RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1967

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order.

Our meeting today is the second in a series of the hearings to be held on the subject of political, economic, and social development in Asia.

We are indeed privileged to have two witnesses well known to the subcommittee. Ambassador Young testified last year before this subcommittee on U.S. policy toward Asia. Dr. Scalapino was one of our experts during the hearings on the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1965.

It is with great pleasure that we welcome back before the subcommittee, Ambassador Young and Dr. Scalapino, two of the foremost Asian affairs experts in the American academic community. They both have prepared statements which I will ask them to read into the record for the benefit of the subcommittee. There was a delay in receiving the prepared statements, so the staff was unable to have them reproduced before the meeting for the members' use.

After the witnesses have completed their statements, members will be permitted to ask questions under the 5-minute rule.

I think it might be appropriate to insert in the record the biographical sketches of these two distinguished gentlemen.

(The biography of Mr. Young follows:)

Kenneth T. Young has specialized in Asian affairs since he was a college student in China in 1935–36, and at the Sorbonne in 1937. He majored in Chinese and Social Sciences for his Harvard A.B., and received an M.A. from Harvard in International Law and Relations in 1942.

During World War II, he was a United States Air Force Combat Intelligence Officer in the Pacific Theater.

From 1952–58, he was Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and Director of Southeast Asian Affairs in the State Department. From 1958–60, he was an executive with Standard Vacuum Oil Company specializing in government relations in Asia and planning new petrochemical facilities there. From 1961 to 1963, he was Ambassador to Thailand and United States Representative on the SEATO Council in Bangkok.

Mr. Young attended the Japanese Peace Conference in 1951, was Deputy United States Representative at the Panmunjom Talks in 1953–54, and participated in the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina in 1954, and the Summit Conference in 1955. He was on the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1952, 1953, 1956, and 1957. In 1964, he was Chief of the United States Delegation to the annual session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Century Association in New York, and the Visiting Committee for East Asian Civilizations of Harvard University; a trustee of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, The Asia Society, and Lingnan University in Hong Kong; and a Columbia University Associate on South and Southeast Asia.

Mr. Young is President of The Asia Society in New York City, a private, philanthropic organization for promoting Asian-American understanding and cooperation in the arts and letters, education and current economic and political affairs.

He is the author of "The Southeast Asia Crisis" (New York Bar Association's Hammarskjold Forum 1965, published by The Oceana Press, October 1966); editor of "Essays on Vietnam" including his "The American Encounter With Vietnam," (Asia Society Journal, April 1966); and co-editor of "The Prospects for Southeast Asia" (Praeger, June 1967). He has written an essay on "The Foreign Policies of Thailand" to be published by Harvard University Press, and is completing a book on "United States Negotiations with Communist China, 1953–1967" for the Council on Foreign Relations, to be published in 1967.

His articles include "New Politics and New States," (Foreign Affairs, April 1961); "Thailand May Be Next But It Is No Vietnam," (Washington Post, August 28, 1966); "American Dealings With Peking," (Foreign Affairs, October 1966); "Diplomacy and Power in Washington-Peking Dealings," (University of Chicago Booklet, 1967); "Vietnam and Southeast Asia; A New Approach." (Chicago Daily News, March 18, 1965); "The Geo-Political Disequilibrium of Asia and American Strategies," (Princeton University Conference, February 26, 1965).

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You may proceed, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH T. YOUNG, JR., PRESIDENT OF THE ASIA SOCIETY AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THAILAND

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Asia's political modernization is the key to Asia's successful performance at home and abroad. Yet political development is the orphan of American policy. It is, therefore, timely and important for this committee to examine this vital matter. I am honored to be asked to appear again before this committee to speak in a purely personal capacity. I do so out of considerable trial and error in Asian political and rural change.

Despite the hazards and complexities of this urgent subject, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that we examine the five primary questions of the American interest, the chief factors and prospects in Asia, the nature of an American role in political development, the need for new expertise and the prerequisites of mutuality with Asian governments.

One. What are the stakes and the American role in Asia?

The stakes are successful modernization and orderly political development that will weigh the world's scale toward progress with stability away from disintegration into anarchy and violence through failure to meet the requirements of modernization. In Asia's revolutionary transformation, the crucial issues are runaway population, ineffective leadership, national disunity and economic decline, even mass famine. Asia faces a rough passage from old societies to new nations.

Asia is half the world's population and five out of seven of its largest nations. Failure to meet the requirements of modernization among such masses of humanity in such proximity could explode around the world. The outlook is not optimistic nor encouraging but

it is manageable if a massive effort is made by all concerned under United Nations auspices with international cooperation.

Asia can play a vital role in deciding whether the world faces peaceful modernization or violent anarchy. In the long run the Asian states can become vital components of world order as viable national entities, as regional partners in an Asian cluster and as responsible members of a new global system. The outcome depends on their capacity to produce new leadership and to meet the challenge and ordeal of modernization.

The American role in Asia should be an active one wherever we are invited. We can usefully serve as a counterpart by proposing innovations, sharing mistakes and helping as adapters of the old to the new. But if we propose initiatives, it is always only for the Asians to dispose by their decisions in their style.

We are usually welcome as advisers and participants if we show tact, sincerity, humanity—and low visibility. While we have much to learn about Asia, if we listen, we also have much to offer: a cosmopolitan way of life, public service, managerial efficiency and executive leadership, technological advancement and innovating propensities, rule of law, consent of the governed, human dignity, social justice, and growing abundance.

Others can learn from our civil wrongs, urban errors and mass failings. Americans blend well in Asia as individuals doing something needed and worthwhile. It is only when we are suddenly massed and highly visible, as in Vietnam and Thailand, that our gross overpresence leads to a culture clash.

Moreover, our role as the balancer of power and guardian of peaceful order is understood, welcomed and essential in most of Asia. It is our style not our purpose that upsets Asians. I do not share the view that we are overextended in Asia, although I urge that we lower our visibility, thin our presence and improve our quality. In view of our historical Asian orientation, we can and should be both a Pacific and an Atlantic power. Now our focus needs to be kept on Asia to help meet its massive problems.

Two. What are the basic factors and prospects in Asian political change?

Political cycles: Asian states are passing through a similar political cycle into a second and still indeterminate cycle of politics. Post-revolutionary movements, Western-style politics, great national heroes, the fervor of independence are disappearing and breaking up. New leadership and consensuses are needed. While each Asian state is at a different stage and mixes a different variety of this cycle, the theory of the cycle helps to orient the political development of each country. The stages since independence appear rather uniform.

Renationalization of politics: In many cases Asians seem to be turning back to Asian patterns of politics such as status, hierarchy, authority, and consensus. Mandated government is replacing elected government. A governing elite takes over from the Western party system. People prefer Asian values of solidarity, harmony, and noninvolvement. There is now a complex interaction between tradition and modernity.

The government gap: The physical and intellectual void between governing and governed, city and countryside, is the basic factor for

the Asians to overcome. The urban elite does not know how to mix or deal with the vast rural population. The villages fear and shun officials. These two societies don't speak to each other. The gilded ghetto on one side of the gap is rich, pretty, and powerful. It is often deaf to the slums and hamlets, expecting the slogans of nationalism or tribal rituals to relieve the poor and subdue the discontented. Across the void, however, the Asian people grow in numbers, in disease and poverty and in apathy. Why should rural Asia change its age-old reserve and noninvolvement in politics? The rural challenge is Asia's political riddle.

The new generation: One hope lies in the rising professional generation. This is the real new Asia. Most of Asia's population is young, poor, but educated somewhat. The college graduates—the so-called young professionals or new men—are the key to closing the government gap and modernizing politics.

Military rule: Contemporary Asia is notable, however, for its resort to government by military officers. This phenomenon reflects the political cycle, renationalization of politics, the government gap, the new generation, and the modernity of the military. I have long assumed that the modern military establishment would suit Asia's political prospects, at this stage temporarily. The military is a national community, provides status, hierarchy and solidarity, understands modernization and gets things done. The military corps is a major clue in solving Asia's political puzzle, but not the only one.

The missing managers: The real lack in Asian countries is not capital, technology or even motivation—on either side of the gap. What is missing is managerial capacity: forecasting, planning, team leadership, decisionmaking, and followthrough to results. The tendency is to have too many politicians, too much rhetoric, and too little performance. The urgent need is to enlarge the environment for attracting, training, and facilitating good managers from top to bottom. How to run enterprises and how to manage the turnover of power by peaceful succession are also urgent political problems.

Media matters: Asian cultures and new communications dovetail beneficially for modernization and political change. Yet, U.S. policy has lacked a communication policy. Asia has always had a flair for messages and media. An oral and visual tradition of social, face-to-face communication—by word of mouth, honorifics, group dramatics, shadow plays, minstrel singers, ceremonial assemblages, ritualistic pageantry, secret societies, soothsayers, and the magic of books—make Asians communications-minded today.

The transistor radio, the community TV set, wall posters, and the moving pictures are spreading like wildfire. Mass media are effective two-way channels of modernization and political development when combined with these traditional media. Use of both generates new politicians, gives new opportunities for leadership, closes gaps, unifies the nation, and exposes the mass of the people to modernity. Even allowing for its harmful effects, mass media are a potent instrument for development.

New Asia in the new era: The second 20 years of Asian independence will look utterly different from the first 20. Politics will proliferate many new options and challenges. Monolithic Marxism, now disintegrating into competing groups, will lose much of its magnetic

pull as the wave of the future, although its splinters will still influence and upset political development in parts of Asia. The Communist fist is far from empty.

On the other hand, China's convulsions will release suppressed hope and dynamism in many Asian countries, especially if post-Mao China is immobilized or fragmented for several years. The end of the bipolar grouping in the cold war opens the way for Asia's young generation to experiment with optional politics. Even regional cooperation becomes interesting. The new era looks encouraging but is increasingly complicated. Communist guerrilla warfare, and other kinds of political violence, will require better handling than so far demonstrated, certainly on our part.

The predicament: Rapid modernization maximizes politics indeed. Too much is expected of too few, too soon, by too many. Modernity causes a rush of new priorities and decisions, creates a host of new demands and activities and produces a stream of stress and upset. Undigested minorities and new groups are fractious or rebellious. Corruption spreads. The "new professionals" and "new voices" press new claims. International rivalries add tensions and complicate decisions. The capacity to govern is overtaxed and understaffed. Fluctuations in the political cycle may get worse. Political breakdown is the danger.

Asian countries will, therefore, tend to stress authority over liberty, concentration rather than the diffusion of power, and national solidarity at the expense of liberalization for individuals and minorities. A strong executive is the prime need. Political parties, legislatures, and competitive politics will not predominate for a while again.

Long skilled in statecraft, Asian governments will solidify the instruments of power before broadening its base. The few will continue to govern. At all costs they will seek a consensus to prevent social chaos and political failure. India and Indonesia will give us interesting and significant test cases of this in the next cycle.

Asian political modernization, in the light of these major factors and prospects, seems to be facing six managerial tasks over the next generation to smooth out the cycle, close gaps, and reach some goals:

1. Strengthening the community of modern leaders at all levels of government;
2. Improving administrative performance and legal uniformity;
3. Carrying out social and economic development;
4. Fostering national integration and unity;
5. Expanding national communication and popular participation; and
6. Developing alternating leadership.

These tasks define the scope of a policy on political development. I agree with Professor Weiner of MIT, who said: "The skill of the governmental elite in grasping the nature of the problems of its own society and in skillfully choosing the most effective strategy for easing its limited resources may be the paramount factor affecting development."

That is why we should play a role in Asian political development along those six lines. In Vietnam that may well be the key to a successful outcome.

Three. Is it desirable or feasible for the United States to have a policy and program on Asian political development?

Yes, subject to some reservations. If our stakes in Asia were not so vital, such a policy would not be necessary or even desirable. But it is. It is also feasible on a limited basis because we have built up enough background, although we still need a lot more knowledge and expertise on Asia. Obviously, any such policy could have only a limited effect. Our role as counterpart or broker would be indirect and restrained.

It is well to emphasize that the judgment and verdict on political systems are only for the Asians to make. We are not trying to foist our form of democracy on their political culture nor decide their political options for them. While it is not our business to embalm the status quo, it is our opportunity to help shape the future.

A policy for political development would, therefore, be based on the following principles:

1. Deference to Asian ways and decisions;
2. Enlargement of the environment of leadership and politics;
3. Coordination of all U.S. overseas programs to put primary focus on political development;
4. Assignment of priorities among the tasks of political development;
5. Emphasis on existing and familiar institutions rather than on new agencies;
6. Importance of a communications strategy for political development;
7. Utilization of private agencies and private funding;
8. Acceleration of research, particularly in Asia; and
9. Legislative endorsement and support, American congressional endorsement and support.

Subject to these principles, what would a feasible program of advisory political development assistance look like? Let me suggest several ideas.

Leadership program: If invited to, we could provide advisory technical assistance to help find the "missing managers," provide a sustained growth of new leaders, help them in the practice of power, and improve their managerial capacity to carry out political modernization. By our aid, a powerplant, paper factory, rural electrification apparatus, television station, and civilian or military training school would enlarge and enrich the environment of leadership and group politics as well as meet economic or social requirements.

A leadership program should have first priority to focus on augmenting and strengthening the "community of modernizers" such as administrators, artists and writers, educators, communicators, lawyers, cooperative and labor leaders, business managers, and military officers. In 1957, I circulated such a program within the U.S. Government which I can now make available to this committee, since it was private and unclassified, and I have it here, Mr. Chairman, if you would like to put it in the record.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We would be delighted to incorporate it at this point in the record.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

I. INTRODUCTION

The urgent and abiding prerequisite of stability and progress in the less developed world is responsible and effective administration. The prospects for Asia, the Near East and Africa will depend much more on the rapid accumulation of human skills and experience than on the construction of physical assets. Greater attention must be paid than heretofore to these human factors to ensure as orderly and satisfactory development as possible in this dynamic, emergent area contalning half the world's population. Progress and change cannot take piace withont guidance and direction. Sustained economic growth, suitable political reformation, and reliable security cannot come without qualified directors and managers. Therefore, the development of leaders and administrators, politicians and bureaucrats, should be put first chronologically, by priority, and in the organization of an integrated aid program for the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Several U.S. policy statements clearly recognize the need for indigenous leadership in the less developed areas. Most of the books or articles discussing any of the underdeveloped regions stress priority for good administration. However, no concerted effort has yet been organized to provide this. We do have a collection of worthy but uncoordinated efforts within the U.S. Government and in the private sector, but they are only partially responsive to the need. We are neither using these available facilities nor exploring additional needs as we ought to be doing to maximize and accelerate the growth teadership. This ontline of a leadership development program is a rough sketch of what we might do to analyze and handle the problem.

II. THE NATURE OF THE NEED FOR A PROGRAM

If the accumulation of effective leaders and human skills were proceeding adequately in natural sequence throughout the less developed areas, no need would exist for any external stimulus and support. Unfortunately, the critical weakness in this whole area is managerial and technical deficiency. The inherent weakness is intensified by the great demands made on a handful of trained people, by the extensiveness and rapidity of change and development in the search for modernity, by the confusion and complexity of rapid innovation, and by the Communist exploitation of the demand for direction and guidance. On the other hand, opportunities are emerging for filling the need, inasmuch as most of the basic factors in the newly-developing countries combine to look for strong national leadership.

A. *A lack of sustained leadership and competent direction.*—New leadership is not coming up from underneath to fill the needs in the future. The basic reason for the need to create a program for development and leadership is to fill the gaps behind the revolutionary leadership in the transition to the crucial stage of national development nnd fulfillment. If this stage could take place over many years of tranquillity and slow development. the urgency for leadership would be much less. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The leadership of most newly emergent countries is still characterized by dependence on a dominant elevated personality. This might be defined as "nuclear leadership" in the sense that political control and direction are built around a nuclens of a unique figure and a single party or nationalistic group. Snch nuclear leadership occurred in China under Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang; in India under Ghandi. Nehru and the Congress Party; in Burma under Aung San. U Nu and the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League: in Indonesia under Sukarno and Hatta: in the Philippines under Magsaysay and the Nationalist Party: in Korea under Syngman Rhee and the Liberal Party: in Viet-Nam under Ngo Dinh Diem and the National Revolutionary coalescence; in Thailand under Marshall Phibun and the Coup Party; and in Cambodia under Prince Sihanouk and the Sang-knm. Nuclear leadership seems to arise out of the stages through which most emergent nations have passed in the mid-20th Century: the revolutionary stage of separation; the post-revolutionary stage of reorganization aud consolidation; and the long-term stage of reconstitution of the national society to bring about the development and fulfillment of the revolutionary goals. The crisis of separation produces the strong dominant personality. He gathers around him dedicated and usually ahle colleagues. Together they form a revolutionary elite and organize a revolutionary nationalist movement. Because of the particular traits of their personalities they are especially ahle to identify themselves with the population of the country which in turn looks to their revolutionary leader-

ship to carry out the revolution. Sometimes the process works slowly over many years; in other cases the process is telescoped into a few years. In any event the victorious revolutionary leaders immediately confront the urgent necessity to reorient themselves into a responsible, constructive administration in the second stage.

The post-revolntionary stage of readjustment is difficult. The mobilization of the masses and the breaking away from old patterns, particularly from colonial control, creates talents and experience often unsuited for the tasks of reorganization and consolidation. Fortunately in much of the emergent world the revolutionary nuclear leadership has been sufficiently talented to make the transition. Much of their success comes from their education in Western techniques and thought. During the first few years after the exciting and satisfying achievement of revolution the leadership has consolidated its control of the country, set up new political parties and new political institutions, usually through modified forms of Western-style constitutional government, and laid the framework for promoting the general welfare and economic development. The hopes and aspirations of the new nation crystalize in the "magic" or "myth" of the dominant leader because he will solve the difficulties and frustrations which immediately begin to plague the new government. The leader becomes endowed with even greater powers, attributes, leadership and responsibility than he possessed during the revolution. He may even become such a "father image" for his nation or such a powerful personality that the power of decision and the destiny of the nation become synonymons with his wish and his fate. This concentration of nuclear leadership into fewer and fewer hands weakens the rise of a post-revolutionary leadership elite and disconrages the secondary growth of talents in leadership. Accordingly, the structure of leadership threatens to run down and erode unless means are found to strengthen its foundation during the period of reorganization and consolidation. Unfortnnately not many governments in the underdeveloped areas have vigorously attacked this problem.

The weakness in the leadership structure becomes acute as the nation passes into the third stage of long-term national reconstitution. Here, new skills and new insights are required which are far different from those used in the revolutionary and even post-revolutionary periods. However, the transition is hard to make in a few years. As the revolutionary leadership grows old and finds itself less and less competent to meet the new and complicated demands of economic, social and foreign conditions, gaps grow between the so-called revolutionary and post-revolutionary generations. Provision for normal and healthy movement np the ladder of responsibility and power is not made. At a time when new roles and functions are expanding in most of these countries, the organization of leadership and talent is incapable of filling the needs.

B. *The inevitability and totality of change in the newly emergent nations.*—Leadership is hurdensome, comprehensive and concentrated because people in the emergent areas seek a total break with the past and look for leaders or mythmakers who can articulate all the new goals and satisfy the new expectations. The masses and the elites have decided on change and development. The reshaping and retooling of society characterizes these nations. They insist upon modernization in the shortest time span possible. They wish to move out of the prefeudal, the feudal or even the 19th Century mode of life, whichever it is, directly into the 20th Century. This change affects a profound and total adjustment of human life in every sphere.

In the basic psychic areas of human attitudes and reactions, individuals in less than a generation must revolutionize their thought patterns, their habits of living, their social relations, their professional aptitudes and their views towards their family, village, nation and world. The totality of change also means social breakdown, for the traditional bonds of social groupings are weakened or destroyed and new social patterns and gronps arise. Family ties and the loose agrarian way of life gives way to urbanized and coordinated relationships. The impact of the West and the introduction of advanced technology require strange new political institutions. And finally, the totality of change seeks to remake the economies of these countries. This multidimensional revolution is taking place all over the world but in the newly emergent nations it is perhaps more consciously planned and directed in this era than elsewhere.

C. *National development and directed social change.*—The intention of these countries to reconstitute their societies by national development and directed social change creates a large nnmber of new roles and functions of leadership to be filled. Most of these countries have formulated plans for economic de-

velopment and undertaken new activities in every field of endeavor. Their ambitions are prodigious and the tasks formidable, but they seem to have the dynamism of "a boom-town atmosphere." It would be tragic to see these hopes dashed by lack of skills. This puts an enormous burden on the human resources of a country, but at the same time provides channels and outlets for the increasing numbers of technically trained and educated people provided they can be guided into these outlets. A program for the development of leadership is of the utmost importance to focus attention on the tasks of leadership and to channel potential leaders into these new roles and functions. A concerted program for the organization and utilization of intellectuals and educated persons in these countries is the only way to meet these needs and to prevent their frustration.

D. *The difficulties and dangers in rapid total change without sufficient leadership.*—The modernization of the newly emergent nations is so rapid and extensive that it requires a particular aptitude for its direction and control, if disorder and disaster are to be avoided. Without a growth of leadership, capable of providing such organized guidance, development and change will be disjointed, unpredictable and eventually dangerous. A whole series of social and political difficulties will arise to frustrate and destroy the kind of change which will be in the best interests of the U.S. and the free world.

For centuries the social systems in these countries have been largely static, rigid, and agrarian. Like a tornado the West has broken down these historic structures and dispersed traditional customs like a hurricane. Now, the number and the nature of choices is so bewildering that individuals and groups may get lost in confusion and frustration unless there is stable and continuous leadership able to point the way and get results. The quickening pace of life and the introduction of innumerable innovations will produce disjointed changes at different social levels unless smoothed out by adept psychological, social, political, and economic means. Selection of new modes of new machines requires the latest learning because choices involve fine determinations of what is transferable from one culture to another, or of what might have been useful yesterday but will be obsolete tomorrow in this world of galloping change. As the balance between the rural and urban areas is upset, the alienation of the urban elites in the metropolitan areas from the large mass of the people in the countryside could lead to acute tension and disunity unless there is capable and sensitive leadership able to command and synthesize the two. The spread of modernism will intensify variations in social background and customs, standards of living, and aspirations while the introduction of technology will favor new aptitudes and new social forces, all requiring integration into a scene of flux. And, if the leadership does not produce satisfactory results in time, an alternative will be sought.

If these various elements and forces now dimly but surely at work in the emergent areas of the world are not brought under control, adverse disruptive effects will be certain. The social and psychic frustrations of unbalanced social changes will bring about an unpredictable redistribution of power within these countries in the first instance. If the tensions and frustrations spread too wide and reach too deep, the social fabric and political structure of the country may disintegrate into anarchy. If there is no development of suitable leadership and if the free world does not pay attention to the problem of leadership, it is probable that the emergent countries will drift towards some kind of authoritarianism, left or right, which would in any case be inimical to U.S. interests. As long as conditions of attraction and power exist in the Sino-Soviet area, one can presume that the drift would follow in that direction. Many people seem to make this assumption when discussing the relative prospects of India and Communist China, for example. However, it may be more likely that during the next few decades, frustrated groups in the emergent areas may turn towards traditional forms of despotism more akin to their cultural and psychological needs.

In the long run, the greatest danger for the effective development of emergent nations would be the alienation of their forthcoming leaders and dominant groups from the free world or the so-called Western way. In the near future the political leaders and the trained persons in Africa, the Arab world, or Asia will continue to be Western-oriented because so many of them, as pointed out above, were steeped in Western ways during the colonial, revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. However, we cannot assume that during the long stage of national reconstitution the leadership arising unaided out of the natural force of selection in these countries will necessarily develop a pro-Western attitude.

Future leaders will not necessarily come out of a Western mold speaking Western languages and thinking in Western ways. Left to chance, the Asian or African elite of the next generation could be hostile or intractable. Accordingly, the right kind of leadership is needed to reduce any possible alienation of elite groups both from their Western supporters on whom the techniques of satisfactory change depend and from their local cultures and populations on whom the political fate of such changes rest.

E. *The New Generation.*—The key to the future as people keep repeating lies in the productive integration of the younger generation in the newly emergent areas. The young men and women coming ont of nniversities and technical institutes will decide the directiou of these nations in the long-term stage. Their satisfactions or their frustrations will determine whether or not these nations move into paths parallel with or antagonistic to ours. Many of the younger intellectuals and talented people are already becoming disillusioned and frustrated because they cannot find adequate outlets for their energies and aspirations soon enough. These are the stuff of leadership hut it must be grasped and molded quickly and dynamically. If the West does not, others will.

Already danger signs are showing, for one thing, in the facllity of Communist slogans and appeals to attract the youth and the intellectuals. Revolutionary leaders are less and less regarded as indispensible if their claims to rule hark back to the revolution and do not point forward to new achievements. New groups and new elites in the post-revolutionary stage are beginning to feel excluded from national leadership. This danger is compounded by the fact that demographic factors are increasing the younger age groups in their rapidly growing populations. The median age in most non-Western countries is in the twenties. The pressure from the younger generation will grow into a potential reversal of values and policies just by virtue of frustration and opposition unless hroad leadership can understand the intellectual gaps between the generations whose difference in age, paradoxically, is not more than a few years. Unless these energies of the youth groups are constructively channeled, the ideas of the present leadership and the symbols of the West, which we assume so many share, will succumb to another creed.

F. *The Campaign of the Communists.*—The program for the development of leadership must take into account the success the Communists have had in using their techniques to create leadership and organization. The Communists have demonstrated the primary importance of attending to leadership. In almost every country Moscow possesses a valuable tactical instrument which we cannot duplicate: the indigenous Communist Party. One of the basic reasons for undertaking a system to develop leadership akin to us is to counteract the Communist advantage and engage indigeuous instruments of power and influence to work along our lines. We can never realize too often that the promotion of leadership and the direction of political force are key factors in the theory and practice of Leninism as applied during the past fifty years. Communist parties everywhere specialize in selecting and training capable candidates for leadership, assigning responsibilities to the proven few, and demanding results from the leadership. The Communist Party organizes and sustains disciplined cadres, uses the instruments of leadership and organization to control the actions of groups and nations, monopolizes this power and leadership, and thus can quickly seize the initiative for action. Both within and outside the party the Communists employ ideology and psychological leverage to gain converts and to neutralize their enemies. The combination of fear, terror, opportunity, attraction and ultimate capture is directed at the young intellectual and educated person throughout the world.

Supplementing the promotion of Communist organization, the Soviet Bloc is conducting a clever, long-term campaign to capture key groups in selected countries in the emergent areas. The Communist Bloc apparently has chosen certain countries as strategic or primary targets. The choice of nations like the choice of groups or individuals is highly selective. The Chinese Communists appear to have picked Cambodia in Southeast Asia as their base for contact and control. Their aid program there is directed at many of the key sectors of the Cambodian economy such as national planning, light industries, education, and especially rural areas. In Burma, the Russians are in the process of planning and developing a technical institute for over one thousand Burmese "engineers", the best of which will be sent for additional training to the Soviet Union each year, and are also moving into the industrial and agricultural sectors in Burma. In Afghanistan the operation is repeated. In Syria and Egypt

the Russians have made great strides among the political, technical, and military elite. In Africa the Russians are concentrating on Sudan and Ethiopia where hundreds of Communist technicians are going. There are many more examples in India, Indonesia and other countries in this broad area. The lesson is that if we leave the field alone the Communists have the intention of taking it over.

Undoubtedly the Communists will make many mistakes and alienate many people in this area, but we must not underestimate their energies in mounting this campaign. Quantitatively at least, they may outdo us in language training of Russian, Chinese, and other bloc nationals, and the provision of Communist technicians sufficiently proficient to make an impression in less developed areas. The Chinese Communists possess the advantages over us of being Asian and having Chinese communities to work through. The danger of Communist penetration and infiltration by technical, educational and cultural assistance lies in its affect on the intellectuals and the younger generation. The Communist message and Communist technology, however much we despise and abhor it, can provide a sense of mission and a feeling of total response for a frustrated group searching for identification and achievement in a bewildering world. If not adroitly and sternly managed, the totality and rapidity of modern change may bring about maladjustments which in turn will cause a sense of alienation or rootlessness. It must be a major objective of any program to develop leadership to better the Communists and to provide a more attractive alternative to the younger age group in the emergent areas.

G. *The Weaknesses of Current Efforts.*—We have economic development, resources development, military development, and every other kind of development but we do not have organized and sustained leadership development. Of course it should be recognized that the United States Government, many educational institutions, and private business as well as the United Nations and other friendly countries are already doing much to educate and train growing numbers of persons in Asia, the Arab world and Africa. Fortunately, there is a universal recognition of the critical deficiencies in skilled and human resources. However, all these worthwhile efforts are largely haphazard and not geared together to produce over-all political results.

There is no well-developed concept of the objectives and means of developing such leadership, no scientific analysis of the particular political process and social matrix in which talent and leadership operate, and no understanding of the roles which leadership must play in the newly emergent areas of the world. Tremendous resources for tapping leadership potential can be seen in many of the current efforts and facilities in this country and abroad, but no concerted program exists for mobilizing these resources towards a desired political objective. An even greater wasted asset lies in the thousands of Americans—civilian and military—sent abroad on official missions for the U.S. Government, for few, if any, of these people are conscious of the particular contribution they could make in spotting talents for leadership and in developing attitudes compatible with U.S. interests and responsibilities. It is possible that the current random efforts may in the long run produce a sufficient quantity of competent and suitable leaders and administrators of a heterogeneous sort. But a haphazard undirected variety of efforts may well be deficient to promote our best interests in time.

H. *U.S. interests and responsibilities.*—Because of our stake in these countries, we must act to encourage and promote the kind of leadership which will facilitate the achievement of U.S. objectives. We have such great responsibilities in the world that suitable indigenous leadership is indispensable to supplement our efforts, reduce our support and activities. If we could easily sit back and casually observe the rest of the world go by, we could ignore the critical need for the right kind of leadership of approximately a billion people. However, the position of the U.S. requires our active participation in the development of the free world in order to promote our interests and carry out our responsibilities. To insure a compatible environment for our own way of life, we need social systems in the Afro-Eurasian continents which harmonize with our own system along broad general lines of human freedoms and democratic rights; and we must prevent the Afro-Eurasian continents from falling under the complete and effective control of hostile powers. Thus we have a direct and long-term stake in the preservation of the newly independent nations, for their capture would counteract the environment of freedom and put rising pressures on our own. Needless to say, we do not seek the exact image or replica of our own way of

life in any of these nations because the infinite varieties and endless possibilities of diversity will enrich universal freedom.

During the period of Communist power and bi-polar international politics the United States is the only single Western power which can insure the security, stability and progress in the Afro-Arab-Asian area. We directly confront the Soviet Union in Africa and the Near East, and Communist China in South and Southeast Asia. It is we or they for a long time to come. If our power and interests falter, the field will be filled by the Communist Bloc as long as it has the capability. If the leadership in these areas swings toward the Soviet bloc, our influence and security will decline.

But perhaps of more challenging significance, the U.S. has the unique facility for influencing the development of leadership in the newly-emergent nations. We can contribute the vitality of our free institutions, the creativity of our own pioneer outlook, the energies unleashed by humanitarian ideals, and the prodigious productivity pouring out from our constantly changing technology to help promote the betterment of the less developed nations of the world. If we Americans are wise and responsive, we can marshal our own resources, our own techniques and our intelligent understanding of their problems to build the bridge for the new nations of the world to pass over from the barren environment of the past to the promising future ahead. Together in an imaginative and constructive effort we can make use of the world's new economic, biological, technological, and psychological forces to help them create acceptable as well as viable modern societies. Our potential for such a contribution to the leadership and people of the newly emergent areas is incomparably greater than that of the totalitarian Communism if we have the will and the foresight to realize our opportunity.

III. THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS

It is necessary to understand the peculiarities of Afro-Asian politics in order to devise a program for the development of leadership in this area. The essential factor for the development of leadership is that the social matrix and the political process in the newly independent nations can be conducive to the formation of leadership. The process of politics and the role of leadership are strikingly different from that in the Atlantic community. We must lay aside our American stereotypes of politics and judge political developments in this particular part of the world in terms of the indigenous matrix out of which leadership arises. This is difficult because our knowledge of the political process there is rather limited and the overlay of Western political forms and values is often deceptive. Politics in the newly independent nations has a Western veneer which does not touch the hard indigenous grain of a totally different species. In a word, patterns of loyalty rather than programs at issue are the most significant element in the political process in this part of the world. There, more than elsewhere, elites predominate in amorphous populations, and personalities control the elites.

A. *Social status and communal identification.*—Political activity revolves around the social status of individuals and the communal identification of persons much more than around fixed issues, programs, or political parties. In the West politically-interested individuals first tend to determine their stands on various issues and then rally to individual politicians who seem best able to represent those ideals or programs. In the emergent nations individuals tend first to rally around the individual or group for which they feel personal loyalty and then support the issues and programs of the leader or group. Since power, prestige and influence are bound up with one's status in the society or hierarchy, the political struggle involves the grasp for prestige and influence in the group or for the manipulation of the favor and loyalty of dominant personalities. An individual's political success depends on relating his status to the social structure of the community or group, i.e., communal identification. The elements in such identification range all the way from the relatively new and impersonal Westernized elites, through ethnic, religious, and a few functional groups, to the clan and family ties at the village level. Political issues and power settings change with the rise and fall of individual leaders and not with victory or loss in the competition of ideas in public debate. The changes of one's personal stand on an issue means transferring one's personal identification or relationship to another man or group. Thus parties tend to cluster around personalities or emerge out of some communal framework. Parties in this area tend to represent generalized ways of life or vague national aspirations rather than sharp

issues thrown up by contending interest groups. These generalizations are symbolized in the persons and utterances of the leadership.

B. *Cliques and personal loyalty.*—The selection and development of leadership involves a relatively small, compact source, for personal cliques are the key units at the level of decision-making in the political process of most societies and groups in the newly independent areas. The pattern of individual personal association is the best available guide for understanding the political process and knowing what kind of leadership will develop. The importance of status and identification together with the lack of political issues or programs appears to explain the phenomenon of cliques so common to this part of the world. Any particular pattern of political relationship seems to be determined in terms of personal associations. Judgments on political issues depend upon the relations among the various members—leaders and led—in any given political situation. The really important questions are those related to patterns of loyalties. At the national level in the post-revolutionary stage the success of the politician in the newly independent nations probably depends more on his skill in using symbols to attract the support of a large part of the population and in inducing its identification with him rather than on his ability to define and argue public policy. At the group level, the success of the leader depends on his skill in manipulating rewards and punishments to maintain the clique intact.

The custom of cliques and the habits of association in the newly emergent areas provide another handle for the development of leadership: the tendency to "donble in brass", or what might be called the plurality or substitute-ability of roles. Since political and administrative responsibilities at the top level are not clearly differentiated among functions or interest groups, members of the elite can move from one role to another which increases the availability and versatility of leadership, at least temporarily. Civilians move into the military establishment and vice versa. In nations just emerging from colonial control or from static traditions, it is generally the tendency that no particular group limits itself to performing a definite function. The bureaucracy may act as an interest group or even as a political movement. The officer corps and military establishment may provide the effective government. For our purposes this means that the selection and training of educated leaders has the widest possibilities where there is the possihility of rotation and substitution.

C. *The diffuseness and fragmentation of society.*—Several distinct features in the political process condition the terms and the tasks of personalized leadership. The disjointed social change and disconnected social matrix in which national leadership operates, creates difficulty in calculating the distribution and intensity of attitudes and values throughout fluctuating and emergent social levels, in ascertaining the relative power of those in favor and those against any particular course of action except by reckoning on personal associations, and in measuring the amount of effort needed to gain the support of doubtful elements in order to produce a consensus of national will or an accumulation of loyal associates sufficient to insure domestic success. The explanation of these peculiarities is also important for a good plan of leadership.

1. The structure of society is like a stretched accordion, for the urbanized and Westernized elite is far removed and often estranged from the general population of illiterate villagers or poor workers still living to a large degree in terms of traditional customs. Alienation between the apex and the body of the social triangle threatens political stability. Following a successful revolution the broad undifferentiated mass of the population may not always share the same ideas or even know about the ends and means of politics developed by the leadership. For its part, the elites may lose complete touch with the people and culture of the country. As the tasks of consolidation and long-term reconstitution of society becomes more complex and bewildering the alienation between the apex and the base of the social triangle may grow.

2. The absence of a generalized and unified system of political communication within the society regarding outstanding national issues aggravates the lack of rapport and increases the intellectual and emotional distance between the apex and the base during the transition period before education and modern media take effect. Most of the population depends on the ancient system of word of mouth information. Except on the most generalized basis or the lowest common denominator of national ambition the leadership has a hard time getting its message over.

3. Moreover, no single general political process operates across the society in the post-revolutionary period to provide a cohesive center or clear focus for

political activities. The disjointed nature of total social change occurring simultaneously at many social levels creates several different political processes running in cross currents such as the modernized, sophisticated urban areas versus the traditional archaic modes in the villages, the conflict between the generations among the urban elite as demonstrated by student activities against their political leaders, the clash between secular and religious elements, and the tensions caused by ethnic minorities seeking status or autonomy in the new nation.

4. In the meantime the changing social structure in these newly developing countries has not yet organized special interest groups which are stable, cohesive and strong enough to promote specific functions and to strengthen the line of communication from the apex to the base. For example, labor unions in this area of the world are usually the personal instruments of some top official or predominant clique rather than bona fide workers' organization. Unfortunately, counterpart groups have not yet developed to express concrete, rational, and well-rooted desires and grievances of the emerging groups. Community associations, civic organizations, and voluntary private groups are only beginning to emerge.

5. The fragmentation and diffuseness of society leaves many individuals and groups unrepresented in a consistent stable fashion. This produces the unpredictable and spontaneous nature of many political events such as the sudden change in allegiance, the unexpected outbursts of disturbances, and the ready response to manipulation by emotional and evocative stimuli.

D. *The power of symbolism and ceremony.*—Effective leadership must make a much greater resort to the manipulation of myths and symbols, pageantry and ritualism than in the West in order to create a national consensus and channel popular energies into constructive outlets. Because the population is not yet politically organized or instructed, and because there are few reliable guides to measure general opinions, politicians and bureaucrats make up elaborately-fashioned symbolism and emotional appeals for political communication. We must always remember that the issues of public policy so common in Western societies are neither the most important aspect of politics nor the only legitimate concern of those in power in the less developed, non-industrialized areas. In a period of rapid social change, the basic problem of such countries is the promotion of national unity and the continuity of leadership. Thus these emergent societies have developed to a high degree the art of expressive or semantic politics to align the diverse segments of the population with the leadership. Pomp, ceremony, and ritual are the paste of politics to bind the westernized elites and the nativistic masses together. Communications follow the patterns of sentiments and emotions whose symbolism can be evoked in the character and personality of the leader of the nation who in the eyes of the people is linked with their daily destiny. Nuclear leadership can remain in power a long time with well-sounding symbols provided it can keep intact.

E. *The appeals of incentives and rewards.*—The internal growth and stability of the elite groups depend upon the leadership's skills in creating incentives, distributing rewards, opening opportunities for service and applying penalties concerning aspirants to the elite. The problem for leadership in building the elite group is easier than creating a national consensus in newly emerging states because the interests and attitudes of the educated levels of the population tend to be specific, rational and homogeneous. The difficulty in the situation stems from the needs to gear the rapid expansion of intellectual and educated persons with the even greater increase in jobs and assignments of national development and industrialization in particular. To constitute a cohesive and growing elite, the leadership must hold out incentives which attract the self-interest of the intellectuals and fulfill their urge to share in the national effort within the elite. The leadership can then strengthen loyalties and aptitudes by using rewards and opportunities in the form of status and rank, responsibility and assignment, in the new functions and enterprises of national development. The younger echelons who respond to such incentives and perform such assignments in the apex of leadership provide the pool of secondary growth to tap for succession to the top. The elements of nepotism and corruption form the unpleasant but inevitable stuffing for much of the elite structure at this stage as long as personal association prevails and public accountability does not. Beyond that, if intellectual, talented persons turn against the leadership or prefer alternate courses of action, they face the penalties of exclusion from the source of status and rewards. Opposition is often a harsh and disagreeable role in these areas.

F. *The restraints on the opposition.*—One of the least understood aspects of the political process in the newly emergent areas is the limitation and pressure put upon leaders and parties in opposition. A program for the development of leadership in these countries must allow for the sharp difference between the non-Western attitude toward opposition and the Western. Accordingly, Western sponsorship of leadership in opposition or stress upon the virtues of the two-party or multiparty rotating system dismays the leadership in power and weakens its relationship with the West. The importance of status, the ties of personal loyalties, and the sentimental character of the political process in this part of the world often twist dissidence into treason and opposition into subversion. And sometimes it is a feud without quarter. The revolutionary leader or the nationalist elite in the post-revolutionary period frequently considers the opposition leader and opposition parties as disloyal and unpatriotic. It can be paradoxical. On the one hand, the urbanized and Westernized leadership intellectually accepts and tolerates the notion of opposition picked up in foreign exposure and constantly justified by Western friends, but on the other hand such leadership instinctively eliminates the power of the opposition for being both unnecessary and subversive. Claims to leadership cannot be shared or rotated because the political process at this stage has the peculiarity of permitting only one version of nuclear leadership to operate. The leadership erupted by the chance and logic of the revolution goes right on blithly or belligerently identifying itself as the pure expression of the national will and the true embodiment of the national destiny. The idea of alternating leaders is silly, heretical and mischievous, if not downright revolutionary!

Rotating leadership in a parliamentary or presidential system of many parties in the present stage of social development confuses the mass of population which tends to attach itself to a unique personality and not to parties with various programs. The bulk of the people in agrarian, pre-industrialized countries is likely to lose its sense of direction if the symbols of power and rule shift too often among the top personalities. The political process becomes so opaque and pointless that the people either lose interest in political affairs which in turn retards the development of modernization and industrialization, or the people eventually turn to a more dynamic leadership which possesses some promise of stability and permanence.

G. *The mastery of modernization.*—While having to display all the skills of the lingering style of traditional politics, effective leadership must also demonstrate a mastery of modern techniques and the latest developments in every field. As national development and retooling become increasingly complex and comprehensive the national leadership must expand its knowledge and perspectives to execute a successfully balanced program of industrialization. This means keeping pace with technological changes in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, basic facilities, and social services. The application of atomic energy to the needs of less developed countries highlights the technical demands on the imagination and foresight of national leadership. One of the potential dangers in the political process is that the top leadership in this post-revolutionary period may not be able to adjust itself quickly enough to the technical demands of modernization. If cabinet, party leaders and civil officials do not understand the intricacies of economics, the utilization of modern media, the requirements of military establishments, and the shifts in the international environment, they will not be able to produce the performance necessary to meet the expectations which the people assume will result from a successful revolution, particularly in raising standards of living. A flagging internal program or confused and procrastinating leadership will be turned out. All the instrumentalities of leadership—civilian and military—must master the specific requirements of modernization.

IV. THE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF LEADERSHIP

The crucial problem for our diplomacy is to pin-point those key instrumentalities and targets of leadership in the total elite group which would be most responsive to our efforts and most compatible with our interests and objectives. Since we do not have the resources to take on the total elite apex in the newly developed countries, we must be selective in looking for leaders and encouraging politically-trained cadres. We have systems for selecting and developing scientists and technicians, but we have no scheme for helping to produce and orient potential politicians. The success of our over-all policies will depend to a great extent on our success in helping the intellectuals to meet the complex requirements demanded by the peculiarities of the political process. Intellectuals

can set the tone in these countries, create the symbols and myths of the revolutions and the new movements, envisage national missions and destinies, and channel the expectations and aspirations of the people into orderly constructive development. The program of leadership development should concentrate on the following key groups of intellectual attainments: the national ruling elite, the civil administration, the officer corps of the security establishments, the professional groups (comprising commercial and business elements, academic staffs, writers and journalist, artists and scientists, and professional services), and representative bodies and such private interest groups as may develop.

A. *National ruling elite.*—The elementary and primary requirements for a good leadership development program is to ereate friendly and productive working relations with the leaders currently in power. Unless this prerequisite exists we will be handicapped in reaehing out to the otber groups except by claudestine channels. If we share a mutual respect and confidence, then the use of our means and resources to seek out and encourage the instrumentalities of the right kind of leadership will proceed favorably and cooperatively. To do this we must always understand the conduct and policy of the current leadership both in domestic and in international matters. A particularly crucial point in our relations with the nationalist or revolutionary leadership is its sensitivity regarding the sovereignty of the state for which these leaders assume a destined responsibility. Beyond understanding its outlook and trying to infinence its behavior, we cannot do much to chauge the present institution of top leadership. We have to do the best with what has already emerged, for its make-up is already conditioned and substantially committed.

The important target in this instrumentality is the maximum nnmber of the future top elite sharing goals and values compatible with our own. The success of any leadership development program ean be measured by the numbers of such top leaders in a government at any given time which we can help emerge from the other instrumentalities of leadership.

B. *Civil administration.*—The newly trained administrators, scientists, engineers, educators, and technicians of the national and provincial bureaucracy provide the primary resrvoir for the corporate stability and organic continuity of the top elite. This group is particularly important in rapidly developing nations in order to carry out the polieies and programs which flow from the set of national values, and interests expressed by the top leadership. Fortunately a considerable amount of technical training and technical assistance is going into the output of improving public administration and technical competence in the newly developed countries. Governments in the area are deeply concerned over the critical deficiency in skilled manpower, for the time is short to insure performance of the many-sided programs in national development and the training of people takes time. Public service can attract the younger intellectuals coming into the market for employment, provide the new functions and assignments which give the incentives and rewards for building a governing elite, and create a sense of service to the nation which all of these countries desperately need to overcome the weakness and short-sightedness of personal associations. The strengtheniug of the civil administration will make the operations of government and the process of politics more rational, concrete, and integrated thau may have been. In the long run a responsible and effective leadership by intellectuals can be promoted only by making available the kind of education and training for administrators, engineers and scientists which will equip them to handle the requirements of each stage of development and deal with the transition from one stage to the next.

C. *The officer corps of security establishments.*—Military training programs are a vast untapped reservoir for promoting political consciousness and social stability. A military establishment is perhaps the one institution in these countries which the U.S. can effect comprehensively and decisively at the political level. Yet we are missing this crucial opportunity. Our military instructors provide splendid technical training, inculcate high morale, and build np excellent combat units. Our system helps to develop a sense of national service and patriotism in the officer corps and among enlisted men which is far more stable and valuable for political purposes than the traditional clan or communal loyalty to a military chieftain. On the political side several uses of the officer corps and military establishment during the post-revolutionary period have been overlooked.

1. A cohesive patriotic group of top officers can serve as a balance-wheel, a guardian of public safety, and a grand referee among antagonist political groups. In addition to serving as a restraining influence on the ambitions or whims of political leaders, the security forces can sometimes sense the various moods and feelings of the people better than the urbanized bureaucracy because military personnel may be closer in attitude as well as location to the population.

2. The military establishment may become one of the main sources for generating the hard decisions necessary for the modernization of many sectors of the country. The army, the police, and the other services may become the most nationalized and technically developed institution within the society because they need the latest equipment and require a modern infrastructure. Thus, the most able officers in the services may have a much greater appreciation of the needs of a modern society as well as a more rational and secular outlook as to how society should be changed than their civilian counterparts.

3. In view of the highly developed military and police techniques in the West and particularly in the U.S. and the spirit of comradeship in the profession of arms, the military establishments in the newly developing countries are probably the most open, friendly, and sympathetic group from our viewpoint. At the very least, self-interest of the officer corps requires continued access to the most up-to-date training and the best materiel that we can provide.

4. Finally, the officer corps will show the keenest sensitivity to threats to the state from subversive or disruptive elements, particularly from the Communists.

Our military aid programs can have a political impact in framing institutional arrangements far beyond the purely military sphere. Many of us have observed the effects which our MAAGs and service schools or their equivalents have had in promoting leadership, patriotism, competence, organic cohesion, and friendship for the United States in nine military establishments in Asia—Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Pakistan. In addition, I know that the officer corps in India, Burma, Pakistan, and Indonesia is partial to the values of the Free World. The combination and cementing of the politico-military organization is an asset for us of incalculable value as long as the Communists have their capabilities and instrumentalities for hostile, disruptive designs on the Free World. To put it candidly and starkly, the military establishment is the one institution which we can service in these countries as the countervailing counterpart to the indigenous communist party. It is the one organic instrument of power we can display in political warfare inside these countries against our adversaries. The rest at our disposal consists largely of individuals, however important.

D. *Representative institutions and voluntary private associations.*—In the long run responsible and effective leadership will arise out of the development of a strong and stable system of representative government. Its leadership is needed to counteract the authoritarianism of administrative elites. In elected institutions or informal private associations there will emerge the leaders and spokesmen who can give public expression to the concrete views of the people. The program of the development of leadership should include tactful support for representative institutions without at the same time alienating the present leadership and without forcing countries into a Western political mold of dividing society among two or more competing parties which alternate in the sharing of power and which fluctuate in strength.

E. *The miscellaneous assortment of leadership potential.*—In a variety of other sources lies potential leadership talent: artists, writers, teachers, scientists, etc. But our resources for a leadership development program will be taxed if we tried to cover all intellectuals, religious groups, ethnic minorities, etc. We should concentrate on "institutionalizing" leadership. Yet, provision should be made in the program for surveying any variety of sources in order to select the people who may seem politically adept, and who may in any case become an asset for the achievement of the political objectives of this program. The intellectuals are susceptible to certain stimulus which our aid programs can provide. Intellectuals are prone to seek Utopian solutions, identify themselves with great causes and abstract values and measure progress by some curious mixture of a quantitative index for national development and a subjective calculation of personal prospects. By and large the young, emergent elites are desperately seeking help and guidance. We should seek the promising ones among artists, scientists, teachers, and spiritual leaders.

V. THE TASKS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT NATIONS

The program for the development of leadership should seek to expand and strengthen the specific talents of leadership which can carry out five primary tasks of leadership called for by the peculiarities of the political process in the newly independent nations. These tasks are: the formation and strengthening of the corporate body of elite leadership, the creation and maintenance of national unity, the success in modernizing old societies and satisfying popular expectations, the improvement of executive leadership and administrative efficiency, and the expansion of popular participation in the political process.

A. *The formation and strengthening of the corporate elite leadership.*—The initial problem for the leadership is to develop skills to create a viable lasting institution of leadership. The relations within the elite are the first concern of the leadership for the reason that, if the leadership is divided or shrinking, none of the other tasks can be carried out. The intraelite or internal problems of leadership involve as far as we are concerned the distribution of incentives and rewards as well as the constant selection and accretion of new members into the corporate body of leadership. Much of the energy of political and managerial talent in the newly developed country is absorbed in creating a new system of relations among the elite because considerable attention must be devoted to this activity if a responsible and effective government is to emerge. Unless there is a viable system of relations inside the national leadership, a genuine basis of national unity wil be difficult or impossible to achieve. Many countries in the newly developing areas of the world are wrestling with the primary tasks of leadership.

B. *The creation and maintenance of national unity.*—Assuming that a stable and viable leadership exists, the next important task is to find mechanisms and arrangements for satisfying the needs of the largest possible part of the population. The role of leadership is vital in any society but is particularly so in those undergoing rapid and discontinuous change in order to determine and clarify on a continuing basis the patterns of values and interests within the society and then to relate these to the distribution of political power and the capacities of the instrumentalities of leadership. The next greatest potential threat to the stability of the non-Western world, after any internal threat to the leadership itself, is the failure to develop that kind of leadership which can skillfully articulate the values of the population and harness the energies of the people by means of a genuine and effective intercommunication between the leaders and the led. During these transition stages from consolidation to long-term development the most difficult task of the leadership in the newly independent nations is to develop and maintain an effective relationship between the apex and the base of the social triangle. While the emphasis is on personal association and symbolic politics the ruling elites can afford to ignore the people, especially when the agrarian population is largely illiterate. But the very process of modernization, now fashionable all over the world changes the tasks of leadership concerning the relationships between the ruling elites and the people.

The rapid introduction of modern technology in many fields of endeavor revolutionizes the character of the political process. More efficient means of communication, the rise of literacy, the rapid urbanization of the population and the creation of new interests and functional groups produce more articulate and dynamic political participation than did the traditional society. The revolutionary elite will ignore at its peril the rise of new political drives and interests among the younger generation just as many feudal and aristocratic elements in Europe once ignored the rise of new elements. Unless there is a favorable and effective communication between the top and the bottom the gap may be bridged by increasingly authoritarian tendencies on the part of the elite or the resort by frustrated groups to some form of Caesarism.

C. *The performance in meeting national goals and satisfying popular expectations.*—While the leadership and top elites are maintaining their internal unity and developing favorable relations with the population as a whole, they must be able to make the right decisions about internal development in order to produce timely and satisfactory performance on the promise of the national revolution or the proclaimed goals of the post-revolutionary government. The top leadership, the civil administration, the officer corps, elected representatives and the intellectual group in general must understand to some degree the essential facts and problems of national development, its substance, its staging and its

ramifications. A myriad of choices must be made every day in complex social, economic, military, and foreign affairs. The balance sheet of results will determine whether or not the people as a whole believe the leadership group is making sufficient progress to warrant continued support. People in the cities and villages are induced to seek change but they want to see it visably and quickly in tangible forms. Responsible and effective government in the newly independent areas is on trial.

D. *The improvement of Executive leadership and administrative efficiency.*—The only way to insure a success of the national programs is to raise the standards of executive leadership and administrative efficiency so that domestic objectives can be achieved. Every member of the government and administrative group in the newly developing countries has the duty to do what he can individually and in combination with others to increase the effectiveness of direction and management. The top leadership in particular has a special responsiblity for applying efforts and resources of the state to educate and train brain power and man power as the first long-term priority of national development. Physical strnctures and monuments are more appealing in the short run because they can demonstrate visable results more quickly than the slow and unseen process of education and training for service in public or private organizations. But the salvation of these countries lies in human resonrces.

E. *The expansion of popular participation in the political process.*—The leadership group should also seek to strengthen the operations of representative institutions and increase the opportunities for the rural and nrban sections of the population to participate in political process. At the same time both government and administration will be rendered more stable and effective if specific interest groups and informal voluntary associations can be established to give vent to popular desires and grievances. Such associations and groups can increase the unity and structure of diverse societies. New informal organizations can satisfy the social needs of people cast about in new functions or locations and in search of new identification. Such associations can provide the framework for a more coherent system of politics if they become channels through which the various values and aspirations within the population are articulated. Strong and skillful leadership will seek to influence the development of such counterpart organizations.

VI. A PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The objectives, measures and resources of such a program must be geared to the peculiarities of the political process, the special targets within the instrumentalities of leadership, and the tasks of leadership. American assistauce can contribnte materially to the development of effective and responsible leadership by tuning our instruments of modern diplomacy correctly to these demands. Our economic and technical aid programs, our military assistance, and onr information services and cultural exchanges can help create a reservoir of suitably oriented and trained intellectuals, put incentives and rewards into the hands of specially-selected leaders for strengthening the instrumentalities of power and fulfilling the tasks of leadership, and provide some of the substance of symbolism and ceremony to improve the communications between the leaders and the people. What needs to be done to launch such a program, if it gains approval, is (1) to formulate the purposes and affects of leadership development, (2) determine the decisions required in the U.S. Government, (3) outline some of the measures, facilities, and resources to be devoted to such purposes, and (4) set up a mechanism for organizing such a program.

A. *The purposes and effects of a program.*—The program of leadership development would have two sets of purposes and effects: those which we would seek and those which we wonld hope the leadership itself would seek. Our immediate purposes wonld be the following:

1. To provide a sustained growth of suitable, competent leadership by careful selection, useful training, and scheduled follow-up.
2. To help meet the tasks of leadership by providing facilities and resources here and abroad especially adapted to the political process and the talents and energies of emergent elites.
3. To inculcate or induce a Free World orientation by offering a truly revolutionary concept of human progress and dignity which mobilizes for

human betterment the latest and best discoveries and findings in the psychological, biological, economic, political, and technological fields.

4. To strengthen the democratic process and representative institutions by stimulating the emergence of functional interest groups, voluntary associations, and political brokers.

5. To afford alternative means to Communism or Caesarism to enable the restless, ambitious individuals and groups in emergent societies to join the rapidly changing 20th Century as members in good standing.

The purposes which we would hope the leadership itself would seek would be the following:

1. To develop objectives and programs appealing to the intellectuals and attracting their contributions to national development.

2. To use the resources and facilities of our assistance and their own environment to strengthen the elite and expand the concept of public interest and national service, and to increase the sense of responsibility and accountability of political leaders and civil administrators.

3. To make political issues related more to objective, concrete policy programs than to subjective demands of personalities, cliques, or symbolic communications.

4. To integrate modern innovations with traditional customs so as both to preserve the basic cultural heritage and encourage national development.

5. To promote political stability by lessening social tension, psychic frustration, and alienation from either Western or national cultures.

6. To demonstrate that the West is the best source for external support in meeting national goals and is not imperialistic or decadent.

B. *The decisions needed in Washington.*—To formulate and launch any such program the U.S. Government would have to make the following three kinds of decisions:

Policy decision: To establish the new objective of assisting in developing leadership and allocating resources to carry it out.

Administrative decision: To organize a new high-level directing and coordinating authority in the State Department to execute the program with assistance from other Government departments and advisory bodies outside the Government as may be necessary.

Operational decision: To accord first priority in funds, personnel and facilities to the execution of the program.

C. *An outline of the measures, facilities and resources for a program.*—The core of the program, once the over-all decisions were taken, would be the organization of resources and facilities to help achieve the purposes and results listed above. The problems of organization would be to coordinate and make the best use of existing resources and facilities and to mobilize new ones if necessary. The following represents a rough outline of some of the necessary steps:

1. New arrangements and administrative devices will be needed to utilize the existing foreign activities and aid programs of the U.S. Government in a coordinated concerted manner to develop political leadership on a country-by-country basis. Those persons handling technical assistance, economic development, military aid, exchange of persons, and information programs for a given country should be trained to use the handles of their projects to accomplish the objectives of the program of leadership development. For example, a new school for public administration will provide a leadership with a constant supply of young people to strengthen the elite and afford an outlet for restless students. A project for economic development or civic action will bring the urban elite into contact with local communities. The reguilding of a pagoda, the building of historic monuments, and the construction of an auditorium can furnish the leadership with facilities for enhancing its status and communal identification, for displaying the symbols and ceremony of national consensus, and for encouragng the gatherings of party officials and voluntary associations. MAAG and police officers can develop close personal relations with Ministries of Defense and Interior, and with general staffs. All of these agencies bring here hundreds of people a year from the less developed areas. More coordinated arrangements should be worked out for their political orientation.

2. New arrangements should be set up in Washington and the field for ascertaining and designating potential leaders, facilitating their tours of study or visits in the Unted States or elsewhere in the Free World, and following up with them in their home country for several years after their return. Much is being done along these lines now, but our collective efforts should be improved

quickly. The latest psychological findings on the discovery of intellectual aptitudes and leadership skills should be systematized for this program. Better ways and more means should be allocated to perfecting the experience of foreigners here, especially those from Africa and Asia. They should be better received, better looked after, and better exposed to American ways. Our greatest deficiency is in the lack of follow-up in the home country. Our personnel abroad is already taxed, but nevertheless our overseas staffs should be directed and trained to maintain a personalized contact with selected returnees. To carry ont the selection and follow-up aspects of a program of leadership development we need several new tools:

a. A roster and current account of the individuals who show leadership potential;

b. A special processing unit in the United States to do the job here;

c. A directive to chiefs of mission;

d. A cultural affairs office in the Embassy directly under the Ambassador to do the job in the field.

3. All key U.S. civilian and military personnel assigned to countries in the less developed areas should be indoctrinated in the principles and purposes of this program, particularly in the objectives listed above. The definition of key personnel should be made as liberal as possible to blanket in the maximum number of persons. Wives should be included for they often play a significant role in influencing good or bad attitudes towards the United States among elite groups. A new facility is needed:

a. The establishment of an institute for such orientation in the Washington area. A large house in the country near the city where key officials could spend a few days of concentrated attention on this problem with specialists and officers in Washington would facilitate the program.

4. To attract the top potential of leadership there should be set up in the United States a new private center for the advanced study of problems in national development, with particular stress on economic and financial problems. Such an institute be made out of the conversion of an existing facility such as the Vanderbilt Institute of Economic Development, the M.I.T. Center or the new Center on International Relations to be established at Harvard. In any event such an institute would be designed to equip current or near leaders with the information and understanding of the new learning so that they would be better able to achieve the objectives for leadership listed in Section VI. A. above. By focusing on their interests and requirements in the crucial field of national development appealing to their self-interest, and flattering their self-esteem, we would indirectly ingratiate the American way upon them.

5. In addition to a new center, the study of certain areas or problems should be consolidated in regional institutes in the United States by attaching them to or expanding existing institutes or schools.

6. New measures will be needed to coordinate U.S. Government activities with foundations, universities, and businesses in order to bring the enormous private resources to bear in the leadership program. Those thousands of persons coming here on private arrangements will lie outside any political orientation whatsoever unless some coordination is effected. One small means would be to rotate specialists among the U.S. orientation center, the new institute for advanced study of national development, and regional centers in the United States. Another means would be to ask the private agencies to collaborate on the roster, so that there would be a single clearing house for records on all foreign persons coming here for training or education.

7. In the countries of the less-developed areas the purposes and results we seek could be achieved by these measures and facilities:

a. The establishment of U.S.-supported colleges, institutes or universities. In the long run a local American educational institution may have a great political impact. Roberts College in Turkey is an example.

b. The support and development of permanent regional centers or institutes to pool the experience, study the results, and project the future of crucial aspects of national development. A minerals center, an agricultural development agency, or a productivity center would increase the cross-fertilization in a region facing common problems and widen the horizons of national leadership.

c. The expansion of English-language training programs to or even beyond the saturation point. Perhaps this particular measure should be put first in the program, for our ability to communicate with the leadership and elite

in the emergent areas is a tremendous asset the Communists lack. And without the Communists, English is the key to their modernization for the population in these areas and the key to our friendship and support.

D. *The financing of the program.*—Even before a cost analysis it is possible to state that the political impact of such a program would be enormous in relation to the size of the funds required. The sums needed for the program outlined above would be only a fraction of the total of our assistance programs, probably a good deal less than 1%. It seems unfortunate that we do not undertake such a small investment to introduce a really effective catalytic agent into development. We spend huge sums on weapons, soldiers, and physical structures but little on the human component. The principal elements needed for the financial support of this program would be the following:

1. The presentation of the program in executive session to the appropriate Congressional Committees in order to obtain Congressional or legislative support for undertaking this program.

2. A new item in the State Department's budget for handling the administration of the program in Washington and the field. However, some confidential funds may be required.

3. A program of partnership financing to build and maintain any of the new facilities mentioned above. It would be advisable to use a combination of funds from ICA and State, PL 480 local currency, the IBRD, the private fundations, American and foreign banks, and private individual investors. Probably a great deal more could be done with PL 480 funds and private individuals than is now the case. The latter might be interested in supporting new colleges or institutions abroad.

E. *The measures for formulating and instituting the program.*—If the concept of such program is worth exploring, some means will be necessary for studying the proposal and making recommendations and findings. Because this program is primarily political in purposes and effects, the Department of State should take the leadership in studying, organizing, and executing such a program. The following steps will be required:

1. First, there should be established at a high level in the State Department a small *ad hoc* group to formulate the concept and elements of a leadership development program by surveying present facilities, consulting with all agencies and outside groups, and submitting a draft program to the Under Secretary or Secretary.

2. Secondly, if the report seemed useful, it should be submitted to the President with the recommendation that it be put before the Cabinet for discussion and approval.

3. The Department of State should then assume the leadership to put the program into effect after interagency consultation via the NSC or OC as required.

4. Final implementation would require a new unit in the Department of State. An officer at a high level with adequate staff would be given the authority and resources to combine into one program the supervision and coordination of all the various aspects of various programs and activities bearing upon the development of leadership. These include economic, military, and technical assistance; cultural, information, and exchange of persons programs; and collaboration with the activities of colleges, universities, foundations, and various professional and technical groups in the United States.

CONCLUSION

When we look into the future to make out its prospects or into the past to use its lessons, we often see that mankind's problems have been less those of production and technology than communication and organization. The crucial and central task ahead is to improve, enrich, expand, and employ our intellectual forces, particularly in the newly emergent nations. They and America have suddenly converged together into the wide stream of world affairs in the 20th century during an era of swift change. It would be tragic to miss this opportunity to establish a harmony of purpose and an area of cooperation where there exists, for a short span at least, a community of ideals and a frontier of action.

America with its heritage, its sympathies, its resources, and its changes can help build this bridge from the scanty past to a fuller future. We can share

with others the great benefits of modern advances and a perceptive understanding of the tremendous changes in contemporary life. Our particular mark should be dignity of conduct, firmness of resolves, and sincerity of purpose. The development of free, confident, enlightened leadership among half the world's population holds out endless possibilities to challenge the American promise.

Mr. YOUNG. For practical cases, I would cite our experience in the program of reform with security in Vietnam in 1954–1956, and in Thailand which has shown an unusual ability, even brilliance, for a century in coping with modernization. Besides, the experiences of Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Burma also indicate the value of our military assistance and military commitments for political development. It would be most foolish to weaken them at this stage.

Rural resurgency: Where the leadership program would hit the highroad of enlarging the national managerial capacity, rural resurgency would take the low road of "bottoms-up democracy." To spark the renaissance and modernization of village Asia, it would close the government gap where the people live and replace their apathy and noninvolvement with new incentives and motives. Paternalistic economic development cannot spark rural participation, and indeed community political action, local leadership, and voluntary democratic decisions out in the countryside. Democracy cannot be promulgated and mandated from the top down in the classical Asian style of politics.

As I mentioned to the committee last year, rural resurgency is a two-prong strategy. First, and most important, are programs to upgrade the capacity of existing and familiar local government and local leadership. This means election of local leaders and decision by the community of its real needs such as land reform.

The second prong is the team of specially trained helpers both from the village and from the city to assist local institutions and leaders in carrying out village innovations and developments. Teams can furnish the help most needed by rural Asia such as veterinarians, teachers, social workers, midwives, agricultural extension workers, and small project engineers. Young graduates, this new generation, seem to make the best teams, like the National Voluntary Association in Vietnam, in the form of an internal Peace Corps. It is essential not to insert heavy-handed officials who have not been reoriented to this resurgency. They can touch off the wrong revolution. Let's be careful not to make this serious mistake in Vietnam and Thailand.

Town centered planning: But we must not forget the vacuum between the urban center and the tiny hamlet. Village Asia alone cannot modernize its way of life, nor master the crisis of food and population. Nor can the metropolis. Town centered planning would provide a solution between the extremes of village smallness and urban bigness, interjecting a new combination of public services, a market environment, and small industries, and providing incentives for farmers and political leaders. A proposal of the United States which I made along these lines at the 20th session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in March 1964, is available for the committee.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We will be glad to have it.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

Proposal on Town-Centered Planning for Rural Development in Asia

(Made by the Delegate of the United States of America, Ambassador Kenneth T. Young, Jr., at the 20th Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, held in Teheran, Iran, March 2–17, 1964)

Mr. Chairman: The Secretariat's very able Economic Survey for 1963 has highlighted the principal problem for action; namely, that lagging development of agriculture threatens the general economic progress of the area. We too are particularly concerned over the fact that population growth continues to outpace increases in national production. More people means more young people in every country. The growing youth majority deserves more attention and higher priority in action for development. Food production must be increased considerably to meet the needs of increasing populations and to assure the healthy economic growth for people in the ECAFE area.

For the well-being of Asian peoples, the United States Delegation joins in the view that more attention and action should now be directed to rural improvement and agricultural progress in Asia.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, in my final observation, may I suggest that perhaps we should be searching for some new technique to stimulate rural productivity, create more public services and better markets, and synthesize a modern but satisfactory rural way of life?

I wonder if we might not look for a breakthrough to quicker rural progress in a concept of town-centered planning of all phases of development. This concept could be described as a technologically progressive, politically integrated but geographically decentralized society organized along town-centered lines. This would mean a new emphasis to meet the needs of rapidly expanding rural populations which are experiencing low standards of living, under-employment, under-consumption and migration of increasing numbers of people unprepared to live and find work in already sprawling cities.

Between the extremes of urban bigness and village smallness, a town-building program could interject a combination of public services, a market environment and the dispersal of industry. Better than the small village, the town could provide centralized training institutions, public works, agricultural extension services, medical care, specialized trade production, and credit facilities and adequate markets. Better than the huge metropolis, the new town would be able to provide an acceptable way of life for under-employed farm families. It could do this by fostering new opportunities for training and employment, particularly in light industries, and by affording its residents with adequate social services. Town-building would center development in a cluster of villages close to rural people. It is as important to avoid the uprooting disintegration of their way of life, as it is to prevent the rootless combustion of super-urbanization.

The service-market environment of rural towns could provide incentives for the cultivators and family heads who are the decisive individuals in rural areas. In such towns they would have markets for selling their crops and stores for buying their family's needs. There are many who are now convinced that a market environment in rural areas is crucial to national development and industrialization in particular.

So, I wonder if perhaps the most important task now for developing nations is not to find new ways to expand domestic markets. What is needed is the local manufacturers both of inexpensive agricultural equipment and the kinds of consumer goods which will create incentives for rural people to adopt modern methods of raising agricultural productivity.

Town-centered planning would require integrated programs of the many social, economic and political factors involved as well as the purely technical design and layout of new or modernized communities. The establishment of such communities cannot be successful unless all of those market factors plus the social and human factors are put together in regional planning.

In particular, application of the latest technological knowledge in town-centered planning can make really hopeful changes for individuals and families, especially young people. For example, our current research indicates that low-cost plastic roofing may be the solution to the most costly feature of tropical housing for millions of Asian peoples—the roof over their heads.

Some precedents and experience are available already in Asian countries along the lines of area development. If regional formulation of a general concept for

town-centered planning has any merit. Mr. Chairman, my delegation would be glad to join with others in further discussions of its feasibility.

Mr. YOUNG. Four. Does the United States have the expertise and organization to conduct a program of advisory political development assistance?

No, subject to some hopeful qualifications. As I said at the beginning, political development is the orphan of American policy. The U.S. Government has not shown much aptitude for it. Embassies too often revert to traditional diplomacy.

AID is primarily a supply agency. Public administration is procedural. Military assistance manufactures soldiers and armed services. Our information and cultural affairs have entirely missed the point about political communication, and national integration. Unrelated and fragmented these programs live in separate operational worlds overseas. Not one of them has had much constructive impact on really basic political modernization.

Nevertheless, I am convinced, Mr. Chairman, that many talented and imaginative officers in our foreign service and other overseas programs could now provide the nucleus of expertise on Asian political developments if there were a national policy and program. Despite any reservation I would urge that the State Department undertake the leadership to formulate them.

If we are to rescue the orphan of political development from obscurity, we can improve our expertise: First, by advisory committees including the Congress to coordinate public and private efforts; second by country research seminars to include the policymakers and the researchers in the United States interested in a country, such as we are working on successfully in the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group of which I am chairman; third, by an Asian Service Corps in the U.S. Government as I suggested to this committee last year; fourth, by expanding the teaching of English and translations into English for training and modernization in Asia, since the Asians have elected English as the common language. We have not done so. This is not cultural imperialism, Mr. Chairman; this is reacting to their decision or their experience.

And finally, by institutes of politics and private managerial services. Ten years ago, I submitted an administrative memorandum to the Under Secretary of State on ways of going about this, which I also make available to the committee as another bureaucratic curio from my files.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We appreciate having it.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR GETTING INCREASED POLITICAL IMPACT OUT OF U.S. OVERSEAS PROGRAMS

1. The U.S. Government in Washington and in its field missions needs a mechanism at the policy level to coordinate the political effects on each one of its overseas programs: exchange of persons, economic and financial assistance, technical cooperation and assistance, military aid and training, information, CIA operations, the overseas programs of Labor, Commerce, Agriculture and other departments and agencies, and those of private agencies and businesses. We have many agencies, projects, facilities and funds but they are too dispersed and undirected now.

2. The following suggestions cover these items:

(A) POLICY

Basic definitions and decisions.
Priorities among programs and countries.
Policy papers.
Authority for our Field Missions.
Diversified flexibility in operations.

(B) ORGANIZATION

Initial survey and idea group.
Intragovernmental clearance and decision.
Administrative arrangements for operating a political program.

(C) TOOLS

A directive to U.S. Agencies and Field Missions.
A syllabus on leadership in newly independent and less developed countries.
English language programs.
American and other technicians of a special competence.
United States-supported educational facilities overseas.
Military establishments.
Regional centers within the underdeveloped areas.
Advanced institutes in the United States and other free countries for the study of special development and problems.
Card file of leaders and technicians.
List and evaluation of projects and programs with high political content.
Special Washington institute for political orientation.
Special follow-up devices abroad.

3. *Policy:*

(a) The most urgent and abiding requirement is a high-level policy decision that the political aspects of aid programs in the underdeveloped areas will be the overriding priority. This decision is indispensable because many other considerations now overshadow political factors in the selection of projects and setting of priorities in all our overseas programs, with some exceptions. Unless there is a NSC directive or Cabinet-level decision binding the departments and agency heads, any attempt to move ahead with this program will be hobbled at lower levels.

(b) Secondly, we need a detailed formulation of what it is we are trying to do to get more political impact out of our training and other assistance programs. What do we mean by "political impact"? We need to establish feasible objectives, develop a workable method of priorities, and construct a system for relating requirements and resources on a political basis.

(c) Thirdly, we need several basic policy papers to outline the fundamental aspects of "political impact" and "leader growth". The draft "Program for Developing Leadership in Newly Independent Nations and Less Developed Areas" of July 1, 1957, is a stab in this direction in the problem of leadership. We also need to develop a roster of all the specific agencies and units dispersed throughout the U.S. Government here and abroad which touch upon overseas programs and training programs in some way. We need these papers in the first stage in order to determine what we can hope to accomplish before devoting time and energy to studying and creating proper organization and tools to do the job, even before the problem of financing and budgeting is examined.

(d) Fourthly, our Ambassadors should be immediately instructed to work on this problem without waiting the outcome of a study so that we could profit from their experience. If a program is put into effect, a policy decision is needed to give Ambassadors more authority and leeway in supervising, evaluating, and revising country programs.

(e) Fifthly, a policy decision is needed to diversify programing and operations according to regional and country variations.

4. *Organization:*

(a) *Initial preparatory arrangements.*—Assuming high-level sponsorship, we first need a hard-hitting, imaginative high level working group to do the preliminary job of sorting out the problem, preparing the various papers, assembling a roster of current facilities, and suggesting ways to handle this problem. Some

one person should be designated for a specific assignment for a definite period of time to head up a "brain-storming" operating and report to the Secretary or Under Secretary of State. He should be given an advisory committee made up of the ablest representatives available from the principal agencies and departments involved: Defense, ICA, CIA, USIA, and Labor. He should have the final responsibility and authority to issue the report himself. An interdepartmental product would be too watered down to be of much use. The purpose of the high-level advisory committee would be to develop interest and enthusiasm and to stimulate ideas in the government so that the agencies operating in this broad area would not feel neglected and would submit contributions to the problem. The terms of reference for this effort would have to be a carefully drafted letter from the Secretary of State, with the backing of the President if necessary, to request each interested agency to provide the State Department with a key person for this first stage and with a written summary of its organizations and facilities bearing upon the problem of political impact. In addition to official sources, the chairman of the task force should have the benefit of outside advice and consultation. A group representing foundations, universities, businesses, and other concerns should be brought together for their suggestions and ideas. The chairman would have to evaluate the quality of current facilities and draft or assemble the necessary recommendations and policy statements for a report. It might first be considered by the OCB. In view of the wide ramifications of this subject, it should then go to the Cabinet for each agency's consideration and final approval by the President. This preliminary group might form the nucleus for the transition to a permanent organization in order to ease the present operating agencies into a new frame of reference.

(b) *Permanent organizational arrangement.*—Since the Department of State should have over-all responsibility for developing, coordinating, and maintaining a political program, the permanent mechanism for this leadership and coordination should be in the State Department in Washington. I would strongly urge, despite the budget problem, a new "Assistant Secretary for Overseas Programs" to report to Mr. Dillon. He should also be a Deputy Director of ICA to provide dual coordination in the same fashion as economic counsellors in Embassies are deputies in USOM. Every effort should be made to keep the new office small. It would be *largely a coordinating function*, but it would also have some operations. On the operating end, I would put IES, U/MSA, a new Cultural Affairs unit and a new Political Evaluation unit. The first new unit would take care of the handling of foreigners here and the second would help the new Assistant Secretary run the program. The first two elements should be reorganized as seemed necessary, combining such functions and personnel existing in ICA and USIA as seemed desirable. On the coordinating end, I would suggest two types of liaison—within and without. The office should have one liaison officer each for military programs, information including the P area, CIA, other departments (Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.) and private American organizations. Outside the office, there should be an advisor attached to ARA, African Affairs, NEA, and FE to serve as a two-way link between the geographic bureaus and the central coordinating point on overseas programs. These area men would play a really significant role in bringing to bear the political background, suggestions, and assessments of the Assistant Secretaries, their Deputies, Office Directors, and *Desk Officers in particular*. To get the most political impact out of our programs we must depend on the geographic bureaus involved. These area advisers should live with the area and country specialists and maintain close relations with and the confidence of the geographic Assistant Secretary. In this way the area advisers could feed into the new Assistant Secretary the finished product of the geographic bureaus.

(c) *Advisory committees.*—The new Assistant Secretary should have the following advisory committees:

(1) A State Department group consisting of the appropriate Assistant Secretaries and chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Overseas Progress should meet periodically with the Secretary, the Under Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretaries to discuss the progress of the whole program.

(2) Interdepartmental advisory committee to consult with the new Assistant Secretary, help him coordinate and operate the program with the participating departments or agencies and develop the technique of matching requirements and capabilities in evaluating the progress of programs in terms of political impact and leader growth.

(3) A committee or panel of consultants drawn from the universities, foundations, businesses, and other private groups—a neglected source of ideas and talents.

(4) A Congressional panel or advisory group to maintain Congressional support for this program and to provide political ideas from practicing American politicians. This could be the standing committees or members thereof on Foreign Relations in the Senate and Foreign Affairs in the House.

(d) *Arrangements in field missions.*—In the field, Ambassadors should have a special assistant, perhaps a Cultural Affairs Officer, to help him carry out this program. In addition to the current deficiencies in Washington, our most woeful lack perhaps is in adequate follow-up over the years of students and technicians returned from the United States. This Embassy officer would maintain card files on returnees, supervise the continuity of contact by appropriate American personnel in the country, and coordinate the designation and selection of new potential leaders or persons to come to the U.S.A. or other suitable areas for instruction, training, or visits. Finally, this officer could also be charged with the function of coordinating a country team evaluation of political impact in our programs in that country.

5. *New tools:*

(a) *Doctrine.*—A syllabus or outline is needed to explain to everyone what this is all about. A general description of how programs can get optimum impact or produce leader growth is needed.

(b) *Directive.*—Such papers should form the basis for a single over-all *classified* instruction for use in all government agencies here and in the field.

(c) *Card files.*—On persons—every Embassy should keep a current roster of all persons in the country studying or visiting the U.S. and the follow-up contacts with those persons. Another card file might be on potential candidates among the university and junior professional groups who show aptitudes for leadership and key talents. A third card file would list and evaluate projects of actual or potential political impact. Duplicates would be kept and worked on in Washington. This is the kind of staff work at which the Russians and Communists excel.

(d) *English language.*—No greater handle for political benefit awaits our full grasp than a rapidly-expanding language program *everywhere* in the less developed area.

(e) *Special occupational technicians.*—We should try to train groups, large or small, of American or other national professional talents to visit, or live in key parts of the less developed world—rural specialists, veterinarians, doctors, teachers, retired managers or bankers, practically anything. Tax-free incomes would be a small price to pay to encourage the *right* people to contribute a couple of years to this effort. I remember an American veterinary who became a folk hero in a Chinese province twenty years ago.

(f) *U.S.-supported educational institutions.*—Out of these come the future leaders in many cases.

(g) *Military establishments.*—Best access to potential leadership may be via the services. In the less stable and less developed areas the officer corps and the military establishment may be the key *political* element. Our MAAGs can theoretically be of political importance.

(h) *Regional centers.*—These can cover many topics and bring the technicians and leaders together for mutual benefit.

(i) *U.S. advanced institutes.*—These could specialize in the particular problems top leaders face in their countries, thus increasing their competence for handling the problems and our facility for dealing with the leaders.

(j) *Special Washington Institute.*—Some course or center is needed, if anything like the above program is launched, to instruct our people here, and particularly those going overseas, of their individual role in these political programs. It should cover at least the key persons and their wives in all departments and agencies.

(k) *Special field follow-up.*—In addition to a special officer and card files, special associations should be organized and maintained—clubs, centers, etc., for Americans and returnees.

6. *Conclusion:*

I have not gone into the substance of objectives, programs, or projects necessary for this program. Much is already being done in this wide field. But un-

less it is pulled together the aid programs will miss many opportunities and may eventually lose support here and abroad.

Mr. YOUNG. Can there be a mutuality or compatibility between an Asian host government and the United States concerning the practice of political modernization? This is the complicated question we come to at the end.

The answer is neither entirely yes nor completely negative. It will depend upon the stage of development in each country, our aptitude for political development. In some cases we can have no program; in others, it will be compatible. In any event, no policy should be undertaken in a country unless there is a specific definition of mutual interests between the Asian government and Washington.

Therefore, I suggest that we look into the possibility of negotiating "modernization agreements"—and I use that phrase only for purposes of discussion—with other governments on the concrete kinds of advisory political assistance with escape clauses for nonperformance.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I welcome title IX of the 1966 Foreign Assistance Act as a first, good step in the right direction. But, speaking purely as a private citizen and taxpayer, I would urge going further down the road to enlarge and enrich the "training ground for leadership and democratic processes."

Asians have a capacity to manage their affairs themselves. They prefer self-government, they have proved that for several hundred years, if not much longer. For over 20 years they have proved their independence. Their nationalism is not in question. But it is no longer the cutting edge to solve dilemmas. Political viability is the issue, and managerial leadership the solution.

Let us help Asia where we are invited. And let us not not be penny-pinchers. The stakes are too high. Some prospects are so hopeful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Your statement is a very thought-provoking one. I am sure the administrative memorandum, the proposals that were made at the 20th session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia, as well as the memorandum on the leadership program that you have made available to the committee will be studied carefuly by the subcommittee and we will try to see why some of your proposals are not more carefully considered by the proper agencies in Government. Thank you very much for your statement.

Dr. Scalapino, if you will proceed, sir, and then the committee will direct questions to both witnesses.

(The biography of Dr. Scalapino follows:)

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

Born: Leavenworth, Kansas. October 19, 1919. Married: Three children. Education and research: Santa Barbara College, B.A., 1940, Harvard University, M.A., 1943; Ph.D., 1948. Carnegie Foundation Grant, 1951–53, Social Science Research Council Fellow, 1952–53, Ford Foundation Grant, 1955, Rockefeller Foundation Grant, 1956–59, 1961, Guggenheim Foundation Grant, 1965–66 Teaching experience: Lecturer, Santa Barbara College, 1940–41, Instructor, Harvard University, 1948–49, Assistant Professor, University of California, Berkeley, 1949–51; Associate Professor, 1951–56; Professor, 1956—. Guest lecturer: Chosen University, Seoul, Korea; University of Hong Kong; Santo Tomas Uni-

versity, Manila; University of Malaya; El Colegio de Mexico; Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda; and various Japanese universities.

Public and professional service: University of California, Berkeley: Member University of California Editorial Committee, 1954–57, Vice Chairman, Institute of International Studies, 1955–57, Member, Graduate Council, Academic Senate (Northern Division), 1958–59, Chairman, Group in Asian Studies, 1959–61, Vice Chairman, Department of Political Science, 1960–61, Chairman, Department of Political Science, 1962–65, Editor, Asian Survey, 1962—. Consultantships: Governmental Affairs Institute, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1956–57, Ford Foundation, 1958–61, The RAND Corporation, 1961—. Joint Committee on Contemporary China, Social Science Research Council, 1962—, Advisory Panel, Asia and the Pacific, United States Department of State, 1966—. Memberships: Governor, Institute of Current World Affairs, 1965 Board of Directors, Association for Asian Studies, 1960–63, Board of Trustees, World Affairs Council of Northern California, American Political Science Association, Western Political Science Association, Foreign Policy Association, Institute of Pacific Relations.

Travel: 1944–46—Pacific area: Okinawa, the Philippines, Japan, 1950—Japan, 1952–53—South and Southeast Asia, 1954—Indonesia, 1955—Japan, the Middle East, 1957–58—Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 1959—Southeast Asia, 1961–62—Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 1963–64—East Asia, Soviet Union, 1965–66—Mexico, Africa, Southeast Asia.

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STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Dr. SCALAPINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a privilege to be invited before this committee once again to discuss certain aspects of our Asian policy. Let me make it clear at the outset that I regard the future of Asia as a matter of utmost importance to the United States. As we move toward the 21st century, the Pacific Basin will become ever more intimately connected with our own peace and prosperity. Within two or three decades, the East Asian-Pacific region will be as significant in world affairs as the West Europe-Atlantic region has been during the 19th and 20th centuries.

Either we shall participate in the development of some political equilibrium in this vital area of which we are so much a part, or we shall face the rising probability of world war III. Either we shall make a commitment in concert with others to pursue more effective routes for Asian socioeconomic modernization, or we shall be forced to live amidst permanent crises. And these two challenges are closely connected, as every careful observer knows well.

Today, we are witnessing a resurgence of American isolationism, and a certain segment of our intellectuals now constitute the vanguard of that movement. This is not surprising. A sizable number of our intellectual community have always had their roots wholly in the West. For many of them, the world has consisted of Europe and certain parts of the Western Hemisphere.

Thus, however unconsciously, the 19th century lingers on in their conceptualization of international problems and policies. They cannot escape its cultural and political boundaries. It is characteristic of them, for example, to assert firmly that we cannot hope to understand Asia, cannot influence developments in Asia favorably, and hence should let events there take their natural course.

Such theses ignore almost everything that has happened in the past 30 years, and all that stands on the horizon. At present two Pacific neighbors, Canada and Japan, themselves extensively involved with other nations of the region, are our two leading trading partners. Their economic future and ours are closely connected.

And our economic relations with many other Pacific nations are rapidly expanding.

Cultural and intellectual ties with Asia have also grown enormously since World War II. Who among us has been untouched by these developments? And who among the Asians? Surely it is time to abandon the old-fashioned notion that Asia constitutes the "inscrutable East," and similar ethnocentric vestiges of the past.

Geography alone makes the Asian-Pacific region a key to global peace or war. It is precisely here that most major societies of the world—those of today and tomorrow—are brought into an increasingly intimate contact. The United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia all must be considered Asian-Pacific states.

All are legitimately concerned about the basic trends and especially the distribution of power within this region. The concept that any one of these states can or should establish hegemony over Asia as a whole, or any significant portion of it is simply untenable. The alternative to some balance of power is almost certainly massive conflict. And without a presence on our part at this particular stage of Asian development, no balance of power in Asia is conceivable. It is such elemental facts as these that must shape the broad outlines of our policy.

If the major premises of the isolationists are wrong, however, their position obtains extensive support from selective elements of American tradition and culture. Isolation, after all, represents a formidable part of our past. The protection afforded us by our geographic position before the advent of modern weapons, the challenge involved in developing a virgin continent, and the unique character of our nationbuilding process combined to produce in us a strong sense of self-sufficiency, a primary dedication to internal growth, and an ardent desire for minimal international responsibilities.

Repeatedly, we rejected opportunities to participate in the struggle to create some viable international order to be plunged into major war ourselves when international crisis had reached unmanageable proportions.

Prior to 1945, for example, our Asian policy was characterized by a reliance upon moral suasion alone, with the hope that utopian gestures like the Kellogg-Briand Antiwar Pact would somehow preserve world peace. When moral suasion, unsupported by any practical sanctions or system, failed, we faced the stark alternatives of withdrawal or total war.

Despite this recent legacy, however, one can understand why many Americans, given our political traditions, long for a return to the age when we mixed long periods of massive irresponsibility with short periods of total commitment for global salvation, bloody though the latter periods proved to be.

Indeed, the latter point deserves our closest scrutiny. Our tradition—indeed, our political culture as a whole—underwrites the general thesis of "All in or all out." We built a civilization, and a highly successful one, by placing a major premium upon such virtues as speed, efficiency and concentration—a maximum application of all our resources, human and physical.

It has been un-American to make partial commitments. Yet if there is a single indispensable element that will determine the effectiveness of our foreign policy today, and our success—even our survival—in the modern world, it is the capacity to develop and sustain incremental policies. By an incremental policy, I mean a policy with the maximum capacity for subtlety, differentiation and above all else, varied intensity of application.

We simply cannot treat international politics in Asia or elsewhere as a game in which we either participate at full strength or not at all. Rather, we must accept and cultivate levels of participation that range from mere availability to the most extensive commitment, with the precise level dependent upon a careful weighing of factors ranging from the objective facts about a given state or region to the symbolic significance of a given issue for the region as a whole.

It must be assumed that each major area of the world can and will have different priorities, and that these priorities will not remain static, but change with the passage of time and events. For a great variety of reasons, Europe had the highest priority for us in the era immediately following World War II, just as the Asian-Pacific region demands the highest priority today.

Similarly, within a region, it must be assumed that certain states or areas will acquire a critical significance sometimes out of proportion to what might seem their intrinsic importance if they were to be isolated or stand alone. Greece and West Berlin in broad terms played the role in Europe which Korea and Vietnam have been caused to play in Asia, not because of the areas themselves, but because of the broad regional issues involved and the context in which these particular crises emerged.

Nothing would be more shortsighted than to measure the question of commitment merely in terms of the isolated significance of a single state. And we must also operate on the assumption that to be forced to a position of either zero or one hundred on a policy continuum is to lose, since such positions provide the most limited maneuverability and the gravest risks.

These foreign policy requirements, in my opinion, spell out the greatest challenge posed to our political leaders today. Put simply, that challenge is to close the gap between their own increasing recognition of the urgent need for an incremental foreign policy and the continued commitment of many American citizens to a totalistic foreign policy, epitomized by the slogan "All in or all out."

The former policy is not without its underlying moral value and political goals, but it is essentially pragmatic, relativistic and developmental in character. The latter policy rests upon certain premises relating both to truth and efficiency that are deeply imbedded in our political culture; it is built upon an isolationist foundation, but a foundation made viable by the willingness to undertake periodically massive commitment providing it can be regarded as a temporary aberration and can be defined and defended in total physical and moral terms.

The gap between these two policies is not being closed. On the contrary, it may be widening. If the blame lies partly with political leadership, it also lies with some trenchant critics. The recent debate

over our foreign policy, for example, has done as much to obscure as to elucidate the major issue and the contending forces.

A long series of simple propositions have been advanced such as the thesis that we are engaged in an attempt to police the entire world, that we regard the struggle against communism as a holy war, and that we do not have interests in Asia sufficient to warrant major commitment in that region.

These themes do not advance us beyond the old isolationist arguments of three decades ago, and they bear scant relation to the real issues of our times. Our degree of commitment throughout the world today varies enormously both in degree and in type, and as it is rising in some areas, it is declining in others, as should be the case. However, the attempt of groups like the Maoists to force us to commit military forces in active combat simultaneously in various parts of the world has not succeeded up to date, constituting a failure that is certainly serious and may well be fatal to their basic tactics and strategy.

Meanwhile, our official policy has moved a long way from the thesis that communism is monolithic and requires a uniform policy of confrontation. In my opinion, we need to refine that policy much further, but the thesis that today the U.S. Government is committed to a holy war against communism is nonsense as even a casual survey of recent policies would indicate, including the proposed consular exchange treaty with the Soviet Union now before the Congress.

Such holy wars as are being conducted at present by Americans tend to be those of individuals armed with moral outrage against current policies and little disposed toward those whom they regard as totally wicked.

How can we move toward a more meaningful discussion of our alternatives in foreign policy, and particularly the fundamental question: How may we develop a more effective incremental policy, and one having greater support from the American people?

Surely such an effort must involve a much more precise study of the process of change in the non-Western World, for it is this world that will concern us most in the decades that lie ahead. It is not my purpose here to suggest that the answers to the critical questions are clear. At most, I hope to signal some of the basic factors involved in social change in Asia, and some of the problems that seem important enough to deserve maximum attention.

In the postcolonial societies of Asia, generally the first-generation leadership has been strongly ideological, deeply politicized and often capped by a man possessing certain charismatic qualities. The primary issue as conceived by this leadership has been political integration; the means, mass mobilization.

The premium upon nation-building in the political sense is understandable. Unless some measure of unity is achieved, an absense of law and order, and a lack of allegiance to central authority may jeopardize all other aspects of development. Thus, in the most generic sense, nation-building generally takes precedence over economic development, although in reality, these two forces are aways interactive in some degree.

If this stage of nation-building is relatively successful, it will succeed in controlling internal dissidence, instilling some sense of national consciousness in the younger generation, and achieving a

minimum of security against external forces. Each of these processes, however, is enormously complex, and none will be fully achieved.

The control of dissidence hinges not only upon administrative-military efficiency, but also upon the full range of internal policies and attitudes. Here, two problems are most acute: the widening urban-rural gap that almost inevitably develops as a concommitant of the modernization process, and the serious problems of relations among the multiple-ethnic groups who coexist in most new states.

If internal dissidence has its mass potential in the grievances of such groups as the peasants and the "hills peoples," however, that dissidence is seldom effective unless it acquires leadership from within the "westernized" urban element, particularly from the student-intellectual community.

Almost every new government has had problems with its student-intellectual community because on the one hand, it is not equipped to use them efficiently in the nation-building process and on the other hand, it is not prepared to allow them to play the role of social critics without substantial restrictions. The first fact stems from the lower priorities generally accorded economic development, and the inexpert or ideological manner in which it is handled. The latter fact relates to the legitimate concern of new governments over the techniques of the opposition, and the precarious basis upon which governmental survival rests.

It is crucial to realize that in the aftermath of independence, "national" politics in new states tends more than ever to be an urban—essentially a capitol city—phenomenon. The hinterland too frequently lies neglected sans funds and talent. Moreover, the use of nationalism as a weapon is at best partly successful. Its appeal is primarily to the political elite, especially the westernized, urban types. Elsewhere, among the peasantry, for example, nationalism depends strongly upon personalization in most emerging states. Hence, the movement is politically fragile. Premature death (Aung San of Burma comes to mind) or massive failure (the deep troubles of Mao and Sukarno) may drastically transform the political environment, with instability resulting no matter how extensive the organizational undergirding. Even where a father of the country completes his full lifespan with minimal problems, the succession period is likely to be a traumatic one.

At a certain point, some version of the "red versus expert" crisis is reached in every emerging society of our times, and it is often connected with the succession from first to second generation political elites. If the first generation elite tends toward strong ideological-political characteristics, the second or third generation elite is frequently more administrative than political, more pragmatic than ideological and more trained in and committed to tasks of social and economic engineering. Only with this latter group does the institutionalization of nationalism truly begin, and is the retreat from a cult of personality sounded.

At any earlier point, irrespective of precise institutional forms—the primary political principle in operation is one of tutelage, and the political style of the elite, together with its abilities and values, determines the character of the polity. Deeply rooted social and cultural institutions from the past remain as crucial elements in shap-

ing political behavior at all levels, but the new national political institutions, almost invariably borrowed from external sources, remain semiforeign, largely versions of a westernized urban elite, scarcely meaningful to the rural masses.

If this be the broadest pattern that has characterized sociopolitical evolution in Asia and in many other non-Western areas, what implications are contained for American policy? First, are not some distinctions in order between the opening stages of emergence, and later, more mature phases, particularly in situations where the "ideal" type of first generation leadership described above does in fact hold power? In such cases, I would submit that our policy should be dedicated to four basic principles.

First, we should establish and maintain our diplomatic presence in all states where the minimal requirements for international discourse are maintained, namely, where our diplomatic representatives are accorded the necessary protection and privileges. Only where this principle is violated should we consider nonrecognition, an action which eliminates our access and almost always has more adverse than beneficial political results.

Second, our economic and technical policies should be of two distinct types, with differences of scale and purpose kept clear. We should always be prepared for humanitarian or strictly political reasons to provide emergency or small-scale assistance of types related to sheer survival. Such assistance should be constantly scrutinized, however, especially if it appears to be blocking instead of abetting much-needed socioeconomic evolution. Our basic aid program, on the other hand, should be carefully developed on the basis of accelerating indigenous processes of growth, removing the barriers generally existent or imposed in new states during the first era after their birth. We can now identify the common problems of major importance: Gross social distortions affecting investment and production; excessive state controls and a hostility toward foreign investment; overemphasis upon industrialization and a lack of concern for agriculture; and destructive budgetary and fiscal policies.

In the broadest sense, our aid programs must operate to counter these tendencies and be forwarded only under conditions where indigenous cooperation can be obtained. This requires an adherence to quid pro quo policies, an insistence that aid produce certain economically desirable results and be directly related to the willingness of recipients to pursue programs mutually acceptable as economically sound. Our trade policies, moreover, should be interactive with our aid program rather than working at cross-purposes, as has often been the case in the past.

Above all, the basic philosophy governing American economic assistance should be that of encouraging new states to come abreast of the experiences and innovations of the last 20 years. It is essential to realize that we have scored more technical breakthroughs in such critical fields as population control, food production, and industrial improvements since 1945 than in the entire previous period of human history. The speed with which we as one leader of the advanced world can transmit these developments to emerging peoples and cause them to be accepted is likely to determine the question of whether we have peace or war, progress or disintegration in our lifetime.

Finally, with respect to economic policies, it should be our objective to emphasize the role of the American private sector in economic interaction, especially when the transition from the first to the second generation elite gets underway, with the realization that private enterprise can provide vital capital and technical training in many cases more effectively than any public source.

Our political and military policies toward Asia cannot be separated from the basic socioeconomic considerations outlined above. Our political interests in Asia are minimal but crucial: We want to see the development of a political equilibrium so that no major power will dominate a region that is inextricably connected with our own security and well-being. To that end, we want to contain Chinese expansion today, just as we wanted to contain Japanese expansion in the era after World War I, and we now recognize that moral suasion alone will never accomplish that goal. This basic goal, moreover, is shared by all, or almost all of the states of Asia including the Soviet Union.

In this connection it would be very unwise in my opinion to write China off as weak and insignificant merely because of the current internal troubles in that state. There is no doubt that China has and will continue to have for the foreseeable future important elements of weakness—in many respects, she will remain a backward nation for a considerable period of time. Thus there will continue to be a gap between her objectives and her capacity to achieve them. Those objectives broadly speaking are the removal of Western influence in Asia, the cultivation of a uniform Asia cast in her image, and the use of that Asia for purposes of Chinese global influence.

But if China must be considered weak vis-a-vis the United States or the Soviet Union, she is not weak vis-a-vis Thailand, Sikkim, Burma, or even India. And no nation that promises to have operational nuclear weapons within a few years, and a nuclear capacity that will affect our strategic planning within 10 or 15 years, can be written off as insignificant.

Thus one essential task in Asia is to provide some means of security for the emerging states both against old-fashioned aggression—the marching of armies across boundaries with flags flying—and neo-aggression, the externally directed or supported "war of national liberation" which is now central to Maoist strategy. That security can come in one of several forms: Bilateral agreements between the United States and those states most threatened; firm regional pacts among the Asian states, themselves, or among Asian and Western states, or broad international agreements underwriting nonalinement or neutralization, and providing concrete means for its enforcement.

No one of these approaches alone is likely to suffice, and each must be accompanied by the type of economic, political, and social programs that make possible internal stability and growth. At this stage, it is essential to maintain some bilateral agreements, but in the long run it is clear that Asians must take a greater role in their own defense, especially as the movement from the first to the second generational leadership occurs. Increasingly it will be in our interest to encourage both regional defense pacts in which a number of Asian states participate, and the effective neutralization of some areas. Moreover, we can safely and profitably make long-range agreements

now for the eventual termination of our major military bases in populous areas of the Far East.

If in 25 years we do not have an international system of security in East Asia, the United States cannot be expected to bear the military burdens alone. Thus, to establish some timetable now for a new military structure in which our role would be to provide a broad military umbrella based upon our mid-Pacific bases and our mobile units, with the Asian states themselves manning all facilities within their own territory, could do much to alleviate current political strains and signal clearly the basic character of the American military commitment of the future. Such agreements should be concluded immediately not merely in the Philippines as has taken place, but also in such areas as Okinawa, Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand.

In political terms, once again, the basic thrust of our policy should be one of interaction with the broad sweep of the Asian revolution. It is commonplace, of course, to say that we should support Asian nationalism—and it is also meaningless, unless some refinements of policy are specified. Clearly, nationalism comes in many forms and with many goals. Our determined opposition to the excesses of Chinese nationalism constitutes one form of support to the right of small Asian peoples to maintain their national identity.

Undoubtedly, the primary form of international interference in the internal affairs of other states in Asia will continue to be the externally aided "war of national liberation." What should be our basic position on this complex issue? There is some evidence to suggest that miscalculation on the part of the Communists regarding American intentions in the past contributed strongly both to the Korean and the Vietnamese conflicts. In each case, the Communists had good reason to believe that the United States would not become involved militarily even if external Communists intervened extensively. We should make every effort to prevent future Communist miscalculations. We should make it clear that our security agreements with Asian countries cover the type of neoaggression practiced by external Communists in Vietnam and Thailand, and threatened elsewhere. At the same time, we should also make it clear that purely internal political problems, including true civil wars, must be handled by the governments of the country involved without American troop support. The touchstone must be the question of external intervention.

As is well known, however, the political viability of these new states—and their capacity to resist external aggression—depends heavily upon internal political conditions. In this connection, our policies should seek to encourage two broad developments: In every possible way, we should seek to help—not merely unilaterally but through various regional and international organizations—with the effective training and utilization of the intellectual elite. Here, as in the purely economic sphere, the role of our private sector—in this case, our own intellectual community—can be indispensable. There should be a vast network of private intellectual contacts, and a dynamic new program of advanced training for which our institutions of higher learning take major responsibility. In no area could we do more to aid political stability and economic development with such minimal efforts.

At the same time, we should seek in a variety of ways to help reduce the urban-rural cleavage implicit in the modernization process.

Once, again, the American private sector can play an important function. Agrarian modernization does not proceed from any single reform or program. It is the product of a complex, interrelated series of activities which must be urged upon the political leadership of emerging societies, and for which external assistance can be exceedingly useful.

In conclusion, I would reiterate these basic points. First, our future is inextricably connected with that of the Asian-Pacific region, and the critical issue, therefore, is not whether we should assume some responsibilities in this region but how to make our efforts most effective and most interactive with other Asian-Pacific peoples.

Second, the problems of Asia will not succumb to any single line of attack, nor are there any simple, easily packaged solutions. Thus, we as a people must be prepared to live with complexity, and to realize the vital necessity of incremental policies.

Finally, we must operate at all times in the full recognition that there is a most intimate relation between the success of the internal modernization efforts of the various Asian states and the possibilities of regional stability and peace. Our interest clearly lies in the rapid emergence of viable Asian states, nations capable of assuming greater responsibility both for their internal development and for their own security.

Recent evidence suggests strongly that a quick transition from the heavy initial emphasis upon ideology and politicization to a greater stress upon pragmatic, problem-oriented policies abets such trends. And this transition in turn will be aided by our commitment and that of other advanced Pacific Basin states to place our priorities on the following basic concerns: The establishment of multiple security arrangements to protect states still in their embryonic, developmental stage: the training of and support for new technical elites, with a strong commitment also to the peasant problem, and top priority to population control, food production, and technical innovation making maximum use of the revolutionary discoveries of recent years.

At no point have I sought to suggest that the United States can or should undertake these various tasks alone. Indeed, it is as important to close the responsibility gap in Asia as it is to close the incremental-totalistic policy gap at home. It is only realistic, however, to accept the fact that in the transitional period that lies immediately ahead, many developments will depend upon our willingness not merely to make a commitment, but to assert leadership.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Scalapino, for a very excellent statement.

Gentlemen, you have very clearly urged that we must not retreat to isolationism. Contrary to previous testimony, you have stated that our presence as well as our assistance in Asia is vital to our national interest.

Very generally you deal with the scope of our assistance. I would like to ask you both for your expert opinion as to what extent U.S. assistance to Asia should be through multilateral channels? Also, what countries along with the United States should furnish this multilateral aid?

Ambassador Young.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I think the answer to that question can only be answered on a case-by-case basis, country by country, and sec-

tor by sector, and type by type of aid. Perhaps American aid in capital development in both industry and services through private enterprise as well as through government-to-government aid could be better transferred gradually or even rapidly to the multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the new Asian Development Bank, and private groups or consortiums of governments or private investors. In such a major problem as a rapid increase in food production, food grains in south and southeast Asia, there should be, and I think there perhaps can only be, an international effort to meet that crisis. The same may be true of the population control problem. When we come to the qualitative features of modernization, such as Dr. Scalapino and I have been talking about, bilateral relationships between the U.S. Government and the host government, or between a university or a private corporation could be best be handled on a bilateral basis rather than a multilateral.

I think we could specify these if you wanted to go into it in more detail, but that would be my immediate answer based on some experience.

I would also say that the U.S. Government, Americans in general, could develop more of the habit of transferring, turning over or sharing this very complex relationship of providing aid and technical assistance with other organizations. I think we have had the habit during the past 20 years sometimes of thinking that it is best if we do it rather than if somebody else does it. While we may know many of the answers, and we may have certain technological advances in this country, there are other countries in the world who, in specific cases like rural development, may have a direct experience more related to India or to Thailand or to Indonesia, the Philippines, than we have in the United States. That is, there is a reverse gap here which is I think necessary to emphasize. The technological advancement in agriculture, industry, education, or government is not easily transferable where the agent of change, the American Government official, the professor or the technical assistant is living in really a very difficult world. His tools, his terminology and terms of reference are hard to relate to a farmer, let's say, in a small village in Mindanao. That is where we should be looking for the equivalent in some other country who has a nearer personal experience through his own education and his own dealing and coping with these problems than the Americans. It is not a question always of intentions or of technical skills, but total background involved.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Could we have your views, Dr. Scalapino? As you know the President has suggested that 85 percent of U.S. development loans should be made through multilateral channels?

Dr. SCALAPINO. Mr. Chairman, I would be very reluctant to subscribe to a given and precise percentage. I feel very much as Ambassador Young does that the first important distinction to be made is a functional distinction. There are certain areas of development which can most profitably be dealt with in broad multilateral terms, simply because the existing agencies and mechanisms already exist. There are other areas where quite possibly a consortium of two, three, or four so-called advanced states can most satisfactorily work out arrangements. I personally would look toward the time when what I would call the advanced nations of the Pacific Basin would in and

of themselves take a greater collective responsibility for some of the emerging states. I think we are moving into a period, for example, when such States as Japan, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, to mention a few, having themselves vital interests in this region, could profitably move toward more collective thinking about how to aid and interact in aid.

But clearly there are other areas where either the mechanism of multilateralism is not available, or the very nature of the task does not make this possible. Some of these areas are vital. For example, turning to my own field, I would emphasize the enormous importance of training scholars and technicians in the more advanced social science methods of handling social problems. Some multilateralism can take place in this connection. But in certain fields of economics, for example, we are further advanced than most of the other nations of the world. It is our responsibility to share our knowledge. Consequently, I would always want to make a functional distinction. I would want to keep in mind the kind of priorities that advanced nations of the world are likely to assign to the Pacific Asian region. And I would want to see an attempt to expand all forms of assistance depending upon the nature of the problem.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Both of you gentlemen have in your presentation emphasized the need to develop the expertise that is necessary to cope with Asian development problems. Do you feel we have the time to develop the required expertise, and how much time do we have? Why haven't we employed our available expertise in the crucial area of Vietnam? Where have we failed in the rural reconstruction program in Vietnam?

It is a triple-barreled question. I understand. Dr. Scalapino.

Dr. SCALAPINO. We are witnessing in Indonesia at the present time the greatly accelerated use of some of the young technically trained personnel that did come out as products of earlier U.S. aid and assistance programs. While it is too early to pass judgment upon this, I think it is clear that where you can get a commitment on the part of the top political elite, young technically trained people can often be exceedingly valuable. The Indonesian experiment at the moment is important to watch to see whether the young economists, many of whom were trained in this country, can play the kind of role now for which they were equipped.

I also believe there is evidence elsewhere in Asia that our technical training program of elites has not been a total failure. On the contrary I would say that in many cases it has played a very vital role. Witness developments in Korea. Our major responsibilities in Japan in the postwar period bore fruit at an even earlier stage.

Naturally, there can be no uniform result, and there is no cause for blind optimism because unfortunately, some regimes are not equipped to use technically trained elites. Under those conditions, the rise of dissidents from the urban westernized sector of the society can be very pronounced and that dissidence can often take quite radical political forms. Thus, there has to be some interaction between the training process and the utilization process. This is precisely why I would hope that we could move toward quid pro quo programs. Also, we should increasingly train people that are already in positions

of importance or are scheduled to move into such positions rather than pursue undifferentiated training programs.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Young, do you think we have the time, and, if so, how much time do we have to develop these experts?

Mr. YOUNG. There are two time factors here. One is the critical urgency in areas of leadership. If enough leaders with capacity to manage affairs are not motivated, not in the job, then there will be certain kinds of breakdowns in some of these countries, either total national breakdown or in certain parts of it of an important nature.

On the other hand, when we are talking about the political modernization of the modern world, including the United States, we are talking about perhaps 50 to 100 years. Most of the students of political development and modernization take that as the fundamental premise, especially if you are talking about Asia, Latin America or Africa, that this is a 100-year process.

When you analyze the tasks that have to be undertaken and you assume a certain destination of modernization, if you define it in certain terms, it doesn't happen overnight. There is an immediate urgency in time, in a time sense for leadership to develop and emerge and take over, and second, it is going to take a long time to modernize. These are not necessarily in conflict.

In answer to your specific question, Mr. Chairman, if the immediate time is not used by the governments of the developing countries to maximize this younger generation for leadership, there will be serious difficulties leading to disintegration and even anarchy.

On the second question of why hasn't a training program developed, I think we have tended in the United States to emphasize too much technical training, for technicians. There is a difference between the technician and the leader. A leader can be technically trained, as Congressmen are as lawyers, but you also have a role to play as political leaders.

The farm expert, or the doctor, or the engineer may be technically trained, and there may be thousands of them coming out of graduate schools in Asia and the United States, but there are only a portion of those men and women who will lead others to a defined objective. I think this is where the training factor in the United States and elsewhere has been deficient.

On the other hand, I would say our military assistance programs in Asia have had the hyproduct effect because of the nature of the military organization of training for leadership, leadership in military terms, but leadership also of organizations. I think this is one of the reasons why the military organization in some countries has stepped into the vacuum of political power and political organization to prevent breakdown and chaos because there are men there from lieutenants to generals who know how to get things done, who know how to organize and lead.

I am not suggesting this is the panacea, that we want to militarize the world. I am just suggesting that at certain stages of political development over 25 years there is a lesson to be learned here which our other forms of aid have either ignored, not been interested in or not had the aptitude to develop; that is, this leadership and managerial capacity that I consider so important.

Third, with regard to Vietnam I think my answer frankly has to be "Yes." I don't think in the last 12 years since 1954 either the Government of Vietnam or the Government of the United States has succeeded in rural reconstruction or in leadership. For one thing, I don't think the younger people, the younger urban educated Vietnamese, have been given much chance.

I don't think they have been asked to be critics or participants in much of what has been going on there since 1954 or today. I think we may tend to make the mistake in Vietnam or other countries of putting in new agencies, of trying out new programs rather than upgrading the competence of the local village council, for example, the district official, the provincial governor, and so on through the normal processes of government administration, which, after all, the Vietnamese have had for several hundred years.

We are not dealing with countries that are politically or administratively upsophisticated in the traditional sense. When we go in with new programs and organizations and try to recruit and develop a whole new frame of reference and new ideology so to speak in political terms we may be undermining the fabric even though it is very disrupted in Vietnam due to some 25 years of war and 100 years of colonialism.

I think one of the things we have to look at very carefully and examine here is the relationship between the traditional patterns of government, particularly in the rural countryside in Asia, and what is new that can be introduced and absorbed in this traditional pattern.

It is the interaction between these two. It isn't one or the other. It isn't "All in or all out," that Dr. Scalapino is talking about. It is a more subtle interaction and this is why I think we need a great deal more research in the United States and also in the Asian countries on political development and particularly on this interaction, where values, institutions, customs, ways of making decisions, relating to people, the led to the leader; this is very different from country to country as well as from the United States to out there.

I think this is where in Vietnam we really haven't gotten down to the fundamental questions of analysis and then operation. We have always been doing things on a crash basis because it is a crisis.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Scalapino.

Dr. SCALAPINO. Some cautious optimism with respect to this problem might be warranted, looking at Asia as a whole. The first great task after World War II was to get political elites at the top willing to deal with economic and technical problems realistically.

As I suggested, as long as disorder was rampant throughout the region, as long as the need to try to bring groups of people together in some kind of nation-state structure was paramount, a very heavy emphasis upon ideology and statism was natural although this emphasis often coexisted paradoxically with a commitment to Western parliamentarianism. Western-style democracy, however, was not capable of being made operational in most cases, given the objective circumstances.

Managerial elements—whether in government or the private sector—tended to be weak, both technically and politically. In the last 5 to 10 years, however, we have begun to witness an increasing cognizance on the part of top political elites in Asia that nationalization

and total statism is not the answer to economic development. With the rising respect accorded mixed economies, moreover, has come an increasing concern over technical problems and technically trained elites.

In Asia, there now exists a pool of people trained abroad, not merely American trainees, but citizens trained in many parts of the world—individuals equipped to perform efficiently in the modernization process, whether via government or the private sector. Such individuals, moreover, affect the time factor to which you made reference because once basic training has been acquired, a 6-, 9-, or 18-month "refresher" program can bring the individual up to date and can make a major contribution.

The long-range modernization program, as Ambassador Young has said, will stretch over 100 years. But short-term training and technical programs that relate to such matters as fiscal and budgetary management or many other immediate problems do not necessarily take years. Often, with some reservoir of trained personnel available they can be accomplished in months.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I want to thank both of you gentlemen for your expert and very valuable testimony. Mr. Chairman, I won't ask any questions, but I would like to state, without necessarily implying blanket endorsement of what these gentlemen have said, that attending the hearing this morning has been a little like descending from the Tower of Babel and sitting at the feet of Solomon and Gamaliel.

I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Ambassador Reischauer yesterday said to the committee that one of the differences between the committee and him was that he had a great deal more confidence in Asia and its resources to develop than we displayed in our questioning.

Certainly one of the primary points that he made in his testimony was that our policy should be marked by a certain restraint, that initiative should come from the Asian nations themselves. I would like to have both of you, if you would, comment on that point of view.

Mr. YOUNG. I don't want to seem to be in total disagreement with Ambassador Reischauer, my former teacher in Chinese. I think my emphasis is different, and perhaps this is a disagreement and it is well to get it out on the table in the democratic process of the United States.

I think I have degrees of confidence and lack of confidence as I indicated in my statement. I think on the one hand, looking at the Asian nations broadly speaking, I am concerned about the possibility of breakdown, of the lack of competent leadership and a competent capacity to govern, to meet these very, very major problems that are on the horizon looking at the next 20 years.

It is this fear or danger of disintegration from minorities, from excessive population, from the lack of food, from the inability to meet the demands of modernization that makes me feel not optimistic—not discouraged, not despairing, but not encouraged in the sense that if we do follow a policy of restraint it is all going to sort of work out. I don't think it will work out. I think that is a massive problem which requires massive help and cooperation—subtle, sophisticated—

from everybody concerned. It is a world problem as well as an American problem.

Mr. HAMILTON. If I may interject, the Ambassador's objection here is that if we are too aggressive, that if we take the initiative the Asians will very much resent it. How do you respond to that?

Mr. YOUNG. I would agree in general terms that we cannot seem to be meddling or playing kingmaker to do it our way and everything will turn out all right. I would agree with Ambassador Reischauer in that respect. That is why I emphasize the basic matter of decision from the smallest to the largest part must be left up to the Asian, that the only thing we can do is take an initiative in suggesting. This I think is quite proper and desirable today, where we are invited, and where there is a compatible relationship.

As you know, there are some countries in Asia where we have no compatibility, and we are not invited in, and in fact, we are not wanted. There is this situation in countries where we have a good relationship but where we must be extremely careful of their sensibilities, where we have to show tact, humility, and as I said, low visibility. That does not exclude in my judgment a policy of making initiatives as suggestions. It is up to us, I think, to take an opportunity to help where we are asked to. But it is up to them to dispose and to make the decisions. I think that to me is the difference. It is a subtle one. It is very much as Professor Scalapino said, incremental.

It is neither all or nothing. Just because we can't develop this kind of an administrative institution in a country, they say no, and then we fold up and back out and go home peeved, and say to the Department of State or a congressional committee, we can't work there because they don't agree with us: this isn't the point.

I think the point is one of give and take between equals. I would go one step further in this respect and say that I would take the initiative of having Americans and others work for governments and institutions in these countries and not work as advisers to them. The more we can "Peace Corps" this relationship, where a volunteer works under a doctor, a principal of a high school or a government official, whatever it may be, the more we can do that in the aid field, in the business field, in the educational field, the better.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much.

Dr. Scalapino, would you like to comment on that?

Dr. SCALAPINO. Yes; thank you Congressman Hamilton. I think it is important to make a distinction between style and commitment. If one is talking about restraint in the style with which one operates, then I am strongly in favor of such a concept.

I think we are all aware, and particularly those of us who have worked in Asia, of how important style is, of how essential it is to interact with different cultures cognizant of the fact that frequently, the symbolism of given words or attitudes is different and general methods of operation are also different. On the one hand, we have an obligation to effect positions and postures that are neither artificial nor false. We cannot—and we should not—obscure the fact that we are Americans. On the other hand, we must never cease to cultivate a sensitivity to other people's cultures and perspectives.

However, let me make it very clear that I think it would be wrong and dangerous if the concept of restraint I have just outlined were

used to minimize or depreciate the stakes that we have in the future of Asia—its relationship to our own security and to our own development—and hence, our responsibilities, as related to our national interest.

Whenever restraint is offered as a kind of neoisolationist formula, I react adversely. Moreover, I do believe at this point that it is important to reduce the excessive wringing of hands—the spirit of which has been so very pronounced in Western liberal circles recently. We have been guilty of many errors—both of omission and of commission—but not nearly so many as some current prophets of gloom and doom would have you believe. Some individuals are now prepared to assert that we really cannot do anything in Asia very well—so we had better not try—a false and dangerous position. Let us acknowledge that there is much about Asia that we do not yet understand and that the need to probe more deeply and more scientifically into many problems and culture variations will continue to be very important. But let us also make clear that there is much about Asian culture in its complex aspects that the Asians themselves do not understand and will understand more quickly only if the advanced world pools some of its resources and knowledge with theirs, and let us not minimize the extraordinary advances we have made in some areas of understanding over the past 20 years.

I think is it vital to keep in mind that there are certain programs, and certain needs of the moment which will only be met if we assume some degree of responsibility and leadership.

It is well and good to talk about allowing initiatives to flow from everywhere, but our power, our affluence, our role in the world dictates some leadership from us. If we shun leadership on the score that we don't know enough, that we aren't ready, a vacuum will result which in turn will lead to much graver problems than those resulting from our making some mistakes in the course of exercising initiative. Have we forgotten already the path from Manchukuo to Pearl Harbor?

I would very much prefer therefore that we put the emphasis upon the need to be cognizant of the sensitivities of others and shun the sort of commitments that are going to spell out their cultural differences, but that this not lead us into a misguided inferiority complex or provide us with an excuse for not doing what it is in our own interests to do. The difference between peace or another global war could well be involved.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Congressman, could I add two quick points to that. In terms of style, I would agree that we can take the same position that Professor Scalapino has suggested as to a style where restraint, subtlety, and tact are needed and as to commitment, where a definitive position is essential in Asia, where there is no doubt that it is to our interest and we are involved in that sense.

But there are two realities which determine the degree of initiative. One reality is the fact that the Americans, the U.S. Government and society, and all our institutions, are respondents to requests for initiatives, advice, as well as aid and capital, all sorts of things. I think we can judge the situation regarding the interaction of whether they take the initiative or we do, by the number of inquiries and requests and officials and others coming to the United States or asking in all

areas of our culture for advice, counsel, experience, sharing, of whether to do it this way or that way, on quite an equal basis.

In other words, we are not in the position of sort of going out to Asia. It is the other way around. I think at this stage anyway we should recognize the reality with a good deal of humility, that we are being asked for many, many things in these terms.

Secondly, it is my experience, as I said, that Americans blend fairly well in these countries as individuals when they have something worthwhile and needed to do. I don't want to go overboard and sound jingoistic, that we have all the answers and are perfect. I do feel from what I have seen in the past 20 years or more in Asia, that Americans do have something as individuals to offer.

In some cases our style, while different and new, is what is most wanted and needed and accepted. It is the newness as well as the way in which we go about things as individuals. As I say, sometimes when we get grouped and massed together, we don't always put such a good picture in front of the Asians. That is perfectly true.

There are individual Americans who can upset years of effort by disrespectful, insincere, blundering and blustering ways, but this is really a personal matter. Anybody who is respectful is bound to have a good hearing.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, as a member of the full committee, but not a member of this subcommittee, that I have followed with a great deal of interest the outstanding work which you and your subcommittee have performed in the Far Eastern area. You have made a significant contribution to understanding at the congressional level, the executive level, and for all Americans, with your hearings in recent years on the Sino-Soviet conflict, U.S. foreign policy in Asia, and these hearings on rural institutional development in the Far East.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On behalf of the subcommittee and myself, I want to thank our esteemed colleague from Florida. I might say for my part I am only emulating the fine example he has set in the highly regarded hearings before his own Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.

Mr. FASCELL. As to the witnesses, let me say I have found them stimulating, refreshing, lucid and pragmatic.

By way of preface to a couple of questions, let me say another subcommittee of the full committee, International Organizations and Movements, has concerned itself for some time in the broad range of some of the matters here, covering the whole aspect of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the nonmilitary, noneconomic area. I agree with you, Ambassador Young, that political development has been the orphan of U.S. foreign policy.

This has concerned us in hearings over a period of 5 years in trying to understand exactly what it is we are doing, what structures we have, what we haven't done and what we could do better.

The specifics which both of you gentlemen have related to this particular area are some ideas we need in order to make advances. We have been very much concerned about coordination of U.S. policy

among all the instrumentalities that now exist, both governmental and nongovernmental. Coordination is a nice pat phrase. The question is how do you really accomplish it. We talk about emphasizing the utility of the private sector in all areas of world development.

But how do you get your own Government to do anything about it or to coordinate it effectively? Is it just going to be haphazard?

Mr. YOUNG. You may have put your finger on the way it will develop, the haphazard way, a combustion sort of thing. This may be the way it has to work out, because of the enormity of trying to get a focus on some sort of coordinated approach to the aspects of political development.

I may have been rash and premature in saying we should focus rather than go in pieces, all over the place. I am not going to give up the hope anyway, and the effort, that until we try to rescue this orphan from the obscurity that such committee has been concerned about over these many years, that until we know it is impossible to coordinate or to relate in some way the private and the governmental, at least within the U.S. Government, to relate the political aspects of all the aid programs which the Congress and the American people are supporting, we should continue trying to do it.

It may take several years before several formulas that are pragmatic come about within the U.S. Government. I would think the first place to start, Mr. Congressman, is in the official coordination and then, secondly, in relationships with private organizations which have some bearing in political development.

For example, when a new industry or a new company is formed in any developing country, immediately there is a need for leadership of that group, just to produce the product. This doesn't mean that that company gets involved in politics. But it does mean that the environment for leadership, organization, and for decisionmaking is expanded slightly.

I think it is possible to analyze, country by country, the possibilities, the kind of facilities which would enlarge the community of leadership and enlarge and enrich the leadership requirement in modern terms for planning, for making decisions and the followthrough for results, whether it is a small company, a cooperative, a village council, a private organization, or the Cabinet of the Government itself.

Dr. SCALAPINO. I have been encouraged, Congressman Fascell, by what may be a first step; namely, the formation of informal groups of scholars coming together with both State Department and AID representatives. There is the possibility now of considering long-range problems, not just immediate crises, on a more or less continuous basis. I regard this as very healthy and very promising—especially since private scholars and public officials can discuss these matters in depth together. In this fashion, the beginnings of joint policy thinking have begun. I think that as people think together, they begin to devise programs and long-range perspectives of meaning.

Mr. FASCELL. I would certainly agree with both of you gentlemen. I want to say that I am not frustrated, either. I look forward to accomplishment of some kind of coordination. There are first steps. In the field, for example, as the ambassador well knows, coordination with the business community varies from place to place. Yet need for cooperation with the business community is obvious.

Our subcommittee examined the issue of coordination with the voluntary agencies and among them. We were surprised to find out that little or no knowledge existed on the overall programs of the voluntary agencies abroad. Several studies now, however, have been conducted and made available to AID. There is now some kind of interaction. At least there is the opportunity to see what is being done by the voluntary agencies and a chance exists to mesh private business impact with what the voluntary agencies are doing and our own aid programs.

If the ambassador in a particular area has the desire and has the stimulation from the Department of State, perhaps this knowledge has some value. I agree with Ambassador Young it has to start at the top or it will not get to the bottom within our own structure.

This raises this question: If the Department of State and all its personnel out in the field see themselves simply as the conduit for the implementation of previously made foreign policy and don't see themselves as activists in the field of rural development, political activity, formulation of local institutional devices, where are we? Is this going to be up to AID? Are we going to provide some new instrumentality? If an ambassador doesn't get the signal from Washington because Washington doesn't see the necessity for sending that signal to the field, who is going to do what has been suggested here?

Dr. SCALAPINO. I would comment very briefly. I think you have raised an enormously important question. As we all know, jurisdictional problems in the field are often at the root of some of our difficulties in effectuating ideas and programs.

It seems to me that at least in the broadest sense the initiative does have to come from the Department, because it is here that policy will be made in broad terms. At the same time, there has to be a reverse and an interactive flow. People in the field have to think of themselves as innovators, constantly aware of things that cannot be seen from Washington's perspective, pushing for new programs and better devices. At the same time the ultimate decisions, the determination of the broad programs ultimately must be made in Washington where coordination is possible.

Interaction between field and the Department is as critical, it seems to me, as the interaction between some of us in the private sector, whether it be the intellectual private sector or economic private sector and Washington.

We, too, going into the field come back and try to present certain ideas. In the past, we have not had really effective interaction between the private sectors and the policymakers in the Government, in my opinion. The gap between the American intellectual community and government has been quite a substantial one.

Mr. FASCELL. We have been very much concerned about that, of course. I have suggested, along with others, that perhaps a starting point would be to get the academic community—I am thinking now of particularly the behavioral and social sciences—in a White House conference with Government personnel to discuss, to resolve or to close the gap that now exists between the professional, the academician and the Government officer in order to best meet the military and civilian needs of the Government.

Mr. YOUNG. We are doing that in southeast Asia with the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group which is just with AID and

some members of the State Department sitting in on it, too. We are trying to do this in a very quiet, pragmatic and careful way, because the interests of the U.S. Government are involved, and AID in southeast Asia, the Mekong and northeast Thailand. But also the position of the scholar is very important to safeguard. What we have to do is try to find the right mix so that the dialog, discussion and the research, the questions regarding development, political and social and economic in southeast Asia, are put together in a way that does not hurt the Government's interest, nor the scholar's interest. I think we are doing it.

We have had a year and a half of experience now with some hundred scholars and the AID people and some foundation people in this one area. So that we are beginning to make some headway there in terms of research, advice, and a clearinghouse, so that everybody involved in southeast Asia in the academic community and government knows each other.

This hasn't happened, despite the fact that you have been putting in billions of dollars in southeast Asia since 1950, but it was not until 1965 that many of us, because of this intellectual gap, felt we just couldn't go on any longer. The professors felt this, the AID people felt it, and some of us who have been on the operational side felt it.

So we have now the beginnings. I would just say the beginnings, and maybe a year from now we will be able to tell you a little bit more of the results.

Mr. FASCELL. I am delighted to hear that, Ambassador Young. We on the Foreign Affairs Committee are just modest enough to take some credit for pushing that along in the right direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Scalapino, I understand that you agree with Ambassador Young that political development has been the orphan of American policy; is that so?

Dr. SCALAPINO. In broad terms, yes, I would agree.

Mr. FRASER. My question that I want to ask centers around this question.

We have demonstrated a rather marked incapacity in Vietnam in the political development field. This is my judgment. I would just cite one or two illustrations: About 1964 we put two AID mission directors in Vietnam in succession each with totally conflicting philosophies as to where you begin to develop the process; begin out of Saigon and work down: or in the rural areas and work up. In other words we had no philosophy, no working hypothesis. We had the experience in 1962 and 1963 that despite our rather substantial involvement there, we didn't know what was happening. The highest officials in the U.S. Government were saying we were winning, when in fact we were losing: an enormous gap of comprehension existed which never has been explained.

There is also the fact that even the elections that were scheduled for the constituent assembly elections were not a product, so far as I can determine, of U.S. understanding or initiative, but really were precipitated by the problem created by the Buddhist sect. This is one reason I think that many people want to be a little reserved about

our capabilities to be helpful in countries when their own internal fabric has disintegrated to the point where they seem to be unable to handle these things themselves. You seem to be quite confident that we can and should pick all of this up and move speedily ahead. You say we should involve the elites in the development process. This reminds me of the possibility that sometime another country might have said to the United States, "Well, you ought to do something about your Negro problem."

Take the problem of land tenure. Lipservice is paid to it. The fact that nothing ever happens bears in my opinion a striking resemblance to civil rights in the United States, where both political parties paid lipservice to it for years, and nothing happened until the Negro got organized and demanded it.

I don't have the sense that you appear to recognize as much as I think you ought to our own lack of insights and understanding of the difficulty of changing attitudes, and our difficulty in intervening in ways that will be useful to the people involved. I would like to have you comment on it.

Dr. SCALAPINO. Let me start by saying that I think some very considerable help was given to us in understanding at least certain facets of our Negro problem by a distinguished Swedish social scientist, Mr. Myrdal. The type of aid he gave us was not insignificant, in helping the professional and academic community to move toward new positions on this problem. Political motivations at the grassroots level, to be sure, came from different sources.

So even we can benefit from foreigu advice and aid and assistance.

Mr. FRASER. We did nothing for more than a decade after he wrote his book.

Dr. SCALAPINO. The germination of new ideas and approaches at elitist levels was a necessary precursor to some aspect of the civil rights movement that took place. A society cannot take intelligent action upon critical and complex political issues unless it receives many stimuli from various quarters within that society. Nor do I regard 10 years as a long period of time measured against the dimensions of the problem and the course of the change.

With respect to your basic question, however, I would emphasize that my position is one of cautious optimism. I can see, and I think all of us can see a number of errors, a number of shortcomings in our past and present policies, and the enormous complexity of the problem that we face. But a little historic perspective here might also be useful. Most of the advanced states, in my opinion, did not begin to take seriously the problems of economic or political development in the non-Western World until after World War II, a brief 20 years ago. In fields like economics, for example, the dominant economic theories were those of Keynesism, with its particular applicability to advanced societies. Only Marxism—turned on its head—had a certain utility as theory for Asia until recently. The American literature on political development that is now coming forth from our academic community is almost entirely a product of the last 5 to 7 years.

Mr. FRASER. Could I interject there. One of the studies made by some political scientists at the University of Minnesota of various societies, and they went back for a century or so, led to the conclusion that it was those governments that aimed least in the direction of plan-

ning, those governments that had the least centralized government, that progressed most rapidly.

Dr. SCALAPINO. My major point, Congressman——

Mr. FRASER. Everything you are saying suggests an input through a central government in planning, involving the elite, and what I am saying is that at least some studies are beginning to suggest that historically this central direction has been least productive.

Dr. SCALAPINO. I think this is often the case. This is one reason why I suggested in my prepared statement that the initial emphasis which was so strong in extensive emphasis upon statism and a totally planned structure is giving away in many emerging societies to new ideas of how economic development takes place. I think this trend is very prominent now in the Asian world.

My major thrust was to suggest that we have had a relatively short period of real theoretical concern and empirical work dealing with the problems of development in the non-Western World. I personally think we have learned quite a lot in the last 10 or 15 years, even if you look at it in the broader perspective. I can remember when a Secretary of State thought that neutralism was immoral. I can remember a period when we had a philosophy of "roll back" for the Communist world and regarded Communism as a monolithic force with only one rigid set of responses. I can remember a whole range of political positions which I think we have refined, and, if I may say so, sophisticated over a period of just about one decade.

I think that the progress we are making now in the technical understanding of some of the alternatives and specifics of development will also be amazing to the readers of the next decade.

In short, without minimizing the problems and without minimizing the deficiencies I think it would be tragic if at this point we went back into some kind of retreatism.

Mr. FRASER. We ought to assess more accurately our capabilities. One of the most dangerous things to do is overestimate our capabilities and lead us into situations where we find ourselves such as in Vietnam, with a half-million troops and no prospect of an end. Those I have talked to in Vietnam say that on the political side, the nonmilitary side, at least, one has to deal in 5-, 10-, 15-year periods, but that obviously is just a hunch. We have been quite unsuccessful for 13 years at that level.

Dr. SCALAPINO. Our efforts in Korea which have now stretched over about 15 years seem to me to indicate that the capacity for development lies even in societies that have been badly fractured by Communist aggression and other problems. Vietnam is a test in some measure of the patience of the American people. It is also a test of their capacity to accept and defend incremental policies. It seems to me unmistakably clear that our decision to maintain a presence in southeast Asia has made the most extraordinary difference to the broad political-economic situation in Asia in the last 24 months.

Mr. FRASER. You would, I suppose, attribute the Indonesian turnaround to the American presence in Vietnam?

Dr. SCALAPINO. Not directly. However, I think it is clear that if communism had seemed the wave of the future in continental southeast Asia, and if the regimes throughout this region had been succumbing in the same fashion, for example, as Sihanouk succumbed

to the thesis that the United States was finished in this area, and that an accommodation with Peking had to be made, the Indonesian elites would not have had some special immunity to the trend. Surely both the timing and the course of the broad political developments there would have been affected.

In other words, the political events in Indonesia were not a direct result of our southeast Asia commitment but the entire balance of power in this region is wholly dependent upon our policies—and that includes Indonesia's future at least as much as her past.

Mr. FRASER. I am running out of time. I would like to comment that my own view of the matter is that if we understood with more accuracy, with more precision, the ways in which we could be helpful to some of these societies in working out their so-called political modernization, that then we would know where we could be useful to these societies. But we have not learned even to look carefully at this capacity, and evaluate it carefully. In Thailand today I am told—I don't like to say anything about people that I don't know—that our AID mission director is very much an economist, economist oriented, and if this is so, then I asume that Thailand is traveling essentially the same road that we have traveled in Vietnam, with a lack of sensitivity to the ways in which we can be usefully involved in these societies. It is when some of us are concerned about understanding our capabilities more accurately and thus want a little more caution, not withdrawal of American power, but a more perceptive understanding of our role, that some of us are lumped into the neo-isolationist group. The polarization of this dialog does not seem to me to be helpful. It is an urgent matter, not only in southeast Asia, but to Latin America as well, to learn how we can help these communities other than through economic aid, which doesn't seem to be a very useful way of proceeding.

Mr. YOUNG. You mentioned Thailand. There you have a government that is concerned about administration and government. They have had a long experience in meeting their internal and external problems for several hundred years. I would think that one of the ways we could learn more about this problem of modernization and our role there would be in countries like Thailand. I think they do have skills. They have problems to meet, of course, but their sensitivity to efficiency and effectiveness of integrating the country together, modernizing, is very high. There is an intensity there. It can develop in all senses from the Thai point of view. We have not mentioned Japan today. There is a history of the past 100 years of political and economic and social modernization which today is a kind of economic miracle starting from 1945.

One of the things that we could do, Congressman Fraser, is look at and study some of the effective areas of development in Asia, to know what the problems are and how they are coped with in given country terms, and then discover from that where our input or our expertise needs to be improved on.

I do think in the last 10 years we have done a good deal of analysis of development in the broadcast sense in Asia and other countries, so we are beginning to see the scope and outlines of political modernization and also do it on a country basis.

There are many studies for many of the countries in Asia. We need many more. In terms of the U.S. Government, if you want to develop this capacity in a prudent way, to do something that you know you can carry through on and not start something that you can't carry through on, I agree this is the point.

Do we have the expertise, the capability? There are research studies and books by Americans, Asians, and non-Americans that are beginning to develop the technology of modernization in intellectual terms. So looking ahead 20 years, we are in a much better position in this field of political development than we were 17 years ago, in 1950, when the whole AID program in Asia started. This is what gives me a certain amount of cautious optimism, if we organize it.

Mr. FRASER. My concern is there is no agency of Government whose primary application is to absorb this research, record these experiences, synthesize it, and apply it in operational terms.

I don't think we have moved to meet that gap at all in the terms that we must do if we are going to be effective.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The gentleman's time has expired. However, I might point out that the witnesses we will have tomorrow, because of their experience, will also be able to respond to this line of questioning. I am sure we can develop these points more fully if you come to the 2 o'clock meeting tomorrow.

Mr. Tunney.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Chairman, do we still have the time?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We will continue on until we must leave.

Mr. TUNNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had a question with respect to a part of your statement, Dr. Scalapino, on page 6. You said our trade policies should be interactive with our AID program, rather than working at cross-purposes as has often been the case in the past.

Would you care to identify some of the areas where it has been working at cross-purposes? I am particularly interested in your thinking of whether or not the United States in combination with other countries, other developed countries, should perhaps work toward guaranteeing a profit for primary products.

Dr. SCALAPINO. I very much had that in mind, Congressman Tunney. I think there are a range of areas where cooperation among the advanced states, and particularly those in the Pacific basin, could underwrite some of the trade needs of the nondeveloped or developing states with respect to primary materials, giving them a degree of viability that would make sense, in the long run, from the standpoint of our own trade interests, and that would be a substitute for or an interaction with AID programs.

If we cling to protectionism and refuse to explore all of the new opportunities now available, once again we are working at cross-purposes with our technical assistance program.

Mr. TUNNEY. Should we do this unilaterally, if we can't get cooperation with the Common Market, for instance?

Dr. SCALAPINO. In some areas I think we should. I think this is a technical problem and needs to be broken down in ways that I cannot do here. It is my belief that in some areas we can and should move unilaterally if we cannot get cooperation.

Mr. TUNNEY. It is my understanding that it is the position of our Government—and correct me if I am wrong—that we should not pursue a course of the guaranteeing of profit for primary products produced in underdeveloped areas of the world. Perhaps Mr. Young could answer this. I have never been able to understand this, Mr. Ambassador. Do you have a comment on that? Am I correct in my assumption?

Mr. YOUNG. Could you repeat the assumption?

Mr. TUNNEY. The assumption is that our Government has pursued a policy of opposition to the guaranteeing of profit for primary products produced in underdeveloped areas of the world.

Mr. YOUNG. I think that is correct.

As I understand it, the reason is that it is the desire to let the marketplace determine the price, supply, and demand, and not to set up quota structures and bureaucratic organization of the international flow of primary products, and that, hopefully, in the marketplace the producers will receive enough return for their sale of rice or tin or coffee, whatever it may be, to develop not only the foreign exchange that they need in their governments, but to also pay the farmer who is the first producer of this.

I don't think it works out that way in practice, because it is an extraordinarily complex international economy that is working by spontaneous motivation, rather than controlled planned motivation.

The only answer, an optimum solution for everybody concerned, is a superagency that can factor all of the variables in the international economy so that everybody comes out with a little bit of something, enough to be satisfied.

I think this raises such a bureaucratic world organization to meet the problem, given the status of world relationships, that it probably is impractical.

On the other hand, there may be ways in which we could move further into protecting the fluctuations in price for the primary producers, because of the political requirements of the economies, depending on one crop or two crops, that the price of that crop determines political stability in effect; rice, coffee, rubber.

It will take 15 to 20 years to diversify those economies where they will not be so dependent on that one crop. I would say during this phase the consumer countries of the primary products, the Western European countries and the United States and Canada and the Soviet Union, too, could well afford to be more flexible in some sort of guarantee of a price, if it can be worked out without this superbureaucratic mechanism.

I think we just haven't devised the formula, haven't used all the intelligence and imagination that is available among economists, Government officials, and the private sector to do so, so that these countries, particularly in the tropical parts of the world, would not be victims of these sudden rises and sudden depressions in the price of their primary product.

There is another factor here, too. I don't think we have really explored the impact on the mass of the population of the international price system, if a higher price went to the Thai producer of the rice, or to the rubber planter who cuts the tree, not to the middleman in be-

tween, or to the coffee or tea producer. These, in many countries, are very poor people. These are the people we are talking about who live in poverty. It is not much, but it is a matter of $5 or $10, per person. This would help in political stability, modernization, and the whole building up. It is rare that you read a book or a Government memo or an official statement on this problem of the price system and the profit of the international commodity that goes to this dimension, the social and political dimension, of the international system.

Mr. TUNNEY. It seems of concern to me that so many people outside of the Government have been writing about the great necessity of trying to establish some kind of machine to bring this about, and yet from what I have been able to interpret from our Government policy, we are working against it at the Government level. This is distressing to me. We know in certain areas we have done this to a very limited degree: in our sugar quotas, for example.

I don't know why we can't do it in other areas: do you?

Mr. YOUNG. No.

Dr. SCALAPINO. There is a very good study, Congressman, that has just come out, sponsored by the Brookings Institute, that deals with this problem and takes much the view that we have been taking here. I would hope it is brought to the attention of the people in our Government.

Mr. TUNNEY. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There are many questions we have that remain to be asked. I have just one for each of you gentlemen before we will have to go to the floor.

Dr. Scalapino, in your statement, in referring to the development of the emerging society, you say that at a certain point some version of the "Red versus expert" crisis is reached, usually connected with the succession from first- to second-generation political elites. You state that if the first-generation elite tends toward strong ideological-political characteristics, the second- or third-generation elite is frequently more administrative than political, more pragmatic than ideological, and more trained in and committed to tasks of social and economic engineering.

I assume this observation, likewise, is to Red China?

Dr. SCALAPINO. I personally believe that one of the critical issues of a substantive nature in Communist China underlying the present crisis is the argument over economic policy and planning. Broadly speaking, the argument is between those who would like to see an increase in economic incentives, an increase in what might be called "economism," and those who continue to think primarily in primativist terms, believing that the regime can use hortatory, ideological appeals based upon sacrifice for the party and state to induce production. This kind of crisis, in my opinion, emerges ultimately in both Communist and non-Communist states, as a concomitant of development.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You go on to say that our policy, therefore, should be dedicated to four basic principles: First, we should establish and maintain our diplomatic presence in all states where the minimal requirements for international discourse are maintained. Granting that

a more pragmatic government were involved in China, would you advocate that the United States initiate the establishment of a presence or diplomatic relations in Red China?

Dr. SCALAPINO. At some point in the future, Congressman Zablocki, it seems to me imperative that we come into a more complicated relationship both bilaterally and multilaterally with the government that has de facto control over 750 million people on the mainland of China. It has always been my belief that the measure of a sophisticated American foreign policy is one that complicates the decisionmaking process of a totalitarian state. That means causing such a state to be involved in the range of issues with which any major society must be involved, issues that range all the way from nuclear weapon control and disarmament to a great many issues that pertain to the region itself, including issues of the definition and protection of boundaries and the maintenance of some regional security system. It is wise to assume that if we can reach a point where we are involving the Chinese Communists in such discussions—in the decisionmaking processes of this sort—the movement toward Chinese moderation will not have been retarded and it may have been abetted.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would you care to venture a guess as to when we might reach the point where we can deal with Communist China?

Dr. SCALAPINO. It seems to me very hazardous to talk of this with any assurance in terms of years. I personally incline toward the view that Mao, or the Maoists, may win this battle, but they are going to lose the war. That is to say——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It appears they may have even lost the battle. They are retreating.

Dr. SCALAPINO. The situation is very confused. It is likely to remain so in the coming weeks. There is no question that they have precipitated a crisis beyond what I suspect was their desire in this situation, and in the final analysis primativism is going to give way to various forms of professionalism, whether it be under military aegis in Communist China or under civilian party leadership.

I would suspect that within 5 years we shall have seen almost all of the old first generation Bolsheviks who have led communism in China for 30 years pass from the scene, whether peacefully or violently. We shall have seen a transitional generation come into power. This transitional generation may not initially be more moderate. It, too, may carry on a relatively fierce ideological struggle for a time, but I think that we can talk fruitfully about the 5- to 10-year period ahead as one in which the premiums upon technical modernization in China will continuously force new technically and administratively oriented groups upward in the power structure.

I want to make it clear that this type is not without danger to us. Its very efficiency and commitment to certain organizational models may create problems for the rest of Asia. But it is not, it seems to me, the same kind of elite, and it does not pose the same type of problems that the Leninists posed in contradistinction to types like Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would like to direct my next question to Ambassador Young, and to pursue the questions of my colleagues as

to what we have learned in our years of efforts and activities in southeast Asia and I would like to ask you Mr. Ambassador, specifically what have we learned from Thailand? After all, we have had a rural development program in Thailand for years. Now we are accelerating our rural program in Thailand.

When you were Ambassador to Thailand didn't the United States have a rural development program in the northeast? If they did, what did we learn from it? Did it differ materially from the accelerated rural development program of today, and if so, in what respect?

And third, as the U.S. Ambassador, did you attempt to encourage the Central Government to do more for the rural population during your tenure as Ambassador?

Mr. YOUNG. Regarding Thailand, I think we all have learned quite a lot about the impact of economic and political development. For one thing, I think we have learned that roadbuilding, large roads as well as small roads, has many consequences, economic as well as political. It is a major factor in the modernization or opening up of rural areas. I don't think this was so clearly known 5 or 10 years ago. Roads were looked at in terms of (a) security and military operations, or (b) in a sort of gross sense of modernization. If you didn't have a national highway system, you weren't a modern state.

But now in Thailand, in the northeast, the north and even in the south, I think we have data, the Thai Government has data and so do other countries and international agencies that the opening of a road induces economic and social development, change, resettlement, modernization of many kinds, some of it rather incalculable, but on the whole beneficial.

I think we have learned that communications, I said, by radio as well as by road and television has an impact in Thailand and other countries, too.

As to your first question about rural development, I think the stress of the American aid program since 1960 or 1961, certainly while I was in Thailand, was rurally directed. The political development, economic development, and security development which we put together as an American approach to aid in Thailand, and to dovetail with the Thai Government's plans on their initiative, was oriented toward northeast Thailand, north Thailand and the south, that is toward the rural, toward the village. There we learned, I think, that it is a complicated process to help the rural participation, the rural motivation, the rural election, what I call rural resurgency, that you can't go in and do it from the top down, that the villager doesn't identify either with the foreigner or with his own government official until there is a psychological gap closed so that trust and sympathy and sincerity are exchanged on both sides, between the official from Bangkok or Saigon and the village leader or the people in the community.

This takes several years to develop. You can't build it overnight. It may take 3 years to build a small road, but it will take longer to develop this trust. The gap is important to work on even though it may take time, in the long sense, as to your original question on time.

As to the second question, accelerated rural development was conceived beginning in 1962 and 1963 and worked out in collaboration with the Government of Thailand in a give and take exchange of some disagreements and some agreements on its scope, its timing, its administration, and its programs.

This was an innovation in the technique of historical Thai development of centralization of government which is traditional and decentralization, which to some extent is modern, not entirely, because modern states tend to centralize in every respect. But here is a case of an experiment with the decentralization of decisionmaking at the local level and the formulation and carrying out of small projects like small dams or fish ponds or roads or village development.

I think while this is not finished and the verdict on its efficiency and capacity and value is still to be determined by the Thai Government and by our mission there, it is one of the very hopeful aspects of political, economic, and social development that is integrated at the local level with a given number of villages involved.

Your third question, Did I coerce or influence the Royal Government of Thailand to be more rural minded? I would say I hope I did nothing to coerce anybody outside of the U.S. mission in Bangkok, and there I suppose coercion is always the option of the Ambassador. He has to make decisions and he has to order and instruct the Embassy, the AID mission, or the military mission or the information mission, or what have you, to do certain things. If he is backed by Washington. as ambassadors sometimes are, in fact very often are, then the change in emphasis to rural development could and did take place in Thailand. So that it is the basic thrust of U.S. Government policy there.

With respect to the Government of Thailand, I come back to my fifth point in my opening statement of mutuality and compatibility. This is one of the neogtiations, of understanding, of talking back and forth, waiting, letting the process develop so that there is a compatibility. There is no element of coercion or influence. But here one must put trust in personal relationships, in the worthwhileness of your proposals and in developing a mutual understanding of what the objectives are, and then the requirements for carrying out the program. If the government doesn't feel it is desirable, the foreign government, in this case the Thai Government, it will not take place.

Therefore, the U.S. Government or the Ambassador has no further case to make, except to wait or turn to something else. In the case of the Thai Government, I think there was such a concern about the development of the country as a whole, because of the Thai tradition of self-reliance, of independence, of a national sense which I think is very strong in Thailand. It was really a matter of working out the programs, not so much the value of the programs.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No questions.

Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. On behalf of the subcommittee, and myself, I want to thank both of you gentlemen for coming here today. With your splendid statements you have contributed considerably to the commit-

tee's understanding of how our Government can more effectively assist in the political, economic, and social development in the rural areas of Asia.

At this time I want to again announce that the committee will meet tomorrow at 2 p.m., to hear Dr. Gayl D. Ness, Dr. Robert Tilman, and Dr. Samuel Huntington, all of whom have been very active in the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group.

Thank you, gentlemen.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, March 2, 1967.)