

25th - ORL Quarterly ending 31 Oct 67

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
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (H) (27 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674216

5 March 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th
Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCH

14 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (BC)

TD: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Location: Vicinity CU CHI, CU CHI Base Camp (XT647153), RVN
Reporting Officer: Major General F. K. Mearns
Prepared by: Captain Howard C. Hanning, CO, 18th Military
History Detachment

1. (C) Significant Organizational Activities.

a. Operations.

(1) General. There were three major operations (battalion size or larger) and 1,198 small unit actions conducted by the 25th Infantry Division during the quarter. All major operations and 191 of the small unit actions resulted in enemy contact.

(2) The 25th Infantry Division Monsoon Campaign which began in May, continued throughout the reporting period. The mission of the division in the Monsoon Campaign remained the same: to conduct offensive operations with emphasis in populated areas, to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations, to secure lines of communications (LOC's), to support the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) Revolutionary Development Program and to reinforce Free World Military Assistance Forces and GVN forces as directed. An added mission was to provide distant security and a reaction force when called upon to aid the security of the Vietnamese National Elections. The three operations of KOLEKOLE, BARKING SANDS and DIAMOND HEAD continued within the division's Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI).

(a) KOLEKOLE (14 May 1967 - Continuing). This operation continued as a search and destroy operation conducted by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in HAU NGHIA and TAY NINH Provinces. During the month of August, the operation employed only two of the 2d Brigade's battalions, the third being away from the area while operating under the operational control of the 9th Infantry Division for Operation UNIONTOWN. Increased ARVN participation in Operation KOLEKOLE served to lessen the

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effect of the US battalion's absence. A significant action took place when the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon (CRIP), consisting of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, and the HAU NGHIA Province Intelligence Platoon (of Regional Forces) supported by gunships, reacted to intelligence and engaged a VC reconnaissance element from LONG AN Province, resulting in 27 VC Killed in Action (KIA), verified by body count (BC). A significant loss to the VC occurred during the period from 5 - 8 August, when the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry located extensive ammunition caches and factories around LOC GIANG (XT426155) along the ORIENTAL River. Items recovered included a metal lathe, 1000 unfinished anti-personnel (AP) mines, over 100 artillery, mortar and recoilless rifle rounds, sufficient material to make 500 grenades and several hundred pounds of tools. Much of this equipment was found in large earthenware crocks buried in the mud along the shores of the ORIENTAL River and was detectable only at low tide.

During September Operation KOLEKOLE shifted to northern HAU NGHIA and southwestern TAY NINH Provinces, while ARVN operations in southern HAU NGHIA Province increased. The 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry conducted extensive dismounted night ambush patrols around LOC GIANG, and along the ORIENTAL River, which resulted in 14 VC KIA (BC) from ten engagements. During the last part of September the 1st and 2d Battalions, 27th Infantry engaged scattered VC west of the ORIENTAL River, resulting in the capture of a VC Prisoner of War (PW) who revealed the location of the 269th VC Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults in reaction to this intelligence. Throughout this operation VC PW and HOI CHANH (ralliers under the CHIEU HOI or OPEN ARMS Program) have provided the 2d Brigade with much information.

Operation KOLEKOLE continued through October with emphasis on search and destroy operations, supplemented with pacification operations, in HAU NGHIA, TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces. Search and destroy operations were characterized by rapid response to intelligence reports in widely separated areas in the division's TAOR. Contact during the month was with small and scattered VC units. Two significant contacts occurred on 21 and 31 October. On 21 October an estimated VC platoon was observed from the air moving from a base camp south of TAY NINH at XT194318. The VC were fixed in place by gunships until A and B Companies of 1st Bn, 27th Infantry were airlifted to the area to engage them. The results of this engagement was 18 VC KIA (BC) and numerous ammunition, weapons and documents captured. On 31 October the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry conducted airmobile contact assaults north of the RACH TRA stream (XT7908) and made contact with the 2d GO MON Battalion (VC). Results of this contact were 28 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC PW.

Results of Operation KOLEKOLE to date are: Personnel losses - 679 VC KIA (BC), 425 VC KIA (poss), 142 VC PWs, 1047 detainees and 34 HOI CHANH. Material captured - 364 lbs of documents, 279 individual weapons,

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684 | 284
 272
 120

.75
32 | 24.0
 224
 160

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5 crew served weapons. Material and installations destroyed - 4829 bunkers, 503 military structures, 425 tunnels, 387 sampans, 4703 artillery rounds, mortar rounds, RPG-2 rounds, recoilless rifle rounds, mines and other explosive devices, 27.75 tons of rice and 40,684 small arms rounds.

(b) BARKING SANDS (18 May 1967 - Continuing). This operation continued as a pacification operation of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in CU CHI and TRANG BANG Districts of HAU NGHIA Province and PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Provinces. Numerous small unit actions, which included Bushmaster (extensive company size patrols), Cordon and Search of suspected VC hamlets, Roadrunner (mine sweeping of roads) and Checkmate (road blocks in unannounced locations to check for VC personnel or supplies being moved by surface transportation), enabled the brigade to reduce VC capability to move freely. In addition, search and destroy missions employing airmobile combat assaults into the IRON TRIANGLE, and along the west side of the SAIGON River south of the IRON TRIANGLE were conducted, when intelligence reports located VC units in the area. On 30 August the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry conducted airmobile assaults against an entrenched VC battalion in the IRON TRIANGLE at XT735193. Small arms (SA), automatic weapons (AW), artillery and airstrikes were directed against the VC resulting in 4 VC KIA (BC), 11 US KHA and 43 US WHA.

Operation WAIMEA, a part of Operation BARKING SANDS, was conducted from 22 through 26 August. In addition to an organic battalion of the 1st Brigade, WAIMEA included the 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry placed under 1st Brigade's operational control from the 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Separate), and the 2d and 4th Battalions of the 7th Regiment (ARVN). The operation was conducted along the RACH TRA, from XT7507 to the SAIGON River at XT814079 and along the opposite bank of the SAIGON River from XT8109 to XT8208. The area of operation was known to be a VC haven because of the thick terrain and extensive canals flowing from the SAIGON River. The operation was designed to drive the VC from the area and to destroy their base camps and fortifications. Contact throughout the operation was limited, however, to engagement of VC in sampans and destruction of fortifications, many of which were booby trapped. Civic action operations were taken to assist the RD cadre and population at nearby TAN THAN DONG (XT7511) and to provide medical assistance at BAO TRAM (XT722156). For further details and results of this operation see Combat Operation After Action Report for Operation WAIMEA, attached as Appendix 4.

Operation BARKING SANDS was continued throughout September as a pacification operation, to which was added the security of jungle clearing operations. During 1 - 5 September primary emphasis was placed on platoon and company size patrols to deny VC units access to populated areas during the National Elections (held on Sunday 3 September). After the elections were held jungle clearing operations were begun in the RACH TRA area, where Operation WAIMEA was conducted in August. The purpose of this clearing was to eliminate foliage used by VC units for concealment when moving along the waterways flowing from the SAIGON River.

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Clearing operations intensified when Operation KUNIA, a part of Operation BARKING SANDS, was begun on 16 September. The brigade moved with four battalions (2d Bn, 15th Inf; 4th Bn, 9th Inf; 4th Bn (M), 23d Inf and 3d Bn, 22d Inf) into the HO BO Woods by land and airmobile combat assaults. Search and destroy operations were conducted in preparation for the arrival of a land clearing team of thirty Rome Plows (a bulldozer with a sharpened blade set at an angle, constructed to be used in jungle clearing operations), the 27th Land Clearing Team, 168th Engr Bn, placed in Direct Support of the 25th Division to clear the HO BO Woods. Land clearing was begun on 20 September. The objective of Operation KUNIA is to eliminate the HO BO Woods as a safe haven for the VC through extensive clearing operations and destruction of VC base camps and forces.

Jungle clearing operations were continued through October as part of Operation KUNIA. Operation BARKING SANDS was continued as a search and destroy operation and security for jungle clearing operations. Jungle clearing was completed in the northern and western parts of the HO BO Woods and continues in the east and south. By the end of October 9,645 acres of the HO BO Woods had been cleared by Rome Plows and by using bangalore torpedoes in areas inaccessible to the Rome Plows.

Results of Operation BARKING SANDS to date are: Personnel losses - 320 VC KIA (BC), 769 VC KIA (poss), 38 VC PWs, 35,801 detainees and 9 HOI CHANH. Material captured - 531 lbs of documents, 222 individual weapons, 18 crew served weapons. Material and installations destroyed - 5169 bunkers, 670 military structures, 855 tunnels, 120 sampans, 3929 artillery rounds, mortar rounds, RPG-2 rounds, recoilless rifle rounds, mines, bombs and other explosive devices, 133.75 tons of rice, 102,714 small arms rounds.

(c) DIAMOND HEAD (18 May 1967 - Continuing). This operation was continued by the 3d Brigade from its base camps at TAY NINH and DAU TIENG. On 1 August 1967 the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was redesignated the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division by USARPAC General Order Number 144, dated 27 July 1967. Authority cited therein was DA Message 824266, dated 19 July 1967. No movement of troops or units was involved in this redesignation. Operation DIAMOND HEAD was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division throughout the reporting period. Search and destroy operations and security missions were conducted in TAY NINH and BINH DUONG Provinces. In addition, the brigade was responsible for the security of its two base camps and to secure engineer repair work conducted on the road network in its area of operations (AO). The improvement of the roads in the TAY NINH (XT2350), DAU TIENG (XT5047), SUOI DA (XT2357) area will increase the reaction capabilities of the brigade, and make better roads available for civilian use. Due to the security requirements which involved two battalions throughout August, other operations were battalion size or smaller. A significant action occurred on 15 August when an airmobile cordon and search of THANH AN (XT536378) was conducted by the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, in conjunction

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with Vietnamese National Police. Results of the operation were 6 VC KIA (BC), 12 VC PW, 30 detainees of whom 15 were classed as civil defendants, and 1 HOI CHANH. Subsequent information from this action brought about the capture of an additional PW in DAU TIENG. In September the brigade conducted numerous small unit actions to provide security for the elections held for the Vietnamese presidency and parliament. The addition of the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (-) to the brigade on 22 September enabled the brigade to resume multi-battalion size operations. The first phase of an extensive project to prevent the use of the MICHELIN Plantation located next to DAU TIENG (XT5047) by VC forces. The population southeast of the plantation was relocated to a refugee center at LAU THIEU (XT8605), thereby eliminating sources of support for the VC. Seventy-four families were relocated by use of CH-47 aircraft. Extensive psychological operations (PSYOPS) exploited this relocation which was accomplished by US and ARVN troop units. Other workers lining on the plantation and more villagers living south of the plantation will be relocated.

In October, the brigade employed multi-battalion operations and smaller size operations down to platoon size ambush patrols. Company size patrol bases were placed to interdict VC troop movements and supply routes. Continued battalion size search and destroy operations were conducted in, and to the northeast of, the MICHELIN Plantation to prevent its use as a VC/NVA haven. Bushmaster (company size patrolling) operations were conducted in the area known as the cresent, 8 kilometers northwest of DAU TIENG. Battalion size search and destroy operations were conducted in and south of BEN CUI (XT4444), and in the northern portion of the Trapezoid, which extends 15 kilometers to the southeast of DAU TIENG. All operations were marked by extremely light contact. Many deserted base camps, food and medical caches were found and destroyed. These search and destroy operations were conducted using a perfected checkerboard technique (see Appendix 2). By deploying in this manner unrestricted fire can be placed around the various elements within the checkerboard to provide support, and to insure a detailed search of the area.

Results of Operation DIAMOND HEAD to date are: Personnel losses - 159 VC KIA (BC), 568 VC KIA (poss), 37 VC PWs, 383 detainees, 4 HOI CHANH. Material captured - 142 lbs of documents, 79 individual weapons, 2 crew served weapons. Material and installations destroyed - 3448 bunkers, 452 military structures, 69 tunnels, 39 sampans, 826 artillery mortar, RPG-2, recoilless rifle rounds, mines and bombs. Additionally 20,928 Small Arms rounds and 123.7 tons of rice were destroyed.

(d) NIGHT THRUST and related operations of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. See Appendix 5.

b. Artillery Support. During the quarter Division Artillery fired 144,498 rounds in support and 124,424 rounds for Harassment and Interdiction (H&I) missions. Included in the totals were rounds fired in support of ARVN operations and/or ARVN outposts under attack.

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c. Air Support. There were 2,917 sorties during the quarter in support of 1,361 missions with the following results: 69 VC Killed by Air Force (KBAF) (BC), 478 VC KBAF (poss). In addition, 264 VC structures, 2,373 bunkers, 25 sampans, 37 tunnels, 12 caches and three bridges were destroyed. There were 47 secondary explosions and 96 secondary fires. There were five B-52 strikes in 36 sorties flown in support of the Monsoon Campaign during the quarter.

d. Army Aviation. There were 20,705 sorties, 2,252 combat missions and 8,270 hours flown, 40,232 passengers and 818.1 tons of cargo carried. Thirty-four aircraft were hit by enemy fire on 19 separate occasions. Armed helicopters expended 1,229,000 rounds of 7.62 machine gun ammunition, 885 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition, 5,195 rounds of 40mm grenades and 5,329 - 2.75 inch aerial rockets in support of combat operations. Results of Army Aviation support were: 34 VC Killed by Army Aviation (KBAA) (BC), 229 VC KBAA (poss), 3 VC PW, 47 sampans destroyed, 19 sampans damaged, 17 VC structures destroyed, 34 structures damaged and 2 oxcarts destroyed.

e. Intelligence.

(1) VC Activity.

(a) General: VC activity consisted primarily of efforts to delay allied clearing operations and incidents with the purpose of countering the GVN elections. No significant contact was made with NVA units during the period. During the latter part of the reporting period VC activity increased. These increased operations may be due to the expected VC Winter-Spring offensive. Guerrillas have found it increasingly difficult to muster civilian support.

(b) VC Tactics.

1 VC activity in the HO BO Woods attempted to delay allied search and clear operations. The primary techniques used were to employ mines and booby traps against the Rome Flow operations and snipers and booby traps against the searching elements. Field CPs were mortared frequently at night and occasionally during the day. These attacks by fire were significant both in that they were against field locations of down to company size units and that they occurred with such frequency, sometimes three or four times a night. This tactic was started shortly after the HO BO operation was begun in mid September and continued into the second week of October when it slackened off.

2 The election periods were marked by increased terrorist activity by the VC. Numerous craters and several culverts appeared along Highway #1 and 9A during the last few days preceding the presidential elections. Three bridges were blown during the early morning hours of 3 September and there were many incidents of PF and RF outposts receiving harassing attacks by fire that night.

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3 There were two significant VC attacks between the Vietnamese Presidential elections of 3 September and those of the Lower House on 22 October.

a On 12 October at 0450 the 34th ARVN Rangers received a ground attack while in a night position in the LOC GIANG area (XT4416). They received small arm, automatic weapon, heavy machine gun, RPG-2, 57mm RR and mortar fire from an estimated VC battalion tentatively identified as the 269th Battalion. Results: 28 ARVN, 10 Vietnamese laborers, and 1 US wounded in action; 3 ARVN and 2 Vietnamese laborers killed in action; and 2 APCs were destroyed. VC losses are unknown.

b At 0345 on 16 October DUC HOA started receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. Shortly afterward BAO TRAI reported receiving the same. The results were: 12 ARVN, 5 PF, 13 CIDG, 8 US and 3 PRU wounded in action; 4 CIDG and 2 US killed in action; 9 civilians were wounded and 1 civilian was killed at DUC HOA. At BAO TRAI 3 National Policemen and 4 PF were wounded in action. VC losses are unknown. The significance of the action at BAO TRAI is that it occurred nearly simultaneously with the attack at DUC HOA and at the outset appeared to be of the magnitude. This has the effect of diverting full attention from the DUC HOA attack.

4 Following the Lower House elections the VC employed a tactic of attacking numerous PF, RF and ARVN compounds in a particular area on the same night. This had the effect of overloading the immediate reaction capability of the Vietnamese forces and made assistance by the Allies very difficult due to the limited channels for coordination and control with the Vietnamese elements on the ground. This in some cases resulted in air assets having to return to their base camps without having an opportunity to expend their ordinance against the enemy simply because there were not sufficient personnel on the ground or in the area to direct them.

(2) Conclusions: It is felt that the VC have two motives in mind when using these tactics. Number one, to prove to the people that they, the VC, and not the government still control the area. Second, that activity of this type could prevent an allied offensive against Main Force units in War Zone "C" and other base areas by forcing them to secure the population and agricultural centers. Failing this they use delaying tactics against operations in their base areas in order to provide maximum time for units and supplies to be withdrawn from the area and to cause the most casualties to the allies.

f. Logistics.

(1) Class I Supply - (25th Supply and Transport Battalion)

(a) Status.

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| | "A" Rations | "C" Rations |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1 Stockage objective (days) - | CU CHI - 5 | 10 |
| | DAU TIENG - 5 | 10 |
| 2 On Hand (days) | CU CHI - 3 | 10 |
| | DAU TIENG - 3 | 8 |

(b) Fresh fruits and vegetables were received from Class I Issue Point SAIGON.

(c) Ice Cream:

- 1 Cycle of issue - four times per week.
- 2 Gallons per week from SAIGON - 1200
- 3 Gallons per week from CU CHI - 832
- 4 Gallons per week from DAU TIENG - 523

(d) Average amount of ice issued daily:

1 Potable - CU CHI - 118,491
DAU TIENG - 27,000

2 Non-potable - None

(2) Class II & IV (25th Supply & Transport Battalion)

(a) Additions to ASL during quarter - CU CHI - 244
DAU TIENG - 153

(b) Total lines on ASL - CU CHI - 1300
DAU TIENG - 153

(3) Class III (25th Supply & Transport Battalion)
(Consumption Rates)

| | | DAILY | QUARTERLY |
|-------------------|-----------|--------|-----------|
| (a) MOGAS (gals) | CU CHI | 17,660 | 1,624,344 |
| | DAU TIENG | 4,550 | 240,130 |
| (b) Diesel (gals) | CU CHI | 18,740 | 1,724,031 |
| | DAU TIENG | 5,000 | 217,420 |
| (c) JP/4 (gals) | CU CHI | 26,550 | 2,443,300 |
| | DAU TIENG | 8,400 | 359,300 |
| (d) AVGAS (gals) | CU CHI | 1,800 | 173,150 |
| | DAU TIENG | 700 | 32,955 |

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(4) Services.

(a) Contract Laundry - CU CHI - 8,625 bundles
DAU TIENG - 16,125 bundles

(b) QM bath unit:

- 1 Total showers for quarter - 9,009
- 2 Average number of showers daily - 117

(c) Graves Registration:

1 Deceased US personnel processed during the
quarter - CU CHI - 143; DAU TIENG - 27

2 Deceased RVN personnel processed during the
quarter - 44

(d) Division water resupply - average daily - 30,000 gals

(e) DUC HOA Helicopter Rearm/Refuel Facility - This battalion took over the operational control and manning responsibilities for the helicopter rearm/refuel facility at DUC HOA on 15 October 1967. Complete rebuilding and relocation of the refueling facility has been undertaken, along with the construction of personnel bunkers, berms for bulk class III and ammunition storage.

(5) Transportation:

(a) Mileage driven:

- 1 Total - CU CHI - 204,237
DAU TIENG - 27,928
- 2 Average Daily - CU CHI - 2,219.9
DAU TIENG - 465

(b) Tonnage Moved:

- 1 Total - CU CHI - 7,603
DAU TIENG - 2,698
- 2 Average Daily - CU CHI - 86.6
DAU TIENG - 45

(c) Troops Moved by Convoy:

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1 Total - 8,042

2 Average Daily - 84.7

(e) Troops moved by pass truck:

1 Total - 4,953

2 Average Daily - 54.2

(f) Operation Night Thrust (31 Aug - 31 Oct 67)

1 Total - 1,944

2 Average Daily - 62.7

(6) Maintenance.

(a) The following jobs were completed by the 725th Maintenance Battalion during the reporting period:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>AUG</u> | <u>SEP</u> | <u>OCT</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|----------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|
| Wheel Vehicles | 403 | 296 | 283 | 988 |
| Track Vehicles | 133 | 101 | 144 | 378 |
| Small Arms | 768 | 1107 | 1057 | 2960 |
| Artillery | 183 | 189 | 156 | 528 |
| Chemical | 56 | 46 | 40 | 142 |
| Refrigeration | 1 | 32 | 20 | 53 |
| Engineer | 268 | 246 | 320 | 853 |
| Signal | 2516 | 2724 | 2612 | 7852 |
| Fire Control | 410 | 455 | 320 | 1185 |
| Office Machine | 190 | 173 | 189 | 552 |
| Aircraft | 203 | 201 | 212 | 616 |

(b) During this reporting period, the maintenance and supply mission of this battalion has been influenced by the following factors:

1 Repair parts availability.

2 Geographical location (weather and terrain during this period has proved to be an influential factor due to extensive operations in mud).

3 Lack of sufficient maintenance at the organizational level.

(7) Medical Support.

The 25th Medical Battalion supported Division units

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with medical service and supplies. Non-division units were supported with medical supplies.

(a) Medical totals:

- 1 Patients seen - 9,167
 - a Disease - 7,347
 - b Non-battle injuries - 1,331
 - c IRHA - 489
- 2 Lab tests - 5,387
- 3 Immunizations - 7,705
- 4 Prescriptions filled - 6,682

(b) Dental patients seen - 6,590

- 1 Dental Examinations - 6,207
- 2 Other (extractions, etc.) - 283

(c) Supply and Service

- 1 Line items issued - 5,154
- 2 Short tonnage total - 15.3
- 3 MEDCAP line items issued - 2,250
- 4 Short tonnage total - 7.23
- 5 Bulk pharmacy items issued - 2,452
- 6 Prescriptions filled - N/A
- 7 Eyeglasses ordered (pairs) - 562
- 8 Maintenance work orders received - 156
 - a Work orders completed - 156
 - b Work orders awaiting parts - 1

(8) Transportation Office.

- (a) Highway continues to be the primary mode of

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transportation for the resupply of CU CHI, TAY NINH and DAU TIENG base camps. Following is a breakout of regular resupply convoys operated in the division area:

1 CU CHI - SAIGON convoys

- a Total convoys - 180
- b Number of convoys per day - 2
- c Total vehicles - 8,505
- d Number of vehicles involved in unit

distribution - 2,860

2 On 1 May Rte 1 between SAIGON and CU CHI was reclassified GREEN. During the period 1 August - 30 September 11,008 vehicles moved over the MSR individually in groups smaller than convoy size.

3 Convoy from SAIGON/CU CHI to TAY NINH.

- a Total convoys - 177
- b Number of convoys per day - 2
- c Total vehicles - 17,891
- d Vehicles by unit
 - 1 1st Log Cnd - 10,004
 - 2 25th Div & atch units - 6,109
 - 3 4th Inf Div - 208
 - 4 PHILCAG - 1,383

4 During the reporting period 1,487 vehicles from the 25th Infantry Division moved over the MSR to TRANG BANG and GO DAU HA in support of operations north of CU CHI.

5 TAY NINH - DAU TIENG convoys

- a Total convoys - 158
- b Number of convoys per day - 2
- c Total vehicles - 7,755

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(b) Special airlift data for the quarter is as follows:

| <u>ACFT</u> | <u>MISSIONS</u> | <u>PRIORITIES</u> | <u>SORTIES</u> | <u>FAX</u> | <u>CARGO (lbs)</u> |
|-------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|------------|--------------------|
| C-130 | 7 | 1 | 15 | 1,173 | 89,900 |
| | 6 | CE | 11 | 7 | 352,642 |
| C-123 | 30 | 1 | 71 | 3,019 | 202,983 |
| | 7 | CE | 24 | 74 | 135,850 |
| C-7A | 12 | 1 | 22 | 412 | 47,300 |

(c) During October the CU CHI airfield was closed for repair which caused units using aircraft for retrograde movements to move by highway. Replacements and R & R personnel were moved by bus and truck. The using of bus and trucks allowed a set schedule to be established for movement of personnel. The only inconvenience encountered by this method was the personnel exposed to the elements.

(d) The volume of business in the Division Baggage Section sharply increased this quarter due to an increase in the number of personnel rotating to CONUS. The section served 1,628 customers and shipped 2,422 pieces of personnel baggage, weighing a total of 206,225 pounds.

(9) Ammunition Office (25th DISCOM)

(a) Stockage Objective:

- 1 Status at end of quarter - 806
- 2 On hand - 1024

(b) Issues.

| <u>PERIOD</u> | <u>AMOUNT (TONS/DAY)</u> |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| 16 July - 15 August | 114.63 |
| 16 August - 15 September | 154.93 |
| 16 September - 15 October | 183.50 |

(c) Average for quarter (tons/day) 151.02

g. Administration.

(1) Personnel. During the past quarter the personnel posture of the Division has been generally good. The assigned strength dropped to approximately 100% of authorized strength during the quarter, but was up to 105% of authorized strength by the end of the quarter. A shortage of Infantry Captains has been a problem during the quarter. At the end of the quarter the Division had a critical shortage (critical is defined

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as anything less than 86% of authorized strength) of two Infantry Captains. There continues to be a shortage of Infantry NCOs. Emphasis on maximizing promotion opportunities has improved the situation with Infantry E6's, but there is still a critical shortage of 309 E5's. Other MOS shortages that this headquarters places in the critically short category are 31K, 35B, 52A, 63G, 91G, 95D, 26W, 45F, 71C and 31M. There was a serious shortage of Artillery MOS's during the quarter, but the situation improved somewhat by the end of the quarter. There was a marked improvement in the number of ARVN Interpreters available to the Division with the number available rising from 41 to 90 by the end of the quarter.

(2) Key Gains/Losses

(a) 2 Aug 67 - LTC Stanley P Converse assumed command of 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry.

(b) 4 Aug 67 - LTC Henry B Murphy Jr. appointed G-4; LTC Thomas O. Harrold assumed command of 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry.

(c) 6 Aug 67 - MG Fillmore K. Mearns assumed command of the 25th Infantry Division; MG John C. F. Tillson III departed.

(d) 8 Aug 67 - LTC Kenneth D. Cowan appointed Executive Officer, 25th Division Support Command.

(e) 10 Aug 67 - LTC Fremont B. Hodson appointed Executive Officer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; LTC Ted E. Gordinier appointed Deputy Chief of Staff.

(f) 16 Aug 67 - LTC Glenn K. Otis appointed G-1; LTC Dennis V. Gentry Jr. departed.

(g) 16 Aug 67 - BG William T. Gleason (then Colonel) appointed Assistant Division Commander.

(h) 1 Sep 67 - LTC John R. Thurman III assumed command of 25th Infantry Division Artillery; Col David E. Ott departed.

(i) 2 Sep 67 - LTC Forney appointed Executive Officer, 25th Infantry Division Artillery; LTC John W. Vessey departed.

(j) 9 Sep 67 - Col Edwin H. Marks Jr. assumed command of 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; Col Doniphan Carter departed.

(k) 15 Sep 67 - LTC Awbrey G. Norris assumed command of 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry; LTC Ralph W. Julian departed.

(l) 18 Sep 67 - LTC Walter E. Adams assumed command

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2d Battalion, 27th Infantry; LTC Edward C. Peter departed.

(m) 19 Sep 67 - 2d Battalion, 34th Armor assigned to 25th Infantry Division with LTC Hal B. Rhyne commanding.

(n) 1 Oct 67 - LTC William McClain appointed Provost Marshall; LTC Robert E. Stromfors departed.

(o) 10 Oct 67 - LTC Carroll W. Smith Jr. assumed command of the 25th Aviation Battalion; LTC William A. Bearden departed.

(p) 18 Oct 67 - Col Donald D. Dunlop appointed Assistant Division Commander.

(q) 20 Oct 67 - LTC John M. Hinchman assumed command of 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry; LTC Stanley P. Converse departed.

(r) 21 Oct 67 - LTC Fremont B. Hodson assumed command of 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry; LTC Goodnow appointed Executive Officer of 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

(3) The Division PX at CU CHI remained in operation during the quarter. In addition the Division assumed responsibility for the PX's at DAU TIENG and TAY NINH. The following quarterly statistical data is furnished:

| <u>PX</u> | <u>FLOOR SPACE</u> | <u>STORAGE SPACE</u> | <u>SALES</u> |
|------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------|
| CU CHI | 8,000 Sq Ft | 7,700 Sq Ft | \$2,941,826.71 |
| <u>DAU TIENG</u> | 6,000 Sq Ft | 2,500 Sq Ft | \$665,588.85 |
| <u>TAY NINH</u> | 5,000 Sq Ft | 3,300 Sq Ft (in 5 GP medium tents) | \$625,204.85 |

(4) Strengths as of 31 Oct 67.

| (a) Assigned Units | <u>OFF</u> | <u>WD</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| AUTH | 1,042 | 135 | 15,795 | 16,972 |
| ASGD | 1,100 | 148 | 16,541 | 17,789 |
| PDY | 1,090 | 136 | 16,398 | 17,624 |

| (b) Attached Units | <u>OFF</u> | <u>WD</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
|--------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| AUTH | 51 | 3 | 593 | 647 |
| ASGD | 46 | 3 | 567 | 616 |
| PDY | 43 | 3 | 551 | 597 |

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(5) Losses (1 Aug - 31 Oct 67)

| | <u>OFF</u> | <u>WD</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
|-----|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| KHA | 6 | 0 | 148 | 154 |
| WHA | 98 | 3 | 1,493 | 1,594 |
| MHA | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| DOW | 1 | 0 | 20 | 21 |
| NED | 2 | 0 | 8 | 10 |
| NBI | 3 | 0 | 309 | 312 |

(6) Gains (1 Aug - 31 Oct 67)

| <u>OFF</u> | <u>WD</u> | <u>EM</u> | <u>AGG</u> |
|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| 387 | 40 | 5,023 | 5,450 |

(7) Provost Marshall Activities:

(a) On 22 August 1967, the 2d Platoon, 25th MP Company provided military police support to the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in Operation WALMEA. The platoon was responsible for convoy escort of resupply and Air Force radar vehicles, reconnaissance and clearing of Highway 8A, and internal security of the TOC and brigade headquarters. During the platoon reconnaissance of Highway 8A they were subject to sniper fire on several occasions. The platoon completed its last assignment of convoy escort and returned to base camp on 27 August 1967.

(b) From 16 September 1967 to 26 October 1967 the 1st Platoon, 25th MP Company was attached to the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in support of Operation KUNIA. The platoon responsibilities included: (1) manning four listening posts outside the perimeter, (2) manning two bunkers on the perimeter, (3) providing security for the TOC and brigade headquarters, and (4) providing security for the road between TRUNG LAF and Highway #1 in order. During the 41 day operation 20 PWs were processed. The platoon on several occasions engaged VC with automatic and semi-automatic fire in defense of the perimeter. On 24 October one squad was attached to the 4th Bn, 9th Inf at their forward base camp until the end of the reporting period.

(c) On 22 September 1967, the 25th MP Company provided one NCO and eight enlisted men to work with Vietnamese National Police (NP) and Vietnamese Military Police (QUAN CAN or QC) in the operation of a Joint Police Patrol. This patrol is divided into two teams of three vehicle mounted elements. One

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MP, one NP, and one QC comprise an element. These teams work throughout HAU NGHIA Province in control of population and resources. The team sets up a check point, stops and checks all vehicles and individuals passing that location, and then moves to another location. This operation will continue on an indefinite basis and another Joint Police Patrol will be organized in TAY NINH Province.

h. Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) Three additional Revolutionary Development (RD) teams became operational in TAY NINH Province bringing the total operating there to twelve. Six teams continued to operate in HAU NGHIA Province and one in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province. A total of nineteen teams are currently working throughout the division TAOI. Overall, the RD programs in the designated hamlets are behind the projected time schedule. Various reasons exist for the time lag which include: non-availability of supplies, improper training and motivation of RD team members, and the initial forecasting of unrealistic goals. Adjustments in the schedule for next year will take into consideration the time lag. Several teams have completed the required projects and attained the required level of development in the hamlets. These teams have moved into the second semester location on schedule. The majority of the moves were short in distance, usually to another hamlet in the same village.

(2) Five Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) became operational during the last quarter. The MAT program is designed to bolster the RF/PF units through US military assistance and provide increased security to RD cadre. The teams were formed from divisional personnel and equipment authorizations. The teams have been placed under the control of the Senior Province Advisor for placement and use. One team in TAY NINH is assuming the role of a district advisor. The present team locations appear below:

| <u>TEAM</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>PROVINCE</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Team A | TAN PHU TRUNG (XT702084) | HAU NGHIA |
| Team B | SUOI CAO (XT453289) | TAY NINH |
| Team C | CAO XA (XT126503) | TAY NINH |
| Team D | CHA LA (XT294501) | TAY NINH |
| Team E | HIEP HOA (XT430071) | HAU NGHIA |

The team organizational structure is as follows:

| <u>U.S. PERSONNEL</u> | <u>ARVN PERSONNEL</u> |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 Officer | 1 Officer |
| 1 Light Weapons NCO (Inf) | 1 Interpreter |
| 1 Heavy Weapons NCO (Inf) | |
| 1 Radio Operator | |
| 1 Medic | |

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i. Civic Action.

(1) The 25th Infantry Division has five AA Platoons from the 2d Civil Affairs Company attached to conduct civic action in the Division TAOI. The five AA Platoons are further subattached to the major subordinate commands with the exception of DivArty. The 1st and 2d Bdes and DISCOM have one platoon each, and the 3d Bde has two platoons.

(2) Statistical Summary:

Helping Hand Recipients - 37,965
MEDCAP Patients - 66,723
Health and Sanitation Projects - 87
Construction - 309

(3) Beginning in September the division implemented the scheduled Medical Civic Action (MEDCAP) program. Advantages of the scheduled MEDCAP program include the training of Vietnamese medical personnel, improvement of the GVN dispensaries and hospitals, continued treatment of patients until they are cured, and improvement of the image of Vietnamese medical personnel in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Although a definite pattern was established there have been no VC incidents at any of the scheduled MEDCAPS.

(4) Through a joint effort by the GVN and US forces 300 refugees were moved from TRI TAM District to LAI THIEU District, BINH DUONG Province. The refugee relocation involved a total of 13 sorties by GI-47 (Chinook) aircraft to transport about 300 VN refugees, their animals and belongings. The refugees were provided sleeping mats, food commodities and family refugee kits from Helping Hand.

(5) National elections for president, senate and the house of representatives were held during this reporting period. The turn-out for the election was extremely high averaging over 70% of the registered voters going to the polls. There were relatively few VC incidents in the TAOI. Although many people were intimidated by the VC prior to the election, few stayed away from the polls and the VC threats proved meaningless.

(6) During the past three months the remainder of the Helping Hand items has been distributed with the exception of some clothing and limited amounts of soap. The original quantity of 380 tons of Helping Hand items was distributed over a 22 month period from January 1966 to October 1967 to some 250,000 Vietnamese recipients. Helping Hand will continue its operations, but it will be limited in scope. Only those items that are available from CARE, Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and salvage items will be available from Helping Hand. The entire Helping Hand concept was extremely worthwhile and has gone a long way toward winning the "other war" in Viet Nam. The following

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is a summary of Helping Hand issues during the quarter:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>QUANTITY</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Books | 625 |
| Candy | 1,400 lbs |
| Clothing | 39,947 lbs |
| Canned Foods | 100,385 lbs |
| Family Refugee Kits | 1 |
| Ind Refugee Kits | 12 |
| Midwife kits | 4 |
| Paint | 162 gal |
| School kits | 2,107 |
| Sewing machines | 2 |
| Soap | 19,745 bars |
| Toys | 5,000 |
| Toothpaste | 1,650 tubes |
| Toothbrushes | 1,228 |
| Saws | 9 |
| Pick Axes | 10 |
| Shovels | 8 |
| Tin | 8 2½ ton truck loads (salvage) |
| Cooking Oil | 227 gal |
| Baby foods | 170 jars |
| Flour (non-edible) | 12,000 lbs |
| Lumber (scrap) | 342 2½ ton truck loads |
| Brick machines | 6 |
| Friendship kits | 905 |
| Instructor kits | 20 |
| Textile kits | 337 |
| Television sets | 1 |
| Physical Education kits | 45 |
| Rice | 32,525 lbs |

(7) A numerical summary of civic action construction/repair projects over the quarter is listed below:

| | |
|------------------------------|----------------|
| (a) Bridges | 3 |
| (b) Churches/Temples/Pagodas | 2 |
| (c) Culverts | 17 |
| (d) Dispensaries | 9 |
| (e) Dwelling | 941 (families) |
| (f) Fences | 1405 meters |
| (g) Hospitals | 16 |
| (h) Leveling/Grading | 20 meters |
| (i) Irrigation Systems | 1 |
| (j) Market places | 8 |
| (k) Playgrounds | 32 |
| (l) Roads | 119.8 km. |
| (m) Schools/Classrooms | 37 |
| (n) Public Showers | 2 |
| (o) Public Toilets | 11 |
| (p) Wells | 11 |

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(8) RF/PF Assistance: RF/PF assistance has continued throughout the TAOI. More emphasis has been placed on self-help projects by the RF/PF and this has met with excellent results. Tons of salvage lumber from Helping Hand has been given to RF/PF in the TAOI and has enabled them to build homes and furnishings for their homes. Additional construction material to include cement, tin, cement blocks, tile, sand and gravel has been provided for RF/PF housing projects in the TAOI.

(9) Friendship Council and Community Relations Meetings have proven to be an effective medium to resolve problems that arise between the Vietnamese people and the US forces in CU CHI, DAU TIENG and TAY NINH base camp areas. These meetings have been credited with maintaining a harmonious relationship between the Vietnamese people and US troops.

(10) The Monsoon Campaign was in effect for the entire reporting period. Most units conducted CA in their previously assigned areas. The 1st Bde did not continue CA efforts in the BAO DON area of KHIEM HAN District TAY NINH Province because of a tactical mission in the HOI LOI and HO BO Woods. The 1st Brigade has since diverted this effort into the TAN HOA area in PHU HOA District. The Monsoon Campaign has established new highs in CA activity for the division. Since the Monsoon Campaign began there has been a general increase in CA activity. Most units have been located in heavily populated areas and have remained there for a considerable length of time, thus enabling the units to establish worthwhile CA programs and to contribute to the overall RD effort of the GVN.

J. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS).

(1) PSYOP activities were in support of operations conducted in TAY NINH and HAU NGHIA Provinces and TRI TAM and PHU HOA Districts and the Iron Triangle area of BINH DUONG Province. The number of leaflets dropped and hours of loudspeaker broadcasting continues to increase. The number of HOI CHANH received has begun to decrease. This is due to fewer small scale saturation operations within the TAOI. Based on past year's CHIEU HOI figures, this is the slowest season for HOI CHANH. The CHIEU HOI Offensive was designed to increase the returnee rate, but did not appear to have a significant effect on the number of returnees received.

(2) A total of 37,489,053 leaflets were airdropped and hand disseminated by the 25th Inf Div. There were 115,797,000 leaflets airdropped in the TAOI by C47 (excluding 25th Div drops), in support of the CHIEU HOI Offensive. Sixty nine leaflets were originated by G5 PSYOPS and produced by the 246th PSYOP Co to exploit PSYOP opportunities.

(3) Loudspeaker broadcasts during the quarter totalled 312 hours. Increased use was made of the UH1D loudspeaker set and

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more emphasis is placed on increased use of U10s for loudspeaker broadcasts and less emphasis on leaflet drops.

(4) PSYOPS during the quarter was in support of the following division operations:

- (a) Operation DIAMOND HEAD
- (b) Operation BARKING SANDS
- (c) Operation KOLEKOLE
- (d) Operation WAINEA
- (e) CHIEU HOI Offensive (DOI MOI)

(5) One ARVN PSYWAR team from the 30th Political Warfare (POLWAR) Battalion was placed in direct support of the 25th Inf Div on 2 October 1967. This team was used by the 2d Brigade. During operations with the 1st Bn, 27th Inf on 4 Oct 67 the team had one man killed by a mine and another injured by a sniper. The team was recalled, per direction of the CO, 30th POLWAR Bn, on 5 Oct 67 and reassigned in support of the 25th ARVN Div, DUC HOA.

(6) One HE team (Audio Visual) from the 246th PSYOP Co was placed in support of the 25th Inf Div on 5 Sep 67. The mission of this team is to conduct audio visual PSYOPS, ground loudspeaker broadcasts and hand disseminate leaflets. Due to a shortage of equipment this team does not, presently, have a loudspeaker capability. The necessary equipment is due on 5 Nov 67. The team has been used during MEDCAPS and in support of other civic action projects to show movies and disseminate leaflets.

(7) The 25th Inf Div participated in the Month Long CHIEU HOI Offensive, 25 Sep 67 - 22 Oct 67.

(8) Authorization has been received from HIFORCEV to requisition PSYOP equipment (polaroid cameras and tape recorders) as mission essential equipment. This is based on the fact that this equipment is necessary for the conduct of successful psychological operations.

k. Medical.

(1) Personnel.

(a) The Division is up to strength in all AMEDS officers except for the Aviation Medical Officer and one Medical Company Commander. Aviation Medical Officers are in demand Viet Nam wide.

(b) The Division Surgeon's Office is up to full strength in enlisted strength and has the attachment of one preventive medicine specialist. A Veterinarian and two enlisted veterinarian specialists are

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attached to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 25th Infantry Division. They perform their duties under the general supervision of the Division Surgeon. The Veterinarian and his staff provide immunization service for pets of the Division, inspect meat and food supplies, perform Veterinary Civic Action Program (VETCAP) missions, and other various duties dictated by operations within the area.

(2) Equipment. In accordance with USARV Message 64171, Subject: Medical Service (U), dated 29 September 1967, Division level ground ambulances and associated personnel spaces will be reduced fifty per cent (50%).

(3) Training. There has been no formal training program during this quarter. Forecast for next quarter is a one week program in Field Sanitation Team training. Unit surgeons are encouraged to continuously upgrade the training and knowledge of medical enlisted personnel.

1. Signal. See separate ORLL from 125th Signal Battalion, attached as Appendix 3.

m. Training.

(1) During the period of August, September and October 1967 the following number of personnel attended the division schools listed below:

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Small Arms Inspection - 43 | Mess Management - 54 |
| Generator Operator - 130 | Mines and Booby Traps - 4,867 |
| Projectionist - 15 | Tunnel Destruction - 27 |
| Explosives and Demolitions - 536 | CRYPTO - 29 |
| Forward Observer Procedures - 23 | Military Justice - 10 |
| Radar Set, AM/TPS-33 - 18 | TSEC/KY-7 - 23 |
| TSEC/KY-8 - 109 | |

(2) Instruction was also given at non-divisional schools during the reporting period to the following personnel:

| <u>COURSE</u> | <u>INSTRUCTOR</u> | <u>NUMBER ATTENDED</u> |
|--|---------------------------------------|------------------------|
| Airframe Maintenance UH1C, UH1D | 34th Gen Spt Gp | 9 |
| Anti-Mine Operations Seminar | Army Concept Team in Vietnam USARV | 5 |
| Avionics/communications Supply | 34th Gen Spt Sp | 4 |
| Eiffel Bridge Classification and Repair | 554th Engr Bn | 2 |

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| | | |
|--|--|----|
| Cable Splicing | 40th Signal Bn | 1 |
| Jungle Environmental Survival Training | Fleet Airborne Electronic Unit Pacific (Philippines) | 4 |
| PIL Management | 29th Gen Spt Gp | 34 |
| Recondo | USARV | 26 |
| Recordaks Microfilm Reader | 246th Spt & Svcs Bn | 2 |
| Turbine Engine Maintenance | 34th Gen Spt Gp | 3 |

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2. (C) Commanders Observations and Recommendations.

a. Observations (Lessons Learned)

(1) Personnel.

ITEM: Personnel Packets.

DISCUSSION: When a packet is formed to be sent to an existing unit it would expedite matters greatly if the receiving unit knew the make-up of the packet by grade and MOS prior to its arrival.

OBSERVATION: A liaison officer should be sent ahead of the packet with a roster to coordinate with the receiving unit.

ITEM: Preventive Medicine Specialists are required in the Office of the Division Surgeon.

DISCUSSION: In RVN, there is a greater requirement for sanitation inspections, surveys, and counseling. The workload is often too much for the preventive medicine officer to handle alone. The surgeon's office has been fortunate in that at one time it had two Preventive Medicine Specialists and at present has one. These men have done an outstanding job of insuring the sanitation and health of the troops.

OBSERVATION: Preventive Medicine Specialists are an outstanding source of help in the overall sanitation of the Division. They should augment each division sized unit in areas of necessity; i.e., South Vietnam.

ITEM: The Chief Medical Non-Commissioned Officer would be better equipped to perform his duties if he were a Sergeant Major.

DISCUSSION: This NCO has to coordinate with senior NCOs of other Special and General Staff. These senior NCOs are normally Sergeants Major (E-9). In order to fully perform his duties in coordination with these other staff sections, lower, higher, and adjacent units and headquarters, the rank of Sergeant Major is highly desirable and necessary.

OBSERVATION: A more efficient and smoother functioning office will result from the upgrading of this vital NCO position.

(2) Operations.

ITEM: Night helicopter operations using radar assistance.

DISCUSSION: During recent night airmobile operations radar assistance from Paris control at TAN SON NHUT was used. A normal operation would require a flare aircraft, one command and control (C&C) aircraft and five UH-1B helicopters (Slicks). The flare ship takes-off, orbits CU CHI and establishes contact with Paris. When all aircraft are in position ready for take off the flare aircraft departs CU CHI on a radar

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vector. Two minutes later the C&C aircraft departs CU CHI and the five UH-1B helicopters (Slicks) maintain a one minute interval on the C&C aircraft. The flare aircraft is vectored to an initial point and turned inbound to the flare drop point over the LZ following the lights of the flare aircraft.

When the flare is ignited over the LZ the C&C should be in a descent two (2) minutes behind. The C&C aircraft accelerates, makes visual identification of the LZ and marks the desired point of touchdown for the lead ship.

OBSERVATION: Due to the heavy air traffic using Paris radar prior coordination and a special frequency are highly desirable. For positive radar identification the flare aircraft must be equipped with an APX-44 transponder. The first flare is released over the drop point as directed by Paris Radar. The flare ship should immediately verify his position, locate the LZ and position the aircraft for additional flares as required.

The C&C aircraft verifies the LZ as soon as possible after flare illumination and makes a low level pass to mark the LZ. Thermite or incendiary grenades are very effective for marking the LZ. One disadvantage is the short burning time (30 - 45 seconds) of these grenades. This makes it necessary to mark the LZ with smoke. When the incendiary grenade burns out the flight leader should be near the LZ and able to see the smoke under the light of the flares.

If a steep formation turn is required to avoid hostile areas it should be accomplished under flare illumination.

ITEM: Night heliborne operation without illumination.

DISCUSSION: Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion conducted a night operation, inserting troops into three LZs, without the aid of artificial illumination. Due to the nature of the mission the ground force commander requested no flares be dropped. The mission was accomplished in three lifts, each lift going into one false LZ before or after dropping the troops in the actual LZ.

OBSERVATION: On a dimly lighted night terrain detail can be seen at altitudes above 1000 feet, however, as the flight descends toward the LZ terrain features become invisible. A command and control aircraft orbiting the LZ is effective in talking the flight leader into the LZ. It is necessary for the C&C aircraft to furnish altitudes and headings since the flight leader is unable to determine the distance to the LZ.

The flight leader should turn on his search light as he descends below 200 feet. Other aircraft in the flight turn on their landing lights at this point. These lights should be set at the proper angle while on the ground prior to departure.

ITEM: Night Operation (VIKING STRIKE). 5

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DISCUSSION: This type operation has proven successful on its initial mission. The concept of using a medium range night observation device mounted on a UH-1D helicopter was developed by members of the S-3 office of the 1st Bde. The device is mounted beside the door gunner and is used primarily to search stream and trail networks. Upon locating the target, the door gunner may engage or the supporting light ship with a fire team can attack the target.

OBSERVATION: Continued use of this concept along the SAIGON River would deny the VC free access to fast transportation by main waterways.

ITEM: Improved Tunnel Destruction Methods.

DISCUSSION: The accepted method of tunnel destruction with explosives can be improved upon through a newly developed hydraulic process implemented by the 2d Bn, 14th Infantry.

OBSERVATION: Complete tunnel destruction can be accomplished by pumping water into all levels of the tunnel and allowing the water to stand for an extended period of time. Once the subterranean structures have softened, artillery and airstrikes can neutralize the area. Implementation of this method can only be accomplished when a source of water is readily available.

ITEM: Reduction of Mortar Attacks.

DISCUSSION: Mortar attacks on battalion and company patrol bases by small teams of VC with 60 and 82mm mortars occur when units fail to patrol aggressively.

OBSERVATION: Local patrolling around base positions is not adequate to prevent mortar attacks. Aerial and map studies must be made of surrounding areas to determine possible mortar positions within effective range. Ambushing these areas will reduce mortar attacks.

ITEM: Stay Behind Ambush Patrol.

DISCUSSION: The most effective method of ambush in the HO BO WOODS has proven to be the stay behind ambush patrol. The VC will move into an area recently vacated by US forces to police up any ammo, food, etc, discarded.

OBSERVATION: Units should train and use stay behind ambush patrols.

ITEM: Types of clearing operation in dense foliage.

DISCUSSION: Standard sweeps in dense foliage are very costly in casualties. Due to noise inherent in movement, VC sniper teams are able to obtain a fix on units direction of movement.

OBSERVATION: Sweep patterns should be varied daily to prevent ambush by VC forces and to provide detailed S&D of areas.

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ITEM: Small Unit Night Airmobile Operation (TORNADO).

DISCUSSION: The need for small units to be inserted by airmobile assets has developed the theory of TORNADO operations.

OBSERVATION: During the conduct of dummy insertions of combat patrols that are characteristic of TORNADOS, actual touch downs should be made on all LZs both fake and real. Aircraft should keep landing light on for minimum periods. Each aircraft commander should have some means to indicate to patrol members when the aircraft is on the ground.

ITEM: Use of sharpened bamboo stakes or metal rods from 105mm ammo boxes as probes during S & D operations.

DISCUSSION: In recent S & D operations, numerous VC weapons and tool caches are located just inches under the surface of the ground. Because of the excellent use of camouflage, many of these caches are overlooked.

OBSERVATION: By using these probes, caches are easily located due to their proximity to the surface.

ITEM: When probing hedge rows for booby traps, use grappling hooks.

DISCUSSION: By using a grappling hook, a soldier can be out of the effective range of most booby traps, and in a covered position, should such a booby trap be discovered and detonated.

OBSERVATION: Ropes, grappling hooks, or field expedients similar to these items, should always be used when penetrating a suspected booby-trapped area.

ITEM: Tunnels with Covers.

DISCUSSION: When a tunnel is discovered with a wooden or cement cover, insure the tunnel or hole is covered by small arms fire or grenade before the cover is completely removed.

OBSERVATION: There may be a VC inside just waiting for the lid to be removed.

ITEM: Friendly Casualties from Air Strikes.

DISCUSSION: All personnel within 2,000 meters of an airstrike should take cover and wear steel helmets for the duration of the strike.

OBSERVATION: Shrapnel from exploding bombs can hit friendly personnel 2,000 meters from the site of the airstrike. In addition, the possibility of erratic rounds must be taken into account.

ITEM: Claymore Mines.

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DISCUSSION: Static electricity from sources ranging from radios to thunderstorms may detonate blasting caps used to set off claymore mines.

OBSERVATION: Blasting caps should be carried separately from the mines themselves. Care must be taken, however, to insure the caps are well secured—the mine is inoperable without the blasting cap.

ITEM: Storing of ammunition and equipment in the field.

DISCUSSION: Recently, a bag containing Claymore Mines, trip flares and ammunition was stored in one bag located near the company command post while the company was out on operation for the day.

OBSERVATION: All highly explosive ammunition, weapons or demolition should be kept separated by type to prevent: Detonation by one type of explosive by another type, such as a claymore by a trip flare; or secondary explosions and increased casualties.

ITEM: Troop Dispersion.

DISCUSSION: Recently, six persons were injured by the explosion of a single hand grenade located in a hedgerow. All the men had bunched together waiting for the first to break through the hedgerow. Three were wounded seriously, and the others wounded enough to be evacuated.

OBSERVATION: Troops must be reminded of the need to maintain dispersion when crossing areas which canalize movement. Such supervision must be a continual process whenever in the field.

ITEM: Radar Positions.

DISCUSSION: Radar sets located in isolated positions are endangered by close-in probes by Viet Cong.

OBSERVATION: Radar positions should be protected by at least two men of the unit to whom they are attached, with the additional protection of Claymore mines, grenades and trip flares. The radar position should be incorporated into a regular line position.

ITEM: Night Bags and B Bags.

DISCUSSION: Night Bags and B Bags are brought in with the evening resupply. They contain: Air mattresses, poncho liners and ponchos used for sheltering. Two squads put their equipment in a well marked duffle bag. Only 50% of a squad's equipment is included as 50% will be awake at all times. The company's duffle bags are then sling loaded for extraction.

OBSERVATION: The troops are not loaded down with heavy unnecessary equipment, which enables them to perform their mission more effectively.

ITEM: Employment of Separate Company Routes of Travel.

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DISCUSSION: By giving each company a separate route of travel on search and destroy operations, a greater area of the AO can be covered. The company puts two or three platoons on line with squads abreast. The company travels along the assigned route and clover leafs approximately every 300 meters. They find it takes a little longer to travel through jungle in this formation, but the area covered is well worth this time.

ITEM: M-72 LAW.

DISCUSSION: The LAW has replaced the 90mm RR because of the 90's weight.

OBSERVATION: The LAW's can be carried because of the light weight of the weapon. It greatly increases the fire power of the element.

ITEM: Emphasis on Greater Security for LZ.

DISCUSSION: Many units in the field are not placing enough emphasis on early warning elements around landing zones.

OBSERVATION: When resupply in the field is accomplished by helicopter, it is necessary to insure that the LZ is secure. This is especially true when VC/NVA forces are known to be operating in the area. Enemy forces have been known to close within fifteen (15) meters of an LZ and effect damaging fire on aircraft and personnel. As a preventive measure against such action, listening posts must be established far enough forward of the main position to serve as early warning against the advance of hostile forces. H&I artillery fires may be used to assure that the VC/NVA forces are not infiltrating the area.

ITEM: Use of 81mm Mortars in Wet Areas.

DISCUSSION: Topographical conditions in wet areas hamper the stability and effectiveness of the 81mm mortar.

OBSERVATION: When placing the 81mm mortar in areas where the ground is wet and soft, the base plate will have a tendency to shift or sink. This will cause continuous deviations from settings on the weapon. To alleviate this problem, dig a hole, and place sandbags filled with the driest dirt possible on the bottom of the hole. If engineer stakes are available, place them flat on the ground under the sandbags. The more layers of sandbags the better. Due to poor trafficability in wet areas of operation, 81mm mortar should be flown into position as opposed to carrying it manually.

ITEM: Probing the sides of abandoned Enemy Foxholes.

DISCUSSION: Many units fail to make an extensive search of abandoned enemy foxholes and prone emplacements.

OBSERVATION: Probing the sides of Viet Cong foxholes has yielded false walls. Partitions made of wood, covered with reeds and mud have been used to conceal caches of weapons, ammunitions, documents, and even en-

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trances to tunnel complexes. A specific incident of this nature occurred when an element of D Company, 3d Bn, 22d Inf was conducting Search and destroy operations in AO MILLER, BINH DUONG Province, north of the MICHELIN Plantation. Erosion around the edge of the foxhole revealed a small portion of wood planking. Further examination yielded a cache containing 15000 - 20000 rounds of mixed .50 caliber and 7.62 ammunition. Also fifty-five (55) rolls of communication wire were discovered. The soil excavated to construct the cache was piled a short distance from the foxhole. The dirt however, had been piled in such a manner, that it gave the impression of an ant hill.

ITEM: Proper Security for Tank Sections.

DISCUSSION: During this reporting period, Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, was given the mission of securing bridges during hours of darkness. Two tanks were used to secure each bridge. It was found that the only way to properly secure the bridge and to insure that the VC did not use depressions or other dead space areas to approach the bridge was to use crew members as outposts. This necessitated all eight members of the crews remaining awake at all times which greatly impeded their capabilities for the next day operations. Dismounting all crew members greatly reduces the capabilities of the tank. If tanks are used in this manner, a minimum of one Infantry Squad should be attached to allow for proper security. Extensive use of trip flares and other early warning devices should be planned for proper security of both the tanks and bridges.

OBSERVATION: Infantry troops and early warning devices should supplement tanks used for security of bridges.

ITEM: Benefits gained by the use of M-79 Grenade Launcher in Tank Company Operations.

DISCUSSION: Tank Companies use the M-79 Grenade Launcher in the following ways:

1. When operating in dense jungle or built up areas, it is often necessary to make reconnaissance by fire at ranges between 75 to 200 meters. During operations with friendly troops, cannister rounds or the tank machine gun cannot be used without danger to the ground troops. An M-79 fired by the loader or tank commander, greatly enhances the capabilities of reconnaissance by fire with a minimum danger to friendly personnel.

2. The VC have made extensive use of trenches or berms which give them cover against the tank's weapons. The tank would not be able to use its direct fire weapons until it was within twenty to thirty yards from the ditch. At this range it was difficult to get the full benefits of the weapons. An M-79 fired by the loader would give the tank the capability of clearing a ditch or berm without unduly exposing the tank.

3. The M-79 is very beneficial for supplementing the F&I fires from a night defensive position. Many laager positions are found to have depressions surrounding them which could be used as an access route to the

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larger position. This dead space could very easily be covered by the M-79. Artillery would also be planned for the larger depressions but the M-79 would give the tank company the capability of rapid reaction to any eventuality.

OBSERVATION: M-79 Grenade Launcher can be effectively used by tank companies.

ITEM: Actions taken by tanks when working with Mechanized Infantry.

DISCUSSION: When moving through thick vegetation APCs should lead the element and the tanks used as a reaction force. The APCs are better able to pick their way through the trees and wet areas. Should the APCs come in contact with the enemy the tanks would be able to rapidly react in any direction. The usual configuration is one Mechanized Platoon leading the tank platoon followed by the rest of the mechanized company.

OBSERVATION: APCs should proceed tanks traveling through thick vegetation.

ITEM: Intra-Platoon Recovery Operation.

DISCUSSION: All platoon members should be thoroughly versed in proper recovery operations and field expedients. Every effort to recover a vehicle with other platoon vehicles should be made prior to calling in the maintenance section. Tanks have also been recovered several times in this reporting period by connecting four APCs and pulling the tank out.

OBSERVATION: Attempt to recover stuck vehicles should be made first by the unit concerned.

ITEM: Clearing of Boobytraps.

DISCUSSION: When operating with Infantry units a tank crew member should not dismount his tank unless absolutely necessary. The tank, once a crew member dismounts, loses a certain amount of its efficiency. The Infantry who are already on the ground should be used to clear the area and to disarm booby traps. The tank is then fully manned having the capability of providing a great deal of cover for the Infantry in cases such as this.

OBSERVATION: In Tank - Infantry operations, dismounted infantry should clear or disarm all booby traps.

ITEM: Deploying Forces without the proper development of a situation.

DISCUSSION: While some enemy base camps are completely deserted, many of them have small caretaker units ranging from 3 to 20 men depending of course on the size of the base camp. Normally these are not elite troops, but they do have a thorough knowledge of that particular area and do have the capabilities of inflicting casualties by detonating pre-arranged mines and booby traps. In addition, they have numerous tunnels and escape

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33 routes which usually allow them to escape after they have inflicted casualties.

OBSERVATION: Air Strikes, Artillery, or organic weapons such as the LAW, the M-79 and the machinegun should be brought to bear on the camp before troops are allowed to enter. If these actions are taken, there is a good possibility that many of the enemy mines and booby traps will either be detonated or rendered ineffective by friendly fires. In addition, any enemy personnel in the base camp may be killed or wounded or forced to leave the vicinity before troops enter, resulting in a reduction in casualties.

ITEM: Anti-RPG Defense.

DISCUSSION: At TRUNG LAP on 17 September 1967, RPG rounds used in indirect fire damaged bunkers and a M109 howitzer. The RPG warhead is a shaped charge and caused extensive damage only when the round impacts and detonates against the target.

OBSERVATION: If the RPG round could be detonated on some object of little value before hitting the intended target, the damage to the target would be minimized. A single sandbag wall around an installation would suffice or as in the case of one unit, chain linked fencing was placed around the M109 howitzer and FDC to establish this additional protection.

ITEM: External loads for airmobile operations.

DISCUSSION: Time is critical in all airmobile operations. An artillery unit can save a considerable amount of time by externally loading as much of its equipment and cargo as possible.

OBSERVATION: By using A-22 bags, cargo nets and sling rigged trailers, a majority of the equipment and supplies of an artillery can be loaded externally.

ITEM: Use of separate personnel sorties on airmobile operations.

DISCUSSION: A great amount of time can be saved during airmobile operations if all gun crews can be lifted in separate personnel sorties. This alleviates the necessity of landing each howitzer section sortie to unload the crew. However, the time saved has to be carefully weighted against the risk of operational loss if one or more of the personnel sorties is lost. On short moves over a relatively secure area, the danger of loss is minimal.

OBSERVATION: When the tactical situation permits a considerable amount of time can be saved during airmobile operations, if a majority of the personnel of the unit are moved by consolidated personnel sorties.

ITEM: Adjustment of close-in defensive fires.

DISCUSSION: Accuracy and safety are of the utmost importance when adjust-

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ting close-in defensive fires.

OBSERVATION: When selecting the adjusting piece for close-in defensive fires, select the howitzer nearest the friendly element. In this way when the battery is fired, all rounds will tend to impact on the safe side of the adjusting piece.

ITEM: Reduction of Casualties.

DISCUSSION: Many casualties are caused from mortar and RPG attacks. These attacks usually occur from the hours of early evening through late morning. Protective vests and steel helmets are issued to all individuals, also all units construct personnel shelters in all positions.

OBSERVATIONS: Although it cannot be predicted when mortar and RPG attacks will occur, the exposure of personnel to these attacks are adversely reduced if they are required to be in their protective shelters or be required to wear their protective vests and steel helmets during the hours of darkness.

ITEM: Fire Support Patrol Bases.

DISCUSSION: Due to the lack of firm ground during the monsoon season in some areas, it is extremely difficult to construct howitzer firing position in fire support patrol bases.

OBSERVATION: In constructing a firing position for a howitzer in wet terrain, a rectangular stand of sand bags covered with Pierced Steel Planking (PSP) will provide a solid platform in a minimum amount of time.

ITEM: Mobile Fire Direction Center (FDC).

DISCUSSION: During the displacement of any artillery headquarters, it is necessary to maintain communications with lower, higher and adjacent headquarters. Also upon arrival in a new position, it is necessary to establish communications immediately and place the FDC in operation as soon as possible.

OBSERVATION: A compact FDC for both a battalion or battery can be built into a 3/4 ton truck and trailer. By judicious selection of equipment and careful loading, this installation is available for road or airmobile movement and can be emplaced with minimum time and effort.

ITEM: Preplanned Artillery and Air Strike Coordination.

DISCUSSION: The simultaneous employment of artillery and air strikes requires detailed coordination. A simple, effective tool for preplanned employment is an AIR/ARTY Coordination Line, more often than not a line independent or normal Fire Coordination Lines (FCLs). All commanders, FACs and FDCs are made aware of one or more well defined terrain features which are identified in the operation order as AIR/ARTY Coordination Lines.

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The line(s) is used to check fire artillery during air strikes in a specified area - aircraft pilots are instructed and controlled by the Brigade FAC to restrict their flight pattern so as not to fly beyond the designated coordination line during a strike; hence, artillery is permitted to continue firing in all but a small portion of the AO.

OBSERVATION: A procedure is necessary whereby artillery and airstrikes can be conducted simultaneously - AIR/ARTY Coordination Line is one effective method.

ITEM: Artillery and Army Aviation Coordination.

DISCUSSION: While supporting large scale combat assaults with multiple lifts and/or multiple LZs extremely detailed coordination is required between the artillery battalion and the Air Mobile Commander, in order to:

1. Insure that all rounds have impacted on the LZ before the first aircraft come in and that the pilot of the lead aircraft knows this.
2. Have a minimum time gap between the end of the artillery preparation and the first helicopter touch down.
3. To accomplish this, the artillery battalion has had in its FDC an aviation battalion LNO on two operations, equipped with radio in order to speak directly to the Air Mobile Commander. It has worked perfectly and has aided immensely in eliminating a critical problem.

OBSERVATION: On any large scale airmobile operation an Army Aviator from the supporting unit should be present at the direct support artillery FDC.

ITEM: Check Fires.

DISCUSSION: For a long while, indiscriminate imposition of check fires drastically affected combat operations by halting all artillery/mortar fires throughout large areas of operations when actually only a small portion of it required free aircraft access. 1st Brigade and 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery now use a policy whereby an aircraft entering its AO requests a check fire - the senior ground commander then decides which support he needs most, artillery or aviation, and approves or disapproves the request.

OBSERVATION: When an aircraft enters an AO and requests a check fire, the artillery headquarters should offer the request to the ground commander's headquarters for the decision.

ITEM: Jungle Clearing with Demolition.

DISCUSSION: During the last three months the 65th Engineer Battalion has been heavily committed to clearing dense jungle and hedgerows in inaccessible areas. Most of the work has been accomplished by the massive

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use of demolitions, primarily the bangalore torpedo. These clearing operations took place in widely scattered areas within the 25th Infantry Division TAOR and involved clearing isolated canals and stream lines as well as areas of poor trafficability on the fringes of conventionally cleared areas.

The bangalore torpedo is a demolition charge designed primarily to rapidly breach mine field and barbed wire entanglements. The bangalore torpedoes used on these operations were made between 1943 - 1944, they had a main charge of amotol and a booster of TNT. The bangalore torpedo is effective for clearing dense brush because of the fragmentation as well as the blast effect. Since it is a linear charge it is particularly effective against bamboo thicket.

The first operation employing bangalores took place in the canal systems along the West bank of the SAIGON River from coordinates XT809-100 to XT799070, in August 1967. Nine major canals were cleared on this operation. The canals were cleared for an average length of fifteen-hundred meters. In addition, thousands of meters of interconnecting hedgerows were eliminated. Bangalore torpedoes were used to remove most of them.

The banks were covered with trees averaging about eight inches in diameter and dense thickets of brush and bamboo. The brush was thickest close to the river. All trees over four inches in diameter were charged with C-4. Any thicket too dense to be easily removed by machete were charged with bangalores. Close to the river the brush extended out into the canal as much as 5 meters. In these areas bangalores were placed perpendicular to the canal. On the banks they were placed parallel with its axis. Frequently the bangalores were placed underwater among the roots of the larger and denser clumps of brush. This was found to be very effective at low tide.

The normal procedure however, was to place the bangalores about a foot off the ground and as close as possible to the heavier brush. All charges were tied with a ring main.

In some areas of very dense vegetation it was necessary to use bangalores to remove the undergrowth before the larger trees could be charged.

Demolition resupply was by helicopter. Bangalores were brought by Chinook to a central location and then carried to the site on foot or by rubber boat. Other demo was supplied directly to the site by UH-1D.

Squads in this terrain cleared up to 500 meters per day.

Demolition expenditures was from 200 - 300 lb of C-4 per hundred meters of canal (both sides) and up to 10 bangalore kits and 1500 feet of detonating cord per hundred meters.

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39 On canals between XT799020 and XT777616 terrain was similar to the previous operation but local flooding made logistics more difficult. Experiments were made in resupplying bangalores by UH-1D instead of by Chinook. This took longer but got the demolition closed to the area where it was to be used. Pneumatic Assault Boats were used to a greater extent for both placing and transporting demolitions. In some cases the brush was so dense that all work had to be done from the boats and line main run down the center of the canal. Bangalores were placed perpendicular to the stream when placed directly from the boat.

In general there were less trees and more brush in this area and therefore less C-4 and detonating cord were used. Bangalores were used at the rate of 10 to 20 per hundred meters.

With the greater need for bangalores and the poor working conditions squads often did not do better than 200 meters a day.

Somewhat different problems were encountered in the THAI MY area. There monsoon flooding and poor soil conditions combined to make clearing with Rome Plows in the fringe areas impossible. Most of the dense brush grew in hedgerows 1 to 3 meters wide. Most of this was dense bamboo. In many cases the hedgerows also had trees of significant size.

Bangalores were placed down the center of the hedgerows. In the dense thickets they were placed perpendicular to the axis of the hedgerow. They were elevated about a foot off the ground in most cases, to make more effective use of the fragmentation from the bangalores.

When the bangalores were placed at right angles care was taken to make sure that the boosters were touching. When this was impossible the charges were individually mined.

Trees larger than 4 inches were charged with C-4. All charges were tied to a line main.

Logistics were much less of a problem in this area. Bangalores were brought in by helicopter and by truck. They were hauled to the site on pole trailers after the cases had been broken down and the bangalores assembled in sections of two. Armored personnel carriers towed the trailers to the site. The APCs drove along the hedgerows and the bangalores were pulled off in whatever quantity necessary; in this manner a squad could clear up to 1000 meters a day when properly supported.

Bangalores were expended at the rate of 10-12 per hundred meters. Eighty pounds of C-4 and 800 feet of detonating cord were also used every hundred meters.

During clearing operation conducted in the HO BO WOODS from XT588310 to XT565325, difficulty was encountered near the SAIGON River. Here ditches and trenches as well as swamp and rice paddies made the river banks inaccessible to dozers and Rome Plows. This inaccessible strip of

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jungle averaged about 15 meters wide. It was destroyed by placing bangalores the width of the strip, perpendicular to the river on 4 meter centers.

In most cases the bangalores were brought to the site on pole trailers but placing them was difficult, especially in the flooded area. In this terrain a squad could place about 250 meters of charge per day.

Up to 24 bangalore kits and about 600 feet of detonating cord were used per hundred meters. No attempt was made to blow the trees, therefore, no C-4 was used.

OBSERVATION: Experience with bangalore torpedoes in these operations proves that bangalore torpedoes are effective for rapidly removing hedgerows and dense thickets in inaccessible areas. They are easy to place and prime but are difficult to transport. When bangalores had to be carried on foot through rough terrain for more than a few hundred meters the advantage over hand clearing is marginal at best. They are, however, more effective than any other type of demolition for removing dense vegetation.

ITEM: Tactical Bridging, Airlifting.

DISCUSSION: During the last five months, Co E, 5th Engr Bn, has airlifted 40 - 38'4" T6 dry spans, 16 - M4T6 five float rafts, 7 - four float LTR and 12 - bridge erection boats.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. All tactical bridging authorized to this unit can be airlifted and emplaced by CH-47 or CH-54 helicopters.
2. This unit can handle twice as much bridging as authorized due to airlift capability.
3. M4T6 dry spans (38'4" & 45') can be used extensively for quick MSR repairs requiring the minimum of time and personnel.
4. During the monsoon season when large portions of roadway are washed away or under water, dry spans can be used as a corduroy by cribbing under each stiffener and tying them together.
5. Airlifting capability has also made it possible to install bridges and rafts in inaccessible areas cranes and bridge trucks are unable to go.
6. Reaction time for any bridge mission has been cut down to a minimum by having various configurations preassembled.
7. By airlifting all bridging, the unit has assumed the added mission capability of hauling engineer materials, primarily rock for road construction.

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ITEM: Tunnel Destruction in the HO BO WOODS.

DISCUSSION: During October, Co B, 65th Engr Bn, was given the mission to set up a pumping station and construct a pipeline from the tidal flats of the SAIGON River to a known tunnel complex located at XT615302, in the HO BO WOODS.

Due to the need of positioning of the first pump in water approximately 4 feet deep, a platform was constructed from light timbers and placed on six fifty five gallon barrels to allow it to float. Three pumps used were rated 1120 GPM with a 130 foot head. Piping used was steel assault piping, 6" diameter. Both 20' and 30' section of pipe were used.

The first 800 meters of pipe had to be laid in water varying from 2 feet to 4 feet deep. To assist in stringing the pipe through this area a UHLD was used. Four hooks were fabricated from 3/8" steel plate and fastened to the ends of a 40,000 lb sling. Pipe was flown in by CH-47's, unslung and then moved in twos to the desired location by the UHLD. The use of the UHLD speeds the laying of this pipe considerably and required fewer personnel on the job site. Several thousand meters of pipe were used.

To string pipe on the high ground, pipe was loaded on pole trailers and flown to the area by CH-47s and the trailer hooked to M13 APC. Two personnel can drop the pipe off of the trailer at desired intervals.

Various problems were encountered in this operation that were unforeseen and caused considerable down time. The pumps, although new, had two major problems. The first, and most serious, was the breaking of coupling between the motor and pump head. After several pumps had failed the same way it was thought that the weight of the pipe coming to and from the pump was putting too great a strain on it. Flexible hose was then used to join the pipe to the pump thereby relieving this weight and allowing the pump to vibrate freely. After this installation no more breakdowns of this nature occurred. The second problem was over heating. A solution to the problem was to pump at night during the cooler hours and to then pump at intervals during the day.

Various results were expected from this flooding. Originally, it was planned to use CS Gas in a crystal form to contaminate the tunnels. By using the water as a carrier the soil would be saturated with the gas, rendering it unusable for a long period of time. This plan was dropped as it would have required the security element and the Engineer personnel to live in a contaminated area as much of the gas would work its way out of the entrances.

Another plan was to use dye in the water. This would allow an aerial observer to see additional entrances and also whether or not the water was draining back into the river. The dye being quite hard to procure, it was determined that a 50 lb bag would be used every 30 minutes of pumping. This system was never given a good test as dye was not available during

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most of the operation.

Some positive results were obtained from the pumping as large sections of ground did sink and much of the tunnel complex could be traced. It can be assumed that these tunnels were destroyed. Due to maintenance problems and type of pipe used, demolition probably would have been faster. With the background now gained and the recent procurement of large quantities of flexible pipe the time required to set a pipeline will be reduced to a matter of several hours rather than two days. This addition will speed the operation considerably and require far less personnel.

Another consideration would be to place explosives throughout the complex. After the tunnel has been flooded it could then be detonated. The water tamping would greatly increase the effectiveness of the explosive and should cause total destruction.

OBSERVATION: Tunnel destruction can be accomplished with water. With more practice and recent addition of flexible hose the operation can be accomplished quickly. For total destruction it is recommended that a small quantity of demolition be used with the water. Selection of the tunnels to be destroyed in this fashion must be carefully made so as to be near a large water source and be within the range of the pump's capability.

(3) Training and Organization. None.

(4) Intelligence.

ITEM: Reproducing Overlays on Acetate.

DISCUSSION: Frequently the 25th MI Detachment Imagery Interpretation Section must produce overlays on clear acetate. To reproduce this product on acetate best results are obtained when frosty acetate and ink are used on the negative. Regular overlay paper will work, however, the marking must be in ink and it takes considerably longer to mark overlay paper with ink than frosty acetate. Combined Intelligence Center, Viet Nam (CICV) can reproduce overlays on clear acetate from these negatives using an ozilid machine. Engineers also have access to this type of machine. The Bruning Machine located in the G2 and G3 Sections can also be used to produce overlays on clear acetate.

OBSERVATION: When enough lead time is available, the Imagery Interpretation Section should produce a frosty acetate negative and the facilities at CICV should be used to produce a clear acetate copy.

ITEM: Knowledge of VC Infrastructure..

DISCUSSION: It is important that a simple definition of the infrastructure be employed within agencies targeted against the infrastructure. Basic publications should be produced to allow the individuals

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working against the infrastructure to learn how to conduct their operations.

OBSERVATION: There must be a single definition of VC infrastructure.

ITEM: The VC have had considerable success recruiting former US detainees.

DISCUSSION: VCPW LE VAN DO stated that although the VC were having considerable difficulty recruiting in CU CHI District, it was relatively easy to recruit people who were former US detainees. He claimed that these people were generally disenchanted and irritated by their long detention by US authorities.

OBSERVATION: Efforts should be made to insure that only valid suspects are detained and also to insure that the interrogation and release of Innocent Civilians and Civil Defendants is accomplished as rapidly as possible.

ITEM: Capture Tags.

DISCUSSION: In many instances, detainees are evacuated without a capture tag or with one which contains fragmentary, incomplete, or erroneous information. It is almost impossible to gain the upper hand during the initial interrogation when this occurs. It is therefore essential that capturing units complete individual capture tags in the field providing complete details of the capture of each detainee. In some cases, personnel of the capturing unit's headquarters have attempted to complete tags after the arrival of the detainee at the Division FW Collecting Point. The lack of first hand information concerning the circumstances of the capture of the individual leads to serious omissions of vital information.

OBSERVATION: Every soldier assigned to combat units should carry and know how to complete capture tags of detained persons.

ITEM: VC Booby Traps.

DISCUSSION: During Operation KUNIA the 65th Engr Bn discovered two VC booby traps rigged in the following manner: A hand grenade with the pin pulled was placed below the surface of the ground and covered with several scraps of tin or other metal objects that would be picked up on a detector, however, were not heavy enough in itself to prevent the hand grenade handle from being released. This was accomplished by covering the booby trap (BBT) with dirt (example, on a road) thus adding weight to the metal. The desired results were for a mine detector to sense the metal, the soldiers probe and locate the suspected mine, remove the dirt which prevented the handle from being released and the hand grenade would detonate.

OBSERVATION: By probing around the suspected mine of BBT the engineers determined the size of the booby trap, removed the dirt surrounding it

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to determine the type mine found prior to attempting to destroy it.

ITEM: VC/NVA Trail Markings.

DISCUSSION: VC/NVA forces have devised a method for marking major trails.

OBSERVATION: While conducting recent search and destroy operations in AO MILLER, in BINH DUONG Province, against VC/NVA forces and installations, north of the MICHELIN Plantation, it was observed by 3d Bn, 22d Inf, 25th Inf Div, that enemy forces were using a particular method to mark specific trails. The area was criss-crossed trails. To mark the major supply routes through the area, notches were cut in a specific specie of hardwood tree. In these notches was placed flammable materials. When conducting resupply during the hours of darkness, the substance in the notches was ignited along the route, much in the same manner as small street lamps. The trees notched were approximately fifty (5) meters apart. The notches were cut approximately (5) feet from the ground. Due to the dense vegetation and high jungle canopy this method of trail marking is difficult to detect.

ITEM: Enemy Employment of Pressure Detonated Anti-Vehicular Mines.

DISCUSSION: While providing work party security on Highway 4, north of NUI BA DEN in northern TAY NINH Province, the Recon Platoon and Mortar Platoon, 2d Bn, 34th Armor, tracks hit 3 anti-vehicular mines resulting in combat loss of 3 APCs. The road had been swept with minesweepers prior to the vehicles moving over the area. On two of the three occasions more than 7 vehicles passed over the mines before detonation. Two of the three holes examined were free of metallic debris while the other had very small pieces of metal. The road was well packed leaving no indication of recently emplaced mines. It was also noted that at each mine location there was a large tree on the side of the road, there were no other indications. The mines were either non-metallic or buried too deep for the mine sweeper to detect.

OBSERVATION: The use of deeper probing devices or heavy rollers on the front of tanks would be an effective means of countering this type of mine warfare.

(5) Logistics.

ITEM: Power Cables for Generators.

DISCUSSION: Power cables from generators to equipment were initially laid underground and with the advent of the Monsoon Season excessive problems with electrical short - circuiting hampered the inoperation. The exact location of the power loss could not be determined.

OBSERVATION: Power Cables were strung above ground using "A" frames or other substantial support as a temporary measure, as the situation dictated. The short circuiting of power cables from contact with excessive

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water was eliminated resulting in more efficient operation of generators, less power shortages and decrease in extra labor in determining the location of short circuits.

ITEM: Sling, 4 legged, 10,000 lb Capacity.

DISCUSSION: Recent operations within this division have resulted in an increase in resupply by helicopter. The vast majority of this supply is being accomplished by sling loads. Several sling loads have been dropped when the sling broke two feet below the donut ring. Some of the loads were destroyed upon impact, other supplies and equipment were recovered intact. An investigation was initiated. All personnel concerned with sling load operations were assembled and the problem of checking slings, nets, donuts, maximum weight capability, etc., were discussed. It was determined that all slings, webbing, donuts, etc., should be given a very careful inspection (by qualified inspectors with test equipment) to determine serviceability. Coordination with Ho, 1st Log Comd revealed that there is no equipment available in-country to test lift equipment and that the best way to check this equipment is by visual inspection by qualified personnel.

OBSERVATION: The use of helicopters for resupply can be expected to increase for most combat and combat support units in Vietnam. More emphasis on instruction on sling load techniques is needed at branch schools and training centers as well as within units presently stationed in Vietnam to adequately prepare a sufficient number of qualified personnel to properly rig and inspect slings and rig sling loads.

ITEM: Aeromedical Evacuation.

DISCUSSION: The medic on the ground must render adequate information to the aircraft crew about the medical status of the patient. A priority classification of the patient along with a brief diagnosis of his injury or illness is required. When feasible a physician should make this classification. When this is not possible, medics should conscientiously use their training by adequately classifying the patient and by relaying to the MEDEVAC an accurate diagnosis. Severely wounded personnel can be saved by rapid evacuation; however, slightly wounded personnel and the aircraft crew can be lost too, if significant risks are taken because a slightly wounded patient has been upgraded to a higher priority.

OBSERVATION: All medical personnel should be constantly aware of the inherent dangers both to the patient and to the aircraft crew of upgrading the classification (urgent, priority, and routine) of a casualty.

ITEM: MEDEVAC Aircraft on standby with the medical battalion provides efficient and timely evacuation of casualties from the battle field.

DISCUSSION: During this quarter MEDEVAC aircraft were attached to the medical battalion on a standby basis. This procedure worked very well in that casualties were extracted from the battlefield in a minimum

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amount of time and were receiving treatment in a medical facility within a short time.

OBSERVATION: MEDEVAC Aircraft will and do provide a great asset to all medical battalions.

ITEM: Clutch Release Bearings.

DISCUSSION: Many clutch release bearings were ruined due to the fact that improper free travel was not maintained in the clutch linkage, or drivers were riding the clutch pedal.

OBSERVATION: Drivers are not aware of the damage that can be caused by improper clutch adjustment or riding the clutch pedal. This problem has been brought up at this month's maintenance meeting for correction. Free travel adjustment is the responsibility of organizational mechanics.

ITEM: Engine Cooling Fan Drive Coupling.

DISCUSSION: Excessive wearing of the coupling mating splines contributes in some cases to shearing of the splines, causing engine overheating.

OBSERVATION: It should be stressed that personnel read the applicable Technical Manuals for their equipment and understand the contents. The excessive spline wear in this case was due to the use of incorrect type grease.

ITEM: Transportation of Office Machines.

DISCUSSION: Office machines are being damaged to the point of salvage by what appears to be improper transportation. Units have stacked equipment into the rear of trucks making no effort to secure them from damage during transportation.

OBSERVATION: Commanders must be made aware of such neglect at the earliest opportunity.

ITEM: Maintenance of Generators..

DISCUSSION: Generator operators apparently are not adequately maintaining their generators. The maintenance appears to be pulled at irregular intervals rather than on a scheduled basis. This can cause many breakdowns.

OBSERVATION: Generators run in pairs have less trouble than those running alone. This allows more time for maintenance.

ITEM: Clogged Bore Evacuator.

DISCUSSION: Continuous heavy firing of the M109 self propelled howitzer causes the bore evacuator to become clogged with carbon. In some cases buildup has become so acute as to prevent the removal of the evacuator.

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OBSERVATION: To avoid the necessity of cutting off bore evacuators, units must insure that the evacuators are cleaned at regular intervals.

ITEM: Improper Oil Level.

DISCUSSION: A total of four engines were caused to become unserviceable due to what appeared to be improper oil level and/or the lack of changing oil and filters.

OBSERVATION: Oil levels must be watched closely. Added attention is required on continuous operation of engines such as generators. The oil should be changed at least as often as required by the applicable LO and when operating in extremely dusty conditions as often as required to insure efficient lubrication.

ITEM: Short Supply of Antenna AT-892/PRC-25.

DISCUSSION: To alleviate the shortage of short antenna for the AN/PRC-25 and AN/PRC-10 antennas, AT-272 antennas were able to be easily re-threaded. Field reports indicated no loss in range or reliability.

OBSERVATION: Substitutes are available for the AT-892/PRC-25 antenna.

ITEM: Proper Sling Loading of Armored Personnel Carriers (APC).

DISCUSSION: The engine of the M-113 APC must be removed before slinging an APC. Consequently the engine top cover must be removed. The right front tie down point for sling loading is on this engine top cover.

OBSERVATION: Often after removing the engine the top cover is not bolted back, giving no attachment point. Be sure the engine top cover is securely bolted down before attempting to sling load an M-113.

ITEM: UH-1 Helicopter Lubrication Oil.

DISCUSSION: A substitute turbine engine oil #23699A is in the supply system. This oil is for engines only, and will not be mixed with 7808. Both oil containers look alike.

OBSERVATION: Due to a number of transmission input quill seals failing, it is believed some oils have already been mixed. Only 7808 and 7808F oil should be used.

ITEM: Tow Cables.

DISCUSSION: The OVE tow cables on both the tanks and APCs are too short for recovery work. A locally fabricated tow cable of about 40 feet has worked best for recovering vehicles stuck in mud. The 40 foot cables have enabled the Scout Section and the Tank Section to recover their own vehicles on many occasions where they would have had to call for VTR (M88).

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OBSERVATION: Longer tow cables are needed to recover track vehicles.

ITEM: Vehicle, Track, Recovery, M88 (VTR M88).

DISCUSSION: The main winch cable is not long enough for most recovery operations. A 400 foot cable would greatly increase the recovery capability of the M88. The full length could be used for APCs with a 1:1 ratio. The extra length would enable a 2:1 ratio to be used when pulling out tanks (often at $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 times vehicle weight). The main winch cables have a very short useable life because of the frequent inability to get close enough to rig a 2:1 mechanical advantage.

OBSERVATION: Longer tow cables are needed to recover track vehicles.

(6) Civic Action and PSYOPS.

ITEM: Distribution of US Clothing and Commodities.

DISCUSSION: In many instances there is a tendency for US Civic Action personnel to make themselves popular through the distribution of US clothing and commodities. This is an activity which should be accompanied by the Vietnamese officials and only monitored by US personnel. A system of distribution whereby the Vietnamese officials actually conduct the distribution will greatly enhance their image in the eyes of the Vietnamese people.

OBSERVATION: All distribution of US food and commodities should be conducted by Vietnamese officials so as to enhance their image with the Vietnamese people. The US personnel should not play an active part in the distribution, but should monitor and insure that all items reach the intended recipient's hands.

ITEM: CA Projects should satisfy the "needs and desires" of the people.

DISCUSSION: The projects in any Civic Action program should satisfy the needs and desires of the Vietnamese people. Vietnamese participation is difficult and often times impossible to obtain unless the people desire a particular CA project. The S-5 can determine the needs and desires of the Vietnamese people in his area from discussions with the MACV advisor, local officials, and from the people of the village and hamlet. Frequently a conflict arises between what the people desire and what others feel is needed. If the problem does arise a compromise may be in order. A desired type project might be completed before a need type project is started. This will of course involve a delay in the project needed, but will gain the support and confidence of the people so that the needed project will be supported by the people. An example would be to show films on the need for casing and capping wells so that the people will then desire better wells.

OBSERVATION: It is important that CA projects satisfy the need as well as the desires of the people. An approach would be to educate the people so as to create the desire in order to complete the need type project.

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ITEM: Permanent Civic Action Areas of Responsibility.

DISCUSSION: Once a unit has been assigned an area to conduct CA it is imperative that this area remain permanent until the area is pacified. If continuity does not exist the people in a given area will be hesitant to cooperate, fearful of Viet Cong reprisals, and generally apprehensive about the overall pacification program.

OBSERVATION: All efforts should be made to assign permanent CA areas of responsibility so that there will be continuity and thus enable pacification of an area to be accomplished.

ITEM: Scheduled MEDCAPS.

DISCUSSION: Past procedure has been to select a hamlet at random and go into the hamlet unannounced, set up the MEDCAP, and then treat the people. The obvious deficiency in the program was that when the MEDCAP ended for that day the patients were either never seen again, or else, they were not seen again until many weeks later when the MEDCAP team again visited the hamlet. Scheduled MEDCAPS will overcome this deficiency and produce other advantageous results. Vietnamese medical personnel can be trained, permanent facilities improved and better equipped medical records maintained on each patient treated and the overall image of the Vietnamese medical personnel improved in the eyes of their own people.

OBSERVATION: Greater emphasis should be placed on scheduled MEDCAPS whenever security permits. Unannounced MEDCAPS should continue as in the past in insecure areas and with tactically deployed units.

ITEM: Aerial Broadcasts.

DISCUSSION: Due to the stringent regulations in VC/NVA units and the low literacy rate, leaflet drops are not an effective means of conducting PSYOPS in certain areas. During interviews with Hoi Chanh, it has been found that more VC/NVA have been made aware of the Chieu Hoi Program as a result of hearing loudspeaker broadcasts than through reading leaflets.

OBSERVATION: Loudspeaker broadcasts are the most effective means of disseminating propaganda.

ITEM: Communication During Aerial Loudspeaker Operations.

DISCUSSION: Aerial loudspeaker broadcasts are affected by weather conditions, flight patterns, height and air speed. Due to these variables it is impossible for the people in the aircraft to insure that the broadcast is being heard on the ground. Communications must be maintained with personnel on the ground to pretest the loudspeaker message prior to flying the target area.

OBSERVATION: An extra radio tuned to nearby ground forces for comments on loudspeaker broadcasts can help insure that an audible message gets to

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the target audience.

ITEM: Increased Inducements to Returnees.

DISCUSSION: Based on interviews with returnees during the Chieu Hoi Offensive, monetary inducements to rally were not a major motivating factor. Primary reasons for returning were desire to be with family and fear of artillery and airstrikes. The primary factor which determined whether or not the individual rallied was the opportunity to get away from his unit and get to a safe area to rally.

OBSERVATION: Emphasis should be placed on family Chieu Hoi appeals and allied power themes. Rally points should be set up and widely publicized to provide increased opportunity for the VC/NVA to rally.

ITEM: Coordination of Civic Affairs at District Level.

DISCUSSION: All civic affairs activities should be cleared through the district chief and should be carried out with assistance by him if possible. It has been found that working directly with a hamlet or village chief often leads to the misuse of distributed items.

OBSERVATION: A good working relationship with the Vietnamese people, especially the local official, is mandatory for a successful civic action program in any area.

b. Recommendations.

(1) Personnel.

(a) That two (2) preventive medicine specialists be made a part of the Division Surgeon's Office.

(b) That the Chief Medical Non-Commissioned Officer's TOE position in the Office of the Division Surgeon be authorized a Sergeant Major (E-9) instead of Master Sergeant (E-8).

(2) Operations.

(a) That the medical Platoons within Infantry, Artillery and battalions be used in field operations in Vietnam.

(b) That organic MEDEVAC aircraft be authorized each Division Medical Battalion.

(c) That units overcome the effective VC tactic of exposing small forces as bait by aggressive reconnaissance by fire and by using all supporting fires available to probe suspected VC positions.

(d) That units avoid entering what appear to be deserted enemy base camps without first employing artillery and/or air-

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strikes.

(e) That units initiate the use of a "Checkerboard" pattern in search and destroy operations, which permits unlimited fire support between elements and provides for a detailed search of an area. (See Appendix 2)

(f) That artillery and Air Force ordnance with "daisy cutter" fuzes be used to saturate heavily wooded areas to trigger mines and booby traps and discourage VC ambushes prior to conducting Rome Flow clearing operations.

(g) That units conduct frequent night operations on an irregular schedule and train newly assigned personnel in night tactics.

(h) That increased use be made of stay behind patrols after the departure of a company or battalion from a base camp.

3. (C) DA Survey Information: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) (as required by USARV Message, #80483, subject: Operational Report Lessons Learned (ORLL) for the period ending 31 October 1967).

a. Organization and Training.

(1) Organization. The Division General Order organizing the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Detachment is GO 3631. The LRRP is attached to the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. Employment of the LRRP is directed by the Division Intelligence Section (G-2) and/or on order of the Cavalry Squadron Commander. Teams may be employed by Brigades of the Division in either an attached or Operational Control (OFCON) status. The LRRP Detachment has the following structure:

- (a) Strength: 4 Officers, 36 NCOs and 78 FM
- (b) Headquarters Section
- (c) Mess Section
- (d) Communication Section
- (e) Two (2) Patrol Platoon Headquarters
- (f) 15 Patrols (6 men each)

(2) Training. Training was planned and organized by the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The training program was supported by personnel assigned to the LRRP Detachment, the Squadron's Artillery Forward Observer and Air Liaison Officer, and the Squadron's Communication and Medical Platoons. Instructor and aircraft support has been provided by the Squadron's Air Cavalry Troop. Initial training for the LRRP Detachment consisted of three, one week phases:

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(a) Phase I: One week of intensive classroom and practical applications. The following subjects were covered:

- (1) First Aid
- (2) Map Reading
- (3) Intelligence
- (4) Communications
- (5) Forward Observer (FO) and Forward Air Controller (FAC) procedures (Artillery Adjustments).
- (6) Aerial Reconnaissance
- (7) Loading and unloading helicopters
- (8) Waterborne Operations
- (9) LZ Selections
- (10) Weapons Familiarizations
- (11) Physical Training

(b) Phase II: One week of refresher and advanced training. This phase was climaxed with a waterborne assault into a specified area of operations. A three day tactical operation was also conducted during this phase. The following subjects were covered.

- (1) Map and Compass Reading
- (2) Intelligence Gathering and Reporting
- (3) Waterborne Training

(c) Phase III: One week of training/tactical employment (Night Ambushes and Operations). Maximum use of air lift was stressed.

(d) A sustained training schedule has been initiated. This schedule supplements the operational requirements and maintains a high standard of training within the Detachment. Subjects covered are those requiring emphasis beyond the initial training phases (i.e., LZ procedures, waterborne operations, artillery adjustment).

b. Techniques of Tactical Employment.

(1) The LRRP Teams may be employed in several capacities. To form an Ambush Patrol, two teams are combined to function as a single ambush unit, thus providing a stronger fighting force. When employed as a Stay Behind Force, normally 4 Teams are combined, prepared to engage the

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53 enemy until reinforced or extracted, as the situation requires. The primary method of employment is as a Reconnaissance Patrol consisting of one five man team. The patrol functions, not as a fighting force, but as a means of gaining intelligence prior to a larger unit entering the area for operations, or for determining enemy unit location and/or identity.

(2) Means of insertion, which are often determined by the type of mission, are as follows:

(a) Helicopter Insertion: Generally the most desired method of employment. May be accomplished in a minimum amount of time. The area of insertion can be pin-pointed, and the team placed without having to commit ground elements in the area.

(b) Tail Gating: This method is accomplished by ground elements conducting a sweep/search and destroy. At the insertion site the team is dropped out of the rear of Armored Personnel Carriers. The ground force continues with the sweep and is simultaneously located in a favorable position to react, if the requirement arises.

(c) Stay Behind: When a ground force leaves an area of operations, a team is left, concealed in the area of operations. This is a desirable means of insertion as the team is initially secured by the ground force and has a quick reaction capability.

(d) Walk Out: Frequently used for areas that are accessible by foot and not at too great a distance from the start point. The advantage of this means of employment is that no additional force is required to assist with the insertion.

(e) Waterborne Assault: The least desirable method, due to hazards involved while employed on rafts, especially when the personnel are heavily equipped. There is also the problem of concealing the rafts once the crossing has been accomplished. The route of exfiltration is also limited when employing this technique of insertion.

c. Lessons Learned.

(1) A minimum of 48 hours is necessary to accomplish the planning, preparation and organization which should be accomplished prior to team insertion. The gathering of data relevant to an area, briefings, and the establishment of Mission Support Sites (MSS) are all activities which should be accomplished prior to the final selection of the initial observation point. The rapid placement of a team(s) in an area which has not been fully developed in the planning and preparation process is a waste of manpower and material, and places the team in undue jeopardy. Conversely time spent in area development and planning lead to the placement of teams in more productive areas. The physical placement of a team on the ground should not be an end in

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itself; it should in fact be the beginning of a well planned and organized intelligence effort.

(2) A clearly defined mission to include Essential Elements of Information should be the key stone to the planning and preparation phase. The issuance of missions which simply direct attention to a broad geographic area should be avoided.

(3) The point of insertion should be minimum of 300 meters from the initial point of observation. Upon insertion the team should move to their initial point of observation as rapidly as conditions permit.

(4) Patrol members should remain in a team configuration: individuals, particularly leaders should not leave the observation point, for the purpose of reconnaissance and/or surveillance. If it is necessary to move to a new location the entire team should displace to the new site.

(5) Food and water available to the patrol must be strictly controlled. Consumption of individual items must be planned prior to insertion. The plan must be adhered to during the patrol's operation; this will insure adequate food stocks to support the patrol's stay. During periods of rainfall water stocks must be replenished. As a planning guide, food and water stocks to support operations for a 24 hour period in excess of the planned stay time should be carried into the operating area.

(6) Pre-insertion checks to insure the adequacy and presence of all items of equipment, and supplies must be made. Inspection will be scheduled in the team's preparation program. Check lists to support the preparation must be available to assist in insuring the presence of items required to support the team's operations.

(7) Once inserted teams should not displace from one location to another without first clearing the move with their control headquarters. Fire planning, extraction, and reaction personnel must be aware of team's move, to include the route to be employed. This will permit reaction elements to up grade their readiness posture during a period when the team's vulnerability is increased.

(8) Periodic checks; i.e. just after Beginning Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) and just prior to End of Evening Nautical Twilight (EENT) should be made to ascertain the exact location of the team. This check can be made by a helicopter over flight of the area with team personnel signaling by use of mirror. This technique of position fix cannot be employed in all operations circumstances, however when the terrain and situation permit, it should be accomplished.

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(9) A minimum of two hand microphones should be available for each radio taken into the operating area. This will reduce the possibility of communications failure due to problems with the microphones.

(10) Each Mission Support Site must be prepared to assist directly in the control and coordination of the team(s) activities. In order to accomplish this they must have available maps vested with the scheme of maneuver, journal and spot report forms. In addition to the materials that must be available all Mission Support Site (MSS) personnel must have knowledge of the scheme of maneuver, team location, insertion times and the report schedule that is to be complied with by the teams.

(11) Prior to commencing each operation a time schedule for reporting by each team(s) is established. The failure of a team to report to the control headquarters is a signal that all conditions with the patrol are not normal. It is then incumbent upon the control headquarters to initiate action to regain communications with the team that failed to report on time. The action initiated by the control headquarters, (alert of a reaction force, placing of aircraft airborne in attempts to regain direct communications) are activities which complicate control and coordination of the entire operation, thereby jeopardizing the team and the operation.

(12) Immediately upon extraction a team should be transported to the major maneuver headquarters under whose control it has been employed. This will permit immediate debriefing and utilization of intelligence information gained by the team. Representatives of the Division G2 Section should be present at the initial debriefing. Upon conclusion of the initial debriefing the team should be returned to their base area where more detailed debriefing can take place.

(13) As a means towards insuring communications between inserted teams and their control elements, tests of communications utilizing "Squad Radios" and a helicopter mounted receiver will be conducted.

(14) Further training in the techniques of air extraction is required. Close coordination and timing between team members and the extraction air craft is mandatory. It is essential that the team's location, route to the pick up zone and the pickup zone be known by all participants in the operation. The placing of timely and accurate suppressive fires can be the key to a successful extraction. To minimize the possibility of friendly fires being placed on the team to be extracted the routes and location to include marking techniques must be known and used.

(15) During helicopter borne extraction operations where enemy personnel are in the vicinity of the selected pick up zone, fire discipline is essential. The LRRP personnel moving to the aircraft must be trained and controlled to fire suppressive fires in areas that will

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not jeopardize the extraction aircraft. Upon boarding the extraction aircraft the team must be trained to immediately clear all weapons. One member of the aircraft crew must be trained to insure that weapons of the team being extracted are in fact cleared once the team has boarded the helicopter.

(16) During a helicopter borne extraction the employment of an individual near the door of the helicopter to assist LRRP team members in boarding the aircraft will greatly facilitate the extraction. The team members are carrying large quantities of equipment and as a result their ability to board the aircraft is reduced. In addition to assisting personnel in boarding the aircraft this individual is readily available to react to team members that may become or, are wounded and require assistance in reaching the aircraft. This individual should be in addition to the organic doorgunners assigned to the aircraft; since suppressive fires can be the key to a successful extraction the full potential of all aircraft to fire should be maintained at all times.

(17) The Mission Support Site(s) (MSS) are essential to assist in maintaining communication and control of LRRP Teams. The site (s) should whenever possible be located within areas such as fire support bases, supported unit command posts, and with US Advisory personnel in ARVN Compounds. Within the Division's current TAOI the radio relay complex on NUI BA DEN has proven particularly effective. By locating these stations within already operational sites, support and security requirements are reduced. Whenever possible Mission Support Operations Centers should be co-located with the headquarters that is responsible for the control of the operation. The co-location will facilitate the exchange of information, support requirements and simplify command control arrangements. Due to the nature of control exercised by the MSS it should be established in a location apart from other facilities. The erection of a CP tent in the vicinity of a battalion or brigade command post has proven to be a satisfactory solution to the location of an MSS. Direct phone lines between the MSS and the supported unit will expedite the exchange of information and will facilitate the control and coordination of the operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



6 Appendices Incl

1. Task Organization
2. Checkerboard Technique of Search & Destroy Operations

JASPER J. WILSON
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

3. ORLL, 125th Sig Bn

~~4. COAR, WAIMEA~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; CAAR #67X182

5. ORRL Feeder, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav

~~6. Pictures~~ Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

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AVFBC-RE-H (14 Nov 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (UIC-WDFU TO) (U)

DA HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 Dec 1967

TERU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.


2. This command has reviewed the attached report and concurs with the comments and recommendations with the following exceptions:

p(25), Nonconcur with the opinion that the Chief Medical Non-commissioned Officer in the Office of the Division Surgeon should be upgraded to Sergeant Major (E-9). The genesis of this opinion appears to be more the relative rank of other NCO's in the headquarters rather than the actual duties performed by the Chief Medical Noncommissioned Officer.

p(25) - p(27), para 2a (2), Night heliborne operation without illumination. In order to preclude the use of aircraft search lights with possible compromise of the LZ and the operation, consideration should be given to the use of pathfinders whenever possible during night air-mobile operations. Pathfinders with special devices such as obstruction lights, landing lights, glide-slope lights and light guns can provide the necessary terminal guidance with a minimum of external illumination.

p(43), para 2a (2), Item MEDEVAC, under the discussion the report states that; MEDEVAC aircraft were "attached" to the medical battalion on a stand-by basis. These aircraft were not attached as defined by AR 320-5. but rather located with the 25th Inf Div and providing area support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


R. E. WAMBSGANS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (BC)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 16 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (ALXA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning personnel packets, page 25, paragraph 2a(1):

(1) This headquarters recognizes the desirability of having grade/MOS breakout for augmentation packets prior to deployment. Direct correspondence between sponsor and deploying unit is authorized and encouraged by USARV Regulation 220-10.

(2) DA policy is to deploy advance liaison parties only for brigades and divisions or in those instances where there are peculiar problems related to deployment of a particular unit. An augmentation packet cannot be considered to be in either category.

(3) Recommend that information of this nature be obtained by the sponsor directly from the deploying unit.

b. Reference item concerning Preventive Medicine Specialists, page 25, paragraph 2a(1); and page 48, paragraph b(1)(a): Concur. The division surgeon has been informed that MTOE action should be initiated to effect this change.

c. Reference item concerning MEDEVAC aircraft, page 43; and page 48, paragraph b(2)(b): Nonconcur. In order to make maximum use of air ambulance resources they should be controlled at army rather than division level. When these aircraft are controlled at the army level they may be used to evacuate patients within the division, between divisions, and out of divisions to U. S. Army hospitals. Aircraft organic to a division would be more restricted and not allow for the shifting of resources to meet the requirements, especially between divisions.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
300 DIR 5200.10 Applies

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
AVHGC-DST (14 Nov 67)

2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (BC)

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

cy furn:

Hq, II FFORCEV

HQ, 25th Inf Div

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GPOP-DT(14 Nov 67 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly
 Period Ending 31 Oct 67 (RCS CSFOR-65)
 (UIC: WALXAA)

AO, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 20 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
 Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

 This headquarters has evaluated subject report and
forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as
indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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TASK ORGANIZATION

1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

HHC, 1st Bde

4th Bn, 9th Inf

2d Bn, 14th Inf

4th Bn (M), 23d Inf

7th Bn, 11th Arty (DS)

HHC, 2d Bde

1st Bn (M), 5th Inf

1st Bn, 27th Inf

2d Bn, 27th Inf

1st Bn, 8th Arty (DS)

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

25th Division Support Command

HHC, 3d Bde

2d Bn, 12th Inf

2d Bn (M), 22d Inf

3d Bn, 22d Inf

2d Bn, 77th Arty (DS)

HHC and Band

DISCOM FWD (Provisional)

25th Med Bn

25th S & T Bn

725th Maint Bn

DIVISION TROOPS

HHC, 25th Inf Div

3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry

25th Avn Bn

25th MP Co

44th Scout Dog Plt

9th Chem Det (Atch)

25th Military Intelligence Det (Atch)

372d Radio Research Co (Atch)

15th Public Information Det (Atch)

20th Public Information Det (Atch)

7th Team AA, Plt HQ, 2d CA Co (Atch)

8th Team AA, Plt HQ, 2d CA Co (Atch)

9th Team AA, Plt HQ, 2d CA Co (Atch)

10th Team AA, Plt HQ, 2d CA Co (Atch)

15th Team AA, Plt HQ, 2d CA Co (Atch)

2d Bn, 34th Armor (-)

65th Engr Bn

125th Sig Bn

25th Admin Co

38th Scout Dog Plt

18th Mil Hist Det

25th Division Artillery (-)

HHC, Div Arty

3d Bn, 13th Arty

6th Bn, 77th Arty (Atch)

Btry B, 5th Bn, 2d Arty

Btry D, 5th Bn, 2d Arty (GS)

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
Appendix 1 (Task Organization) to Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1967

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
"CHECKERBOARD" TECHNIQUE OF SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS

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Four company battalion search



Three company battalion search



Companies conduct detailed S&D in 1000 meter grid squares and on order rotate all clockwise or all counter-clockwise.

Appendix 2 (Checkerboard technique of search and destroy operations) to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

From 125th Signal Battalion

25th Infantry Division

For the Period 1 August - 31 October 1967

APPENDIX 3

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| B | Power Source for FM Radios |
| C | Bonner and Mast for FM Radio Antenna |
| D | AT-214 Reflector AN/TRC-24 Mounted on AB-577 |
| * E | Secure FM Retransmission Station |
| * F | Multichannel VHF Diagram 25th Div Monsoon Campaign 1967 as of 22 October |
| G | Film Drying Cabinet |
| * H | Photo "Hot Shelf" |

*Withdrawn, Hqs, DA

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

1 August - 31 October 1967

NARRATIVE REPORT

1. GENERAL:

During the period starting 1 August 1967 and terminating 31 October 1967, this Battalion continued to support the 25th Infantry Division in all operations. Multichannel VHF systems continued to provide a major portion of the communications for the Division as increasing use was made of this means to interconnect Fire Support Bases and Battalion Patrol Bases. The VRC-12 series radio remains the initial means of communications and the primary back-up for existing VHF systems. During the period, a detailed survey of FM radio operations, requirements and configurations was conducted. The more significant lessons learned during this period are contained in this report. This report supplements the 1 May to 31 July 1967 report. Lessons learned reflected in that report are not repeated in this one.

2. SECURE FM:

One of the findings made during the period will, I believe, have serious impact upon the planned program for the application of secure equipment to all FM nets. We have found that any interference on the frequency assigned for secure use will interrupt and make unreadable transmissions in process in the secure mode. For completely reliable secure transmission, free from continuous interruption, "totally discreet" frequencies are required. Based upon our experience, such a frequency is extremely rare. Therefore, reliable and responsive secure transmission over multiple nets does not appear to be feasible utilizing the KY-8 or similar device. Development of a security device which is not sensitive to interference is necessary in view of the requirement to "share" frequencies.

3. SHORTAGE OF FM RADIO EQUIPMENT:

Present TOE authorizations for FM radio equipment in the Headquarters and Headquarters Companies of the Infantry Division, Brigades and Battalions are inadequate to completely meet the communications requirement in the counter-insurgency effort in Vietnam. During combat operations in forward locations, the Battalions habitually establish small command posts from which to maintain tactical control of their maneuver elements. The FM radio equipment authorized by the TOE is adequate to meet this requirement. However, a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) must also be maintained at the Battalion's base camp for command, control and coordination purposes. Photograph 1 at Tab A shows the typical base camp TOC FM radios in use by an Infantry Battalion

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engaged in field operations. The same situation exists at Brigade Headquarters, since a Tactical Operations Center must be maintained at Base Camp while the Brigade operates a forward CF. Photographs 2 thru 5 at Tab A show the FM radio configurations in use in one Brigade Base Camp Tactical Operations Center. In the forward area a like FM radio requirement exists.

The same general situation is also found in the Division Tactical Operations Center (DTC). Photographs 6 and 7 at Tab A show 2 radio configurations installed in the DTC. These radios must be maintained at all times for command and control purposes and for coordination between the staff planners at base camp. They must be duplicated at the tactical command post in a forward area.

Another serious drain on tactical FM communications is the requirement for radios for base camp defense nets. A significant number of RT-524's and AN/PRC-64's are "tied down" at base camp observation towers, listening posts, firing bunkers and command posts. Units man the base camp defenses as an "additional duty" while continuing their basic field missions. The radios employed for base camp defense are diverted from TOE assets that should be with the unit in support of their basic field mission.

To help meet this greatly expanded combat requirement for FM radio communications in tactical operation centers, radios have been taken from lower priority staff officers. This action leaves many personnel and sections without the communication equipment authorized to accomplish their assigned missions in a timely and efficient manner.

4. Power Source for FM Radios:

Quite often FM radio equipment must be operated for extended periods of time, in a ground mount configuration, removed from the vehicles in which they are normally installed. The TOE configurations depicted in the previous paragraph exemplify this requirement. This requires a 24 volt DC source other than that provided by the vehicle. Usually, two 12 volt vehicle batteries wired in series are utilized for powering the equipment with a charger or rectifier to maintain the batteries in a charged state. These rectifiers are often hard to come by.

In the 125th Signal Battalion, another method has been utilized with excellent results to maintain the charge on the batteries. Certain AC generator sets, such as the 10 KW air-cooled generator SF 10 (MD) and 10 KW water-cooled FERRO I, are equipped with battery charging receptacles. The purpose of the receptacle is to permit a DC generator to be utilized to charge the batteries of the AC generator sets. Through the use of an adapter, a power cable can be connected to this receptacle (see Tab B) in order to use it as a source of DC for operating FM radios requiring 24 volts DC. This system is a highly reliable, efficient and effective method of providing power for the operations of FM radio equipment.

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5. Masts for FM Radio Antennae:

To increase the effective range of the VRC-12 series of radios, this unit has utilized telephone poles at base camp for antenna masts. Telephone poles ranging in height from 48 to 90 feet have been used depending upon the required range and terrain. The added height over the standard 12.5 meter RC-292 antenna has greatly extended the range of base camp radio stations.

In areas where there is a requirement for several antennae, such as Brigade and Division Tactical Operation Centers, a "bonnet" constructed from an ammunition canister and engineer stakes (see Tab C, picture 1) may be mounted atop the telephone pole (Tab C, picture 2). This "bonnet" will mount as many as four RC-292 antennae. Tests have shown negligible interference among the antennae so mounted as long as a frequency separation of at least 3 MC, and preferably 5 MC, is maintained.

This field expedient also results in a significant savings in space in the CP in that the extensive area required to erect multiple antenna masts with associated guy lines is eliminated.

6. Antenna Masts for AN/MRC-69's:

Erection of standard 45' antenna masts in areas with heavy tree growth or swamps is a problem. The problem occurs when the antenna sections must be assembled on the ground before being "gin-poled" to a vertical position. Lowering the mast to trouble-shoot the antenna or to change dipoles necessitated by a frequency change is awkward and time consuming.

The AB-557 antenna mast (depicted at Tab D) designed for use with the AN/GRC-50 radio has been tested as a replacement for the standard TRC-24 mast by the 125th Signal Battalion in the Vietnam environment under combat conditions. Tests have proved that the AB-577 is ideal to meet our requirements here. We have learned the AN/TRC-24 antenna reflector, AT-214, can be affixed to the AB-577 (shown in Tab D) without modification. Since the AB-577 is required for specialized conditions only, it is not felt that each AN/MRC-69 need be so equipped. A quantity of ten (10) of these antennae would be sufficient, as an example, for this unit operating in the current terrain. The AB-577's appear to be in short supply, however, and we have been unable to obtain the quantity we feel desirable.

7. Secure FM Retransmission Station:

As utilization of the new VRC-12 series of radios with the secure voice equipment (TSEC/KY-8) expanded, the requirement for a secure retransmission capability became evident. There is presently no standard equipment configuration available to meet this secure retransmission requirement. As an interim measure, the 125th Signal Battalion has devised a manual retransmission station which will allow retransmission of

secure information utilizing the KY-8 and RT-524.

First, two secure radio stations are established, one on each of the selected operating frequencies. The two radios are then interconnected, utilizing a modified control radio set, C-2299/VRC. At this point, a locally fabricated control box is connected into the Radio Central Set. Tab E, picture 1, shows the secure retransmission station ready for operation.

The heart of the retransmission station is a two switch control box (see Tab E, picture 2). Positioning of one switch allows either automatic clear retransmission, separate utilization of each radio, or manual operated secure retransmission. When the first switch is set in the secure retransmission position, the operator at the secure retransmission station monitors the transmission and operates switch number 2 to connect one secure radio to the other when he hears "over" at the end of each transmission. Basically we utilize radio wire integration (RWI) operating techniques in the operation of the secure retransmission station.

Although the system described requires the presence of an operator when in use, it provides a vital link in the communication network for the Division and allows secure retransmission of combat essential information over extended distances when required.

8. Multichannel VHF Diagram - 25th Div Mission Campaign as of 22 October:

Multichannel VHF links remain as the backbone of the Division communication system. Wide dispersion of Division elements during the period resulted in added emphasis being placed on the ability to support these elements with artillery fire. A marked increase in the number of Fire Support Bases (FSB) requiring Signal Battalion VHF support was experienced. A diagram depicting typical multichannel VHF network during the period is attached at Tab F.

9. Drying of Photographic Film:

Difficulties have been encountered in providing adequate dust free facilities for the drying of photographic film. Even in areas where limited air-conditioning is available, dust still remains a major hazard to the production of high quality film negatives. Since standard airtight film drying cabinets are not available, this Battalion has found a partial solution to this situation. Tab G, picture 1, shows a rough film drying cabinet approximately 2' x 3' x 2' which has been fabricated from plywood. Inside the cabinet, two light sockets are mounted. Each contains a 150 watt lightbulb. The end result is shortened drying time for the film with minimum exposure to dust.

Based on the success of this initial endeavor, the 125th Signal Battalion is in the process of constructing a larger, improved drying

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cabinet utilizing the same principle. A sketch of the new cabinet is attached at Tab G (picture 2).

10. Reduction of MOISTURE and DAMPNESS in Cameras:

During the rainy season in Vietnam, a constant problem is encountered in maintaining photographic equipment, especially cameras, in a dry, moisture free atmosphere. Moisture in the camera creates a maintenance difficulty along with general deterioration of the metal and fabric parts of the camera. Additionally, the rapid growth of mildew and fungus which results from the warm, moist climate in South Vietnam contributes greatly to camera operation problems.

The 125th Signal Battalion has combated this problem by building into a shelf system a sealed cabinet with light bulbs similar to a film drying cabinet. A picture of this facility is shown at Tab I. Storage of cameras and associated equipment in this cabinet keeps the moisture level down, thus retarding the growth of fungus and virtually eliminating mildew and moisture damages.

Louis G. Mathern, Jr.
LOUIS G. MATHERN, JR.

LTC, SigC
Commanding


CONDUCTING REAR GUARD TO OUTPOST
BATTAL CAMP CAMP 1001.



700 4

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
HOOPER DESIGNED FOR MOUNTING
1 EA HO-902 ANTENNA. -2-



TAB C

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
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TAB C

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POCKET WITH 4 ANTENNAS MOUNTED ATOP
A 65 FOOT TELEPHONE POLE.




TAB D

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
AT-214 REFLECTOR (AN/TTC-21)
MOUNTED ON AB-577.

FILM DRYING CABINET



TAB 6

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FILM DRYING CABINET

TAB G

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A
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HEADQUARTERS
3D SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCAV-3

4 November 1967

SUBJECT: Feeder to Operational Report for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1967 (U) (RCS CSFOR 65)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDCMHD
APO 96225

SECTION I: SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

1. General.

a. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1967, this organization retained responsibility for security of the 25th Infantry Division Main Supply Route (MSR), escorting 18,430 vehicles between Hoc Mon (XT7107) and Tay Ninh (XT1950) during the quarter. On 23 August the Squadron was directed to conduct Night Thrust Operations on Hwy 1 and 22 between Hoc Mon Bridge (XT7107) and Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1750) a mission which was retained throughout the reporting period. The Squadron also provided the control headquarters and one troop to the Division Base Camp Mobile Reaction Force, secured a portion of the Cu Chi Base Camp Perimeter. Provide Election Support to the Vietnamese National Elections conducted during the periods 31 Aug to 5 Sep 67 and 19 Oct to 24 Oct 67 by insuring freedom of movement on Hwy 1 and 22 from Hoc Mon Bridge to Tay Ninh. During these same periods static security was provided on the Hoc Mon Bridge (XT712072) and Trang Bang Bridge (XT501178). The Squadron conducted a weekly MEDCAP Operation in the Village of AN DUC treating approximately 2,005 persons. Conducted nightly ambush patrols vicinity the Cu Chi Base Camp; provided security for Engineer construction and repair operations. Conducted Round Up Operations; a series of airmobile landings employing Vietnamese National Police to screen local nationals found in areas adjacent to Hwy's 1 and 22. Night Helicopter Landings have been conducted in areas adjacent to Hwy 1, the purpose of the landings have been to limit the enemies movement during periods of limited visibility. Combined Security Patrols consisting of US Troops and RF/PF personnel from the village of AN DUC have

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been conducted during the reporting period. The Squadron has organized, equipped, trained and initiated the employment of a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment. Planned and conducted refresher training for the 3d Squadron of the 10th ARVN Armored Cavalry Regiment.

b. Two major changes in the organization occurred during the month of September. Co A, 2-34th Armor was released from operational control of the Squadron and Troop C moved from Dau Tieng to join the unit in Cu Chi. Also during September the Division Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Detachment was organized and trained and became an integral part of the Squadron.

c. During the reporting period, organic and attached troops engaged in principal activities as indicated:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop: 92 days operations.

Troop A: 87 days operations; 5 days training/maintenance.

Troop B: 88 days operations; 4 days training/maintenance.

Troop C: 85 days operations; 7 days training/maintenance.

Troop D: 92 days operations.

LRRP: 6 days training; 25 days operations/training.

2. Support From Other Services.

a. US Air Force close air support was utilized frequently during the reporting period against targets such as known enemy units, fortifications, landing zone preparations, diversions, and minefields. When the requirement could be preplanned one day in advance, results were highly satisfactory. Results of immediate missions were usually successful, however due to time limitations specific types of ordnance on the aircraft were not ideal for the target engaged with a resultant loss in effectiveness.

b. U.S.A.F. forward air controllers were on station over the MSR during the conduct of the day convoy from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh and were readily available for any needed assistance.

SECTION II: CO'S ANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION II, Part I Observations (Lessons Learned).

a. Personnel. None.

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b. Operations.

ITEM: Dismounted Area Search.

DISCUSSION: During the reporting period armored columns have been harassed and ambushed along the Hwy's 1 and 22 at night. The activity has been centralized in and around built up areas that provide good concealment for approach and withdrawal. Where fire has been received from built up areas, the local populace has usually been forewarned by the VC of the attack. If civilians are in bomb shelters, or have departed a village one can expect enemy activity.

OBSERVATION: A thorough dismounted search prior to and during a move through built up areas has sharply reduced the number of enemy incidents along the ISR at night. A search of several houses adjacent to the road may forewarn of an enemy attack. Also, the movement of dismounted personnel will facilitate the detection of an enemy ambush prior to the movement of vehicles and personnel into the enemy selected killing zone. See Following ITEM.

ITEM: Counter Ambush Planning and Coordination.

DISCUSSION: During the reporting period the Squadron has been subjected to numerous enemy harassment and ambush attempts.

OBSERVATION: The enemy have employed road blocks (some with booby traps), mines, small arms and automatic weapons harassment fire, anti-tank weapons, and ambushes along the ISR. The activity has been centralized around built-up areas that provide good concealment for approach and withdrawal. In instances where fire has been received from built-up areas, the local populace leave their homes for local underground fortifications or move to ARVN compounds in the area. A danger signal to a Troop operating along the Highway is a village that is empty of civilian population. Although lack of civilian population in a village does not always mean the VC are in the area, each instance requires thorough checking. In attempt to conceal the fact that the civilian populace has left a built-up area, the VC will leave lights burning in the houses. This requires a detailed search of built-up areas not a visual inspection from the road. Moreover, this requires a close liaison between Squadron and US Advisors located at District Headquarters along the route at Cu Chi, Trang Bang and Go Dau Ha. Timely reporting by US Advisory personnel of any unusual civilian activity in their district gives an indication of enemy activity. This is accomplished by frequent liaison visits by S-2 and S-3 personnel to these districts to discuss Squadron operations and enemy activity in the area. The district receives many agent reports of enemy activity; although many are false, each requires careful analysis and preparedness. Another successful technique is personal coordinate between Troop Commanders and US Advisory personnel, and in some instances, placing an ARVN soldier with the Troop to coordinate directly with the ARVN compounds along the highway. To facilitate the exchange of information between this unit and US Advisory personnel communications frequencies and callsigns have

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been exchanged. Nightly communications occur particularly relative to ambush locations and other activities planned or underway in a particular sub-sector. To further facilitate the exchange of information a common point of reference system has been developed and exchanged between the Squadron and all US Advisory Teams along the route of operation.

ITEM: Hand carried light for night dismounted sweeps.

DISCUSSION: Dismounted sweeps have been effective for this unit in searching built up areas. As the sweeps are conducted during hours of darkness, it is essential to have sufficient illumination to search in and around buildings and other structures.

OBSERVATION: A strong hand carried light is both effective and practical for personnel conducting dismounted night searches. By working in two man teams, one with a light conducting the search, and another providing cover to the light bearer, a thorough sweep and quick reaction can be effected. The lights are a standard 6 volt lantern and have been issued to each of the Squadrons three Ground Cavalry Troops.

ITEM: Perforated Steel Plate. ~~See Incl 1~~ *19m*

DISCUSSION: RPG-2, RPG-7 and other anti-tank weapons have been used against this unit causing both personnel casualties and vehicle damage.

OBSERVATION: PSP, mounted on each side of a tank has proved effective as a stand-off for anti-tank rounds. The lower portion of the tank hull and a portion of the suspension system is covered by the PSP. As a test, three RPG-2 rounds were fired at a tank with PSP mounted on it. Although some rounds did penetrate the additional stand-off distance afforded by the plate reduced the number of penetrations. To date a tank with the plating mounted has not been attacked by an enemy rocket weapon; however it is felt that the plating will minimize the effect of any attack. The plating has been mounted using a "quick disconnect" technique (See Diagram Incl 1). This permits removal of the plating for maintenance. During cross country movement the plates may be removed and carried on the vehicles back deck.

ITEM: Dropping Flares from UH-1D Helicopter.

DISCUSSION: In an effort to provide Squadron elements readily available illumination when artillery or other means were not available, flares have been dispensed out of UH-1D Helicopters.

OBSERVATION: For best results, flares should be dropped at an altitude of 2,000 feet with the minimum fuse settings. At such an altitude and setting the flares will normally burn out just above the ground. If allowed to burn at higher altitude, flares would endanger other aircraft in the area.

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By dropping a flare at two minutes intervals continuous illumination can be maintained. When time permits, the fuse timing should be set prior to take off. Safety pins should remain in the flares until ready for use. The Flares utilized by the Squadron are the MK24 type flare; each UH-1D helicopter can carry 55 flares and provide a maximum of two hours of continuous illumination.

ITEM: Use of Zeon Searchlight Mounted in the UH-1C Aircraft.

DISCUSSION: In an effort to provide helicopter gunteams a means of illuminating a target at night without use of flares or other available illumination, the Zeon Searchlight was mounted on a UH-1C Helicopter.

OBSERVATION: The Zeon searchlights, because of its weight, proved unsatisfactory as it caused severe stress on the aircraft. The use of the light proved impractical as it emitted such a small beam at low altitudes (500' - 600') that it was impossible to track. When at higher altitudes (1000' - 1500') the light did not provide sufficient illumination for point target detection. Considering the potential stress damage to the aircraft and the minimal results attained the Squadron ceased employment of the light system.

ITEM: Co-located 90mm Recoilless Rifle and Radar.

DISCUSSION: There are several locations along the MSR which are frequently targets for VC activities. In an attempt to detect enemy movement in these areas, radar teams are positioned several hundred meters away with good coverage of the entire area. Once detected quick reaction is essential to destroy the enemy.

OBSERVATION: By co-locating a 90mm Recoilless Rifle with the Radar, a target may be engaged immediately. There is no waiting period between detection and engagement time, whereas previously, upon detection, ground forces would have to move to the target area, or indirect fire employed. Since the targets were assumed to be a small group of enemy personnel capable of rapidly leaving the area, a quick reaction direct fire weapon has proven to be a satisfactory deterrent to enemy activity.

ITEM: Mounting of the AN/PFS-4 Radar on the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier. (See Incl 2). *MM*

DISCUSSION: This Squadron has successfully employed the AN/PFS-4 Radar in the mounted mode shown in Incl 2. The set is placed in this position while the vehicle is halted. The position where the vehicle is stopped is selected to maximize the radars scan capability. This technique has proven particularly effective during night route security operations. After moving through an area the radar is placed in operation to scan back into the area to determine the presence or absence of enemy activity.

OBSERVATION: By employing the radar in this manner the security and surveillance capability of the employing force is greatly enhanced. The radar can be rapidly emplaced on the vehicle, taking advantage of the vehicles communications system for reporting sightings etc. A degree of protection is afforded by the presence of the armored vehicle and its mounted weapons system.

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ITEM: The Mounting of Searchlights on the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier. ~~See Incl 1 Item~~

DISCUSSION: In order to provide a maximum degree of artificial illumination during periods of night operations this Squadron has mounted searchlights on selected armored personnel carriers in each ground troop. Ten lights were mounted in each troop. The lights were acquired from a number of sources; the sources included ambulances of the Divisional Medical Battalion, landing lights on OH-23 Helicopters and the boom searchlight on five ton standard wrecker. When incorporated with the Tank-mounted Zeon Searchlights a high degree of artificial illumination is available to the Ground Cavalry Troop.

OBSERVATION: The mounting of these lights has greatly enhanced the operating capability of the Cavalry Troop. These lights have proven particularly effective during movement and searches in built up areas. This has facilitated route security operation in that vehicles in addition to the tanks have an organic searchlight capability that can provide illumination in areas previously dark and therefore utilized by enemy ambush teams.

c. Training and Organization. Forwarded under separate cover; LRRP Organization and Training.

d. Intelligence. None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Civil Affairs.

ITEMS: Engineer units should be employed on a voluntary basis consistent with the CA effort, when their participation does not conflict with the tactical mission.

DISCUSSION: Many of the hamlets and villages in RVN, some of which presently enjoy an active CA effort, have a desired and actual need for improvement or construction which could be accomplished quickly and effectively by US engineer units, but would take prohibitive man-hours to perform by civilian labor. Experience has indicated that engineer volunteers are exceptionally receptive to the CA effort, perform in an outstanding manner and contribute a technical skill capability not otherwise available. Recognizing that employment of engineers should be closely coordinated with SA and Vietnamese Officials familiar with a given area, engineer efforts can be directed specifically towards projects which afford maximum follow-up participation by local civilians.

OBSERVATIONS: The employment of engineer operations and equipment to support the CA effort achieves high impact results; accomplished tasks that could not otherwise be done by maneuver battalions or civilian labor; affords the opportunity for Vietnamese initiative and subsequent work; and, being on a voluntary basis, offers varied experience and increased morale to participating operations.

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ITEM: Employment of US/PF night combat/ambush patrols greatly reduces VC acts of terrorism and intimidation at the village and hamlet level.

DISCUSSION: The CA aspect of Revolutionary Development cannot be effectively accomplished without a certain degree of local security. Often, the success of RD is dependent upon the degree of security a village or hamlet has. The mere presence of a US patrol base (4-6 men) with PF contingent in a hamlet comprises threat enough to local VC guerilla units to severely restrict their activity and movement. Combined Combat Patrols further provide a realistic training vehicle for participating PF soldiers and while enhancing their self-confidence and increasing their military effectiveness serves to originate a capability from which PF may conduct similar operations without US support. The patrol's effectiveness regarding destruction of local VC elements is largely dependent upon surprise and can be best accomplished by a clandestine drop of the US patrol base at the PF outpost, done on an unscheduled basis.

OBSERVATION: By employing US/PF night combat/ambush patrols within a village/hamlet, VC activity is greatly reduced; participating PF gain confidence and realistic training; the principle of GVN support is strengthened; and an atmosphere more favorable to the progress of Revolutionary Development is created.

g. PSYOPS. None.

h. Special Interests:

ITEM: Effect of climate and night operations on a units operating capability.

DISCUSSION: Prolonged periods of night operations without the provision of rest periods during night time hours will have a detrimental effect on a units operating potential. In general; operations conducted during periods of limited visibility against an enemy who's most likely method of attack is an ambush are physically more fatiguing than a daylight operation in the same area. The night environment and requirement for detailed dismounted searches are factors which contribute to this fatigue. Associate the fatigue factor with the day time climate of this units operating area; i.e. heat which limits the ability to sleep and it is evident that a continuous night operating cycle will have an adverse effect on the units overall operating potential. Other requirements such as rest operations resupply and general maintenance of individual and crew items of equipment further limit suitable rest periods for personnel conducting night operations.

OBSERVATIONS: Rest periods during night time hours when the heat of the day is minimum must be provided in the operating schedule of units conducting night operations. This can be accomplished by rotating entire troop/company size units into a night rest period or by rotating platoons within a given troop/company size unit into the rest period. Rest during the cool period of the day should be provided a minimum of once every four operating days.

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SECTION II, Part II Recommendations. None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

for John P. Bulbriski 1LT
JEROME A. PORCZELSKI
Captain, Armor
Adjutant

~~Inelocures 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100~~

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)

OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

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UNCLASSIFIED

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

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