

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 10TH COMBAT AVIATION BATTALION
APO 96377

Incl 1

AVGD-AE

12 September 1967

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
17th Combat Aviation Group
APO US Forces 96240

TO: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
APO US Forces 96384

1. (U) Type operations: [REDACTED] (Hong, Kil Dong).
2. (C) Date of operations: [REDACTED].
3. (C) Locations: CQ 245375.
4. (U) Reporting unit: 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.
5. (C) [REDACTED] ROKFV 9th Republic of Korea Infantry Division and Capitol Republic of Korea Infantry Division.
6. (C) Intelligence: At the outset, the latest intelligence estimate reported that approximately 1,800 VC including elements of 5th NVA Division and 95th NVA Regiment, were located to the west of Tuy Hoa in the mountainous areas.
7. (C) Mission: The mission of the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion (Reinforced) was to:
 - a. Provide direct support to the Capitol, Republic of Korea, Infantry Division (CRID).
 - b. Provide direct support to the 9th, Republic of Korea, Infantry Division (WHRID).
 - c. Provide general support for ROKFV.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Group 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

d. Be prepared to mass aviation support as directed by CO, 10th Combat Aviation Battalion to support the ground commander.

8. (C) [REDACTED]

The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion using three assault helicopter companies, the 48th, 129th and [REDACTED] and two assault support helicopter companies, the 180th and 196th supported Republic of Korea, Forces Vietnam elements (CRID and WHRID) in the conduct of extensive search and destroy operations.

9. (C) Execution. The operation began on the morning of 9 July with a multi Regimental assault into the mountains in the vicinity of the Tuy Hoa - Dong Tre - Cung Son triangle. Subsequent assaults (Company, Battalion and Regimental) were conducted throughout the period to the southeast and northwest of this area until the 10th Combat Aviation terminated support of the operation on 31 August 1967 due to a mission change from 17th Combat Aviation Group.

a. Operational statistics by companies.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TROOPS (Lifted)</u>	<u>CARGO (Lifted-Tons)</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HOURS (Flown)</u>
48th AHC	13,020	1,052.5	12,091	3,457.6
[REDACTED]	26,446	2,670.3	12,857	3,549.0
129th AHC	32,033	2,448.7	14,150	4,327.3
155th AHC	2,237	81.6	1,216	442.4
180th ASHC	11,139	6,702.8	6,625	1,449.2
196th ASHC	9,314	3,543.4	4,618	914.9
281st AHC	1,169	36.5	930	180.6
117th AHC	673	48.8	603	124.3
Totals	96,031	16,584.6	53,090	14,445.3

b. Medical evacuations 100

c. Combat assaults

(1) Company size	39
(2) Battalion size	17
(3) Regimental size	6

d. Extractions

(1) Company size	22
(2) Battalion size	9
(3) Regimental size	6

[REDACTED]

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

e. Ammunition expended

<u>7.62mm</u>	<u>2.75"</u>	<u>40mm</u>
1,080,650	3,339	16,413

f. Night time

(1) 129th AHC	195.5
(2) 48th AHC	82.5
(3) 180th ASHC	61.0
(4) 281st AHC	0
(5) [REDACTED]	36.2
(6) 155th AHC	6.8
(7) 117th AHC	0
(8) 196th AHC	0

10. (c) [REDACTED] Operations

a. Enemy losses

(1) Enemy KIA	637
(2) VC captured	88
(3) VC detained	34
(4) Small arms captured	359
(5) Crew served weapons captured	94
(6) Telephones captured	15
(7) Switchboards captured	3
(8) Radios captured	36

b. Friendly losses

(1) KIA	27
(2) WIA	68

~~Confidential~~

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

c. Anti-aircraft fire

(1) Number of aircraft receiving fire	27
(2) Number of aircraft hit	7
(3) WIA	4
(4) KIA	0
(5) MIA	0

11. (U) Administrative matters are included in the discussions listed in paragraph 13.

12. (C) Special equipment and techniques.

a. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, Chinooks, with their greater troop carrying capacity, were effectively used to move large numbers of troops into the operational area in minimum time. This was accomplished by the formation of tactical air columns comprised of UH-1D's, CH-47's, and armed helicopters for escort. An adequate number of UH-1D's were provided to conduct the initial assault into the insecure landing zone. After these troops had secured the landing zone, (minimum of five minutes) CH-47's were used to bring in the bulk of the combat troops. If this was to be a final extraction from the pick-up zone, the last troops out and the pathfinders would be extracted by UH-1D's. The armed helicopters provided armed escort at the landing zone after first firing preparation fires 5 minutes before the initial assault. A second gun team was required to provide cover for the final extractions at the pick-up zone. This technique required positive control by the mission commander, however, it proved very effective throughout this operation.

b. On one combat assault, conducted on 16 August 1967,¹ 46 Engineer troops were initially rappelled into a proposed LZ and through the use of explosives and chain saws, cleared an area in which approximately 450 combat troops were inserted. Although this process took a considerable amount of time, first in rappelling the Engineers, and then in the clearing of a suitable landing area, this procedure proved successful. With improved methods, training, and equipment, a more rapid LZ preparation may be realized.

c. The 10th Battalion Command and Control element displaced from Dong Ba Thin to Phu Hiep a few days prior to the start of the operation. From this location the TOC was better able to react to any situation as well as to control and coordinate the efforts of the subordinate units.

1. Operations Order 32-67 Attached as inclosure 1 to inclosure 1

~~Confidential~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

d. A particular characteristic common to all 62 of the combat assaults conducted during the operation was the frequent use of several pick-up zones with simultaneous assaults into several landing zones. The complexity of the assaults was further complicated by time requirements imposed by the ground commanders for assaulting each of the LZ's. The number of pick-up zones for these assaults ranged from a minimum of one to a maximum of seven while the number of LZ's for one combat assault was as high as 15.²

13. (C) Commander's Analysis.

a. Armed helicopter support.

(1) Comment: Armed helicopter support for this operation was very effective.

(2) Discussion:

a. The effectiveness of the gunships was a direct result of an adequate number of aircraft being made available to accomplish the assigned mission. Provisions were made in the planning phase to limit the number of simultaneous assaults on insecure landing zones to only that number which could be effectively prepped by the available gunships. A functional fire plan was provided which was flexible enough to cover all unforeseen changes.

b. Reinforcing the gunships organic to the supporting units was a continuing problem. On several occasions, the supported unit commander requested as many as 40 UH-1D's and 15 OH-47's to assault as many as 17 LZ's, yet did not request the additional gunships necessary to support the supported unit's tactical plan.

b. The supporting unit must be informed.

(1) Comment: During the planning stage of this operation, several problems were encountered in obtaining accurate, timely and complete information required to complete the operational plan.

(2) Discussion:

a. Information required, pertaining to location of landing zones to be used, was not made available to this unit in sufficient time to allow for proper planning. Landing zones were frequently changed. In spite of this unit's recommendations against several proposed LZ's, the ground units continued with their planning based on the assumption that Air Force bombing would provide usable landing zones where none were available. It was pointed out that in recent attempts made by the 9th ROK Division this method proved ineffective and that they should not plan to use these areas.

2. Operations Order 31-67 Attached as inclosure 2 to inclosure 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Confidential~~
AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

b On several occasions this headquarters was not provided the information required to prepare movement tables until less than 36 hours prior to proposed assault time. This does not lend itself to the proper preparation and dissemination of plans in sufficient time to allow participating subordinate units adequate planning time to conduct an operation this extensive and complex. When this information was received, it was incomplete and failed to include all the troop elements and cargo to be moved. On one occasion there had been no provisions made to move two 4.2 mortar platoons (3 CH-47 sorties for each of the regiments). Another time there were no provisions made to provide a security force to secure the area where the CH-47's were to land with the artillery.

c. Communications.

(1) Comment: During the planning and execution of these operations there were several examples of communications failure between the supported unit and this headquarters.

(2) Discussion:

a Our requirements for space and support in the form of engineers and security for the refueling and rearming area were relayed through the liaison officer several days prior to the time actually required. At this time, it was indicated to this headquarters that everything would be provided, however, when we requested this support, it was apparent that the responsible persons had not been made aware of our requirements.

b It was repeatedly requested that the supported unit limit the number of pick-up zones in order that this headquarters could provide pathfinders at each location and that English-speaking officers be provided in all PZ's to insure proper loading and provide assistance to the pathfinders. Despite the assurances that our requirements would be met the numbers of pick-up zones did not decrease and interpreters were not provided. This was a recurring experience throughout the operation.

d. Aircraft utilization.

(1) Comments: There are several ways that utilization of the CH-47's could be improved with resultant more efficient operations.

(2) Discussion:

a The TAC CP's were requested to use slings to carry as much of their bulk equipment as possible to eliminate the

~~Confidential~~
AVGD-1E

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

time required for loading and unloading, i.e., tentage, concertina wire, etc. Although sling equipment was available the supported units persisted in moving these loads internally, causing a considerable amount of wasted time while aircraft sat on the ground awaiting to be loaded and unloaded. This practice resulted in extended exposure of the aircraft to enemy fire as well as the waste of valuable aircraft time.

b It is recognized that some internal loads are necessary for the conduct of operations. Adequate personnel must be provided for loading and off-loading of all internal loads. On several occasions, only two or three men worked loading and unloading CH-47 internal loads while additional troops observed from 20 to 30 meters away.

c Excessive loading time means not only that the aircraft can carry less in a given time but also that it becomes more difficult to schedule refueling. Less sorties can be programmed between each refueling and TAC CP's are out of communications with their subordinate units for longer periods of time. Often in single ship landing zones, other aircraft must orbit and waste valuable flying time while waiting for the Chinooks to be loaded.

d Loads for CH-47's must receive the careful attention of the person responsible for their preparation. Some ships were not fully loaded while many of the artillery loads exceeded the 7000 pound maximum for the CH-47 (mountainous regions, 1000 feet or more above sea level). For example, during one day's operation, on 12 August 1967, two aircraft were used to displace TAC CP's and flew a combined total of twenty hours and fifty-five minutes yet carried only 25.5 tons of cargo, which is far below the load capability. When compared with one other aircraft which, on an artillery displacement, flew nine hours and forty minutes, hauling 58.5 tons of cargo; it is readily apparent that the two aircraft moving the TAC CP's were not being properly employed. The loads, as prepared, varied from a minimum of approximately 1000 lbs to a maximum of 9500 lbs. This caused much wasted aircraft time while these loads were rearranged.

e. Forward support areas.

(1) Comment: Forward support areas were established for this operation to facilitate expeditious refueling and rearming. This resulted in a greatly reduced turn-around time from LZ to support area to PZ which increased aircraft availability and also produced a proportionate decrease in the number of hours flown in support of the operation. In daily operations an average of 318 hours and 1,217 sorties were flown.

~~Confidential~~

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

(2) Discussion:

a. The support area must be large enough to accommodate a rearming area separate from the refueling area. Also, parking space for standby aircraft to alleviate traffic congestion and improve the safety of operations, separate refueling areas by aircraft type, i.e., Liftships, Gunships and Chinooks are advisable. Areas approximately 800 meters by 400 meters were deemed adequate for this operation. During the latter stage of the operation, a 16 point refueling area was established which proved highly satisfactory, expediting refueling even at peak activity periods. Through the use of additional equipment, not TOE to this battalion but on loan from 1st Log Command, a rapid refueling capability was achieved. This was highlighted in the last major C4 conducted on 20 August 1967 when 50 helicopters landed, refueled and took off in 28 minutes.

b. ROK Engineer support was initially inadequate, resulting in late stockages and slow resupply of the facilities. Construction and improvement of the poor road network in the area of operations was a primary consideration for which engineer support was mandatory.

c. Local security of the refueling areas was inadequate at times. On one occasion, a squad of nine men was given the task of securing an eighteen hundred meter perimeter. Of necessity, the forward support area must be operational prior to the commencement of operations and the supported unit must provide security for this vulnerable activity.

f. The liaison officer's role as a responsive link between ground force and mission commander.

(1) Comment: The liaison officer provided a direct responsive link between the Division Command Group and the Mission Commander throughout the operation.

(2) Discussion: This direct link between the liaison officer, co-located with the Division G-3, Air Liaison Officer and the Artillery Liaison Officer provided an immediate and flexible channel through which the operation was effectively monitored. All changes were efficiently coordinated at the correct level of command and pertinent information was relayed as required.

g. Reinforcement of aviation support.

(1) Comment: Throughout the operation, problems existed between this headquarters and higher headquarters as to whether sufficient reinforcing aircraft would be provided to support the planned combat assault as requested by the ground commander.

~~Confidential~~

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

(2) Discussion: On several occasions doubt existed up to 12 hours prior to a combat assault as to exactly how many aircraft would be available for the operation. Despite frequent calls to higher headquarters and liaison visits it was not always possible to fix the number of aircraft which would be available. Movement tables, fire support plans and operations orders would have to be altered at the last minute to add or delete reinforcing aircraft which were requested earlier. Due to the distances involved between the reinforcing elements and the area of operations, it was impossible to determine until the last minute if the support would be provided.

h. Additional lessons learned are enumerated in detail in the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion ORLL for the period ending 31 July 1967.

14. (C) Recommendations.

a. Armed helicopter support: It is recommended for all future operations that any request for additional lift aircraft also include a request for a corresponding number of armed helicopters. This is particularly important where numerous LZ's must be assaulted simultaneously to support the ground commander's plan.

b. The supporting unit must be informed: Since the success of this type operation hinges largely upon the aviation unit, it is strongly recommended that the supported unit provide the supporting aviation unit with all the information pertaining to the operation as soon as possible and in any case, the aviation element must receive all complete and accurate information required to complete the movement tables not later than 48 hours prior to the start of an operation this complex. Aviation unit recommendations on LZ selections, number, and type aircraft required must be considered by the supported unit.

c. Communications: It is recommended that a minimum of one English-speaking officer be available at each pick-up zone whenever operating with non-English speaking troops. It is further recommended that the importance of this communication problem be stressed to all persons involved in joint operations with more importance placed upon the relay of timely, complete, and accurate information.

d. Aircraft utilization (CH-47): In order to obtain the maximum CH-47 utilization during the hours flown, cargo nets should be used to move as much cargo as possible. Where it is not possible to carry sling loads, the supported unit should take necessary action to insure that a sufficient number of men are available for loading and unloading, thus reducing ground time to a minimum. Chinook usage should be restricted to only those loads whose bulk or weight preclude the use of the UH-1D.

~~Confidential~~

AVGD-AE

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation HONG KIL DONG (U)

e. Forward support areas:

(1) The basic stockage levels and resupply rates of POL and ammunition must be ascertained early in the initial planning stage. Initial stockage may be computed considering the concept of operation, number of LZ's, estimated flying time by type aircraft and the available supply routes.

(2) Definite requirements for engineer support (improvement of the support area and road network build up) must be placed on the supported unit during the initial planning phase. This requirement should stipulate the specific action required with completion dates and must be closely monitored to insure compliance.

(3) Security requirements should be definite to include recommended force size, reporting place and time.


(4) Convoy control measures are mandatory to insure expeditious flow of the supply train. The supported unit must stipulate definite measures to preclude unnecessary delay of the resupply vehicles.

f. The liaison officer must be co-located with the supported unit's command element throughout the operation to insure smooth cohesive operations.

g. Recommend, that in future operations, the aircraft committed for any phase be determined in sufficient time to prepare the operation orders, movement tables and fire support plans.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Inclosures
1 OPORD 32-67
2 OPORD 31-67


JACK W. SERIG
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy Nr _____ of _____ Copies
10th Combat Aviation Battalion
Phu Hiep RVN (CQ 2438)
141200 August 1967

Incl 1 to Incl 1
OPORD 32-67

Reference: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014, Map Numbers 6734 II,
6733 I, 6733 II, 6834 III, 6833 IV, 6833 III.

Task Organization

<u>48th AHC</u>	<u>117th AHC</u>	<u> </u>	<u>155th AHC</u>	<u>180th ASHC</u>
2 LFT	1 LFT	2 LFT	6 UH-1D	5 CH-47
4 UH-1D		13 UH-1H		
2 UH-1D C&C				

1. Situation.

- a. Enemy - Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly Forces - Current SITREP.
- c. Attachments - Task Organization.

2. Mission - The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion helilifts 13 companies of the 29th Regiment and 30th Regiment of the 9th ROK Infantry Division into 7 landing zones south of Ninh Hoa RVN commencing 160630 August 1967.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion utilizing 25 UH-1D and 5 CH-47 aircraft, will helilift 13 companies of the WHRID into 7 LZ's as shown in Annex A (Air Movement and Loading Tables).

(2) Fires.

- (a) Artillery preparation: LZ preparations ending 0625.
- (b) Tactical air support: LZ preparations ending 0600.
- (c) SAC air support: ARC Lite 0500.
- (d) Gunship preparations Annex B, Fire Support Plan.

b. Tasks.

(1) 48th AHC.

- (a) Provide 2 LFT (Joker 1 and Joker 2).
- (b) Provide 4 UH-1D's lift ships (Blue Star).
- (c) Provide 1 UH-1D C&C for command group.
- (d) Provide 1 UH-1D C&C for Commanding General WHRID.

(2) 117th AHC.

Provide 1 LFT (Sidewinder).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) 188th AHC.

- (a) Provide 2 LFT (Spider 1 and Spider 2).
- (b) Provide 13 UH-1D lift ships (Black Widow Blue and Black Widow Red)

(4) 155th AHC - Provide 6 UH-1D lift ships (Blue Star Flight)

(5) 180th ASHC - Provide 5 CH-47 lift ships (Big Windy)

c. Coordinating instructions.

(1) Time Table - Annex A (Air movement and loading table).

(2) PZs

(a) PZ 1. First lift, the Bluestars will land in trail on north side of the PZ on the white lights. The Blackwidow Red flight will land in trail on the south side of the PZ on the Amber lights. Both flights will land at 240 degrees or as directed by PZ control. Subsequent lifts will land as directed by PZ control.

(b) PZ 2. First lift, the Blackwidow Blue flight will land in trail on the north side of the PZ on the green lights. The Big Windy flight of 5 aircraft will land in trail on the south side of the PZ on the white lights. Both flights will land at 240 degrees as directed by PZ control. Subsequent lifts will land as directed by PZ control.

(c) PZ 3. Blackwidow flight of 7 aircraft will land in trail on the orange panels at 240° or as directed by PZ control.

(3) Aircraft loading - Annex A.

(4) Flight routes, RPS and orbit points - Annex C - Map Overlay

(5) Enroute Altitude - Annex C - Map Overlay

(6) Formations

(a) LZs 1,8 - enroute formation single trail - 30 second separation between aircraft.

(b) LZs 2,9,10,12 - enroute formation 2 ship echelon right 30 second separation between flights of 2.

(c) LZ 3 - enroute formation single ship in trail - 5 minute separation between aircraft rappellings 2nd phase single ship trail.

(d) CH-47 aircraft will maintain 60 second separation between flights.

(7) LZs (Location - Annex A).

(a) LZ #1 - 1 ship LZ cut out of north side of rock pinnacle. Land to the south with a right turn-out on take off.

~~CONTINUATION~~
(b) LZ #2 - 2 ship LZ land to southwest, prepared helipads from previous operations. Take off to Southwest with a right turn out.

(c) LZ #3 - Bombed out area on saddle. Engineer team will prep. into and prepare a 1 ship LZ with a take off and departure lane from west. C and C aircraft will advise on landing and take off.

(d) LZ #8 - 1 ship LZ on saddle surrounded by 25 foot trees on all sides. Touch down area appears to have scattered bushes. Land to west, take off west with right turn out.

(e) LZ #9 - 2 ship LZ on ridge. Covered with scattered trees and rocks.

(f) LZ #10 - 2 ship LZ on sloping ridge with 2 level areas. Scattered trees and rocks.

(g) LZ #12 - 2 ship LZ, Flat bare field surrounded by 25 foot trees.

(8) Downed aircraft procedures - SOP

(9) Reporting points - off PZs and off LZs.

(10) Weather decision - 0600 hours by LTC Crooks (weather delays in one hour increments).

(11) Rules of engagement - is per LOI, 10th CAB

(12) Pathfinder organization of PZs as briefed.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Refueling - Aircraft will refuel Blue Star refueling point at Ninh Hoa. CH-47's will refuel at temporary miniport north of heliport.

b. Fuel loads UH-1D aircraft will arrive at PZ with 1000 lbs of fuel unless otherwise briefed. CH-47 aircraft will refuel as per company SOP.

c. Dust off - Dust off will orbit east of operational area vicinity BP 9976 at 4000 feet.

d. Medical evacuation

(1) Evacuate ROK wounded to 102nd Medical Evacuation Hospital at 100th ROK Logistical Command, BP 0260.

(2) Evacuate Us wounded to Nha Trang, 8th Field Hospital.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
e. Rearming - Gunships will rearm at Blue Star rearming points at Ninh Hoa.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Signal

- (1) Command Frequencies - FM 45.3, UHF 237.7, UHF 122.7
- (2) Alternate Command Frequencies - FM 44.3, UHF 236.7, UHF 122.5
- (3) Gunships - FM 45.3, UHF assigned unit frequencies for air to air UHF 122.7
- (4) Dust off - FM 47.9, UHF 237.7
- (5) FAC - FM 32.4, UHF 301.5, Ragged Scooper 85.
- (6) Pathfinders - FM 47.8
 - (a) PZ 1 - Alpha Control
 - (b) PZ 2 - Bravo Control
 - (c) PZ 3 - Charlie control
- (7) Refueling - Blue Star Control FM 34.95
- (8) Smoke
 - (a) PZ - PZ 1 green, PZ 2 violet, PZ 3 green
 - (b) LZ - yellow
 - (c) enemy fire - red
 - (d) Friendly distress - green and yellow
 - (e) Medical evacuation - violet and green
 - (f) Friendly - green

b. Command

- (1) RITF Commander - Maj Baik
- (2) Mission Commander - LTC Crooks

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (3) Alternate Mission Commander - LTC Sawls
- (4) Second Alternate Mission Commander - Maj Ellis

CROOKS
LTC

ANNEXES

A - Air Movement and Loading Table

B. Gunship Support Plan

OFFICIAL

STECKLY

S-3

DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED 24 HOURS AFTER
COMPLETION OF OPERATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

LIFT NO	LIFTING UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	PZ	TIME	ACL	NO A/C	TROOP	LZ	TIME	REMARKS
1.	BLUE STAR	6th Co 29th REGT	1 (BP998860)	0620	5	10	50	1 (BP837735)	0630	CA (1 SHIP LZ)
2.	BLACK WIDOW RED	EXPLOITATION TEAM 29th REGT	1	0620	4	6	24	3 (BP882733)	0630	CA-RAPPEL (1 SHIP) (5 Min separation between aircraft)
3.	BLACK WIDOW BLUE	12th Co 30th REGT	2 (CP008858)	0620	5	5	25	2 (BP852723)	0630	CA (2 SHIP LZ)
4.	BIG WINDY	12th Co 30th REGT 11th Co 30th REGT	2	0625	31 30	4 1	121 30	2	0635	
5.	BLUE STAR	6th Co 29th REGT	1	0640	6	10	60	1	0650	
6.	BLACK WIDOW BLUE	6th Co 29th REGT	1	0645	6	6	37	1	0655	(1 A/C ACL 7)
7.	BIG WINDY	11th Co 30th REGT 5th Co 29th REGT	2	0645	33 35	4 1	129 35	2	0655	
8.	BLACK WIDOW RED	EXPLOITATION TEAM 29th REGT	1	0700	4	6	22	3	0710	(3 sorties of sling- loaded explosives af- ter last lift, refuel and stand by at PZ1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A OPORD 32-67 AIR MOVEMENT AND LOADING TABLE

ANNEX A OPORP 32-67 AIR MOVEMENT AND LOADING TABLE

LIFT NO	LIFTING UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	PZ	TIME	ACL	NO A/C	TROOP	LZ	TIME	REMARKS
18.	BLUE STAR	9th Co 29th REGT	1	ON CALL	5	10	50	3		(1 SHIP LZ)
19.	BLACK WIDOW RED	9th Co 29th REGT	1		5	6	30	3		20 min turnaround
20.	BLUE STAR	9th Co 29th REGT 11th Co 29th REGT	1		6	10	60	3		
21.	BLACK WIDOW RED	11th Co 29th REGT	1		6	6	36	3		(includes 23 from 9/29 and 37 from 11/29)
22.	BLACK WIDOW RED	11th Co 29th REGT	1		6	6	36	3		
23.	BLUE STAR	9th Co 30th REGT	2		6	10	60	3		
24.	BLACK WIDOW BLUE	10th Co 29th REGT	1		5	5	25		(BP908750)	CA (1 SHIP LZ)
25.	BLACK WIDOW BLUE	10th Co 29th REGT	1		6	6	36	8		
26.	BLACK WIDOW BLUE	10th Co 29th REGT	1		6	5	30	8		
27.	BLUE STAR	9th Co 30th REGT	2		6	6	60	3		
28.	BLACK WIDOW	10th Co 29th REGT	1		6	10	54	8		
29.	BLUE STAR	9th Co 30th REGT	2		6	6	34	3		
30.	BLACK WIDOW	3rd Bn 29th HQ TAC	3 (BP927812)	On CALL	5	7	32	12 (BP908777)		CA 10 min turnaround

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B OPORDER 32-67 GUNSHIP SUPPORT PLAN

CONFIDENTIAL

	06 00	06 30	07 00	07 30	08 00	08 30	09 00	09 30	10 00	10 30	11 00	
JOKER 1												
	LZ-1						ORBIT BRAVO					ORBIT BRAVO
	XXXXXX											
	25											
SPIDER 1	LZ-2		ORBIT ALPHA				ORBIT ALPHA	LZ-8				
	XXXXXX							XXXXXX				
	25											ON CALL
JOKER 2	LZ-3	ORBIT BRAVO					ORBIT BRAVO	LZ-12				
	XXXXXX							XXXXXX				
	25											ON CALL
SPICER 1				LZ 9&10	ORBIT ALPHA				ORBIT ALPHA			
				XXXXXX								
				30								
	OFFICIA SICK											

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Copy Nr. of Copies
10th Combat Aviation Battalion
Phu Hiep RVN (CQ 2438)
102300 August 1967

Incl 2 to Incl 1
OPORD 31-67

Reference: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000, Series E7014, Map Numbers 6735 I, 6736 II, 6835 IV, 6836 III.

Task Organization

<u>48th AHC</u>	<u>117th AHC</u>	<u>129th AHC</u>	<u>188th AHC</u>
2 LFT	2 LFT	1 LFT	1 LFT
5 UH-1D		1 HFT	13 UH-1H
:		12 UH-1D	
		1 UH-1D C2C (CQ)	
<u>180th ASHC</u>	<u>196th ASHC</u>	<u>10th CAB</u>	
7 CH-47	5 CH-47	1 UH-1D (C2C)	
		1 Dustoff	

1. Situation.

- Enemy forces - Current INTSUM.
- Friendly forces - Current SITREP.
- Attachments - Task organization.

2. Mission - The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion helilifts 14 companies of the Cavalry Regiment and 26th Regiment of the Capitol ROK Infantry Division and 4 Artillery Batteries into 15 landing zones west of Van Canh RVN commencing 120730 August 1967.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of operation.

(1) Manuever - The 10th Combat Aviation Battalion, utilizing 31 UH-1D's and 12 CH-47's will helilift 14 companies of the CRD into 15 LZ's as shown in Annex A (Air Movement and Loading Table). The first phase will consist of 3 flights helilifting the Cavalry Rcgiment and 26th Regiment in a vertical envelopment combat assault into multiple LZ's. Phase two will be the helilifting of the battalion and Regimental Tactical Headquarters and four batteries of artillery into multiple LZ's.

:

(2) Fires.

- Artillery preparation: On call.
- Tactical air support: LZ prep terminated NLT 0730
- Gunship preparation: Annex C, Fire Support Plan.

b. Tasks

- (1) 48th AHC.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (a) Provide 2 LFT's (Joker 1 and Joker 2).
- (b) Provide 5 lift ships (Blue Star Flight).

(2) 117th AMC.

- (a) Provide 2 LFT (Sidewinder 1 and Sidewinder 2).

(3) 129th AMC.

- (a) Provide 1 LFT and 1 HFT (Cobra 1 and Cobra 2).
- (b) Provide 12 UH-1D lift ships (Bulldog Red and Bulldog blue).
- (c) Provide 1 UH-1D C&C for GRID CG.

(4) 188th AMC.

- (a) Provide 1 LFT (Spider 1).
- (b) Provide 13 UH-1D lift ships (Black Widow Red and Black Widow Blue).

(5) 180th ASMC.

Provide 7 CH-47's as lift ships (Big Windy).

(6) 196th ASMC.

Provide 5 CH-47's as lift ships (Flipper).

c. Coordinating instructions.

(1) Time table - Annex (Air Movement and Loading Table).

(2) PZ's.

(a) PZ "A" (BQ 865914) - The PZ will be organized to land two flights in trail in two columns from north to south. Land to the northwest or as directed by PZ control.

(b) PZ "B" (BQ 865897) - The PZ will be organized to land four flights in trail in four columns from north to south. Land to the northwest or as directed by PZ control.

(c) PZ "C" (BQ 925775) - Land four flights in trail in four columns from north to south. Land to the northwest or as directed by PZ control.

(d) PZ "E" (BQ 878903) - No pathfinders. Land to the northwest in trail.

(e) PZ "G" (BQ 823856) - Land two aircraft in trail from north to south. Land to the northwest or as directed by PZ control.

(f) PZ "H" (CQ 103780) - No pathfinders. Land to the northwest in trail.

(3) Aircraft loading: Annex A.

(4) Flight routes, RP's and orbit points: Annex C, Map Overlay

(5) Enroute altitude: Annex C, Map Overlay

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(6) Formations - A 30 second separation will be maintained between UH-1 flights and 60 second separation between CH-47 flights.

- (a) LZ's 1, 2, 6, 7 - Formation enroute V of 3's - landing single ship.
- (b) LZ's 3, 4, 5 - Formation enroute TAC heavy left - landing four ships abreast.
- (c) LZ's 8, 9, 11, 12 - Formation enroute TAC heavy left - Landing 2 ships abreast.
- (d) LZ's 10, 13 - Formation enroute V of 3's - Landing V of 3's.
- (e) LZ 14 - Formation enroute TAC heavy left - Landing 5 ships abreast.

(7) Location of LZ's - Annex A.

(8) Downed aircraft procedures - SOP

(9) Reporting points - Off PZ's, RP's, and Off LZ's.

(10) Weather decision - 0700 by LTC Sawls (Weather delays in one hour increments).

(11) Rules of Engagement - SOP.

(12) Pathfinder organization of PZ's as briefed.

4. Administration and Logistics.

a. Refueling - Aircraft will be refueled at ESSO (CQ 070739) and TEXACO (BR 840055) as prescribed in Annex A.

b. Fuel loads - Aircraft departing Phu Nhiep will top off at ESSO enroute to PZ and aircraft departing Lane Heliport will top off at Lane Heliport prior to leaving for the first LZ. The CH-47 will refuel per company SOP. All subsequent refueling aircraft will top off.

c. Dust Off - Dust off aircraft will orbit over VIC BQ 7999 at 4000' and monitor FM 46.9 and UHF 237.7.

d. Medical evacuation.

(1) Evacuate US wounded to Quin Nhon Evacuation Hospital.

(2) Evacuate ROK wounded to 6th ROK MASH (BR 940228)

e. Rearming - Gunships will rearm at TEXACO (BR 840055).

5. Command and Signal

a. Signal.

- (1) Command Frequencies - FM 45.3, UHF 237.7, VHF 122.7.
- (2) Alternate command frequencies - FM 44.3, UHF 236.7, VHF 122.5.
- (3) Gunships - FM (assigned unit freq) UHF 237.7, VHF 122.7.
- (4) Dust Off - FM 46.9, UHF 237.7.
- (5) FMC - FM 32.4, UHF 301.5 ~~TUM~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(6) Pathfinders FM 47.8.

- (a) LZ A - Alpha Control.
- (b) LZ B - Bravo Control.
- (c) LZ C - Charlie Control.
- (d) LZ H - Hotel Control.
- (e) TEXACO Control - TEXACO refueling point.
- (f) ESSO Control - ESSO refueling point.
- (g) Artillery Control - ("Z "E").

(7) Smoke.

- (a) "Z "A" - Green; "Z "B" - Yellow; "Z "C" - Yellow;
"Z "G" - Yellow.
- (b) LZ - Violet.
- (c) Enemy fire - Red.
- (d) Friendly distress - Green and Yellow.
- (e) Friendly - Yellow

b. Command.

- (1) AMTF Commander - Maj Gen Lew.
- (2) Mission Commander - LTC Sawls.
- (3) Alternate Mission Commander - Maj Fernander.
- (4) 2nd Alternate Mission Commander - Maj McWhorter.

CROOKS
LTC

ANNEXES

- A - Air Movement and Loading Table.
- B - Gunship Support Plan

OFFICIAL:

STECKLY
S-3

DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED AFTER 24 HOURS FOLLOWING
COMPLETION OF OPERATION


CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A OPORD 31-67 AIR MOVEMENT AND LOADING TABLE

LIFT NO	LIFTING UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	PZ	TIME	ACL	NO A/C	TROOPS	LZ	TIME	REMARKS
1	BULLDOG	9 Co Cav Regt	BQ 565914	0730	5	14D's	70	1	0748	CA (ALT LZ) (BQ 622902)
2	BLUESTAR	10 Co 26 Regt	BQ 925775	0730	6	5D's	30	8	0750	CA
3	BLACK WIDOW RED	11 Co Cav Regt	A	0735	6	5D's	30	4	0753	CA
4	BLACK WIDOW BLUE	9 Co 26 Regt	C	0740	6	3D's	18	8	0800	
					35	2 47's	70			
5	BULLDOG	6 Co Cav Regt	BQ 868896	0805	5	14D's	70	6	0822	CA Refuel at TEXACO
6	BLUESTAR	4 Co 26 Regt	C	0810	6	5D's	30	10	0825	(ALT LZ 7 BQ 611969)
7	BLACK WIDOW RED	7 Co Cav Regt	B	0810	34	4-47s	130	BQ 688912	CA Refuel at TEXACO	
					6	5D's	30	5	0828	CA Refuel at ESSO
					36	4-47s	142	BQ 590922		
8	BIG WINDY RED	9 Co 26 Regt	C	0825	36	2	72	8	0845	Refuel at TEXACO
9	BULLDOG BLUE	6 Co Cav Regt	B	0900	5	7D's	35	6	0915	ALL AIRCRAFT REFUEL-
10	BLACK WIDOW RED	7 Co 26 Regt	C	0910	6	5D's	30	12	0925	(ALT LZ 7)
					33	4-47s	130	BQ 677893	CA	
11	BLUESTAR	10 Co Cav Regt	A	0915	6	5D's	30	8	0925	
					36	4-47s	142			

CONFIDENTIAL

UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	PZ	TIME	ACL	NO A/C	TROOPS	LZ	TIME	REMARKS
RED	9 Co Cav Regt	A	0920	5	7D's	36	1	0938	(ALT LZ 2)
BLUE	Arty Security Force (61st Arty)	E	0930	5	2-47s	70			
WIDOW RED	5 Co 26 Regt	BQ 878903	C	0940	6	5D's	30	14	0947 CA
R	11 Co 26 Regt	C	0950	6	4-47s	130	BQ 597984 11	0955	CA
RED	Arty Security Force (10th Arty)	E	1000	5	4-47s	130	BQ 587905 9	1008	CA
WIDOW RED	6 Co Cav Regt	B	1005	35	2-47s	20	BQ 665916 13	1010	CA
						70	BQ 695910 6	1020	(ALT LZ 7)
BLUE	Tac CP 3 Bn Cav Regt	A	1020	6	6	36	4	1035	
WIDOW RED	Tac CP 2 Bn Cav Regt	B	1025	6	6	36	5	1040	
WIDOW BLUE	Tac CP 2 Bn Cav Regt	B	1035	Car	1	Car	5	1050	
WIDOW WHITE	5 Co Cav Regt	B	1040	35	5	170	8	1055	Released for Arty
RED	Tac CP 2 Bn Cav Regt	B	1040	6	6	36	5	1055	
R	Tac CP 2 Bn Cav Regt	B	1050	6	6*	30	5	1105	Final Extraction *1 A/C for Pathfinders P/U 1 BW A/C

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIFT NO	LIFTING UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	LP	TIME	ACL	NO A/C	TROOP	LZ	TIME	REMARKS
24	BIG WINDY RED	Tac CP 3 Bn Cav Regt	A	1100	Car	1	Car	4	1115	
25	BLACK WIDOW RED	Tac CP 2 Bn 26 Regt	C	1105	6	6	36	10	1120	Refuel at TEXACO
26	BULLDOG RED	Tac CP 3 Bn Cav Regt	A	1110	5	6*	26	4	1125	Final Extraction *1 A/C for Pathfinders
27	BIG WINDY BLUE	Tac CP 3 Bn 26 Regt	C	1115	Car	1	Car	8	1130	Refuel at ESSO Refuel at TEXACO
28	BLUESTAR	Tac CP 2 Bn 26 Regt	C	1130	5	6	30	10	1145	Refuel at TEXACO
29	BIG WINDY RED	Tac CP 2 Bn 26 Regt	C	1140	Car	1	Car	10	1155	Refuel at TEXACO
30	BULLDOG BLUE	Tac CP 3 Bn Cav Regt	A	1050	6	6	36	4	1105	Refuel at ESSO
31	BLACK WIDOW RED	Tac CP 2 Bn 26 Regt	C	1155	5	6	31	10	1210	
32	BULLDOG BLUE	Tac CP 3 Bn 26 Regt	C	1155	6	6	36	8	1215	
33	BIG WINDY RED	Tac CP Cav Regt	G	1210	Car	2	Car	5	1225	
34	BULLDOG RED	Tac CP 3 Bn 26 Regt	BQ 823856 C	1215	6	6	36	8	1235	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIFT NO	LIFTING UNIT	LIFTED UNIT	PZ	TIME	ACL.	NO A/C	TROOPS	LZ	TIME	REMARKS
35	BLUESTAR	Tac CP 3 Bn 26 Regt	C	1220	5	6*	25	8	1240	Final Extraction *1 A/C for Pathfinders
36	BLACK WIDOW RED	Tac CP Cav Regt	G	1220	5	6	35	5	1235	Refuel at TEXACO
37	BULLDOG BLUE	Tac CP Cav Regt	G	1230	5	6	30	5	1245	Refuel at ESSO
38	BIG WINDY RED	Tac CP Cav Regt	G	1240	Car	2	Car	5	1255	Refuel at TEXACO
39	BULLDOG RED	Tac CP Cav Regt	G	1250	5	6	30	5	1305	Refuel at ESSO
40	BLUESTAR	Tac CP Cav Regt	G	1300	5	6*	28	5	1315	Final Extraction *1 A/C P/U Pathfinders Refuel at TEXACO ALL AIRCRAFT REFUEL
41	BLACK WIDOW RED	Tac CP 26 Regt	H CQ 105780	1320	5	6	30	11	1345	
42	BULLDOG BLUE	Tac CP 26 Regt	H	1325	5	6	30	11	1350	
43	BIG WINDY RED	Tac CP 26 Regt	H	1340	Car	2	Car	11	1405	
44	BULLDOG RED	Tac CP 26 Regt	H	1345	5	6	30	11	1410	
45	BLUESTAR	Tac CP 26 Regt	H	1400	5	6	30	11	1425	
46	BIG WINDY RED	Tac CP 26 Regt	H	1430	Car	2	30	11	1455	
47	BIG WINDY	4.2 Mort Plat Cav Regt	Van Canh BR 840053	On Order	Car	--	Car	5		3 Sorties
48	BIG WINDY	4.2 Mort Plat 26 Regt	Van Canh BR 840053	On Order	Car	--	Car	11		3 Sorties OFFICIAL
										STECKLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

	0730	0800	0900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400
*COBRA 1	LZ-2 0748	(ALT 3)		LZ-12 0925			REFUEL AT STANDBY	
COBRA 2	LZ 8 0750			LZ 14 0947			PZ (C) 1220	
SPIDER 1	LZ 4 0753			LZ 11 (NO PREP) 0955				
*JOKER 1		ESCORT LZ 2&7 0822		LZ 9 1008				
JOKER 2	LZ 10 0825			LZ 13 (NO PREP) 1010				
SIDEWINDER 1	LZ 25 0828			PZ(B) FE 1050	PZ (A) FE 1110		PZ (C) FE 1300	
SIDEWINDER 2		ESCORT TO LZ 8					REFUEL & STNBY	OFFICER STECKY 3-3
*FIRE TEAM COORDINATORS								

CONFIDENTIAL