

By AB/mgNARA, Date 9/92

33

*NOVEMBER  
TIME FRAMES*

G. (U) SIGNAL Illegible; omitted, Hqs, DA.

H. (U) Aviation Medicine

1 (U) Treatment - Aid Station Operations. Illegible; withdrawn, Hqs, DA.

2 (U) Preventive Medicine and Immunization. Immunizations have been brought very near the 100% level throughout the Battalion. This has been accomplished by establishing a "shot" line at the pay line each payday, and has proved to be very effective. The weekly program of malaria chemoprophylaxis of USARV has been complied with. A peak incidence of falciparum malaria in the infantry units stationed at Camp RANIER, DAU TIENG, RVN, occurred during late November and December. The malaria was known to have been innoculated during these units' operations in the field. As a result, there was a directive by the 25th Infantry Division, which this Battalion supports, concerning malaria chemoprophylaxis which obligated the 188th Assault Helicopter Company, located at DAU TIENG, to initiate and terminate a 28 day period of Dapsone chemoprophylaxis for malaria. Venereal disease remains at a moderate level. A news-letter educational program on VD and other preventive medicine subjects has been initiated by one of the Battalion flight surgeons. Aviator flying fatigue continues to be a significant problem. During the month of December 1967, two companies of the Battalion flew over 5000 aviator flying hours, one over 4500 hours, one over 2500 hours, one over 1500 hours and the last, 700 hours. It is the opinion of the present incumbent of the Battalion surgeon's office that the number of hours is not the significant factor in the control of fatigue. Aviator fatigue is a complex of mission type, flying hours, hours waiting, and a period of rest. The aviator fatigue problem could be alleviated somewhat by adding a goal-directed rest period with the control of the number of hours flown.

Sections 3-8 illegible; omitted, Hqs, DA.

I. (U) Operation YELLOWSTONE

The largest airmobile operation conducted by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion occurred on 8 December 1967. Six weeks prior to that date, the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion was alerted to support the 25th Infantry Division in Operation YELLOWSTONE. The support of YELLOWSTONE constituted one of the largest commitments of an aviation battalion to an airmobile operation in the history of combat assaults. Six airmobile companies were utilized to insert two full brigades of US infantry. Con-junctive with the assaults was the conduct of an enormous logistical air-lift employing 33 medium CH-47 helicopters and a platoon of heavy CH-54 sky-cranes. A total of 200 logistical sorties were flown from rear area base camps to forward field locations in a steady flow of aircraft maintaining a planned two minute separation. The combined use of UH-1 aircraft in assaults and cargo helicopters in re-supply activities succeeded in placing in the Operational Area a great number of ground forces and an immense logistical back up in a relatively few number of hours.

By JB/mGNARA, Date 9/92

34

To properly account for the sizeable achievement, credit primarily must be given to the luxury of planning time. The six weeks allotted were sufficient to insure that every facet of coordination had been accomplished and every contingency had been fully explored.

Certain problems were inherent in the planning phases of the assault. To rapidly implace the desired number of troops and tonnage of equipment into the LZ, forward staging areas were a necessity. Based on the logistical requirements of the participating aircraft and a large space requirement for cargo and troop massing areas, SOUI DA and DAU TIENG were selected for troop lifts, and TAY NINH WEST for cargo.

The nearly 150 aircraft employed in the conduct of the operation presented a refueling requirement at each of the forward staging areas. Fuel points were established at SOUI DA and additional points were furnished to support the assault. To expedite the refueling processes, however, it was necessary to direct the type aircraft which would be permitted to operate at each POL area. Since all logistical resupply was to be flown from TAY NINH, CH-47 and CH-54 aircraft would be serviced there. Lift ships of the six participating airmobile companies would refuel at the twenty points of DAU TIENG. Since only temporary fuel points had been installed at SOUI DA, refueling there was limited to gunships, smoke ships and command and control aircraft. This proved a most satisfactory arrangement and, as such, presented no problem whatsoever during the conduct of the operation.

A very unique task confronted the Battalion Operations Section, however, was the scheduling of CH-47 and CH-54 resupply sorties. Over 200 sorties were required to be placed into an LZ according to an itinerary of 100 in the morning and 100 in the afternoon. Utilizing 33 CH-47 and 2 CH-54, a schedule was developed insuring maximum utilization of aircraft. Having little experience in large scale Chinook operations from which to draw on, CH-47 sorties were scheduled two minutes apart for the entire day at pre-determined air speeds.

Another area heretofore somewhat unique to 269th operations was the controlling of the immense tonnage of cargo moved from the PZ at TAY NINH to the LZ at KATUM. Extensive use of Pathfinder and Pathfinder techniques assisted immeasurably in successfully inserting the logistical trains needed for the continued conduct of YELLOWSTONE.

Overall, the operation proved a substantial achievement for the 269th. The ease with which the operation was conducted was a tribute to the planning and professionalism of the Black Baron Combat Aviation Battalion. The "lessons learned" as a result of this operation are interspersed in Section II as "Debriefing notes - Operation 42-67."