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SEADAG DISCUSSION PAPER

# NETWORKS AND GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
# SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE GROUP THEORY OF POLITICS

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## The Dyadic Model

A dozen years ago the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, in pursuit of its grand design for the execution of a cross national study of politics along the lines of the functional scheme subsequently outlined in Gabriel Almond's classic introductory essay in The Politics of the Developing Areas, commissioned a series of investigations of "Interest Groups and the Political Process."[1] This writer was one of the Committees grantees.

We were asked to study the process of interest articulation in our respective countries of investigation. While we were advised to be on the lookout for un-organized interests and for a variety of structures and processes not common in modern western political systems, our major task was to perform censuses of "interest groups".

Many of us did bring back lists of interest groups. But on the whole, the results were disappointing. Some found few identifiable groups that could be listed. Others, like this writer, who worked in the "Americanized" Philippines, were able to compile longer lists of voluntary associations. But many of the latter were largely chimerical ones: paper groups, created mainly to give publicity to their founders, which after a meeting or two ceased to exist. Only a few groups played a significant part in the political process.

Several of the grantees subsequently devoted books to their findings, among them Robert Alexander, P.J. Vatikiotis, and Myron Weiner.[2] Others included briefer discussions of interest group activity in longer works devoted to broader subjects.[3] But the conclusion of most of those

involved in the project, as shown in their reports to the Committee, was that "interest groups" do not play as important a part in the political process as had been expected. This conclusion is reflected in the fact that the Princeton series of Studies in Political Development, the major compilation of the product of the aforementioned Committee and its grantees, contains as yet no volume on "Interest Groups and Political Development". And it seems unlikely that such a volume will appear in the near future.

Yet functionalism is still with us, and properly so. Interest groups may be less prominent than was expected. But if Almond's list of conversion functions remains sound, and I think it does, then the "interest articulation" function must be performed in any political system in which decision-making is a specialized task, and there must be structures to perform it. Almond himself has ammended his theory to take account of the disappointing performance of the four types of groups listed in his 1960 essay i.e. institutional, non- associational, anomic, and associational interest groups, by drawing attention in a 1966 work to "the importance of individuals as articulators of their own interests."[4] But then, bound it seems by his earlier commitment to groups and group interest, he draws away from this promising observation by adding that individual self representation is "commonly cast in the guise of the articulation of more general societal or group interests."[5] And thereby, I think, he misses a crucial point: That in many developing polities the great bulk of individual self representation is self-representation pure and simple, without any pretense of a concern for the categorical interests

of any collectivity, be it society as a whole or a sub-group within it. It is the aim of this paper to explore the structural basis and the consequence of pure and impure self-representation in several South-east Asian political systems, and to outline, by means of a set of paired hypotheses, a model which, it is hoped, will explain some of their peculiar features.[6]

Before proceeding, it may be useful to review the essential features of the "group theory" of politics, as well as some recent criticism of that theory. The theory, stated in its broadest terms, assumes that individuals act in politics as members of categories, with a view to performing categorical functions or furthering categorical goals. They do so, it is assumed, because they perceive that through common action, designed to achieve the adoption by government of certain general policies of categorical applicability, all members of the category will benefit as individuals.

The American version of the group theory comes to us from Arthur Bentley by way of David Truman and Earl Latham.[7] The most recent British version stems from such pluralists as Harold Laski.[8] Marxist theory makes the same basic assumption, i.e. that men who are alike will and should act in unison in their collective interest. The now largely forgotten theorists of the fascist corporate state also maintained that individulas who are alike do and should act in unison, though in their view the various "organs", composed in each case of a functionally specialized category within the society, should not clash but, like the organs of a living organism, should work in harmony for the higher purposes of the nation state.[9]

In all versions of the theory, individuals who become conscious of being members of the same category are likely to find it to their advantage, or to be their duty, to create formal associations of some sort, the better to advance their categorical interest or perform their organic role. But formal organization is not essential to the theory in its broadest form. The essential feature is that individuals who are alike are more likely to act together for their mutual interest than individuals who are not.

The group theory of politics has found favor with American political scientists for both empirical and normative reasons. Americans do in fact attempt to influence governmental action largely through the aegis of organized and unorganized interest groups. And such behavior is consistent with the American belief that individuals should attempt to advance their interests by advocating the passage of laws rather than by seeking personal favors. But as a prescription for self-interested action, the theory has grave logical shortcomings which become evident empirically when one examines politics in many developing countries, especially former colonies whose legal systems and laws are not of their own creation but were imposed form abroad.

A serious criticism, advanced by Mancur Olson, an economist, is that if the purpose of group action is merely to achieve categorical goals from which all members of a category will derive benefits, an individual member of the category has no great incentive to put his shoulder to the wheel of common action, for even without his participation he will share in the fruits of that effort simply by being a member of the favored category.[10] An equally serious criticism is that the theory assumes that governmental action must take a categorical form: That government or at

least modern government proceeds according to the rule of law, i.e. that laws will be enforced rigidly and impersonally whatever their content, and that individuals can benefit only through the operation of laws which provide similar benefits for all others like themselves. Only if this is assumed--and in many developing countries it is a highly dubious assumption --need individuals resort to the cumbersome method of advancing their private interests by working for the similar interest of countless others. These criticisms of the group theory bring us to some alternative models of political structure, including interest-articulation structure: Those of the dyadically structured network and the dyadic personal following.[11]

Simple "dyads", the constituent elements of networks and personal followings, are two-person groups. They are composed typically of two individuals who are allied in a relatively stable arrangement of exchange through which each helps the other attain his separate goals.

If a dyadic relationship arises out of primary ties, as between two close kinsmen, the choice of dyadic partners may involve little discretion. Where no such primary tie exists, the individual has considerable freedom in his choice of dyadic partners and in the intensity and the length of time for which he will maintain a dyadic tie. For this reason, and because only two persons are involved in a specific dyadic relationship, certain other principles follow:

1. Property is individually owned. It can be given by one to the other, lent, or exchanged. But because of the fragile nature of most dyads, marriages excepted, it is rarely pooled.

2. Intra-dyadic transactions in property, and the giving of other aid is based upon reciprocity.

3. Because the intensity of interaction may differ from dyad to dyad, graded favoritsm in the treatment accorded different dyadic partners as well as nonpartners is made explicit.

4. Because dyads are fragile, their maintenance requires continued cultivation through the exchange of favors.

5. Dyadic relationships, being systems of barter, must be between individuals who in some respect are unalike. Each gives to the other something the latter cannot provide for himself. The dissimilarity of the two partners may be temporal or categorical. In the first instance two individuals who in other respects are alike have a surplus or shortage of the same commodity at different times: A lends to B when B is in need,and B returns the favor when A finds himself in short supply. In the second instance individuals who are cateforically different supply each other what neither can supply for himself: an extreme example is the Jajmani system found in parts of India under which two individuals of different castes provide each other with services which, because of ritual prohibitions, they cannot perform for themselves.[12]

6. Beacuse a dyad consists of two persons, and because their dissimilarity is often of a categorical sort, the benefits obtained through dyadic relationships are particular rather than categorical. The shoemaker makes shoes for the butcher and the butcher supplies meat to the shoemaker, but the shoemaker is not likely to be asked to interest himself in the welfare of the butchering trade as a whole.

7. While a simple dyad is a two-person group, not necessarily related to any other two-person group, most individuals in dyadically structured systems maintain dyadic alliances with many other persons. Individuals differ however in the number of dyadic alliances which they seek or are able to maintain. This has important consequences for the distribution of power.

A dyadically structured society as a whole can be thought of as a network of "overlapping and intersecting" relationships,[13] a network which is unbroken, though it may be more densely woven in some of its portions than in others.

Because dyadic relationships typically bind together persons who are unalike, a very common type of dyadic arrangement is one between persons of unequal wealth, status, or power. Often in such cases a single superordinate individual is the upper terminus of many separate "vertical" dyadic relationships with numerous individuals of lower status than himself. Anthropologists call such arrangements "Patron-client"systems. We shall use a more explicitly political designation: "personal following." In much of what follows, we shall be dealing with vertical systems of this type.

Dyadically structured systems are, of course, old hat to economists. But political scientists have given little attention to them for the good reason that dyadic structure plays but a minor role in the political organization of developed nations, and for the additional reason that, because dyadic structures are unstable, amorphous, and usually un-named, they are far less easily discerned than are discrete groups. But dyadic networks and dyadic patron client systems have aroused considerable interest in recent years among social anthropologists, social psychologists, communications theorists, and insofar as simple dyads are concerned, among game theorists.[14]

It must be noted that dyadic structure probably is present to a significant degree in all societies and polities, intermixed with other types of structure. But dyadic structure has in particular attracted the attention of scholars working in certain regions, notably Southeast Asia, Latin America, the circum-polar regions of both hemispheres, and the pre-modern and present-day peasant communities of Europe. Why dyadic structure, in its several forms, is more prominent in some times and in some regions of the world than in others is a question about which social anthropologists are not yet in full agreement. But some possible reasons may be suggested: Where the alternative structural device of the discrete group is absent or uncommon, dyadic structure is most likely to be employed in fact, and most likely to be noticed by outside observers. It may be viewed as a very useful and flexible but, for most modern purposes, a somewhat inefficient device, which comes to the fore where more efficient devices are absent.

Discrete groups, on the other hand, are most likely to be present first where there are obvious categorical distinctions between people and no cross-cutting personal loyalties to weaken these distinctions, and, second where there is a need for strong and stable collectivities, as for example in times and places where land or other property are in short supply and men must join together to defend them against outsiders.

In primitive societies and in these which still bear their traces, discrete groups most commonly take the form of unilineal descent groups (enduring groups of a corporate type based on the tracing of descent

through one sex only. E.g. lineages and clans.) In modern societies, or pre-modern one where unilineal descent groups have lost their hold upon the loyalties of their members or been destroyed, discrete groups usually take the form of voluntary associations which, where obvious categorical distinctions exist, tend to be recruited on a categorical basis. In transitional societies voluntary associations are most likely to make an early appearance where there has been earlier experience with discrete groups based on common descent. (Examples are tribal associations which have proliferated in the new cities of Africa, and the plethora of associations, based on common linguistic or regional origin or upon common surnames, found among the overseas Chinese..)

Where then is dyadic structure most likely to play a major role? I would suggest that among primitive peoples it is most likely to appear, and to take the form of webs of kinship ties, in societies which have cognatic systems of kinship. (The reasons for this will become clear in the subsequent description of the kinship system of Kalingas.) In transitional settings, non-kinship-based dyadic structures are most likely to proliferate either where cognatic kinship systems provide a model for them, or in the case of unilineal societies, where unilineal descent groups have, for certain actors, become disfunctional.[15] In modern polities, dyadic structures are likely to play a prominent role where certain types of formal associational activity are proscribed. An example is the Soviet Union where the impediments to the formation of non-communist parties, as well as to the creation of formally organized sub-parties within the CPSU, have led to the emergence of informal personal

followings of a distinctly "pre-modern" type. But even in modern democracies one can discover personal followings of the dyadic type. They are most prominent in the upper levels of political organizations. Thus while many of us are "members" of the Republican or Democratic Party, the men who rushed to Hyannisport when trouble brewed were friends, followers, and clients.

To illustrate the structure and functioning of dyadic networks and leader-follower systems, we shall examine certain features of the political systems of three Southeast Asian societies, each at a different stage of modernization, and each having a different religious tradition. Our three cases are: The pagan Kalinga of highland Northern Luzon in the Philippines, Monarchic Buddhist Thailand during the Ayudhya period, and the predominantly Catholic contemporary lowland Philippines.

## The Kalinga

Our first and most "primitive" example of a Southeast Asian polity is that of the Kalinga, one among several pagan peoples who inhabit the mountain region of Northern Luzon. During the period of American colonial rule the Kalinga, or at least those of them who live near the several roads which have been built through the mountains by the colonial administration, have come increasingly under the influence of the more civilized outside world. But many of their traditional institutions survive, or survived long enough to be observed by anthropologists.

Our description of Kalinga political structure is based on studies by Roy Franklin Barton and Edward P. Dozier.[16]

The ecological setting of Kalinga society is as follows: This linguistic-cultural group is scattered among a number of valleys in settlements whose size depends upon the expanse of each valley, and upon the type of agriculture pursued. The largest contiguous settlement, the barrio of Lubuagan, consists of fifteen closely clustered "towns" with a total population in 1960, according to Dozier, of approximately 4,000 persons. Its people make extensive use of wet-rice agriculture in terraces built in the valleys and along the sides of hills, a fact which accounts for Lubuagan's relatively great population density. Farther north, where canyons are deeper and narrower and where more reliance is placed on shifting dry-rice agriculture, settlements are much smaller, consisting of a half dozen to no more than thirty houses.

Like most primitive societies, that of the Kalinga until recently was organized almost wholly on the basis of kinship. The prevailing form of kinship structure among the Kalinga, like that of the other Southeast Asian societies described in this paper, is "cognatic" or, as some anthropologists call it, "bilateral," or "ambilineal." It is the same type of kinship structure which prevails in Western Europe and the United States, though there kinship ties tend to be less widely extended. In such systems each individual when he looks beyond his nuclear family, finds himself surrounded by a circle of "relatives," the collection of individuals whom anthropologists call a "personal kindred." It consists of the descendants of all of an individual's ancestors of a certain generation without regard to sex. In Kalinga, it consists for each person of all descendants of his eight pairs of great grand parents.

Certain consequences flow from the structure of kindreds:

1. No two individuals, other than siblings, have identical kindreds.

2. Kindreds have no sharp boundaries. Like the ripples which emanate from a stone which has been dropped into a pool, they gradually fade away as their distance from the center increases.

3. Kindreds are individual-centered. That is to say, each individual's kindred is defined with reference to himself, and exists primarily to serve his needs. After his death, it disappears as a distinctive entity.

4. The size and precise membership of each kindred depends largely upon the person at its core. It does so because he alone can decide how wide a circle of kinsmen he will attempt to cultivate, and which specific kinsmen he wishes to include as functioning (as distinguished from purely nominal) members of his kindred. It does not depend exclusively upon his wishes however. For each of those kinsmen with whom he wishes to maintain active ties must in turn be willing to maintain ties with him, i.e. must wish to count him as a member of his own personal kindred.

Thus a person's kindred is an outwardly radiating collection of dyads with one individual at its core. A community so structured--and this is the case with Kalinga communities, may be conceived of as a dyadic web of interlacing kinship ties.

The main function of the personal kindred is to provide the individual at its core with support and protection. In an essentially anarchic society, where head-hunting for purposes of revenge and prestige was the rule until quite recent years, and where, as will be seen, there were no

"public" functionaries charged with the punishment of murdereds or other offenders, the most important function of the kindred was to support the individual in conflicts over porperty or personal affronts which might lead to killing, or if he were killed, to take vengeance through counter-killing against the killer or one of his kinsmen.

The purpose of counter-killing was not to punish evil, to enforce a public law, or to maintain the public peace, but to obtain "satisfaction" for those who had lost a kinsman (an objective which sometimes was met without further violence through payments in kind, distributed among the surviving kinsmen in accordance with their closeness to the original victim), and to demonstrate that those who took part in the act of vengeance were dangerous people, whose interests were not to be trifled with.

While rallying to his support or avenging his death, the personal kindred of an individual was, in a sense, a "group." But it was an ephemeral group, and the willingness of an individual kinsman to participate depended largely upon the way he had been treated in the past by the individual at the kindred's core. That is to say it depended upon whether the man who now sought his support had aided him in the past when he had been in danger, and whether he had treated him as a close kinsman by sharing property with him on certain ritual occasions. In short, it depended upon dyadic reciprocity.

Were there any discrete groups in Kalinga society? There were and are a few. One discrete group found in Kalinga, as in all societies, is the nuclear family, consisting of a set of parents and their unmarried children. But the family is a temporary group, which disappears with the death of the parents and which is replaced by the separate newly-formed

nuclear families of the children. Furthermore the Kalinga family, until the birth of the first child, is an extremely fragile unit, in which each spouse retains personal control of his or her inherited property, and which is subject to easy fission and divorce when the conflicting loyalties of the spouses to their separate kindreds demand it. Only with the birth of the first child, and the vesting of the inherited property of both parents in the child--i.e., with the appearance of an individual related by blood to both parental kindreds,does the marriage become a really stable one.

Dozier reports the existence of certain other types of discrete groups, in some but not in all parts of the Kalinga region. In the densely inhabited parts of southern Kalinga, these groups take two forms: there are some "conical clans," (also sometimes called "ambilineal descent groups") consisting of all of the descendants through either men or women, of a wealthy ancestral couple. Such groups, which came into being it appears in order to keep together their land over several generations, usually have one member who is charged with supervising the use of the jointly inherited property by all of the heirs. There are also to be found in some of the larger settlements discrete geographic subdivisions which Dozier calls "wards," each of which has an informal council consisting of the old men of the ward. The composition of wards is based upon the residential contiguity of the members rather than upon kinship or descent. Their functions formerly were to organize their members for collective defense. But both conical clans and wards are the exceptions rather than the rule. In most Kalinga settlements, neither can be found. Finally, in some of the smaller settlements in the Northern reaches of Kalinga, all of the inhabitants of a settlement regard themselves as being somehow

related through a web of kinship ties even when the precise kinship connections between all pairs of individuals are not clear. This makes them a "group." But it is a far cry from a discrete collectivity of the type one expects to find if one assumes the universal applicability of the group model of politics. Insofar as kinship is concerned, then, throughout Kalinga and throughout the larger conglomerate of pagan cultural-linguistic groups in the mountains of Northern Luzon, the one uniform pattern upon which until recently all persons had to rely for their physical safety is that of overlapping personal kindreds.

Yet the nature of the terrain inhabited by the Kalinga, divides them geographically into a number of distinct settlements. Did an individual settlement have any form of local government prior to that now imposed by the lowland nation state? The answer again is a qualified "no." No-where in Kalinga, even in the small settlements in the North where all regarded each other as kinsmen, was there a single identifyable "headman." No-where was there a body whose members separately or collectively had authority over all inhabitants of the settlement. What did exist was not authority but personal leadership. There were and are in every settlement various individuals whose superior prowess in combat or whose superior wealth or wisdom gave them influence not only over their immediate family members but also over many of their more distant kinsmen. When one of these self made leaders decided upon some course of action, a cluster of persons made up of his family and these kinsmen, were likely to follow him. And when all of the leaders of substantial personal followings could agree on some course of action -- a rare occurrence in any case -- a large proportion of the community could be mobilized it its support. But not the <u>entire</u> settlement. For while not everyone could be a leader, no one was obliged to be a follower. There was always the option of being an inde-

pendent individual who neither led nor followed any man, and it was the presence of such individuals, as well as frequent disagreement among leaders, that made community-wide action extremely hard to achieve.

Further, community action was of an extremely limited sort, being mainly concerned with such matters as defense against raiding parties from other settlements. It fell far short of "government." There was no law making, no tax collection, no arresting of accused persons by policemen, no courts, and no public executioners. Killing and other wrongs were torts against individuals and their kindreds, not crimes against the community, and were punished by individuals with the assistance of their kinsmen, and the help of "good talkers" who made a profession of being neutral mediators. Under such conditions justice varied, depending upon the relative ferocity of the two antagonists and the size of the kindred which each could mobilize in his own support. I have tried to discover how Almond's "conversion functions" were performed in this "stateless" political system, but have found no satisfactory answer. There was clearly a "system" of inter-related parts. But at best one can say that its processes consisted of the totality of the power-related acts of individual actors, most of which were concerned with the circulation of property among individuals, and with the settlement of interpersonal disputes.

There existed, and still exists, one additional dyadically structured institution which is described in some detail by Barton: The inter-regional network of "peace pacts." Until fairly recent times, the lack of roads, the virtual restriction of marriage to members of the same locality, and the danger of losing one's head if one ventured far from one's home settlement (or "region" as Barton calls it) served as a strong deterrent to inter-regional travel. With the construction of roads through the mountains by the lowland colonial government during the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries, travel between regions became easier while the possibility of profit making through inter-regional trade provided incentives for such travel. To assure their safety when visiting other regions, native traders establish two-person trading partnerships through which each partner gave food and lodging to the other and, more important, promised to avenge him in the same manner as he would avenge his own kinsmen, should the other be killed by someone in that region. During the latter part of the nineteenth century this institution, which initially had given protection only to the two partners, became transformed into a more elaborate system under which two "pact holders" living in different regions each undertook in his own region to avenge any traveler from the other's region who met violence while visiting there. Individual protection thus became blanket protection. But it was still anchored in individuals. It was the pact holder assisted by his personal kindred, and not the region, which offered protection. It was the pact holder who paid compensation if he failed to avenge, and who collected compensation if the other pact holder failed to do so. And if a pact holder died, and no one else came forth to take his place, the pact lapsed and with it the possibility of safe travel between the two regions. Furthermore, each two of the many regions of Kalinga had --or did not have--their separate pacts with each other, and for each pact affecting a region the pact-holder might be a different individual. The complex of pacts thus was a network, not an association. Finally, whenever a new pact was negotiated, any individual in either pact holder's region who had an unsettled blood-debt to avenge in the other region could assert the right to be excluded from the coverage of the pact.

Thus the peoples of Kalinga were never able to devise what to foreigners might seem the much more logical, effective,and categorical solution to the

problem of individual security: The establishment of a Kalinga-wide confederation guaranteeing everyone protection everywhere. The system was as primitive, and as wholly dyadic in structure, as was the international community of powers prior to the establishment of the League of Nations.

## Monarchic Thailand

Our second example is that of monarchic Thailand during the latter part of the Ayudhya period, a span of time extending from the beginning of the reign of King Trailokanat (1448-1488) until the end of the Ayudhya period in 1733. Our main source is H.G. Quaritch-Wales.[17]

Five institutions embodied large components of dyadic structure in the political system of that period. The "rule of declining descent" for royal princes, the method of selecting high governmental officials, the system of patron-client relationships employed to provide corvee and other services to the state, and private indentured clientage or debt slavery.

The rule of declining descent was a logical consequence of the ploriferation of royal princes and princesses which was a general feature of Southeast Asian monarchies. In Thailand, as in most of the region, royal polyginy was the norm. This means that a King had many sons by numerous wives, all of whom were entitled to maintenance including a personal retinue, and many of whom regarded themselves as serious candidates for the throne.

The number of persons having such rights and claims was further increased by geometric proportions by the fact that, consistent with the sexually non-discriminatory principles of cognatic descent, princely status, a princely income, and the right to transmit claims to the throme, if not the right to claim the throne for oneself(though the latter was not uncommon in Burma) were transmitted equally to and through male and female

descendants of a King.[18] Thus each reign produced a flood of princes and princesses each of whom expected to pass on princely status to his or her sons and daughters. Had they been able to pass on their status in full, Thailand soon would have been populated largely by princes and princesses. There had to be, therefore, some check to this inflationary increase of royalty, a check which did not do violence to the cognatic principle of equal treatment for both sexes.

The solution for this dilemma devised in Thailand was one that is often employed when there is inflation: Devaluation. Princes and princesses were assigned various grades, depending on the number of generations they were removed from a kingly ancestor. Thus a King's sons and daughters by his queens were royalty of the highest grade, and had the strongest claims to the throne. Their sons and daughters each lost one grade, and with it suffered a diminution in the strength of their claims to the royal succession. This decline in princely rank continued until, after the fifth generation, a royal descendant lost princely status altogether and became a commoner.[19]

As princely rank was transmitted through both sexes, it followed also that a child could benefit by inheriting rank from both of his parents rather than from one parent alone. Thus the rank of King's son or daughter, though always very high, varied with the rank of the mother, the highest rank going to royal children whose mothers were daughters of Kings in their own right. It therefore took longer for the descendants of such a mother to sink to the level of commoners, than for the descendants of less exhalted royal wives. Thus also in later generations, princes and princesses of lower rank could, by marrying one another, pass on an extra-strong dose of royal blood to their children and thereby briefly delay their loss of rank.

The ability of royal daughters to hold rank and to pass on claims to the succession to their children complicated the matter of their marriages. If a King allowed his sisters or half sisters of high rank to marry ambitious princes, he endangered his own hold on the throne. For this reason he often married his sisters or half-sisters himself. But a queen of really high rank such as that to which a queenly sister was entitled posed a threat of a different kind to the King. For such a queen might rival him in dignity and power. For this reason, kings who married their sisters and half-sisters often made a point of raising none of them to the position of Queen, reserving that position for a wife or wives of less exhalted parentage.

In addition to deriving rank through their descent from a previous King, members of a reigning King's personal kindred were, at the time of his ascent to the throne, appointed to a special set of appropriate ranks. And there were in addition a set of special titles for certain hereditary princes and prencesses expressive of their exact relationship to the King. Finally, the King could at his pleasure bestow rank of a different, non hereditary type upon any commoner or raise or lower the rank of any prince or princess.

Though seemingly complicated, the foregoing system of ranks can be reduced to a few quite simple structural principles: Rank depended upon the number of dyadic links through either men or women to a previous King or kings. Thus the rank of princes or princesses by birth was determined by counting the number of successive and parallel links of inter-generational or intra-generational kinship through either sex to a reigning King or to previous Kings. Thus also, princely or non-princely rank by promotion or demotion depended upon royal favor, a dyadic tie of a non-ascriptive sort.

Dyadic principles of organization may be observed in operation in late Ayudhya period administration. They affected both the filling of high governmental posts and the organization of the system of corvee labor.

Thailand historians are in some disagreement as to the nature of the legal relationship between monarch, men,and land during the first century of the Ayudhya period and the Sukhodaya period which preceeded it. Wales was of the view that the system was a "feudal" one, but this has been disputed.[20] By the time of the reign of Trailokanāt, at any rate, there existed a system of personal patron-client relationships not directly related to land, which was designed to supply corvee labor and taxes in kind to the royal government.[21] Under this system all parts of the realm were under the direct administration of that government except for some areas, far from the capital, which were under the largely independent control of certain royal princes. In the capital, there were established a number of functionally specialized departments of government (kram). These were staffed at the lower levels by commoner officials. But the headship of each department - whether effective or titular - was with few exceptions entrusted to a high-ranking prince or princess.

The mass of freemen now held their land directly from the King, and owed service to him. It is the method by which the performance of this service was organized that is of special interest from the point of view of this paper, for it was based upon patronship-clientship. The entire population, both men and women, were assigned to one of two major divisions, one of them civil, the other military. Within each division, each free man or woman beyond the age of childhood was obliged to choose a patron. This patron had to be a departmental official, and it was under this patron-official that the commoner performed his corvee labor, or through whom,in lieu of labor, he delivered produce to the government. The system was actually a pyramidal one, consisting of successive vertical links of

patronage and clientage. While the high-ranking princes and princesses who headed the great governmental departments each had numerous commoners who were their direct clients, many of the commoners who provided labor or services for their departments were the direct clients of lower-ranking departmental officails. These officials in turn were the personal clients of the princes or princesses who headed the departments. As such they served as intermediate links in vertical chains of patronage and clientage through which the services of the commoners who were at the bottom of the pyramid were made available to the government.[22] The King, for whom all work was performed, thus was the superior patron of all.

In principle, a free commoner had the right to select his own patron. In practice, this freedom was limited to some depree by administrative considerations: He was obliged to select a patron who was in his own division. He had to choose one whose department could make use of the client's special occupational skills. And he was obliged in any case to have some patron, on pain of being reduced to the status of a royal slave. But so long as he met these conditions, a commoner could, at least in theory, seek out a patron who offered a light work-load and who could be expected to treat him kindly. At least in theory, he could leave an oppressive patron and attach himself to another.

There were two structural reasons for the substantial measure of choice allowed to free commoners in these matters. One was that individuals were attached to individuals rather than to such enduring entities as governmental agencies or land. The second was that in this symmetrically cognatic society there were no unambiguous rules of inheritance for the filling of vacant roles of either patronship or clientship. Departmental headships, which brought with them the right to have large numbers of clients, were assigned to princes and princesses on the basis of the

closeness of their relationship to the reigning King. When a prince died, his post was given to another close princely kinsman of the ruler. And upon the death of a King, most high posts were re-distributed among th e new King's personal kindred. Thus, a princely department head had no clear right to pass on his office or his clients to his immediate descendants. The same was the case of course with commoner officials whose offices, titles, and whose rights to have clients could be withdrawn at the pleasure of the King. As for the commoners, who occupied the lower termini in the relationships of patronship and clientship, the fact that persons of both sexes were obliged to be clients meant that a husband and his wife might each serve a different patron. In such instances the custom, which in any case was not a strict requirement, that a child choose the same patron as his parent, gave the children of such marriages two equally preferred patrons among whom they might make their choices.

In addition to directing his clients in their performance of corvee labor for the King, the patron was allowed to demand from them some additional labor for his personal use. But in return, the patron-official was expected to serve as his client's protector, that is to provide for his physical safety, help him secure justice, and when needed, to extend him loans. This extra-governmental arrangement helps to explain two non-official types of vertical interpersonal relationships which came into existence in Thailand. These were private indentured clientage, and outright slavery. Princes and other persons with large numbers of official clients, who diverted a portion of the client' time to the tilling of their private estates, found that these estates, and thus their incomes, could be increased if additional agriculturists could be put to work on them. But in a labor-short country, where any freeman was entitled to ask the King for the use of a plot of land, such agricultural labor could only be secured

through a combination of pressure and inducements. The pressure stemmed from the right of an official patron to be the first to whom his clients might turn for loans in time of need, and the concomitant right, when such debtor clients defaulted on their loans, to transform them into their personal debt-slaves. The inducement lay in the fact that such debt-slaves, like the more exhalted personal retainers of princes, were partly or wholly exempted from corvee labor.[23] The degree of a private debt slave's exemption from royal service depended upon whether he had forfeited himself for his full value, in which case he owed all of his time to his owner, or whether he had incurred a debt equivalent to only a part of his value. In the latter case, his time belonged partly to himself, partly to his creditor-owner, and partly to the King. As persons in the latter situation retained many of the rights of freemen, including the right to own property and to found families, as well as the right to regain their liberty by paying off their debts, and as their children were born freemen, it is more appropriate to describe them as "indentured clients", than to call them "redeemable slaves", as does Wales. Because persons in both of these unfree categories often had more security and were less burdened with work than were freemen, many persons reportedly assumed such unfree status intentionally, borrowing money without a serious intention of repaying it. This helps to account for the presence of a very large number of "slaves", which a nineteenth century European observer estimated to amount to one fourth of the population of Thailand.

This essentially structural analysis of monarchich Thailand in the latter Ayudhya period helps to explain certain aspects of the quality of government during this time. It was noted that the favored group of high princes and princesses who held the highest positions in the royal government were an amorphous cluster of individuals chosen because of their close

kinship to the reigning monarch, and wholly dependent upon him for a tenure which was unlikely to outlast his lifetime. Such a cluster of office holders could not, in view of their structure and composition, achieve a degree of cohesiveness sufficient to make themselves into an effective institutional check upon the King. Because there were such a mass of princes and princesses, there was no room at this time for great independent lines of land-holding magnates of the type that in Europe were able to create a parliamentary counter-weight against monarchic power, or of a powerful professional commoner-bureaucracy of the type that in China performed a somewhat similar function. Nor could there be, in this cognatic society, an equivalent of the hereditary Brahmin caste which in the ancient kingdoms of Hindu India played an equivalent role. All of this helps to explain the unmitigated royal absolutism which was a feature of pre-modern Thailand and, indeed, of most of the ancient monarchies of Southeast Asia.

There was to come a time, however, when Thailand's princes were forced to pay the price for their long period of ascendancy. The revolution of 1932, which ended absolute monarchy, was inspired in considerable part by the resentment of European-educated commoner officials over the dominance of high governmental positions by their princely superiors. And one of its first acts was to bar princes from the occupancy of such positions thereafter.

Patronship and clientship remain among the main building blocs of informal organization in present day Thailand. David Wilson has given us an excellent description of personal followings in the higher levels of the Thai military establishment, where they form the components of "coup groups." Lucien Hanks has described similar structures, which he calls "entourages" in the private sector.[25] But for a detailed analysis of the role played by dyadic structure in a modern Southeast Asian state, we shall turn once again to the Philippines.

## The Modern Philippines

The Philippine case is based upon the writer's own past and ongoing research. A more detailed discussion of the Philipping political system will be found in his monograph and in a forthcoming book.[26]

Viewed from the top downward, the Philippine political system appears to be composed mainly of discrete structures: There are a wide variety of occupationally specialized voluntary associations. There are two nation-wide political parties which compete with each other for the control of the Presidency. There is a Congress, both of whose houses usually though not invariably organize themselves at the beginning of each session on party lines. There are departments and agencies of government staffed, ostensibly, by civil service eligibles. And there is a system of courts. All of these political and governmental structures function in part at least as do their American Counterparts.

But in other ways, which seem puzzling to American observers, these discrete structures operate in a manner not easily explained by the "group theory" of politics. Associational and institutional interest groups perform but a very small portion of the large quantity of "interest articulation" which clearly takes place in this indubitably democratic political system. The two major parties, unlike political parties in almost all of the more developed democracies, are identical in their social composition and fail to present distinctive or even distinguishable programs to the electorate.

Within the government both parties display a minimum of party discipline: In the House of Representatives, disloyal members of one party have helped to overthrow their party's Speaker by joining with the opposite party to install one of the latter's members in this powerful post. On one occasion members of one party helped the opposite party retain the

Speakership with the tacit support of their own party's chief executive. Members of the bureaucracy, for their part, frequently, show little regard for formally established lines of authority, while judges too often fail to insist on the strict and impartial enforcement of the law.

Some explanations for these departures from the patterns of performance which we have come to expect of political systems based, ostensibly, upon the American model begin to appear when one examines the Philippine system not from the top downwards but from the bottom upwards. One then discovers that this system makes as much use of non-discrete as of discrete elements. Specifically, it relies heavily for the performance of various tasks upon a great network of dyadic ties, some of them horizontal but most of them vertical, leading inward and upward from the villages to the national government, from "little people" to "big people," and from those who have favors to ask or demands to make to those who have the power to grant them.. This network of personal ties shows little regard for the boundaries which separate discrete structures, whether they be interest groups, parties, or the various instrumentalities of government. And in performing its various tasks, the Philippine political system proceeds as much through particular decisions affecting specific individuals, and based on the principles of favoritism and the quid pro quo, as through categorical decisions, applied impersonally and impartially in accordance with the rule of law.

In short, the Philippine political system makes use of both discrete and dyadic structures in a mix which contains a substantially larger component of dyadic structure than does the American political system.

The nature of the Philippine mixture can be seen in the manner in which the system performs two major tasks: The election of public officials and the satisfaction of interests. We shall discuss each of these two tasks and the structures which perform them separately.

The most striking feature of elections in the Philippines is the strong disposition of the mass of ordinary citizens to vote for "personalities" rather than for political parties. This means, if they are independent voters, that is to say free agents, that they cast their votes for those candidates whom they find personally attractive or who promise them favors. It means, if they are dependent voters, that they vote for those candidates supported by the petty local leaders in whom they have confidence or to whom they are beholden. As these petty leaders in turn often support cross-party tickets of their own selection, it means in either case that a large proportion of the electorate cast their votes on a dyadic rather than a particular basis. We found hard evidence of this in the course of the analysis of 1,745 actual ballots taken from ballot boxes at ten sample precincts in the province of Laguna after the off-year elections of 1963. These showed that in the average precinct seventy-four per cent of the ballots were cross-party ones, i.e. listed candidates of more than one party.[27]

The cross-party voting habits of the electorate have their counterparts in the strategies of the candidates. These find it necessary to create what are essentially private campaign organizations. Each candidate finds that he must build a personal following, the core of which consists of his kinsmen, his close friends, and his personal clients. These serve as his "leaders." To these are added some less reliable backers recruited among politicians of lower status who are drawn to him by past or promised favors. In addition, the candidate builds alliances with politicians of a status equal to his own, who lend him the votes of their followers on the condition of reciprocity when they in turn seek election.

To finance his campaign, each candidate must raise his own funds. The bulk of these come from his own pocket and the pockets of his close relatives. Some are contributed, as in the United States, by local businessmen. But for much of the remainder the candidate relies upon contributions from candidates running for higher-level offices who, though richer than he, need his help in their own search for votes.

To all this his party makes no major contribution. Its organization is rudimentary. It has few funds to contribute, for in a society in which reliance is placed mainly on specific interpersonal relationships, would-be contributors prefer to give their money directly to individual politicians, who can be expected to remember past favors, rather than to an impersonal organization, which cannot do so.

The largely personal nature of political loyalties among the electorate, and the personal hold which leaders have upon their followers permits and, under certain circumstances, encourages party indiscipline among politicians. Such indiscipline takes several forms:

One form, which has been mentioned, is that of cross-party alliances between candidates of opposing party attachments. These occur, typically, when a presidential or senatorial candidate, campaigning far from his home region, buys the support of a well known local politician of the opposing party by contributing to the latter's campaign funds. A second form of party indiscipline is that which occurs when several members of the same party insist upon running for the same office at election time. This being very common, party leaders in the Philippines usually give their blessing to what they cannot prevent in any case, declaring such constituencies "free zones", in which all candidates of their party are "official candidates." The third form of party indiscipline, which though less common is

most spectacular when it does take place is party switching. This like other forms of indiscipline is found at all levels of the political hierarchy. Two Presidents of the Republic, since Independence, switched parties shortly before their election. And at the most recent national elections of 1969 the presidential and vice presidential candidates of both major parties were erstwhile party switchers.

Structurally each party, in theory, is an association composed of those who have become party members. But this is deceptive, In practical terms, each party is a multi-tiered pyramid of personal followings, one heaped upon the other. The lowest tier is made up of the personal followings of innumerable petty village leaders. These leaders provide support for leaders of municipal stature who, usually are members of the same party and these in turn mobilize support for the politicians who compete for provincial and higher offices. Each link in this vertical chain is based upon face to face relationship, and is conditional upon the downward flow of patronage and spoils. Not infrequently however, as we have seen, a lower level following led by a member of one party provides support for a candidate of the opposity party or for several candidates of different parties. This means that a pyramid of followings cannot be regarded as an intra-party faction, but must be viewed as a quite independent structure resembling a network of strong vines which twists back and forth between two great but largely hollow trees.

In each town and province leaders of roughly the same structure, with their personal followings behind them, cluster together in rival local groups which are held together at that level by family ties, self-interest, and shared enmities. While each of the two parties ostensibly has a chapter in each town and province, composed of its members residing there,

these chapters have little significance. The real functioning element of a party in any locality is one or more of the aforementioned local groups, or more precisely the leaders of one or more of these groups. It is they who put forth candidates, campaign for them, and who monopolize the spoils of office. The number of groups competing for electoral offices varies from town to town and province to province, depending largely upon the peculiarities of each town's historic feuds and alliances. Where there are two groups, and these are fairly stable, linkage with the national political parties causes no serious problems, though even in such places reversals of alliances between groups and parties sometimes take place. Where there is but one important group, or where there are more than two, various problems of linkage occur which affect the ability of local and national leaders to manipulate each other, for the purpose of extracting governmental outputs and political support.[28]

"Boundary maintenance" between the parties is minimal. Political leaders wander into and out of them, with their personal followers in tow. Any politician with a following, or the material resources needed to create one, is welcome in either party at any time, and need serve no apprenticeship before being allowed to run for public office as his new party's official candidate. Entry requires no formal act of adherence, and membership carries with it no real obligation to contribute to a party's coffers or support its other candidates. Membership is not a category but a matter of degree. Long time party stalwarts can be described as genuine members. Newcomers and prospective defectors have merely attached themselves to a party. No-one belongs to it irrevocably.

Given the indefiniteness and permeability of their boundaries, political parties, like most other "associations" in the Philippines, fall

far short of the American associational model. Their names give them a deceptive appearance fo discreteness which can mislead a foreigner. As we have seen, they are but one of a variety of structures which help to elect candidates to public office.

The personal, non-partisan basis of political loyalty helps to account for the types of individuals who win elections. Victory tends to go to those with the greatest personal wealth, the largest towns, i.e. who benefit most from the "friends and neighbors effect," to those with the most flamboyant campaign styles, and to those who give hope of dispensing the largest amount of patronage and other favors. A candidate's position on questions of ideology or his loyal support of such as there is of party policy appear to be of minimal importance.[29]

When one inquires into the manner in which interests are satisfied in the Philippine polity, one finds that less use is made of the "primary" ties of kinship and patronship-clientship than was the case in the structures used for the contesting of elections,and more of ties arising out of considerations of specialized economic interest. But such arrangements insofar as they are employed, are also dyadic.

In Almond's by now familiar re-working of the "group theory" of politics into the framework of a political systems model,the demands of individual citizens, in a more developed polity, are satisfied through a series of consecutive " conversion processes," performed by a number of specialized structures. The process as it goes through its several stages involves the progressive transformation of the particular into the categorical, and then into the particular once again: Thus ,individuals have

particular wants. Interest groups "articulate" these wants in the categorical form of policy demands designed to benefit all of their members. Political parties , in the course of seeking electoral support for their candidates, "aggregate" the diverse policy proposals of various interests into even broader categorical proposals for over-all governmental action. In the United States, as in most modern democracies, each party produces a somewhat different aggregate than do its rivals, an aggregate which reflects the peculiar combination of interest groups upon which the party especially depends for electoral support, and to which it attempts to make a special appeal. In the next stage of the cycle of conversion processes, the"rule making structure," that is to say the legislature, under the leadership of one or another party, transforms these programmatic proposals into categorically applicable laws. Next, "rule application structures," that is to say administrators, convert categorical laws into particular decisions involving specific citizens or corporations. And finally,"ajudicating structures," that is to say the court system, though acting in specific cases, makes decisions which set precedents for categorical application in all identical cases. In the end, the individual citizen gets what he wants, or a portion of it, but only as a result of a lengthy process that is designed to assure that all who are like himself will receive the same benefits or be subjected to the same deprivations.

The foregoing model of the manner in which interests are satisfied fits the Philippines only to a limited degree. The passage of general laws and their categorical application is not a precondition for the satisfaction of individual demands upon the government in that country's political system. Favorism and leniency, not the categorical imperative or the rule

of law,are the culturally sanctioned principles of Philippine action which operate in the sphere of government as well as outside it. In the Philippines private goals can be attained in disregard of the law by members of all social strata. The powerful,the rich, and the well connected can do so through personal office holding,through the use or threat of force, or by offering material rewards to decision makers. The weak and the poor often can obtain leniency either through establishing client relationships to persons in positions of power or, in the case of those who lack such connections, through appeals for awa (pity) -- an appeal which carries much weight in Philippine society. For those who can obtain governmental favors or leniency for themselves, and this includes most of the politically minded members of society, there is little incentive to work for the passage of general legislation. This helps to account for the relatively minor part which is played in the interest articulation process by organized interest groups.

The argument should not be overstated. Of course there are in the Philippines many voluntary associations which to some degree resemble American pressure groups, and their number is growing rapidly.[30] However with a few exceptions, notably that of the sugar industry, for whose political effectiveness there is a special historical explanation, these groups are small,subject to fission, and often short lived. While some of them do press for general legislation, major parts of their leaders' efforts are devoted to interceding with public officials on behalf of specific individuals and firms. As a result they often are viewed as essentially the personal instruments of their leaders whose private interests receive first attention. Ordinary members of the category for which an association

professes to speak usually have little to gain through membership unless they have personal ties with the leaders sufficiently close to justify the hope that special efforts at intervention will be made in their behalf. Most individuals find it more to their advantage to cultivate whatever personal connections they may have with any politicians who are willing to help them obtain favors.

The process of interest aggregation, the next stage in Almond's conversion cycle, is also affected by the low value which is attached to the rule of law.

In modern democracies, it is assumed the interest aggregation function is performed mainly by the political party system. The assumption that parties will transform the demands of interest groups into an aggregate of a higher order stems from the assumption, which is empirically supportable, that parties, like interest groups, represent categorically distinctive sectors of the political community. They are however broader slices of the whole than are interest groups for they are designed to capture majorities needed to win elections. Often they attempt to represent the interests of a whole social class. In the Philippines however, political parties do not represent distinctive sectors of society, distinctive points of view, or even the interests of distinctive regions. Indeed, the two major political parties are quite indistinguishable. The reason for this appears to be that in the Philippines, members of different social classes find that they can be most effective politically when they are allied to each other. The mass of "little people," that is to say the peasants,the urban workers, and the lower middle class, know that they can gain most in the short run by attaching themselves to leaders richer and more influ-

ential than themselves, who can supply them with favors, and that such favors cannot be obtained by joining with others of their own class in exclusively lower class political parties. The rich for their part, secure in their political dominance, have seen no reason to create a party designed specifically to defend the interests of the rich. But finding themselves in competition with other members of their class for vario advantages obtainable from the government, see that the best way of assuring that they will obtain them is by going into politics themselves, which means by creating personal political followings composed largely of members of the lower class.

As a result,the most successful political combinations in the Philippines, including the two major parties and most minor ones, have been open in their recruitment of members, broadly inclusive in their search for electoral support among all classes and regions, and wholly syncretic in their policies. for their success has depended upon their ability to win power in keen competition with opposing but identical combinations, and to retain it by rewarding their leaders and followers of all classes with concrete benefits appropriate to each individual's place in the socio-economic ladder.

This in turn has contributed to the fluidity of party allignments, for given the importance of being with the party in power for those seeking favors, and in the absence of doctrinal reasons for remaining loyal to the party out of power, politicians and their followers have seen little reason to abstain from the common practice of party switching.

The non-categorical or more accurately the omni-categorical basis of recruitment to party membership has made the parties poor instruments for

planned programmatic interest aggregation. Neither party has been able to devise a program that is either coherent or distinctive. Both have totally inclusive programs . And the uncertain party allegiance and indiscipline of their congressional membership has meant that neither party could ensure united support for a coherent program if it had one. There is ,in short, no semblance of a @responsible party system,"

Coherent programs, insofar as they can be found, are produced not by parties but by individuals. Each new President of the Republic creates his own program when he assumes office, guided by his personal views, the views of his advisers, and by a variety of pressures from various sources which no president can ignore. Each member of the Congress does roughly the same think, though many members of both parties respond to some degree to pressure or persuasion from the incumbent president. Thus, the regulative output of the Philippine government is the resultant of the individual decisions of numerous legislators, guided to some degree by the president, rather than the handiwork of the dominant political party as such.

But rule making in any case is a less important aspect of the governmental process in the Philippines than it is in countries where laws are strictly enforced. For this reason members of Congress in the Philippines are less interested than are their British or American counterparts in their legislative tasks, and more interested than the latter in their roles as holders of undifferentiated power, who have the ability to intervene in the administrative process on behalf of their constituents or of themselves. For it is at the administrative stage of the governmental cycle that many of the decisions which most affect Filipinos are made, in what is often a quite arbitrary fashion.

Congressional influence over administrative decisions is exercised directly through the leverage obtainable through the congressional control over departmental appropriations, and indirectly through the ability of members of the Congress to place their proteges in administrative positions and to influence their careers thereafter. One finds therefore a complex network of personal alliances which cut across the formal boundaries between the branches of government. This is the case of course in all political systems to some degree, but in the Philippines the pattern is especially marked.

This system of alliances has consequences for the informal operation of the executive branch. As the proteges of members of Congress are more dependent for their advancement upon the intervention of their extra-departmental patrons than upon the good will of their immediate superiors, bureaucratic discipline is uncertain. Saddled with many uncontrollable subordinates, the wise official responds by attempting to create a personal following of his own among those of his subordinates who show a willingness to give him their primary loyalty in return for the receipt of special favors, and by refusing to delegate authority to any but his personal clients. The Tagalog term for such a personal client is bata (child). Modern organizations in the Philippines, whether in government or in the private sector, are honeycombed with bata systems of the classic patron-client type[31]

We have seen that, together with a multi stage conversion process, performed by a succession of specialized structures, one finds in the Philippines a much more simple process of favor-seeking and favor-giving which is accomplished through the establishment of direct relationships

or chains of relationshipe between seekers of favors and bureaucrats. These relationships or chains of relationships, dyadic in nature, bypass associational interest groups, parties, and the law making structures of government, and therefore reduce the importance of their part in the governmental process. A number of consequences follow from this heavy reliance upon dyadic methods of goal attainment:

It makes for a system which, to a high degree, satisfies the demands of some, though not all, members of every sector of society in a particularistic fashion, thereby minimizing inter-categorical, including inter-class hostility, and reducing the bitterness of conflict between the political parties as well as between other organized groups.

But by permitting favoritism to undermine the impersonal administration of justice, it contributes to the near anarchy which prevails in many parts of the Philippines at the present time, and erodes confidence in the system of government among the more modern-minded members of society.

It causes changes in governmental policy to be secular rather than cyclical in nature, for it makes change dependent not upon the alternation in power of the two political parties but mainly upon long term changes in the contellation of forces in Philippine society, as well as upon the accident of an individual president's personal views.

It produces a system whose responsive and distributive capabilities are quite high, but whose extractive and regulative capabilities are exceedingly low.

Finally, it leads to that preoccupation with personalities, offices, and spoils, and that lack of interest in policy or ideology, which is such

We have examined the role of both discrete groups and dyadic structures in three Southeast Asian political systems. We conclude with a set of hypotheses concerning these two contrasting types of social structure which, we suggest, have broader applicability for students of developing societies in Southeast Asia and in other regions, most notably Latin America.

## Hypotheses

The following hypotheses concern the structural principles and patterns of performance of ideal-typical categorical groups on the one hand, and dyadic followings on the other. These hypotheses are the result of a. deduction from some simple structural concepts, b. current theory concerning dyadic followings, especially that formulated by Lloyd Fallers, Robert Pehrson, George Foster, John Thibaut and Harold Kelley, and the writer and c. a growing body of empirical research conducted in the three geographic regions where dyadic followings are especially important, which appear to support these hypotheses.

Three points must be made before the hypotheses are stated: First, no distinction has been made between organized and unorganized categorical groups. Most of the categorical group hypotheses appear to apply to both, though to a greater degree to the former than to the latter. Second, the dyadic hypotheses are mainly concerned with complex dyadic structures, especially dyadic followings. Excluded are hypotheses concerning interaction within simple dyads as well as those concerning horizontal dyadic alliance systems among ordinary individuals. These are of less interest to political scientists than to members of several other disciplines. Third, it should be stressed that while the hypotheses are meant to apply to two contrasting ideal-typical models, few structures in the real world are purely categorical or purely dyadic. Most real structures, including those found in Southeast Asia, incorporate a mixture of the two sets of structural principles. But the writer contends that societies mix them in different proportions, and that this has important consequences for their political systems.

## Definitions

1. A categorical group is one whose members are united by the fact that they fall into the same distinctive category or class, and thereby are distinguished collectively from members of other categories in their environment. (Examples: Persons of the same occupation, class or ideological persuasion)

2. A dyad is two persons bound together for purposes of mutual aid.

3. A dyadic net is one whose members are connected directly or indirectly by a web of dyadic ties. (Examples: Clusters of relatives or friends)

4. A dyadic following is a special type of dyadic group consisting of one leader and various followers, each tied to him by a personal bond of loyalty. (Examples: The personal followings of petty traditional leaders in most of the non-communist countries of South-east Asia, Latin America and pre-modern Europe)

## Hypotheses

### Group Configuration

#### Genesis

1. Categorical groups tend to be group-created and group-centered: A category exists. Its members become aware of their shared attributes. They may then choose some among their number to direct them in the common defense of their collective interest.

2. Dyadic followings tend to be leader-created and leader-centered: An individual, wishing to become a leader, proceeds to construct a personal following by winning the voluntary adherence of various individuals who can be persuaded to follow him.

#### Cohesion

3. The cohesion of categorical groups tends to be closely related to the presence of objects of common interest to their members.

4. The cohesion of dyadic followings tends to be closely related to the existence of the opportunity for mutually advantageous interaction between the leader and his various followers.

Size

5. The size of categorical groups tends to be closely related to:

   a. The number of persons in a locality who fit the category concerned.

   b. The presence of parallel groups with similar if not identical interests, with which consolidation or alliance is possible.

   c. The presence of rival groups with contrasting interests which act as stimuli to group organization or consolidation or alliances.

6. The size of dyadic followings tends to be closely related to:

   a. The opportunity for the maintenance of face to face relationships between the leader and his followers.

   b. The availability of sufficient spoils to maintain a large following.

Stability

7. Over the short run, the composition of categorical groups tends to be more stable than that of dyadic followings.

   a. Categorical groups tend to be more concerned than dyadic followings with the maintenance of group boundaries.

   b. The stability of dyadic followings tends to be closely related to the leader's ability to distribute tangible rewards among his followers immediately and continually.

Endurance

8. Over the long run, the endurance of categorical groups tends to be longer than that of dyadic followings.

   a. The endurance of dyadic followings is dependent to a greater degree than that of categorical groups upon the personal attributes of successors to positions of leadership.

Group consolidation

9. Categorical groups tend to be consolidated in accordance with the principle of "nesting."

(Under this principle, characteristic of segmentary societies, parallel groups unite through the recognition of those shared attributes which distinguish all of them from other groups.)

10. Dyadic followings tend to be consolidated through the pyramiding of leaders.

(Under this procedure, characteristic of feudal systems, several leaders of lesser stature, each accompanied by his personal following, attach themselves to the same higher leader, becoming his followers while retaining their own followings.)

The territorial basis of grouping

11. There tends to be more clustering of members on the basis of geographic proximity in dyadic followings than in categorical groups.

    a. This is not so in the exceptional case of geographically localized categories.

12. Supre-local combinations tend to be more stable when founded on categorical rather than on dyadic principles.

13. Rival groups are more likely to have their bases in different parts of a locality rather than in the same part of a locality in the case of dyadic followings than in that of categorical groups.

## Superardinate and Subordinate Roles in Groups

The nature of headship

14. The heads of categorical groups tend to a high degree to be "officers" entrusted with authority to act in the name of their groups.

    a. To a high degree their official acts are supported by sanctions imposed collectively by the groups.

    b. Such sanctions tend to be most effective when the following conditions exist:

        1. Categorical groups are multi-functional and/or mutually exclusive.

        2. Group membership is ascribed.

15 The heads of dyadic followings tend to a high degree to be "leaders" acting on their own authority.

a. Group sanctions to compel obedience to leaders by individual followers tend to be rare and ineffective.

b. Individual compliance with a leader's instructions tends to depend to a high degree upon the separate personal consent of each follower.

The nature of membership

16. The rank and file of categorical groups tend to a high degree to regard themselves as being "members" who have rights and obligations with reference to the group.

17. The rank and file of dyadic followings tend to a high degree to regard themselves as "followers" who have claims upon and owe favors to their personal leader.

The Criteria for headship

18. In categorical groups, those occupying positions of headship tend to a high degree to be persons who have attributes which distinguish the rank and file of the group from the rank and file of other categorical groups.

a. The head of a categorical group tends to be regarded as a primus inter pares.

19. In dyadic followings, those occupying positions of headship tend to a high degree to be distinguished from their followers by superior wealth or social status.

a. The leader of a dyadic following tends to be regarded by each follower as his personal patron.

Responsibility and responsiveness

20. The heads of categorical groups tend to a high degree to be responsible to their groups for actions taken in the group's behalf.

a. Such responsibility tends to be enforced by conciliar procedures involving the entire group or representatives of sub-groups of the group.

b. The heads of categorical groups tend to be relatively unresponsive to the purely private demands of individual group members.

c. Responsibility tends to be highest on matters of general group policy.

21. The heads of dyadic followings tend to a high degree to be responsive to the private demands of individual followers.

    a. Responsiveness tends to be obtained through personal pressure from individual followers rather than through conciliar or other collective procedures.

    b. The leaders of dyadic followings have a high degree of freedom to follow their personal preferences in setting or altering their positions on questions of general public policy.

## Goals and Goal Achievement

### Types of goals

22. Goals which are categorical in application and/or ideological in form tend to be more prominent for categorical groups than for dyadic followings.

23. Goals consisting of particular rewards for specific individuals tend to be more prominent in the case of dyadic followings than that of categorical groups.

### Diversity of goals

24. Categorical groups tend to concentrate their activity towards the achievement of a limited number of related goals.

25. Dyadic followings tend to disperse their goal-attainment efforts among a wide variety of unrelated goals.

### Sharing of rewards

26. To a high degree, the rewards which result from the attainment of categorical group goals benefit all persons in the category concerned, regardless of whether they have taken part in organized group efforts designed to attain these goals.

    a. For this reason, there is much pressure for category-wide participation in such group efforts

27. To a high degree the rewards which result from the attainment of the goals of dyadic followings are confined to the members of that following.

    a. Participation in these rewards tends to be closely related to the degree of the individual follower's established value and loyalty to the leader.

Importance of the group head's private goals

28. To a relatively high degree, heads of categorical groups are required to concentrate their attention upon the attainment of group goals.

    a. The group leader's rewards tend to be relatively modest, and to depend in large part upon his value to the group.

29. To a relatively high degree, leaders of dyadic followings are free to concentrate their attention upon their private goals.

    a. The dyadic leader's rewards tend to be relatively large, and to depend upon his skill in manipulating centers of power outside his following.

Time schedule for goal achievement

30. To a high degree, members of categorical groups can be persuaded to put aside short run goals in the interest of long run group goals.

31. To a high degree, members of dyadic followings will insist that their leaders concentrate on short-run goals as a condition for their continued allegiance.

Methods of goal achievement

32. As a method of goal achievement, categorical groups rely to a relatively high degree upon the collective action of their members.

    a. Frontal attacks upon opposing groups are a favored tactic.

33. As a method of goal achievement, dyadic followings rely to a relatively high degree upon the manipulative skills of their leaders and on bargaining.

    a. Attempts to weaken rival leaders by wooing away their followers are a favored tactic.

## The Interaction of Groups in the Polity

The number and competitiveness of rival groups

34. In constituencies where rival groups are recruited on a categorical basis, the number of distinct groups or sub-groups will tend to correspond to the number of distinctive categories present.

a. The relative size of different groups will tend to depend upon the relative size of these categories.

b. The probability of a closely competitive two-group system's existence will be relatively small.

c. The presence of a large number of distinct categorical groups among which rival multi-group alliances can be formed will increase the probability of a closely competitive two-alliance system's existence.

35. In constituencies where rivalry occurs between dyadic followings, the probability of the existence of a closely competitive two-following system will be relatively high.

Similarities and differences between groups

36. In constituencies where groups are recruited on a categorical basis, rival groups tend to be dissimilar in their composition and in their goals.

a. In such cases inter-group disputes tend to turn on substantive issues.

37. In constituencies where groups are dyadic followings, rival followings tend to be similar in their composition and in their goals.

a. In such cases inter-group disputes tend to turn on "personalities" and spoils.

(It is a general characteristic of dyadically structured systems that within them overt cooperation takes place between persons who differ from each other while overt conflict takes place between persons who are alike. The reverse tends to be the case in categorically structured systems.

The reversal of group loyalties

38. In constituencies where groups are recruited on a categorical basis, relatively few members shift their allegiance from one group to another.

39. In constituencies where groups are dyadic followings, the shifting of allegiance between leaders is relatively common.

a. Such shifts of allegiance are closely related to the ability of rival leaders to offer material rewards to their followers.

The reversal of alliances between groups

40. In constituencies where groups are recruited on a categorical basis, the spectral order of groups remains relatively stable. (ie. ABCD remains ABCD.)

    a. The line which separates coalitions may change its position, but two-directional reversals of alliances will be extremely rare. (i.e. AB v CD may become A v BCD or ABC v D, but not AD v BC.)

41. In constituencies where groups are dyadic followings, no obvious or permanent spectral order of groups is likely to exist.

    a. Various changes in the composition of coalitions, including two-directional reversals of alliances, will be fairly common.

## Some Omnibus Hypotheses

The specific hypotheses listed above lead to some omnibus hypotheses of a problem-oriented sort which may be of some interest to individuals concerned with the processes of political and economic development. These omnibus hypotheses deal with the resolution of conflict and with goal achievement:

The resolution of conflict

42. Dyadically structured systems provide for the accommodation of potentially conflicting interests and for the simultaneous satisfaction of diverse demands by the following means:

    a. Providing socially non-disruptive opportunities for individual want satisfaction by directing interest towards particular rather than categorical goals.

    b. Maximizing opportunities for individual as distinguished from group mobility.

    c. Fostering the aggregation of diverse categorical interests by means of compromises which, albeit at the cost of consistency, obviate the need for clear cut choices between incompatible alternatives.

    d. Fostering mutual-aid relationships between individuals across categorical boundaries.

    e. Dispersing centers of power.