

- f. Promoting a type of inter-group competition under which rival groups tend to be:

Sufficiently large to make coalition government unnecessary.
 Closely competitive
 Non-exclusive in their recruitment
 Heterogeneous in composition
 Similar in policy
 Non-dogmatic
 Capable of making rapid adjustments in policies and alliances to meet altered conditions.

43. Categorically structured systems tend to resolve conflicts by the following means:

- a. Fostering an awareness among individuals and groups that they have a higher common interest which supersedes their specific conflicts.
- b. Under certain conditions: By creating stalemates between rival groups which may lead to an acceptance of the need for compromise.
- c. Under certain conditions: By creating stable majorities capable of imposing solutions to conflicts.

Organization for goal achievement:

44. Categorically recruited systems tend to be better suited than dyadically structured systems for the concentration of collective effort towards the achievement of clearly defined collective goals. Specifically they are best suited for the following tasks:
- a. Fostering recognition among large numbers of persons of the same category of the similarity of their goals.
 - b. Fusing scattered private goals into collective goals.
 - c. Forcing clear cut choices between incompatible goals.
 - d. Devising broad long-term programs of action for the achievement of such goals.
 - e. Mobilizing for such programs support which is numerous, disciplined and sustained.
 - f. Restraining individual action which jeopardizes collective goals in order to pursue private goals.
 - g. Controlling inter-group rivalries which jeopardize collective goals.

- h. Selecting leaders fully committed to collective goals.
 - i. Maintaining collective control over leaders
 - j. Enforcing obedience to leaders.
45. Dyadic systems tend to be better suited than categorically structured systems for the rapid attainment of the particular private goals of individuals. Specifically they are best suited for the following tasks:
- a. Focusing attention upon objects which are specific and concrete rather than general and abstract.
 - b. Giving recognition to the personal wishes of individuals.
 - c. Permitting the simultaneous pursuit, by different individuals, of a wide variety of different goals.
 - d. Fostering mutual aid among persons with dissimilar goals.
 - e. Promoting adjustments capable of preventing large-scale conflicts between different groups of goal-seekers.
 - f. Selecting leaders most capable of interceding with power-holders on behalf of individual goal-seekers.
 - g. Keeping leaders sensitive to the wishes of individual followers.

NOTES

1. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman(eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1960), Introduction.
2. Robert Alexander, Organized Labor in Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1965); P.J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921-1957 (London: Cass, 1967); and Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Merle Kling, who was not a member of this group, published his own study, A Mexican Interest Group in Action, (Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall, 1961)
3. See Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1963); George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960); Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); as well as this writer in his 1965 monograph.
4. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. 75.
5. Ibid.
6. An earlier version of the author's critique of the "group theory" of politics with reference to the Philippines, including a rudimentary model of a dyadically structured system, is contained in Carl H. Landé, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), Monograph No. 6. See especially Appendix II, "Group Politics and Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory." The subject is also treated in the author's doctoral dissertation, "Politics in the Philippines," Harvard, 1958.
7. Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); David Truman, The Governmental Process(New York: Knopf, 1951); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1952).

8. Harold Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917); and by the same author, Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company., 1921); and A Grammar of Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1925).
9. See Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophical Basis of Fascism," and Alfredo Rocco, "The Political Doctrine of Fascism," in Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Readings on Fascism and National Socialism (Denver: Allan Swallow, no date).
10. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
11. The points made in the following several pages are adapted from the writer's 1965 monograph. See Landé, op. cit. pp. 144.
12. H.A. Gould, "The Hindu Jajmani System: A Case of Economic Particularism," Southwest Journal of Anthropology, 14 (1958) pp. 428-437.
13. Words used by Murdock to describe the kinship structure of cognatic societies. See George Peter Murdock, Social Structure (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 60. Sutton calls such networks "reticulations." See F.X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Harry Eckstein and David Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York; The Free Press, 1963) p. 73.
14. For Latin America see George M. Foster, "The Dyadic contract: A Model for the Social Structure of a Mexican Village," American Anthropologist 63:6 (Dec. 1963); and Arthur J. Rubel, Across the Tracks: Mexican Americans in a Texas City (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), pp. 214-216. For Southeast Asia see Herbert P. Phillips, Thai Peasant Personality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 93; Ethel Nurge, Life in a Leyte Village (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965) especially Chapter 6; "Dyadic Relationships in the Family"; Carl H. Landé, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), especially Appendix II, "Group, Politics and Dyadic Politics: Notes for a Theory" pp. 141-148; L.M. Hanks, "The Corporation and the Entourage: A Comparison of Thai and American Social Organization," Catalyst (Summer, 1966): Koentjaraningrat "Javanese Data on the Unresolved Problems of the Kindred," in Ethnology, 7:1 (Jan. 1968). Thomas Kiefer has used the dyadic model outlined in my 1965 monograph to describe some parts of the political system of a Moslem Philippine tribe. See his Tausug Armed Conflict: The Social Organization of Military Activity in a Philippine Moslem Society (Chicago: Philippine Studies Program, Department of Anthropology, 1969), Research

Series, pp. 130-2. For a summary of his findings, see by the same author, "Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare among the Tausug of Jolo" in *Ethnology*, 7:3 (July, 1968). For preindustrial Northern Europe see Robert N. Pehrson, The Bilateral Network of Social Relationships in Kónkämä Lapp District (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Pubs. 1957), Slavic and East European Series, Vol. 6; Otto Blehr, "Action Groups in a Society with Bilateral Kinship: A Case Study of the Faroe Islands" in *Ethnology*, 3:3 (July 1963); and Eileen Kane, "Man and Kin in Donégál: A Study of Kinship Functions in a Rural Irish and Irish-American Community" in *Ethnology*, 7:3 (July, 1968). For non-cognatic societies in which dyadic structure has been reported see Lloyd Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Heffer 1956), especially pp. 288-232; and Harumi Befu, "Network and Corporate Structure: A Structural Approach to Community Interrelationships in Japan," in *Studies in Asia*, 1963. For more general discussion of dyadic structure by an anthropologist see E. R. Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship and Patron-Client Relationships in Complex Societies" in Michael P. Banton, ed. The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (New York: Praeger, 1966) pp. 1-20; by social psychologists see John W. Thibaut & Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959) especially Part I, "Dyadic Relationships"; and Murray Glanzer & Robert Glaser, "Techniques for the Study of Group Structure and Behavior: Empirical Studies of the Effects of Structure in Small Groups," in *Psychological Bulletin*, 58, 2-27 (1961); and by a game theorist see Anatol Rapoport, Two Person Games, (Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan, 1966). Recently a number of statistically oriented students of the international system have begun to examine its structure dyadically. See for example R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior," *World Politics*, XXI:2 (1969) pp. 226-241. Closely related are a growing number of reports on patron-client systems and on corruption, which without discussing dyadic structure per se, describe what are essentially dyadic systems of vertical interaction. See especially Alex Weingold, "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Society and History, X:4 (July, 1968); W. F. Wertheim, "Patronage, Vertical Organization, and Populism," Paper read at the VIIIth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences in Tokyo, September 1968 (unpublished); James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," American Political Science Review, LXIII:4 (December, 1969).

15. Lloyd Fallers reports examples of African rulers who, wish-
 int to rid themselves of checks imposed by their privileged
 lineage-mates, shift bureaucratic power to personal clients
 drawn from non-privileged descent groups. See Fallers, op.
cit. A similar pattern has been reported for China during
 the Manchu period. See Franz Michael, The Origin of Manchu
Rule in China (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1942). A

modern equivalent is found in the case reported to the writer by Hans Brisch, of the close advisor to a high Soviet official whose value to the latter stems in part from the fact that the advisor is not a party member, and thus cannot become a rival.

16. R. F. Barton, The Kalingas: Their Institutions and Custom Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); and Edward P. Dozier, Mountain Arbiters: The Changing Life of a Philippine Hill People (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966).
17. H.G. Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration (London: Bernard Quaritch, Ltd., 1934).
18. For a discussion of some traditional Thai and other Southeast Asian solutions to the problems posed by multiple claimants to a throne, see Carl H. Landé, "Kinship and Politics in Primitive and Pre-Modern Societies," in John McAlister (ed.), Southeast Asia: The Politics of National Integration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970).
19. For the declining descent rule, see Wales, op. cit., Chap. II. See also Mary R. Haas, "The Declining Descent Rule for Rank in Thailand: A Correction," American Anthropologist, LIII(1951), pp. 585-587.
20. Wales, op. cit., pp. 44, 45.
21. A similar pattern appears to have existed in early Cambodia. Ibid, p. 46.
22. In addition to the system of ranks discussed earlier, there was a quantitative system of grading called sakti na, which denoted the number of clients attached to its possessor.
23. A somewhat similar development, but one involving the control of land rather than directly of people, occurred in Japan during several centuries following the Taika reform of the seventh century. And it was encouraged by rather similar inducements. In this case peasants who tilled what in theory was Imperial land and who owed rent to the Emperor, began to commend their land to Imperial officials who turned them into private estates, but imposed less burdensome rents than did the Emperor.
24. David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1962).
25. Hanks, op. cit.

26. Lande, 1965, op. cit.
27. For a more complete preliminary report on these findings, see Carl H. Lande, "Parties and Politics in the Philippines," Asian Survey, VIII:9 (September 1968), pp. 742-747.
28. An extensive study of the relationship between factionalism and inter-level linkage is at present being carried on by the writer in 208 towns of the Southern Tagalog region. This study, co-sponsored by the Ateneo de Manila University and the University of Kansas, is supported by the Agency for International Development, the National Economic Council of the Republic of the Philippines, and the American Council of Learned Societies.
29. The personal attributes of winning candidates as compared with losers are also being examined in the course of the Southern Tagalog study.
30. See Remigio E. Agpalo, The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1962); and Robert B. Stauffer, The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1966.).
31. For a horizontal pattern of dyadic relationships common in the Philippines, see the discussion of suki in James N. Anderson, "Buy and Sell and Economic Personalism: Foundations for Philippine Entrepreneurship," in Asian Survey, IX:9 (1969).