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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 1st Brigade
25th Infantry Division
APO 96385

AVDCFB-C

21 March 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation YELLOWSTONE)

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO 96225

1. Name: Operation YELLOWSTONE
2. Dates: 080600 Dec 67 to 242400 Feb 68
3. Location: War Zone "C"
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division
5. ¹(8) Reporting Officers:
 - 1st Brigade: COL Edwin Marks (8 Dec 67 to 18 Dec 67)
 - LTC Fremont B. Hodson Jr. (19 Dec 67 to 24 Feb 68)
 - 4-9 Inf: LTC John M. Henschman
 - 2-14 Inf: LTC Alfred M. Bracy
 - TF 2-34 Armor: LTC Hal B. Rhyne (8 Dec 67 to 14 Feb 68)
 - LTC John H. Tipton (15 Feb 68 to 24 Feb 68)
 - TF 1-5 Inf (M): MAJ Ralph A. Hook (20 Dec 67 to 1 Jan 68)
 - LTC Henry B. Murphy Jr. (2 Jan 68 to 24 Feb 68)
 - 2-12 Inf: LTC Ralph D. Tice (28 Dec 67 to 16 Jan 68)
6. ¹(8) Task Organization:
 - a. 8 Dec 67: HHC, 1st Brigade

4-9 Inf Bn
2-14 Inf Bn
1-49 ARVN Inf Bn
TF 2-34 Armor

B Co, 1-5 Mech
A Co, 1-5 Mech
C Co, 2-34 Armor (-)

1-27 Artillery (Bn) (Bn) (7-11 Arty)

C, Bn, 2-32 Artillery

POD, 1st Bn, 1st Bn

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~~7-11 Arty Bn (DS)~~
B Co, 65th Engr Bn (DS)
Signal Support Element (DS)
1st Plat, 25th MP Co
B Co, 725th Maint (SPT)
D Co, 25th Med Co
DISCOM Fwd Spt Element (SPT)
Sec, QM GRREG Plat (SPT)
Fwd Spt Sec, 25th S&T (SPT)

b. Changes:

- (1) 171200 Dec 67: 1-49 ARVN Inf Bn released OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (2) 201400 Dec 67: TF 1-5 Inf (M) OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (3) 271000 Dec 67: 2-22 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (4) 281138 Dec 67: 2-12 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (5) 281632 Dec 67: 2-22 Inf (M) OPCON 3d Brigade.
281632 Dec 67: 2-14 Inf Bn OPCON 3d Brigade.
- (6) 300800 Dec 67: 2-14 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (7) 010700 Jan 68: TF 1-5 Inf (M) released OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (8) 021115 Jan 68: 4-9 OPCON 3d Brigade.
- (9) 021631 Jan 68: 3-22 Inf (-) OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (10) 050930 Jan 68: 3-22 Inf (-) OPCON 3d Brigade.
- (11) 160615 Jan 68: 4-9 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (12) 160615 Jan 68: 2-12 Inf (-) OPCON 3d Brigade.
- (13) 230615 Jan 68: 1-5 Inf (M) (-) OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (14) 270500 Jan 68: 1-5 Inf (M) (-) released OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (15) 310600 Jan 68: 1-5 Inf (M) (-) OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (16) 020700 Feb 68: TF 2-34 Armor released B Co, 1-5 Inf (M) to TF 1-5 Inf (M) and received OPCON C Co, 2-14 Inf.

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- (17) 100600 Feb 68: Tf 1-5 Inf (M) OPCON 3d Brigade.
- (18) 131800 Feb 68: A Co, 2-22 Inf (M) OPCON 1st Brigade attached to TF 2-34.
- (19) 171800 Feb 68: 2-27 Inf OPCON 1st Brigade.
- (20) 180800 Feb 68: 2-27 Inf OPCON 3d Brigade.

7. ~~N~~(8) Supporting Forces:

a. Artillery:

(1) The 7th Bn, 11th Artillery was airlifted to FSB CUSTER (XT 333896) on D-Day to provide close fire support for the 1st Brigade. During the operation the following fire support bases were utilized:

- (a) FSB KNOX XT 280 778
- (b) FSB SCOTT XT 265 930
- (c) FSB BEAUREGARD XT 380 855
- (d) FSB HILL XT 278 680
- (e) FSB WAINWRIGHT XT 282 528
- (f) FSB WAINWRIGHT II XT 288 509
- (g) FSB BAILEY XT 338 852

(2) Ammunition expended included 49,363 rounds HE, 775 rounds WP, 16 rounds smoke, and 191 rounds illumination. Artillery fires accounted for 102 enemy KIA (BC) and 99 KIA (POSS). GSR and reinforcing units were used extensively for firing TOTs, preparation of landing zones, large tactical targets, and the H&I program. The operation was characterized by almost total use of air movement for repositioning and resupply of the artillery units. Extensive and effective use was made of direct fire techniques utilizing fuze time for perimeter defense. Artillery support throughout the operation was excellent.

b. Tactical Air: Tactical air support was provided by the 7th USAF. The missions were controlled by the 1st Brigade TACP.

- (1) Missions flown: 292

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Lighter sorties: 546

- (a) Preplanned: 236
- (b) Immediate: 194
- (c) Diverts: 38
- (d) Preplanned Diverts: 78

(3) Results: Bunkers destroyed - 589; bunkers damaged - 37; trenches destroyed - 2075 meters; trenches uncovered - 1550 meters; fighting positions (spider holes) - 45; structures destroyed - 91; structures damaged 19; sampans destroyed - 5; VC KBA (BC) - 49; VC KBA (POSS) - 135; gun or mortar positions destroyed - 13; tunnel entrances uncovered - 22; secondary fires - 11; secondary explosions - 17; supply caches uncovered and destroyed - 2.

c. Army Aviation:

- (1) Sorties UH1 aircraft. (Total 1,947)
 - (a) Gunships: 300
 - (b) Tactical troop lifts: 142
 - (c) Resupply: 855
 - (d) Air evac, C&C, Recon and misc: 650
- (2) Sorties CH-47 aircraft. (Total 650)
 - (a) Resupply: 645
 - (b) Evacuation: 5
- (3) Sorties CH-54 aircraft for resupply: 0
- (4) Sorties OH23G aircraft. (Total 2,250)
- (5) Ammunition expended. N/A

8. ~~NC~~ Intelligence:

a. Intelligence collection and studies, prior to the start of Operation YELLOWSTONE, indicated that War Zone "C" had long been a major VC/NVA base area for elements of COSVN HQ and subordinate units consisting of: 69th

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Artillery Regt, 1st Guard Bn, 680th Training Regt, 7th NVA Div, 82d Rear Services Group, and possible elements of the 9th NVA Div. The total strength of these units was estimated between 10,000 and 14,000; however, in late November 1967, the 9th VC Div moved into Northwestern Binh Long Province and other units were dispersed down to battalion-size units throughout War Zone "C". Initially their pattern of activity was to defend supply areas and to fight delay actions, allowing COSVN Ho to move north across the Cambodian Border. Once this was accomplished, enemy forces conducted counter sweep operations and attacks on friendly base camps.

b. War Zone "C" is characterized by extremely heavy jungle vegetation and occasional open areas. The hydrography of the area is restricted to two small streams which had little effect on friendly or enemy movement. The terrain was heavily dotted with trenches and fortifications. The largest concentrations appeared to be in headquarters and cache areas just south of the Cambodian Border.

c. In the first week of the Operation, friendly units met with little enemy resistance. Most of the contact was limited to indirect fire harrassment and probing actions. Intelligence indicated that COSVN HQ and its security guard units were located due north of KATUM, probably moving across the border. Other unit dispositions and locations were unknown; however, it was suspected that elements of the NVA 7th Div were dispersed to the south and east of KATUM. There were no signs of a mass exodus of War Zone "C", upon the arrival of US troops.

d. Significant contacts during the operation were generally with company or smaller sized units defending base camps. There were a few instances of enemy units attacking ARVN or FWF during sweeps, but the majority of activity involved contact with VC/NVA units in heavily fortified base camps or forward defensive positions. Enemy tactics were to make the operation as costly as possible while committing a minimum number of troops. He made extensive use of indirect fire, employing 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars, and 122mm rockets. These attacks were generally used for harrassing purposes, attempting to inflict casualties and destroy supplies rather than to support ground attacks. However the enemy did on two occasions demonstrate a capability to conduct a multi-battalion attack on friendly FSBs.

e. The enemy employed AT mines on Route 4, but AP mines and booby traps were conspicuous by their absence.

f. Significant enemy losses:

(1) 08 and 09 Dec 67: 4-9 Inf Bn vic XT 289 938 located three caches containing 350 tons of unpolished rice. The rice was later evacuated.

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(2) 200140-200500 Dec 67. The 4-9 Inf Bn FSB BEAUREGUARD (XT 380 855) was attacked by an estimated 1-2 NVA battalions from the 141st NVA Regt. Results: 6 US KIA, 12 US WIA; 40 VC KIA (BC), 33 KIA (POSS), 18 small arms, 9 crew-served weapons, and 1 PRC-10 radio captured.

(3) 041030 Jan 68. B Co 2-14 Inf located and destroyed 40 tons of polished rice vic XT 358 858.

(4) 171428-171700 Jan 68. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated 2 VC companies vic XT 348 908. Results: 2 US KIA, 13 US WIA; 13 VC KIA (BC), 1 small arm and 5 heavy weapons captured.

(5) 251415-251620 Jan 68. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated VC company vic XT 248 952. Results: 1 US KIA, 16 US WIA; 20 VC KIA (BC).

(6) 031513 Feb 68. A Co 4-9 Inf ambushed a VC squad vic XT 362 870 resulting in 7 VC KIA (BC), 2 pounds of documents, and 1 machine gun.

(7) 070015 Feb 68. 1st Brigade CRIP ambushed an estimated VC company, vic XT 186 504. Results: 1 US WIA, 2 PF WIA; 26 VC KIA (BC).

(8) 161245-170900 Feb 68. 2-14 Inf engaged one VC battalion vic XT 242 483 entrenched in Tay Ninh City. Results: 4 US KIA, 25 US WIA; 81 VC KIA (BC).

(9) 19 Feb. 2-14 Inf engaged an estimated VC company with all organic weapons and supporting fires vic XT 0754. Results: 3 US WIA; 66 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC POW, 81 rounds 107mm rockets, and 114 rounds 82mm mortar.

g. The heavy jungle in War Zone "C" made movement slow and tiring. Streams were for the most part an insignificant factor in effecting movement. The ground was hard, but the jungle restricted movement of tracked vehicles to the road.

h. Observation and fields of fire were extremely limited by the dense vegetation. The VC overcame this by making extensive use of observers in trees. In this manner the VC were able to accurately adjust mortar fire on the FSBs.

1. The overall evaluation of the intelligence information gained from local and attached sources was considered to be C-3 (sometimes reliable, possibly true). In War Zone "C" there was a lack of local agents. Most intelligence was from the combat troops and aerial detection devices. Operational security of Operation YELLOWSTONE was considered fair.

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ENEMY LOSSES

DATE: 8 Dec 67 - 24 Feb 68

	<u>4-9</u>	<u>2-14</u>	<u>2-34</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Names of Other Units In Operation</u>	<u>TOTAL LOSSES</u>
KIA (BC)	100	287	19	84	Air Force	490
KIA (POSS)	123	159	10	45	2-12 Inf	337
Detainees		3	20	35	2-22 Inf (M)	58
PW's				4	1-5 Inf (M)	4
Civil Def			4	7	3-17 Cav	11
Inn CIV			16	27	1-49 ARVN	43
SA Wpns	29	14	7	20	7-11 Bn Arty	70
Heavy Wpns	9	17	2	6	1-27 Bn Arty	34
SA Ammo	23,593	7,100	452	120	2-32 Bn Arty	31,265
HE Ammo	262	937	80	272	3-13 Bn Arty	1,551
Mines & BT's	30	37	145	24	2-77 Battery	236
Rice (ton)	11½	39½		475		526
Structures	81	92	19	11		203
Bunkers	500	616	67	129		1,312
Documents (LB)	17	47½	1	5		70½
Tunnels (M)	421	186	10			617
Sampans		4		3		7
Foxholes	248	167	12	38		465
Trench						1,810
Radio's	1	1		3		5

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Miscellaneous Items Captured/Destroyed

Commo Wire - 60 lb.	Protective Masks - 4
Scissors - 1 Pr.	Telephones - 1
Diesel Engine - 1	Knives - 3
Foot Bridges - 5	Canteens - 13
Fish - 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Tons	
Stoves - 8	
Bayonets - 1	
Sugar - 15 lb.	
Beans - 150 lb.	
Garden Plots - 3	
Medical Supplies - 12 lb.	
Fish Traps - 6	
Cows - 5	
Miscellaneous Foods - 15 lb.	
Salt - 3 tons	
Fertilizer - 400 lb.	
Sandals - 10 pr	
Aiming Stakes - 2	
Sewing Kits - 1	
Water Buffalo - 2	
Miscellaneous items - 5 lbs.	
Loud Speakers - 1 Set	
Hammocks - 1	
Tables - 6	
Bamboo Ladder - 3	
Live Stock Corral - 3	
Lard - 50 lb.	
Cabbage - 50 heads	
Sleds - 2	
Propaganda Leaflets - 12 lb.	
Bicycles - 35	
Cooking Areas - 6	
Web Gear - 17	
Weapon Magazines - 26	
Ponchos - 18	
Clothing - 80 lb.	
Wells - 16	
Cooking Equipment - 50 lbs.	
Tools - 59 lbs.	
Typewriter - 1	
Pigs - 5	
Chickens - 50	

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9. ~~(S)~~ Mission: The 1st Brigade received the mission to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces and installations in War Zone "C" and to complete the following engineer projects:

a. Construct USSF/CIDG camp and type II C-123 airfield at Thien Ngan (vic XT 0881).

b. Construct USSF/CIDG camp and rehabilitate airfield to type II C-130 at KATUM (vic XT 3390).

c. Clear, improve and maintain the following roads for military convoy traffic:

(1) Route 4 (XT 284 618 to XT 333 903)

(2) Route 243 (XT 284 618 to XT 335 575)

(3) Route 247 (XT 101 758 to XT 272 772)

10. ~~(S)~~ Concept of the operation: The 1st Brigade conducted combat operations with the 4-9 Inf, 2-14 Inf, and the TF 2-34 Armor constituting the major force. Combat operations were designed to support the engineer effort at KATUM and PREK KLOK, THEIN NGON, and secure logistical convoys to KATUM, and to search out and destroy VC/NVA forces and bases. This operation was conducted in three phases.

a. Phase I. (D-Day to D+10) The 4-9 Inf, 2-14 Inf, 7-11 Artillery and the 588th Engineer battalion were airlifted into the CIDG secured LZ at KATUM, and conducted combat assault vic KATUM with the 4-9 Inf and 2-14 Inf. TF 2-34 Armor secured movement of the heavy engineer equipment to KATUM, artillery to PREK KLOK, and logistical convoys on Route 4 from MUI BA DAN to KATUM, and began improving the KATUM airstrip to receive C-130 aircraft.

b. Phase II (D+10 to D+60) The 1st Brigade conducted methodical search and destroy operations within the TAOR, opened Route 4 for overland resupply to PREK KLOK and KATUM.

c. Phase III (After D+60) YELLOWSTONE forces began phasing down. 2-14 Inf and HHC 1st Brigade returned to TAY NINH BASE CAMP 8 Feb 68 with the remaining elements closing TAY NINH 23 Feb 68.

11. ~~(S)~~ Execution: 1st Brigade received the 25th Infantry Division OPLAN 18-67 (Operation YELLOWSTONE) dated 281900H Nov 67. The 1st Brigade prepared and implemented OPORD 12-67 (Operation YELLOWSTONE) dated 031200H Dec 67. In executing D-Day of Operation YELLOWSTONE each battalion of the Brigade Task

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Force prepared their OPORD. The 2-14 Inf and the 4-9 Inf conducted a combat assault into LZ's in the vicinity of KATUM securing objectives designed to provide security to the Task Force elements to be quartered at KATUM. The 588th Engr Bn from D-20 to D-1 cleared and opened roads required to support Operation YELLOWSTONE, and on D-Day convoyed to KATUM. On D-Day the 7-11 Artillery Bn was airlifted from TAY NINH to KATUM (FSB CUSTER). TF 2-34 Armor from D-2 to D-1 occupied FSB BLISS (XT 287 642) and FSB HILL (XT 278 680) while on D-Day the TF 2-34 Armor attacked north to establish a FSB at PREK KLOK (XT 288 815).

b. Significant contact:

(1) 11 Dec 67: 4-9 Inf in an ambush patrol vic XT 275 960 engaged 2 VC with small arms at 0135H. At 0218H this AP received 50 rounds of 60mm mortar resulting in 1 KIA and 8 WIA. The mortar fire lasted 21 minutes. The AP requested a LFT, counter-mortar ship, and a Spooky. Artillery fire was provided from FSB CUSTER (XT 333 903). At 0311H mortar fire began again with 10 rounds of 60mm from vic XT 268 975. At 0316H, 14 rounds of 60mm and 1 RPG were received from vic XT 265 966. Losses: 2 KIA and 22 WIA. VC losses unknown. NOTE: By engaging the 2 VC with unknown results the 4-9 Inf compromised their position but did not relocate.

(2) 120845 Dec 67: While the 1-49 ARVN Inf was combat assaulting to an LZ vic XT 378 858, one of the UH1Hs carrying troops was shot down vic XT 334 915. The LZ was initially cold at 0836H, but as the third lift to 1-49 Inf landed on the LZ at 0901H, they received 60mm mortar fire, indicating the LZ was hot. The mortar was spotted at XT 390 857 and engaged with a gunship and artillery. Mortar contact was broken at 0937H. The LZ remained cold after 0937H.

(3) 121130 Dec. The CO HHC, 1st Brigade C&C ship received small arms fire from vic XT 343 913. Artillery was fired into the area. At 1130H also a CH-47 extracting a UH-1D from XT 342 913 received fire from XT 342 913. At 1304H FAC received fire from XT 342 913 resulting in no hits. At 1425H, B Company 2-14 Inf received small arms fire from XT 342 913, returning fire with artillery and organic weapons. At 1508H B company 2-14 Inf received additional fire from XT 342 913 again returning fire with artillery. At 1514H FAC received BAR fire from XT 342 913 and again artillery fire was delivered into the area. Losses: no friendly; enemy unknown. NOTE: Artillery does not negate the necessity for the infantry to move through an area to clear the area of VC.

(4) 140827 Dec 67: A Company 2-14 Inf received SA and AW fire from vic XT 343 912 from an estimated 2 VC. Contact was broken at 0829H with no casualties. Contact was reestablished at 0844H resulting in 1 KIA and 1 WIA. Contact was broken [REDACTED] 1035H with A Co receive-

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ing SA and AW fire and rifle grenades resulting in 2 WIA. Contact broken at 1038H and reestablished at 1056H from a bunker vic XT 343 913 with A Co receiving AW fire and RPG from an estimated 20 VC 90mm fire was delivered point blank on the bunker and an airstrike delivered at XT 343 912. The airstrike resulted in 2 US WIA from A Co and one WIA from C Co who had maneuvered into the area to assist A company. At 1540H A company continued to sweep to XT 338 909 while C Company sweep to XT 342 914 without contact. Friendly losses: 2 KIA, 15 WIA; enemy losses: 2 VC (BC).

(5) 140940 Dec: C Company 4-9 Inf received SA fire and claymore from vic XT 245 941 with sporadic fire continuing until 0950H. B Company moved in to block the trails vic XT 251 937. Contact was maintained until about 1100H. An airstrike was delivered at 1105H to XT 250 940. B Company moved to the north flank as the contact was reestablished at 1115H. Contact at 1120H was vic XT 245 944 with this contact broken at 1147H. Friendly losses: 6 KIA, 18 WIA; enemy losses: 7 KIA (BC), 10 KIA (POSS), and 3 RPG - 2 rounds.

(6) 150640 Dec. KATUM Base Camp received 35-40 60mm mortar rounds. At first light when C Company 2-14 Inf examined the perimeter they found that one claymore mine had had the wires cut and one claymore had been turned around.

(7) 161024 Dec: B Company 4-9 Inf received AW fire from an estimated VC platoon vic XT 245 942. The VC platoon had 7 AW firing. D Company began moving from XT 241 944 at 1035H to assist B Company. VC contact with B Company was broken at 1059H and reestablished at 1103H as 3 AW began firing from XT 245 942, resulting in 1 US WIA. CSRCA was placed on the VC position at 1118H. Contact was broken at 1145H with B Company moving to XT 245 939. D Company established contact vic XT 246 944 at 1214H and breaking off at 1230H without casualties.

(8) 200140 Dec: The 4-9 Inf at FSB BEAUREGARD (XT 380 855) received 95 rounds 82mm and 60mm mortar. At 0230H infiltrators were reported inside the perimeter. The infiltrator set fire to the artillery ammunition resulting in 620 rounds 105mm burning. At 0346H the FSB was surrounded by an estimated 1-2 NVA battalion. At 0405H the land line communications with the FSB were cut. The mortar attack ceased at 0550H then began again at 0705H. Contact was broken at 0735H. Friendly losses: 6 KIA, 12 WIA; enemy losses: 40 KIA (BC), 33 KIA (POSS).

(9) 171428 Jan 68. C company 2-14 Inf established contact vic XT 348 903 with an estimated 2 VC companies. The contact began with C Company receiving SA, and AW, from an estimated 3-10 VC. Fire was returned with SA, AW, artillery, and gunships. From this contact C Company sustained 1 WIA. Contact remained until at 1515H A Company, who was maneuvering into

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the area, received fire at vic XT 345 906 resulting in 1 WIA. Contact remained as C Company reported 2 KIA and 10 WIA at 1535H. At 1705H the VC force was estimated to have a reinforced platoon in the woods with 2 platoons in bunkers. Contact was broken at 1730H with sporadic fire remaining until about 1830H. Friendly losses: 2 KIA, 13 WIA; enemy losses: 13 KIA (BC), 14 KIA (POSS).

(10) 251402 Jan 68. B Company 2-14 Inf received SA fire at XT 248 952 from an estimated reinforced VC squad. The gunships on station supported B Company with fire. At 1430H the FAC ship on station received 2 hits with negligible damage. At 1430H A Company received SA fire at XT 248 953 which resulted in the CO of A Company being wounded. At 1443H A and C Companies consolidated under the command of CO C Company. B Company moved into the area and at 1535H B company was at XT 248 952 and A and C Companies at XT 248 954 with the VC force between the 2-14 Inf elements. Contact remained until 1715H. Friendly losses: 1 KIA, 16 WIA; enemy losses: 20 KIA (BC).

(11) 06 Feb 68. NVA/VC forces employed CS RCA at PREK KLOK. The CS was in burlap bags, tied with rope and wire, and had an explosive charge attached to the outside of the bag. About 6 bags were placed adjacent to the perimeter. Three bags did not detonate. These bags were evacuated to Division. The bags which did detonate were placed downwind from PREK KLOK and were not effective against the camp.

(12) 11 Feb 68. KATUM Base Camp received 32 rounds of 82mm mortar. Some of the rounds contained "gas" which incapacitated 10 individuals. The casualties were reported to be nauseous and have headaches at 1002H. By 1330H all of these casualties had been returned to duty.

(13) 150825 Feb 68: A Company 588th Engr Bn and 1 platoon of A Company 2-22 Inf (M) enroute to THIEN NGON were ambushed by an estimated VC company at XT 089 790. The VC fired AW and RPG resulting in 10 KIA, and 2 APC destroyed. The contact was broken at 0850H with unknown VC losses.

(14) 160115 Feb 68. PHU KOUNG, XT 234 746, began receiving mortar and 122mm rocket fire and ground attack. MACV requested and got 1 APC ARVN troop and 2 ARVN Inf companies to support MACV. Action broke at 0245H as it began at BIEN KEO, XT 231 435. At 0310H the mortar fire began again at PHU KOUNG and BIEN KEO, but the ground attack had ceased. At 0345H, as both contacts continued, PHU KOUNG reported VC had entered the MACV compound. One VC POW, captured by MACV, stated that his unit was from NUI BA DEN and that the unit would continue the attack until after sunrise, then would return to NUI BA DEN. Contact was broken at PHU KOUNG at 0530H but continued at BIEN KEO. At 0545H the VC CP was suspected to be located vic XT 245 485; and the TAY NINH Province Chief requested US forces to sweep the

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area XT 250 493 to XT 250 495 to XT 270 493 to XT 270 470 giving orders to fire any type ordnance the US forces required. By 1200H 2-14 Inf was sweeping the area vic XT 27 49 and XT 28 50. The combined forces at this time was 4 US companies and ARVN companies. Contact was established at 1245H and continued vic XT 241 483 at 1905H and B and C Companies 2-14 Inf moved to support A Company 2-22 Inf (M). At 1959H three airstrikes were delivered at XT 244 486. Sporadic contact and mortar fire continued to 170425 Feb. At 170806 Feb it was reported that the VC unit had withdrawn at 170300 Feb. Contact was not reestablished. Friendly losses: 4 KIA, 25 WIA; enemy losses: 81 KIA (BC). The VC force was estimated at 1 battalion.

(16) 190800 Feb 68. 2-14 Inf established contact with an estimated VC company firing all organic weapons and supporting fires vic XT 075 534. Sporadic contact was maintained all day. Friendly losses: 3 WIA; enemy losses: 66 KIA (BC), and 2 POW.

12. ~~(C)~~ Results:

a. Personnel:

(1)	FRIENDLY	KIA	WIA	NBC	MIA	TOTAL	
	4/9	20	154	1		175	
	2/14	13	194	18		225	
	2/34	15	92	15		122	
	1/5	4	1	1		6	
	2/12	2	10	5		17	
	HHC	5	7			12	
	OTHERS	59	458	40		557	
(2)	ENEMY	4/9	2/14	1/5	2/12	HHC	OTHERS
				2/34			
	KIA (BC)	100	287	19		7	77
	KIA (POSS)	123	159	10		13	32
(3)	KILL RATIO	FRIENDLY/ENEMY					
	4/9	1 - 5					
	2/14	1 - 11.9					
	2/34	1 - 1.2					
	1/5						
	TOTAL	1 - 6					

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b. Equipment:

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>QTY</u>
ACCESSORY OUTFIT, field	1 ea
ALARM SET, AN/GSS9	4 ea
ARMORER VEST, protective	80 ea
BAG, waterproof	105 ea
BAYONET KNIFE, w/scabbard	108 ea
BARBER KIT	2 ea
BELT, pistol	107 ea
BINOCULAR 6X30 MIL RET	1 ea
BLANKET WOOL, bed olive green	61 ea
BOOT, tropical	105 ea
CANTEEN, plastic water 2qt	267 ea
CANTEEN, plastic	6 ea
COMPASS, magnetic lensatic	6 ea
CARRIER, personnel, M13A1	1 ea
COVER, canteen aluminum	111 ea
DRAWERS, men cotton OG-109	40 ea
FORK, field mess	70 ea
GENERATOR SET, 3KW	1 ea
GLASSES, sun protection	10 ea
GLOVES, leather, work type	50 ea
HAMMOCK, jungle	105 ea
HANDKERCHIEF, cotton	60 ea
HEADNET, mosquito	70 ea
HELMET, steel	95 ea
KNIFE, field mess	105 ea
LAUNCHER, grenade	3 ea
LINER, helmet, soldiers	95 ea
LINER, poncho, nylon	122 ea
MACHINE GUN 7.62mm M-60	11 ea
MACHETE, w/o sheath	8 ea
MASK, protective, field M-17	264 ea
MATTRESS, pneumatic	105 ea
PACK, combat field	105 ea
PAN, mess kit CRS	105 ea
PISTOL, .45 Cal	14 ea
PONCHO, nylon	119 ea
POUCH, ammunition	201 ea
PLOTTING BOARD, M-16	1 ea
RADIO SET AN/PRR 9	14 ea
RADIO SET AN/PRC 25	3 ea
RADIO SET AN/GRC 106	1 ea
RADIO, TRANSMITTER	9 ea

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RECEIVER, TRANSMITTER RADIO RT524	1 ea
RIFLE 5.6mm M-16E1	44 ea
RIFLE, RECOILLESS 90mm M6F	3 ea
RUCKSACK, nylon w/frame	107 ea
SIGHT UNIT 60mm	2 ea
SOCK, nylon w/olive green 109	200 ea
SHOVEL, entrenching tool	105 ea
SPOON, field mess CRS	70 ea
SUB-MACHINEGUN CAR 15 5.56mm	2 ea
SUSPENDERS, field pack	105 ea
TANK, combat M48A3	4 ea
TABLEWARE, OUTFIT field	1 ea
TENT, shelter half	105 ea
TOWEL, bath, olive green	200 ea
TROUSERS, men's tropical	727 ea
TRUCK, cargo 3/4 ton	1 ea
TRUCK, utility 1/4 ton	1 ea
TYPEWRITER, non-port, non-elect	1 ea
UNDERSHIRT, cotton, olive green 109	250 ea

13. (g) Administrative Matters:

a. PX facilities were not available to the troops in the field on this operation. A mobile PX was considered but deemed not acceptable in that this would automatically result in the discontinuance of sundry packs. Any desired items not included in these packs could be purchased by designated unit individuals at Tay Ninh and sent out on resupply. This is preferable to the certain inequities that would occur if a mobile PX was available at the forward base camp.

b. There was considerable difficulty in the rapid distribution of mail in the early and intermediate stages of the operation. This was largely due to the irregular air service. A regularly scheduled cargo plane eliminated this problem.

c. Difficulties were also experienced in getting replacements, returning R&R personnel, etc.: from Cu Chi to Tay Ninh and Katum. Again this was largely due not only to irregular aerial service but also insufficient flights. Getting soldiers back to their units was always slow. The problem would have been at incalculable proportions if it were not for the frequent ground convoys.

d. Supply: All classes of supply were drawn from Tay Ninh LSA who operated a forward support area at Katum. Supply convoys were operated daily and controlled by DISCOM Forward. Water points were operated at Katum, Prek Kloc, and Bau CO by the 588th Engineer Battalion. The Support Base Knox all

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potable water was supplied by a water point operated by the 65th Engineers. Showers points at Katum were operated by Tay Ninh LSA and at Bau CO by 588th Engineers. The greatest problem area of supply was ice, which seemed to be in limited supply at all forward camps.

(1) Class I:

"A" RATIONS	251,439 meals
"C" RATIONS	183,375 meals
LRRP RATIONS	680 meals
SUNDRY PACKS	1,079 ea.

(2) Class II and IV: A total of 345 tons was used in support of the operation.

(3) Class III:

Mogas	46,490 gal
Diesel	73,800 gal
Lub oil OE-30	2,370 gal
Lub oil OE-10	1,159 gal
Lub oil OE-50	1,450 gal
Lub oil OE-90	325 gal
Grease AA	85 lb
Solvent	55 gal
Hydraulic fluid (brake)	84 gal
Hydraulic fluid (ramp)	87 gal
Aviation Gas	13,232 gal
JP-4	18,000 gal

(4) Class V:

Ctg, 5.56mm	41.3 tons
Ctg, 7.62mm	82.0 tons
Ctg, Cal .45	2.8 tons
Ctg, Cal .50	139.2 tons
Ctg, 40mm	16.9 tons
Ctg, 81mm	347.0 tons
Ctg, 90mm	808.4 tons
Ctg, 106mm	3.6 tons
Ctg, 60mm	210.0 tons
Ctg, 4.2 Mortar	279.5 tons
Hand Grenades	14.5 tons
Smoke Grenades	15.5 tons
Mine, claymore	5.7 tons
Miscel, (flares, demo, sig)	13.3 tons

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e. Maintenance: Maintenance teams from the battalions were with their respective units. They were able to perform all 2nd echelon vehicular maintenance. The 725th Maintenance Battalion provided some maintenance facilities. No 3rd echelon maintenance was provided in the field. Problem areas for the 2/34 Armor were:

- (1) Procurement of tank engines
- (2) Availability of repair parts for M73 machine gun
- (3) Support maintenance for fire control instruments, artillery and artillery and small arms.

f. Treatment of casualties, evacuation, and hospitalization: Dust-Off support was provided by Cu Chi and Tay Ninh MEDEVAC units. Battalion aid stations treated patients for minor ailments and "D" CO, 25th Medical Clearing Station located at Katum handled all cases beyond the capabilities of the battalion stations.

g. Transportation: Transportation was provided by organic vehicles, CH-47, C-130, C-123, UHID.

h. Communications: Communications were provided by brigade and battalion sections; this consisted of FM and RTT. UHF was provided by 125th Signal Battalion.

i. Medical Evaluation: Personal health was generally good throughout the operation. One significant problem area, was that of rat control. Control measures included:

- (1) Proper police of area, especially the mess area.
- (2) Use of anti-coagulant poison.
- (3) Use of traps and snares.
- (4) Dapafane Malaria Prophylaxis was used in addition to the Chlorequins-Primacuin tablets. No malaria was reported during the operation. Common complaints included colds, minor cuts and scratches, and at first, sunburn. Skin irritations were a persistent problems with most resulting from the heat. These were minimized by the daily use of showering facilities.

14. ~~(C)~~ Special Equipment and Techniques. None reported.

15. ~~(C)~~ Commander's Analysis:

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a. All engineer projects assigned to the 1st Brigade were completed (USSF/CIDG camps at KATUM and THEIN NGON and improving the airstrip at KATUM to receive C-130 aircraft and constructing an airstrip at THEIN NGON to receive C-123 aircraft).

b. The roads were secured, cleared, and improved to support the Brigade operations within War Zone "C" and the Brigade located and destroyed many VC/NVA bases and forces. At about D+30 there was a substantial decrease in VC contact as the VC moved into the Saigon area for their TET offensive.

c. From 18 Jan 68 to 15 Feb 68 all contact with the VC was with very small units or scattered individuals. During this time minor mortar attacks were the only VC offensive actions. Major contact was established on 15, 16, and 17 Feb 68 which suggested that some of the units which had moved to the Saigon area had returned. On 19 Feb 68, the 2-14 Inf located a VC company area which was suspected to have conducted the mortar attacks on the TAY NINH Base Camp.

d. Action continued throughout the Operation YELLOWSTONE with sporadic contact almost daily.

e. The use of airmobile assets enabled the Brigade to assault a large portion of its TAOR. Without airmobile assets the Brigade was restricted to the immediate vicinity of its base camps. When restricted to assault entirely by ground movement, the effectiveness was minimal since the VC units began to move around the US installations and effective ground range.

f. Eagle flights were conducted infrequently because of the requirement to support US forces with artillery and the difficulty in moving and securing arty at temporary FSB's based on the dense jungles and lack of CH-47's to accomplish timely movements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Joseph F. Mc Cormack
145 DW
for THOMAS A. STOIY
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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