RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1967

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will come to order.

We continue today the subcommittee's hearings concerning rural political, social, and economic development in southeast Asia.

Our witnesses today are uniquely qualified to testify on these matters. Not only have they achieved outstanding reputations in their professional fields, but they are deeply involved in the Southeast Asian Development Group (SEADAG). This group, formed on the initiative of AID, includes American academic experts from the Rockefeller, Ford, and Asia Foundations, Education and World Affairs, the Rand Corp., as well as AID, State, and other government officials with specialized interests and responsibilities in the area.

The prime purpose of AID in launching the SEADAG and its related research program in the words of former AID Administrator Bell, "is to acquire the better understanding of social institutions, people and human motivations so necessary for better planning and execution of technical assistance." I applaud the objectives of this group and before these hearing are concluded, I am sure all of us will want to hear more about its program and accomplishments.

Dr. Tilman is chairman of the Political Development Seminar: Dr. Huntington is chairman of the Vietnam Seminar; and Dr. Ness is chairman of the Rural Development Seminar.

I think it would be well to insert the biographical sketches of these gentlemen in the record at the appropriate place.

Each of our witnesses has a prepared statement.

Questioning will be under the 5-minute rule. Let us start with Dr. Tilman.

You may proceed, sir.

(The biography of Dr. Tilman follows:)

VITA—ROBERT O. TILMAN

Personal: Born, July 21, 1929, Caruthersville, Missouri: married, December 19, 1954, to Jo Huddleston (no children): United States Army, 1951–1954.

Education: B.A. (Memphis State University), 1957; M.A. (Duke University), 1959; Ph.D. (Duke University), 1961; Army Language School (Chinese), 1951–1952; NSA Language School (Korean), 1954–55.

Languages: Chinese Mandarin (read, write, speak—fair/good); Malay/Indonesian (read, write, speak—poor); Korean (read—fair/poor); French (read—fair/poor).

Career history: Intelligence Research Analyst, National Security Agency, 1954–56, Executive Secretary, Commonwealth Studies center, Duke, 1960–62, Assistant Professor, Tulane University, 1962–65, Assistant Professor, Yale University, 1965—, Director of Undergraduate Studies, Southeast Asia, 1965—, Director of Graduate Studies, Southeast Asia, 1966—.

Professional memberships, etc.: Member, Southeast Asia Committee, Association for Asian Studies, 1964—, Chairman, Southeast Asia Committee, Association for Asian Studies, 1965—, Member, Executive Committee, Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, Agency for International Development, 1965—, Executive Committee, Malaysia Council, Asia Society, 1965—, Southeast Asia Editor, *Journal of Asian Studies*, 1965—, American Political Science Association, 1958—, Southern Political Science Association, 1964—, American Society for Public Administration, Comparative Administration Group, ASPA, Vice-Chairman, Southeast Asia Program Committee, XXVII International Congress of Orientalists (1967).

Fellowships, honors, etc.; Phi Beta Kappa; James B. Duke Fellow (pre-doctoral), 1958–59; Social Science Research Council Fellow (pre-doctoral), 1959–60; Commonwealth Fellow (pre-doctoral), 1960–61; Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies (post-doctoral), 1964; Fellow of the American Society of International Law (post-doctoral), 1963; NDEA Fellowship (post-doctoral), 1966.

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"The Alliance Pattern in Malaysian Politics: Bornean Variations on a Theme." *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. LXIII, No. 1 (Winter 1964), pp. 60–74. "The Indonesian Threat and the Growth of a Malaysian Nation." Paper presented at the 16th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., March, 1964. "The Sarawak Political Scene," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No. 4 (Winter 1964–65), pp. 412–525. "The Socialization of the Chinese into Palaysian Politics," in Robert Sakai, ed., *Studies on Asia*, 1960, in press. "Bureaucratic Development in Malaya," in Ralph Braibanti, ed., *Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1966. "The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency." *Asian Survey*, Vol. VI, No. 8 (August 1966), pp. 407–419. [A Danish translation by the Oversisk Institut, Copenhagen, appeared in *Den ny Verden*, and a condensed version appeared in English, Portuguese and Spanish in *Military Review*, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas] "Education and Political Development in Malaysia," in Lndo Rocher, ed., *Education et developpement dans le sud-est de l'Asie.* Brussels: Institut de Sociologie de l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles, in press. "Integration and Disintegration in Malaysia: The Case of Singapore." Paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1966. "Malaysian Foreign Policy: The Dilemmas of a Committed Neutral," in John Montgomery, ed., *Public Policy*, in press. "Political Forces in Malaysia," *Asia*, in press. *Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia* (edited volume of readings under contract to Praeger scheduled for publication in 1968).

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT O. TILMAN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE UNIVERSITY

Dr. TILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you and the members of the committee for having invited me to appear here. This is an important subject with which we should all be concerned these days. I think that it is a very favorable indication of interest that this committee has undertaken to consider this particular subject.

Before I begin I would like to disavow any real expertise on local government in the several southeast Asian states. There simply are not a large number of southeast Asia local government specialists today. Those of us who have spent time in southeast Asia have of necessity looked at some aspects of local government, but there are few people who have specialized in it. I too am one who has been interested in some of the problems, but I have not devoted my major research thrust to the question of local politics and government.

POLITICAL CHANGE IN RURAL SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

INTRODUCTION

Title IX of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1966, which outlines general goals concerning the utilization of democratic institutions in aid-receiving underdeveloped countries, recognizes a feature of U.S. foreign aid policy that had previously been more implicit than explicit. Prior to this act there had, of course, been identifiable political development doctrines and principles in our foreign assistance programs and individual AID officers had held implicit or explicit views on the subject.[1] However, despite the generality and brevity of title IX and its susceptibility to varying interpretations, our political development goals are now somewhat more clearly defined. For better or worse, the United States seems to be moving in the direction of consciously trying to export political development at the local level, just as we have tried with varying degrees of success to export economic development to Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the years since the Second World War. With the increased attention now being paid to "political development" in American foreign aid, it seems an appropriate time to examine this elusive concept, to probe some of our own presuppositions, to raise a few warning signals, and to suggest some fruitful leads for marrying knowledge and action for the benefit of all concerned.

THE AMBIGUITIES OF "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT"

Although the term is widely used (and not infrequently abused) there is unhappily little agreement on the content of the concept of "political development." At one extreme it may be used to describe a process whereby every political system seems historically destined to move toward the approximation of our own (or some related Anglo-Saxon variant of our own), a usage of the term that comes uncom-

[1] See Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program," World Politics, XVIII (January 1966), pp. 194–235.

fortably close to the 19th-century idea of progress as a manifestation of social evolution. At the other extreme it may simply imply the emergence of a political system that is capable of maintaining itself in power over a reasonably long period of time, and in this sense a "developed" policy is one that is "stable," regardless of the nature of the government itself. Between these two extremes lie a plethora of interpretations, some with a slightly different focus which emphasizes the shift from purely local loyalties to the awareness of larger "national" ties on the part of the common people of the country.[2]

Although such a fact may be discomforting, we must begin by accepting that scholars and practitioners alike do not agree on the exact political character of a "developed" state, however inviting the catchy term "political development" may be. It is for this reason that one can assess "development" (and on the other side of the coin, "decay" [3]) only within the framework of his own value commitments. Outside this framework it is more realistic and more analytically useful to speak of political "change," rather than political "development."

THE RATIONALE FOR OUR CONCERN WITH POLITICAL CHANGE

Despite the warnings and reservations I shall voice later, I think that the U.S. Government is justified in its growing concern about the political content of its assistance programs. Leaving aside for the moment the superficial attractiveness of spawning foreign governmental institutions in our own image (which I shall later argue is often undesirable), no U.S. aid program can ignore the political environment of the host country. Planning economic development in a sterilized vacuum may be a satisfying academic experience for some theoretical economists, but it is of diminished utility in the real world of the practitioners of economic development.[4] Presuming that our foreign aid programs stem from a basic desire to further our own long-range national interests, it should be our wish to see the emergence in the new states of viable governments, undoubtedly of greatly differing forms, devoted to increasing human productivity, raising standards of living, and lifting the minimum floor of general human welfare. This is partially a political matter and one with which we must inevitably be concerned.

THE CONFUSION OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE

In a brief but enlightening article in a recent journal for interested generalists an anthropologist with considerable research experience in rural Thailand has recorded a revealing example of the confusion of form and substance in a social welfare program in the isolated underdeveloped villages of Chiengkhan in northern Thailand. In a com-

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[2] For brief discussions of the content of the concept, see *ibid.*, pp. 195–205; Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII (April 1965), pp. 386–393; and Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966), ch. II.

[3] Huntington, op. cit., has employed this term to describe the process of "retro-development."

[4] The National Planning Association's economic projections for Malaysia, unfortunately, were obsolete almost on the day of completion. Although the volumes contained much valuable data and useful analysis the withdrawal of Singapore for purely political reasons prior to the publication greatly diminished the value of this lengthy study as a whole. In this case it is doubtful that many political scientists could have warned NPA of the danger of a split, but it does serve to point up the necessity of taking political contingencies into account.

mentary on the ethos of rural life in this suddenly interesting region Michael Moerman describes several episodes involving community development work, projects that apparently were espoused by United Nations, AID, and Bangkok officials. One of these projects involved the construction of sanitary toilets in the countryside, despite the fact that it was costly and perhaps less hygenic in that area than was the traditional practice of using the nearby jungles, where adequate space and frequent rainstorms reduced health hazards to a minimum. Although almost everyone attending the village community development meetings, where this and other projects were discussed, felt such proposals to be ludicrous (in fact, everyone, including the presiding district officer seemed to get great enjoyment out of these proposals), it was, nevertheless, concluded that some concrete toilets of the type specified should be built. Such a program was necessary because, first, senior officials of the Ministry had ordered that they should be built, and, secondly, if they did not build some of these visting Westerners and Bangkok officials would look down on the people of Chiengkhan as country bumpkins. In other words, considerations of traditional hierarchy and a desire not to appear backward in the eyes of outsiders dictated the construction (but not the use) of at least a few concrete toilets along the main road where such facilities would be most conspicuous.[5]

The obvious point in this digression is that in rural southeast Asia we must be sensitized to the difference between form and substance, whether it might be in toilets or politics. By dogmatically insisting on the adoption of our own familiar political structures, which may be completely out of tune with local realities, we run the risk of constructing the political equivalent of the concrete toilet in northern Thailand, useful as symbols of "progress" but having little meaning within the context of the daily life of the average southeast Asian villager. If AID political development programs seek to introduce the praphernalia of American politics simply because we happen to have found these useful in our own environment, or perhaps because we revere them as symbols ourselves, then our efforts will at best be fruitless and at worst they will be counterproductive of the desired results. If we concern ourselves with the substance—that is, with encouraging political changes that contribute to raising standards of human existence—our tasks will be far more difficult, but the rewards will likely be infinitely greater.

THE PROBLEM OF STABILITY AND CHANGE

There are probably few today who would deny that U.S. foreign policy faces a perplexing dilemma on the question of stability versus change in southeast Asia. Our national interests, at least in the short run, seem to dictate political stability and economic development, but economic development is itself likely to contribute as much to political instability as to political stability. The most stable political system imaginable undoubtedly would be one built on a great illiterate mass peasant base and ruled by a single hardheaded, calculating, benevolent despot, who had the foresight and the tools to construct

[5] Michael Moerman, "Western Culture and the Thai Way of Life," Asia, No. 1 (spring 1964), 31–50, especially pages 36–37.

institutional safeguards against the growth of literacy and the intrusion of foreign ideas. Yet such stability, even if it were possible, goes against the grain of American idealism, to say nothing of its failure to provide markets for manufactured goods and surplus capital. Moreover, in a world of growing interdependence and shrinking lines of communication it is not possible to build such institutional safeguards into a system. Change is therefore inevitable, and it becomes the task of U.S. policy to influence the nature of this change so far as possible rather than trying to contain it.

A Peace Corps volunteer teaching English at a Sabah Chinese School, an agricultural extension worker introducing corn to West Java, or even a community development worker supervising toilet construction in rural Thailand—all of these are introducing some changes into the countryside, and, though each will meet with a different degree of success, each is contributing to instability in a very real sense. A new awareness on the part of the individual that he somehow now has more control over his own destiny than he previously thought possible creates a new demand on government, and such new demands may eventually threaten the stability of the existing regime. It is not inevitable, however, that such instability must lead to violent upheaval though this is indeed a possibility.

The most attractive alternative course of political change, which threads a path between political stagnation and violent revolution, might be labeled dynamic stability, for such a system has the capacity to adjust to new demands without breaking down. The U.S. Government can do little to engineer overt political change in underdeveloped countries, but it can, and in my view it should, be better prepared to counsel and to assist aid-receiving governments in their attempts to cope with the new demands generated by foreign assistance programs and other forms of alien influence. The proffering of advice is already the principle as well as the practice, but we ourselves are too ill prepared to offer sound counsel. The fact is that we know painfully little about the intended and unintended consequences of induced social and economic changes, and without this kind of information counseling is a hazardous undertaking. It is in this area of our foreign aid endeavors that the scholar seems to have much to offer.

THE TWO WORLDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

The worlds of the scholar and the bureaucrat, though similar in some respects, are different in many important ways. Although academic routine has become increasingly frenzied, the scholar still enjoys the luxury of time to research his subject in depth and reflect on his findings in a manner that is seldom if ever available to the government official. Even in cases where the bureaucrat has undertaken academic training similar to that of the scholar the pressures of meeting day-to-day deadlines in Washington and the field force the man of action to make many decisions on the basis of incomplete information. On the other hand, the scholar, insulated from the pressure of making immediate decisions, is in danger of falling into the trap of hypothesizing in a never-never land that is cut off from the real world. Logic seems to dictate that the two worlds should be mutually reinforcing, that scholars and bureaucrats should somehow work together in a happy sym-

biosis. Many thoughtful persons in each of the two worlds have devoted considerable effort to effecting this symbiosis, and I do not intend to stray off here into a discussion of the broader problem. Rather, I shall restrict myself to the considerably more limited subject of cooperation and mutual exchanges between social scientists and AID at the level of field operations in southeast Asia.

It seems to me that one of the most pressing needs at this time is for microstudies of political change, both international and unintentional. Roads, radios, health services, fertilizer factories—all of these are primarily social and economic, but they all are likely to have unintended political consequences. Moreover, if these consequences can be predicted, such technology could be employed for specific political purposes, or at least the host government could be forewarned about the probable political implications of such innovations. The point is that a great deal has to be known about the environment and about the political impact of modern technology in a traditional setting. This does not, of course, rule out the necessity of making guesses and taking risks, but it does, at least, reduce the possibility of gross error.

My own impression, gained chiefly from discussions with AID officials in this country, is that AID has not had sufficient opportunity to take stock of the political impact of many of its operations in southeast Asia. There are many programs now complete and many that have been going on for a sufficiently long period of time that some evaluation of the political spinoff is possible. It would seem to me that many of these might now be examined in a rigorous analytical manner in an effort to learn whatever lessons they might contain about political change. If political goals were incorporated into the programs the researcher should try to find to what extent these were realized, to what extent they were not, or perhaps to what extent the goals themselves underwent a change in the process. If the program goals were primarily economic or social the researcher would need to learn how the resulting changes affected political structures and political behavior. Only if equipped with this kind of knowledge can AID provide reliable counsel to existing governments which are faced with new political demands and to U.S. policymakers who must make difficult decisions about the allocation of limited resources to assistance programs in southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

The political stability imposed on southeast Asia by the European powers in the 19th and 20th centuries was in a sense unreal and unnatural. Southeast Asia had always been a political backwater under the general hegemony of China (*pax Sinica* would be a better description) in which each of the numerous tribal states were almost constantly at odds with one of their neighbors or even with themselves. Southeast Asia is no longer in the backwater, China is not at full strength and besides she now has competition, and the European powers are no longer in a position to impose an artificial stability. The period of decolonization has seemed troubled thus far, but the chances are that things will get worse before they get better. The present political boundaries of southeast Asia are largely products

of the colonial era, and they bear little relation to the natural configurations of southeast Asia—geographic, cultural, ethnic, or linguistic. In some states of southeast Asia the revolutionary elites have passed from the scene, in some the process goes on today, and in some it has not yet occurred. In both domestic and international politics the next quarter-century, and perhaps longer, will be marked by instability more than by stability.

While the political struggles of southeast Asia will be dramatic, the most profound changes in the area hopefully will be social and economic. The fact is, however deflating it may be to the ego of the political scientist, that at the present time we, the political scientists, should be willing to take a back seat to the economist in planning AID programs. This does not mean that economists can ignore the advice and warnings of political scientists, but it does mean that foreign aid should be aimed more at economic and social than at political goals. There is no well defined end to political development, and we are not on very firm ground when we attempt to engineer political change without knowing something about the logical end of the process. Economists at least know that they wish to maximize productivity and raise the standards of human welfare. Political scientists should be available to give advice on the political consequences of their enterprises and to make suggestions about how to cope with the new demands thus created. Political scientists, however, should not be expected to provide a formula for creating the ideal political system, and American aid programs should not try to impose such a system on any recipient of U.S. aid.

There are, of course, many who do not share my views. This attitude will be particularly distasteful to those who hold as an act of faith that the maximization of individual liberty must be the primary goal of all development programs. There may, of course, still be an area of agreement. If the maximization of individual liberty means a conviction that individuals in a modernizing state will eventually begin to demand an increased voice in decisions made by the political elite, or perhaps demand admission to elite status themselves, then I am in full agreement, though this, too, is an act of faith on my own part. If, on the other hand, this means that everyone in southeast Asia wants to look and act like us at this particular point in history, then I cannot agree. We may force southeast Asian states to accept constitutions, parties, elections, and all the trappings of American politics, but all of this will be a hollow shell until the paraphernalia "fits" the existential situation. And, of course, there is always the disturbing possibility that it never will.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Tilman.

Dr. Huntington.

(The biography of Dr. Huntington follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF DR. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Samuel P. Huntington is Professor of Government at Harvard University and a Faculty Member of the Center for International Affairs there. Born on April 18, 1927, in New York City, he received his B.A. from Yale University in 1946, his M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1949, and his Ph.D from Harvard in 1951. He taught at Harvard from 1950 through 1958, and then was Associate Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University 1959 to 1962, when he returned to his present position at Harvard. He has been a Research Associate of the Brookings Institution, a Faculty Fellow of the Social

Science Research Council and has lectured at numerous civilian universities and at the war colleges. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute of Strategic Studies and the American Political Science Association. He is chairman of the Vietnam Seminar of the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group. He has also been a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Navy, the Institute for Defense Analyses and other organizations. His publications include: *The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Harvard University Press, 1957); *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (Columbia University Press, 1961); Editor, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (The Free Press, 1962); and co-author of *Political Power: USA/USSR* (Viking Press, 1964). Articles by him have appeared in numerous scholarly journals and journals of opinion, including *Foreign Affairs, Daedalus, World Politics*, the *National Observer*, *Yale Law Journal*, the *American Political Science Review*, and the *Journal of International Affairs*.

STATEMENT OF DR. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. HUNTINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Like Dr. Tilman, I very much appreciate the opportunity to meet here with the committee. Like Dr. Tilman, also, I have to disqualify myself. He disqualified himself as an expert on local government in southeast Asia. Let me disqualify myself as an expert on southeast Asia in general.

Unlike either of the gentlemen on either side of me, I am not a specialist in southeast Asia. I have visited the area, but my primary concern has been with the more general relationships between political development and economic development and social change in modernizing countries in general, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Consequently, I can speak to the interests of the committee only as someone with this more general topical concern, rather than with any sort of area expertise.

1. DECLINE IN POLITICAL STABILITY

In his speech in Montreal last May, Secretary of Defense McNamara called attention to one of the more alarming trends in world politics. This is the increasing tendency towards violence and instability in those large areas of the world in Asia, Africa, and Latin America which are undergoing rapid social and economic change. At the beginning of 1958, the Secretary pointed out, there were 23 prolonged insurgencies going on in the world: at the beginning of 1966, there were 40. In 1958 there were a total of 34 significant outbreaks of violence throughout the world: in 1965 there were 58. The "years that lie ahead for the nations in the southern half of the world," he warned, "are pregnant with violence." I think all of us would have to agree with the Secretary's analysis. All too often the history of these countries after World War II has been characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of authority

by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete disintegration of more broadly based political parties.

In the two decades after World War II, successful coups d'etat occurred in 17 of 20 Latin American countries (only Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay maintaining constitutional processes), in half a dozen north African and middle eastern states (Algeria, Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, Iraq, Turkey), in a like number of west African and central African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Central African Republic, Congo), and in a variety of Asian societies (Pakistan, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, South Korea).

Revolutionary violence, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare wracked Cuba, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic in Latin America, Algeria, and Yemen in the Middle East, and Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Malaya, and Laos in Asia.

Racial, tribal, or communal violence or tension disrupted Guyana, Morocco, Iraq, Nigeria, Uganda, the Congo, Burundi, the Sudan, Ruanda, Cyprus, Ceylon, Burma, Laos, and South Vietnam.

The past 6 months have witnessed the collapse of 15 years of stable rule under Communist auspices in China; the past few weeks suggest that the 20 years of stable democratic rule which made India the great exception to the prevailing pattern of instability may well be drawing to a close. Throughout Asia Africa, and Latin America, there has been a decline in political order, an undermining of the authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy of government. Not political development but political decay has dominated the scene.

II. THE GAP IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

This trend toward violence and instability in the third world is obviously of major concern to the United States. The United States has a political and humanitarian concern in seeing countries develop through peaceful means. In some cases, violence and instability are the product of Communist action; in all cases, they produce opportunity for Communist action.

When political processes deteriorate into violence, recourse is often to an authoritarian regime of either the left or the right in a vain effort to reestablish public order. Such authoritarian regimes create a temporary truce but they cannot bring permanent peace unless they are converted into more broadly based regimes which provide for widespread popular participation in government.

At times the instability may grow to the point where, as in Lebanon, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic, some form of American military intervention may seem necessary in the interests of world peace and our own security. Such situations pose sharp dilemmas for American policy.

On the one hand, it is argued that in most, if not all, modernizing countries a Communist seizure of power would be against vital American interests, that the United States has an obligation to allied and friendly governments to support them against insurrectionary efforts initiated and encouraged from abroad, and that failure of the United States to respond with military backing to its friends in one place would encourage doubt and wavering among its friends in other places.

On the other hand, it is held that the United States cannot be the "policeman" of the world, that we have neither the right nor the capability to intervene effectively in the affairs of most modernizing countries, that we should restrict our concerns only to those countries where we have a clearly defined vital interest, and that we should learn to adjust to and live with the national and radical revolutions which are likely in so many of the modernizing countries. Clearly a major goal of American policy is to escape from this dilemma of military intervention, on the one hand, and neoisolationism, on the other. The former is undesirable; the latter is impossible.

The most striking gap in American foreign policy toward the third world has been its failure until recently to deal directly with the problems posed by this mounting violence and instability. Along with other industrial nations and with international agencies, the United States has actively attempted to reduce poverty and to promote economic development in the nations of the third world.

It has, in contrast, devoted little attention to the problems of promoting political stability and political development in those countries. This failure is in part due to tendency of Americans to believe that instability is the result of poverty and hence that efforts to promote economic development will also promote political stability. In fact, however, no evidence exists which links the process of economic development with political stability. Nor does a correlation exist between poverty, disease, and illiteracy, on the one hand, and political instability, on the other.

Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that it is not poverty but rapid improvement in standards of living, not disease but the spread of modern health practices, not illiteracy but the expansion of education and mass communications which encourage political instability and the decay of political institutions. Economic expansion may increase absolutely the economic well-being of most groups in society, but it also almost always widens the relative gap between rich and poor. The spread of education and mass communications enhances expectations and hence vulnerability to extremist appeals. Industrialization and urbanization undermine or destroy traditional patterns of life and thus lead to alienation and instability. The appeals of communism are to be literates, not illiterates.

All this is not to argue that economic development should be avoided in order to preserve political stability. It is simply to point out that these are two independent goals and that progress toward one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other. In some instances, some measures of economic development may promote political stability; in other instances, they may seriously undermine such stability.

So, also, some forms of political stability may encourage economic growth; other forms may discourage it. India is one of the poorest countries in the world and has had only a modest rate of economic growth. Yet through the Congress Party it achieved a high degree of political stability.

The per capita incomes in Argentina and Venezuela are perhaps 10 times that in India, and Venezuela has had a high rate of economic growth. Yet for both countries political stability has remained an elusive goal. By themselves, in short, programs of economic devel-

opment promote only economic development. The promotion of political development and political stability requires different programs and the change or modification of programs designed originally simply for the promotion of economic development.

In the past few years the needs of political development have received increased attention from officials in the executive and legislative branches. One of the principal sources of interest and concern has been this committee, and I wish to congratulate the committee for the creative role it played last year in writing into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 title IX, which gave concrete and explicit legislative recognition to the needs of political development.

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Political development has two dimensions. First, it involves the expansion of political awareness, political consciousness, and political participation to previously apathetic masses of the population. In traditional society politics is the concern of a small aristocratic or bureaucratic elite. In modern society politics becomes the concern of the common man and the common man becomes the concern of politics. This is true whether the modern state is a Communist dictatorship or a constitutional democracy. The crucial difference, indeed, between a modern Communist dictatorship and the old-style traditional authoritarian dictatorship lies precisely in this. The latter rested on the indifference and apathy of the bulk of the population: the former demands the active support and participation of the mass of the people. The fact that political consciousness and political participation is much higher in Castro's Cuba than it was in Batista's Cuba does not make the former any less of a dictatorship than the latter. It simply makes it a popular dictatorship instead of an oligarchial dictatorship and hence a stronger dictatorship. In democratic countries the expansion of political participation is marked by the extension of the suffrage and the progressive enlargement of the share of the population which can and does have the opportunity to participate in politics.

The processes of social and economic change—urbanizaion, industrialization, the spread of literacy, education, and mass communications—all increase political awareness and political participation. This increasing concern with politics can express itself through violence and extremism. If this is to be avoided, institutional channels must exist for the expression and organization of this participation in ways compatible with the peaceful evolution of the political system. This is the second dimension of political development: the creation of an institutional framework to provide for the peaceful participation of larger and larger groups of people in the political process. If a political system is unable to develop the organizations to serve this end, if its leaders, like Diem in South Vietnam in the late 1950's, instead attempt to close off the institutional channels for popular participation, then inevitably revolutionary leaders will arise to mobilize popular participation against the political system rather than through the political system. To maintain political stability, consequently, the construction of organizations and institutions for peaceful popular participation in government must go hand in hand with the expansion of political awareness among the masses of the population. This

basic truth was well expressed by the most accute student of the origins of modern decocracy, Alexis de Tocqueville when he observed that:

> Among the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.

Political organization thus must go hand in hand with the expansion of political participation. This linkage was recognized by this committee when it provided in title IX that American foreign assistance programs should be administered to assure "maximum participation" by the people "through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions." In its report the committee explicitly recognized the role cooperatives, labor unions, trade associations, and community development groups can play in this process. In addition to these institutions, however, there is yet another which can play a crucial role in the organizatiou of political activity. That institution is the political party.

Modern politics differs from traditional politics in that the masses of the people become involved in it. That mass participation has to be organized. Many organizations and groups serve this purpose. The most important of these is the poltical party. The political party is, indeed, the distinctive institution of modern politics. Traditional political systems may have bureaucracies, legislatures, and elections, but they do not have political parties. The political party as an organization is peculiar to modern politics, and it is the institutional means of organizing mass participation in politics. The growth of peaceful political participation in modernizing countries requires the creation of strong political parties.

By and large stable countries have strong political parties; unstable countries have weak parties. More importantly, countries which do have strong political parties can look forward to future stability with considerably greater confidence than countries with weak parties or with no parties. The future political stability of Thailand is more problematical than that of Malaysia, in part because Thailand lacks the organized political parties to assimilate into the political system the groups which inevitably will acquire political consciousness as the process of modernization continues. It is a bitter truth but a real one that probably the most stable government in southeast Asia today is the Government of North Vietnam. The relative political stability which has characterized that country in contrast to South Vietnam derives in large from the fact that in the north the organization of the Communist Party reaches out into the rural areas and provides a channel for the communication of rural grievances to the center and for the control of the comtryside by the Government.

Changes in the political stability of a country coincide with changes in the strength of its party system. The emergence of South Korea from civil strife and instability during the past 4 years has coincided with the creation by General Pak and his associates of a strong political party which has been able to provide effective rule and public order and at the same time promote economic growth and such needed reforms as the normalization of its relations with Japan. The contrast between India's political stability during the 1950's and the instability of Pakistan was due to the strength of the Congress Party in

India with its well-developed grassroots organization, as contrasted with the weakness of the Muslem League in Pakistan which at that time was little more than a clique of maneuvering politicians with no roots in the country which they were supposed to govern. The emergence during the past 5 years of a new political stability in Pakistan has coincided with the development of a new grassroots political system through the basic democracies and the reinvigoration of the Muslem League organization. At the same time, the decline in the strength of the Congress Party threatens India with increasing political turmoil and instability.

One crucial turning point in the expansion of political participation in a modernizing society is the inauguration of the rural masses into national politics. The timing, the method, and the auspices of this "Greek Uprising" decisively shape the subsequent political evolution of the society. It may occur relatively rapidly or it may occur slowly and proceed through several stages. The nature of the party system in the society largely determines whether it takes place peacefully or through revolution. In a colonial society, the Greek Uprising may occur under the auspices of the nationalist intellectuals who, as in India and Tunisia, mobilize peasant groups into politics within the framework of the nationalist party to support them in their struggles with the imperial power. In a competitive party system, the peasant mobilization often takes the form of one segment of the urban elite developing an appeal to or making an alliance with the crucial rural voters and mobilizing them into politics so as to overwhelm at the polls the more narrowly urban-based parties. The victories of Jefferson and Jackson over the Adamses had their 20th-century counterparts in Turkey, Ceylon, Burma, Senegal, the Sudan, and other modernizing countries. Third, peasant mobilization may take place, at least in part, under military leadership, if as in South Korea and perhaps Egypt a rural-oriented military junta comes to power and then attempts to develop a broad power base in the countryside to overwhelm and contain its urban opponents.

Finally, if no group within the political system takes the lead in organizing peasant political participation, some group of urban intellectuals will mobilize and organize them into politics against the political system. This results in revolution. This is what almost happened in the Philippines. This is what did happen in Vietnam. This is what may be happening in Thailand.

IV. THE UNITED STATES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Obviously the United States can affect the political development of other countries only in a marginal way. Each society will choose its own forms of political organization or disorganization. All that foreigners can do is to advise its leaders on the prerequisites and requirements of political organization, even as they do for economic development, and give them technical and material assistance in the development of political organizations. We have already done much along this line, particularly at the local level. Under the mandate of title IX undoubtedly much more will be done. It is, however, desirable for us to recognize political development as an important end in itself if the tendencies toward violence and instability in modernizing countries are to be reduced. More specifically, our existing efforts might be improved by action along the following lines.

(1) We should explicitly recognize that a major goal of American policy is the promotion of stable political institutions in modernizing countries and particularly the development of strong political parties. To this end, I would urge that the committee consider the desirability of amending title IX by adding the words "and democratic political parties" to the existing language. In general, our support for and cooperation with political leaders or military juntas should depend upon their actively attempting to develop grassroots political organization. If we do get irrevocably committed to any one leader, no matter how charismatic he may be, we should, like the Russians in Cuba, try to nudge that leader into the difficult task of political institution-building.

(2) We should devote much more effort to the study of the conditions and patterns of political evolution and to the elaboration of new concepts and categories useful for the analysis of societies undergoing rapid social change.

(3) We should evaluate economic and technical assistance programs not only in terms of how they contribute to economic development but also how they affect political development. We should try to identify those types of economic assistance which may contribute to both forms of development. We should develop criteria and guidlines for balancing prospective economic gains against political losses and political gains against economic losses.

(4) We should inaugurate new activities directed specifically toward political development. These might include assistance to political parties, programs to develop and train political leaders, assistance to more broadly based and public-oriented interest groups, and more widespread support for community development programs.

Finally, we should create some office in our own Government which would have a primary responsibility for political development. Until recently, the Agency for International Development has been, in effect, an agency for economic development. Somewhere, either inside AID or outside AID, but preferably inside, we need an office for political development. We need diplomats and economic planners, but we also need to recruit and train personnel skilled in the techniques of analyzing political change and promoting political organization. What we need, perhaps, is a new-style CIA, more skilled in building governments than in subverting them.

All this may seem highly adventurous. But it is actually a highly conservative prescription for political stability. The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or military force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Huntington.

Dr. Ness, if you will proceed.

The biography of Dr. Ness follows:

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Age: 37; born Los Angeles, California, March 19, 1929.

Married to Jeannine Renee Ness, nee Aimont. Children: Marc A. age 10, Eric H. age 8, Ian T. age 4, Shanta T. age 1.

Present address: 1301 S. Forest, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Present position: Assoc. Prof. of Sociology, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Director, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan.

Education: 1952 BA (Honors) Sociology, University of California, Berkeley. 1956 Graduate Diploma (Agricultural Economics—Cooperatives), University of Copenhagen, Denmark (Fulbright Grantee). 1957 MA Sociology, University of California, Berkeley: Thesis: *Danish Rural Cooperatives*, unpublished. 1961 Ph.D., Sociology, University of California, Berkeley: Thesis: *Central Government and Local Initiative in the Industrialization of India and Japan*, unpublished.

Career: 1953–55: Military Service. Organization and Methods Examiner in an Army Ordnance Depot in France. Upon separation from the Army, continued in the same position as a Department of the Army Civilian employee for six months, until leaving to take up a Fulbright grant for study in Denmark. 1956–61: During graduate study served part time as teaching assistant in introductory Sociology courses and as a teaching associate in an integrated social science course. 1961–Aug. 1964: Research Fellow in Malaya and Southeast Asia, Institute of Current World Affairs, New York.

Publications: 1. "The Cooperative Movement and Industrial Capitalism in England and Denmark." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* (spring 1961). 2. "Population Growth, Economic Development and Development Policies." Journal of Tropical Geography (May 1963). 3. "Econocological Analysis and Differential Growth Rates, A Comment." *Human Organization* (Winter 1962–3). 4. "Economic Development and the Goals of Government in Malaysia." in Wang, Gung-wu, ed., *Malaysia* (Praeger, 1964).

5. "Asian Overurbanization and the Industrial Distribution of the Labor Force." *Proceedings of the 2nd Bi-Annual Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia*, Taipei, September, 1962.

6. "Community Development and Public Investment: The Programming of Economic Development in Malaysia." *The Developing Economics*, December 1964, Vol. II, No. 4.

7. "Subdivision of Estates in Malaya 1951–1960: A Methodological Critique." *Malayan Economic Review*, April 1964.

8. "Trends Report on the Study of Social Stratification and Social Mobility in Malaya." Forthcoming issne. *East Asian Cultural Studies*.

9. "Modernization and Indigenous Control of the Bureaucracy in Malaysia." *Asian Survey*, Fall 1965.

10. "Social Scientists in Policy Formation in Developing Nations: The Case of Southeast Asia." Paper for AAS, Berkeley, December 1965, Publication planned.

11. "Organizational Strategies for Rural Development" East-West Center Seminar on Community Development and Local Government, August 1965. Publication of papers planned.

12. "Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia," University of California Press, publication scheduled for Spring 1967.

Service:

External:

1. Executive Secretary, Southeast Asian Development Advisory Group, Agency for International Development.
2. Southeast Asia Committee, Association for Asian Studies.
3. Malaysia Committee, Asia Society.

University Assignments:

1. Executive Committee, Sociology Department.
2. Committee on International Studies, College of Literature, Science and the Arts.
3. Council on International Studies, Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs.
4. National Defense Foreign Language Fellowship Committee, Rackham School of Graduate Studies.

STATEMENT OF DR. GAYL D. NESS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Dr. NESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Allow me to join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for this invitation.

I should like to address myself to the problem of the relationship between central governments and the development of rural voluntary associations. I shall like to touch upon three aspects of this problem, and then suggest certain general policy implications. My remarks

must necessarily be brief and general, especially since they deal with the complex and heterogeneous situation in southeast Asia, but perhaps they can be elaborated upon later. The three aspects concern first, the advantages and the dangers of such rural organizational development; second, the obstacles to such development in the rural scene; and third, the obstacles to such development in the postures and conditions of the central governments.

1. From our experience of the past two centuries of modern development in the West, we tend to be convinced of the advantage of the development of local voluntary associations, especially in rural areas. Such associations include consumer and producer cooperatives, religious organizations promoting education and mutual aid, farmers associations, business enterprises and even political parties. We have found in such organizations a great capacity to mobilize human energies, to direct them to the solution of local problems and the advancement of the interest of rural people.

This has been generally associated with a long-term and sustained increase in both productivity and welfare, and with the increasing popular participation in the political process. Our approach to modern development in southeast Asia reflects our own past experience, and we appear to believe that stimulating the development of local organizational capacity in the rural areas will advance our aims of creating stable, open societies with considerable capacity for increasing the wealth and welfare of their members.

We should recognize as well, however, that just as such development was accompanied by conflict and violence in our experience, it is likely to have the same at least short-run effects in southeast Asia. When rural peoples are mobilized they will work to promote their own interests. Where such interests have been neglected or oppressed by central governments, conflict is bound to ensue.

Throughout southeast Asia there is a longstanding undercurrent of conflict between hill peoples and lowland peoples, and between rural peoples and urban peoples. We have already seen that the mobilization of the Montagnards in South Vietnam, admittedly for security purposes, results in heightened conflict between hill people and the central government. I think we can expect a great deal more of this type of conflict in the future, especially if we are successful in organizing hill peoples.

Our Western experience also shows, however, that such conflict can be positive and creative; it need not be totally destructive. It shows that in balance the advantages of rural organizational development outweigh the disadvantages of conflict. It is also likely that by being more sensitive to these underlying bases of conflict in southeast Asia, we might strengthen the advantages and avoid some of the more destructive aspects of the conflict.

2. The physical and intellectual isolation of rural areas throughout southeast Asia is one of the major obstacles to the development of effective voluntary associations. Traditional patterns of organization provide for the total individual and the total village society. The types of organizations we seek to stimulate draw individuals into organizations on the basis of limited interests. The isolation of the village units of rural society supports the traditional form of organization. Such things as schools and roads break the isolation, weaken

traditional structure and provide the basic social conditions for the widespread development of voluntary associations.

The isolation also makes rural peoples suspicious of the central government. Most rural experience has reenforced this suspicion as central governments and their officers have often been more interested in exploiting than in increasing the real wealth and welfare of rural peoples. Some modern leaders have been able to overcome this suspicion personally, but only by demonstrating great integrity and concern over an extended period of time.

This type of leadership cannot normally be mass produced in government development programs. Malaysia's experience demonstrates, however, that a truly effective program of rural infrastructure construction, which can be more or less mass produced, can break down this suspicion. It can go a long way toward convincing rural people that the central government is concerned with their welfare and capable of acting upon that concern.

3. Despite sometimes rather great efforts, central governments have been singularly unsuccessful in directly promoting the development of local organizations. Colonial governments experienced widespread failure in their attempts to promote cooperatives and other types of economic organizations. They often failed as well in attempts to transfer authority to chosen followers and organizations among indigenous peoples.

Cooperatives and other forms of economic organization were unsuccessful because they failed to provide significant returns to rural people. The costs in registration and formal control, demanded by excessively bureaucratic government programs, were generally not worth the meager, and even sometimes doubtful returns. The more political attempts failed because the "chosen" to whom authority was being passed were those who had demonstrated their ability to manipulate the colonial masters rather than to those who could mobilize rural peoples.

The new independent governments of southeast Asia have generally not been any more successful than their ex-colonial masters in stimulating local organization development. In some cases they have been less successful. This can be seen in both the public and private sectors.

In the public sector, the burdens of administration and the paucity of experienced administrators forces central governments to call to the capital rural leaders who show any organizational talent. In addition, the normal patterns of upward social mobility lead through the capital rather than through local organization. Most young elites in southeast Asia see the capital city as the place in which to get ahead.

Both sets of conditions provide the new states (and even Thailand) with powerful centripetal forces, which draw off rural leadership thus inhibiting the development of effective local organizations.

Finally, new governments often feel rather precarious and do not appreciate the difficulty of implementing new development programs. Local failures in implementation are often taken as indications of subversion and lead central governments to take over direct responsibility for specific programs. This removes from the rural people the ability to learn from their mistakes and further inhibits the development of local initiative.

All three processes are most critical together in that they tend to draw off existing supportive local leadership. What is left is at best

a vacuum, at worst a training ground for exclusively oppositional leadership. The process intensifies the underlying conflict between rural areas and central government, and leads it in destructive rather than progressive directions.

I would submit we have seen a great deal of this lately in Indonesia.

In the private sector the "socialist idiom" of the new states—deriving from the understandable tendency of nationalist movements to equate capitalism, colonialism, and indigenous economic backwardness—also acts to inhibit rural organizational development in some states. Suspiciousness of the private sector exacerbates the sense of precariousness of the central government, often causing it to adopt policies that obstruct the development of local economic organizations in the private sector. Where such an idiom has been absent or weak, as in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, we have found a rather rapid development of rural organization, primarily in small scale businesses.

4. What appears to be needed, then, is a condition in which rural isolation is weakened and in which rural leadership can be trained and can gain experience in significant organizations. Local organizations will be significant only to the extent that they meet the needs and advance the interests of rural people.

Three lines of attack seem plausible. First, of great importance will be programs of physical infrastructure development, the building of roads and bridges, the extension of radio and press communication, and the development of widespread educational systems.

Second, a policy with a permissive posture and a highly generalized set of incentives will have the advantage of allowing local initiative to develop in types of activities that are most relevant to local conditions. Government officers, particularly in the capital, are seldom as knowledgeable of these conditions as are local people themselves.

Cooperative or community development programs that continue to demand formal registration and formal organization with double-entry bookkeeping, constitutions and bylaws can probably expect no more success than they have had in the past.

Finally, it may well be that the leadership conditions noted above are the least tractable to formal policy change. "Decentralization" has been a goal in much AID policy in southeast Asia. It is doubtful, however, that this has been very effective in reversing the powerful centripetal forces of the existing central governments of the region.

We may well continue to promote such decentralization, with little expectation beyond that this may add in the long run to the development of local initiative, but we should certainly not expect to reverse processes that are apparently so deep seated in the political character of states of the region.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Ness.

Thank you, gentlemen. As chairmen of the various seminars in the Southeast Asian Development Group I am sure that the views you have presented to this subcommittee must have been discussed within SEADAG. Have these seminar discussions had representatives of the various branches of Government participating, particularly AID and State Department? What impact have they had, in your opinion, Dr. Tilman?

Dr. TILMAN. Actually, the political development seminar has now only been in operation through two meetings. One meeting was or-

ganizational, the other substantive. We had participation by AID and the State Department at the New York meeting. I would say the participation was most appreciated by all of us from the scholarly world.

The people who came from AID and State all had something to say, and they did a good job of saying it. They brought us back to the world of reality, for academics sometimes wander off into the world of unreality. They pointed out some of the real problems they face day to day.

I think our discussions had some impact on every participant. It is very difficult and I do not know if anyone can measure the amount of impact this kind of discussion has, but I am quite certain that all of us went back with some of our views changed just a little bit: at least we were willing to think more seriously about some of the principles that we have previously regarded as unthinkable—unthinkable in the sense they were given and there did not seem to be any reason to question them.

I think we had some of these presuppositions shaken from under us. I am looking forward to this again in the future. I think the SEADAG seminars, from what I have seen of them so far, offer one of the most hopeful possibilities thus far for a continuing dialog between the academic side and the Government side.

I hope that we will continue. I know that there is certainly determination on my own part and on the part of most of my colleagues involved in it on the scholarly side, and from the reports we heard when the session was over the Government side is eagerly looking forward to the session next month.

I hope in the long run it will have impact on both of us. It is a two-way street. It does not merely have impact on Government, but on us as well. We spend a great deal of time going in and out of the field, but we are in a different position from that of Government personnel. Government personnel are faced with making decisions quickly. We in the academic world, while we are becoming increasingly harried, at least have time to sit back and reflect, and if we run a few months overdue on a deadline, the world will not crumble down on top of us. We have always known of the problems that the Government officer faces, but we have not fully appreciated all of the complexities. I think the sessions we are having now provide us with an opportunity for a dialog that previously was much more difficult to carry out.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Huntington, you apparently have a keen appreciation of the desirability on the part of AID to actively support the development of democratic institutions as spelled out in title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Are you hopeful that AID will follow the directives?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. I am sure that they are.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You are aware that, for over 6 or 7 years, they have kept it in the bottom file?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. Both within the SEADAG and outside of SEADAG I think many academics, including myself, have had contact with the people in AID who are working on this problem. Some of them have participated actively in SEADAG meetings. I would like to take the opportunity also to second everything that Dr. Tilman said about the relations between SEADAG and the governmental participants.

In our Vietnam seminar, which is equally young and has only had two meetings, we have very active participation by the AID people. I think this seminar like the others will help build a two-way bridge between the Government, and AID in particular, and the scholars and academics concerned with these problems.

We are planning future meetings, particularly on the problems of political development in Vietnam. The outcome of these meetings hopefully may be of some use to AID and the State Department. On the other hand, AID and the State Department have been very helpful to us. One of the things our group is most concerned with is trying to promote a broader and deeper knowledge among scholars and among the American people of the history, culture, economic system, political system of Vietnam. I think I am correct in saying that until very recently there was less knowledge available in the United States on that southeast Asian country than on any other.

We have conceived one of the useful functions that our group could perform would be to try to promote the serious study of the problems of that country with the hope of making a contribution to a more serious public discussion and debate of what is going on there.

Consequently, in addition to our activities as an advisory agency to AID, we are on our own attempting to promote the interest of other groups in encouraging serious scholarly research on Vietnam.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Ness, are you equally as optimistic concerning the attention that the deliberations and the reports of SEADAG will receive by the proper governmental agencies? You know, we in Congress, in making reports, are always hopeful that AID or the proper governmental agency will at least read our reports; nevertheless, we are frustrated at times.

Are you hopeful that some positive effect will come from the efforts of SEADAG?

Dr. NESS. I am. I have a cautious optimism about this. I think the thing that makes it most hopeful is essentially the way it has been structured. The seminars are small groups, not really more than a dozen people, who have been or will be meeting four to six times a year, concentrating intensively on a narrow range of problems. They will have and have had one, two, or three AID personnel in them throughout the meetings, so that there is established a continuing dialog between academia and AID.

This in itself simply makes each of us aware of the other's problems and the other's capacities. This increase in the dialog makes me hopeful that what we have to say—and I am afraid it is not terribly much in many cases—will certainly be listened to.

On the whole we have been very impressed with AID's desire to get assistance, with their candidness in discussing their problems with us. I think this is something we have been universally impressed with.

Apparently most of us feel that we are engaged with AID in a continuing dialog in which we are all searching for a better understanding of the process of development. That understanding, and the ability to act upon that understanding, will be the most significant products of SEADAG. AID personnel are not, so far as I know, compelled to take part in SEADAG. The academic members are not paid consultants. Costs are met by AID, but the time is given freely. This means that SEADAG will continue only as long as both sides derive some benefit and see some advantage in the continuing dialog. Thus

I see the continuation of SEADAG, and AID's increased participation in it, as an indication that AID is listening; it provides the basis for my optimism.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You gentlemen are far too modest. In your opening statements you protested that you lacked expertise in the area. I know this is not the case. Again, I want to say that the objectives of this SEADAG group we all applaud and we hope that your efforts will not be for naught. As I stated earlier, we in the Congress often write reports in order to bring about a better understanding of our views. We are flattered when our counsel is sought, but too often we find often it is not followed.

A good example is the subcommittee's hearing on the Sino-Soviet conflict, held in early 1965. I don't believe there was a foreign embassy here in Washington that did not seek a copy of it.

When the subcommittee, in late 1965, traveled to the countries in southeast Asia, including those on the periphery of Communist China, we found they had not heard of the report or the hearings. Neither the public affairs officers nor the embassy people who should have had a copy advanced to them for their use knew of our efforts.

I hope your efforts in SEADAG will receive more attention.

Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I think as a new member I might appropriately, at this point, express my appreciation to you for holding these hearings and for their value, and say it is expert testimony rather clearly in spite of the gentlemen's modesty.

Dr. Huntington, there is an old truism about poverty, illiteracy, and disease constituting the breeding ground of communism. You seem to take a somewhat different tack in that you indicate a pretty clear distinction between economic and social development and political development, and indicate that even the opposite in some cases may be the case; that is, you state the appeals of communism are to the literate and not the illiterate.

You rather impressively develop the point that there is no evidence which links the process of economic development with political stability—

> nor does a correlation exist between poverty, disease, and illiteracy, on the one hand, and political instability, on the other. Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that it is not poverty but rapid improvement in standards of living, not disease but the spread of modern health practices, not illiteracy but the expansion of education and mass communications, which encourages political instability and the decay of political institutions.

That is a rather interesting line of thought. It leads me to this question: If we pursue the development of an AID program, thinking purely in social and economic terms, with no eye to political development, if indeed we follow a hands-off policy with respect to political development, would you say that we might be accomplishing good things with social and economic programs but contributing to political instability and be a contributing factor to political developments that might be the opposite of the kind that we would like to see?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. I think this is a very real possibility. I don't think it necessarily follows, just as I don't think it necessarily follows that the promotion of economic development will produce political stability. I think, however, that with economic development which

isn't planned with a very real eye on its political impacts and consequences, there is a high likelihood that this will not stabilize politics, and consequently it is very important in drawing up of economic plans for the promoting of economic growth that the political factors be brought in. If you look at the history of countries you can see that very often the periods of most rapid economic growth are accompanied by an increasingly unequal distribution of income among the groups in the population.

In some degree this may be a necessary aspect of economic growth, at least rapid economic growth. This is the sort of thing that has to be kept in mind because you may be raising the GNP per capita at a very satisfactory rate, but you may also be creating serious imbalances, regional, between one group and another within the society, and this can lead to various forms of political instability.

This was the reason why I emphasized that it seemed to me terribly important to develop the institutional channels so that people who are brought to political consciousness, people who do develop demands upon the government or upon the society, have some available institutional vehicle through which to express those demands and consequently will have less tendency to resort to terrorism or violence.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Then I gather—indeed it seems to me you clearly state that it is both possible and proper that we should have some hand in such political development or attempt to do so through our overall aid?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. I think that in drawing up aid programs we ought to give very careful attention to these political consequences and we ought to develop criteria, analyze very carefully the effects of the economic programs, and discuss with the recipient governments the destabilizing possibilities of one line of development against another.

Here let me, if I may, go back to an additional disqualification because quite obviously this is quite a difficult thing to do. I am sure if you got together a group of political scientists and economists, we could probably come up with certain rules of thumb about the political effects of different types of aid programs, but the state of the art is still pretty primitive in terms of this type of analysis.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Tilman, I don't mean to be polarizing positions or starting an argument, but you have stated that foreign aid should be aimed more at economic and social than at political goals.

What is your feeling about this idea of political development and this being a major emphasis in our approach to aid?

Dr. TILMAN. I think it is apparent that Professor Huntington and I disagree on some points. One might lay this to the difference of the personalities of the optimist versus the pessimist. One might lay the blame to the fact that Yale and Harvard have not agreed in the last several centuries and there is no reason why they should today.

As Professor Huntington has spelled out his answer to your questions here, I am far more in agreement with his response than I think I was with his initial statement, although I have not read the initial statement over very carefully.

To answer the first point on the appeals of communism, it seems to me that the appeals are highly diverse, that various people are attracted to it for various reasons. I would say in some societies there

are people who may be attracted to communism simply because it provides them with a means of identity in a world where their old values are crumbling about them.

Whether we are pleased with it or not, and however much we may disagree with it, the Communists have succeeded in presenting a more tightly knit body of ideology, which one can identify with, an ideology that seems to have answers to certain problems faced in life. We happen to think they are the wrong answers, but it nevertheless provides some pat answers and thus provides a means of identity.

Secondly, there is a kind of revolutionary communism which promises to get a part of the spoils for people who do not feel they are getting an adequate share. Thus, for some there is a revolutionary appeal.

Thirdly, there is a pragmatic appeal in some cases. The Communist Party of Indonesia was highly successful in providing the very kind of institution that Professor Huntington was suggesting earlier, an upward communications system. They were able to communicate from the peasantry upward to the top. The party went out and asked the peasants what they wanted, and they fed this information into the decisionmaking elite. Because of this concern peasants came forward and joined the party.

Finally, one cannot rule out the international ideological aspects of communism. Most of all, however, as Professor Huntington pointed out, in a period of instability, in a period when economic progress is being shown to be possible and people suddenly realize they can do something about their own positions, they start casting about to try to find some means to answer it. Communism presents one such alternative. Our own system would appear to be another possibility. Professor Huntington, at least in his initial presentation, would seem to be inclined toward activism in encouraging the acceptance of our system: I find myself more reserved and in agreement with Professor Huntington's later remark, that we ought to be available to give advice and counsel.

My starting point is that I am a bit pessimistic that we, the United States, can do much if the country itself does not desire such changes. I cannot see how we can engineer political development if some of the leaders of the host country do not themselves want this kind of political development, and I think that such a desire has yet to be demonstrated.

I am afraid in the past that we have been guilty of being just a little bit overenergetic in exporting some of our ideas about politics. I am most concerned, as you probably have discerned, that we may try to export the trappings of politics and the structures without exporting the essence of these structures, the functions that are supposed to go inside the structure.

Mr. BUCHANAN. If I have time on the second round——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Please continue.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would like to pursue this further, but there is a second question perhaps related to it that I would like to ask Dr. Ness.

I would like your opinion of this from the point of view of the problem of central governments versus rural population, and I have had a little exposure to this problem in a visit to Vietnam last year.

I was in a village or two in which I had rather the feeling that it might be possible that the villagers might not want the Vietcong or a gun to their heads, but on the other hand might not know who was the central government, or care.

In light of this problem of urban elite and perhaps the neglected rural population, what do you feel about the possibility of us at any level or in any way attempting to influence and aid in political development?

Dr. NESS. You raise of course a very fundamental problem, that of the past isolation and neglect of the rural areas. Can we help to break down that isolation? Can we induce the governments of urban elites to take a greater interest in their own rural peoples? The two questions are closely related, because a government that is concerned with its rural peoples will normally expend considerable effort to work for those peoples and will consequently break down much of the isolation of the rural areas. We have seen some very successful examples of this in Malaysia: we have seen failures elsewhere in the region.

Perhaps the easiest thing to do is to promote public works programs in the rural areas. These are normally popular programs, providing advantages for both the urban elites and the rural peoples. Thus there is likely to be the least opposition to this type of program. It is, further, the type of thing our technologically advanced society can provide quite easily. Such programs are, of course, rather corruption-prone. Considerable effort must be invested to insure that at least some of the work actually gets done and gets done in the rural areas, but I think these problems are not insuperable.

One of the immediate advantages of such programs is that they do break down some of the physical isolation of the rural areas. Further, they make the presence of government felt in a positive and helpful way, thus breaking down some of the political isolation of the rural areas.

A more difficult type of program requires the extension of education to the rural areas. This works to break down further the intellectual isolation of the rural areas and tie them more securely into a larger network. I agree with Professor Huntington that this will not immediately bring political stability. Quite the contrary. It is likely to bring increased conflict, and it is also likely to be opposed or subverted by the exsting elite. I do not think we should, or can, shrink from the conflict or the possibility of subversion. We are, after all, dealing with revolutionary situations and we are ourselves a revolutionary nation. I should argue that we can promote educational programs, literacy programs, programs of increased communications. While these may not always turn out exactly as we like, they will provide the general conditions on which alone open and useful societies can develop.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Certainly it would seem that this is a very desirable thing to whatever extent it is a possible thing.

Mr. Chairman, I expect I could have some further response, on the second round.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The second round.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have listened with interest to the presentations which reminded me that I have been in the areas of southeast Asia and Africa. Sitting here, I think of Vietnam, particularly the northern part of what was the original Vietnam. At that time the area was under Chinese influence.

It was the rural area that maintained the Vietnamese people and culture. I believe that you have to treat each country individually as they all have different problems. I for one am not too sure we have the right to impose our way of government on other people.

Your illustration in reference to city planning brought to mind a story a Greek planner told me when I was chairman of the planning board in the city of Chicago. He mentioned the fact of a planner setting up a program for housing for jute workers in East Pakistan. The workers lived in the hills and were going to live in concrete-built houses close to where they worked. In 3 years 98 percent of the workers had tuberculosis.

In your illustration, many of the people know how to live in their own area, more so than people from other areas who are not accustomed to that climate or conditions. I believe that with the background and history of Asia and where they have had a strong dictatorial government, you are not going to superimpose our way of life or democracy upon these people. I believe that we can help educate them but we must permit them to make their choice of what they want to do.

I do not believe that we have the right to impose our thoughts on them. The Congo is a good example. In 1960, I asked a representative of the State Department what plans had been made when the Congo would receive their independence on July 30.

He stated at the time that they did not have any plans. He said, "Well, the Congo is divided into six areas for the convenience of the Belgian Government and the people of the areas did not know each other."

I said. "All they know locally is the tribal rule. I believe they should be allowed to go on their own way and through education prepare themselves for a more sophisticated society."

We saw what happened in the Congo. I feel that there will be many problems in the future all over the world. I do not believe that you are going to change everybody overnight to your way of thinking.

Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Not just now. Thank you very much. I am sorry to be late, but I have been on the floor with the bill that really belongs in our jurisdiction, Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is a woman's prerogative to be as frank as you are.

Gentlemen, it is not my intention to start a division within Harvard itself——

Mr. HUNTINGTON. We don't need outsiders to help us on that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee did hear from Ambassador Reischauer. If I am not mistaken he differed quite a bit with your point of view, Dr. Huntington, in what our efforts should be in sponsoring political change. It is no wonder that Yale and Harvard differ, but can Harvard and Harvard differ? Dr. Tilman gave among

his arguments that there is no well-defined end to political development and we ought not to attempt to engineer political change without knowing something about what the end product will be.

You suggested in your statement on page 12 "that an office for political development be established in AID." I am wondering if this would not have an adverse effect. Although I have supported for years the proposals in title IX and I am in sympathy, therefore, with the basic intent of title IX, I would have some reservation as to the effect, the adverse effect it would have on the recipients of our aid if we did follow your proposal. Aid recipients are extremely touchy about any indication that the United States is interested in shaping their political affairs.

And further, it would also be more grist for the Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda mills. They would say that the United States is attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of these developing nations. Would you care to comment?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. Yes. It seems to me, first of all, we do interfere in the internal affairs of nations throughout the world. The world is becoming a much smaller place. We are perforce playing a major role in world politics and inevitably we have an influence as to what goes on in many parts of the world, just as what goes on in many parts of the world has a corresponding reacting influence on what goes on in American politics and government.

I think the problem, Mr. Chairman, may concern the use of the word "political," which has certain sensitive and perhaps ideological overtones which other words do not. Certainly we are and have been influencing the way in which other countries have evolved politically through a variety of means, not the least of which has been our economic assistance programs.

We also influenced some of them through our military programs. In at least some instances we have had a very decisive effect on the future of a country through fairly large programs of military assistance which have made easier the involvement and the participation by the military in the politics of their countries.

Consequently, I think what is involved in the general thrust of my remarks and suggestions is not an increase or a decrease in American involvement in world affairs and inevitably in the domestic affairs of other countries, but rather a more conscious concern with the political effects of that involvement. It seems to me that in some cases with our military assistance programs, in some cases with our economic assistance programs, in some cases with our other activities, we have not looked at the long-run political effects of those programs on the other countries.

In my suggestion for something like an office of political development in AID, I was really thinking of an office which would make this concern its primary responsibility. We have throughout AID and in the State Department, of course, individuals who are concerned with these problems, but it might well be desirable to institutionalize—if I may use a favorite word of mine—to institutionalize this concern, and one way of doing this would be through the creation of such an office.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. May I ask the panel whether, in their opinion from the vantage point of your study, as experts in the area and the sub-

ject matter, you think the United States is overextended? Can the Asian peoples on their own, without our aid or assistance or even leadership, meet their problems?

Dr. Ness.

Dr. NESS. That is a very tall order, Mr. Chairman. In the first place, I am not quite certain how to measure the extension, what standard should be used. From the standard of our own wealth, we are not overextended. We can provide a great deal more assistance to the rest of the world without really feeling it very much. I suspect this will become increasingly the case rather than decreasingly the case as we go along.

There is another standard, however: To what extent can the countries in which we are involved absorb our kind of impact? This I find a more useful, but also a more disturbing, standard. One of the things that impresses me in southeast Asia is the fantastic power of the United States, not simply as a military power or economic power, but just as a great, strapping, productive giant.

When we move into a country with an aid program, we don't normally move gently and subtly. We move more like an excited giant.

Mrs. BOLTON. Why do we do that?

Dr. NESS. I suppose I am at a loss to understand this fully. It seems to be a natural correlate of our power and our optimism.

Mrs. BOLTON. And we don't care what the rest of the world thinks?

Dr. NESS. I guess I would take exception with that. I think we do care about what the rest of the world thinks. We happen to be optimistic about things like development. We see possibilities and want to get done the things we can see that need to get done.

Mrs. BOLTON. You use the word "need." Who says it needs to be done? May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Yes.

Mrs. BOLTON. What have you decided is the difference between progress and developments, and now you have used evolution, evolvement, now you have three words there. What values do you put on them? What does that do? Develop in what direction? Progress in what direction? Is it progress to cut down all our trees to make a highway? To do away with our lovely lakes just so a few people can get downtown a little faster? Is that progress? They tell us in Cleveland that it is.

That is why I am a little pointed about it.

Dr. NESS. If you are asking for a personal statement of values, I would think not. I do think in a general way, however, that what we define as economic development, increasing human productivity, is progress. I think it is better ——

Mrs. BOLTON. Only productivity?

Dr. NESS. This is the thing we are talking about in economic development. In economic development we are talking about increasing productivity. I think this is a good thing. I think this is progress, because it provides for a greater capacity for the development of human talents. I think it is better to be well than to be sick. I think it is better to live longer than to die younger, and so on. These values can be closely associated with economic development. And economic development can be seen fairly clearly. This may be one

of the reasons organizations such as AID are closely oriented to this type of goal.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Tilman, would you care to comment on whether the Asian people can, without our assistance and leadership, meet their problems?

Dr. TILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if you will pardon my saying so, I think that you have slipped two questions in on us rather than one.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am happy you picked it up.

Dr. TILMAN. Is the United States overextended and can southeast Asians meet their own needs? I think these are two separate questions and you have to view it from two separate perspectives. I would agree with Professor Ness' observations that when the United States moves in it does seem to move in in force.

I once was told by a Thai friend of mine, and I suspect that he was only half joking, that the biggest disaster that can happen in any area is when the United States identifies a problem, because once we identify a problem we tend to overreact for some reason or other.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. That would also apply for domestic problems.

Dr. TILMAN. At least I am happy to see we are consistent. I agree this is a problem. Really I have struggled with this problem in my own mind for some time. I have observed how some other countries have reacted in southeast Asia. While I am not certain that they were much more successful, the manner in which they approached the solution, or approached the attempt to resolve the problem impressed me.

On the military side I have never been terribly impressed with a massive moving in of PX's and theaters and all of the trappings that go along with our involvement. Perhaps it is necessary, but perhaps it is not. In any case, it is something we should give thought to. So far as our capacity, or in your terms, "is the United States overextended," I think this is a question that I am not in a very good position to answer. I am not in a position to see the total picture.

I would agree with Professor Ness that in absolute terms, of course, we are not overextended. If the American people are willing to do it, I suspect we can practically feed, clothe, and protect the world. This is, of course, overstating the case, but at this point in our development we are capable of doing a lot more than we are doing. That is not really the question.

The question is: Is it a politically acceptable goal to try to do this sort of thing? This is where we are likely to become overextended. If we make commitments that politically the people as a whole are not willing to accept, then we are overextended. Sometimes it concerns concrete issues; more often it is just a general sense of reluctance that the politician senses.

I am afraid, looking at that in this sense, we are overextending ourselves in southeast Asia.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Just to pursue that a bit. Is it possible that we are overextended to the extent that we are trying to do it all ourselves, on a bilateral basis rather than a multilateral basis?

Dr. TILMAN. I personally think it would be desirable if we could give as much assistance as possible on a multilateral basis. I am also enough of a realist to recognize that quite often some of the things

that we do in our direct national interest are not in the best national interests of other countries and thus others are reluctant to join in with us. Ideally, from both our point of view and from that of the recipient country I think it would be better if we were to be involved multilaterally rather than bilaterally.

In reply to the question "Can they meet their own needs," I think we have to view this from the perspective of the gap between the have and have-not nations. I hate to put it in these polar terms because it is rather a continuum. Nevertheless, regardless of how one views economic development, the fact is that the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped countries is widening. It is certainly not growing smaller. There are a few measures one can find to show the gap is closing, but one has to select these carefully to find the right measures to show that this gap is closing.

The only point I am making here is that viewing it as the problem of the gap, the underdeveloped states could not do as well without our assistance as they do with it. I think that it is in our long-term national interest to assist the southeast Asian states in programs for economic development and social welfare. I would strongly support that kind of involvement.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Huntington, would you care to comment?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. On the two questions, it seems to me perhaps the second question might determine the answer to the first because I would agree with Dr. Ness that in terms of our own capacity and resources we are still far from reaching the limit. We are not overextended in that sense.

On the second question—Can the countries in southeast Asia meet their own needs?—I would go very much along with what Dr. Tilman has just said. I think we face problems of defining what are those needs. There are certain types of needs which only they can meet. There are others where they can be helped with outside aid.

One of the most important needs in southeast Asia is the need to create some sort of sense of national identity in many of these countries. To meet a need like that it seems to me the only thing probably we can contribute is some material and technical assistance.

We obviously cannot create an identity for them. This is something which the people involved would have to do themselves. We may be able to help them with the physical infrastructure of which Dr. Ness speaks, but I would like to emphasize that I think one important aspect of the style to which he referred is this tendency to put a stress on things like physical infrastructure. But it seems to me that equally important, are developing and trying to promote the local organizations and groups which are going to use those physical facilities.

Unless the people in the villages think of them as their own, unless they become involved in some way, the physical infrastructure will not produce much in the way of continued development. I would think it much better to have almost every aid program on some sort of matching basis which requires a significant local input so that when the road is built, or the schoolhouse is built, or the other improvements are made, the people in the communities have put some of their own time and sweat into it and it becomes identified with their own purposes. In many countries we have tended to go too

far in terms of moving in and trying to do everything ourselves because in many cases we can do it quicker and more efficiently if we do it ourselves. I don't think this pays off in the long run.

If I may just make one other related comment, it seems to me one important thing here, one of the things which I would like to stress, is the fact that there are these difficult choices involved, these choices in values and goals.

Mrs. Bolton asked, What is progress? Progress can be in a variety of directions and progress toward one goal may mean moving away from another goal. I certainly didn't want to give the impression, for instance, that I was against literacy and the expansion of literacy. This would not be in my own self-interest as an educator.

But progress toward literacy and the expansion of literacy obviously may involve sacrifices in terms of other goals. I think we tend to assume that all good things go together. Maybe this, too, is a product of our historical experience because in our history all good things pretty much did go together. This is an exception. In most countries progress toward one good thing involves a sacrifice of other things.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We have, fortunately, the assets and resources.

Mr. MURPHY. Would you state your second question again?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are we overextended?

Mr. MURPHY. That was the first.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The second was——

Mr. MURPHY. Could these countries——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Could these countries without our assistance and leadership meet their problems?

Mr. MURPHY. May I ask you a question? Do you believe Pakistan and India could finance the Indus Basin project?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Hardly.

Mr. MURPHY. It would be necessary for outside aid which they are receiving at the present time. The same would pertain to the Mekong project.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. There is no question that outside aid was necessary. Besides, I don't think these countries would have gotten together on terms if they had had the resources and the means. In the case of India and Pakistan I think there had to be a catalyst.

Mrs. BOLTON. You use the word "capacity." Do you consider that we have the capacity to go on doing and doing despite the fact the other day we had to raise our debt limit another $6 billion?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You are asking a question——

Mrs. BOLTON. I am just throwing it at the panel.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Shall I ask it of Dr. Tilman, because he did imply it was only the political climate in this country, not the lack of capacity, that prevented us from meeting the food needs of the entire world. Even if we are able, I don't think it is our intention to feed or police the world.

Dr. TILMAN. I think the answer is that we have the capacity in physical terms to do far more than we are doing if we choose to do it. I pay only about one-fifth of my salary in income taxes, and I complain bitterly about having to pay that. But there are a lot of states where at my level of income I would be paying 60 percent. Of course, I would complain even more if I had to do that. The point is, there is still much slack. Much more could be done if the people of the

United States were willing to do it. The capacity is there to go much further. We could raise the debt ceiling another $50 or even $100 billion.

Mrs. BOLTON. We probably will.

Dr. TILMAN. There does seem to be a natural escalation here. I recognize that. The point is that I think you must consider the question within the framework of that which is politically feasible. I, personally, think we are reaching the upper limits of what is politically feasible just now, but again I suspect that this will escalate, and we will change our views.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Huntington, do you want to comment? The debt limit is not due entirely to our aiding the world economically or militarily.

Dr. HUNTINGTON. I think we certainly have the physical resources. I don't remember precisely the figures, but I believe the proportion of our total GNP which has come within the cognizance, or has been spent by the Federal Government, has remained relatively steady or has declined somewhat over the years.

To be sure, there is the burden upon us, but it seems to me that in terms of our own self-interest we have little alternative but to do what we are doing. If you look at our history in the last quarter century now from World War II, we have become progressively involved with different areas of the world. We have at times reached a plateau and then we have become more involved and the debt limit has gone up again.

One of the great questions in my mind about our capacity is precisely our capacity to withdraw from areas of the world. We are facing the problem now with respect to Europe where it seems to me that our military presence could be very drastically cut down and many other things could be done.

But once we move into an area it is very, very hard, in part for reasons which exist in our society and perhaps even more for the reasons which exist in the countries where we are, to withdraw. I don't think southeast Asia is a place where we should withdraw at the moment. I do think we could cut back in Europe, and I hope we will have the political capacity to do so.

Mrs. BOLTON. I would like to hear from Dr. Ness on this.

Dr. NESS. The question was originally, Are we overextended? I was fishing for standards. The one standard that I started with was the standard of our own capacity.

I think in using this standard we are not overextended by any means. I think we have the capacity, the physical productive capacity to do a great deal more in this way. I should not like to project this too far, though even the conservative projections of the hard scientists are absolutely fantastic and the economic problems we run up against when we get to this level of affluence are problems that we are all quite familiar with today. The suggestions for the negative income tax, and so on, are just one way of meeting this problem of fantastic affluence.

Might I take a stab at the second half of the question which I didn't get to and make a comment, in one sense try to set the record straight. I should disagree with my colleague, Dr. Huntington, concerning the posture of our aid programs in southeast Asia. We do tend to move

in very powerfully, simply because we are large and productive and get excited about things that can be done. We like to see these things being built and organized, and perhaps push too hard for the absorptive capacity of the countries we are dealing with.

At the same time I am struck with the restraint, the reservation that we display in not doing things for other people. I would observe, for example, the Philippines highway programs. If my understanding of our aid involvement in the Philippines is correct, we are totally willing to assist with all the financing and all the technical assistance necessary for a decent highway program in the Philippines. There is sufficient legislation and allocation in the Philippines for such a highway program.

The only problem is the Philippine bureaucracy, the public works department, and so on, are apparently not quite up to the standards of doing the work. The whole public sector in the Philippines is something less than we and some Filipinos would desire. What we have done here is to refuse to finance these programs unless the Filipinos demonstrate that they can do the work themselves.

My understanding of some of the frustrations of the involvement in the second front in Vietnam, the agricultural development front, derive precisely from this type of restraint. Whether or not we always practice this and whether or not we can, we have a tendency to believe that we should not do for other people what they must learn to do for themselves.

This produces something of a paradox. On the one hand we have exercised considerable restraint in many aid programs in attempting to work only where there is some demonstrated local capacity for the work. At the same time, we push very hard to get people to demonstrate or to promise local capacity. Perhaps in this latter we are just too large and powerful for many of the countries of southeast Asia.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. I was just thinking of two projects that reached the community, that the people realized and understood. Outside of Vientiane in Laos money was furnished and the people built an elementary school. It was practically columns and a roof. Probably to Americans it looked to be an odd school. But it worked out very well. Speaking to the people in that particular village disclosed that they were proud of their achievement. I believe the money spent in that case was very effective.

In reference to the northeast area of Thailand, you mentioned the highways. There is a great lack of highways. There is only one highway going to the northeast, the Friendship Highway. When we were there I spoke with the people in the villages who were aware of the real value of the new road because it meant getting their rice crops to the market. They were very much impressed with that particular project.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Dr. Tilman, Dr. Huntington has made it clear that he was not advocating illiteracy. Would you want to make it clear you are not advocating an increase in the income tax?

Dr. TILMAN. I will be happy to go on record and so state.

Mr. BUCHANAN. As to participation on the part of a nation and particularly local participation in whatever aid programs we conduct, it seems to me this is impressive in Vietnam, at least in the civic action programs of our military, in that these are always done in cooperation with the Vietnamese, and while they are building many schools and digging wells and doing all sorts of things, this is consistently a cooperative effort.

I would assume and hope our aid program is more or less on this basis.

Gentlemen, I would assume that to whatever extent we can play a part in it we would like to see the eventual development of a prosperous and stable southeast Asia and political institutions that are both stable and have some value to the people of the nations of southeast Asia.

Do you see in the ideological conflict between us and the Communist nations of the world any conflict in southeast Asia or in Asia any problem of a new colonialism in southeast Asia, and would you comment on this general area of whatever challenge there might be of a new imperialism of some nation in southeast Asia, say Red China, imposing its will upon the peoples of southeast Asia and what role we ought to have in response, if any?

Dr. TILMAN. Somehow it always seems to start at the right end of the table.

Dr. NESS. And move to the left.

Dr. TILMAN. It is a very tall order here to speak of this, but I have some strong feelings about our position in southeast Asia vis-a-vis China. I think one thing we ought to realize is that when the European powers moved into southeast Asia, they moved in at a very abnormal time. They moved in at the time of the decline of a Chinese dynasty, during a period when there was not a strong China to contend for power in southeast Asia. I am not speaking of the arrival of merchants and adventurers from Europe, but of Europeans coming in force and scrambling for spheres of influence and for the occupation of territory.

Mr. MURPHY. That would be around the middle of the 19th century.

Dr. TILMAN. The major thrusts were during the close of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries. There had been European powers there before, but prior to that Europeans had mostly staked out ports and factories from which they could trade. By the middle of the 19th century they were actually occupying and administering southeast Asian territory.

What was happening during this period of time in China? China was in a state of decline. Imperial China was nearing the end of a dynasty and was not able to react. But if this had happened a few centuries earlier, do you think China would have been so passive? I doubt it seriously. China had always tried to maintain a pax Sinica throughout the area. There was a tribute system of international relations involving mutual exchanges and quid pro quo relationships. China maintained the stability of the area and guaranteed borders. But, during periods when she was strong enough, she also saw to it that no country took off on an adventure of her own.

This had existed off and on throughout the history of Asia. As Chinese power periodically declined, some time would probably elapse

before you could see the results of it in southeast Asia. But I suspect if one could plot violence over time in southeast Asia, for example, attacks of one ruler on another, he would discover a positive relationship between the power of a Chinese regime and the stability of southeast Asia.

I am only saying this to put southeast Asia into some reasonable perspective. If China becomes a major power again she can be expected to try to exert greater inflluence on southeast Asia.

I would not associate myself with those China specialists who have discovered China's role in southeast Asia in history and have concluded that when she becomes powerful again, southeast Asia will be hers. That is not the case at all.

During pax Sinica there were no European powers around to contest it. When the West arrived there was no China to contest it. When both China and the West are present in southeast Asia there is going to have to be some kind of mutual accommodation.

China is going to expect to have some voice, some influence over decisions made in the area. Because we now have interests in the area too, we are also going to expect a voice. The only long-term solution so far as I can see is some kind of continuing accommodation. On a pragmatic basis, from month to month and year to year, we must calculate each other's abilities, capacities, and desires and formulate our own policies against those of others.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, sir. Could we have the other two gentlemen answer?

Dr. HUNTINGTON. On the specific point of the rule of Communist China in southeast Asia, it will be some while, I would think, before Communist China is able to play a major role in the area again, such as Dr. Tilman has described it displaying in the past.

It would seem to me that the thing to do is to use this interim period to attempt to develop more stable and vital nations in the area. It has been subjected to Chinese hegemony and then to British and French and Dutch imperial rule. I don't think it would be political development in any sense to now add a third phase of American hegemony in this area, and I must confess that I don't view with any enthusiasm the prospect of the United States and China continuously jockeying for position here.

It seems to me the most desirable thing is to attempt to create what in a large sense never existed there: real nations which are able to provide for their own internal stability and which to be sure will in due course be between the United States and possibly India, Indonesia and Japan, who could play a major role in the area, on the one hand, and Communist China, on the other. What is between these opponents should be in the nature of more solid substance rather than a battlefield to be fought over.

Dr. NESS. I think I would just add a few things to this. I am in substantial agreement with my colleagues here. You mentioned first of all the question of ideological conflicts. We do see a fair amount of this in the region though primarily on the level of national states and international relations.

Of course we have the ideology and the ideological conflict. On the one hand a Communist ideology, which I would consider to be a coercive ideology. This I would set in opposition to an ideology of the

Western states quite generally which is one of a more open set of societies. I think there is this conflict which is there, and raging in the minds of some.

At the local level we often have a different kind of ideological conflict, which I think we can see in the way which local people are mobilized. Here all too often one of our real difficulties is that the conflict is between, on the one hand, the carriers of an ideology of welfare and change, and on the other hand the carriers of an ideology of the maintenance of the status quo, security and so on. We have often got ourselves on the wrong side of this.

There is continually some attempt to change our posture and stance. I understand we have a new ideology of revolutionary development in our political rhetoric, certainly from the President's office, and also apparently in AID as well, where this is becoming somewhat institutionalized. Whether or not this will be sufficient to insure that we stay on the right side of the local ideological conflict remains to be seen.

On your question of the new imperialism of China, I would again agree with my colleagues, and mention only that a good bit of the conflict we see with China in the region is not necessarily ideological, though this does play a large role. We see China acting like a big state. It wants to protect its borders. It doesn't really have difficulties with Burma now, though these countries share long borders.

Burma is however, closed to the rest of the world. This closure to the rest of the world undoubtedly insulates Burma from a great deal of Chinese pressure. If I am not incorrect in this, some of our difficulties with Burma earlier stemmed from our unwillingness or inability to assist Burma in reducing the conflicts with China over their border. As a result, we and others became unwilling intruders into that unhappy country.

Mr. MURPHY. Pardon me at that point. What effect did the Prime Minister's visit to Washington have in reference to the relationship between Burma and Red China?

Dr. NESS. I didn't follow this closely. I didn't see any immediate reaction. This was a very——

Mr. MURPHY. I mean the fact that the Prime Minister saw fit to come here.

Dr. NESS. You recall it was a very restrained visit. It was without a huge fanfare and it was little more than a visit. In one respect the visit I understand was thought advisable to balance the visits that had previously been made to the Soviet Union and to China itself. This made it more of an act of neutrality than an act of open friendliness to the West.

Mr. MURPHY. I thought it was more of an easing up of an estranged relationship with the United States.

Dr. NESS. This may be. I would just say that in addition to whatever ideological conflicts there are with China in southeast Asia, there is also the simple desire of a big state to protect its borders. It is very analogous to our problems with Cuba.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Let me announce that Dr. Huntington wants to catch a 4:45 plane. He mentioned earlier the need for self-help, equal participation, and matching effort on the part of the recipients of our aid, and there is no doubt that the panel will agree with that.

Dr. Huntington, you also stated that a national identity is necessary. Is that sufficient motivation? Short of a fear of Communist insurgency, what means can be used to persuade the regimes in the developing countries that it is in their interest, in their best interest to widen their political base, decentralize and allow some local initiative? I know we were on a higher philosophical plane, but I do want to bring the hearing back to rural institutional development in Asia and I want Dr. Huntington's reply before he has to leave.

Dr. HUNTINGTON. I think there is little that we can do in looking at the broad picture because it seems quite obvious that this type of development has to come from within. But I think we certainly can encourage governments which are friendly to us to move in these directions.

One can perhaps divide the governments with which we have such dealings into a variety of categories. There are some which are very anxious to do precisely this sort of thing. Here our assistance would be very largely in the technical and administrative realm.

There are other governments which have not as yet accepted the need to broaden their base. Here it is in our interest and in the long-term interest of those societies for us to use whatever leverage we may have in efforts to propel them in that direction. I frankly think that if we had played a more active role in the political development of South Vietnam in the 1950's, we might have avoided at least some of the troubles which we are confronting in the 1960's. But I don't mean by this that we should tell a government what to do, that we should try to export our institutions, because obviously the particular form which institutions will take will vary from one society to another, and the societies in southeast Asia are very, very different from each other as well as being very different from us.

It seems to me we do have a responsibility to encourage them in moving in the direction of broadening their participation for their own more peaceful development as well as in our own interests. The whole process of modernization tends to produce identities. One of the things that we are seeing in South Vietnam is the emergence of a South Vietnamese identity which didn't exist before. This is in part a product of the war and the changes that are taking place in the culture and in part of the fact that we are there.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do any of the other members have a question of Dr. Huntington? Otherwise we will excuse him so he can make his plane.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you very much for your valuable testimony.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Dr. Huntington.

Do you gentlemen want to comment on the question I asked of Dr. Huntington?

Dr. NESS. I should like to make a couple of comments. One is I think you are quite right in that we need to get the motivation of local people. We have to be concerned about self-help type programs. Yet I think we have to be far less concerned with the motivation of the peasantry, and far more concerned with the motivation of the leaders themselves.

The general masses of rural people, the peasants in southeast Asia, will use very well the things that we are able to provide through

technical assistance. More important, of course, is to get the self-help and motivation of the government leaders themselves. You then asked the very penetrating question of how this could be done.

Here I would claim to know very little and have very few ideas. Most people involved in the business of international relations and diplomacy would have better ideas of how to create specific programs to elicit local motivation. I would like to propose one kind of model that I think has been extremely successful for some very understandable and specific reasons. This is the model provided by the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction in Taiwan.

I think this is one of our great successes in the business of utilizing foreign aid to increase human productivity. We may not have, as far as we can see, increased political development, but this would be for other reasons. I would argue that what we have been able to assist in developing local farmers' associations and an involved and modern farm group will, with the passing of General Chiang Kai-shek and what one expects to be the change of base of power in Taiwan at that time, provide the institutional structure for a very stable and a very progressive political development following on the economic development.

The JCRR has been a very successful organization for a rather narrow set of reasons. Of course we were dealing in 1950 with a far smaller problem on Taiwan than we had on the mainland of China. Taiwan had a large corps of highly qualified young men from the mainland, trained agriculturists, economists and so on. More important, however, was the model of the Joint Commission itself which contained two Americans and three Chinese. This violates many of the canons of good aid activity where the people are supposed to do the development themselves. There was apparently some local opposition on the part of the American aid missions to this sort of thing.

Mrs. BOLTON. Was this because there were three Chinese and two Americans?

Dr. NESS. Because there were two Americans.

For example, a similar type of organization was proposed for the Philippines and was opposed on the grounds that development organizations should be directed by indigenous people alone. I recognize that I stand as something of a small minority on this issue, but I think the JCRR model is highly applicable to the Philippines, Thailand, and to Indonesia.

The important point lies in the autonomy given to the organization by having two Americans on the Commission. They were chosen for their own professional capacity, as were the Chinese Commissioners. Some of the autonomy came from the independent and well recognized professional quality of all the Commissioners. But some of the autonomy also came from the two Americans themselves. They were certainly in a far better position to present their claims and arguments against their compatriots in our foreign aid programs than were the Chinese Commissioners.

The autonomy and the high professional quality gave to JCRR the organizational capacity to evaluate the local situation, to see what needed to be done to increase productivity and welfare, and then to argue forcefully for the necessary programs. In one sense the effect

was to provide external support for those excellent local leaders who had the desire and the willingness to work for development in Taiwan.

It is important to see that some of the advantage in JCRR came from a rather simple structural provision, which gave to some foreign nationals a position and responsibility for local direction and execution. The dangers will be apparent, but I think the advantages far outweigh these. The advantages will be most powerful if high professional quality is used as the basis for the selection of the foreign nationals. Given these advantages, I think the JCRR model is highly applicable to other countries that do contain highly qualified local peoples; Thailand and Indonesia as well as the Philippines are excellent examples.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Ness, the JCRR was a two-Government activity, the Taiwanese and the United States.

Dr. NESS. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What is your evaluation as to the desirability of a multination activity perhaps representing the recipient and then perhaps the United States, Japan, Taiwan, or others?

Dr. NESS. I think the Joint Commission could be multinational rather than binational.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would it be preferable? What advantages do you see.

Dr. NESS. That depends I think on the local situation. One of the nice things about the JCRR was that the arguments in the five-man Commission almost never broke down on American-Chinese lines. The arguments cut across these and they were very professional kind of arguments.

If you had a much larger multination group, there would be greater possibilties of division within it. I think the most important thing would be to concentrate upon having highly qualified professional people in those positions, really first-rate agriculturalists, agronomists, economists, people of this sort of some independent stature who had great professional capacities to analyze the problems of productivity and development and so on. I could see some advantages in a multination arrangement—the advantage of image, for example. I don't think there is very much to discredit the idea.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Dr. Tilman do you want to add anything?

Dr. TILMAN. I am happy to add comments to what others have said. I think we are facing a major problem in the matter of setting local initiative. In a sense, it is something like organizing a club to foster anarchy; because once you organize the club, you have defeated the whole purpose of securing anarchy. How do you get local initiative without supervision? How do you create a nonorganization?

It is a real problem. My appeal is that we need originality and open thinking. We must somehow get things started at the lower level without appearing to start them ourselves.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. This is what we are groping for. It is one purpose of these hearings.

Dr. TILMAN. I am afraid that thus far we are in a better position to point out how things should not be done, except in the one case that Professor Ness has raised here. For example, I have been struck

by the developing democracy program in Thailand. Perhaps I should add that this is a laudable attempt to create a township-level council and utilize this as a forum for the villagers to express their views on politics or on what needs to be done. How have we gone about creating it? I say "we" because I have a strong suspicion that we had a great hand in creating the idea of a Tambon council. The Ministry of Interior published something like an eight-page order detailing the creation of Tambon councils which has been sent out to the village heads concerned to be posted on the walls for the people to read. Of course, most don't read. It is eight rather detailed pages incorporating one expression from the Gettysburg Address, which is not exactly indigenous to Thailand, and employing language that reads something like the oath from a low-level U.S. security check. One requirement was even for a "belief in constitutional government," which is interesting since Thailand has not had a constitution for almost a decade. I would suggest that anyone who subscribes to this provision must be subversive to the regime. The point I am making is this: Is this the way you go about political development? I am afraid it isn't.

Then you come back and say, "All right, if this isn't the way, how do you go about it? How do we encourage local participation without being the heavy-handed big brother? I really cannot say for certain, but my view is that we must avoid playing the role of the big brother. Let us not force participation on anyone, because the fact is it cannot be done in any meaningful sense.

One might create conditions that are conducive to participation, but one cannot create participation. Perhaps as a political scientist I should be interested in going out and engineering political change, but I am not. Rather I prefer to see the creation of infrastructures that seem likely to increase productivity and raise the standard of human welfare.

Hopefully, these will generate political demands, and at this point the political scientists should be available to counsel and advise. The real problem will be to assist political systems in developing a capacity to respond to these growing demands and to respond in a manner not incompatible with our own national interests. Hopefully, the next stage will increase popular participation, but this is a hope, not a natural law.

How one does it is another problem. I can only say we are all groping for solutions.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I can't agree with you more. As a member of the subcommittee that visited the villages in Thailand, we were deeply impressed with their desire to help themselves and they appeared as well organized as any county board in the United States. We met them and they discussed their problem with us.

I can't help but agree with you, though, because I wonder what happened after we left.

Dr. TILMAN. I am afraid it probably followed the pattern reported by Professor Ness. When the government came with a set of rules and regulations this embryonic organization probably disappeared because it was impossible to conform to the rules and regulations.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We are very pleased that they thought that the electric power, the light bulb, an innovation in their village, was really their doing.

Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Only this: It seems to me in all these new human relations, and by that I mean our efforts to help other people, and it is supposed to be in our interest to help ourselves and each other, it doesn't seem to me we have learned very much of what human understanding should be. I happen to have done some work in very poverty-stricken areas. It doesn't help them at all to clean out their house and leave it nice and good, unless you change the person who owns or takes care of the house. That is a problem. That takes time. Are we giving them time enough to recognize the fact that they need to change, if there is going to be any? They need to want something different.

Or do we do that? I haven't been in southeast Asia. I have been in Africa and I know something of that, but not in southeast Asia. Do we try to do that?

Dr. NESS. Do we try to give them the time that they need to change?

Mrs. BOLTON. Perhaps we are always impatient.

Dr. NESS. As far as the local people are concerned, I think we often underestimate their willingness to accept innovations that are clearly demonstrated to be in their advantage. We can look around southeast Asia and see most recently the Thai northeast peasants adopting kenaf when the jute crop failed in Pakistan and raised the price rapidly. Kenaf is a fairly decent cash crop in northeast Thailand.

If you look at the planting of rubber in southeast Asia throughout the 1900's, 1910's and 1920's, literally millions of acres of jungle land were carved out and brought into the production of rubber when peasants had to look ahead 7 years to see a return. These are people who obviously have some fairly rational capacity for calculating their advantages. They build the concrete toilets and the fences that the community development officers have them build because it will also be to their advantage. They will get the community development officer off their back.

It is a kind of short-range advantage for them. If we are impatient for them to build toilets and things of that sort, the advantages are not terribly clear. If we are impatient for them to adopt a new strain of rice before it is proven we are too impatient. Such development is not done quickly. It was done rapidly in Taiwan, and it took about 20 years to get the proper strains of rice and proper fertilizer for the soils——

Mrs. BOLTON. How about getting the proper strains of children?

Dr. NESS. I would be more concerned about getting the proper numbers than the strains.

Mrs. BOLTON. It includes numbers.

Dr. NESS. There again I think the willingness to accept family limitation programs, family planning programs, is far greater than we often understand. Certainly this is true in the Buddhist parts of southeast Asia. Our colleagues from Michigan operated a limited pilot project in Thailand, simply to get research data. They found women walking in from miles around to get one of the intrauterine devices.

I think we can easily sell short the peasantry unless we do recognize the great willingness to accept innovation clearly demonstrated to be to their advantage. They don't have large margins by which to make mistakes. The advantages must be pretty clear to them.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It must be very difficult when they had for centuries held the belief that the greater the number of children, the more it added to their prestige and security in their old age.

Dr. NESS. That works so long as half or three-quarters of the children born are dead before they reach adulthood. When you keep them alive they cost a considerable amount and then it becomes easier to demonstrate the advantage of limitation.

Mr. BUCHANAN. May I ask for a brief answer to one question? Would both of you comment on the role of private nongovernment agencies in the aid program and if there is possible value in some coordination, at least communication, with what they are doing on the part of our AID people. Would you have some comment on this general area of private voluntary aid programs?

Dr. NESS. Certainly the very biggest one in the world, almost rivaling AID itself, is the Ford Foundation. You have a number of other foundations as well. Rockefeller has been in this business for some time in southeast Asia and I think very astutely, too. The Asian Foundation is another. We have a large group of American foundations in the business of stimulating development. I don't know if you ever had testimony from these people to discover what their programs are. It is useful to view the foundation programs as a parallel aid agency. They certainly are conceived as such in the field. There are certain foundation representatives in Asia that are mildly considered informal ambassadors from the United States.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. A final question—although there are many questions that I have that are still unanswered, but time is drawing to an end. Considering this newly formed organization, SEADAG, which brings together the academicians and the experts from AID and other branches of Government, I am prompted to ask this question of both of you, but specifically Dr. Tilman: On page 4 of your statement you discuss the two worlds of knowledge and action. What suggestions do you have for increasing the exchange of information between scholars and academic specialists and Government authorities on matters of economic, political, and social development in the developing countries over and beyond what is already done? How would you bring the world of knowledge and action together so the world can move ahead?

Dr. TILMAN. I hope that it follows the world is going to move ahead after we have brought these two together.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If it doesn't——

Dr. TILMAN. We have problems.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The Lord help us.

Dr. TILMAN. How do we increase and institutionalize this dialog? This is a problem that is far broader than southeast Asia and SEADAG, or even AID and the academic world. Our president at Yale is becoming increasingly concerned about this question of the exchange of talent and the flow of ideas back and forth. At a luncheon only about 10 days ago with the president this was the major subject of discussion among the group.

It is again one of these things that we all approve in principle and then we discover how difficult it is to implement. I think Yale is moving ahead on this, though the precise forms this will take are still indefinite. I think the kind of thing that we started with SEADAG, which was the kind of activity foreseen in the Gardner report, has positive value.

I quite frankly would like to see it extended slowly to take in other areas of the world other than just southeast Asia. I think it should be an incremental growth, for it must occur as a need is felt. SEADAG cannot expand overnight. One has to go about this sort of thing slowly, though the model that we have here, if it continues to function as we think it will, might very well be applied in other areas of the world or in other departments of government.

I think my major argument here is twofold: (a) the principle is good, and (b) now let us expand it in an incremental manner rather than making a major assault. The frontal assault always frightens me.

Dr. NESS. I am in complete agreement. I would just add a few things to this. I think in the first place we shouldn't underestimate the extent to which there has been an increasing dialog not only between academia and all agencies of Government, but between Government and all centers of initiation, centers of knowledge, centers of information throughout the country. I think there has been a fair amount of this and we can be encouraged by it. There are two somewhat specific things I have in mind to move ahead in dialog. One would be an increase in the efforts that are being made to organize the kind of information we now have. There is a considerable amount of activity of this sort in various Government agencies currently, to organize information and store it in such a way so it can be retrieved easily. This is something we should do more with.

We have talked about this with the Far East Bureau for some time now. In AID we have the largest organization that the world has ever seen attempting to stimulate the development of other nations as a part of foreign policy. It has been at this business for 20 years. It has had a very rich experience and yet it would be very difficult for anyone to draw upon that vast experience.

It is very difficult to see that the experience itself is cumulative, that the mistakes and the successes we made 10 years ago in southeast Asia can be used to help us plan what kinds of programs we should create today. Just the sheer problem of getting at that past experience in the files is staggering. And the files are sadly lacking. AID's memory is now essentially lodged only in the heads, in the individual memories, of all the people in the organization and it moves around as they move around. This is not a sufficient organization of that memory to make it available to the Agency itself.

I should think that more attention to what we have called the organizational memory program would be a very useful thing.

A second specific measure concerns the structure of the contact the Government has with various sources of information. This might very well be made more efficient and more productive of a real dialog if it were structured in such a way to be an ongoing and consistent kind of dialog. What we have been doing with AID in our SEADAG operation in these seminars, we find to be extremely useful. We

find it important to have AID personnel meeting with us over an extended period. This avoids the one-shot "What kind of information do you have now" operation, and provides for a continuing discussion of a whole set of problems. In this particular structure we build up a kind of understanding of each other's problems and capacities, so that we can tap them more readily and they can tap us more readily.

I think that structuring for a dialog is a specific proposal that probably could be utilized in other agencies of Government.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much.

Now, if I may be so presumptuous and dare to answer my own question, let me say that the world of knowledge has certainly been brought before us this afternoon and you gentlemen have been the contributors

Thank you, gentlemen, for your fine presentation.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene Wednesday, March 8, 1967, at 10:30 a.m.)