

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96268

AVDCTB-C

9 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: COMBAT OPERATIONS AFTER ACTION REPORT

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
ATTN: ACOFS, G3
APO 96225

1. (U) NAME OF OPERATION: BATTLE OF BUD CUT - OPERATION YELLOWSTONE, CONDUCTED BY 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 012230 JAN 68 TO 020500 JAN 68.
3. (U) LOCATION: FSB BURT (XT 500 805).
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

5. (U) COMMANDERS:

3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV	- COL LEONARD R DAEMS, JR
2D BN, 22 INF (M)	- LTC AUBREY G NORRIS
3D BN, 22 INF	- LTC THOMAS HARROLD
2D BN, 77TH ARTY	- LTC WILLIAM L ALBRIGHT

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

2-22 INF (M)	BDE CONTROL
3 TMS 44TH PSD	2/77TH ARTY (DS)
1 PLT D/65 ENGR (DS)	D/65TH ENGR (DS)
2-77 ARTY	A, C, & D BTRY, 3/13 ARTY (GSR)
BTRY A&C	3D PLT, 25TH MP (SPT)
3-22 INF (-1 CO)	DISCOM FWD COMD (SPT)
3TMS 44TH PSD	FWD SPT SEC SAT (SPT)
1 PLT D/65 ENGR	B/25 MED BN (SPT)
	D/725 MAINT BN (SPT)
	SEC QM GRRC PLT (SPT)

7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

A. ARTILLERY:

(1) PREPLANNED AND ON CALL DIRECT AND INDIRECT ARTILLERY FIRES WERE USED DURING THE OPERATION TO COVER ENEMY ROUTES OF ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL. ARTILLERY WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AND WAS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY. THE USE OF DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY, 105MM HE AND BEEHIVE AND 155MM HE, PROVED TO BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN HOLDING ENEMY ASSAULTS AT THE FSB PERIMETER. ARTILLERY FIRE WAS INITIALLY USED DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ATTACK PRIMARILY IN A COUNTER-MORTAR ROLE. PREPLANNED COUNTER-MORTAR TARGETS WERE ATTACKED BY ALL FIRING BATTERIES LOCATED AT FSB BURT AND FSB BEAUREGARD. AS THE ATTACK PROGRESSSED AND LISTENING POSTS AND AMBUSH PATROLS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER REPORTED CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES, CALLS FOR INDIRECT FIRE WERE RECEIVED AND DELIVERED BY THE ARTILLERY. AS IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT A FULL SCALE ENEMY ATTACK WAS IN PROGRESS, NUMEROUS CALLS FOR FIRE WERE RECEIVED. ADJUST FIRE AND PREPLANNED DEFENSIVE CONCENTRATIONS WERE FIRED. AT ONE POINT, THE BATTERY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER OF BATTERY C,

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2D BN, 77TH ARTY REPORTED HANDLING 8 MISSIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY. PERHAPS THE MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF ARTILLERY WAS MADE IN A DIRECT FIRE ROLE. AS THE PERIMETER REPORTED HEAVY CONTACT, THE ARTILLERY MEN LEVELED THEIR TUBES AND, AFTER COORDINATION WITH INFANTRY ELEMENTS, BEGAN DELIVERING HE DIRECT FIRE INTO LOCATIONS JUST FORWARD OF THE PERIMETER. A LARGE VOLUME OF DIRECT FIRE WAS DELIVERED AROUND THE ENTIRE PERIMETER DURING THE BATTLE. HIGHLY INSTRUMENTAL IN STOPPING ENEMY FORCES ATTEMPTING TO BREACH THE PERIMETER WAS THE USE OF THE APERS (BEEHIVE) ROUND. THIS FIRE WAS DELIVERED TO THE NORTHEAST, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST PORTIONS OF THE PERIMETER. PARTICULAR VOLUME WAS CONCENTRATED TO THE SOUTHEAST AND SOUTH DOWN THE ROAD WHERE LARGE MASSES OF ENEMY FORCES WERE ATTEMPTING TO PENETRATE. DURING THE MIDDLE AND LATTER STAGES OF THE ATTACK, EFFECTIVE USE WAS MADE OF BLOCKING FIRES TO THE WEST BY BATTERIES FROM FSB BEAUREGARD. THESE FIRES SERVED A TWO-FOLD PURPOSE IN PREVENTING NOT REINFORCEMENTS BUT WITHDRAWL IN THAT DIRECTION. AS THE ENEMY BEGAN WITHDRAWING TO THE SOUTH, FIRES WERE PLACED ALONG AND JUST OFF THE ROAD IN AN INTERDICTION ROLE.

(2) POSITION OCCUPIED: FSB BURT (XT 500 805).

(3) STATISTICAL DATA:

(A) ARTILLERY AMMUNITION EXPENDED:

		A/2/77	A/2/77	A/3/13	C/3/13	D/3/13
1.	HE	936	1000	413	171	218
2.	BH	13	45	-	-	-
3.	PD	824	900	98	171	218
4.	MTSQ	112	50	-	-	-
5.	VT	-	50	315	-	-

(B)

1.	HE	630	325	-	-	-
2.	BH	10	50	-	-	-
3.	PD	200	885	-	-	-
4.	GB	-	-	574	-	-
5.	WB	-	-	100	-	-

B. USAF:

(1) EXTENSIVE USE WAS MADE OF TACTICAL AIR IMMEDIATE STRIKE MISSIONS, WITH THE NORMAL AIR REQUEST CHANNELS BEING USED FOR ALL MISSIONS FLOWN. AIR STRIKES WERE EMPLOYED IN ASSEMBLY AREAS AND ON HEAVY ENEMY ATTACKING TROOP CONCENTRATIONS TO WITHIN 150 METERS OF THE FSB PERIMETER, UTILIZING ALL ORDNANCE. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT NAPALM AND CBU'S WERE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN BREAKING THE ATTACK FORMATIONS OF THE MASSED ENEMY. SPOOKY WAS UTILIZED TO PROVIDE ILLUMINATION FOR THE AIR STRIKES, AND FIRE SUPPORT DURING LULLS BETWEEN AIR STRIKES. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT TAC AIR PROVIDED THE OVERWHELMING FIRE SUPERIORITY THAT EVENTUALLY BROKE THE ENEMY ATTACK.

(2) STATISTICAL DATA:

(A) MISSIONS:

1. IMMEDIATE MISSIONS REQUESTED: 32
2. IMMEDIATE MISSIONS FLOWN: 32

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(B) RESULTS OF TACTICAL AIR: IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE PRECISE DAMAGE DONE TO THE ENEMY BY AIR STRIKES DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE BATTLE WAS FOUGHT IN DARKNESS AND EXTENSIVE USE OF ALL AVAILABLE WEAPONS MADE EXACT DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF RECOVERED ENEMY BODIES DIFFICULT. THOUGH THE ENEMY ATTACK WAS HALTED BY GROUND FORCES AT THE PERIMETER, TAC AIR APPEARS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR BREAKING THE ATTACK. THOUGH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHEN FIRE PARITY WAS ATTAINED - SUPERIORITY WAS GAINED BY USE OF TAC AIR.

C. ARMY AVIATION:

(1) EXTENSIVE USE WAS MADE OF ARMY GUNSHIPS. PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT OF TAC AIR, GUNSHIPS PROVIDED CLOSE-IN DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT TO THE PERIMETER. SUBSEQUENT TO TAC AIR INITIATION, ARMY AIR WAS UTILIZED TO PROVIDE INTERDICTORY FIRES ON ESCAPE ROUTES, AND DIRECT FIRES ON SUSPECTED ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS MOVING TOWARD THE FSB FROM THE NORTH. AN ARMY AIR FLARESHIP WAS USED TO GREAT ADVANTAGE DURING PERIODS WHEN SPOOKY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. ADDITIONALLY, GUNSHIPS WERE UTILIZED TO ESCORT RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT; THEIR SUPPRESSIVE FIRES WERE ABSOLUTLEY NECESSARY AS THE FSB WAS RINGED WITH ENEMY ANTIAIRCRAFT AUTOMATIC WEAPONS.

(2) EMERGENCY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY BEGAN AT 020330 JAN 68 UTILIZING 5 SPARTANS (189TH AHC), FROM BIEN HOA WITH AMMUNITION FOR 2/22 INF AND 3/22 INF.

(3) FIVE SPARTANS (189TH AHC), BLACK WIDOW (188TH AHC) AND LITTLE BEAR (A/25TH AVN) RESUPPLIED THE ARTILLERY OUT OF KATUM.

(4) FOLLOWING ARMY AVIATION UNITS PARTICIPATED IN THE BATTLE:

(A) UH-1D: 189 AHC (SPARTANS), 188TH AHC (BLACK WIDOWS) AND A/25TH AVN (LITTLE BEAR).

(B) GENERAL SUPPORT: C/3/17 AIR CAVALRY, 188TH AHC (BLACK WIDOWS), 187TH AHC (RAT PACK), 189TH AHC (SPARTANS), 25TH AVN (LITTLE BEARS) AND FLARESHIP (WILDCAT).

(C) AMMUNITION WAS RESUPPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

	FROM DAU TIENG	FROM KATUM
M-79	3374	1008
4.2	250	360
81MM	350	360
.50 CAL	18900	40000
5.56	89600	65000
7.62	30400	13440

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

A. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SUOI CUT AREA FOR OPERATION YELLOWSTONE (CONTINUED) WAS OBTAINED FROM 25TH DIVISION G-2 SOURCES, 11 FIELD FORCE PERINTREP, VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS AND LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS.

(1) NORTHEASTERN WAR ZONE "C" WAS BEING USED BY VC MAIN FORCE UNITS AS A SAFE HAVEN DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF FRIENDLY LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA SINCE THE BATTLE OF SOUI TRE IN MARCH 1967.

(2) ROUTES 244 AND 246 WERE BEING USED AS MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEASTERN WAR ZONE "C" AND INTO CENTRAL BINH LONG PROVINCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority ANND 873541
By 1.2 KAPA Daid 2/19/68

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) UNITS LOCATED IN THE AREA OF SUOI CUT WERE BELIEVED TO BE TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD BATTALION UNLOCATED IN THE AREA. CONTACT WITH THESE ELEMENTS BY THE 1ST BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY US DIVISION ON 16 AND 20 DECEMBER IN THE VICINITY OF KATUM AND BO TUC CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF THIS UNIT. IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS OF THE 271ST VC REGIMENT WERE ALSO BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF XT3976.

B. ENEMY ACTIVITY:

(1) DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER ENEMY ACTIVITY TOOK THE FORM OF COUNTER SWEEP ACTIVITIES AGAINST ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE, 25TH US INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE VICINITY OF KATUM AND BO TUC. IN ADDITION, FRIENDLY BASE CAMPS IN THAT AREA RECEIVED MORTAR ATTACKS ALMOST NIGHTLY.

(2) THE CEASATION OF FRIENDLY H AND I FIRING DURING THE NEW YEAR'S TRUCE BROUGHT ABOUT INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF SUOI CUT AND FROM THIS ACTIVITY EVOLVED THE HEAVY MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK ON FSB BURT (XT 500 807). IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE ENEMY PLANNED TO USE THE CEASE FIRE TO MOVE HIS TROOPS SAFELY TO WITHIN STRIKING RANGE OF THE FSB.

(3) READOUTS OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATION OF PW'S INDICATE THAT THE ENTIRE 271ST VC REGIMENT AND THE 5TH AND 6TH BATTALIONS, 272D VC REGIMENT WERE EMPLOYED IN THIS ATTACK.

(4) THE ATTACK OF FSB BURT TOOK THE FORM OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE HARASSING MORTAR FIRE INTO THE FSB DURING EARLY EVENING HOURS. AS THE EVENING PROGRESSSED, AMBUSH PATROLS BEGAN OBSERVING INCREASING MOVEMENT AT VARIOUS POINTS COMPLETELY ENCIRCLING THE PERIMETER OF THE FSB. AT APPROXIMATELY 2100-2200 HOURS, AMBUSH PATROLS BEGAN RECEIVING "PROBING ATTACKS" WHICH DEVELOPED INTO HEAVY CONTACT BY SMALL ENEMY ELEMENTS. AT APPROXIMATELY 2230 HOURS MORTAR ROUNDS (BOTH 60MM AND 82MM) AND RPG ROUNDS BEGAN "RAINING" INTO THE FSB FROM A NUMBER OF ENEMY MORTAR SITES AND RPG POSITIONS AROUND THE PERIMETER. THE MORTAR ATTACK WAS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY A GROUND ATTACK OF SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, GRENADES AND RIFLE GRENADES COMPLETELY ENCOMPASSING THE BASE. THE BRUNT OF THE ATTACK WAS PLACED FIRST IN THE SOUTHEAST SECTOR WHILE A SECONDARY ATTACK WAS DIRECTED AT THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST SECTORS. THE ATTACK FROM THE SOUTHEAST SHIFTED TO THE SOUTH AND THEN BACK TO THE SOUTHEAST. THE ATTACKS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT, TERMINATING AT APPROXIMATELY 020500H. AT THIS TIME THE ENEMY BEGAN WITHDRAWING TO THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST AND TO THE NORTHEAST.

9. (C) MISSION: 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION MOVES TO NORTHERN WAR ZONE "C" AND CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TO DESTROY VC/NVA FORCES & INSTALLATIONS, OPENS LAND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR FRIENDLY FORCES AND INTERDICTS VC/NVA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 3D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION DEFENDED FSB BURT WITH ONE INFANTRY AND ONE MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION. POSITIONS WERE DUG-IN AND LISTENING POSTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EACH LINE PLATOON. AMBUSH PATROLS AND LISTENING POSTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EACH LINE COMPANY. TWO BATTERIES OF 105MM AND ONE BATTERY OF 155MM HOWITZERS SUPPORTED THE DEFENSE UTILIZING INDIRECT FIRES AND FULLY INTEGRATING DIRECT FIRES. (REFERENCES: OPORD 40-67, HQ, 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV, WITH CHANGES 1 AND 2 DATED 26 DEC 67; FRAGO 1-67 TO OPORD 40-67, DATED 27 DEC 67.)

11. (C) EXECUTION (CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY)

A. 011845H JAN 68: AN AMBUSH PATROL MADE CONTACT WITH AN UNKNOWN SIZED VC FORCE 200 METERS EAST OF THE PERIMETER.

B. 012010H JAN 68: MOVEMENT NOTED AROUND THE PERIMETER WITH LIGHT ENEMY PROBING OR PATROLLING ACTIONS DIRECTED TOWARD THE PERIMETER. LIMITED MORTAR ATTACKS DIRECTED TOWARD THE FSB.

CONFIDENTIAL

Authority ANND 873541
By 12 NAPA Date 2/2/68

CONFIDENTIAL

C. 012230H JAN 68: FSB BURT (XT 500 805) CAME UNDER HEAVY MORTAR ATTACK FOLLOWED BY RPG, SA AND AW FIRE MOSTLY FROM THE SOUTHEAST AND NORTHWEST ALTHOUGH ALL SECTORS OF THE PERIMETER WERE SUBJECTED TO ALL TYPES OF FIRE. A LIGHT FIRE TEAM, FAC AND TAC AIR, IN ADDITION TO SPOOKY AND ARTY WERE CALLED FOR AND EMPLOYED AS THEY BECAME AVAILABLE. ALL OF THE SIX AMBUSH PATROLS BECAME ENGAGED TO VARYING DEGREES.

D. 012400H JAN 68: MORTAR AND RPG FIRES SLACKENED AND GROUND ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE PERIMETER FROM ALL DIRECTIONS WITH SECONDARY ATTACKS COMING FROM THE NORTHWEST AND NORTHEAST. THE MAIN VC EFFORT CAME FROM THE SOUTHWEST AND SHIFTED TO THE SOUTHEAST.

E. 020100H JAN 68: VC ELEMENTS HAD SUCCEEDED IN REACHING BUNKER LINE POSITIONS IN THE SOUTH (C/2-22 INF(M)) AND SOUTHEAST (C/3-22 INF). BEEHIVE ARTILLERY ROUNDS WERE EMPLOYED ALONG WITH DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY AND GUN AND FLARE SHIPS. LOCAL BATTALION RESERVES WERE COMMITTED TO SECURE THE PERIMETER. AN ADDITIONAL RESERVE OF TWO PROVISIONAL INFANTRY SQUADS WAS RECONSTITUTED FROM HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS OF THE 2-22 INF AND COMMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THE 3-22 INF IN THE SOUTHEAST.

F. 020145H JAN 68: VC FIRE AND CONTACT SLACKENED.

G. 020200H JAN 68: VC FIRES INCREASED AND ALL AREA'S WERE ENGAGED. WEIGHT OF ATTACK WAS TO THE SOUTH (C/2-22 INF(M)) AND SOUTHEAST (C/3-22 INF). ONCE AGAIN, BEEHIVE AND DIRECT FIRE ARTILLERY WAS EMPLOYED ALONG WITH GROUND AND FLARE SHIPS. THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST PORTIONS OF THE PERIMETER WERE UNDER PRESSURE OF THE HEAVIEST ATTACK.

H. 020248H JAN 68: TAC AIR IS EMPLOYED IN THE SOUTH, ALLOWING ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY TO BE PLACED IN OTHER AREA'S OF THE PERIMETER. ARMY AIR SUPPORT CONTINUES.

I. 020311H JAN 68: FIRE AND CONTACT SLACKENS AND CEASES EXCEPT IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST WHERE TAC AIR IS BEING EMPLOYED.

J. 020327H JAN 68: ALL VC EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED AT THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST PORTIONS OF THE PERIMETER WITH ONLY SPORADIC FIRES DIRECTED TO OTHER PORTIONS OF THE FSB. ARTILLERY DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, BEEHIVE, GUN AND FLARE SHIPS AND TACTICAL AIR CONTINUES TO BE EMPLOYED.

K. 020500H JAN 68: VC BEGIN WITHDRAWL TO SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST AND TO THE NORTHEAST. LEAVING DELAYING FORCES TO SCREEN THEIR MOVEMENT. ALL AVAILABLE FIRES CONTINUED TO INTERDICT WITHDRAWL ROUTES.

12. (C) RESULTS:

A. US LOSSES:

(1) PERSONNEL: 23 KHA, 146 WHA.

(2) EQUIPMENT: 3 APC'S; 1 40MM GUN (SP) DESTROYED, 2 APC'S MODERATE DAMAGE, 1 CAL .45 PISTOL, 3 .50 CAL MACHINE GUNS, 9 M-60 MACHINE GUNS, 14 M-16 REFLES, 3 M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS, 1 STARLIGHT SCOPE, 1 SIGHT 81MM MORTAR.

B. VC LOSSES:

(1) PERSONNEL: 379 KIA, 8 POW (WIA).

(2) ENEMY EQUIPMENT CAPTURED AND EVACUATED: 75 AK-47 RIFLES, 1 CHICOM LMG'S, 1 CAL .45 PISTOL, 12 RPG-7 LAUNCHERS, 16 RPG-2 LAUNCHERS, 2 TA-1 TELEPHONES AND 5 LBS DOCUMENTS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) ENEMY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED:

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>	<u>CLOTHING</u>
50 CHICOM GRENADES	2 MILES ELECTRICAL WIRE	100 SETS WEB GEAR
180 RPG ROCKETS	72 CANTEENS	12 PISTOL BELTS
2 RDS 75MM RECHARGEABLES	56 ENTRENCHING TOOLS	7 PONCHOS
4000 RDS AK-47 AMMO		
1000 LMG AMMO		
10 PROPELLANT CHARGES RPG 2 AND 7		
30 AK-47 MAGAZINES		

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

A. PERSONNEL: DURING THE ENGAGEMENT, THE BRIGADE S-1 SECTION OPERATED FROM CAMP RAINIER WITH REPORTS BEING FORWARDED FROM FORWARD LOCATIONS.

B. SUPPLY: NOTIFICATION TO BE PREPARED TO EFFECT EMERGENCY RESUPPLY OF CLASS V FROM KATUM TO FSB BURT WAS RECEIVED BY THE BRIGADE S-4 AT APPROXIMATELY 020130H AT KATUM. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ALL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CONTROLLED ON THE BRIGADE ADMIN AND LOGISTICS FREQUENCY. UNITS BEING RESUPPLIED WERE 2/22 INF(M), 3/22 INF AND 2/77 ARTY. AIRCRAFT WERE CONTROLLED BY THE BRIGADE S-4 FOR RESUPPLY OF 2/22 INF AND 3/22 INF. AIRCRAFT UTILIZED BY 2/77 ARTY WERE CONTROLLED BY S-4, 2/77 ARTY SHARING THE SAME FREQUENCY.

C. MEDICAL: MEDICAL EVACUATION OF WOUNDED PERSONNEL FROM FSB BURT WAS ACCOMPLISHED INITIALLY BY RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY DUSTOFF CREWS STATIONED IN DAU TIENG AND TAY NINH WITH BACK-UP COVERAGE PROVIDING SECONDARY EVACUATION BY SHIPS FROM CU CHI AND LONG BINH. THE PRIMARY ROUTES OF EVACUATION WERE: (1) D COMPANY, 25TH MEDICAL BATTALION LOCATED IN KATUM, (2) B COMPANY, 25TH MEDICAL BATTALION IN DAU TIENG, AND (3) THE 45TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL LOCATED IN TAY NINH. SECONDARY EVACUATION WAS ACCOMPLISHED TO THE 12TH EVACUATION HOSPITAL, CU CHI, THE 24TH AND 93D EVACUATION HOSPITALS IN LONG BINH, AS WELL AS EMERGENCY CASES TO THE 45TH SURGICAL HOSPITAL.

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: NONE.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: NVA FORCES ENCOUNTERED DURING THIS ENGAGEMENT APPEARED TO BE WELL DISCIPLINED AND WERE VERY WELL EQUIPPED, INCLUDING NEW WEAPONS. THE SUCCESS OF THE DEFENSE IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER, SUPERIOR INFANTRY FIREPOWER, DEVASTATING ARTILLERY FIRE, BEEHIVE, DIRECT & INDIRECT FIRES, AND DECISIVE, OVERWHELMING TACTICAL AIR POWER. THE GROUND DEFENSES WERE DELIBERATE AND MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AND WHILE STILL BEING FULLY DEVELOPED WERE ADEQUATE TO MEET THE THREAT POSED THE NIGHT OF 1-2 JANUARY 1968.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. THE INTEGRATION OF DIRECT ARTILLERY FIRES IN THE DEFENSE OF A FSB IS A PRIMARY CONSIDERATION. PLANNING OF PERIMETER INSTALLATIONS MUST INCLUDE OVERHEAD AND REAR PROTECTION TO PERMIT ITS UNINHIBITED EMPLOYMENT.

B. AMBUSH PATROLS ARE VITAL TO PROVIDING INFORMATION AS TO ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION. AP'S SHOULD BE CONSTITUTED IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, BUT NOT SO LARGE AS TO BE UNABLE TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION WHILE CONTINUALLY REPORTING ENEMY INFORMATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ANND 873541

By 17 HAPA Date 2/19/78

CONFIDENTIAL

C. TAC AIR CAN BE USED VERY EFFECTIVELY AT NIGHT. A VISIBLE REFERENCE POINT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IN VECTORING TAC AIR ONTO PRECISE TARGET AREAS.

D. SPOOKY ILLUMINATION IS NECESSARY FOR TAC AIR; HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL THE LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT PRIOR TO EMPLOYING TAC AIR AS IT ILLUMINATES DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMY. ONCE THE TAC AIR STARTS, THE ENEMY'S ADVANTAGE PROVIDED BY THE ILLUMINATION IS NEGATED BY THE FIRES FROM THE AIRCRAFT.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Donald K. Weise

DONALD K. WEISE
CAPTAIN, INFANTRY
ADJUTANT

INCLOSURES:

1. OPORD 40-67 WITH CHANGES 1 & 2
2. SKETCH OF FSB BURT AND ENEMY ATTACKS
3. AFTER ACTION REPORT, 2-22 INF(M)
4. AFTER ACTION REPORT, 3-22 INF

DISTRIBUTION:

5-CG, 25TH INF DIV
20-CO, 18TH MIL HIST DET
1-S2
1-S1
3-S3
1-S4
1-S5
2-2/12 INF
2-2/22 INF
2-3/22 INF
2-2/77 ARTY

CONFIDENTIAL

COM Authority NND 873541
By 1-2 HARA Date 2/29/88 2330 SECONDARY ATTACK
CONTINUOUS

