

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96268

AVAIL: 2

26 December 1968

SUBJECT: Monthly PSYOP Report

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: G-5
APO San Francisco 96225

1. Total number of leaflets received from other than 6th PSYOP Bn (locally produced, JUSPAC, CORDS, VIS, ETC.): 3,000.
2. Total leaflets:
 - a. Hand disseminated 26,600.
 - b. Air dropped 5,865,000.
3. Total loudspeaker hours:
 - a. Air 62.5.
 - b. Ground 67.0.
4. Total posters distributed 532.
5. Total movies shown 2. Number of hours of movies 2.
6. Total JUSPAC Newspapers distributed by air None; ground 3,450.
7. Total Cultural Team performances None.
8. Total County Fairs 1.
9. Narrative evaluation of effectiveness:
 - a. General: Increased emphasis is being placed upon the pacification program. The category "V" hamlets are the priority hamlets. The hamlets in the Michelin present a problem since without security no substantial long run program can be affected. APT's have been requested and will be

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used in "V" category hamlets other than the Michelin. These teams can develop a better rapport with the villagers in hope that we can obtain more specific intelligence on which to base more effective PSYOP programs. Our Vietnamese Police Team, which is no longer attached to the Brigade, was quite effective in Thanh An. They received information from the people that led to the uncovering of some VC equipment and a mortar position.

b. Chieu Hoi Program: This month we had seven Hoi Chanh in our AO. Four turned themselves in at FSB Mahone. Their information did not turn out to be very credible - 2 were considered VC and 2 were just forced laborers for the VC. A tape was obtained from these men and played in their area of operations.

Another Hoi Chanh was a NVA. He gave some useful tactical information but was reluctant to have a leaflet or tape made. He was afraid that by doing so his family would be harmed in the North. We managed to have him make a tape but his name was not mentioned.

Another Hoi Chanh was a VC who operated in the Ben Tranh area. He was quite cooperative and made a tape and a leaflet message both directed at his comrades. He stated that his main reason for Chieu Hoi'ing was that he was tired of war. He also stated that he heard many loudspeaker tapes and there were many leaflets dropped in his area.

The other Hoi Chanh was interrogated at Tri Tam District and as of yet we have not received any report.

c. NVA Program: This program has been directed at discouraging and demoralizing the enemy. The most effective method of doing this is in immediate reaction to enemy setbacks such as their abortive ambush of 17 December 1968. The NVA Hoi Chanh stated that their biggest problems were a shortage of food and medical supplies.

d. PSYOP Anecdotes: None.

10. Problem Areas:

a. Night loudspeaker operations provide an excellent opportunity to have a more effective PSYOP program. It is a known fact that the enemy moves at night. Also there are times after contact when we can be fairly sure of the location of the enemy. Yet because of lack of night air loudspeaker asset quick reaction PSYOP's could not be utilized. When it is used the following morning the location of the enemy cannot be accurately established.