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AGAM-P (M) (13 Aug 68) FOR OT RD 682315

4 September 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 101st  
Air Cavalry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters 101st Airborne Division  
APO San Francisco 96383

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 101st Airborne Division for the period  
ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. OPERATIONS.

(1) During the period February through April 1968, the 101st Airborne Division has conducted combat operations in three of the four Corps Tactical Zones in the Republic of Vietnam, as well as the Capital Military District around Saigon. Elements of the Division have fought Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Regulars and Local Force units from the marshy rice lands southeast of Saigon to the mountainous jungles west of Hue. During the period, the Division has served as a Reaction Force, ready to deploy on a moment's notice to any location in Vietnam. At 310300 January 1968, the VC/NVA launched their TET Offensive. During the early hours of the battle, a VC Sapper platoon breached the court-yard wall, placing a significant threat on the American Embassy, Saigon. A Ready Reaction Force from C-1-502 Inf was directed to conduct an air mobile assault to the roof top of the Embassy building, and to clear and secure the Embassy and surrounding area. After two attempts, the assault force was able to land on the HOT LZ at 010834 February. In less than 1 hour, the Embassy and surrounding area had been secured. The action resulted in 9 VC KIA and 2 AK-47's credited to the 101st Abn Troopers. There was one US casualty, a door gunner on one of the assault helicopters was wounded by SA fire.

(2) Another example of the type of rapid reaction operations conducted by the Division occurred on the morning of 22 January when the Division was alerted for future operations and directed to send one brigade immediately to ICTZ. At that time, the 1st Bde was conducting operation SAN ANGELO in Phuoc Long Province near the Cambodian border; and the 3d Bde was conducting Operation MANCHESTER north of Bien Hoa. The 2d Bde, at the time, had just begun an air assault into the Michelin plantation area near Minh Thanh (XT 6367) to begin a reconnaissance in force operation in that area prior to TET. At 220910 January, 1-501 Inf received its warning order while in flight to the Brigade AO. The aircraft were diverted and returned to Cu Chi from where the battalion deployed to Hue/Phu Bai the following day. The 2d Bde (-) followed immediately. The 2d Bde remained OPCON to III MAF and further OPCON to 1st Air Cav Div until 10 March 68. The activities of 2d Bde during the period 22 Jan - 10 Mar are included in the after action report at Inclosure 1.

For OT RD

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(4) On 5 Mar 1968, operational control of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div and 2/11 Cav passed to HQ's IIFV and the Div HQ moved by air to Hue Phu Bai. The Division Tactical Operations Center opened, vic YD 832145 on 6 Mar, OPCON to III MAF and at 082400 Mar, the Division assumed operational control of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div (YD 817147) and began Operation CARENTAN I. On 10 Mar, the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div (YD 637275) returned to Division control, and OPCON of the Division passed to the newly created Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV). At 180800 Mar the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div was released from participation in OPERATION JEB STEWART and returned to Division control. The activities of the 1st Bde during operation JEB STEWART are covered in the combat after action report at Inclosure 6. With the return of the 1st Bde, the Division Task organization for combat in I CTZ was as shown below:

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div:

1-327 Inf

2-327 Inf

2-502 Inf

2d Bde, 101st Abn Div:

1-501 Inf

2-501 Inf

1-502 Inf

3d Bde, 82d Abn Div (Task Force):

1-505 Inf

2-505 Inf

1-508 Inf

2-17 Cavalry

(5) The 101st Abn Div officially started OPERATION CARENTAN I at 082400 when the Div HQ assumed control of the 3/82 Abn Div. The operation continued as the 2/101 Abn and 1/101 Abn joined the Div on 10 and 18 Mar respectively. CARENTAN I was a Regional Reconnaissance In Force operation conducted in the area generally from the Perfume River south of Hue City northwest to vic Camp Evans and from Hwy QL-1, northeast to the Gulf of Tonkin. When the 1st Bde returned to Div control on 18 Mar the AO was extended south of Hue to vic East-West Grid O5 to include the area in which

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they had been working while in OP JEB STEWART. During the reporting period, the Division has participated in three major unit operations: CARENTAN I, CARENTAN II and DELAWARE. These operations are discussed below.

(6) OPERATION CARENTAN I: Operation Carentan I was initiated 082400H Mar, when the Division assumed operational control of 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div. The operation was conducted IAW 101st Abn Div OPORD 5-68 (CARENTAN) at Inclosure 7. The mission of the operation was to locate and destroy enemy forces, base areas and logistical installations in the assigned AO with emphasis on interdicting enemy infiltration routes along Hwy 547. Concurrent with the above, the Division assumed the responsibility for the external security for the Tan My - Cocca Beach port facility (YD 8232). The concept of the operation is discussed at Inclosure 7. Unit activities during Carentan I consisted of preparation and occupation of fire support bases (FSB), mine sweep and road clearing operations, convoy escort missions and after it joined the Div on 18 Mar, began a reconnaissance in force Op to the southwest astride Hwy 547 to clear the road and to interdict enemy infiltration from the southwest into Hue.

(7) CARENTAN II: Operation Carentan II was initiated on 1 April as an extension of Carentan I rather than as an entirely new operation. The mission remained the same with the additional requirement to extend the Division AO to the west to include the areas and responsibilities previously held by the 2d and 3d Brigades of the 1st ACD. This mission was designed to facilitate the 1st Cav drive to open Hwy 9 and the relief of the Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base. The AO extension generally included the area between Hwy QL-1 and the Gulf of Tonkin from Camp Evans northwest to Hai Lang. The concept of the operation is included in the 101st Abn Div OPCORD 7-68 (CARENTAN II) at Inclosure 8. The activities of the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div Task Force in OPERATIONS CARENTAN I and CARENTAN II will be covered in the ORLL which the Bde submits as a preparing agency. The activities of the 2d Bde, 101st Avn Div in operations CARENTAN I & II will be covered in the Inclosure 9. A review of these separate actions at this point would be superfluous. However, several will be described below to point out the techniques and methods of combat which are representative of the philosophy and approach to successful operations employed by the Division during the period.

(8) During the month of March, Division activities centered closely around Hue. Unit activities were generally devoted to the establishment of base camp facilities and positioning forces as the Divisional units returned to Division control. Minor internal AO adjustments were made to facilitate fire-control and maneuver coordination. Generally the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div was deployed to the northwest of Hue; the 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div to the south and southeast of Hue and the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to the southwest of the Imperial City. The terrain over which operation Carentan I & II was conducted

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(a) Early in the afternoon on 9 April the 2d Bde Forward Air Controller observed what appeared to be 8-10 122mm rocket positions vic YD 5721. Arty and two tactical air strikes were employed against the suspected locations. A platoon from C-1-502 Inf was air-lifted into the area. As soon as the artillery was lifted the platoon was inserted at 1408 hrs to raid the area. The quick reaction resulted in 9x122mm rockets captured. The rockets had been positioned on bamboc rails and were aimed at Camp Evans.

(b) During the 1st week in April the 2-501 Inf was securing Wunder Beach (YD 4955) and Fire Support Base HARDCORE vic YD 450510. Recon operations were conducted throughout the area to obtain information on enemy strengths and dispositions. On 10 April, hard intelligence indicated an enemy build up vic Thonh Phuoc Dien (YD 4748). In response to the intelligence information A-2-501 began a RIF from FSB HARDCORE to an attack position vic YD 471490 while D-2-501 conducted an air assault to an LZ vic YD 479481. Both companies began a coordinated attack on the village after artillery and TAC Air prepped the objective. At 1317, both companies established contact vic YD 472489 and YD 473484. TAC Air and artillery were employed, and, as ground contact continued it became obvious that the two companies were engaged with a sizable enemy force. At 1844, the battalion was relieved of its responsibility to secure the beach and firebase and immediately air-lifted B Co into the objective area to help establish a cordon around the enemy force prior to darkness. After the cordon was established, 81mm mortars were inserted to bolster the cordon. The three companies maintained 100% alert during the night and employed continuous illumination and artillery. Throughout the night the enemy employed SA/AW RPG and mortar fire in numerous unsuccessful attempts to escape the cordon. The following morning, helicopter gunships, artillery and seven ES (CS) launchers were employed against the enemy position followed by TAC Air. At 1230 hrs, Co D and Co B (-) attacked the village from the southeast to northwest into the blocking positions of Co A and the remainder of Co B. The objective was swept by midafternoon meeting only scattered resistance. The entire operation resulted in 66 NVA KIA, 13 NVA PW, 21 individual weapons and 5 crew served weapons captured, plus numerous munitions and miscellaneous equipment. The operation had dealt a significant blow to the 6th Bn, 812th NVA Regt. Friendly casualties were 7 KIA and 35 WIA.

(c) On the morning of 20 April the 2-17 Cav was deployed with Trp A conducting a dismounted reconnaissance in force vic YD 6029, South West of An Lo Bridge (YD 624302). 2d Platoon, A-3-5 Cav (atch'd to 2-17 Cav) was located at An Lo Bridge (YD 6230), and Trp B, 2-17 Cav with one Platoon of M113 armored personnel carriers was conducting a reconnaissance in force operation northwest of An Lo bridge. At 1045 hours, B Trp observed and engaged an NVA platoon vic YD 613326. B Troop continued to develop the contact determining that the enemy force was an NVA company. It was also discovered

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that the stream between the enemy and Trp B was not fordable. (See figure 1, below). It was readily apparent that the enemy's position was bounded on the north and south by natural obstacles. Immediately Trp A was heli-lifted from its position southwest of An Lo bridge into an LZ vic YD 612338 and then moved overland into a blocking position vic YD 609332, thereby preventing any escape from the west. While A Trp was being lifted in to position artillery and TAC Air placed withering fire on the enemy position. Simultaneously, B Trp moved around the marshy area on the south to attack the village from the east. As B Trp was moving into its attack position vic YD 629335, the attached Cav Plt (2-3-5 Cav) moved from An Lo Bridge to join the attack. B Trp assaulted with the two mechanized platoons abreast and the infantry platoon following closely behind. By 1815, the entire village had been swept. The action resulted in 33 NVA KIA, 6 NVA PW's, 18 individual and 1 crew served weapons captured. The entire operation resulted in only 5 US WIA (3 evac).

(d) On 21 April, C & D 2-501 were conducting a reconnaissance in force operation vic YD 7530 in response to intelligence build up in the area. At 1445 hrs Co C observed 2 VC vic YD 754311. The company engaged the enemy killing one and capturing one AK-47. The company pursued the enemy into the village of Thom Kim Doi (YD 7531) where they established contact with an enemy platoon. Co C deployed along the southeast corner of the village employing heavy artillery and 4 tactical airstrikes against the enemy position. As the contact developed, the enemy employed AW, RPG and 82mm mortar fire against the friendly forces. Co D working adjacent to Co C moved in around the northeast side of the village. The enemy force was further evaluated to be a company and just prior to darkness Companies A & B 2-501 Inf were heli-lifted into the northwest and southwest sides of the village, respectively. The cordon was completed at 1910. Artillery and continuous artificial flareship illumination were employed throughout the night. During the night, the enemy made several unsuccessful attempts to escape the cordon. The enemy's persistent attempts to escape, however, further reinforced the fact that a sizeable force had been trapped in the cordon. At first light, as the friendly forces began closing into the village they again received heavy AW/RPG and mortar fire. Heavy artillery and 6 TAC Air strikes were employed throughout the day. Captured documents indicated that the enemy force was the 4th Company (heavy weapons) of the 812th NVA Regt. The attacking forces continued to meet stiff resistance as the action continued into the late afternoon. At 1716 hours the 1st ARVN Division Recon Company (The Black Panther Forces) was heli-lifted in to join the southern portion of the cordon, and the 222 RF Company moved overland from Quang Dien vic YD 6833 to join the cordon in the north. 47 NVA were killed during the day as the contact continued into the night. The cordon was continued as artillery maintained continuous illumination and bombarded the enemy positions throughout the second night of contact. A reduction in enemy resistance was noted and at first light the village was swept with artillery and TAC Air. then companies A & D attacked from the north

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through the village towards the blocking positions on the south. The operation resulted in 74 NVA KIA, 1 NVA/TW and 13 weapons captured or destroyed. Friendly casualties for the entire 3 day operation were 12 US WIA.

(e) Approximately 1400 hrs, 28 April the 1st ARVN Div Recon Company, while operating in close coordination with Div forces along the Song Bo River vic YD 6929 reported a significant enemy force located vic YD 6828. Reacting in response to this report, 1-501 Inf with 4 rifle companies and 3 platoons of popular force troops moved overland and by helicopter to establish a cordon around the area. (See figure 2, below). The rapid response caught the enemy by surprise. During the remainder of the afternoon and throughout the night, the enemy attempted to escape the cordon. Each attempt was repulsed utilizing tremendous amounts of heavy artillery, helicopter gunships and continuous artificial illumination during the night. The following morning (29 April), the friendly forces in the northern "neck" of the cordon began to push into the village. Immediately they met stiff resistance from enemy forces with SA/AW/RPG in fortified bunkers. The battle raged throughout the day with allied force making little progress. B-1-501 Inf was inserted into the cordon to bolster the northern position. M106 recoilless rifles and 81mm mortars were air lifted in to add additional fire power as TAC Air and artillery continued to pound the fortified enemy. E8 (CS) dispersers were also inserted and integrated into the cordon as plans were made to attack the following morning. The actions on 29 April accounted for 64 enemy dead. Throughout the night, the enemy continued his violent, yet unsuccessful attempts to escape. The enemy estimated at battalion size massed AW/RPG/ and mortar fire while trying to rush a platoon size force through the cordon vic YD 694284. Recoilless rifles and claymore mines were an effective deterrent to the would-be escapees. The artificial illumination and heavy artillery continued throughout the night. The enemy resistance was beginning to fade although savage fighting continued all day 30 April. Contact continued during the night of 30 April - 1 May. Twice during the night, enemy forces tried to escape the cordon but were driven back. A Hoi Chanh who rallied during the contact and several PW's identified the enemy unit as the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt. Early in the morning, a psywar appeal was made by a loudspeaker to the trapped enemy. The psywar operation was made in conjunction with the TAC Air Strikes on the village. After several air strikes had been made, the Hoi Chanh made an appeal to the trapped enemy to surrender. After a pause, the forward air controller would direct a long, low, screaming pass over the village, then the loudspeaker made another appeal for surrender telling the trapped soldiers that the next pass would be for real. Sufficient time was given for believers to react then the aircraft were directed in "live" to further convince any doubters. This technique directly influenced the 95 NVA/PW's who surrendered during the day. The psyops mission was followed by a CS drop and more tactical air strikes. The enemy had weakened considerably as substantial advances were made into the village and the cordon was further consolidated. The day's action resulted in an additional

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141 NVA KIA, and 75 weapons captured. Continuous pressure was maintained throughout the night of 1-2 May. Enemy attempts to escape decreased and his fire power was considerably reduced as artillery and TAC Air had eliminated his indirect weapons. PW's indicated heavy casualties had been sustained and the remainder had been without food for several days. On 2 May the sweep of the village was completed. For several more days friendly elements remained in the area to completely search the area for weapons and other items of intelligence value. The total results of this highly successful operation netted 314 NVA KIA, 107 NVA/PW's and 103 weapons captured. Friendly casualties were 4 KIA, 21 WIA (17 EVAC). Investigation after the action confirmed that the enemy unit was the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt and that during the action the Bn Commander, Executive Officer and 3 Company Commanders had been killed. The five day operation had rendered the enemy battalion virtually ineffective for a considerable period of time.

(12) The actions cited above are by no means the only actions conducted during the period. These actions account for a small portion of the 1882 enemy killed during the operation. They do, however, point out the methods which have been successfully employed by the Division in the coastal plains around Hue. These methods are significant in that they are simple, comprehensive, interrelated and, most significantly, that they were successful. There is one additional principle that has also greatly enhanced these operations; that is, the extension of "night operations" to include a network of ambush sites established nightly throughout the AO. The Division has averaged 50 squad/platoon size ambush positions each night. In operation CARENTAN I & II, these night operations have accounted for approximately 60% of the total fighting for the period. A more detailed account of enemy casualty and equipment losses during the period is included at paragraph c (Intelligence) below, Operation CARETAN II continues through the end of the reporting period.

(13) OPERATION DELAWARE: Operation DELAWARE began 190001H April 1968 as a one brigade operation into the mountainous jungle astride Hwy 547, southwest of Hue. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div conducted the operation IAW Division OPORD 11-68 (DELAWARE) at Inclosure 10. The operation was designed to compliment the 1st ACD assault into the Ashau Valley. The mission of the 1st Bde was to conduct ground and airmobile assaults southwest from FSB Bastogne to interdict enemy routes of withdrawal/infiltration vic junction: Hwy's 547 and 547A (YD 5504); establish FSB Veghel vic hill 333 (YD 5404); block Hwy's 547 and 547A in zone and provide security for FSB Bastogne and Rome Plow operations in the area. Upon completion of the above, be prepared to continue attack to the south into the Rao Nai (River) Valley or to re-orient north along the axis of the Song Bo River towards VC/NVA Base Area 114.



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The original concept of the operation is discussed at Inclosure 10.

(a) The initial concept of operation was changed on 17 April 1968 at which time the brigade received a FRAG O directing that the 3d ARVN Abn Task Force would assume responsibility for the clearing of Hwy 547A. The ARVN Abn Task Force would also air assault into a LZ secured by elements of the 1-327 Inf and provide one battalion to assist in securing LZ VEGHEL. The mission of the 2-502 Inf was changed to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the Rao Nai Valley. The date for the air assault remained unchanged.

(b) The LZ for the air assault of the 1-327 Inf into the Delta Junction Area was changed from Hill (YD 546049) to vic YD 556030. This was due to the inability of the Hill to be satisfactorily cleared with tactical air including 2000 lb daisy cutters. As this location was the prime consideration for establishment of LZ VEGHEL doubt was now cast as to the practicality of this as it would undoubtedly require a major engineer effort. In view of this the decision as to where LZ VEGHEL would be located was withheld until after the air assault.

(c) Excluding (a) & (b) above, the operation was initiated on 19 April 1968 as planned. Early in the morning of 19 April the 2-502 Inf and 2-327 Inf launched attacks to fix and destroy enemy forces operating west of Fire Base BASTOGNE. The air assault of the 1-327 Inf commenced at 1100H with Company C making the initial assault. An aircraft in the first wave at 1103H developed mechanical problems and crashed on the LZ resulting in 6 casualties (5 from C-1-327, 1 crew member) none serious. C-1-327 closed on the LZ at 1130H and secured the location for the displacement of the remainder of the battalion. The air assault was completed at 1237H. On the following day the 6th ARVN Abn Bn air assaulted into the same LZ which was still secured by C-1-327. The relief of the 2-502 Inf by the 1-502 Inf at BASTOGNE was effected on 20 April. This was followed by the air assaulting of the 2-502 Inf into an LZ vic YD 558028 on 21 April. The remaining two battalions (3d and 8th) of the 3d ARVN Abn Task Force air assaulted into the same LZ on 22 and 23 April respectively. During this period 19-21 April elements of the 1-327 Inf were involved in heavy fighting to seize objectives 1 and 2 vic YD 550036 and YD 543028 respectively. On the evening of 21 April the 2-502 Inf was given the mission to relieve the 1-327 of mission to seize objective 2 (YD 543028). On 22 April after four days of heavy fighting the 1-327 Inf seized objective 1 (YD 550036) and C-2-502 Inf seized objective 2 (YD 543028). Elements of the 3d ARVN Abn Task Force were engaged in heavy fighting vicinity YD 565043 and Hill 333 (YD 546049). On 28 April the 3d ARVN Abn Task Force crossed the Song Bo River vic YD 528035 and moved west into the Pac Nhe Valley, the 2-502 Inf oriented west into the Rao Nai

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Valley leaving the 1-327 Inf in the Delta Junction Area. The 2-327 Inf was operating west of Fire Base BASTOGNE and north of Hwy 547. All elements are in this general posture at the close of the reporting period. The dense triple canopy jungle and the steep rugged mountains presented a formidable obstacle to operations in the area. Weather conditions severely hampered air operations. Enemy ground contacts in the area were scattered and generally the enemy force was squad size or smaller. Enemy initiated activities were predominately rocket and mortar stand off attacks. Some anti-aircraft fire was experienced in the area. Several large munitions caches were also discovered.

(d) Results as of 30 April 1968 (does not include ARVN):

Friendly losses

40 KHA  
206 WHA  
1 MHA  
2 NBC

Enemy losses

221 NVA KIA (C)  
1 NVA PW  
58 SA  
19 C/S

b. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS. During the period February through April 1968, chemical activities of the Division included aerial and ground employment of RCA CS, aerial and ground based defoliation operations, aerial smoke operations and personnel detector operations.

(1) RCA Operations:

(a) Non-persistent RCA CS has been used extensively in conjunction with preparatory fires on fortified hamlets north and northwest of Hue during Operation CARENTAN. The CS delivery systems used include E158 CS Cannister Clusters, E8 Tactical CS Launchers, locally fabricated CS grenade dispensers and 4.2 CS mortar rounds. Use of CS in preparations is in consonance with the 101st Airborne Division's policy of wide ranging reconnaissance and rapid concentration of units to fix and destroy the enemy once located. The CS is integrated into supporting fires, primarily in a target softening role.

(b) Five examples of these operations are described below:

1 Action 7-8 April 1968 vic YD 6729 (See figure 3, below)

a At 0810 hours on 7 April, an ambush element of B-1-501 was returning from their night ambush position to the company base area when it was fired upon from the western edge of the village, by what was later

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estimated to be a company size VC/NVA force. Another ambush element linked up with the platoon (-) and engaged the enemy with organic weapons. At 0915, contact was broken and the platoon (+) moved on to the company base. The company then set up blocking positions on the west side of the village. "C" Company, 1-501 moved into the area north of the village and established blocking positions. B-1-505, conducting RIF operations to the east, was lifted across the river by helicopters and proceeded to sweep to the west. Lead elements came under heavy SA/AW fire from the small village to the east of the initial contact. They pulled back and called for artillery and air-strikes and included 20 rounds CS from their organic 4.2 mortar. It was soon determined that this complex was heavily bunkered and well defended. By this time it was late afternoon and plans were made to continue the attack the following day.

b The next morning C-1-501 began at first light to move S. around B-1-501 toward the river. At 0930 a CS preparation was placed on the village and followed by artillery and air strikes. The initial CS pass was at 1500 feet and delivered four E158 Cannister Clusters which impacted on the western edge of the village, covering about 70% of it with agent. The wind at this time was westerly at 7 to 10 knots, with a neutral temperature gradient. Light and medium artillery and four air strikes followed the CS. By late morning, C-1-501 moved into attack positions west of the village.

c Upon completion of the final air strike at 1150 hours, additional CS was placed on the village. Two E158's were dropped, again from 1500 feet on the target line, in order to suppress expected ground fire. Next, using the rocket pod grenade drop system, 192 grenades were dropped in the village. The CS pass was closely followed by 192 HC grenades. A final pass was made at 1500 feet to drop the remaining two E158's on a tree line along the NE corner of the village from which fire was coming. The wind direction was now almost northerly, and the village was completely covered with agent. Artillery was again employed and the two companies on the north and west began sweeping through this village, and later the one to the east. During the sweep of the villages and the surrounding area, the company killed or found the bodies of 37 enemy.

d The ground commanders praised the effects of the CS and felt that it had significantly increased the effectiveness of the artillery strikes, and had assisted them in their assaults across the open rice land surrounding the villages.

2 Action 9 April 1968 vic YD 6828 (See figure 4, below)

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a On 8 April, the 1st Battalion (Abn), 505th Infantry made heavy contact with a suspected company size NVA force in the village of Phuoc Yen, vic YD 680280. Bravo and Charlie of the 1-505 reinforced by Alpha of the 1st Battalion (Abn) 501st Infantry cordoned the village while TAC Air and artillery were called in. The cordon was maintained through the night and, on 9 April, Bravo and Charlie prepared to sweep from the south and west respectively while Alpha moved from its positions to the north.

b As the sweep began, CS grenades were dropped on a generally east-west line to aid Alpha and Charlie in entering the village. Winds were ENE at 8 to 10 knots and the temperature gradient was lapse. Bravo company, which did not have protective masks waited until the agent cloud cleared the village before advancing. At 1155, coincident with the CS drop, Alpha moved toward the village, across 150 meters of open ground receiving light sniper fire, but suffering no casualties. Alpha completed the sweep into the village east of the river, taking several detainees.

c Charlie company also moved toward the village as the CS was dropped. They encountered the CS agent just as they reached the edge of the village. At that time, the agent concentration was weak but protective masks were required. The company made no contact while the CS was in the area, but contact was made with an estimated platoon size force after the agent cleared.

d Wind and temperature gradient contributed to rapid dissipation of the agent cloud, but the CS did provide sufficient fire suppression to allow the companies to reach the village without casualties.

e Alpha company's sweep netted four NVA bodies prior to making contact.

f In each case, protective masks were found on or near the bodies. The CS agent had provided sufficient suppression to allow the companies to cross open ground and enter the village even though at least a portion of the enemy force was equipped with protective masks.

3 Action 10 April 1968 vic YD 4748 (See figure 5, below)

a On 10 April 1968, the 2d Battalion (Abn) 501st Infantry employed RCA CS in conjunction with a sweep operation on the village of Phuoc Dien vic YD 475485. The village was believed to contain an NVA company.

b Alpha company, having made initial contact near the village, was reinforced by Delta company shortly after noon when Delta completed a combat assault on a LZ west of the village. After link-up with Alpha

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the two companies prepared to sweep from NW to SE through the village. Prior to the sweep, five E8 Tactical CS Launchers were to be fired into the village, closely followed by airdrop of 192 M7A3 CS grenades on the SE side of the village.

c Immediately after the E8's were fired, both companies moved toward the village through the CS cloud. As they moved forward, they killed three NVA who were moving about in the village. At 1317, as they reached the edge of the village, both companies began receiving SA/AW fire and occasional RPG rounds. By this time, the CS cloud, driven by the relatively stiff winds, had passed through the village. It had, however, allowed the companies to cross approximately 200 meters of open terrain without taking any casualties.

d Stiff resistance was encountered from bunker complexes within the village and at 1630, contact was broken and TAC Air and artillery were called on the village. A sweep of the village on 11 April yielded 19 NVA KIA, 1 PW and 20 detainees. Of the 20 NVA found in the village, two had protective masks. Total friendly casualties were 3 KIA and 10 WIA.

e The commanders involved felt that the CS could have contributed more to the operation if it had lingered in the village a longer period of time. The 15 to 20 knot winds coupled with the strong mid-day lapse conditions greatly accelerated the dissipation of the agent cloud. Reinforcement of the agent cloud with additional grenade passes or with additional E8 launchers would have been appropriate when the companies began receiving fire inside the village. At the time such reinforcement was not possible, due to non-availability of helicopters and additional CS munitions.

#### 4 Action 18 April 1968 vic YD 7230 (See figure 6, below)

a On 18 April 1968, three companies of the 1st Battalion (Abn) 501st Inf trapped an estimated company size NVA force (later identified as 4th Co, 1st Bn, 803 NVA Regt) in the fortified hamlet of Dong Xuyen vic YD 7230. With C Company blocking to the north, B Company on the west and A Company to the south, D Company moved into position from the east. D Company received AW fire and RPG fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 11 WIA. D Company withdrew and waited while airstrikes were called on the village. After the final airstrike, CS gas was placed on the village and followed immediately by an artillery TOT.

b The CS mission consisted of three passes, one at 1000 feet using one E158 Cluster, and two low level each delivering 192 CS grenades using locally fabricated grenade drop racks. The initial E158 pass was intended to suppress enemy fire for the low level passes by placing an initial

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concentration of agent in the area. Fighter aircraft had received AW and RPG fire during the preliminary airstrikes.

c The E158 landed on target and effectively covered the northern portion of the village. Immediately following the E158, a low level pass from NW to SE was made and 192 grenades were dropped along the NE side of the village. On the third pass, NVA were observed moving around in the village. As soon as the CS ship cleared the area, the artillery TOT was fired on the village.

d The CS drops were made at 1800, 1805, and 1815 respectively. Winds were from the NE at approximately 10 knots. The temperature gradient was neutral. The target coverage was 100% of the village, and 100% of the munitions functioned.

e A sweep of the village on 19 April 1968 discovered 54 NVA bodies. Four AK 47's and two SKS were captured along with numerous SA ammunition, miscellaneous LBE, a large medical kit and 4500 lbs of rice and documents. Total friendly losses for the engagement were 1 US KIA and 12 WIA.

f Again, ground commanders considered the CS munitions which were incorporated in the softening fires contributed extensively to the impressive body count and helped to reduce friendly casualties.

## 5 Action 28 April - 1 May 1968 vic YD 6827 (figure 7, below)

a The cordon operation around Phuoc Yen village (vic YD 6827) began on 28 April when four rifle companies from 2d Bde 101st Abn Div (A-1-502, A-1-501 and B and D-2-501) responded to intelligence information and encircled the hamlet where an NVA battalion later identified as the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt, was reportedly entrenched. During the night and early morning hours of the 29th, the enemy made three concerted efforts to break the encirclement which were successfully beaten back. On 29 April, heavy artillery, TAC Air, gunships and recoilless rifle fire together with intensive machine gun and rifle fire from the paratroopers continued to batter the enemy.. Gunships from the 308th Avn Bn and 101st Avn Bn killed 51 enemy. An additional 13 NVA were killed by the paratroopers and 4 weapons were captured. On 30 April, the enemy continued to deliver heavy volumes of SA/AW/RPG fire from the village. Friendly artillery and 15 TAC airstrikes continued throughout the day to soften up the objective area, as another paratroop company (B-1-501) was heli-lifted into augment the seal. Thirteen NVA were killed during the day's

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teams and 1st ATF air and ground reconnaissance were increased. This intelligence watch paid dividends: on several occasions, attacks by fire were accurately predicted, and, once launched, pre-positioned reaction forces were immediately brought to bear.

2 At the same time, in addition to increasing its activities in III CTZ, the 101st Abn Div (minus its 3d Bde) was alerted for deployment to I CTZ. Personnel from every section under the Office of the ACofS, G2, displaced to I CTZ to establish liaison with existing intelligence organizations, US and ARVN units, and Marines, and build an intelligence data base.

3 The Division (-) deployed to I CTZ, joining its 2d Bde, which had been conducting combat operations under OPCON 1st ACD since 24 January. The Division became operational on 8 March with the initiation of Operation CARENTAN I. Initially situated at GIA LE until Camp Eagle construction could be completed, the G2 Section reported direct to II MAF. Liaison and coordination had been established with Provisional Corps, Vietnam, and on 10 March, PCV was activated as the controlling US Corps HQs for the two northern provinces in I CTZ.

4 On 27 March, the G2 Section displaced to Camp Eagle. Having perfected its liaison techniques in II CTZ, the Division established continuing personal contact with PCV, TF XRAY, 1st ARVN Div, THUA THIEN Sector, Project Delta (USSF), FOB #1 (USSF), and other intelligence agencies to insure complete exchange of current intelligence.

(b) G2 Air and II, MID:

1 1 February to 9 March 1968 (Bien Hoa) - during this period, G2 Air section conducted routine aerial surveillance and reconnaissance functions in the III Corps Tactical Zone and prepared to move to I Corps Tactical Zone. The 101st Airborne Division Imagery Interpretation Section was fully operational and under OPCON of the G2 Air Section. The Imagery Interpretation (II) Section conducted aerial observation supplemented by hand-held photography. Primary efforts of the II Section were directed toward Imagery Interpretation and targeting. A system for recording and storing data base information was developed during this period. Of particular significance during this period was the coordinated surveillance and reconnaissance of the Bien Hoa mortar/rocket belt during the TET offensive. This was accomplished by using O-1E aircraft, armed helicopters and AN/TPS-25 Ground Surveillance Radar. Also during this period, one G2 Air/II officer was sent to the forward CP in I Corps to establish liaison and obtain the standard operating procedure for utilization of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance assets in I Corps.

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2 7 March to 24 March - on 7 March the G2 Air section moved by air from Bien Hoa to Gia Le. The G2 Air section became operational in I Corps at 1200 hours on 8 March when telephone and radio communications were established. In this same period, the II section moved, by echelon, to I Corps. Initial coordination was established with III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) and Provisional Corps Vietnam (PCV) when the 101st Airborne Division came under the OPCON of the latter. Assets for visual reconnaissance were obtained from Northern VASAC Coordinator utilizing the 220th Reconnaissance Aircraft Company (RAC). Up to 30 hours of O-1E flying time were made available to the Division daily. In addition coordination was effected to obtain one (1) AN/TKQ-2 Ground Data Link Station from III MAF for direct read-out of SIAR imagery in support of 101st Airborne Division operations. In the latter portion of this period the AN/TKQ-2 Ground Data Link Station became operational at Camp Eagle and greatly aided in reducing the time between sensing and engagement of enemy moving targets.

3 24 March to 30 April 1968 - on 24 March the G2 Air section deployed to its present location at Camp Eagle. All elements of the II section had completed their move and the section was operational. During this period, the G2 Air section in conjunction with the II section prepared terrain analysis and conducted extensive reconnaissance for Operations Carentan I, Carentan II and Delaware. Also during this period, as part of an intensified training program, several personnel were sent to 1st Military Intelligence Bn (MIBARS) in-country schools for G2 Air and Imagery Interpretation Training. An II aerial observer course was conducted at Camp Eagle for Division aerial observers. Numerous liaison trips were made to III MAF, 220th RAC, 245th SAC, Detachment B, 1st MIBARS, and PCV to improve the aerial surveillance and reconnaissance effort in the PCV area.

(c) Enemy Order of Battle, MID:

1 The period of 1 February - 30 April was marked by movement of the OB Section from Bien Hoa (III CTZ) to Camp Eagle (I CTZ).

2 The Order of Battle Section consisted of six men at the time of its deployment to ICTZ. Five men preceded the Division Headquarters to ICTZ while one man remained at Bien Hoa to support remnants of Division Headquarters and the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div. The five men sent ahead to ICTZ were stationed with the 3d Marine Division, 1st Air Cav Division, and II MAF. While stationed with these units in the capacity of liaison for the 101st Abn Div, each man learned the enemy situation and obtained complete sets of Order of Battle files from each of the units. The culmination of their efforts was the production of a 212 page Order of Battle handbook that organized in a meaningful fashion all information collected by each man.



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3 Since arriving at Camp Eagle, the Order of Battle section has been expanded to 14 men with one man at each brigade supporting the S2. The order of battle section also has included within its duties target nomination for G3 Air/FSE.

4 The section has since been reorganized internally to meet its additional commitments. The OIC and NCOIC are primarily responsible for target nomination and supervision of all Order of Battle functions. Two Order of Battle teams have been created on an area coverage basis and as such are responsible for all enemy actions within their respective areas.

5 Since arriving in ICTZ the Order of Battle Section has produced numerous studies concerning the enemy situation, enemy tactics, enemy organization and projected enemy actions. The Order of Battle Section has also been responsible for a large amount of input to the Daily Intelligence Summary. The target nomination section of OB has nominated in the neighborhood of 150 targets from the period 21 March to 30 April. On 21 April the Order of Battle Section published a complete update to the Order of Battle Handbook previously published.

(d) CI and IPW, MID:

1 During the period covered, the MID planned and accomplished a major unit movement into Camp Eagle. This was executed in such a manner that the MID remained operational at all times.

2 Coordination and control personnel were sent forward from each section to make initial contact with operational counterparts in the area. These personnel were followed by the Advance Party consisting of personnel from each section. Coordinating personnel and Advance Party Personnel formed the nucleus for operations in the forward area for approximately three weeks. These personnel were followed by the main body which was sent forward with other Division elements as operational requirements dictated. Until the main body arrived at Camp Eagle, an MID Officer acted as the OIC of the forward element. He organized the MID base camp and directed operations as instructed by the 101st MID CO, who was kept abreast of the needs of forward and rear elements by continuous visits and through communications facilities. At present, there are four personnel at Bien Hoa Base Camp, responsible for rear operations. All other personnel are operating at Division Headquarters, Camp Eagle and at the Brigade Headquarters. During the same period, the 181st MID was amalgamated into the 101st MID. It was formerly in support of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. The 101st MID also acquired the 9th ARVN MID.

3 Initially upon arriving at Camp Eagle, the IPW Section, in conjunction with the Office of the Provost Marshal, coordinated for the use of the 3/82d Abn Div PCW Camp which was in the vicinity of Camp Eagle.

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This gave the section immediate facilities for POW interrogation. The IPW Section made immediate coordination with the Collection Branch of PCV. They also coordinated with III MAF to insure proper reporting procedures and formats. In addition, the IPW Section arranged for the exchange of IPW reports with the 1st ARVN Division. MID personnel can interrogate their PW's at any time it may become necessary. The IPW Section has had much assistance from the attached 9th ARVN MID which has been deployed down to Brigade level. The personnel are especially helpful in providing efficient document readouts and also assisting in IPW interrogation.

4 Immediately upon arrival at Camp Eagle, Counterintelligence personnel made coordination with CI PCV, 525th MI Group Office at Hue, CI MACV Hue, CI MACV Phu Bai, and other intelligence agencies. Arrangements were made for mutual exchange of intelligence reports during liaison visits. Liaison was initiated with District, village, and hamlet chiefs in order to acquire information. Counterintelligence personnel conducted a thorough survey of civilian employees in Camp Eagle for the purpose of recommending proper security measures and for establishing an informant net within these workers. Significant strides have been made in the recruitment of sources from these employees.

5 Prior to the Division's movement to Camp Eagle, Counterintelligence personnel made periodic visits to all Division units to insure that excess classified material was being properly destroyed by burning. Post evacuation checks of all Division base camps were conducted to insure the above.

NOTE: As a result of diligent work prior to movement, the 101st MID was able to establish an excellent living and working area. Prior planning consisted, among other things, of insuring that proper amounts of tentage, defensive material and working supplies were at hand prior to movement. Rear elements constantly monitored the needs of the forward party to insure adequate resupply.

## (2) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company.

(a) At the beginning of this reporting period Co F, 58th Inf (LRP) was being utilized as a security force for the Division Headquarters in Bien Hoa RVN (III Corps TZ). On 12 February 1968, a 12 man security detachment was sent to the I Corps Tactical Zone for security of the advance planning group of the Division. On 27 February 1968, the remainder of the company, which was operating at approximately 60% strength, deployed to Gia Le, ICTZ.

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(b) On March 1968, the Company received the mission of security for the opening of the new camp, Camp Eagle, retaining the mission for the month of March. With the security mission of Camp Eagle, the Company conducted short range reconnaissance patrols and local ambush patrols. In addition to the security of Camp Eagle, during the month of April the Company also was designated as the Division reaction force. The Company was called upon to provide security for three downed helicopters during the month. All training conducted during the period was OJT. Due to the lack of equipment and the non-availability of aircraft during this reporting period, Co F, 58th Inf (IRF), did not operate as a Long Range Patrol Company.

(3) 265th RR Company: Due to the nature of the classification of this unit's mission, their report was forwarded thru Radio Research channels to CO, 509th Radio Research Group.

(4) Enemy Situation.

(a) 1 Feb 68 - 8 Mar 68:

1 During this period the 101st Abn Division was located in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Contacts with enemy units during this period were a result of the VC TET Offensive, as the enemy remained within striking distance of the populated centers. The enemy disposition in III CTZ prior to the TET Offensive was believed to have been as follows for VC and NVA regular units:

9th VC Division HQ  
271st VC Regiment  
272nd VC Regiment  
273rd VC Regiment

NE Bin Long Province  
vic "Fish Hook"  
vic "Fish Hook"  
Bu Nho area, vic YT 0296, with one Bn possibly SW of Phuoc Vinh.

7th NVA Division HQ  
165th NVA Regiment  
141st NVA Regiment  
101st NVA Regiment

NE War Zone "C"  
W of Highway 13, vic XT 6887  
Security for COSVN HQ, central War Zone "C"  
vic Michelin Rubber Plantation

5th VC Division HQ  
274th VC Regiment  
275th VC Regiment

unlocated in Phuoc Long Province  
Hat Dich area, Phuoc Thuy Province  
Unlocated in Phuoc Long Province, last contact immediately south of Song Be with 31st ARVN Rangers on 25 Nov 67.

88th NVA Regiment

Northern Phuoc Long Province, with possibly one battalion in the vic of the "Fish Hook"

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a new heavy weapon (possibly 240mm rocket) was not brought to bear against friendly forces due to logistical difficulties.

4 Elements of the 9th VC Division and the 7th NVA Division did not participate in the attacks in the Saigon-Bien Hoa-Long Binh areas. The TET Offensive in these areas was conducted by Local Force elements, except for the 274th and 275th VC Regiments. It is conceivable that the VC plan of attack was as stated by PW's: Local Forces to grab hold in the populated areas with the aid of civilians, and then the entry of Main Force units into Saigon to add support and firepower to the Local Forces in order to seize the cities. The 1st US Inf Div made heavy contact with the 273 VC Regiment north of Saigon in Binh Duong Province near Phu Cuong City, killing over 200 and thereby preventing the 273d from entering Saigon. The 25th US Div contacted both the 271st VC Regiment and the 272d VC Regiment, inflicting heavy casualties upon both of these units and preventing them from gaining access to the city. Elements of the 165th NVA Regiment and the 101st NVA Regiment later moved south towards Lai Khe-Ben Cat with the obvious objective of containing the 1st US Inf Div to that area in order to enable elements of the 9th VC Division to gain entrance to Saigon. They were too late since elements of the 9th VC Division had been severely hampered from initiating offensive operations in Saigon. Eventually, the 141st NVA Regiment and the 88th NVA Regiment joined the other enemy forces in the area in order to maintain pressure on Saigon, and thereby force concentration of friendly forces. The K-1 and K-2 Battalions of the Dong Nai Regiment attacked Tan Uyen District H's as anticipated, but the K-3 Battalion detached itself from its sister battalions and engaged friendly forces south of Saigon in Long An Province.

5 It can be surmised that if the 1st US Inf Div and the 25th Inf Div had not interdicted the move of the 9th VC Division towards Saigon, the VC TET Offensive would have come much closer to accomplishing its goals.

6 During the month of February the 101st Abn Division engaged the enemy in several small contacts. The most significant of these contacts occurred immediately north of Bien Hoa as elements of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div contacted elements of the 275th VC Regiment along the south banks of the Song Dong Nai. During the latter part of February elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div deployed to Phu Bai, Thua Thien Province in the I Corps Tactical Zone to join the 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div. The 101st Abn Div HQ's became operational in ICTZ on 8 May 68.

(b) 8 March - 30 April: On 8 March 68, upon the initiation of Operation Carentan, the enemy disposition was as follows: Within the

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area of operations the Tri Thien Military Region Headquarters operated as the highest level control authority. This headquarters was located in eastern Base Area 104 (vic YD 5520). The 324B NVA Division Headquarters was located east of Puan Tri City (YD 3353) in the coastal lowlands. Subordinate to this division and operating south along Highway 1 (vic YD 6132) was the 812th NVA Regt and subordinate battalions 4, 5 and 6. The 90th NVA Regiment of the 324B NVA Division and 2 battalions of the 803d NVA Regiment were reported east of Hue City area (vic YD 7532). The 29th NVA Regiment of the 325C NVA Division was also reported in the vicinity of Hue. Four regiments not subordinate to division level headquarters operated within the area of operations. The 5th NVA Regiment, though unlocated, had elements dispersed in northern portions of Base Area 101 (vic YD 3343). The 416th NVA Battalion, subordinate to the 5th NVA Regiment was identified in Hue during TBT. The 9th NVA Regiment was located along Highway 1 (YD 4640). Battalions of this regiment, the 2d, 4th, and 7th were dispersed east of this location in the coastal lowlands. The 6th NVA Regiment and subordinate battalions, the 800th, 802d and 806th were dispersed immediately to the north of Hue. Elements of the 4th NVA Regiment were dispersed east of Hue (vic YD 8820). Sapper Battalions operating within the area included the 10th Sapper Battalion unlocated in the area surrounding Hue, and the Hue City Sapper Battalion also unlocated. The 810th LF Battalion was located SE of Hue vic 6316. The 804th LF Battalion was located SW of Hue vic YD 9007. There are seven local force companies that operated within the area. The H-99 and C-113 LF Companies operate SE of Quang Tri City in the coastal lowlands. The C-114 and C-115 LF Companies operate NW of Hue in the lowlands. The C-116 and C-117 and C-118 LF Companies operate SW of Hue in the coastal lowlands.

(5) Significant Changes in Enemy Disposition (Thua Thien Province):

It is presently believed that the 324B NVA Division Headquarters has been disbanded and the regiments of this division are now subordinate to the Tri Thien Military Region. This has been reported by PW's. The alternatives remain that the 324B NVA Division Headquarters elements have either been absorbed by the Tri Thien Military Region or remained in NVN to train troops.

The 9th NVA Regiment is presently believed to be located in Base Area 101 along with its subordinate battalions.

The 4th NVA Regiment is presently believed to be located in the vicinity of Phu Loc District Headquarters with one battalion possibly in Phu Vang District SE of Hue.

The Hue City Sapper Battalion is believed to be co-located with the VC Thua Thien Political Headquarters in the area known as the Hue City Near Supply

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Area, vic YD 7505.

At the beginning of Operation Carentan, the 2d Bn/803d NVA Regiment was located north of Kong Ha in Quang Tri Province being utilized in a transportation and supply role for the 1st and 3d Bn/803d NVA Regiment located north of Hue in Quang Dien District. Agent reports indicated in late March that the 2d Bn/803d Regiment had deployed into Thua Thien Province. In contacts with the 3d Bn/803d NVA Regiment, documents were captured which indicated that the 2d Bn had moved into the area. Although never positively confirmed, the 2d Bn/803d NVA Regiment is carried as possibly within the 101st Abn Div AO.

The 812th NVA Regt is still believed to be operating in southern Hue Lang District; however, a recent contact may indicate a southern move by the Regt. On 21 April 68 the 4th Bn, 812th NVA Regt was contacted at Thon Kim Doi vic YD 7531.

The 90th NVA Regt has been confirmed in the area west of Hue. On 7 April an agent stated that a battalion was located at YD 723305. The names that the agent gave as commanding this battalion identified the 7th Bn, 90th NVA Regiment. On 20 April 68, a Hoi Chanh identified his unit as the 9th Bn, 90th NVA Regiment. He stated that his battalion was located vic YD6619. On 30 April the 1/501st started a cordon operation around Phuoc Yen Village (vic YD 6828). They believed that they were facing a battalion-size element. This battalion was later identified as the 8th Bn, 90th NVA Regt.

On 26 March 68, as elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div deployed down Rt 547, they engaged enemy forces fighting from well-fortified position. Captured documents revealed the LBN of the 7th Bn/29th NVA Regt. On 30 Mar 68, supporting reconnaissance elements captured a PW in the vicinity of Delta Junction (vic YD 545049) who stated that he was a member of the 9th Bn/29th NVA Regt; he reported that his unit's mission was to secure Rt 547. A PW captured on 16 April 68 (vic YD686096) he stated that he was from the 8th Bn, 29th NVA Regt. He also reported that his unit's mission was to interdict Highway to Allied use.

The 810th LF Battalion is believed to have deployed to the Hue City Rear Supply Area, vic YD 7505.

The remainder of the NVA, MF and LF units continued to operate in their normal operational areas.

(6) Significant Enemy Activities (Thua Thien Province):

On 21 March 68, at 0400 hrs, elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div at LZ Pinky while supporting another FSB were attacked by SA, AW, rocket and RPG

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fire. Under the cover of 23 B-40 rounds enemy sappers breached the defensive wire with bangalore torpedoes and penetrated the perimeter. Documents taken off of dead NVA soldiers at first light revealed LBN's of 7th and 9th Bn's/90th NVA Regt. Except for harassing attacks by fire, this was the only enemy offensive move during the period 18 Mar 68.

Prior to the initiation of Operation Carentan II elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div moved south in an attempt to penetrate into New Base Area 114. The enemy platoon and company size contacts were believed to have been with elements of the 90th NVA Regiment.

At the same time, elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div continued to contact elements of the 2d Bn/803d NVA Regt in the vicinity of the "W" in the Song Bo, vic YD 6928. All during the period 18 Mar to 18 Apr 68, elements of the 101st Abn Div continued to engage elements of the 1st and 3d Bn's/803d NVA Regt from the vicinity of the "W" in the Song Bo, east along the banks of the Song Bo and along the banks of the Perfume River to the vicinity of YD 763313.

On 10 and 11 April 68, elements of the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div contacted elements of the 6th Bn/812th NVA Regt in a village SE of FSB Hardcore. Preliminary interrogation of PW's captured during this contact revealed numerous ASA's; the most frequent being 7th Bn/812th Regt. Further interrogation disclosed that all the PW's were from the 812th NVA Regt, however, PWs continued to use the designation 7th Bn. It was concluded that since most of the PWs were new recruits from NVN that they had been replacements to the 6th Bn/812th Nva Regt. It is significant to note that the 6th Bn/812th NVA Regt. had not been heavily engaged during the TET fighting as had the 4th and 5th Battalions had also received replacements.

On 22 Apr 68, the 2/502 came into heavy contact vic YD 5602. A PW captured in this action identified his unit as the 10th Co, 3d Bn, 308th Engineers. This unit is nicknamed Cutthroats. It is possible that this large an engineer unit has been responsible for the recent upgrading of 547A and the depot complex in A Shau - A Loui Valley.

On 19 Apr Rallier Pham Van Nghia stated that he was a member of the 22d Regt. He reported that the CP was located vic YD 761032. He also stated that the K-4, K-10 and K-18 Bn's were subordinate to the 22d Regt. This location falls within the general vicinity known as the Hue Rear Supply Area. Nui Ke Mtn vic YD 761055 is reported to be the location of the VC Thua Thien Province Political Headquarters. The Hue City Municipality Unit is also believed to be located in this area. Also, K-10 is an AKA\*for the 804th LF Bn. It is possible that the 22d Regt is a newly formed command and

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control HQs for the units operating south of Hue.

(7) Enemy Tactics:

Indications existed that the enemy intended to introduce more conventional weaponry into the Quang Tri-Thua Thien battlefield. 23mm ammunition found by supporting reconnaissance elements indicated the possible presence of the ZU-23 Anti-Aircraft Gun. Numerous incidents of aircraft receiving AA fire and air bursts at 800 feet also substantiated the reported presence of 37mm AA Guns. Agent reports, PW's and a cache which contained 76mm tank ammunition all indicated the possibility of enemy tanks along Route 547; aerial photography also reported possible tank sightings as well as tank tracks in the A Shau Valley and in the vicinity of Route 547.

Agent reports, PW's and captured documents all pointed towards a second offensive directed against Quang Tri City and Hue. A further indication of the enemy's intention to re-attack Hue is the refusal of the 803d NVA Regt to withdraw from the coastal lowlands north of Hue to safer haven in the foothills or mountain to the west of Hue. Even in the face of heavy losses and devastating airstrikes the enemy only attempted to disengage itself from friendly forces and move to another fortified village or hamlet in the coastal lowlands. It is believed that the 803d NVA Regt is attempting to maintain a position within striking distance of Hue. It appears that the enemy is willing to accept heavy casualties since he is in an area where once detected he becomes highly vulnerable to friendly forces. Also, the 90th NVA Regt was given the mission of strengthening the infrastructure in the area west of Hue. This was the mission the 8th Battalion, 90th NVA Regt when it was caught and decimated at Phuoc Yen Village.

(8) Recapitulation of Enemy Losses for Quarterly Period:

During the period, enemy losses were as follows (including 3/82d OPCON to 101st Abn Div):

VC/NVA KIA	2683
VC/NVA PW	84
Hoi Chanh	9
Capt Wpns	700
Grain (Capt/Dest)	48 tons
Doc (Capt)	87.5 lbs

(9) Recapitulation of losses for OF CARENTAN I & II

Friendly

Enemy

193 KIA

29

1892 KIA

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Friendly

1190 WIA (1007 Evac)  
11 MIA

Enemy

69 PW  
1 Koi Chan  
389 IWC  
60 CSWC

(10) Recapitulation of losses for OP DELAWARE:

Friendly

40 KIA  
206 WHA  
1 MIA  
2 NBC

Enemy

221 KIA  
1 NVA/PW  
56 IWC  
11 CSWC

d. LOGISTICS.

(1) General.

(a) During the reporting period, the division G-4, and the division Support Command provided logistical planning, direction and support for the following operations:

- 1 Tacoma 15 Feb - 30 Mar
- 2 Carentan I & II 11 Mar - Present
- 3 Delaware 19 Apr - Present
- 4 Division move to I CTZ

(b) The move of the division's administrative and support elements to I CTZ presented several problems, due to the limited use of Phu Bai Air Field, and the congested condition of Route 1 from Da Nang to the Phu Bai area, and North. Close coordination with Marine Forces provided for the movement of over 1300 troops, 600 vehicles, and over 9,000 tons of organizational equipment by sea and air to Da Nang, and North to Phu Bai by sea and overland.

1 Elements of the following division units were involved in this move:

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- a HHC Division and attachments
- b Division Artillery
- c 101st Aviation Bn
- d 2/17th Cavalry
- e 801st Maint Bn
- f 326th Engineer Bn
- g 101st Military Police Company
- h HHB 2/11th Arty
- i Support Command

2 Unit personnel and vehicles convoyed from Da Nang to Phu Bai and Camp Eagle, with security being provided by 2/17th Cav, and B/1/17th Cav. Marine Support agencies in the Da Nang area provided billeting and staging areas for these convoys.

3 Unit equipment, not able to be carried on the troop convoys was staged at pier/dock sites and then moved North in the following ways:

- a LST or LCU to Hue Ramps, or Tan My ramp.
- b Convoyed North by 2½ ton truck assets levied from division units.

## (2) Logistics Operations

(a) General: During the reporting period covered the 101st Airborne Division participated in 4 major operations in which the 101st Airborne Division Support Command provided the necessary combat service support to insure the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The basic concept for the supporting of the Division remained the same throughout the whole time frame. The concept included the disposition of Forward Support Elements consisting of a Maintenance Platoon, a Medical Company and a Supply Detachment which accompanied their respective Brigades to their bases of operations. The size of the Medical Company remained the same on all occasions, however the size of the Maintenance Platoons and the Supply Detachments

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varied in accordance with the distance of the Brigade Base Camps from the Bien Hoa Base Camp and whether or not the 1st Logistics Command placed an FSA at or near the Brigade Base of Operations. In cases where a Division Tactical Command Post was used a Logistical Operation Coordination Center was established at the location.

(b) Dispositions:

1 During Operation Tacoma: (movement to I CTZ)

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Supporting Agency</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st Bde FSE	Phu Bai	FLCC-A	Phu Bai
		TF Lane	Camp Eagle
2nd Bde FSE	LZ Jane	TF Munoz	Quang Tri
	LZ Sally	TF Mc Donald	Camp Evans
3rd Bde FSE	Phuoc Vinh	Log Cmd LSA	Phuoc Vinh

(NOTE: Class II & IV TO&E items from Bien Hoa and repair parts from Bien Hoa then Camp Eagle as Maintenance Bn Closed Camp Eagle)

2 During Operation Carentan I & II & Operation Delaware:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Supporting Agency</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st Bde FSE	Phu Bai	TF Lane	Camp Eagle
2d Bde FSE	LZ Sally	TF Mc Donald	Camp Evans
3d Bde FSE	Phuoc Vinh	Log Cmd LSA	Phuoc Vinh
3d Bde 82d Abn FSE	Phu Bai	TF Lane	Camp Eagle

3 DLOC was initially set up at Camp Eagle during the latter stages of Operation Tacoma and it gradually expanded into a Support Command forward as the desired elements of the Support Command closed at Camp Eagle, during the initial stages of Operation Carentan. Included in the Support Command forward were elements of the DSO, DMSO, and DTO.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) The 801st Maintenance Bn supported the Division operations by utilizing the Forward Support Maintenance Platoons placed in direct support of the organic Brigades. The Ground Maintenance Company (-), the Transportation Aircraft Maintenance Company and the Bn Headquarters remained at Bien Hoa until the latter portion of Operation Tacoma whence they displaced forward to Camp Eagle

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3. SECTION 3, HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SURVEY INFORMATION.

a. Confidential msg #42434 from AVHGC-DST, Subject: Tactical Cover and Deception, DTC 271113Z March 1968, requested data from preparing agencies on Cover and Deception operations conducted during the period.

b. Throughout the reporting period, the 101st Airborne Division has been actively engaged with enemy forces both in I and III CTZ's. There has been no requirement for overt deception operations at Division level other than normal security and counterintelligence measures taken consistent with the current operational missions. One such technique utilized by Division forces has been that of carrying 4-5 days rations at the beginning of an operation. The technique reduces the necessity for daily helicopter resupply. It allows the maneuver elements to operate more freely without telegraphing their direction and rate of progress by daily logistical sorties. It further reduces the necessity of re-locating daily, night defensive positions, when resupply is accomplished late in the afternoon.

c. During the period 25 March through 28 March, the 101st Abn Div did participate in a Corps level deception plan IAW Annex H to Provisional Corps Vietnam OPOD 3-68, dated 16 March 1968. The plan was designed to convince the enemy that the main thrust of FCV attack would be in the Dong Hoa area and to the north and further to deceive the enemy on the 1st ACD's plan to attack west along Hwy 19 to relieve the Khe Sanh combat base. The concept of operation as it applied to the 101st Abn Div was to move one rifle company and a Signal Detachment to vic Dong Ha. The Signal Detachment was to transmit radio messages simulating an Arrival Airfield Control Group such as would be conducted if the 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div were moving to Dong Ha. The rifle company was to conduct operations in the villages and populated areas, so as to obtain maximum exposure of the Screaming Eagle Patch and give the impression that a much larger force was in the area. One airborne rifle company and 15 personnel (1 Off and 14 EM) from the B.501st Signal Bn moved by air from Hue/Phu Bai Airfield to Dong Ha on 25 March. Two AN/VRC-46 radios and one AN/ARC-121 radio group accompanied the signal personnel. Operational control of the Task Force passed to CG, 3d Marine Division upon arrival at Dong Ha.

d. The 15 personnel were located in two different locations approximately 10 Km apart. This was done so that all the radio signals would not emanate from the same location. The signal team was to simulate the following radio nets:

- (1) 2d Bde Command Net
- (2) 2d Bde Admin Net
- (3) 2d Bde Intel net
- (4) 1/501 Bn Cmd Net