to C7, a number of enemy Recon agents penetrated the area of Lò Kiếm in the night of 21 May 67, and recommends addressees to patrol their areas in order to capture these enemy agents. An activity plan for Jun 67, reveals that T13 was to receive replacements from [C 7 7, 8 and 11 on 1 Jun, and that the Đoan 7 was to receive replacements from Công Trường 9 [poss 9th VC Div] on 6 Jun, to conduct a political re-orientation course from 7 to 18 Jun, and to organize a District Unit. An undated situation Report informs [C 7 6, 7, 8 and 11, Dispensary, B2/155, Recon Unit, H16 and D16 that a number of enemy recon agents penetrated the general base area of a District Unit and requests addressees to establish an ambush and to patrol in an attempt to discover these enemy agents. An Order, dated 24 Jul 67, signed by Nguyễn Văn Sô, Assistant CO [or the CO of the Đoan, informs Đoan HQ, Dispensary and [C 6, 7, 8 and 11 that the enemy would possibly patrol Village 75, and instructs subordinate units</p>	7 Jan 68 WT991644 B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA (Opn Rapid Fire Five) Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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Bulletin No. 8854

CDEC

Doc Log No.

Summary

Capture Data

stationed in this village to improve camouflage, to observe noise and light discipline and not bunch up. A Situation Report, dated 28 Jul 67, prepared by U/I District Unit, informs Villages 73, 74 and 75 that enemy troops landed on 26 Jul 67 and believed to be moving to this district unit base area, and instructs units to prepare for counter-sweep operations and to reinforce patrols especially in the areas of Units B1, B2a and B16. This report is reproduced for distribution to C7, C8, C6, C11 Dispensary, 155, Bz/155, Ba Dũng, H16, Hòa Hiệp Village Unit, Phú Ninh Dist, Tây Ninh Prov, and Recon Unit. Entry dated 29 Jul 67 reveals that the Dispensary of Đoàn 80C 7 was designated as C9 and that C7 and C8 were requested to inform H16 and C11 of the new designation of the Dispensary. Also contained in the document are two tables of challenges and pass-words and recognition signals, one applied from 1 to 10 Jun 67 and the other, prepared by Đoàn 129 poss military Staff Depot, HQ, SVNLA, from 1 to 16 Aug 67.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: No Further Significant Information.

01-1424-68  
(32 page  
original  
handwritten)

(B)

(C) Personnel Status of Rear Service Group 82, HQ SVNLA.

(C) Personnel Record, undated, contains personnel rosters listing name of members of elements of Rear Service Group 82, HQ, SVNLA 7:

K70 poss Dispensary 7 had 122 members. Key cadre listed are: Doctor Võ Văn Vị, Bn X0; Nguyễn Văn Lai, Bn X0; Võ Văn Diệu, Political Officer; Doctor Võ Văn Mới, Co CO; Doctor Lê Minh Đại, Bn X0; Trần Văn Xinh, and Nguyễn Trọng Ngu, Medical Technicians, Co X0.

K71 poss Clothing Depot 7 had 44 members. Key cadre listed are: Trần Văn Toản, Plat Ldr; Nguyễn Văn Thắng and Bùi Văn Hưng, Assistants Platoon Ldr.

K72 poss Transportation Elm 7 had 129 members. Key cadre listed are: Hồ Ngọc Bảo, Co X0, Co CO; Nguyễn Ngọc Hoa, Cq X0, Political Officer; Nguyễn Văn Biển and Nguyễn Văn Đề, Co X0.

K73 poss Clothing Depot 7 had 44 members. Key cadre listed are: Liêm Văn Phúc, Plat Ldr and Tô Thị Tu, Assistant Plat Ldr.

K74 poss Security Guard Co 7 had 95 members. Key cadre listed are: Nguyễn Văn Dũng, Co CO; and

7 Jan 68  
WT991644  
B-36, "A" Co,  
5th US SFCA  
(Opn Rapid Fire  
Five)  
Received CDEC:  
8 Jan 68

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Bulletin No. 8854

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
	I6 Thành Van, Co C <sup>o</sup> , Political Officer.	
	Z1 <u>/</u> poss Ordnance Elm <u>7</u> had 65 members. Key cadre are: Truong Công Tu, Chief of "7", Võ Văn Hoá, Co XO, Political Officer; Nguyễn N Chung, Co XO, Assistant Chief, Truong Văn Bao, Assistant Chief Trần Ban, Chief of Section 2 and Nguyễn Văn Đức, Assistant Chief of Section 2.	
	B28 <u>/</u> poss Supply Depot <u>7</u> had 57 members.	
	H24 <u>/</u> poss Medical School <u>7</u> had 20 members. Key cadre listed are: Trần Minh Châu, Bn XO; Mai Môi, Bn XO, Political Officer; Cao Quý Năm, Co XO; Doctor Dương Anh Kiết, Co CO; and Thái Văn Minh, Co XO, Medical Technician.	
	C2. <u>/</u> poss Convalescence Camp <u>7</u> had 41 members. Key cadre listed are: Đặng Văn Hiếp, Co CO and Nguyễn Văn Ni, Plat Ldr, Assistant Political Officer.	
	T22 <u>/</u> poss Weapon Depot <u>7</u> had 14 members. Key cadre listed are: Huu, Co XO and Phạm Hưng Biểu, Plat Ldr.	
(U)	<u>CDEC COMMENT:</u> Full translation will follow under IIR # 6 027 0247 68	

*Mr. GALLI*

A. L. GALLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
APO US Forces 96222

MACJ261

9 January 1968

BULLETIN No. 8855

ENEMY DOCUMENTS


CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Date
01-1425-68 (3 page original handwritten)  (B)	<p>(C) Boan 80C, HQ, SVNA</p> <p>(C) Item #1: Message, dated 12 Dec 67, from Bich to Boan 80C, reveals that the enemy <u>FMAF/RVNAF</u> troops operating in the areas adjacent to the junction of Routes #20 and 22 and were destroying <u>VC</u> bases and depots located from Cán Đèo to the northern areas.</p> <p>(C) Item #2: Message, dated 13 Dec 67, from Bich to Boan 80C, informs addressee of enemy activities in areas adjacent to Routes #20 and 22.</p> <p>(C) Item #3: Message, dated 16 Dec 67, prepared by Boan 80C and sent to B1 of 0129, reveals that enemy forces were operating in the area stretching from Cán Đèo to the junction of Routes #20 and 22 and air strikes were conducted in Vam Cỏ Đèo, Rà Piết, Cao Su, Tam Thái, Ta Xia and Tà Ruc. B1 was requested to inform Boan 80C of enemy activities in Dist 12.</p> <p>(B) CDEC Comment: 1. No Further Significant Information. 2. Originals passed to TRU</p> <p>Diary of member of 42d Bn.</p> <p>(C) Diary, dated between 8 Jan 68 and 2 Jan 68 by Phan Van Thuân, age 43, native of Phu Tho <u>Prov in North VN</u>, Polit Off of 42d Bn, contains fragmentary notes on his activities during and after being treated at 07 Convalescence Unit <u>poss of Group 80C</u>.</p> <p>Document reveals that Phan formerly served in Polit Sec of Boan 80 <u>poss Replacement &amp; Trng Group, HQ, SVNA</u> until its deactivation effective 4 Apr 67. He was treated at 07 Convalescence Unit from 19 Feb to 31 Mar 67 due to an unspecified cause. Document discloses that 07 was located in an isolated jungle area along an unspecified river on the Cambodian border.</p> <p>In an undated entry, document reveals the composition of Boan 80 as follows:</p>	7 Jan 68 (T991644 B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA (Opn Rapid Fire Five) Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68
01-1425-68 * (9C page original handwritten)  (B)	<p>Diary of member of 42d Bn.</p> <p>(C) Diary, dated between 8 Jan 68 and 2 Jan 68 by Phan Van Thuân, age 43, native of Phu Tho <u>Prov in North VN</u>, Polit Off of 42d Bn, contains fragmentary notes on his activities during and after being treated at 07 Convalescence Unit <u>poss of Group 80C</u>.</p> <p>Document reveals that Phan formerly served in Polit Sec of Boan 80 <u>poss Replacement &amp; Trng Group, HQ, SVNA</u> until its deactivation effective 4 Apr 67. He was treated at 07 Convalescence Unit from 19 Feb to 31 Mar 67 due to an unspecified cause. Document discloses that 07 was located in an isolated jungle area along an unspecified river on the Cambodian border.</p> <p>In an undated entry, document reveals the composition of Boan 80 as follows:</p>	7 Jan 68 (T991644 (Opn Rapid Fire Five) B-36, "A" Co, 5th US SFCA Received CDEC: 8 Jan 68

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Bulletin No. 8855

CBEC Doc Log No.	Summary	Capture Data
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- Convalescence Unit: C11, C8 and C7

- Training Unit: C6, C4, C3, C2, C1 - Medical Station - 41st Pn

- T15 and T13

The above Units were activated before the 1966 Lunar New Year.

It was reported that C7's location was hit by "enemy" airstrikes several times. On 4 Mar 67 the Unit was hit by Napalm bombs and in addition, C7 had to move to Cambodian territory to the base areas of C410 and C8 many times to evade "enemy" sweep operations, especially during the Junction City Operation. Subject recorded that he had gone to Cambodian to participate in many meetings held by the 42d En Party Chapter during his treatment period at C7.

In subsequent entries, document reveals that after the deactivation of Bn 80, Subject was reassigned to 42d Pn as a Polit Off. He did not like this place because of the friction between him and Mroi Ha [of 42d Bn] and furthermore, felt isolated, being the only Northerner. Subject wanted to be transferred to Comrade Sâm's Unit located in Binh Long [Prov], mostly composed of North VN cadre such as Cầu, Luhn and Kiết.

Entry dated 10 May 67, reveals that Hai Ngon was assigned to the position of Asst Polit Off [of 42d Bn] upon his graduation from an unspecified course conducted by C11 and also during this period, 42d Bn was moved to a river bank at the previous location of B3 Depot of Bn 80.

Another entry, dated 9 Nov 67 discloses that C10 was separated from Bn 80 [poss Replacement-Tng Bn of Group 80, NC, SVN] and became subordinate to Bn P2 [poss Rear Svc Op 82] as of Jan 68. In an undated entry, document records that Bn 80 was located in Tà Pêng area.

On 28 Dec 67, two Recon members, Phê and Co, were reported killed by an "enemy" airstrike at Lô 1 Thô while carrying out [Farm] production mission.

In the last entry, document reveals that a Party was given by Subject's

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Bulletin No. 8855

01-1229

Doc Log #

Summary

Capture Data

Unit on 6 Jan 68 [sic] to celebrate the 1968 Lunar New Year.

Document also contains 15 Personal History Statements of members of C1, C3, C4, C7 and B12.

Author further recorded on the cover of the Diary the LBN: 86554/YK - Đoàn 80A.

(U) CDEC Comment: \* Extract translation will follow under IIR #6 027 0244 68

01-1227-68

(1 page  
original  
handwritten)

(B)

(C) Đoàn 80C, HQ, SVNLA

(C) Message, dated 2 Jan 68, from Thủ [CO] of Đoàn 80C, to Đội [Unit] 1, Đoàn 129 [Mil Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA], reveals that on 29 and 30 Dec 67, the enemy [FVN/F/RVNAF] conducted air strikes and arty shellings on Cua area which was adjacent to Vam Co Dong and on Cambodian territory. Two enemy aircraft were shot down by personnel of Đoàn 80C. Friendly [VC] forces sustained three WIA.

(U) CIEC Comment: 1. No Further Significant Information. 2. Original passed to TRU.

01-1228-68

(3 page  
original  
handwritten)

(B)

(C) Đoàn 80C, HQ, SVNLA

(C) Item #1: Message, dated 23 Dec [year unspecified], prepared by Bích, [addressed to Đoàn 80C], reports on the activities of elements subordinate to the 25th US Inf Div and 49th [RVNAF] Regt in Cà Tum, Cần Đang Sông Phan and areas adjacent to Route #22. Bích reveals that an attack was launched on the elements of the 25th US Inf Div operating in Cà Tum by an unspecified [VC] Div which resulted in 100 "enemy" KIA.

(C) Item #2: Message, dated 29 Dec 67, signed by Thủ, CO of Đoàn 80C, addressed to Đội [Unit] 1, Đoàn 129 [Mil Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA], reports that a US Plat landed at Đồi Thủ to attack the Production Sites of the two Units subordinate to Đoàn 80C. After five minutes of attack, the US Plat withdrew and called in arty fire from Trai Bi. Friendly [VC] forces sustained two KIA, two WIA, and lost one CMC Rifle and one K44 Rifle. US forces had one KIA.

(C) Item #3: Message, dated 29 Dec [year unspecified], from Thủ [CO of Đoàn 80C], reveals that on 19 Dec a raid was launched by friendly [VC] forces on elements subordinate to the 25th US Inf Div at B6 Túc.

(U) CDEC Comment: 1. No Further Significant Information. 2. Originals passed to TRU

MA. L. GILLI  
LTC, USA  
Dir, US Elm, CDEC

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By J.M. NAVF Data 2/10

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COMPANY A

1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

APO 96227

SUBJECT: INTERROGATION REPORT  
(Infiltrator)

10 January 1968

TO: See Distribution

Report number: 03-01-68

Date of interrogation: 06 Jan 68

Classification: NVA

Disposition: Company A, 5th SF (Abn), 1st SF, Bien Hoa, RVN

---oo0oo---

Full name: NGUYEN VAN CU

Aka: None

Date and place of capture: 061126 Jan 68 at XT 150878.

Circumstance of capture: Source was captured while he was hunting.

I. BIO DATA:

Full name: NGUYEN VAN CU

Date and place of birth: 24 Oct 1946 at HIEP HOA district, HA BAC province, North Vietnam.

Parents name: Father: NGUYEN VAN SO

Mother: NGUYEN THI CON

Occupation: Rice farmer

Religion: Buddhist

Marital status: Single

Education: Writes and reads

Resided: HIEP HOA district, HA BAC province, North Vietnam.

Social affiliation: Middle farmer.

Political affiliation: Communist

II. BACKGROUND ACTIVITIES:

From 1946 to 1965: Source was a small boy, lived with his family and worked in rice fields.

From 1965 to 1968: Served with VC.

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10 Jan 1968

III. EXPLOITED INFORMATION:

Source stated that he was drafted on 21 March 1965. He was trained in HAI DUONG province for 4 months. Training included: Firing (AK 47, AK 50), digging foxholes, tunnels and bunkers.

Source stated that in July 1965 he finished training and was assigned to the H-19th Engineer company, 611th battalion, 219th regiment. The mission of his company was to dig tunnels and foxholes to be used for protection against air raids. On 05 August 1965, H-19 Engineer Company infiltrated into SVN. After  $3\frac{1}{2}$  months his company reached 4th Bac Ke post (this post is in SVN). His infiltration group was called 611th group and included 300 men. While the group was infiltrating there were approx 20 men who contacted malaria. Source had malaria in 4th Bac Ke post and stayed in a hospital which is located in the 4th Bac Ke post, 5 days walking distance from 6th Military Region. When source was released from the hospital he was again assigned to H-19th Engineer company. At that time, the location of H-19th Company was in 6th military region. Strength of H-19th company was approx 80 men. The units mission in 6th military region was to build roads and trails for the VC. His unit was located in 6th military region for 11 months. The H-19th Engineer Company was disbanded and source was assigned to 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon, C-25th Engineer Company, located in TAY NINH province. C-25 LBN 86200YK/B5 of 5th regiment is subordinate to COSVN.

Organization of C-25 Engineer Company:

CO: NHAN  
XO: QUYNH  
PO: KHOAN

C-25 Company has 3 platoons, each platoon has 3 squads, each squad has 9 members.

Platoon leader of 2nd platoon (Source's platoon): HOANG.

Squad leader of 1st squad (Source's squad): QUAN

Mission of C-25 company is to set up mines and dig tunnels.

Source stated that he has been in C-25 Company approx one month. His company has had no contact with SVN or US forces. During the day, C-25 company has patrols outside the base camp perimeter from 0500 hours to 1000 hours and during the night they patrol inside the base camp from 2100 hours until 0500 hours the next morning. The base camp is located vic XT 1787 and has 10 building in each building they have dug foxholes. Around the base camp there are trenches, tunnels. They have planted DH. 10 mines (claymore) in the North, South, East and West side of the base camp. The base camp has only one entrance. C-25 Company has AK rifles caliber 7.62 but no machine guns or mortar. There are approx 3 claymore mines set up along side the trail that leads to the entrance

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SUBJECT: INTERROGATION REPORT

10 Jan 1968

of the base camp. There are about 40 men (17 NVA the rest SVN) in the base camp. Every 6 or 7 days a detail of 6 men departs toward the Cambodian border to pick up rice and foodstuff. The supplies includes rices, dry fishes, salt and Nuoc Mam.

Source did not know of any rice or weapons caches. He has not seen any American or SVN POW's in the area.

IV. INTERROGATOR: SP/6 BENITEZ

INTERROGATOR'S COMMENT: Source in many instances contradicted himself and denied having any knowledge as far as places and directions. I believe he is holding information. Recommend further interrogation in regard to COSVN infrastructure and locations.

*Frank V. Paone*  
FRANK V. PAONE  
1LT, MI  
S-2

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Det B-36, 5th SFGA  
Long Hai, RVN  
4 December 1967

OPORD: OPERATION RAPID FIRE V

REFERENCE: MAPS, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, 6131 I, 6132 II, 6231 II, 6232 III,  
6232 IV, Series L7016

TASK ORGN: CO A, 5th SFGA, Special Task Force Rapid Fire (Det B-36),  
Det B-32, Army Svn Supt (5 UH-1D, 3 UH-1C(UTT), 2 O-1 Radio  
Relay, 10 UH-1D on Call), USAF FAC (1, O-1 Acft), 23rd Arty Gp.

1. (C) SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces: (Annex A)

b. Friendly Forces:

- (1) II FFV OPCON and Gen Supt.
- (2) CO A, 5th SFGA: Comd and Supt.
- (3) Det B-32: Coord/IN
- (4) Tay Ninh East and West: Avn Facilities
- (5) Arty: GS (II FFV Assets)

c. Attachments and Detachments: (Eff 060800 Dec 67)

- (1) 5 UH-1D Acft: (II FFV Assets)
- (2) 3 UH-1C (UTT) Acft: (II FFV Assets)
- (3) Two O-1 Radio Relay Acft: (II FFV Assets)
- (4) One O-1 FAC Acft (II FFV Assets)


2. (C) MISSION: Special Task Force Rapid Fire conducts special operations  
commencing 0 Day, 08 December 1967, in designated AO's to develop Combat  
Intell and satisfy EEI.

3. (C) EXECUTION:

a. CONCEPT: Special Task Force Rapid Fire establishes FOB at  
Tay Ninh East, XT 204510, beginning 5 Dec and employs eight IRRP teams within  
AO Bear beginning 08 Dec to accomplish the mission and assigned tasks. Two main  
force platoon will secure the FOB (Tay Ninh East) and provide ready reaction  
for patrols committed in the AO/ All USAF and Army Avn Support will be located  
at the FOB. Indirect fire support provided by 23rd Arty Bp. TAC air on call  
thru USAF FAC. UTT's provide armed Recon and close Air Support on call.

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## b. Company A, 5th SFCA

### (1) S-2

- (a) Provide area study of AO Bear.
- (b) Furnish up to date info on enemy, weather and terrain
- (c) Coordinate Photo coverage.
- (d) Provide required map coverage.
- (e) Provide a POW collection point of handling POW's and documents
- (f) Coordinate and provide other Intel as required.

### (2) S-3

- (a) Provide Liasion with II FFV as required.
- (b) Provide necessary frequencies and commo support.
- (3) S-4 Provide logistical support as required.
- (4) ALO: Provide required coord with USAF.

## c. Det B-36

- (1) Provide 6 USASF for Command and Control Plus 5 radio operators.
- (2) Establish FOB and Commo Center.

d. Det A-361. Provide one Recon and one main force Platoon. Strength of this force will be 8 USASF, 2 LRRP's and 50 VN Nationals.

e. Det A-362. Provide one Recon and one main force platoon. Strength of this force will be 8 USASF, 5 LRRP's and 60 UN Nationals.

f. Det A-302. Provide one Mike Force Company as ready reserve. This unit will be operational in AO Mongoose.

g. Det B-32: Coord and Liasion.


h. US Army Avn Supt (II FFV Asset)

(1) Provide continuously, five helicopters capable of carrying at least six combat equipped soldiers. The ships must also be able to hover at an altitude of 100 feet during infiltrations and extractions with this number of personnel on board.

(2) Provide a ten slick scramble on two hour alert.

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(3) Provide three UTT's capable of performing close air support.

(4) Provide continual Radio Relay on a 24 hour Basis.

i. 23rd Arty Gp: GS

j. TAC Air Support.

(1) Immediate: on call thru FAC to III DASC, Kien Hoa

(2) Preplanned : On call thru III DASC.

k. SAC support: ARC LITE and Quick Run Strikes on call thru the II FFV, Long Binh.

l. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) MSF 361 and 362 provide additional USASF, LRRP and VNN, Cambodian, personnel as required.

(2) All mines and booby traps will be self destructive.

(3) All personnel contacted within the AO are considered hostile.

(4) Decisive engagement will be avoided unless defeat of the enemy in detail is calculated.

(5) Assets of Co A, 5th SFGA, designated to support Opn Rapid Fire V will be attached off 060800 Dec 67 unless by VOCG.

(6) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt.

(7) Commo to higher Hqs will be direct to B-32 and by RTT to Co A, 5th SFGA.

4. (C) Administration and Logistics:

a. Administration:


(1) A roster of all Rapid Fire V personnel will be provided to Co A and Long Hai. A third copy will be maintained at the FOB (TOC), Tay Ninh.

(2) All personnel will ensure emergency Data Cards are up to date.

(3) ID Tag's will be the only ID carried by personnel operating in or over the AO.

(4) Casualties will be reported as soon as possible using SOP direct to Co A, 5th SFGA.

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- (5) US dead will be taken to Co A, 5th SFGA, Bien Hoa ASAP.
- (6) US and VN Nationals wounded will be evacuated to 45th MUST Hospital Tay Ninh West).
- (7) VN Nationals slightly wounded will be treated at the FOB.
- (8) All POW's and documents will be process thru the FOB to Co A, 5th SFGA, Bien Hoa.
- (9) Medevac: All wounded will be medevaced using Det B-36 attached Avn Resources.

## b. LOGISTICS:

- (1) An emergency resupply of ammo and medical supplies will be on hand at the FOB, Tay Ninh East, for delivery by helicopter.
- (2) Additional supplies of all classes will be procured from Co A, 5th SFGA as required.
- (3) Class I:
- (a) Personnel committed to the AO will be issued one Indig and one C-Ration per day.
  - (b) Personnel not committed will eat class A rations prepared at the FOB Mess Tent.
- (4) Class II SOP
- (5) Class III SOP
- (6) Class IV SOP
- (7) Class V SOP

## 5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. SIGNAL: Current SOI in Effect.
- b. COMMAND:
- (1) CO, Co A, 5th SFGA, Bien Hoa over-all commander of all Co A assets.
- (2) CO Det B-36 has command and control over all elements operation within the AO.
- (3) CP will be Co-Located with the FOB/TOC (Tay Ninh East).

DISTRIBUTION: SPARTIAL  
ANNEXES: A. INTEL B. OVERLAY  
OFFICIAL  
CRICHTON  
S-3

JAMES G. GRITZ  
MAJ IN  
Commanding

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By I.M. NAW, DMA 7/10

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Det B-36, 5th SFGA

Long Hai, RVN

4 December 1967

ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPLAN RAPID FIRE V

REFERENCE: a. Maps, AMS JCG (G) Series L7016, Scale 1:50,000, sheets 6232 III, 6232 IV.

b. Tatical Terrain Study Base Areas: Tay Ninh and Vicinity.  
Hqs MACV J2 dated 15 October 1967.

1. (C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. Current order of battle does not indicate the presence of any major VC/NVA units in the AO, however, the Hqs 7th NVA Div with support elements and the 271st VC Regiment are all located vicinity XT5993 and it is probable that elements of these units may be in or near AO/

b. Reference b indicates the presence of numerous well used trails leading into RVN from Cambodia and it is probable that the enemy is using the area as a major infiltration route.

2. (C) ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTED WITHIN THE AO.

a. What is enemy strength, disposition, composition and unit identification?

b. What are the locations of base camp, command and control facilities and logistical support activities within AO?

c. Will the enemy fight to preserve base camps or will they withdraw? If they will fight, determine with what forces, when and with what supporting arms. If they will withdraw, determine to where and by what routes using what means of transportation.

d. Will the enemy reinforce his forces within the AO? If so when, from where, and with what forces?

e. Determine the use of trails, roads, and waterways with respect to type of traffic, volume and frequency of use.

f. What activities are being carried out within the AO by VC/NVA units, where, in what strengths, and with what effectiveness.

3. Request for information and assistance: Company A, 5th SFGA is requested to furnish:


a. Maps of the AO

b. Photo coverage of the AO

c. Prisoner detaining facilities for POWs captured within the AO.

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## 4. (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCES:

a. Military Security: Commanders will take all active and passive measures to preserve the security of this operation, to include:

(1) Limitation of the number of personnel with knowledge of the mission and AO to those with a need to know.

(2) Strict Adherence to established procedures concerning the handling of classified documents and material.

(3) Insuring that indigenous personnel having access to areas connected with the operation do not gain knowledge of the operation.

## b. Communications Security.

(1) Only those CRYPTOGRAPHIC systems and codes authorized by US National Authority will be used for electrical communications required protection.

## 5. (C) MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Instructions for exfiltration of VIP POW's will be requested subsequent to capture.

b. All captured documents and equipment will be reported to Co A, 5th SFGA.

c. POW's will be interrogated at FOB for immediately useable information and then evacuated to Co A, 5th SFGA.

## ACKNOWLEDGE:

JAMES G. GRITZ  
MAJ IN  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

OFFICIAL:

NUNEMAKER  
S-2

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ANNEX H, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

1. The following information and comments are included in the body and annexes of this After Action Report. However, it is felt that due to the fact these statistics and other media may elude the reader they are emphasized in this attachment.

a. During the conduct of Operation Rapid Fire V a total of seventeen (17) helicopters were struck by enemy fire. Ten (10) of these were downed, three were destroyed, and four three were seriously damaged. Seven of these aircraft were hit at various times but returned to station under their own power.

b. The statistics below are a resume of B-52 strikes and assessments:

XT 245952	Ground assesed by Det B-36	25th Div Request
XT 202961	Air assesed by Det B-36	25th Div Request
WT 997641	Air assesed by Det B-36	B-36 Request

c. Following is a list of B-52 strikes requested:

WT 980680 (Received but ordnance dropped at WT 997641, as indicated in paragraph b. above).  
XT 088881 (Not received)  
XT 115890 (Not received)  
XT 095921 (Not received)  
XT 085915 (Not received)

d. The "Woodcutter" area indicated on Operations and Intelligence Overlay attached as Annex G is of special interest. Within this area Vietnamese loggers are allowed to travel freely with the permission of the Province Chief. It is known through interrogation reports and information received freely from these woodcutters that the following Viet Cong activities take place in this zone.

(1) Loggers communicate with the VC and cooperate with their desires in order to cut wood in the area.

(2) Truck owners are taxed at pre-arranged times in order to enter and leave the area.

(3) VC limit the movement of the woodcutters and dictate the areas that can be used in order not to interfere with the movement, cover, and concealment of Viet Cong units, either local or main force.

(4) Logger trucks are used for the transport of VC locals, who are in some cases working as woodcutters.

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