RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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CONTENTS

LIST OF WITNESSES

Page

Wednesday, February 28, 1967:
Reischauer, Hon. Edwin O., former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and presently professor in East Asian Studies, Harvard University ---- 2
Wednesday, March 1, 1967:
Scalapino, Dr. Robert A., professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley ---- 77
Young, Hon. Kenneth T., Jr., president, the Asia Society, and former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand ---- 48
Thursday, March 2, 1967:
Huntington, Dr. Saumel P., Professor of Government, Harvard University ---- 115
Ness, Gayl D., Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan ---- 122
Tilman, Robert O., Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University ---- 109
Wednesday, March 8, 1967:
Chennault, Mrs. Claire Lee ---- 152
Thursday, March 9, 1967:
Gaud, Hon. William S., Administrator, Agency for International Development ---- 191
Poats, Hon. Rutherford M., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, Agency for International Development ---- 205

STATEMENTS AND MEMORANDUMS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Biography of—
Chennault, Mrs. Claire Lee ---- 151
Huntington, Dr. Samuel P ---- 114
Ness, Gayl D ---- 121
Reischauer, Hon. Edwin O ---- 2
Scalapino, Dr. Robert A ---- 75
Tilman, Robert O ---- 107
Young, Hon. Kenneth T., Jr ---- 47
Memorandum submitted by Hon. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., on leadership development program ---- 53–69
Statement by Hon. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., U.S. delegate at 20th Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, held in Teheran, Iran, Mar. 2–17, 1964, on town-centered planning for rural development in Asia ---- 70–71
Memorandum submitted by Hon. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., on suggested measures for getting increased political impact out of U.S. overseas programs ---- 71–75
Memorandum submitted by Mrs. Claire Lee Chennault on the Chicom's "Great Socialist Cultural Revolution" ---- 185
Letter to Hon. Clement J. Zablocki, chairman, from Hon. William S. Gaud, Administrator, AID, commenting on proposal for the establishment of an Asian Service Corps ---- 220

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1967

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2.15 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will come to order, please.

I would at the outset like to welcome the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota, Congressman Blatnik. Also, I would like to announce that, under the rules of the House, photographs and tape recordings may not be made while the hearings are in progress.

Today the subcommittee will begin a series of public hearings on rural institutional development in Asia. During these hearings which will run into late April, the subcommittee will not only hear expert academic and nongovernmental witnesses but will bring from the field Government officials from the Department of State, Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency, and Department of Defense who actually develop and operate our programs.

The primary emphasis during these hearings will be on U.S. efforts in political, social, and economic development in the rural areas of Asia, studying in depth those programs being conducted in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines. Members not only of this subcommittee but the Congress as a whole have been concerned for some time about the Communist penetration of these rural areas and what the United States is doing to head it off or combat it.

There are a number of basic questions concerning the U.S. efforts in this most important area. For instance, is it possible to measure how successful the United States has been in its rural development programs? One objective of these programs, it seems to me, would be to encourage central governments to be more responsive to the needs of the countryside, thereby drawing the rural population closer to their local and central governments. Are U.S. aid programs aimed at accomplishing this? If not, what and how can the United States be of the most help to the governments in such efforts? Can it help at all? Should the United States even have a role and, if so, in what respect?

These are just a few of the questions to which we will be seeking answers over the next 6 weeks or so.

We are indeed privileged to have with us today the Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and presently professor in east Asian studies at Harvard University. Ambassador Reischauer has written extensively of Asia, in particular on Japan.

I think it might be well at this point to insert in the record Ambassador Reischauer's biographical sketch.

(The biographical sketch is as follows:)

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

Born: October 15, 1910. Tokyo (American Missionary parents).
Academic training:
Oberlin College (Ohio). A.B., 1931.
Harvard University (1931–33, 1938–39). M.A. 1932, Ph. D. 1939.
University of Paris, 1933–35.
Tokyo University, 1935–36.
Kyoto University, 1936–37.
Peking (private study), 1937–38.
Academic positions:
Harvard University:
Instructor 1939; Associate Professor 1945.
Professor 1950 to 1961: Title: Professor of Japanese History.
Present position: University Professor 1966.
Harvard-Yenching Institute: Director 1956–61.
Association for Asian Studies: President 1955–56.
Government service:
State Department Service 1941, 1945–46.
War Department Service 1942–43, 1948–49.
U.S. Army, Lt. Col. 1943–45 (awarded Legion of Merit).
U.S. Ambassador to Japan, April 6, 1961–August 31, 1966.
Major publications:
Various Japanese language texts (with Elisseeff and Yoshihashi).
The Romanization of the Korean Language based upon its phonetic structure (with George McCune) (1940).
Japan Past and Present (1946, 1953 and 1964).
The United States and Japan (1950, 1957 and 1965).
Translations from Early Japanese Literature (with Joseph Yamagiwa) (1951).
Ennin's Diary: The Record of a Pilgrimage to China in Search of the Law (1955).
Ennin's Travels in T'ang China (1955).
Wanted: An Asian Policy (1955).
East Asia: The Great Tradition (with J. K. Fairbank) (1960).
East Asia: The Modern Transformation (with J. K. Fairbank and A. Craig) 1965).

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Reischauer has a short prepared statement which I will ask him to read into the record.

Mr. Ambassador, the subcommittee operates under a 5-minute rule during which each member is allowed in turn 5 minutes to ask questions. After the members present have each had an opportunity to ask questions, they will be permitted additional questions if they so desire.

Will you proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN, AND PRESENTLY PROFESSOR IN EAST ASIAN STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. REISCHAUER. Thank you, Mr. Zablocki and gentlemen. It is a privilege to appear before this distinguished committee to testify on the complex subject of political and social development in Asia and the role of U.S. programs in this process of development.

I must start by saying that I have had no experience in the planning or administration of economic aid programs, though I hope that my long contact with Asia and study of its history may offer some insights on the underlying question of what the U.S. approach should

be toward political, social, and economic changes in Asia. It is to this more basic aspect of the problem that I have been asked to address my remarks.

I should first like to repeat some of the points that I made in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 31. These points in brief are—

That Asia is a very large and diverse area, and that therefore blanket policies cannot and should not be mechanically applied to all of its countries;

That the less developed countries do not enter significantly into the immediate balance of power in the world and that their long-range evolution into healthy and prosperous members of international society is of more importance to the United States than are their present political postures or developments over the next few years;

That the less developed countries are in a state of flux, seeking patterns of growth that will help them transcend their colonial heritage, wipe out past humiliations, and achieve stability and prosperity as modernized nations, and that therefore rapid change is for them not only inevitable but for the most part desirable;

That the past colonial relationship between the less developed countries and the advanced, industrialized nations has left the former understandably fearful of domination by the industrialized nations, resentful of their proffered leadership, and profoundly suspicious of their efforts to help shape developments within the less developed countries; and

That differences in culture and race between the countries of Asia and ourselves further intensify these negative feelings toward us, limiting the influence we can have on changes in Asia and necessitating a special degree of caution, restraint, and modesty in our efforts to play a useful role in Asian development.

It is because of these basic considerations that I suggested to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "we should not seek to play the role of leader in Asia" but of "friendly outside supporter" for "Asian initiatives" and that "we should not sponsor political, social, or economic change in Asian countries, though we should be responsive to requests from them for aid in carrying out such changes, whenever we judge that these changes would help in the healthy development of these countries and that our aid could usefully contribute to this end."

I should like to elaborate on these general propositions, but first I must point out exceptions to them. When we have already become so deeply involved in an Asian regime that we are to a large extent responsible for its very existence, we cannot avoid responsibility for its nature.

This was the situation at one time in Korea, and is the situation in South Vietnam today. Ideally, such deep involvements should be avoided, but when through fate or accident or error they have already developed, an abnormal response is required.

In South Vietnam we find our combat troops heavily committed, but the war cannot be won on the battlefield alone. The outcome depends to a large extent on what is achieved in the economic, social, and political development of South Vietnam. While we must continue to recognize that we are the outsiders in someone else's country, we must exercise here a type of initiative and even leadership that

would be totally undesirable in our more typical relationships with Asian countries.

I approve of the initiatives we are taking to build up the society and economy of South Vietnam and to help develop a more representative form of government. My only regret is that we did not start on such activities sooner and more vigorously.

The United States has been accused of showing the "arrogance of power." Although such arrogance is an ever-present danger, I personally feel that this is not our basic problem and that, considering the vast power we possess, we have so far shown relatively little arrogance.

Our problem seems to me more our unconsciousness of the power we exercise. In cases like those of Korea and Vietnam, we have failed to use as much influence in the fields of social and political development as the situation demanded.

A more typical situation in Asia, however, is the one in which we fail to see that our actions, or at times our lack of action, seem to the people of the country concerned an undue exercise of power or influence. We are a huge and strong nation, and our slightest move, however unwitting, can have a profound impact on others. I felt this very keenly even in a large and highly advanced country like Japan. How much more is it the case in the weak and less developed countries of the world.

I am afraid that, in our unconsciousness of the tremendous power we exercise, we have tended toward simple-mindedness in our approach to the problems of Asia. To be sure, the countries of Asia need great economic, social, and political changes, and most of them are quite aware of this fact. For the most part, they wish to move toward more prosperous, more stable, and more democratic societies, and these are exactly the goals we would like to see them achieve.

We have great economic resources—virtually a third of the world's total wealth—and tremendous reservoirs of skill and technical knowledge with which to aid them in achieving these ends. What would seem more logical than for us to chart the way and lead them to the promised land of democracy and affluence? This would seem to be the hypothetical straight line between two points.

There is one flaw to this approach, however. It overlooks some mighty mountain chains that lie in the way. In other words, it ignores the complex realities of the world in which we live and goes against basic human nature.

In the first place, I do not think we have the knowledge and wisdom to chart a course for Asian countries. Each is a very distinctive nation, with its own special qualities. Any course must be based first of all on the realities of the local situation, which we understand much less than do the people who live there. Our role in charting a course could at best be only supplementary.

The legacy of the colonial past, moreover, makes Asians unwilling to have us chart their path and lead them into the future. One need not, however, cite their particular historical background to see the unrealism of such an approach. No people is going to let another take such leadership in their own affairs.

We certainly did not let the Europeans chart our course across the American Continent, though we were happy to use their capital and

skills. Today it is we who have the necessary fertilizers of capital and skills that the Asians need to help them in their national growth. But we must apply these fertilizers with judicious restraint or else we may burn or smother the still delicate plant we wish to help grow.

The chief hope for the healthy development of the nations of Asia is their own nationalistic ardor. The main outside influence that can help in this development is the wealth and skills of the United States and the other advanced nations. The problem is that these two forces, instead of working together in harmony, can all too easily work against each other. We must learn how best to reduce frictions between these two great forces and make them pull together.

Most fundamental to this problem is the matter of attitudes—or one might call it style. We must be absolutely certain in our own minds that we can only be outside, sympathetic helpers and not inside leaders. We must constantly remind ourselves that it is their country we are dealing with, not ours.

We must realize that each country has its own way of doing things and that our ways, however good we find them, may not be practical or even desirable for other people. We should think not in terms of exporting democracy or other of our treasured values, but in terms of supporting Asian nations in their efforts to reach their own goals, which in most cases, I feel sure, will include the goal of democracy. We must realize that the long way around is often a quicker and surer way of reaching an objective than the short straight line. History has constantly illustrated this point.

The question of attitudes and style raises the problem of personality and training. I have often felt that the quality of our representatives in a country to which we wish to give aid is almost as important as the nature of our programs. The way one does something is usually as meaningful as what one does.

Americans who may be extremely competent in their special fields and might be very effective in the United States can sometimes—because of lacks in their background knowledge or because of a certain insensitivity of personality—do more harm than good when sent abroad. I have found this to be true even in a country like Japan, and it is still more the case in the sensitive, less developed countries of Asia. I would like to see more attention paid to both personality and training in our missions in Asia.

Even with the right attitudes and people, however, we will always face the practical problem of the degree of aid we can give to countries whose nature and actions we cannot approve. Can we give aid to countries that are not democratic and do not even seem to be progressing in that direction, or to countries that fail to take certain badly needed steps in their own development? Can we support dictatorships? Can we underwrite social injustice or economic incompetence? Do we not have to attach tight strings to all the aid we give?

There can be no clear-cut answers to these questions, because the diversity of Asia is too great for blanket rules, but I think that we can work out some general guidelines. We should remember that, because of past experience, present living standards, literacy rates, and levels of technical skills, democracy is not a political system that could be put into immediate and full operation in some parts of Asia

and that progress toward democracy will probably be very slow in many places.

In some countries such progress may be seen for a while only in basic processes such as the gradual spread of education, rather than in the development of specific democratic institutions. It is even possible that democracy may prove quite unattainable in parts of the world, though I personally feel that the concept of a free, democratic society is so appealing to men everywhere that almost all countries will attempt to achieve it.

Much the same can be said about the problems of economic and social development. Many Asian countries are simply unable to do the things in these fields that we might consider desirable. For a long time progress toward a more stable, affluent, and just society may take place only as a creeping growth at the grassroots level.

The basic point, though, is that we should not judge the utility of our aid simply in terms of existing conditions or of immediate rapid progress, but rather should evaluate it in terms of its contribution over a long period of time toward the development of a more stable, prosperous, enlightened, and, we would hope, democratic society. This fits into the time-scale of our interests in the less developed countries of Asia, which is not in their present realities but in their potential as healthy members of the world community over the decades ahead.

In short, we should judge the value of our aid primarily in terms of its long-range effect. If it underwrites inaction by backward regimes or helps preserve outmoded institutions, it will obviously be of no benefit to them or to us.

On the other hand, even in the case of a country whose present institutions we cannot approve, if our aid were to help lay the foundation for future healthy development, it would be in our interests and in theirs. In particular we should remember that the key to development is what happens to people in the process of a nation's modernization. Their knowledge, their skills, and above all their sense of participation in an increasingly just society count more than mere physical things.

What I have said implies that there should be strings of a sort tied to our aid, but this is perhaps not the way to define it. I think it is a mistake to offer aid on specified conditions. This seems too much like outside interference. If the conditions are political, they are particularly offensive and may do more harm than good.

It would be much better to have the recipient country take the initiative in drawing up aid proposals, tied up and packaged with its own strings, and let us exercise our judgment in deciding whether the proposals appear sound enough to support.

This, of course, would seem to throw the full responsibility for the planning process on the recipients; and yet one of the great problems of the less developed countries is exactly their lack of adequate skills for sound planning. Part of this need might be filled by a process of informal consultations between the country developing the aid proposal and the aid-giving country.

A fuller and better answer to the problem would be to provide the less developed countries with assistance in planning which is quite distinct from the giving of aid itself. The problem might be met by

an international body of experts, paid perhaps by funds supplied from abroad, but clearly serving the countries for which they are planning and not the countries of their origin.

Here I am mindful of the experience of the Japanese during the early decades of their efforts to modernize their country. There was, of course, no aid to be had at that time, but the Japanese hired the best experts they could find in the West—usually at great expense—and since these men were clearly working for Japan, the Japanese used them extremely well to help plan the development of their nation.

The important point is to remove the aid-giving country from the position of seeming to determine or chart the future of the recipient country. This is particularly important when the aid giver is so large and dominant a country as the United States. The wasteful friction between the forces of outside aid and internal nationalism would be greatly reduced if the planning process could be put fully under the control of the recipient nation and outside help in planning could be internationalized in this way.

I might add that the channeling of the aid itself through international agencies would further reduce this friction. I am hopeful, in this regard, about the role that might be played in East Asia by such regional institutions as the Asian Development Bank, ECAFE, and other international organizations. It must be admitted, however, that international agencies inevitably involve greater complexities and a heavier overhead than do bilateral instrumentalities, and that therefore there may be some reduction in the effectiveness of aid given through such channels. But this loss should be measured against the possible loss through friction with nationalism when aid is bilaterally administered. If viewed in this light, the international channel may well prove the more efficient.

My remarks have centered on attitudes toward the American role in Asian development and the style in which we perform our role. These may seem like intangibles, but my experience has shown me that it is just such intangibles that often shape history. This is not surprising, because intangibles such as these have to do with people, and it is people, rather than things, that make history.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Ambassador Reischauer, for an excellent statement.

On page 3 of your statement, Mr. Ambassador, you say that in Korea and Vietnam we failed to use as much influence in the fields of social and political development as the situation demanded. Let me say that I think if we had begun rural development early enough and intensively enough in Vietnam, we might not now be faced with a massive pacification effort there.

Nevertheless, your statement seems to me contradictory to your earlier expressed view that "we should not sponsor political, social, or economic change in Asian countries."

Mr. REISCHAUER. I cited that as a specific exception to the general rule, pointing out that when we have gotten ourselves so involved in a country that its existence is because of our aid, as in the case of Vietnam today, or Korea some years ago, then we are really responsible for what that country is. This is a moral problem for us Americans, because we don't feel we should interfere in other people's countries, but if we have interfered to the point where the country exists because

of us, we should see that it exists properly. I think in those cases we have failed to live up to our responsibility in seeing that they have a better regime than they managed to produce for themselves.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Therefore, you think that in such a circumstance the United States should start development activities of that type sooner and more vigorously.

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is right.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Ambassador, I would be interested in having your views on the current situation in Thailand. Some experts believe that the level of insurgency in Thailand is similar to that in South Vietnam in the late 1950's. Right now the United States is actively engaged in attempting to convince the Thai that administrative, political, social, and economic changes must be made if the popular support of the government is to be broadened.

My question is, Are we wrong in taking such an active role there, or do you see Thailand as another "abnormal" situation where the United States must become involved?

Mr. REISCHAUER. This is closely related to the whole problem of our military presence in Thailand. In the Senate I was questioned on that point—what did I think of it in view of my general principles?

I replied that I thought the Thai situation was so deeply involved in the Vietnamese situation and the Laotian situation that it could not be divorced from them, particularly that area up in the northeast. So we have really to look upon it as an extension of a situation of heavy commitment already.

That being so, on the military side I would say that we should perhaps look upon this as an abnormal case in which we should try to exert direct influence to try to get a better program in the rural parts of the northeast.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What other abnormal situations in Asia or southeast Asia do you see that we should actively participate in?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Those are the only areas that I can think of: South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. I have no other exceptions in mind.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Ambassador, on page 4, the last paragraph, you indicate that—

> The chief hope for the healthy development of the nations of Asia is their own nationalistic ardor.

I have some question about that. It seems to me that the nationalistic ardor has softened the Asian states into some undesirable and unproductive situations. I have in mind Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia, of Burma cutting Western ties to find a "Burmese" way to socialism. The India-Pakistan war over Kashmir, and the Thai-Cambodian squabbles. All these incidents can be traced to nationalism. They have caused tremendous expenditures for arms which might better have been put to development purposes. They have worked against the establishment of true regionalism in Asia. Would you care to comment?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I would agree with all your statements there. There is no doubt about it that nationalism can always be carried to extremes, making it a dangerous thing and a harmful thing. We in our own history have seen that a great deal over the last few centuries.

Still, on balance, I think the nationalistic ardor of these newer countries of Asia is a constructive force despite the destructive fringes to it. In any case, this is historically inevitable; if these countries are going to become sound countries they are going to do it through a great enthusiasm for themselves as national units.

Nations are the building blocks of the age in which we live. I think we are going to have to be fairly tolerant of some of the excesses of nationalism that show up. It is easy for us who are, in a sense, past the point where nationalism was of greatest value to us, it is easy for us to criticize them and say they shouldn't be so nationalistic, but I just don't think that is quite fair. They are going to go through the phase that I think the rest of us, the Europeans, Americans, the Japanese, have gone through.

We will have to be fairly tolerant of some of the unpleasant aspects of nationalism and on balance look upon it as being a force for good in the construction of Asia, and the independent units which we would like to see there.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Generally, from your statement I gather, Mr. Ambassador, that you believe that our assistance in Asia should be of the same nature we provided through the JCRR—Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction. You do, I believe, have faith that through such joint programs we are looked upon as sympathetic helpers and not inside leaders. Do you believe that——

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is true, I believe, except I think the JCRR, which was an experiment carried out largely on the island of Taiwan, was again in a fairly unusual situation. We were involved in the existence of the regime there and so more committed to a leadership role, a role of initiatives, than we would be in most places. Therefore we could have the joint situation in which we took a lot of leadership. I doubt that in most countries in Asia they will invite us to play quite that large a role.

I think we should certainly try to contribute to things of that sort, if they come up with plans of that type.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What I am trying to get from you is what your position is, whether you think they can do it all on their own. Do they have the leaders to do it on their own?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think they do. They don't have enough expert skill to plan all these things. Therefore, I suggested that a special effort might be made to try to get more planning skills into their hands. It will be a healthier situation if those planning skills are in their hands, and they exercise ultimate political judgment with a group of international experts to help them do it. We stay on the outside to help provide the know-how, the funds, and so on, insofar as this group can come up with realistic plans.

When we go rushing in and try to organize it ourselves, I think we are likely to build up a lot of countercurrents to what we are doing. I am suggesting maybe a different style of approach.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think this hearing has already begun to highlight the problem we are trying to find the solution for. Your testimony and presentation, thus far, is promising to be most helpful toward that end.

Mr. Mailliard.

Mr. MAILLIARD. I have no questions.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Reischauer, in your statement before the Senate you said Vietnam is something we should have avoided. I think most of us can probably agree to that.

When we decide to put aid into a country and military assistance, and begin putting men and material in, we ultimately commit our prestige. Doesn't a momentum build up that is difficult to reverse, at least from a political standpoint, so that the administrators that have made that decision feel that even though it is done on a minimal basis initially they have committed themselves and they have to keep going with it? Isn't it a very difficult thing to reverse this process once we have begun it, even in a small way?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Our recent history would certainly show it is a very difficult thing. I am quite certain when we got started in our various commitments in Vietnam nobody envisaged the situation we have gotten into and they would have all backed right out of it if they saw it developing in this direction.

We've got to be very conscious of this problem. As you put it, we commit our prestige. I don't see why we have to commit our prestige, frankly. I think this is what we should not be doing. We should try to be helpful. If our help cannot be used successfully there, it is the local country's prestige that is committed; not ours.

This is part of the reason for maybe not having it our plan, but their plan that we are supporting.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it possible to put men and material and resources into a country without committing our prestige?

Mr. REISCHAUER. It depends on what you mean by "men and resources." If you are talking about Peace Corps people, I am sure we can. We have not committed our prestige if we have sent a lot of enthusiastic, idealistic young people to help.

As soon as you put in military advisers, you are at a different level, that is true. I don't see why the economic technician commits our prestige.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we have some countries in Asia where you would caution us against overcommitment now?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I would caution us against overcommitment in any country where we are not already overcommitted. There are going to be a lot of turns in the road of these countries. That is the nature of the underdeveloped countries.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is your assessment of military aid in general in southeast Asia, thinking now not particularly of Vietnam and these exceptional countries that you have pointed out.

Mr. REISCHAUER. You are getting me beyond my depth. I am not an expert in these things. I could imagine that there could be cases of a constabulary sort of aid to groups that preserve peace, that keep guerilla movements from developing, which might be a valid form of aid.

On the whole I should think we are going to do better by a country if we limit the military side of our aid as much as possible and try to put it into more constructive things.

Mr. HAMILTON. I was also interested in your remarks in your statement to this committee about the development of persons who are sensitive and have a sense of history. How do we go about doing that? What procedures is it necessary for the Government to adopt to put these kinds of people in the field?

Mr. REISCHAUER. First of all, I don't think there has been a realization of this aspect of the problem. Not enough people maybe have been sensitive enough to the situation in Asia to see that American A may be a fine person, but it's not really very effective there because of a lack of sensitivty and ability to really communicate in a way that is appreciated there, whereas citizen B, who looks not better than the other man, might be very effective that way.

If we are aware of that problem, we can do something about it. I think we have to put a little more effort into training, developing more language skills, which is one of the ways to achieve this kind of more sensitive contact.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any particular assessment of our attempts in South Vietnam, or other areas for that matter, on our techniques of social and rural development specifically?

Mr. REISCHAUER. No. As I said, I am not an expert in having dealt with any of these things. Let me just point out that we should not take our experience in Japan, which I do know about, as being an example, because we had a defeated nation and one we were ourselves occupying. We could do things, and it was proper to do them, of a sort that is not proper in these independent nations.

The one area that I am really familiar with is not a good example.

Mr. HAMILTON. How encouraging are the movements in Asia toward economic cooperation and regionalism? Do you put real hope on this for the decade or two decades ahead?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I was quite a skeptic about this until quite recently, because the talk about regionalism was our talk for a long time. While there was some talk about Asian and African solidarity, it was just talk. They were anti-West, but had nothing to pull them together.

I have changed my tune on this recently because there has been a great deal of hopeful forward motion on regional get-togethers, particularly in the southeast Asia and east Asian area. I think perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the one great advanced nation in the area, Japan, is taking part in the thing.

Mr. HAMILTON. You feel the initiative is coming from Asian leaders?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes. It would be not desirable for us to push this too hard. We might even smother it in that way. But I think we should do everything we can to back it up. Perhaps try to channel things through the regional groups insofar as we can.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is your assessment of the Asian Development Bank?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think it is a very hopeful thing. I think it is one of the best that has come along.

Mr. HAMILTON. This is one of the leading examples——

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes. There are a lot of other things of the same sort on a somewhat more restricted scale that have developed in the last year or so.

Mr. HAMILTON. Could you mention some of those specifically?

Mr. REISCHAUER. There have been several conferences. They have not formulated themselves into real organizations yet. There was the ASPAC conference up in Seoul last year. The Japanese in the spring of 1966 called together the ministers of economics of the various southeast Asian nations for conferences, to build that feeling of mutual

interest in each other which probably is valuable economically but is even more valuable politically.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Ambassador Reischauer, you mention on page 7 that in particular we should remember the key to development is what happens to people in the process of a nation's modernization, and then referring back to your statement on page 4, the chief hope for the healthy development of the nations of Asia is their own nationalistic ardor.

From the point of view of nationalism and the fate of the people of Asia, is there in your judgment extant in Asia any new imperialism that might constitute a threat to Asian nationalism and the welfare of the people of the various nations of Asia and that should be a matter of our concern?

Mr. REISCHAUER. There are lots of local rivalries. India-Pakistan is one of the most obvious. There are others like that. That is not the kind of imperialism you had in mind. You were thinking of something much more sweeping.

There are really only two countries that conceivably would have the power for this. One is Japan, and it has absolutely no tendency in that direction today. I don't know of any country more pacifistic than the Japanese.

The other is possibly Communist China. I think its imperialistic threat has been greatly exaggerated in this country. It is not that strong. Their fundamental philosophy is one of the world being swept by revolutions that are locally homegrown, rather than necessarily carried by Chinese troops abroad. I would be very much surprised if we found Communist China, even if it were a little bit stronger than it is today, engaged in anything like imperialistic sweeps through that part of the world.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You would feel that it is unlikely that the Government of Communist China is interested in the domination of Asia or capable of such domination?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think it would be interested in the domination of Asia in the sense of having Communist regimes around that looked to Peking for leadership, but they think of achieving this in terms of local revolution. The problem is usually a domestic one rather than one of external aggression.

So it isn't imperialism in the sense of an overt military push, though they certainly will keep up their efforts of undercover subversion as long as they have the kind of ideas they have today.

Mr. BUCHANAN. National wars of liberation, some have said, constitute the new Communist strategy in Asia. You feel that this is to be distinguished from direct military aggression?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes. I think it is quite different because the whole concept of wars of national liberation is that they are done by local people. They will feed in arms, leadership; they try to stir it up. But it has to be done fundamentally by the people there. That is their concept. I don't think we have seen them going across their frontiers, at least from their point of view, except in the Korean war, where they thought they were meeting a menace to them.

In the case of the Indian border, I think they thought they were going across the border in order to rectify it and bring it in line with what they thought was the correct border.

Mr. BUCHANAN. There are those who would say in Vietnam that the National Liberation Front is the arm in South Vietnam of the North Vietnamese Government and therefore would be directly under the command of the North Vietnamese Government. You do not necessarily accept this point of view, but you see no such——

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is a somewhat different case. I think to the North Vietnamese it is all one country. Of course they are going across the 17th parallel, but that is a border that they think shouldn't exist. It is quite a different thing from, let's say, having the Chinese operate deep in another country in an effort to overthrow the government.

Mr. BUCHANAN. One other line of questioning, sir. There have been some critics of our foreign aid program who have pointed out that there should be more people-to-people and project-by-project aid and there has been some criticism at least in the past that there has been too much government-to-government aid and too much reliance upon our aid being channeled through a government that might be dictatorial or in some other way corrupt. I gather you feel this would be preferable to our playing too direct a hand in a country?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think it would be, basically. The governments will tend to be not very efficient. Many of them will be corrupt, but remember, practically all countries until fairly recently had more or less corrupt governments. We shouldn't be too harsh in our judgments there.

The alternative is for us to try to work in underneath the government, in a sense being subversive for a good cause, as we would say, in someone else's country. This is the kind of thing that gets you into the type of involvements that end up in Vietnam and similar situations.

Given the fact that Asian history will have lots of ups and downs for some time to come, I think it is advisable for us to stay out of roles like that. People to people is different. If it is a private grouping to people in Asia, I think this is fine. The more of this the better.

The American Government to somebody else's people, another government's people, is a rather dangerous thing to do. That shows a kind of arrogance that I think we have to be cautious about.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Is there perhaps a need for a greater emphasis on private aid, therefore?

Mr. REISCHAUER. As Ambassador to Japan, I always said that the private citizen can do anything a government can do and better, if he will do it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How would you suggest that we ought to proceed in Vietnam where you carve out an exception to your general rule that we should not get as deeply involved in the internal affairs of another nation? You say that we must work in the economic, social, and political development of South Vietnam, but how do you think that ought to be done?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Obviously in wartime conditions it is awfully hard to do much. I think our efforts to get a more representative form of government—the Constituent Assembly and the elections that it will lead to—are all to the good. We have obviously put pressure on that side. I think we must push on that side.

On the other end, you have the grassroots variety of development, but you have to have an area of security before you can proceed. This is tied up in the military situation. I am not sure that we have done as much in the areas that we have tried to secure as we should. We haven't given them enough security, and then inside of that, built enough in the way of institutions. In the long run a national government that has a degree of representation to it, and a demonstration of a better landholding system and a more equitable kind of society, will probably be more of an answer to the Vietcong than the military. An important other half to it——

Mr. FRASER. How do we build an institution in South Vietnam?

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is difficult. I think you should bring these questions to people with more knowledge than I have. I suspect the role of Americans at the grassroots level is fairly limited. We don't have enough language skills and empathy with the people there. I think we could have done a great deal more in helping train elements in Vietnam, Vietnamese that is, who would approach these problems in the right way. The great discrepancy between the power of the Vietcong and the power of the Vietnamese Army bas been the political training of the Vietcong, as opposed to what the ARVN has. We ought to help see that there is better political training. I am using the term in the broad sense to mean an attitude toward the people and the institutions to be built on the part of the ARVN.

Mr. FRASER. You say I should address this question to somebody who may be more expert on the matter?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. I ask you to cast your eye in a general sense over the allocation of responsibilities for foreign policy here in Washington. Which agency would you think would house these kinds of experts?

Mr. REISCHAUER. The State Department should.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know of any aetivity by the State Department to develop this kind of expertise?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I would imagine so, in the AID programs.

Mr. FRASER. When you are talking about State you are talkiug about AID?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I am thinking of those two together.

Mr. FRASER. In State you would say AID is the agency as you understand it that would house this kind——

Mr. REISCHAUER. To a large extent.

Mr. FRASER. Where else?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Obviously the military, the Army, which is down on the ground there, and is doing a lot of this sort of thing, too.

Mr. FRASER. Would you find there the locus of expertise on the institution building?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think it should be more over in AID. I don't know whether there is enough there, or not.

Mr. FRASER. Would you expect if you would read the statutes that you would find that AID is charged with this kind of responsibility which might be termed loosely political development?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Probably in the overall statements it wouldn't say that because I think this is an exception to the rules. I would hate to see it in the overall statement that that is what AID is trying to do. I think we have a special situation in Vietnam in which AID must take the lead in this kind of activity.

Mr. FRASER. Supposing someone over there posed the choice to an American of whether it was better to build a local police force, one that would be responsible to local government, or whether the police should be responsible to the central government or to a province chief? Where would the person be found in the U.S. Government who would have an informed opinion about that kind of question?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I suspect in the country team in Saigon and its local representatives.

Mr. FRASER. What training program, what kind of capacity is sought to be developed by what agency here that would lead to this kind of expertise on the country team?

Mr. REISCHAUER. You are leading me beyond my depth on this one.

Mr. FRASER. These in part are rhetorical questions because I don't think there is such an agency that has this responsibility.

Mr. REISCHAUER. If you say so, I will agree with it.

Mr. FRASER. I would have thought that you might have been exposed to some of these activities if they had existed.

Let me pose an illustration of the problem we face. In Hawaii there is a training school for those going to Vietnam. The trainees are actually sent out, in field work, into some of the rural parts of Hawaii where they get among the people, identify the power structure, draw land maps and so on. As I understand the consolidation of functions under Ambassador Porter, this may be closed down and transferred to the Foreign Service Institute in Washington. As I understand it, the Foreign Service Institute is not ordinarily thought of as having a role in this kind of thing. I don't know if you have any reaction to the question. I am reciting a set of facts that concern me.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I share your worry. I think that is an organization that is meant for a more generalized situation. This is a very specialized one. You should have a specialized organization for it.

Mr. FRASER. I don't want to take more time. I will come back to it.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Culver.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Ambassador, on page 2, at the bottom of your statement, you make reference to the abnormal situation, so-called, of Korea and South Vietnam, and you say that "Ideally, such deep involvements should be avoided, but when through fate or accident or error they have already developed, an abnormal response is required."

What about North Korea, the Korean situation? Was that either fate or accident or error?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I wouldn't want to put those terms on specific situations. I think in the case of Korea it was probably more fate. We ended up there holding half of that country, and we didn't know how to handle it. This brought us into a deep involvement there. You can't see specific errors made except perhaps the original one in letting the country be divided at the surrender time.

Mr. CULVER. Could you characterize as fate the invasion by military force of North Korea across the international boundary line?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I mean it was fate in the sense that the country was divided, and the situation grew out of that. There were probably errors involved too.

Mr. CULVER. What I am trying to suggest is that I think there are certain hard international realities, power oftentimes calls for U.S. involvement of a much more concrete description than something like fate, I would suggest. I wonder what was the attitude of the Japanese, Mr. Ambassador, toward the North Korean-South Korean struggle generally by way of a consensus of attitude? What was their view?

Mr. REISCHAUER. At that time, remember, they were occupied by the United States and considered themselves not an independent nation and as being out of world problems. There was extraordinarily little interest, considering that this was right next door and would affect their future. They were thinking about their own immediate problems and did not react very strongly to this, one way or another.

Mr. CULVER. Do you think in retrospect the U.S. experience in Korea and the subsequent resolution of that conflict on that basis could be viewed as a plus in terms of the stability of Asia today?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Very possibly so, yes. I think I would probably say so. I have felt we did the right thing in Korea most of the way through. Early on we made some errors in not realizing what we were getting into. There were errors made when we rather obviously defined South Korea outside of our area of defense. This maybe brought on the war that might otherwise not have come. We could only respond to it when invasion came. I am agreeing with you, I think.

Mr. CULVER. You suggested that, Mr. Ambassador, if one had the foresight to envision the monumental cost of our current Vietnamese involvement it would have been a path that we most likely would not have elected to travel. If at the time of the major decisions to escalate our involvement there someone could have foreseen the cost but also foreseen the possibility that, say, in the year 1970 there would be a Korean-type peace and the possibility for comparable progress, would you still be of the opinion and judgment, in the terms of Asian stability, it would have been an unwise decision initially?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Of course we don't know what the total costs are. We don't know what it will be by 1970 and what you described. I have backed our present position right along as being the right one in a rather poor series of choices that we have before us.

Where I think we made mistakes—originally, in the first years after 1945, I think if we had not given support to the French effort to restore their colonial regime there, you would have gotten a regime under Ho Chi-Minh, who had a fair number of Communists in his group. But he and his people have always had the strong concept of resistance to Chinese control. I think if that had happened we would have probably had a Tito kind of regime in Vietnam, and probably quite a bit beyond Tito in terms of being friendly with us. Nobody would have ever thought this was a terrible problem, and we would not have the various losses, the various high prices we have paid for the Vietnam situation but would be probably as well off as we will be if we get this thing settled by 1970.

Mr. CULVER. Do you feel qualified in making a similar assessment of the likelihood in the case of Thailand and Laos in the absence of U.S. presence and that it would evolve along the Titoist situation?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Thailand is an independent country.

Mr. CULVER. In the absence of a U.S. presence.

Mr. REISCHAUER. We probably would not have that northeast situation. If you had a rather strong nationalistic, even if Communist, Vietnam between China and the northeast of Thailand, I doubt if you would be having that problem. Laos is a different kind of question.

Mr. CULVER. Isn't really the difficulty in northeast Thailand primarily a problem of ethnic divisions and borders that some view as illogical and unreasonable and that the difficulty, given a Ho Chi-Minh domination in Vietnam, would on the contrary likely be quite similar?

Mr. REISCHAUER. You have got a good point there because after all it has been the North Vietnamese who stirred up the trouble in Laos, not the Chinese.

One element of the northeast part of Thailand, as I understand it, is that there are a large number of Vietnamese who have fled the war and are there. If there had not been that continuing war would those people be there? I am not sure enough of the history to be certain. I suspect that might be the situation, which would make it much more stable. You would probably have had a longer history of stability in that area, which would make it less likely that the present kind of situation would have developed.

In the case of Laos we have a peculiarly difficult situation, because this is a very small country in terms of population, but one ethnically very mixed up. To have any sort of stability there is quite difficult. I myself have felt that it is not wise for the United States to have gotten its prestige so deeply involved in what is such an obviously small and unstable part of the world. Let's give what aid we can, but not to the point of hurting ourselves.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Ambassador, it has been suggested that the events of October in 1965 with regard to Indonesia were to a great extent undertaken by the comforting proximity of United States commitments in Vietnam. Would you subscribe to that thesis, or do you think that it is likely that these events would have transpired totally independent of that consideration?

Mr. REISCHAUER. One can't rule out the possibility that the war in Vietnam and our strong stand there made this possible. But in terms of the specific events as of the night of September 30 and October 1, I think those would have happened in any case, because the Communists tried to pull their coup by killing off the generals, and some of the generals escaped and were fighting desperately for their lives. At that moment they weren't worrying where the 7th Fleet was or whether Americans were fighting in Vietnam or not, because they were trying to preserve themselves and fight back.

I suspect that most of that story would have transpired in any case. But nobody can be absolutely sure of that.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Ambassador, one of the things that troubles me a great deal, and I think I speak for other Members of Congress who have had the opportunity to travel even briefly in some of these undeveloped situations, is the apparent failure to properly pool and

evaluate the experience in implementation and administration of some of our AID efforts, particularly with regard to rural development.

"You can go to country X and they say, "Let us show you our grand scheme for rural development." You fly for an hour and in country Y they say, "We would like to show you our 1970's concept for this country." I wonder, even though I understand your suggestion of the Japanese experiences hardly appear analogous for the application of some of our efforts there to something like Vietnam or Laos or Thailland, I wonder whether in your judgment and experience as Ambassador to Japan there has been an ample consideration of the value of getting men of your background and experience, with your own admittedly unique experience in the particular country in which you are involved, to sit down with others and find out does this work and if so why and would it work here and if not why not and see the extent to which we can deal in generalities about this great region characterized by diversity that we could come up with some sound concepts and not see with every change in Saigon AID administration we throw the baby out with the bath water and jettison all our AID experience under this administration and start out afresh with the bold new initiatives of the other without taking a harder look, more discriminating look as to what the prior experience has been and what we can build in the terms of our subsequent programs.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think you are right as to the problems we face in these countries. I think in the foreign service I did run into a kind of parochialism between the different Embassies. They all wanted to have their own little show and not get any advice from others. I am sure this must apply to our AID missions and others, too. There is a lot of transferable expertise that we perhaps are not using. I would also be interested, in seeing a transfer of the knowledge built up by other countries—such as the joint rural reconstruction experiments in Taiwan and the tremendous thing the Japanese have done, not only in the land reforms that we helped them put through at the end of the war, but in a long rural buildup. It would be helpful to have this kind of information get around to all the countries a little bit more.

The international kind of planning I was talking about might be one way of doing this. I think it would be very much to our benefit, the benefit of the world I mean, to have that kind of knowledge more widely spread.

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We will start the second round of questioning.

Mr. Ambassador, are we overcommitted in Asia? If we are, to what extent are we overcommitted and in which countries in Asia? I know we have bilateral and multilateral treaties with many countries but we do not have treaties with others. For example, we do not have a treaty with Indonesia.

Mr. REISCHAUER. My fear is that maybe we have the wrong kind of commitments when I say we may be overcommitted. I don't want us to cut down on our overall commitment at all. Our modern age has a discrepancy between the advanced, rich countries like ourselves and the less developed ones which have two-thirds of the world population, while we have most of the world's wealth. This is an unsound situation in the kind of unitary world we now have. We with one-

third of the world's wealth, ought to have a big commitment to try to help these others get ahead. I don't think we help them very much by military commitments. That was my point. Our kind of military power doesn't really give them much security against the kind of thing that they really face, which is largely internal.

I don't think there is a great danger of external aggression in most of these areas. Against that perhaps we can do something. I am all for the presence of the 7th Fleet and our ability to exert military power when we can successfully do so. But we cannot do much about guerrilla warfare. This is handled much better by economic and institutional buildups.

I would like to see us do more for countries like Indonesia and others and not worry whether they are allied to us or not allied to us.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You did say that in some instances we must give assistance, for example, military items for security police. This is exactly how our involvement started in Vietnam.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I rather reluctantly said that there probably are times when that is desirable. I wouldn't want to rule it out as a possibility. It is not the side in which I would like to see our major effort expended.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Nevertheless, you do see situations in Asia where it might be necessary on our part to give assistance to certain countries.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think there are times probably when we should. We had the Huk uprising in the Philippines.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You have said that it is wrong for our country to sponsor political, social, or economic change in other countries, particularly Asian countries. Mr. Ambassador, Japan is now giving substantial economic assistance to other Asian countries, and correct me if I am wrong, but it is my understanding that Japan attaches conditions to its bilateral aid. Is it, in your opinion, all right for Japan, in giving assistance, to sponsor political, social or economic change in Asian countries?

What I am trying to say is, if it is wrong for us to sponsor changes is it in any way, any degree, proper for other countries, such as Japan?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think Japan gives aid with that kind of strings attached to it. The trouble with their aid has been that so much of it is tied to their own commercial development, expansion of markets, and they haven't given the free kind of aid. They have not thought enough in terms of the development of countries to which they have extended these credits. I don't see any sign of their trying to put political conditions on aid. Fundamentally, I think that is not good for any country to be doing, least of all the strong countries.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you envision that Japan will play a leading role in the coming years as far as assisting the other countries in the Asian area?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think there is no doubt about it. In the Asian Development Bank, for example, they matched our sum of $200 million out of the billion dollars there. This is one thing that is not controversial in Japanese politics. They all believe they ought to be doing something, although they are reluctant when it comes to putting their hands in their pockets and doing it. There is no doubt they are going to move more and more into that field. That is one of my reasons for being relaxed about the dangers in Asia. Another is

that the chief source of trouble—China—is in decline rather than rising right now.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Will aid from other countries close the gap between the haves and have-nots?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think all of the have nations will have to give more than they have been giving. But even that won't do it, because the real problem is the learning of skills in these other countries. We haven't yet learned how to transfer these skills well enough.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On page 6, the bottom of the lengthy paragraph, it says:

> For a long time progress toward a more stable, affluent, and just society may take place only as a creeping growth at the grassroots level.

Is it not true that the gap between the peasants or grassroots and the urbanized elite in the countries in that part of the world is widening rather than closing?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes. I don't have statistics on this. But I would not be surprised if that were the condition. This is very commonly the condition in countries in the early stage of economic development like that. It is rather hard to work against that. It is not easy to correct it, is what I am trying to say.

My main point in that paragraph is that we shouldn't be too demanding of quick results because perhaps a slow upcreep of literacy over a 10-year period might be the most significant way to eventually get ahead in a country.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That brings me back to this question: Are the countries in Asia, such as Japan, in a better position to help the have-not countries, are they better equipped to close this gap, to obtain this long-term, as you put it, grassroot development, are they better equipped in their assistance programs than we in the United States?

What I am coming to is, in your statement you indicate that we are not equipped to lay out the plan, to give the assistance that is necessary in Asia. Are they better equipped?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think they are better equipped at all. I think there is probably more technical know-how in Japan that might be of value to these countries than we have ourselves, because conditions in Japan, density of population, the rural economy, and the like, are perhaps a little bit closer to the conditions in these other countries. The Japanese experience with modernization might be more relevant than our own. But I don't think that makes them better equipped to do the masterminding, the planning for the future for these other people than we are, simply because the thing against it is not really so much our lack of knowledge as it is the fact that it goes against human nature. The people are going to want to plan for themselves.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You maintain that a country receiving multilateral aid can develop on their own better than they can with aid on a bilateral basis?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I have pointed out that bilateral programs run the risk of aid given by a major country runs the risk of stirring up countercurrents of nationalism. You reduce this friction by doing it the other way.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. As you know, the President is asking that the new AID objective be to funnel at least 85 percent of U.S. development

loans through multilateral channels. Do you see this objective as meeting your ideas for administering U.S. aid?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I am all for putting it through multilateral channels insofar as possible.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you think the political climate is such here in the United States and Congress to agree with you?

Mr. REISCHAUER. "Insofar as possible" should include that point. It is a matter, partly, of education. If the American public and American Congress think it is getting more for its dollars through multilateral channels, then they will be more for it. I think they are getting more for their dollars in the long run through multilateral channels.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Until such a climate is developed, it might be better if the United States continues doing it——

Mr. REISCHAUER. This is your political judgment.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. If we do act primarily through multilateral channels it is reasonably certain that the people of the recipient country not only will not feel that we are trying to dominate them, they will not know we have had anything to do with it. Will this make any difference?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think so. We are not looking for gratitude. We are looking for a better world to live in. You are not likely to get gratitude for this kind of thing.

The word "face" came up a great deal in the Senate. I do not think face or gratitude are things that we need to worry about. America is known by everybody to be by all odds the greatest country in the world. Others, I think, see us as not just the largest country but the one with the largest heart. I don't thing we have to worry about that.

Mr. BUCHANAN. In the polemics of the international situation you feel even though this rule might not be followed by the other countries, the Soviet Union, Red China, whatever is done would probably not to be done on a multilateral basis, you don't feel that in this kind of competitive situation this makes any difference?

Mr. REISCHAUER. It is competitively to our advantage to do it multilaterally. If they want to do it unilaterally to their own disadvantage, it is too bad for them.

Mr. BUCHANAN. You mentioned that China is in a state of decline. Surely if there is a source of aggression in Asia it would seem this would be a likely source. Could you give us your judgment of the situation in China now as to whether it indicates any popular unrest against the regime or simply competitive forces within a regime? You mentioned decline, and it intrigued me.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I wouldn't want to suggest that the Chinese Communist system is likely to fall apart. The Chinese are a people with long experience in government and organization, with perhaps more genius in that field than any other people in the world. I think it is improbable that they will fall apart despite all their difficulties. I do think that they are coming to the point where their past efforts at progress have added up to such an unmitigated series of disasters that the leadership will have to recognize that they must go in a somewhat different direction from the one they have been going in. Mao

is not willing to accept that. He is fighting desperately for the old way of doing things that brought him to power. Obviously there are many others that see it quite differently; otherwise he wouldn't have the fight that is going on now.

I would think it is safe to assume that in a short period of time, 2 or 3 years, we will find an effort there to go in quite a different direction than what they are going now. I don't mean they will throw out communism, but will try to accommodate themselves a little bit more to the realities of the world around them. The first step might be to restore a little bit more of a relationship with the Soviet Union. That would be the first step, I would think. I would imagine they would want to try to build a closer and more beneficial relationship with Japan, and they might eventually be willing to have some sort of relationship with us. I think they are very likely to go in a new direction soon.

Mr. BUCHANAN. That is very encouraging. You stated on page 7, if I have 1 more minute:

> We should judge the value of our aid only in terms of its long-range effect. If it underwrites inaction by backward regimes or helps preserve outmoded institutions, it will obviously be of no benefit to them or to us. On the other hand, even in the case of a country whose present institutions we cannot approve, if our aid were to help lay the foundation for future healthy development, it would be in our interests and in theirs.

Given the diversity of which you have well spoken, could you particularize on this at all?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I had basically in mind military dictatorships which are now very common in Asia. I have always felt they would be common in Asia. I would suspect that they will be common in Asia for some time to come. That is probably because a military system is one of the easiest things to modernize. We are not very strong on military dictatorships in this country, but we should not rule out the possibility of giving aid to dictatorial regimes if our aid seems to be building the kind of long-range things that might some day make it possible for those countries to go beyond their military dictatorships. It is even conceivable that the same principle would be applied to Communist countries. We do that in regard to the Tito regime in Yugoslavia. I could imagine Communist regimes that would have that relationship with us. We would help them develop skills that would allow them to grow beyond communism. There are fewer examples of that sort.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I join with my colleagues, Mr. Ambassador, in welcoming you here to the committee today. I read your statement, and I do have a few questions, and some points that I would like you to enlarge upon.

I am sort of intrigued by your statement that we must think not in terms of exporting democracy or other of our treasured values, but in terms of supporting Asian nations in their efforts to reach their own goals, which in most cases I feel will include the goal of a democracy. If we could go back a few days, a few years, really, and we could just talk, if you don't mind, about Vietnam, was not that the issue among many of the people who are now the critics of our policy in Vietnam? Wasn't the fact that we were not exporting democracy and perhaps

we should have been supporting democracy during the Diem days when our conscience couldn't stand the help that we appeared to be giving to Diem and Nhu. A lot of people who are now the critics felt that, well, there was a sort of double standard of what we would accept earlier and what some of our people are pushing now.

My question really boils down to whether or not this is a whole new concept. Do not some of the critics of our Vietnamese policy now, were they not in those days advocating exporting democracy, if we were going to be exporting aid, and are we not in this position because we followed their advice?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Again, we get back to the case of Vietnam. The same case came up in Korea, and I remember feeling strongly myself about it at a time when we were stuck with Syngman Rhee. His regime existed because of our military support, and we owed it to the Korean people to try to push harder for the development of a better regime there because we were involved in its very existence. We brought Diem to Vietnam in the first place. If we are going to bring somebody in and install him as a ruler, then we are a little bit responsible for what he is like.

Right from the moment we got ourselves committed that way in Vietnam I think we were responsible for having better institutions than Diem was able to provide. I would agree, in those cases you have to take on a greater responsibility. But by and large that is a kind of involvement that we should avoid, I think.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Looking back into the development of how it came about, how do we avoid it? As you say in your statement here it is nice to be friendly and we should not seek to play the role of leader in Asia, but of friendly outside supporter. By being a friendly outside supporter and encouraging people toward self-development do we not assume a responsibility when their development is challenged by people other than those within their own country?

Mr. REISCHAUER. If there is going to be clear and open aggression, we will probably have to meet it almost anywhere in the world. That is probably true. You cannot meet it just in selected areas if you are really going to be for that kind of world. I doubt very much we are going to have many cases of that in Asia. Even in the case of the Korean war, this was two halves of a divided country, and Vietnam also is a divided country. Otherwise, we have not had aggressions that we would have to get involved in, with the exception of the North Vietnamese trying to stir up trouble in Laos. That would be one case perhaps.

Mr. CULVER. India.

Mr. REISCHAUER. When you get these bilateral situations, by and large I think we ought to try to stay out of them.

Mr. CULVER. China-India.

Mr. REISCHAUER. At least from the Chinese point of view I think that was a limited problem, to attempt to correct a border and not an all-out attempt to subjugate India. The basic problems I think will be domestic, coming from within, and it is very, very hard for us to do anything about that.

Mr. GALLAGHER. When it appears that the support is coming from without, as appears to be the case in Vietnam, as appears to be the

case in Thailand, some of the other areas in southeast Asia, what do we do then when the government comes screaming for help, this government that considers us their friend? And since we have a role of leadership, how do we disengage from enlarging our responsibilities as the problems grow?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think we have allowed these problems to appear as American problems. They come screaming to us as you put it. They don't come to the French or English. But these people are just as much involved in it as we are. It was a natural situation to get into after the war when we were widely extended and were the one great power. I think we should cut back. All of the countries of the world should be just as much interested in this sort of thing as we are. It is probably less of a menace to us than it is to many, many others. In other words, I would advocate that we keep our "cool" about it. We don't have to get that worried about each of these situations.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Then I would get back to where we started. We obviously didn't keep our "cool" about Mr. Diem and Mr. Nhu. At that point, if we were in fact responsible for that government, which I don't buy completely, but if we were, assuming without supposing that we are, at that point we had some advisers in there, a very limited number of advisers; however, it would seem to me that we probably could have used that as the threat and if the government did not rehabilitate to the way we consider a government should be in those days we could have gone home. There is a line of thought that we encouraged if not supported the coup. Once having done that then we certainly did become responsible for that government and succeeding governments. The prestige was not at stake in the early Diem days. Now, we have a number of troops over there, and now it becomes a problem for this Nation, whereas before it did not have that dimension, was not of that magnitude.

The thing that I always find perplexing is when the monk poured the gasoline on himself, that this became something that our Christian conscience couldn't tolerate here in the United States. The popular response was one that I think influenced our Government at that time. Do we allow this sort of thing to happen again, or were we not, in effect, in those early days trying, as you put it here, to export democracy? We seem to have a double standard on all of this.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think we got ourselves overinvolved from 1945 on in helping the French begin something unsound and then ourselves walking into an unsound situation in 1954. I think we have became more or less responsible for that government since that time and got ourselves more and more committed until we got involved in doing the things we are doing.

I have been a supporter of what we have been doing, because we are now in that position. My whole plea is that we look at these things before we get across that fatal line of commitment. In the long run, if these countries are not able to defend themselves, probably we aren't going to be able to defend them—at least at a reasonable price. I think this has been proved pretty much in Vietnam already. We are paying a tremendous price for the defense of a very small country. Yet if there had been enough strength in that situation to begin with, we would never have been needed to help defend them.

We have to realize that our interests, unless we commit them, are not that great in the first place. This is a long history we are involved in. Some of these countries will go in and out of undesirable situations between now and 50 years from now, or 100 years from now, by which time I hope we will have reached a more desirable situation than we have now. We cannot and should not make ourselves responsible for every one of those countries.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I certainly agree with you, Ambassador. The thing that has perplexed me is that those who are most critical of our situation in Vietnam were the loudest voices toward a commitment to get rid of Diem regardless of what the consequences were, and we became the inheritors of everything that followed Diem.

On what you have just said here, would you care to comment on a question: Are the nations of southeast Asia viable politically? That is to say, are they capable of controlling their own environment and maintaining order internally?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think they are viable in the sense that they are going to exist. They have gone through the most difficult period already. They have gotten started. They have lived for 10 or 20 years, as the case may be. With very few exceptions they are gaining in strength rather than losing strength.

While my statements that we shouldn't get ourselves that much committed may sound heartless, I think it is in their own best interest. What we are doing for South Vietnam has not been much in the long-range interest of South Vietnam.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It was the spinoff——

Mr. REISCHAUER. There might be some spinoff values. Here we have a problem. Here we stand in 1967 trying to formulate the problem we face, but it seemed different in 1954. At least I formulated it differently in my mind. I had a much clearer concept then of a more unified Communist menace to that part of the world, though I did predict even in 1954 that the Chinese and Communist Russians were going to split. Now, we have a certain amount of hindsight. I think we can realize that we perhaps overbuilt the concept of a unitary Communists menace at that time in our minds. We shouldn't carry that on into the next decade. I don't think we have that much of a danger. I think the countries are mostly viable and we will probably be able to help them more by not trying to get them alined with us or trying to show this kind of leadership and playing it somewhat more cool. When I say "cool" I don't mean giving less aid. Maybe we should give more aid. But we should play a less involved role in their future.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would there be a threat to their political stability and their political independence if we were not engaged in Vietnam?

Mr. REISCHAUER. One can argue in the case of Thailand there probably would be, as it is so deeply involved. But take Burma. Burma obviously feels that it can probably defend itself better by refusing to have anything but the most strictly correct relationship with us, because the more relationship they have with us the more fear they have that China will put pressure on them. They figure their own interests are not to be closely tied with us. They are still independent. They are doing fairly well in the sense of maintaining their own independence.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Of course, fortunately, at the time they were not a target. What happens when they become a target?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Well——

Mr. GALLAGHER. Over in the Senate you said the threat of communism to the continent has failed. It has faded, but it has not disappeared.

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is right. It depends on what kind of menace exists. If you get a strong, indigenous Communist movement that threatens the Burmese Government, they are seriously threatened then. They have two Communist movements already but neither has threatened them seriously. If one threatens them seriously, they are deeply menaced, but could we help in that situation? Probably not very much and only at tremendous cost, if at all.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Of course, you must then get to a point of asking: Are you prepared to write off our desire to see nations develop viable political structures without a threat of outside aggression, or internal subversion supported by those outside the country? Where is the breaking point?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Actually in terms of our immediate interest we aren't threatened by aggression in most parts of Asia. The only place that would be of deep interest to us is Japan, which has modern kinds of power. I don't think we have this threat.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If it is not a threat to us——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I mean a threat to the countries there We have had enough history since the war to know that these countries do defend themselves very well through their nationalistic spirit. In fact, they seem to do it a little bit better or more easily than with our military aid. I think you are posing a false problem, perhaps.

Mr. GALLAGHER. No false problem exists in Thailand and no false problem exists in Laos or Cambodia where you do have a national liberation front movement which is at various stages of development. It seems to me that the maintenance of world order and peace is, if not the total responsibility of the United States, at least a partial responsibility, and I think a lot of the people who wish to develop free of Communist national liberation-type governments look to us for help. If this is so, can we afford to let national liberation movements run rampant in southeast Asia? And, further, can we permit aggression to become the legal means of initiating and forcing change in the underdeveloped countries and to where we sit back and say let them fight it out?

Mr. REISCHAUER. You are posing problems that aren't really existing.

Mr. GALLAGHER. There are the problems that existed for us and that is why we are in South Vietnam.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Do we find any widespread aggression in Asia at the present time? Or even, for that matter, very successful national liberation movements going on? There has been a sort of smoldering Communist movement in Burma. The Huk has never been completely wiped out in the Philippines, I admit. But this is not a situation spreading through all of Asia.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, but as Congressman Zablocki just mentioned, without our assistance they probably would have been more successful, certainly the Huks. Certainly without our being in South Vietnam,

I would think that the heat would be on in other countries, if we take the development of national liberation-type movements, if we are prepared to say that some will succeed and some won't, that we should allow a happy balance to come into the world, that is one thing. And Malaysia, also——

Mr. REISCHAUER. It was stamped out. I am all for what was done in Malaysia and what we supported in the Philippines. In the case of the Philippines it was done largely by them, not by our soldiers.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Not our soldiers, but we gave aid.

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is right. It is an island, where it can be a sort of isolated situation. I think you are building up a hypothetical case that this thing is going to happen everywhere. I think the actual situation is that it doesn't look as though it will happen everywhere by a long shot.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I am not trying to build up a hypothetical case that it might happen. What I am trying to draw upon is your experience on this so that we don't really get involved in another Vietnam. I think that is really the interest of many of us here today, and the classic patterns exist in these other countries that we have mentioned.

I am interested in how we handle this. Perhaps the minuet has stopped now for the moment because of being locked in by the sad music of Vietnam, both sides. I would like to know what justification there is for your conclusion that long-range evolution of the underdeveloped countries is not dependent on their political, as you said here, on their present political postures.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Let's put it the other way around. What if the situation, such as developed in Vietnam, were endemic throughout Asia? Do you think the United States could do anything about it? How many Vietnams could we fight at the same time? Obviously we can't.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Not very many of them. On the other hand, where is the water level here——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I am not sure that your proposition—because we are fighting in Vietnam, that, therefore, there is less of it going on elsewhere in Asia—is correct, I don't think they are that closely connected. Most of these things have grown out of local conditions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Communists didn't have a few problems of their own right now, wouldn't they be able to give greater assistance to the national liberation fronts?

Mr. REISCHAUER. The types of activities that the Chinese tried to carry on in Africa I think worked against them, largely. They got themselves thrown out in many cases.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I agree. But in their own ball park, southeast Asia, is where we are talking about now.

Mr. REISCHAUER. The Burmese think it is easier to do it without our help. The Indonesians have felt that way, too.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It is a little like the umbrella protection. The other people are encouraged. Indonesia to some extent, it seems to me, came apart. The fact is the forces opposing communism knew there was an opposition and if we don't allow that opposition to exist or encourage it there will be no opposition other than the national development of a national liberation front.

Mr. REISCHAUER. We went over that Indonesian one already. I do think it was in terms of what was happening specifically there. Beyond that the 7th Fleet is the thing that gives Indonesia an option much more than a war in Vietnam. I am for the maintenance of American military power in that part of the world in a way in which it can be in reserve to be used if it is necessary. This means primarily maintenance of a naval power based on the oceans rather than in countries where you stir up problems for yourself and maybe weaken the defense as much as strengthen it by your presence.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I agree completely. This is the thing that I was a little perplexed about by your statement, that we should play the role of a friendly outside supporter. Sometimes there has to be a friendly outside supporter with a lot of muscle and this is the thing in which we are all interested, I believe.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Permit me to pursue the line of questioning that Mr. Gallagher started. How do you respond to the statements of some of our top policy planners that the cardinal tenet of American foreign policy since the end of World War II has been the maintenance of and the integrity of international boundary lines? George Ball talked about this in his Northwestern University speech and Mr. Rostow mentioned it in some lectures he made. You seem to me to be taking a position different from them. In the formulation of American foreign policy, or at least in the articulation of it, these men have stressed the fact that we are going to keep the integrity of these international boundary lines that were created in the aftermath of World War II. You are saying it seems to me that we are going to keep them in certain instances but in other instances we may not. It seems to me you are at odds with their statements.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think I am. I don't think international boundaries have been much challenged in this postwar world. In the two wars that involved us, Korea and Vietnam, these were not strictly international boundaries. In the case of the Korean war, it was perhaps more of a real boundary that was crossed by an external force. We met it, and I think we were right. That is the only case I know of that sort of thing.

Mr. HAMILTON. You don't object to the articulation of that kind of policy?

Mr. REISCHAUER. No. I think the whole world should be committed to that. We should work to see that we get other people more committed to these things, rather than thinking of it as being only our responsibility. This is a matter of style, how you approach the problem.

Mr. HAMILTON. You seem to have a different, more passive concept of our aid program in general. You say, for example, that the United States should not sponsor change, and that the recipient countries should take the initiative.

Would you agree with that characterization of your position?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes, that is quite correct, because I think we achieve more. Again I am talking more about attitudes and style in this thing, maybe more than actual realities, because I think we would have to insist that the country come up with very hard, clear, good planning if it wants our support and aid. But we should not be run-

ning in there to do it for them. We should try to find ways to help them get the kind of expertise they need to do it. But——

Mr. HAMILTON. What if they refuse to take the initiative and we think it is in our national interest that they do so?

Mr. REISCHAUER. It is very hard to imagine a case in which it will be in our vital interest in the sense of a short-range interest. Name me a country outside of Japan in Asia whose prospects over the next 5 years is a matter of vital interest to this country.

Mr. CULVER. India.

Mr. REISCHAUER. What is the vital interest? We have a vital interest in 500 million Indians and where they go over a long period of time. What happens in the next 5 years is not a matter that affects the vital interest of our country.

Mr. CULVER. Our trade is not that large.

Mr. REISCHAUER. It is only in terms of what this would mean for the future of the world that it would be of great interest to us.

Mr. CULVER. In the next 5 years I can envision circumstances involving India in the subcontinent of Asia which would be of vital importance to the United States in maintaining peace in the world without any test of my imagination.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I was talking about vital interest in terms of a direct, immediate challenge.

Mr. CULVER. It is far——

Mr. REISCHAUER. You are talking about the peace of the world and future development, and I agree. We are very much interested in how they are going to develop.

Mr. CULVER. If that great Asian democratic experiment fails, I think it will be a most fundamental blow to the United States and its welfare.

Mr. HAMILTON. Suppose, Mr. Ambassador, you have a country like Burma that itself does not want to take American assistance in large quantities, and yet we might think because of its strategic location next to India and the people there involved that they ought to do a lot more.

Do we let that go and not attempt to move in aggressively to stop the tide?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Can you imagine any way in which we could move in aggressively that would be effective?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think we do it, don't we, when we send military people in and social and economic planning—

Mr. REISCHAUER. This is with their asking us to do it?

Mr. HAMILTON. We actually take the initiative. We move in. We are the ones who are the aggressive ones, it seems to me, in so much of our foreign aid and military programs.

Mr. REISCHAUER. This is what I think is wrong with it, when we think of it in those terms.

Mr. HAMILTON. In your view, if they fail to take the initiative, we write it off.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Right now that is exactly the situation there, that we don't have major programs there. I think that is right. They don't want it. We can't force it on them. We shouldn't try to force it on them.

Mr. HAMILTON. From your experience with Japan, what is the Japanese attitude toward Vietnam?

Mr. REISCHAUER. They are very much distressed about it. They are distressed to see us involved there. They think we may have gotten into a kind of situation that they got into in China, getting enmeshed in a war and not being able to get out. Since we are their closest partner and friend, this disturbs them greatly, and the chance of this escalating into a war with China—myself I don't think there is a great danger of this—but this fear gives them a gloomy picture of the situation.

The Japanese Government has understood the kind of situation that we have found ourselves in and has on the whole given us support. The Japanese public remains very worried.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, so I won't forget to say it, I want to say I believe that your tenure as Ambassador to Japan was really remarkable and distinguished service. I think also it might be useful to indicate that in general I am agreeing with everything you are saying, but let me just pursue a couple of questions that arise out of this dialog.

In the case of the Philippines we gave aid to the Philippine Government in the suppression of the Huks. But as you point out, they were able to do it largely through their own forces with our economic aid and some military hardware.

Suppose the case had developed to the point that despite our aid to the Philippine Government we found that they were not able to control the Huk rebellion, that increasingly large areas of the Philippines came under their control, and that the effectiveness of the Government fighting forces appeared to be substantially less than the effectiveness of those on the other side, and we found that in working through the central government—this is purely hypothetical now—it turned out to have many aspects of corruption and so on, so it appeared that we came to the point where we would have to put in U.S. troops to carry on the battle, or alternatively to say we had reached the limit of our capacity to help them in terms of a reasonable commitment.

Is that the point where you feel we have to make the hard, final decision whether to continue along, or to pull back? I don't mean to use the Philippines with its particular strategic situation, but rather to put the more general situation.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I hate to talk about specific countries. But still it makes the point clear. We have a special relationship with the Philippines, so getting involved to that extent seems a very understandable situation. Then you do have that very hard decision: will American soldiers in the Philippines solve this situation, when the Filipinos themselves, with our full aid, cannot do it?

My guess would be that the American soldiers can't.

Mr. FRASER. Cannot?

Mr. REISCHAUER. No. They turn nationalism against the outsider coming in——

Mr. FRASER. No matter what happens it may come to the point where a calculation of our potential may lead us to believe that we should not get further involved out of consideration to their own future and our own?

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is right. In terms of the impact that this has on other areas too, the commitment of our troops on the soil of one country may build up adverse reactions in many other places, affecting our further influence.

Mr. FRASER. Looking at Thailand, we have two kinds of presence there, as I understand it. We have an economic aid program and, I presume, aid for rural development, and also a substantial military presence, which is in support, in part of the Vietnam effort.

I would gather from what you say that you feel the continued economic aid to Thailand, the continued support of their efforts to control the insurgency might be justified.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think it is.

Mr. FRASER. Supposing the insurgency effort grows to the point where their forces, with our military and economic aid, no longer can handle the situation. Would you then see us coming to the same kind of crossroads decision again?

Mr. REISCHAUER. It would be one of these crossroads decisions. It would be deeply involved in the whole Vietnamese situation and would have to be read in that light.

Mr. FRASER. The truth of the matter is, that as we work in these societies and are forced to work through the central government, we are working through an uncertain agency in terms of its ability to relate to its people?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. An uncertain capacity to administer?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. An inability to inspire the fighting men? There will be some cases, because the central government is such a poor agency it doesn't appear as though they can make it——

Mr. REISCHAUER. There will be failures. The trouble with a less developed country is that it is less developed. It can't do certain things very well. The only correction to that, if it would be a correction, would be something semicolonial, which is probably even worse. I think we have to just recognize these limitations to our ability to control the situation in Asia.

I think all this kind of questioning we have been having is not really quite right, because it presupposes a less favorable situation than I think exists. These countries are not that feeble. They have tremendous pride in themselves. They want independence, and so on.

Mr. FRASER. One of the observations that has occurred to me as you look around the world is that those countries that have gone Communist have done so through strongly indigenous movements which have been led, or captured by, Communists; but where the external role has been minimal. I think of the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, and Cuba, where one cannot point to any third other country as being the instigator.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Except in the postwar situation where you had the Russian armies and others going across borders. But that was a postwar situation. You are quite right now, and I think that points it all up.

Mr. FRASER. Where there has been aggression through a Communist country stimulating an insurgency movement in another country, where the primary idea forms in the head of the Communist country

who trains cadres, puts them in another country, and supplies them arms, and so on, there is no instance in history where that has succeeded, so far as I know.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think so.

Mr. FRASER. Well, one might come to the conclusion that those countries likely to go Communist are those where there is a strong Communist indigenous movement or one they have gotten hold of but, absent that, there is the prospect, with reasonable measures, the movement can be stopped?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes.

May I go back to a point that came up earlier, whether India is important to us? It would be a tragedy for us and the whole world and all our hopes for a more peaceful better world if the democratic experiment in India should fail. But if it were to fail it would probably be because of some really indigenous movement, Communist or otherwise, that destroyed it. It is against that sort of thing that we are not very competent to work. We could not do much about it. Probably our attempt to keep democracy from failing, in a military way, might do more damage to India and the prospects for world peace in the long run then if we were to stay out of it.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, thinking of your experience in Japan, in your judgment would there be any value if people active politically in the United States, not necessarily officeholders, had an opportunity to know the politicians in Japan on a dialog basis.

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is a valuable thing. The Japanese Diet has wanted to have contact with our Members in Congress. I think it would be most useful to have a dialog of that sort.

Mr. FRASER. I am thinking also of the political activists who often lie behind the Diet Members.

Mr. REISCHAUER. At all levels that is useful. If we are to have a better world we have to know each other better than we do today.

Mr. FRASER. Do you think it would deepen the understanding of the people in this country if we had that kind of dialog with the people in Japan?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. It might deepen the perception that we have in working out world problems. I realize it is a rhetorical question. We don't have this but at the parliamentary level, which doesn't serve the purpose.

Mr. REISCHAUER. This kind of contact is probably more important with Japan than almost any other country in the world. It is the only one advanced great nation that does not come from our own cultural background and has peculiar problems of language communication with us. I think we have to make more efforts in understanding of this sort with them.

Mr. FRASER. If our Government could support this without governmental control, do you think this might be useful?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes: very valuable.

Mr. FRASER. I have a lot of questions but I know there are others who want to ask some.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Culver.

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Ambassador, I was interested in your response to Mr. Buchanan's question with regard to the possibilities and prospects

for a more realistic attitude on the part of future Chinese leaders and their role in the world. It is generally said that the Soviet Union has in recent years come to such a recognition with regard to international power balance.

Do you think that if we assume that premise that the Soviet Union represents the type of evolution we can reasonably anticipate being forthcoming in the near future or foreseeable future in China, that part of this realism on the part of the Soviet Union has been brought about as a result of the commitments militarily and of the United States in the postwar period?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes; I think it very definitely has. Let me point out there is a distinction, though, between our containment policy in Europe and other parts of the world. There it was a firm kind of containment, based on solid countries that were socially and economically strong, and where we could, with their cooperation, really put our military power.

In the less developed countries of the world we do not have that kind of favorable environment.

Mr. CULVER. Would South Korea be characterized by you, relatively speaking, at the time of the United Nations as an underdeveloped country?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. And the job is more difficult when you are working in that type of environment, but it can be done?

Mr. REISCHAUER. It was a clear-cut case, and we did it. I have always been for what we did there.

Mr. CULVER. It seems to me I accept the idea that the United States determination in Berlin, in the Lebanon, Cuba, where we demonstrated both the role and the capacity to resist certain Communist efforts, certainly Korea, have gone a long ways to bring about this new realism on the part of this generation of Russian leadership. I was very much concerned by your description and characterization of the Indo-Chinese difficulties in 1962 and prior and subsequent years with regard to their border differences and suggesting that this was really a political difference on a bilateral basis, and certainly did not represent an effort on the part of the Chinese to subjugate a whole nation.

Do you believe that political border differences should be resolved by force or peaceful means?

Mr. REISCHAUER. By peaceful means.

Mr. CULVER. How would you characterize the differences of Nazi Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia prior to World War II? Aren't those bilateral problems involving borders?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Nazi Germany obviously exerted force through threat, and this was wrong.

Mr. CULVER. And aggression. How would you distinguish the Chinese-Indian border incidents, in a general way with regard to this international premise of a world under law, as opposed to force from the German experience in these other two situations? What would be the distinguishing factor that makes the premise of the United States involvement distinguishable?

Mr. REISCHAUER. The Czech-German border is a long and old historical border that had been accepted for many hundreds of years.

The one between India and China—wasn't it called the Curzon Line—had been drawn, but had not really been accepted by everybody, and happened to go through uninhabited territory. It is a different kind of situation. You could have maps which showed it differently, which was the case between China and India.

Mr. CULVER. How do you resolve that difference?

Mr. REISCHAUER. It should not be done through force. I don't believe that at all.

Mr. CULVER. It is not the business of the United States in terms of the maintenance of a durable peace to resist aggression——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't remember our having joined in the fight at all.

Mr. CULVER. I was a little concerned——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think anybody suggested that we should.

Mr. CULVER. I am sorry——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think anybody suggested that we join in the border fight.

Mr. CULVER. I think we had an important role to play in that difficulty, and I think we increased the military aid at that juncture and it was at the expressed invitation of a very anxious and concerned Indian Government which had prior to that time professed the greatest imaginable commitment to neutrality and noninvolvement.

I was also interested in your suggestion and observation that some of these countries like Burma and Cambodia and Thailand, although I don't know if you specifically mentioned that country, have publicly indicated that they would prefer that the United States not involve themselves directly in the affairs of their country, and its security, because of the fact that they felt they could better bring this about without this relationship. I well recall the meeting with Thai officials in November of 1965 in which one of their ablest leaders said in our presence that with the United States withdrawal from Vietnam that country would fall completely to communism within 6 months, and his own country would go under in a year. He also indicated, which has subsequently become public knowledge, that they were forever grateful to the United States for our assistance, but it was being offered at that time and accepted with the understanding that this would be privately done, but certainly there was no question whatsoever that he viewed it as essential to their survival.

You know, De Gaulle says that he doesn't need the United States any more either militarily. But is not that public display of confidence bottomed on the realization that the U.S. military shield will be available if and when in a genuine way the national security of that country is basically being threatened?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think there is some confusion over Thailand. I would not say that it did not want our military commitment to it. Thailand is one of the reasons we should not withdraw from Vietnam, and I have supported our presence there since we are there, because if we were to withdraw at this stage in history it might result in all sorts of collapses around there and in other areas, too. I am not in disagreement with that. It is true that Burma and Cambodia have stated that they feel they could protect themselves better without than with an alliance with us. I would agree that the French——

Mr. CULVER. Have you observed a marked change in the Cambodian stance vis-a-vis U.S. participation in Vietnam in the course of the last year, that the tides of battle have dramatically changed? It might lead a cynic to observe that the wave of the future would move in one direction at one time, that they identify themselves with a different cause today, and I can understand, because they are primarily interested in themselves.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I haven't observed it myself, but I have seen many comments to that effect, and I wouldn't be at all surprised——

Mr. CULVER. It has markedly modified. I was also concerned about your suggestion that we have this power and we should keep our cool in using it. Did we keep our cool in Cuba and in aid to Greece and Lebanon and Berlin and Korea, all these places where isn't it true that this power on the shelves without a demonstrated will and capacity to employ it if necessary does not necessarily have all that magic consequence?

The 7th Fleet, for example, with all due respect to the old days where we had a banana diplomacy, is hardly a realistic deterrent to northeast Thailand Communist aggression, is it? It might be very effective in discouraging the Chinese mainland regarding frolics as to Quemoy and Matsu and Taiwan, but what is the good of a 16-inch gun in the middle of Laos, offshore batteries?

Mr. REISCHAUER. You throw all sorts of different examples in——

Mr. CULVER. Sort it out——

Mr. REISCHAUER. Greece, Europe——

Mr. CULVER. I will be very specific, if I may rephrase it for your benefit.

The 7th Fleet in your judgment, is it an effective military weapon to resist and defeat Communist wars of liberation in Asia on the mainland?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Not very widely, no. I believe that we should have it there. It does have a stabilizing influence. Particularly in island nations, it is a real defense.

May I reply in a sort of rhetorical question: Do you think the history of the Vietnam war is sufficient to discourage would-be leaders of wars of national liberation in other parts of Asia? I am not sure. They may draw from it conclusions that America is not able to stop that kind of thing.

Mr. CULVER. I would say two things in reply to that: I would say the one military lesson we can all agree on is that some of the awesome military power the United States in recent years has been relying on to maintain the peace of the world, the nuclear capability, is not relevant to defeating the new type of international, I would submit, to a great extent, Communist efforts in the world. I think one of the reasons that the war of liberation concept is being currently employed is because it is the one way to advance and extend the influence of the Communist world in the light of nuclear realities.

I think the United States is making most impressive military progress in the ability to refine the U.S. military potential and its potential in dealing effectively with this type of situation. I think our problem is indeed no longer military in Vietnam, it is social, economic and political. I think it would be a sobering realization to me, if I were

sitting in Hanoi and thinking about northeast Thailand, or sitting in Peking wondering whether or not the United States was a paper tiger, to see this massively effective commitment in Vietnam making such great progress militarily. I think that would be a sobering deterrent to any ambitions that I had, which any Communist understands, which he feels very sincerely and genuinely represents the best form of government to catapult these countries into the 20th century.

Mr. REISCHAUER. If you are going to have further wars of national liberation, they are not going to be things that Peking can organize itself, but will depend on a local group that can do it. I don't think those local groups are going to necessarily draw the lessons from Vietnam that you are drawing from it. I think the whole threat of wars of national liberation is diminishing primarily because Communist China is proving such a failure at home, for one thing, and another thing is because the less developed countries of the free world are beginning to make progress. Thus we are actually doing a great deal more in stopping wars of national liberation through the money we are putting into real aid, as opposed to aid for military things, which is part of the military side, than we are by the tremendous military posture we have maintained. I am for a military posture insofar as it is effective. I think the 7th Fleet has been successful. I think there are situations in which we should try to help these countries build up the kind of police power that would be useful against guerrilla activities and subversion. But I think that a much larger part of the answer to this threat is economic and institutional development.

Mr. CULVER. I think we are in complete agreement on that aspect, Mr. Ambassador. I think we are basically in disagreement in regard to the unfortunate necessity of the U.S. military power being applied in some of these situations and, above all, the demonstration of our willingness and the capacity to effectively deal with this type of situation, the new threat, if you will.

I am not thinking about a nice domestic revolutionary civil war situation, that good old healthy civil war there in the classic sense that erupts, but I think we have overwhelming evidence of the degree of control and stimulation and direction of their effort, at least to satisfy me.

I have just one last question, Mr. Chairman, and that is:

You make reference to the fact that Vietnam is a tremendous price to pay to develop a very small country. I wonder it it isn't a very great principle, this principle that we are going to insist that international disputes and border difficulties and so on be settled through political and peaceful means, as opposed to the utilization and employment of force? I think our commitment to that very great principle in the immediate postwar period, which I think a great many people forget as memories of World War II fade, have brought about this more sobering and rational conduct on the part of the Soviet Union. The fact that it is expensive, and the fact that when you say how many more could we afford, we all certainly pray that we won't have to face any more; but I think it is also a fact that Vietnam, for all of its cost today, in fact represents in terms of our total military budget 10 percent of our gross national product, that our military budget compared to the wealth of the Nation has gone down recently, and, we

could, if you want to get real tough minded about it, probably afford a number of Vietnams financially. I don't know how many we could afford politically.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I agree with you on that. I think people have overstressed the financial cost of the war to us. But the political price we have had to pay is very high. I was struck in coming back from Japan that I came back to find this terrible division over Vietnam in this country. I could see abroad that we also paid a high price in terms of our influence. The war has certainly placed a strain on our relations with Japan, which are more important than our relations with all of southeast Asia.

I might be in complete agreement with you in this having been worth the price if it was a clear-cut case of aggression across a border. It is a much fuzzier, more mixed up thing than that, even in our minds, and certainly in the minds of Asians it looks more like an internal problem.

Mr. CULVER. I respect the sophistication of that struggle. I think it is also important when you talk about keeping our cool, that we keep our cool at home and abroad and that the draft bill, for example—the draft just prior to World War II passed by one vote, didn't it, just before Pearl Harbor—that we have a great problem of political education at home. There is no doubt about it. It is also true there is nothing worse than fair-weather friends. I think it is true of the community of nations just as in personal relationships.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think the chief difference in our views is that I have a more optimistic view of Asia. I think it can maintain its independence and develop on that basis. Occasional setbacks will not necessarily be disastrous to our interest or to the longrun future of Asia. I think what we stand for in terms of a free and affluent society and democracy has a great deal more appeal in Asia than many people realize.

The other side is stuck with all the wrong ideas, and will defeat itself. Most of our successes in Asia have not been, strictly speaking, our successes so much as failures of the other side. This is what is turning things in our favor. This is why I think we can be more relaxed about many of these things and, as I say, a bit more modest about our role and not so worried about defense and so on. In taking a more relaxed attitude, I think, we will create a climate that actually puts more strength into the situation in Asia, because Asians then will realize they are standing on their own feet, and this will make a better relationship with us and make it more possible for us to give effective aid to them.

I am so optimistic that I am suggesting that we take a somewhat less defensive attitude toward the whole problem and a more positive attitude toward it, because I think the situation permits this.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do you think it is all right for missionaries to try to continue to effect changes in these countries?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Missionaries, of course, can. I come from a missionary background. If you believe strongly in something, you naturally want to share it with others. I see nothing wrong with individual Americans doing anything of this sort. As a government it is a different matter.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you. No further questions.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we talk about keeping our cool. We could say it is accurate that the United States, the Administration of the United States has kept its cool in the development of the unhappy relationship that now exists between the Soviet Government and China, and would you agree since it is largely overlooked, that we could have really fouled this one up pretty good, that we did keep our cool in the situation that now exists in China?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I didn't get the last part. We could foul it up if we didn't keep our cool?

Mr. GALLAGHER. As I have indicated, that we could foul things——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think we have done well when we take things in a more relaxed way. We have been relaxed in the Sino-Soviet split. I think the Indonesia case is also a case in point there. Our willingness to let them push us out in almost every way except in diplomatic relations, our willingness to keep our mouths shut and not try to do things, I think all this helped the Indonesia situation go in the right direction.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Ambassador, translating this to some of the smaller countries that may well want to be independent, there might be an antifreedom group there, are you suggesting in order for them to learn to stand on their feet that we should stand idly by and let them get knocked down as much as is needed and say "We went through it ourselves"?

Mr. REISCHAUER. If they are being knocked down from inside, I think we probably would do better by not trying to interfere.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Even though it represents less than the majority feeling in the country?

Mr. REISCHAUER. When you have a small group of guerrillas fighting, I don't say we shouldn't give aid in terms of weapons to the government to help them try to stamp it out. I see nothing wrong with that kind of aid. If the government turns out to be so inefficient or corrupt it can't handle the situation even with this outside aid, I don't think we probably help in the long run by marching in ourselves.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would you say that was the basis of our decision on Diem?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think we got off on the wrong foot there right from the start. If we had settled for a nationalist regime with a Communist coloration in Vietnam in 1954, we might be in a better worldwide situation today.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Could you please explain—I read your statement—what you mean by our unconsciousness of the tremendous power we exercise? Can we ever judge the actions that we take before we take them, and is not hindsight a little easier than foresight? How can we be unconscious of our power?

Mr. REISCHAUER. We can do a thing that seems a small economic thing to us, but might have a tremendous impact on a small country, for example, in the prices of what it has to sell in the world. We can make a statement which to the local people is very impressive, very strong, and yet to us is just one of thousands of statements that we make, and thinking as we are, of so many other things, it may not

seem terribly important to us. There are many, many cases, I think, when we don't realize what the impact is of our action.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would you give an example of this simplemindedness, I think is the term you used?

Mr. REISCHAUER. An Asian people may want to progress in a certain direction, and we may want them to go there too, so we decide to take them by the hand and lead them there. This is all well and good, but it goes against human nature. We haven't looked at the situation from their viewpoint. That is what I meant. It may be goodheartedness, but we sometimes rush in and mother-hen things to death.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Can we react differently to a situation that is an exhibition of power——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I am not sure—

Mr. GALLAGHER. An exhibition of power. Say a neighbor of China or India. How can we react differently and still be conditioned by our own morality?

Mr. REISCHAUER. If, for instance, the Chinese Communists should try to threaten people with their nuclear weapons, we have to react very, very strongly and make it quite clear that we will not tolerate things of that sort.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Now where they threaten, where they really do it.

Mr. REISCHAUER. They do it?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Where in Vietnam we have the North Vietnamese in there and the people say they are not there but are nice fellows. How can we react differently? One of the things that worries me, and I have listened to this in many instances, it occurs to me that we are only imposing the strictures of our morality on us and not on them.

It seems to me this is leaving us at somewhat of a disadvantage.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think that I am suggesting we put any special strictures of morality on ourselves.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The strictures of morality on us, I think, but not on the other side, not necessarily you, but the whole concept of this. That is, we should act, we are sort of simpleminded, and that is what your word suggested to me, and on it goes, the other side can do pretty nearly what it wants, we can understand them, but we cannot understand why we react, that it is a moral for us to react. I would just like to——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think I am on your side on this one. I think too often people have a double morality and try to hold the free world or the United States to one standard, and then forgive the other side anything. I think this is quite wrong.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Just one more question, since you were in Japan at the time we made a very difficult decision, and that is to bomb North Vietnam. Were you consulted on this?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I was asked that in the Senate, and I can't remember just what happened at that time. I remember in other specific moves of that sort Washington did consult me, but I don't really remember a full consultation as to what the Japanese reaction would be in case we started bombing on that scale.

I remember on the POL when we bombed it last summer, there was a clear consultation on that one, and I reported that I didn't think there would be a very strong reaction against it in Japan, and there wasn't. I don't remember weighing in on this other one.

Mr. GALLAGHER. As an expert on southeast Asia, were you not canvassed as to what you thought the reaction would be?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I was an expert on Japan. I think if we had thought more about this, we would have taken a closer reading as to the reaction throughout the world. My memory, though, isn't clear on this point.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you approve or disapprove the bombing in North Vietnam as a logical escalation of what——

Mr. REISCHAUER. At the time I did my best to try to explain it to the Japanese in the terms that it was explained to me: that this action would help cut off the flow of men and arms from the north, and thus would help deescalate the war. They expressed skepticism at the time.

Since then it has been found out we didn't cut off as much as we hoped to. I think the concept that existed at the time, to make it painful enough for the north so that it would want to negotiate, was perhaps unsound psychologically, given the sensitive feelings of the Asian people to the colonial past.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Were you not canvassed originally when we were getting around to making this decision as to what the reaction of the Asian people might be?

Mr. REISCHAUER. I can't remember being, but I couldn't guarantee I wasn't.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What do you think now of the present demand that we stop bombing, and the other part of it that we do a little more bombing? Now, I would say I would be canvassing your opinion at this point.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I don't think there is much more we could do in bombing that would be useful and that wouldn't run absolutely unacceptable risks. We have expanded a few things recently.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Risks in what way?

Mr. REISCHAUER. That make enough difference in this flow of goods or pressures to be worth it. If we were to wipe out the cities, which we could do easily——

Mr. GALLAGHER. I am talking about the powerplants, the dams, the irrigation systems——

Mr. REISCHAUER. The irrigation systems——

Mr. GALLAGHER. POL.

Mr. REISCHAUER. We have done POL, power stations, a lot of things. There is not much left of that sort that you could add.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The power stations remain.

Mr. REISCHAUER. They obviously are not going to cut down the ability of the north——

Mr. GALLAGHER. MIG bases.

Mr. REISCHAUER (continuing). In its conduct of the war very much or make new pressures that would really make a difference. They lead in the wrong direction. I think if possible we should find ways to cut that down.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I agree. What would you think would be some of those ways?

Mr. REISCHAUER. This requires the kind of military information that I don't have right now. How much of the flow we do cut down——

Mr. GALLAGHER. If we got out of the bombing business, because there are a great many people who feel that this would disengage and we would all slow down a little bit, are you of that opinion?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Only mildly so. I think if we were not bombing them in the north this would make a slightly better psychological situation, and we would have a little bit more chance of negotiations than we have now. I, myself, am rather skeptical though that we are going to get negotiations of any sort because I don't see how the Vietcong and South Vietnamese are going to be able to agree on anything.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What is your prognosis?

Mr. REISCHAUER. All I can see as likely in the future is a gradual diminution of the war, if we can find ways to get it to simmer down. I think we should be working on long-range strategy in that direction. That is why I have snggested looking again at that line across the 17th parallel. If we were able to put that in, it would cut out the need for any bombing in the north altogether, and it would dry up the southward movement of supplies and men. Also efforts to really pacify a large part of the delta would help, because this would get both the food and the manpower out of the hands of the Vietcong and would in time lead to a deescalation of the war. These two strategies are things that come to my mind——

Mr. GALLAGHER. Would you agree that what we are doing is about——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I have always said that I am a supporter of the administration policies, which I understand to be to try to bring this war to an end as soon as possible without escalating to the place where we get to fighting the Chinese or withdrawing, which I think would produce many of the dangers that we have been talking about.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, one of the impressions that I get as I have looked at the Vietnam war is that we don't very carefully look at who the other side is. I want your reaction to this. We seem to have the feeling that Communists are strange animals who react differently than other human beings and they all wear black hats and the other side white hats, and if you put enough pressure on them they will give up because they have a guilty conscience. My impression is that we don't understand them well enough, the commitments, the kind of ideology they hold, the commitment to the cause that they fight for, and as a consequence we make bad judgments about what they are going to do. I don't know if you share this feeling or not. I am not suggesting that this means that one sympathizes with the Communist system. What I am suggesting is that we aren't perceptive enough about what they are, what their relationships are, and the essentially political character of the movements, and lacking these insights we say this is external aggressiou, that whatever happens in the south always happens in response to the directives out of Hanoi and Hanoi is the principal belligerent; that if we get Hanoi out of the war this is the end of the war.

You may not agree with my concern here, but I believe that it is our incapacity, for example, to put ourselves in the shoes of the other side to get some insights as to how they see the world and to understand

their political ideologies, that lead us into blind alleys time and time again. You may not share that view.

Mr. REISCHAUER. I agree with you very much on that. I think we forget that Communists exist because these people think that communism is the best way to build the kind of country and society that they would like to see developed. Particularly in Asia where people are so eager to build countries where only colonial regimes existed before. Their fundamental motivational force is nationalism; that is, to build a strong Vietnam or a strong Burma. When we look upon them as being special kinds of devils in this world, as evil men rather than Vietnamese who want to build a strong Vietnam, and who think of communism merely as the best way to do this, we see the whole thing wrong. It is because of that kind of thinking that we don't have enough confidence in nationalism's ability to create strong independent regimes. We don't seem to have enough confidence in the things we believe in. Our kind of society works better than the Communist society. Even Communists may become educated to see their system isn't the best way and a modified system may be better. This is why I think we can be much more relaxed. These are human beings with their nationalistic urges as their strongest urges.

Mr. FRASER. One of the things that amazed me was to have the reports, which must have been based on intelligence reports, in 1962 and 1963, that suggested that things were going well in Vietnam, leading the Secretary of State to talk about withdrawal of troops, and so on. I have always taken this as a symbol of our inability to understand these societies, the political dynamics, because if we had obviously we wouldn't have said the things we did.

I know some Americans over there knew differently, some of the reporters. In our institutional approach to these things our observations have to fit into our preconceived pigeonholes, and if they don't fit we push them in any way and we analyze things in those terms. This is why I was asking about Japan. There is one thing that I think U.S. foreign policy needs and that is to have deeper, more perceptive insights into these societies, what are they thinking about, why are they reacting as they do. If we have this we might begin to understand the limitations on our power, and where we ought to be a little more reserved in the exercise of it. I feel this keenly. I don't find in the style and tradition, for example, of our State Department that we tend to get this. The traditions are the old diplomacy, government-to-government relationships. The idea of getting out as we do in our own districts, gumshoeing and talking to our people—if we were doing this is Vietnam—I think we would have understood more perceptively the problem.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Going back to Korea, I felt strongly we were flying blind in Korea because we had no Americans who were really knowledgeable about Korea. We had not trained them. There we were responsible for half of the country but had no expert knowledge. I think the same thing has been true in Vietnam. The same thing will be true in many parts of Asia. As the richest Nation in the world, we ought to develop more expertise. The State Department is where we need more of it, but we need it also throughout our country.

Mr. FRASER. I agree. The way the United States can do it successfully, of course, is not quite so clear. Our State Department people

traditionally are attached to embassies, and so on, and carry that responsibility as they move around in society, and it imposes some limitations on them I think that don't attach to people in a different capacity.

Mr. REISCHAUER. We have developed very good State Department experts in the Japanese field, where it has been a known specialization for a long time, and we have a lot of good people. But there is always a fight between the generalists and specialists. I think we try to do the whole State Department operation on a shoestring, that we ought to have more people.

Mr. FRASER. The village elections were abolished in 1956. This apparently was of no important concern to our Government, at least measured by any responsible pressure on Diem to change the decision. Diem might have been a dedicated person, but inherent in the way he was operating would be the inability to cope with the insurgency movement. But we didn't have people who were sensitive to this and understood it.

I worry right now about Thailand. I think we have the impression that through economic aid we are going to effectively work at what is essentially a political problem in the rural areas, working with the Central Government which I suspect takes the same attitude toward the rural area, which is that they don't have much time for them——

Mr. REISCHAUER. When you think of what the Vietnam war is costing us and when you think this Nation does not have a group of experts that know what the problem is, it seems absurd. We wouldn't spend $5 billion in space development if we didn't have specialists in that field. Yet we spend $15 billion in Vietnam without a backup of knowledge.

Mr. FRASER. This is a style of involvement that is new to America: How does the society function? How do the groups relate to one another? What else can you do to help them along to work out their own problems? If we could develop that then I would think our ability to be helpful to these people would be enhanced, and we could rely less on the military response.

Mr. REISCHAUER. This might be the most important lesson we get out of Vietnam, that we have to develop a larger corps of experts in all parts of the world.

Mr. FRASER. I am told today, for example, there is no memory unit in Washington that is recording our experience in Vietnam. The experience is found only in personnel who are transferred in and out every few years.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In summation, Mr. Ambassador, it may be true that, while we should not be as fearful and concerned as we are about the developments in Asia, I think it also behooves some of us to be less critical of U.S. efforts. It is fine to say multilateral programs would be more successful, and that we ought not take the less developed countries by the hand and lead them, but permit them to grope for solutions in their own way; yet we must look on the entire situation in perspective.

Immediately after World War II the emphasis and our concern was in Europe. We had the Marshall plan to rebuild the devastated areas in that part of the world. We completely ignored Asia, and

this is the greatest criticism against the United States, because we ignored Asia. Many people feel, for that reason, we now have many of our present problems there. Even to this very day we are largely European oriented. That is one reason why we do not have the expertise in the Asian area we should. Considering the limited resources we have had I think we have done very well. Despite our concern in Europe a goodly portion was lost to communism. In Asia very little, areawise, except for the Chinese mainland, has been lost to communism. That, too, probably could have been avoided. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if we can afford at this time to depend upon multilateral aid channels for assistance to the less developed countries in Asia. Bearing in mind that it is a less effective way of disbursing aid and we seem to have difficulty locating other governments who are willing to help. I would not want anything to impede our assistance efforts, both military and economic, to such a fine ally as the Philippines, and for that matter to India, Pakistan, and the other countries.

However, I do hope that in the future multilateral programs will be developed to relieve the United States of its bilateral obligations in this area, without leaving a vacuum, otherwise we will really invite trouble.

Mr. Ambassador, I want to commend you for your eloquent presentation today. It is quite obvious that some of the members of the committee don't agree with you but the purpose of these hearings is to obtain these various points of view.

It is not because we want to develop democratic governments after our own pattern, because I think these Asian countries will have to develop their own governments; the countries must develop their own leaders, but should we not give some guidance and leadership?

In your testimony before the other body you stated that the imposition of a democratic constitution on the Japanese by the United States after World War II has not been as important in the growth of truly democratic institutions in Japan as the natural disposition of the Japanese themselves. Yet it is my recollection that historically Japanese governments have been autocratic and authoritarian. Would you comment?

Mr. REISCHAUER. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am in complete agreement with most of what you have said. Let me go back over the situation. First of all, I do think that we should be proud of ourselves for our response after the war to the challenge we faced. We were the only country that could do many things at that time. We were new to that sort of responsibility, and I think the American public and the American Government responded magnificently—to be sure, without much depth of knowledge and experience in these things, but on the whole, extremely well. As we have gone on we have found that some of our reactions were not the wisest. I think we should become more skillful in what we are doing. I am advocating just some slight changes in attitude, in direction in what we have been doing. I certainly would agree that we must go on giving the kind of aid we have been giving. I certainly would not advocate any abrupt, sudden change in course.

Countries that we have guaranteed defense to, we must go on defending until something takes the place of our guarantees. I was

just trying to point out some general directions in which I think it would be healthy for us to try to move.

To get back to the specific question about Japan and the American occupation. Our occupation of Japan shows that when we have the responsibilities we must measure up to those responsibilities. We did take strong and vigorous action in Japan. We had defeated Japan and we occupied the country and did extremely well in measuring up to the resulting responsibilities.

I say that we should have done more in the situations in Korea and Vietnam in the same way, because we had the responsibility there. The fundamental thing that the Japanese experience teaches us, though, is that although we did our share in trying to help the Japanese go to a better model than they had before, their success was fundamentally something they grew themselves. Japanese postwar democracy is primarily the outgrowth of the institutions and ideas they themselves developed between the 1880's and the 1930's, at which time they ran into serious trouble. It was a revival of this earlier development, as helped by us after the war, that resulted in the great success of democracy in postwar Japan.

I don't think we should take from the Japanese example the idea that we can export or teach democracy to others. We can help them achieve it, perhaps, if that is what they are themselves seeking. I don't think we can give it to them.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are we now discussing how far we should go toward helping them reach, not just a democratic government as we know it, but establish a government that is stable, economically viable, and has adequate defenses against aggression? How far do we go?

Mr. REISCHAUER. The important thing in all these matters is that, if we are going to have viable, stable countries in Asia, it is going to be because they themselves have developed that viability and stability. We can only be an external force there. If they are viable only because we are propping them up, this will not last. We have come to a time when things are a little more relaxed in the world, and we can look upon our activities not as a crash program—holding a line that is about to cave in—but more in terms of helping something develop in Asia. That is why I am advocating that from now on we ought to try to take a different approach and different attitude toward our role in Asia.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The situation has now developed in Asia, so as to make it possible to depart from a crash program and relax a bit?

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is right.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We couldn't do so 2 years ago, 5 years ago, or 10 years ago, unless we had had the foresight and the wisdom immediately after the World War not to subscribe to the colonial policies of some of our allies——

Mr. REISCHAUER. I think we could have made the whole thing a lot easier for Asians if we had not so concentrated on Europe at the end of the war.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Was it not true that France had a domestic political situation at that time and we didn't want to rock the boat?

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is why we did what we did. I thought it was wrong. Everybody interested in Asia thought it was wrong at that time.

We put European interests, on French emphasis and so on in Europe, ahead of the problems of Asia, and now we are paying for it. I think we are getting a little bit better balance in our interests now between Europe, Asia, and other areas than we had immediately at the end of the war.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. With continued attention, study, and assistance and without necessarily foisting ourselves upon them I think there can develop a better, more peaceful and stable area.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Just one other question. I don't know if you were going to close it up.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Go ahead.

Mr. FRASER. This opens an aspect that I haven't heard discussed. Much of the rationale for Vietnam involvement is centered around a China containment policy. What do you say about that?

Mr. REISCHAUER. At the present moment, I think, it may be somewhat involved in that, if we were to withdraw, this would give a lot of credence to Mao Tse-tung's concept of wars of liberation, but if we had allowed a nationalist regime, whatever its political coloration, to come to being in Vietnam at the end of the second World War, it would probably have contained China a lot more cheaply than we are doing.

Mr. FRASER. If there is a containment it is an attempt to disprove a theory enunciated by Mao rather than any role China has played of a more direct character.

Mr. REISCHAUER. Yes, you remember that southeast Asia has anti-Chinese feelings. This is a feeling that will contain China if anything does. I think it will do it successfully.

Mr. FRASER. We are faced with the analogy of Munich. I always thought implicit in the Munich analogy was that failure in Vietnam must refer then to the new opportunities for China. Since I have never been able to find China in this war, I couldn't follow the reasoning.

Mr. REISCHAUER. That is not a good analogy.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much, Ambassador Reischauer, for a very enlightening and most interesting presentation concerning your point of view.

The subcommittee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned until Wednesday, March 1, 1967, at 10 a.m.)