RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1967

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:35 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will come to order.

We are indeed privileged to have before us Mrs. Claire Lee Chennault. Mrs. Chennault has just returned from an extensive trip to Asia and has agreed to give us her views on what is happening in China, as well as her views on other aspects of her trip to Vietnam and elsewhere.

I think at this point we might insert her biographical sketch in the record.

(The biography of Mrs. Chennault follows:)

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MRS. CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT

Name: Mrs. Claire Lee Chennault (Anna)—widow of Lt. General Claire Lee Chennault. News correspondent, writer, and lecturer.

Age: 41.

Citizenship: United States Citizen.

Religion: Catholic.

Office: Investment Building, 1511 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Telephone: 347-0516.

Residence: Watergate East, 2500 Virginia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Telephone: 333-7779.

Career: 1945–48, War Correspondent with Central News Agency, Kunming and Shanghai; 1945–49, Feature Writer, Hsin Ming Daily News, Shanghai: 1947–57, Public Relations Officer, Civil Air Transport, Taipei: 1946–57, Editor, Civil Air Transport Bulletin, Taipei, Taiwan: 1958–63, Chief of Chinese Section, Machine Translation Research, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; 1958–present, U.S. Correspondent, Hsin Sheng Daily News, Washington, D.C.: 1963–66, Broadcaster, Voice of America, Washington, D.C.; 1965–present, Special Correspondent to Washington, D.C.—Central News Agency; Lecturer; President, General Claire Lee Chennault Foundation, Washington, D.C.; President, Chinese Refugee Relief, Washington, D.C.

Membership: Overseas Press Club, New York, N.Y.; National League of American Pen Women; Writers' Association, Free China: 14th Air Force Association; U.S. Air Force Wives Club, Washington, D.C.; Flying Tigers Association; Republican State Committee for Washington, D.C.; Theta Sigma Phi.

Publications: A Thousand Springs, Paul S. Eriksson, Inc. (1962); Chennault and the Flying Tigers, Paul S. Eriksson, Inc. (1964); Way of a Fighter (Translated from English to Chinese 1955); Dictionary of New Simplified Chinese Characters, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. (1963); Telegraphic Code Chinese-English Dictionary (for machine translation), Georgetown University Press, 1963); Twelve Books in Chinese; e.g., Song of Yesterday, The Writers' Press, Taipei, Taiwan (1961); M E E, The Orient Book Store, Taipei (1963); My Two Worlds, Books World, Taiwan (1965); The Other Half, Books World, Taiwan (1966).

Women of Distinction Award, Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas, 1966; Freedom Award, Order of Lafayette, 1966; Freedom Award, Free China Association, 1966; Doctor of Letters Chung-ang University, Seoul, Korea, 1967; Discoverer of America Award, 1967.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mrs. Chennault, you have a prepared statement which you may read or summarize for the benefit of the subcommittee. If you will proceed.

STATEMENT OF MRS. CLAIRE LEE CHENNAULT

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, guests, I am honored to be asked to speak before this distinguished group. I have this prepared statement, which I herewith file, and I will orally summarize it in order to save time for questions and answers.

Last week I returned from the Far East and southeast Asia after spending a month touring Vietnam, Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. For the past several years I have been working as a lecturer on Asian affairs and have made trips to Asia three to four times a year to be sure of my facts. Not long ago I spent some time in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines. I know most of the Asian leaders and have very close contact with the people in that part of the world. I mention all this so that you may not think I am making my analysis on Asia out of books.

I grew up in China during the Second World War. When the Japanese invaded China, I was in the first year of high school; and, at the end of the Second World War, I had just graduated from college and was working as a news correspondent for the Chinese Central News Agency and other newspapers.

From 1947 to 1958 I worked very closely with my husband, General Chennault, during the Korean war and then into the Indonesia conflict. I understand and feel deeply what the people in Asia are going through today. At the same time, being an American citizen and having spent much time discussing Asian problems with the people in this country, I can also look at the Asian problem as an American.

Last year I lectured before about 60 groups of American audiences and I am very encouraged to know that the American public today is aware of international affairs and is concerned with the problem we face today in Asia.

The future of America and the free world is being determined by what is taking place in Asia. Therefore, as Americans, it is important for us to be realistic as well as to be well informed about the Asian problem.

May I say it is time for us Americans to stop acting like God, seeking perfection on earth, and start thinking like human beings about the reactions of human beings. Let us be realistic enough to look at the situation in Asia as a problem that concerns our own affairs and stop pretending that the only reason we help the other people is because we want to bring justice and freedom to other people. Let us face reality, that the reason we are involved in Vietnam: the reason we are so concerned with the power struggle in mainland China; the reason we are working so hard to encourage the Asian nations to work together, is because we want to safeguard our own security by keeping an Asian balance of power, and to prevent the Communist power from expand-

ing to a point where it becomes a present danger to us here. Collective security, shall we say, is formed for our own survival as a free nation.

We should not be ashamed to say so. I think the people in Asia and the world over will respect us if we are more frank on this subject. Like every other nation we have every right to act for our own protection, for our own interest, and make clear to the world our intentions.

If we speak the truth it will not only help to clear the atmosphere in Asia but also the confusions at home. Our hesitation, our indecision have confused both the people at home and abroad. Let's face it, today the war is not only fought by soldiers with arms, but also we are trying to win the hearts and minds of the people.

Any nation of strength and power, interested in freedom for people as a whole and for order in the world would have to do the same as we are doing now. The strength, power, and wealth of the United States is the greatest human accomplishment of our time, and the only hope for order and civilization in our time. The future of the free world depends on where we decide we are heading and we must know our way. We have to show the rest of the world clearly that way. The people all over Asia are still looking toward America as the leader, as the hope of freedom, because America is the only country that has the power and the strength to lead. After all, we are the most organized civilization which most for ourselves needs an organizable world and we alone have the power to help keep a free world organizable.

From Vietnam to India, Pakistan to Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Nationalist China and Korea, people asked me the same question over and over again—and I have been there many, many times—"Who is going to win this war in Asia?" And that is all they are realistically concerned with. Therefore, we must be equally realistic about our problems in Asia. One of the problems of America is that we have been so anxious to be liked, to be loved; yet it is more important for our friends and enemies alike to understand us, to respect us, and to know of our strength and our power. They only respect strength but not weakness.

In the last few years I have made many, many trips to Asia. During my many trips I have observed the most important events happening in that area. I think today the most important events are: No. 1, the power struggle in Red China; No. 2, the war in Vietnam; and No. 3, the political change in Indonesia. (Maybe we have been so concerned and concentrated our attention on the problem of Red China and the problem in Vietnam that we have not paid too much attention to this political change in Indonesia. Eventually this event is going to shape the future of Asia also.) No. 4, which is important and yet also encouraging, is the search for self-protecting unity among the free nations in Asia. Since I am limited to a short statement, I will try to give the committee some of the footnotes and then maybe later on we can discuss some of the problems in a question-and-answer manner.

First, I would like to mention the power struggle in Red China. Only 10 days ago I was in Taiwan and had the opportunity to spend many hours with the Red Guard escapees who had managed to get to Taiwan. I spoke to three of them. The first one was a high school student, Wang Chao Tien, age 19; the second one a college student,

Chao Pei Yuen, age 25, from Peking University; the third one a Ping-pong champion from Canton, Tze Pan Shen. When I asked them how they found out that the other part of the world had a better life than Red China, they gave me some interesting but rather logical answers.

Mr. Wang told me (he also told me about how he escaped from Manchuria to Peking and then to Shanghai and then Canton—we will talk about that later) that he had been reading in the paper about car accidents in America and Taiwan. For that reason the Communist press has been attacking Taiwan and America. He said to himself, "Now if those countries have enough cars to cause car accidents, they must have plenty of cars. If they have that many cars, the people must be better off than we are. In Red China we don't have any car accidents. We don't have any cars."

Secondly, he mentioned that he had read in the paper about the corruption of different governments of the free world. Yet their press was allowed to expose the mistakes of those governments. He said to himself if that was the case, those countries must be more democratic than Red China, because in Red China no one is allowed to criticize the government. The press is never allowed to expose the shortcomings of Mao Tse-tung. He thought to himself, if that was the case, if that country was freer and richer, that's the country he would like to go to.

Also the other witness told me he read that in America and even in Hong Kong and Taiwan the people have so much to eat that they waste food. He said, "In Red China we never have enough to eat. We never have any food to waste." He said, "We are always hungry." He preferred to be in places other than Red China, where there's food enough for all.

The interesting thing was when I asked these Red Guards of their escape. I said, "Where were your destinations besides Free China?" Many of the students talk about going to the Soviet Union. But they gave up the idea because of the severe winters, and they were concerned with the disputes with Russia and were not sure they would be welcome there.

So most of them try to go south to Nanking, Shanghai, and Canton. According to the Red Guards, their organization was very disorganized. In fact, I asked one of them what the reason for their joining the organization, and one of them said "Well, all the schools were closed, and we had nowhere to go. We didn't have enough to eat; by joining the Red Guard, we could go to see Peking, the capital, and we traveled free."

They got on the train and—with only standing room—traveled many days from northeast China to Peking. At one time there were about 1 million Red Guards in Peking. Yet many of them had no direction. They didn't know what they were doing. Everyone wanted to just join the group. They didn't want to be singled out. If anyone said "I don't want to join the Red Guards," he might be criticized. This was the way the Red Guard was formed, and many of them were talking about escaping, and yet they were afraid they were not sure how to escape.

One thing that really struck me was that all of the three Red Guards I talked to are excellent speakers. They were quick in re-

sponding to questions. I askd them how they were trained, and they said that from grammar school they had been trained to debate, to confess, to criticize, and to attack others, and therefore they had many years of training. Their idea was "If I don't attack somebody, somebody is going to attack me." I asked the Red Guards "What are the things that make you feel strange coming out from Red China to the free world?"

The Ping-pong player said to me "I think the skirts of the women are too short."

The other one said "Well, I would rather see the women's skirts short than to see the girls and the boys dressed the same like in Red China. They have one kind of uniform and you couldn't tell the difference between the women and the men."

The other thing they mentioned that was strange to them was that the movies from America and Europe were too sexy. One of the Red Guards said "I would rather see this kind of movie than see only the propaganda kind of movie in Red China, telling you to attack, fight, and to confess."

The 25-year-old Red Guard said to me he was not used to seeing people dancing the go-go. I said "Well, maybe if you stay in Taiwan long enough you might enjoy them." They told me many of the students were trying to escape yet they didn't know the way. Also they were talking about America and Russia. I asked them "Are the people talking more about American attack on mainland China, or Soviet invasion?" This student smiled and said "We know that the American attack is propaganda by the Government, but the Soviet Russian invasions of Inner Mongolia and Tibet, Sinkiang, and even Manchuria, this is serious and we worry about it very much."

I also want to mention the war in Vietnam. I was the first woman to have the opportunity to spend many hours with the Buddhist leader, Tri Quong. Many of you will remember he was partly responsible for overturning the government of Diem. Last time I saw him he was still on his hunger strike in the hospital. The day I saw him he was on the 56th day of his hunger strike. He had a scale in his room and he was drinking either beef consomme or orange juice, so I said to him "You are not on a hunger strike. You are on a liquid diet."

He said "I have to keep on going for my people."

We had a long talk. He mentioned nationalism and that the problem of Vietnam should be settled by the Vietnamese. We had many interesting talks. I learned he had been very, very quiet and this I think is due to General Ky's remarkable leadership, who has shown his strength.

I think every time the government showed its strength, the Buddhist power quieted down a bit. I have been very impressed with the leadership of General Ky. I think we have to remember a country like Vietnam has been under foreign control for so many years; we have to understand their feeling, and their problems.

During my tour around this country rarely did people ask me if people in Asia have enough to eat; instead the first question they ask is, "Are they going to have democracy?" This shows how litttle we understand the people. There can't be democracy when people don't even have enough to eat. First things must come first. What are the first things for these people? They are security and protection.

Only after you have given these people security and protection, stability of a strong government, then can you try to raise the standard of living and education.

After all these are accomplished then maybe we can talk about individual liberty and political freedom. Some of our mistakes have been that we try to enforce our kind of system on some of the countries we help. It won't work. Their backgrounds, their needs are entirely different from ours. I think this is part of the problem in Vietnam.

Conditions in Vietnam are looking up, particularly on the economic front and political front. In September they are going to have their elections. The Koreans who are playing a big part in this war in Vietnam—about 50,000 Koreans there—are doing a wonderful job. The National Chinese are helping the land improvement project in Vietnam. This is important because we don't know how long this war is going to go on, and in war you also need to produce food to feed the people and the soldiers.

I took a whole day traveling outside of Saigon, to Bai Hua, to look at some of the farming projects. I think this is the kind of project we should encourage. The farmers today know that if they have a new method to produce, they can do better, and many of them even showed me the cabbage, the vegetables grown from their farms. They were very happy working together with the free Chinese from Taiwan. This kind of project has been encouraged by the Chinese Government and the Vietnamese Government.

I should not neglect to say that I have always been impressed by the fighting spirit of our men in Vietnam. They are doing a marvelous job. I think here in this countr ythe least we can do is to give our fighting men our complete support, but not confuse the issues.

I remember one day I was speaking with the chamber of commerce in Malaysia, and I ask these people, "What do you think of U.S. involvement in Vietnam? Are you for it or against it?"

They said "What are you talking about. Of course we are for it."

"Why don't you come out and say so?" I asked.

"Because in the States you people keep on arguing about it. We want to wait for you people to make up your minds before we make any comment."

In Singapore—of course they have always been sort of standing in the middle and not saying too much about this—the professors, the students, the businessmen I talked to, all said to me: "You are doing the right thing in Vietnam. As long as you stand firm, you will have friends. But if you hesitate, if you show hesitation, indecision, then you will lose your friends."

This is the situation in Vietnam. Then I went to Indonesia. During that time I observed many of the demonstrations, for Sukarno and anti-Sukarno. I had the opportunity to talk to many of the students. I asked their opinion, because today the political change in Indonesia has given the people in Asia certain significance. The significance is that if this could happen in Indonesia, a country that has been under the Communist influence and control for so long, and yet all of a sudden this political atmosphere changes, if this could happen in Indonesia, maybe it could happen later on in other nations under Communist control, maybe even in Red China.

I think this is important and has real significance for the other people in Asia. The interesting thing I have observed in Djakarta and other cities is that the Indonesians believe in slogans. They write all kinds of slogans on the wall. I have observed the people busily washing the wall almost every week because one day the pro-Sukarnos come in and then next week they have a group anti-Sukarno, and then the slogan will be washed off and new slogans written on the wall.

Today we are all much concerned about the way the Indonesian Government, headed by Suharto—is going to dispose of the power of General Sukarno. Timing is very important. It is too early to predict whether Suharto's hesitation is the right or wrong thing to do. I think only time will tell. Definitely, Sukarno's power is being decreased.

Finally, I want to mention the new look of the free nations in Asia. The cooperation amoug many free nations—the Koreans, the free Chinese, the Philippines, the Thai, etc., they all realize that in order to get help they have to help themselves. As America, we can't go around and help every nation in the world who needs help: eventually we have to draw the line. We should help only those nations who are on our side, who are willing to help themselves, who show some results after getting help from America, who help us to carry out our objective in Asia. Some of the nations have accomplished such objectives, such as the Nationalist Chinese, the Koreans—certainly everyone who has been in Korea can't help but be impressed with their hard work and their 5-year program being created by President Park. And in Taiwan, we all know since the beginning of 1965 we have stopped our aid to Taiwan and its land reform project today is the shining example not only in Asia but all around the world. Many times I have seen the so-called farming experts from Latin America, from Africa, in Taiwan to learn from their farming improvements. This is the kind of self-help we like to encourage in other nations.

The Philippines are also trying to improve many things at home. They have sent engineers and medical groups to Vietnam. This is the friendly gesture they show toward America. The important thing for America to do is to keep our strong friends on our side, and at the same time try to build up the weaker nations in Asia to prevent them from falling into the Communist orbit.

This is all going to take time and patience. We can't expect miracles. But I think our attitude toward particular Asian countries should be based on a realistic appraisal of their value to the United States.

Right now, in many Asian countries, what the people need is not so much participation in a political party, but effective and responsible government which can protect the country from the Communist infiltration and Communist aggression, and at the same time maintain peace and stabilization in order to give the people better living conditions.

To sum it up, their need is first, security, and second, food. When these things are well established, then we can talk about individual liberty and political freedom. Not long ago I said to some of my audiences: "When the girls working on the farms have a few dollars to buy lipstick or high-heeled shoes, I don't think these people will join the Communists."

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(The complete prepared statement of Mrs. Chennault is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF ANNA CHENNAULT

I am honored to be asked to speak before this distinguished group. Last week I returned from the Far East and Southeast Asia after spending a month touring Vietnam, Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan and Korea. For the past seven years I have been working as a lecturer on Asian affairs and have made trips to Asia three or four times each year to be sure of my facts. Not long ago I was in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines. I know most of the Asian leaders and have some familiarity with the people in that part of the world. I mention all this so you may not think I am making my analysis on Asia out of books.

I was a newspaperwoman growing up in China during the second world war. Later I worked closely with my husband, General Chennault, who was then head of the CAT airline during the Korean war and then into the Indonesia conflict. I hope I understand and feel deeply what the people in Asia are going through today, while at the same time being an American citizen and having spent much time discussing Asian problems with people in this country I can also look at the Asian problem as an American.

I lectured before more than 60 American audiences last year and it is most encouraging to know that the American public today is more aware of the many problems we face at home and abroad over developments in Asia. I don't think we can overestimate the importance of the events taking place in Asia today. The future of America, the future of the free world, is being determined by what is taking place in Asia: therefore, as Americans it is important for us to be realistic as well as informed about Asian problems. May I most gently say it is time for us as Americans to stop acting like God seeking perfection on earth and start think like human beings about the reactions of human beings. Let us be realistic enough to look at the situation in Asia as a problem that concerns our own welfare and stop pretending that the only reason we help the other people is because we want to bring justice and freedom to these people. Can we face reality—that the reason we are involved in the Vietnam conflict, the reason we are so concerned with the power struggle in Mainland China, the reason we are working so hard to encourage the Asian nations to work together is because we want to safeguard our own security by keeping an Asian balance of power to prevent the Communist power expansion to a point where it becomes a present danger to us here. The collective security we talk about is for our own *own* survival as a free nation. We should not be ashamed to say so—and it confuses and bewilders other nations that we do not say so. Haven't we like every other nation every right to act for our own national interest and make clear to the world our intentions: why does our image require us to pose as completely fascinated "idealists?" If we speak as others act, and as we in truth act, we will gain respect and credibility not only from our friends but from our enemies and it will even clear the atmosphere and confusion at home. Our hesitation and confusion today has confused both our people at home and the people we help all around the world. As a nation there is no reason for us to be apologetic for our action in Vietnam. Any nation of strength and power interested in freedom for people as a whole and for order in the world has to do the same. The strength, the power and the wealth of the United States is the greatest human accomplishment of all time and the only hope for order and civilization in our time. The future of the free world depends on where we are heading and we must not pretend we do not know it and accept the burden of our strength. If America fails the world will fail with us. As President Johnson has so clearly seen and stated we have to stand across the path of aggression disorganizing the world because there is no one else capable of standing there. But I have confidence that this country, the United States and her people, will have the eyes to see where its own bread is buttered and the will to stand fast and help the rest of the world become free enough to stand with us for an organizable world. After all, we the most organized civilization have like the British before us the most stake in keeping the world organized to live the way we live and to do business the way we do business.

From Vietnam to India and Pakistan to Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Nationalist China and Korea, people asked me the same question: "Who is going to win this war in Asia?" At the present stage of things—no matter how they got there—that is all Asians care about—who is going to win, the United States or the Chinese Communists.

During my many trips to Asia I have observed that today the most important events in Asia are (1) the power struggle in Red China, (2) the war in Vietnam, (3) the political change in Indonesia, (4) the searching for self-protecting unity among the free nations in Asia. Since I am limited to making a short statement I would like to give you some background information concerning these four events before I try to answer any questions you may have.

1. THE POWER STRUGGLE IN RED CHINA

Ten days ago I was in Taiwan and had the opportunity to spend many hours with Red Guard escapees who had managed to get to Taiwan. The first one was a high school student, Wang Chao Tien; the second a college student from Peking University, Chao Pei Yuen; the third a ping pong champion from Canton, Tze Pan Shen. When I asked them why they came and how they found out that the people outside of Red China have better opportunities than Mainland China these are the things they told me. Mr. Wang gave me these three rather logical reasons for choosing the free world. He said the Communist press has constantly attacked America and Taiwan on many things but particularly about our automobile accidents, corruption among government officials and business organizations, and waste of food. But then Mr. Wang analyzed this criticism to conclusions in favor of the free world. If we have automobile accidents he reasoned it must be because we have a lot of cars. If that is the case the people must be better off than in Red China because in Red China no one owns a car and there aren't enough cars in the street to cause accidents. As for corruption Mr. Wang argued with himself in Red China the press wouldn't allow discussion of corruption; if the press in America and Taiwan is free to expose and criticize corruption and mistakes of the government there must be a free press and if the government allows a free press the people must be freer than those living under Mao Tse Tung's regime.

Lastly, concerning waste of food, since China has gone through one starvation period after another there is never any food to waste for actually there is never enough to eat. If the other part of the world has enough food to waste the people must be well fed. If that is the case, he would certainly rather live in the capitalist world or the imperialist world than in Red China.

Other interesting things the Red Guards told me: when some of them were planning their escape there were two destinations being considered—one, Soviet Russia and two, Taiwan; however, most of them eliminated Russia because of the long distance and the severely cold winter they were afraid they might not survive. Above all, they were also afraid they might not be welcome in Russia.

We cannot overlook the influence Soviet Russia has on the Chinese particularly the Soviet Union's movements in this so-called power struggle of Red China. Russia has always been trying to get control of China: in fact, Mao Tse Tung's government was put in power with Russian help. Many people I have talked to in Asia particularly in Hong Kong and Taiwan believe that after the China power struggle subsides there might eventually be a Russian controlled China including Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang and maybe even Manchuria, and only the rest of China being Chinese controlled. It may surprise you but many refugees I have talked to coming out of Red China say the real concern today of all people in China is a Russian invasion rather than an American attack.

If you study the Red Guard abberations you realize that there is a political vacuum being created in China with Mao Tse Tung ordering the Peoples' Liberation Army to move into a political field where they don't belong because the loyalty of the Army to Mao Tse Tung has become questionable. These Red Guards are really just easily enthused Chinese children who have become a powerful and dangerous force employed for violence by men engaged in political struggles. The Red Guards have learned the use of denunciation in order to survive themselves in this sad and troubled land.

I was surprised to see that all three of the Red Guards I talked to are excellent speakers, quick in response to questions. They explained to me that they have been trained ever since they became students to debate, to confess, to criticize and to attack; therefore they were well trained in the ability to speak in self-defense. They also told me that the students joined the Red Guard because all the schools were closed (the high schools but not the colleges have just been re-opened) and they had nowhere else to go and also that no one wanted to be singled out as an individualist and refuse to go along with the gang. Many of them joined the Red Guard just to get the opportunity to get

away from home. In November last year there were over one million Red Guards in the Red Capital.

Since last month Mao Tse Tung appears to be putting the brakes on the Red Guards. Many of the Red leaders realize the so-called cultural revolution is hurting the country's economic and political strength. The Chinese industrial and agricultural capabilities were already away below the standards of modern nations. Their economic development was hurt first by the so-called great-leap-forward. Now it has been grievously set back further by the cultural revolution.

In the months to come in the effort to put the house in order Red China's Prime Minister Chou En Lai will be the man to watch. I said that last year and I say it now. Regardless of how the wind blows, Chou who has the best finger to the wind in Red China will play a very important part in Red China's future.

History proves revolutionists seldom make good administrators. Mao is a revolutionist, Castro is a revolutionist, Sukarno is a revolutionist. They were successful in overturning the regimes they denounced but put their countries in even worse shape. Chou is a revolutionist but a shrewd administrator.

As the Red Guard ping pong champion told me, Mao Tse Tung kept on telling his people they have to sacrifice for the better future of their country, but the people have been sacrificing for over 20 years and they wonder when the future is coming. It has been so long in coming that they are tired of waiting and they do not want to go on sacrificing the present in the name of nationalistic pie-in-the-sky. They want to have enough to eat now, to be able to go to school now and to have clothes on their backs now.

I'd like to mention a light side of our conversations with the Red Guards. When I asked them what seemed strange to them in Taiwan they began with this—women's skirts are too short; however, they would rather see women wearing mini-skirts in Taipei than pants in Peking. In Red China both men and women wear the same kind of uniform. You can't tell the difference between them even if you look close and life is happier when you can tell the difference easily.

One Red Guard also mentioned that some of the movies from America and Europe are too sexy; however, they also argue that they would rather see the sexy movie than the only kind of films made in China, i.e., propaganda, which keep telling you to fight and to confess.

Their third criticism was about the free world having so much to eat that they waste their food. But the college student Mr. Chao said he would rather see people have enough food to eat or even to waste than to live in a society where people go hungry all the time. And finally the young people in Taiwan make these Red Guard escapees uncomfortable because they all agree they will never be able to learn to dance the go-go.

2. THE WAR IN VIETNAM

In Vietnam many people feel that the major danger is not a military defeat. In fact they are confident the United States is capable of bringing this war to a military close. But everyone is deeply concerned about a subsequent diplomatic disaster. The Communist tactic is to keep us in Vietnam as long as they possibly can; therefore we will either win this war quickly or lose it slowly. The obviously urgent things for us to cousider doing are these: (a) blockade the coastline denying ammunition belug sent to the enemy by our supporters and our so-called allies; (b) continue to destroy every military target of the Viet Cong; (c) bomb whatever military targets and supply facilities there are anywhere in Hanoi and Haiphong but inform the civilians of these two areas to evacuate; (d) encourage the free nations in Asia to participate even more and in every way they can in the struggle in Vietnam.

I am a General's widow and I feel strongly for the safety of our military personnel first. But I have not failed to think of other considerations and I have listened hard to others than U.S. military men. I was the first woman to interview the Buddhist leader Tbi Quant two years ago. I accompanied the Korean Prime Minister Chnng I Kwon to Vietnam on Friday 15 and I had an opportunity to talk to many local leaders and many ordinary people. I interviewed in Salgon the Korean general who is responsible for the 50 thousnnd Korean men fighting in Vietnam today. Only two weeks ago I went out to Bai Hao 40 miles out of Saigon to visit the agricultnral experts from Taiwan working in Vietnam where they have an agricnltural improvement program which

bas been very successful. This is tbe kind of project and the kind of participation by Asians we should encourage as much as possible.

General Ky has always impressed me as a remarkable leader. And 1 particularly want to mention as a real hope in the situation the Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington, Dr. Bieu Diem, whom Prime Minister Ky sent to Washington. The Ambassador is one of the most able Vietnam leaders 1 have met. He is a civilian and a newspaperman whom some of you may have seen on Meet the Press.

Of course in Vietnam today besides trying to win the war on the battlefield those who are trying to free Vietnam are also busy preparing for the election in September. Regardless of what is going to happen in Vietnam in tbe next six months we should have a long range plan concerning not only the fnture of Vietnam but the fnture of Southeast Asia as related to the situation in Vietnam. Remember, in Korea for many years after the cease-fire American soldiers have had to stand guard between south and north Korean borders.

One important thing we have to remember is that most of the conntries in Asia have been under the control of foreign powers and now they have a first fixation on trying to free themselves from any foreign control. In Vietnam we are trying to repair the damage the French and the Japanese as well as the Viet Cong have done. For 25 years these people have been fighting for their independence and we can't expect miracles from effort sustained that long. A military victory will help bring political stability which will give a chance for economic improvement in Vietnam. All this will take time but first things must come first and security of life and limb comes first. I believe that we are moving forward toward giving tbem that so they can give themselves the rest of what we think of as the fruits of freedom.

3. INDONESIA

The political change in Indonesia is important to Asia becanse it has proven that all the efforts of the Chinese Communists to gain control of thia richest land of Asia have failed.

The failure of the Red Chinese movement of infiltration in Indonesia, in Cuba and in some of the African countries certainly has great effect on Mao Tse Tung's plans. At the same time the Indonesian political change could inspire other nations and perhaps eventually some of the Chinese in Red China to overthrow totalitarianism and communism. General Suharto has been cautions in the manner of disposing of Sukarno but there is every reason to believe that Indonesia will play an important part in Southeast Asian economy in the years to come.

4. THE NEW FORWARD LOOK AND COOPERATION AMONG THE FREE NATIONS OF ASIA

They have dared to take in their hope that the United States will stand firm against the threat to them of Red China's A-bomb has inspired many Western visitors. The world in Asia is not the same as 10 or 20 years ago or even before the Manila Conference. The young people now growiug up in that part of the world now dare to want to live with dignity and free from foreign control. We have to treat these people as our equals in freedom and help them to help themselves.

Today the strong Free Asian countries are not only daring to form a more united front to protect themselves from Communism but are also taking a more active participation in winning the war in Vietnam. Taiwan has sent agricultural assistance to Vietnam to help the farmers to produce more food. Over 50 thousand Koreans are already in Vietnam fighting.

The Philippines which were having their own troubles from Sukarno-inspired and subsidized subversives have sent engineers and medical groups to Vietnam. This is the kind of action we should encourage. The Communists have emphasized Asia for the Asians. We should counter-attack such psychological warfare with our own plan of Asia for the Asians. Let us help people who are willing to help themselves.

To this end therefore we ought to encourage a more united front for all free Asiau countries and a more active participation of all free nations on the Vietnam war.

For a long range program we need a more concrete economic program to make all these countries decently self-sufficient in the fundamental necessities of life so that we will not have to continue to help them for too long a period and a psychological program to make these people believe the trnth that we are their friends and that we really desire to preserve peace and an organizable world in Asia.

Today the U.S. is engaged in a world wide struggle with the Communist powers over organization of the world for an organized peaceful world in which we can live or a disorganized world in whose troubles the Communists can fish for power is the kind of a world they want. Our attitude toward Asia should be based on a thoroughly realistic appraisal of their value to the United States.

Right now in many Asian countries what the people need is not so much of participation in a political party but an effective and responsible government, which can protect the country from Communist infiltration and Communist aggression, and at the same time maintain peace and stabilization in order to give the people better living conditions. To sum it up in two words, their immediate needs are food and security. When these things are well established then it will be time to talk about individual liberty and political freedom.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Madame Chennault, for an excellent statement. We are indeed happy that you have agreed to share your views and observations on your recent extended trip to Asia with the subcommittee.

I will call upon our esteemed colleague, the distinguished lady from Ohio, Mrs. Bolton, to lead off the questioning.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to have Mrs. Chennault here. Here is a whole page of the things you have done and been. We are deeply honored.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Thank you.

Mrs. BOLTON. Some of us who revered your husband so very much are particularly pleased that you have seen fit to come before us. I read your remarks last night with the greatest possible interest, and am so glad to have you do what you have just done by coming here: make them more real and human.

I think the attitude you have is quite one that we need to encourage among ourselves. Would you feel that it would be useful if there were an organization—I don't know whether you saw in the New York Times of February 7, "Out of the War in Vietnam, Victory for Mankind." It is a very interesting bit. It is from the World Institute Council of the Institute of International Information in New York. I have read that with great interest. It would seem as though it fitted in with so much of what you have said that the free nations of Asia and that area of the world should get together, that no one nation can do it alone. It has been my thought that no Western nation could really do it, especially not alone.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. There is no question that the United States needs to achieve an even closer relationship with Asia in order better to understand Asian problems. These Asian countries also should be taking ever-increasing responsibility for their own economic, social and political development.

It would, therefore, certainly be worth while to look into the possibility of establishing such an organization as outlined in the article you mentioned. However, if any organization is formed, it should include not just theoreticians, but practical, experienced people such as technicians and military types.

Mrs. BOLTON. Two or three little questions. What is the age of what you call students? Are they like the South American students; do they get to be men of 40 or older or are they students as we really understand the word?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. You mean the students in Asia?

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. In Asia we have students of all ages. I think for the last 10 or 20 years the world in Asia has changed so much.

When we look at the situation, the people, the whole environment, the atmosphere in Asia, it is changed. We have to look at it with an entirely different attitude; the situation and the faces of Asia are not the same as before the Second World War, or even after the Second World War.

The young people today in Asia naturally are idealistic, like those in this country. Particularly they want to gain identity. They want to, shall we say, gain independence. This is the thing they are seeking, and therefore today we have to treat them on equal terms.

I have said in my statement the power struggle in Asia today is not a matter just concerning bullets and soldiers, but a psychological struggle. The important thing is how to win the hearts and the minds of the people.

The young people today want to have other people respect them. They are much better educated, whether they are in Communist China, free China, or in Malaysia—even in Vietnam. They want to build, shall we say, a new Asia by the Asian people?

Of course, their idea is fine but they realize they need help. As I mentioned when a student wanted to escape they were thinking about whether to go to the Soviet Union or free China. So it would depend today on who comes and gives them the help first in the right way.

Again, this is the field in which we are competing with the Communist group, whether it is Soviet Russia or Red China. The students today certainly are very hard working people. They, of course, are also for peace, but not peace with unreasonable conditions or surrender to the Communists.

I am sure today that even in Red China the young people never have had any experience with freedom, yet they know they do not want to live under this totalitarian system for long. A group of students mentioned to me the reason they escaped was they were tired of sacrificing in the name of nationalism and independence, to drive a foreign power from their country. The people began to ask, "Well, we are willing to sacrifice 1 year, even up to 5 years, but we have been sacrificing for the last 20 years. First we had the 5-year plan, then we have the 'Great Leap Forward.' Now the so-called cultural revolution. We are tired of all the sweet promises. We want to live better now."

I have here an analysis of this cultural revolution which is too long to be read, but I hope it will be included in the record.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Madame Chennault, without objection, your analysis of the cultural revolution will be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to appears on p. 185.)

Mrs. CHENNAULT. People in Red China are beginning to think. They ask: "How long do we have to continue to sacrifice? We don't have a whole life to sacrifice." They know there must be something wrong about the Communist system, even those Red Guards. When they read in the papers, the Communists' attack on the free world, it has the opposite effect on them. They start thinking, "Well, all right, so the free nations have corruption, but their press has the freedom to criticize this corruption, so they are freer than we are; they are better off."

Mrs. BOLTON. I think you made a fine point and say it well.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think as people have better education they will have a mind to think. If they have the mind to think, truth and

knowledge will help keep us free. A free and democratic government has to be supported by the well-informed public.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you very much. We are reduced to 5 minutes for each of us.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I talk too long. My husband always said I talked too much.

Mrs. BOLTON. We are very grateful for your talking.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It isn't the chairman's intention to close off further discussion, but the lady's time has expired.

Mrs. BOLTON. We are apt to have the last word, Clem, you know.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am afraid of that. One satisfaction in being chairman is that I rap the gavel and close the meetings.

My questions, Madame Chennault, are only intended to develop more fully for the record what we understand to be your views and observations.

Starting with your closing statement on page 6, you say that the people of many of the Asian countries need not so much participation in a political party but an effective and responsible government.

Immediately the question arises in my mind, How can they have an effective and responsible government without a political consciousness on their own part?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think when we look at the other countries and when we talk about democracy, sometimes we might be inclined to judge the other nations by our own standard. When you talk about democratic government, the people in Vietnam, for instance, I have been traveling in that part of the world for many, many years, talking to the people, and I can see the people gradually beginning to grab hold of the so-called interest in politics or in their own government. But all this needs education first.

When you said "How can they have a responsible government without their political consciousness," this all comes with education also. For instance, some years ago when we talked about free elections in Vietnam, many villagers, the farmers, they didn't even know who should they vote for. Communist agents would move into those villages and would tell the people, "You vote for such people. If you don't do as I order tomorrow your whole family will be murdered." That was the case some years ago.

Now when I say "a responsible government to give them protection," I mean a government which will say to the people, "All right, you are free to vote; you will not be forced to vote for such and such a person and we'll protect you." Gradually the people will begin to realize they do "belong," and be proud of their own country.

Last year when they had the elections in Vietnam, 80 percent of the people went to vote, against the Vietcong's warning. For people are beginning to realize that it is their responsibility to build a better government.

However, I don't think that we can expect the kind of democratic government being established now in many of those nations that we have in this country, because all of this is going to take time. A military victory will be a foundation for political stability, economic improvement; at least a military victory will help to accomplish this objective. It is going to take time.

Today I think many of the governments we help are such that we are not even satisfied with or are against their system, but we have no realistic alternative. Either we are going to help a government that is friendly to America or the government is going to be friendly with our enemy.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. To pose the question in another light, let me go to the second part of your closing paragraph where you sum up in two words that food and security are the first order of business in some of the countries of Asia, even at the cost of individual liberty and political freedom.

The implication is that the United States is wrong in attempting to institute democratic procedures in South Vietnam.

We don't intend, I hope, to transplant democracy as we know it, but shouldn't there be some assistance on our part to develop democratic institutions.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes. We are right in doing so, but shall we say, sometimes we are too anxious. In other words, what is first? What comes first? Are we going to accomplish a military victory or some kind of settlement first? Are we going to do all this together at the same time? Or are we going to improve the food production and at the same time reorganize their government?

Sometimes when we have been too anxious for a certain governmental system to be established—we create confusion. For instance, I mentioned that I have many times talked to this Buddhist leader Tri Quong. His idea naturally was against all foreign interference in his country—which includes democratization.

He mentioned that his country would not like to have any foreign interference, because they wanted to be independent. At the same time he was criticizing his own government.

I said, "All right, suppose this government is not perfect, that you are not satisfied with this government." I said, "Do you have any other substitution for General Ky's government. He said "No." He said, "I am not a politician." I said, "All right then. Who do you want to lead this country?" He had no answer. I said, "In this time during the transition we have to rely on certain leaders to lead the country until we find a better formula."

General Ky mentioned to me many times: "I am not a politician, I don't even want to be the President of this country, but at this time we are at war, and until we find a better leader I have to go on working to lead my country." I think he is right in that respect.

However, we also have to study the background of a country like Vietnam. For many, many years, first they were under the French control; later on, under the Japanese control. These people have never had any experience of self-government. Therefore, they need time to build up a stronger government, and during this time they will learn from their own mistakes.

That is why I think education is important, and I think when people have better education, when the people have more food to eat, when they are not so hungry, gradually they are going to demand a better government, and work for a better government. But until they have the security and the protection to form that kind of government without interference, without being overrun by the Vietcong, it will

be too much to expect that Vietnam today can have a perfect democratic government.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. With the members permission I will ask one further question. A principal purpose of these hearings is to determine where our aid can help or where our aid has failed. So, let me just ask, do you believe there can be an abundance of food or more food and security without some sort of community rural development programs?

We were repeatedly told and when in Vietnam we were advised——

Mr. MURPHY. Are you speaking of Vietnam?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Yes, because Vietnam is where we have given large amounts of military assistance and even greater quantities of economic assistance. At the present time we are told that while we are winning the military war we are not winning the hearts and minds of the people, many of whom, we were advised, are not at all concerned about what happens in Saigon.

Unless they are awakened to a political conscionsness where they have a knowledge of government on a local basis, where they can then develop an allegiance and loyalty to a central government, can they ever really have security or sufficient food production?

Therefore, what are your views as to a need for a governmental supported community development program in order to secure the country and to make the economy viable?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. That is what I mentioned I believe in as a part of psychological warfare. We have to improve on this front. Everyone has the confidence that we will win the war, but how are we going to win the hearts and minds of the people? This is going to be a long-range program.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We don't want to win the hearts and minds of the local people for the United States, but we want it for their government.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Exactly. In order to help them they have to be on our side, in order for them to get help. But in such a program the Asiatic nations today should be given more responsibility. Make them realize the meaning of helping themselves.

Taiwan is sending many of their agricultural experts to Vietnam. Chinese and Koreans are Asians. The Communists have been talking about Asia for the Asians. Maybe we can borrow some of their theories to use some of the Asians to help us carry out some programs and projects.

I was told that the Koreans, for instance, once they move into a village, really protect the people, and work together well with the natives. They can understand them better, and be more patient than we Americans, and they are willing to work with the people. So are the Taiwanese from Nationalist China: I have seen them actually working in the farm together with the farmers.

There was one story that one of the Chinese told me. At first even the Chinese when they went into the farm, the farmers looked at them with suspicion and they were not even cooperative. The farmers said, "Maybe it is just another group of foreigners coming in to tell us what to do." For the first week this group of Chinese in order to show the farmers that they were really there to help them—they went to the farms—did all the work while the Vietnamese farmers

just stood there and looked. After a week they finally got to talk to each other. Of course some of them speak their language. Eventually when the harvest came the farmers asked, "You mean all these products belong to us? We don't have to send them to the government?" "This is all yours," they were told, and the Vietnamese were very happy.

One farmer and his wife, for a whole year had just wanted to eat a chicken. The Chinese expert said to him, "Now you can buy more than one chicken." They were very happy and they gave their cooperation.

On this aid program, therefore, we could supervise yet we should make use of the Asiatic personnel. The friendly countries of the Philippines, the Koreans, the Nationalist Chinese, can do some of the work for us on a theory of Asia for the Asians. I think that will get better results.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much. I am sorry that I took so much time.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman. Mrs. Chennault, I would like to address my first question to page 4 of your prepared statement regarding the war in Vietnam.

You say:

> In Vietnam many people feel the major danger is not a military defeat, in fact they are confident that the United States is capable of bringing the war to a military close, but everyone is deeply concerned about a subsequent diplomatic disaster. The Communist tactic is to keep us in Vietnam as long as they possibly can: therefore we will either win this war quickly or lose it slowly. The obviously urgent things for us to consider doing are these: (a) Blockade the coastline denying ammunition being sent to the enemy by our supporters and our so-called allies: (b) continue to destroy every military target of the Vietcong; (c) bomb whatever military targets and supply facilities there are anywhere in Hanoi and Haiphong but inform the civilians of these two areas to evacuate.

My question is, in view of certain interest on our part in getting this Vietnam question before the conference table, and certainly in view of the statements made by some very prominent citizens on the other side of the aisle that we shouldn't even be bombing in the north, are these recommendations that you are advocating to this committee, endangering the chances of getting it to the peace table for discussion?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. May I say very frankly that we have been talking about peace but never really gotten much response. It takes two parties to negotiate.

This is the criticism that the people in Asia have for us. In other words, some of the people said, "Well, you just can't bring the Communist to the conference table while you fight on Monday, talk peace on Tuesday, and negotiate on Wednesday." They just simply ignore us.

Many people mentioned that the only way to bring the Communists to the conference table is to show them that we are ahead, we are on top. Until then we are wasting our time to talk about a negotiation.

In Asia today, the people say, "All right, make up your mind you are going to win this war, please; show your enemy your strength and your determination. If the Communists know that you mean business, you won't have any trouble bringing them to the conference table."

In fact, our confusion in this country has created a confused feeling in Asia of many of our own U.S. people, who say to me, "With all your help, our aid to many of the free nations, why are they not completely on our side? Well, because they are confused, they never know where we stand.

The Communists have taken advantage of our confusion. The Communists come out and say on the front page of their newspaper, "This war in Vietnam is not supported by the American public." I have read that kind of statement in Communist papers all over Asia.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Aren't you concerned, though, with the expansion of this war? Don't you have any fear that Red China might come in under any circumstances, or the Soviet Union?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I would say "No." Particularly now, Red China today has enough trouble in her own land. If Red China ever wanted to invade they would have done it a long time ago. They wouldn't have waited that long. From the many people that I have talked to and the information that we have received, the Red Chinese are not capable of getting involved any deeper in the war in Vietnam.

However, they are using this propaganda of intervention to frighten the Western World. In other words, they keep on saying, if you move one step further, we are going to come in. They have been saying this for a long time. The Communists have a theory in Chinese words, "Da da, tan tan." "Da da" means to fight. "Tan tan" means to talk. To fight to their advantage and then to talk to their advantage. So they are trying to keep us in Vietnam as long as possible until maybe one day the American public's patience will wear out. Then maybe some day the Americans will say to the Government, "All right, we are tired of this war. We are tired of getting our boys killed. Let's bring them home regardless of what kind of consequence we have."

This is the kind of danger that most of the people who understand the situation in Asia are much concerned about.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would like to say that I share in your feelings about bringing more Asians into these reform projects in the rural areas. I think this is true not only in Vietnam, but in other countries of Asia as well.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I think this is probably one of the best suggestions I have heard in a long time. I am hopeful our committee will go into this thoroughly to review the entire aid program on this basis.

I am aware of what the Taiwanese and the Koreans are doing in Vietnam. I think it is an outstanding job as far as the rural development and working with the citizens. Certainly the citizens trust these people because they are Asians. I certainly want you to know that I endorse your recommendation.

I hope that the Congress this year will review our program in this particular area to see if we can't utilize some of the friendly Asian nations in participating in some of these important projects.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame, I agree with you in your answer to Mr. Broomfield in reference to the invasion of Indochina by Red China. My position was predicated on Red China's military and defense posture, and that

they are not in a position to invade Indochina, because of their own defensive vulnerability and especially with the containment by the United States around Red China. Another reason for the Red Chinese not to invade Indochina is because of the lack of food supply.

China with a population of over 700 million and an expanding population of 12 million every year, aggravates the food problem.

My question is, when you were in Hong Kong and with your many contacts of people in that area what is the effect of the withdrawal of people from the agricultural areas to the cities along with the Red Guard as it applies to the inadequate food supplies? How are the Chinese populace going to be fed if the people are leaving the farms?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. As many of you might know, I was appointed by President Kennedy as the president of the Chinese Refugees Relief in 1962 when thousands and thousands of hungry people were coming out from Red China.

Today with this so-called culture revolution and the forming of the Red Guards in many areas, the farms are being neglected, and the result, actually the damage, is not clearly shown yet. Wait until harvest time—this really is hurting Red China. That is why recently Chou En-lai (whom I consider one of the most clever politicians in Red China) had come out recently (just last week) telling all the people to go back to their farms, go back to their schools.

The high school is being reopened now. They realize the damage the Red Guard has done. This is the biggest problem of China—the shortage of food. That is why some time ago Red China has had the ambition of gaining control of southeast Asia, the rice bowl of Asia.

Although, because of their own problem and disturbance at home, they won't be able to do anything right now—they will never give up this idea—where to find food. This is why we are so concerned with their shortage of food problem; we will always face the problem of Communist expansion to go somewhere to find food. The immediate problem that Red China faces is not only the shortage of food but even their industrial production is decreasing, because all the factories are being neglected due to the formation of the Red Guard. This power struggle in China today that we have talked about, will put Red China in a dark period. In a way, it helped the free world to see the real face of Red China.

Mr. MURPHY. Pardon me. Do you believe that Mao Tse-tung will be successful?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Even if he is successful it will only last for a very short time, because real divisions have been created. Eventually China will be a departure from Mao Tse-tung's China. What direction it will take maybe it is too early to predict. We know Soviet Russia has been supporting anti-Mao elements in Inner Mongolia.

Mr. MURPHY. And Sinkiang.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes; and in Tibet and Manchuria. In all this area the Russians are paving the way. We won't say they will control, but they will have great influence in that part of China.

The southern part—from the Yangtze River south—the people are closer to the free world, closer to Hong Kong, to Taiwan, and to the Western World. These people will fight for a freer China, hopefully with outside help. We won't be surprised if Mao's China will be di-

vided into two Chinas. Not the kind of two Chinas, Taiwan and the mainland, some people have been talking about, but two Chinas, one part in the north being influenced and controlled by the Soviet Union and the other part maybe by the free world.

This is a great possibility.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Chennault, do you think the present difficulties in Red China will be settled within a reasonable time?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I would say it is going to take a certain length of time.

Mr. WHALLEY. Are you talking about years?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes; years. This is just the beginning. In the past—even 2 years ago—I have had many debates, arguments with some of our so-called Chinese experts. They believed that Mao Tse-tung was well-established. There was no question of his power. I mentioned that there were many facts that prove that Mao Tse-tung was having trouble 2 years ago. But many of our people said "No, he is well established."

Trouble that has been creating and forming in Red China for some time has come to an explosion. The reason Mao Tse-tung created the Red Guard is because he did not trust the army; he found the army had divisions. Even many of his trusted lieutenants had shown certain disloyalty.

Chou En-lai and Lui Shao Chi—I met them after the Second World War—Lui Shao Chi leaned on the Soviet Union, Chou En-lai trained in France. Both Chou En-lai and Mrs. Chou En-lai are working as a team. They are very clever. I think Mao Tse-tung's theory about communism and how to run a country certainly is outdated, even for his own people. This is not the kind of system they want any more, because his theory failed to produce a better life.

The 5-year program, the Great Leap Forward, all these programs failed. But Mao still wants to grab his power. As for Lin Piao, the reason he came so far ahead and on top is because people considered him the hero of the Korean war.

How long are these Red leaders going to last? When we look at the whole group of these so-called Chinese Communist leaders, their average age is about 65. The young people, there are many of the young Chinese Communist leaders whose names are not too familiar to the Western World, will move in.

A good example I mention in particular is Liao Chang-Chi. He has been sent out to many of the Eastern European countries as representative of Mao Tse-tung. I know this man very well and he is one of the ablest Chinese Communists. Whatever direction Red China is going to take, today it is too early to predict. But we know that China is going to change individual leadership, but they will continue to practice communism. Though what kind of communism they are going to practice, we don't know, but we can be sure it is not going to be Mao Tse-tung's communism.

Mr. WHALLEY. The Communist army in South Vietnam is made up principally of men from South Vietnam. If South Vietnam really wants liberty why do these men from South Vietnam fight so desperately on the side of communism?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. This is not entirely true. We hear so many reports that the Vietcong are very dedicated soldiers. But I have been to one of the so-called Vietcong prison camps (in South Vietnam they have created an area to take care of some of the prisoners). Some of these soldiers are only 13 and 14 years old. So we know the Vietcong have a shortage of manpower also. These people are fighting for an idea. They have been told that they do not want foreign invasion and they must fight for their own independence. Some of them, of course, are being forced to fight. Many of the young soldiers know if they don't fight their families will be in trouble. They have their families as hostage. This is the system of conscription that the Communists use.

I don't believe that many of them are dedicated soldiers. Many of them are forced to fight. I think their fighting spirit is breaking now. There are many many proofs. Due to our bombing the Vietcong know that they cannot keep on fighting just because Red China and maybe even Russia have said "We want you to keep on fighting."

I don't think Ho Chi Minh today has the sole say of what he wants to do. Yet their propaganda is superb. Maybe we should borrow some of their methods to tell people that to live in the other part of the world is better than to live under Communist control.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mrs. Chennault, on page 2 of your statement you ask the question, "Who is going to win the war in Asia?" And you respond by saying that—

> At the present stage of things—no matter how they got there—that is all Asians care about—who is going to win, the United States or the Chinese Communists.

Does this mean that most people in Asia think that the war in Vietnam is between the United States and China?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I would say partly "Yes." They all realize the fact that we are fighting this actually to prevent Communist expansion. We have been saying only that we are going to bring justice and freedom to help these people. Yet if we come right out and say "All right, we are also concerned about our own safety, because security and protection for the free world as a whole cannot be separated," I think we will have better support. The people in Asia realize they are not strong enough, they don't have the power strong enough to defend themselves. They have to depend on a powerful country to help them and they realize this fact. They are not ashamed of this fact. They always want to side with the stronger power.

Today in Asia we also realize there are some countries that stay neutral, and yet deep inside they know the reason they can afford to be neutral, is because the United States is there to protect them.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you think the relationship is between Hanoi and Peking

Do you think that Hanoi is under the thumb of Peking? Do you and most Asians think this is true?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes. When Ho Chi Minh gained his power as when Sukarno gained his power in Indonesia they had to use outside Communist support. So today all Asians look at Asia and say, who is the powerful Communist country and naturally they look at Red China.

Yes, I think Ho Chi Minh is still under certain control by Red China.

Mr. HAMILTON. May I put the question this way: Do you think Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi could make the decision to negotiate even though Peking was strongly opposed to it?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. It will depend on how strongly we put our trump card on the table. Today I would say the decision and the outcome of the war in Vietnam depends more on how Americans act than the Vietcong or Ho Chi Minh act. I think it is up to us more than it is to them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Does Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi have sufficient political independence from Peking that they can make a decision to negotiate contrary to the wishes of Peking?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes, if we show enough strength and power. You see, the situation and the atmosphere change every year, particularly now—last year China was having her own problems, even Ho Chi Minh realized that Mao Tse-tung was very busy putting his own house in order.

Many people I have talked to feel that this is the right time for us to put more pressure on North Vietnam, that we might be able to bring them to the conference table, that now Ho Chi Minh even without complete approval by Mao Tse-tung, might be able to deal with us alone.

Two years ago if you asked me this question I would say "No." Today I think there is a great possibility that Ho Chi Minh might want to say to Mao Tse-tung, "All right, you have your own trouble. You go ahead and worry about your problem and I am going to worry about mine."

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to get your attitude toward the U.S. power in Asia. We have had some witnesses speak of the arrogance of power. We had a witness before this committee several days ago who said it was not so much a case of the arrogance of power by the United States as an unconsciousness of our power in Asia.

How do you feel about the power of the United States in Asia? How would you characterize it?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Let me say that I don't think we have to be apologetic or ashamed of our strength and our power. Today naturally we are trying to keep the balance of power. We are not trying to fool ourselves that we are going to eliminate the Communist power completely in Asia. We are trying to keep the balance of power and tell the other side, "Let's don't move. If you move, we have the strength and will move too." The majority of the people want to be on our side. They look toward America as the hope of their freedom, as the hope of their protection. That is why it is so important for us that we show our strength and our power. I think if we show more of our strength and power we will have more friends openly on our side.

One of the leaders in Korea talked to me about American power. He said, "Now in America, you have democracy. Democracy is a wonderful thing and yet sometimes it has its shortcomings. You can't be counted on to continue with a certain policy because every few years you change Presidents. Due to the change of Presidents and your administration change, a certain policy, a certain project will not be carried out."

He was talking privately about the American power and so forth. I thought it was an interesting comment.

Mr. HAMILTON. May I direct your attention specifically not to military power but to economic and political and social power. You make the statement in your remarks that for a long-range program we need a more concrete economic program to make all these countries self-sufficient in the fundamental necessities of life.

Again, referring to another witness this committee has had before it, he took the view that we should not seek to play the role of leader in Asia but of a friendly outside supporter. We should not sponsor political, social or economic change in Asian countries, though we should be responsive to their questions.

Do I detect a difference in opinion between that witness and you as to the use of our economic and social power in Asia?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. No, I think that your witness was correct to say that we should not try to interfere in their political matters. But there are certain areas where they do need guidance and they do need help and supervision. We cannot talk about the whole area in Asia as one example. I think different areas have different needs. In Taiwan, of course, this is a well-advanced country and their land reform project has been working so well, and they have political stability; therefore, their needs are different from Vietnam.

In Vietnam they have been fighting a war for 25 years, and again their political situation is different and their need is different. In Korea for the last few years we see this change of gradually working toward improvement and self-sufficiency, and again this is a different situation. I don't think that we can just lump together Asian nations and say there is one plan with which we are going to work with all of them.

I think we have to study each country according to their needs. However, I do say that we should make them work for their support. In other words, we will only help them to help themselves. I think this is the most important program. With some of the countries, if they don't show any significant result after getting so much help from the United States, then we should reconsider our help to them.

I don't think the United States can continue to help every nation who needs help.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mrs. Chennault, is there any danger that our perpetual suing for peace in Vietnam could create the impression in Asian minds of weakness and lack of resolve rather than a genuine desire for peace with justice?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. As I have mentioned many times, the timing is important. I think we have been bending backward in seeking peace—of course our President mentioned the door for peace is always open and this should be our attitude. However, at the same time when the other side ignores us—as Secretary Dean Rusk says, "Every time we talk to them they hang up the phone." How many times are we going to allow them to hang up the phone on us?

So before the Communists or the Vietcong agree to come in to the conference table, the actions we are taking in Vietnam should be continued. Some of our people talking about "Let's pull for stopping the bombing to give them a chance to talk for peace." When we stop

bombing we give our enemies the chance to rebuild and get supplies to their military installations, and many of our men will be sacrificed for that action.

We might be idealistic and we might want to talk peace, but at the same time I think we should be most concerned about the lives of our young men who are fighting in Vietnam today.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you. I must agree.

As I understand it, perhaps the only thing on which Chiang Kai-shek's government and the Communist government on the mainland of China have agreed in the past is that there is one China rather than two, no matter how unrealistic this may seem to many other people. Do you find any sign of any degree of support for Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland of China, and do you find anything in the present situation that might indicate a more immediate fall of communism on the mainland?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Most of the information we receive comes naturally from the southern part of China, Canton, Kwangtung Province and some of the fishermen coming across the sea from Fukien Province to Quemoy and Matsu, and of course they have brought with them many of these posters, and even the anti-Mao slogans and how some of the people talk about the return of the free government to mainland China.

I think today people looking at the situation agree that the situation is such that regardless of who is or is not going to return to mainland China, the mainland Chinese do not want the Communist control in China forever. People are really getting very dissatisfied with the Communist system; they don't want to keep on sacrificing.

I think this is the situation, and maybe the opportunity that the free world can take advantage of: To keep their hope alive, so that we can hope that one day China will be friendly to the West again.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would assume after all these years there would be very little reason for substantial support for Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland of China, because the Communists have been in power for some time, and as I understand, his support was primarily in the cities where they have been highly organized.

I wondered if the thing you mentioned in quoting the Red Guard attacks upon Taiwan and the United States may have sustained in this negative manner, a certain amount of support for the Government in Taiwan.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. As we realize in Asia today most of the people today depend on their land. They are poor people. So what are the basic requirements of these people? To have enough to eat, to be able to send their children to school, to have a better standard of living. This is the basic thing.

When the people have a chance to make comparison, they look at Taiwan and they realize the people in Taiwan live better—I have visited many of the farms in Taiwan, many of these farmers have two televisions. This never happened before.

I said "Why do you need two televisions?"

The farmer said "My daughter wanted to look at a different program."

This is the thing that would never happen in Red China today. People make comparisons and say "All right, I prefer that kind of system run by the other government." All they care about is "Do I

have enough to eat, clothes to put on my back, can I send my children to school?"

If we can answer these questions positively, then they are on our side.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Chennault, I join my colleagues in being delighted to have you here before us. I am fascinated by your statement.

One of the things that hit me the hardest, and in which I certainly concur, is when you said their propaganda is superb, and that we ought to do more in this field to demonstrate that it is better not to let the people be forced to live under the Communists. I would agree with you that we should perhaps step up our propaganda. In fact, we have been trying to get some kind of signal across on this subject to many people over in the Senate of the United States.

We so far have not been successful.

I notice here your remark about the Red Guards. It seems to me we have a great many things in common with the Red Guards. I know just how those Red Guards feel in Taiwan where you indicate that the young people in Taiwan make the Red Guards uncomfortable, because they all agree that they will never be able to dance the go-go. I know just how they feel.

I think there is a great hope that we can bring about a detente with some of the things that make the Red Guards unhappy. I notice too that here the wisdom of China comes through brilliantly. I have been trying to get my four daughters to realize this, that in Red China the people wear the same uniform, and you can't tell the difference. I think this is something that we ought to try to convey to some of our teenagers.

The thing that I am quite interested in is, one of the real problems that exists today, and some of the discontent and frustrations here in our country, the United States, your country, is that there seems to be a refusal on the part of some people to believe that we are really talking about the same thing.

For instance, many of our people seem to say if we get into a bombing pause, that that is really what Hanoi wants as a precondition to talks. On the other hand, the President, and the Secretary of State, keep insisting that what they say, and in fact that is what they say, is that they want us to promise unconditionally and permanently that we will cease bombing, that if we do they may talk somewhere along the line.

There seems to be a feeling that there is a breakdown in communication as to what these words mean. Do you think that it could be possible that they don't know that we would accept a pause, and that we don't know that they are not really saying unconditionally—promise to the world permanently, forever, that we are not going to bomb. I would like your comment on that.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think the Communists understand us perfectly. Maybe sometimes we ourselves don't understand some of the statements being heard around this country. They understand what we think.

In China there was a famous general, and he said "To win a war, you not only have to know about your own people, you have to understand your enemy." I think they understand us perfectly. Each time

some people say "Now you stop bombing and then maybe we can try to get the people to come and talk." Have we ever put any condition telling North Vietnam what conditions we have on them? We have tried this so many times. Each time only giving them the opportunity to build up their strength, giving them a chance to move more supplies.

The last time I heard that they were even using bicycles to move the ammunition to kill more of our men. I think the time has come, regardless of whether some of the people disagree, we have to make up our minds—are we really going to bring this war to a close? If we are going to do that, then you have to show your strength first, instead of your weakness.

You have to show your determination first instead of your indecision, and your confusion. It is very simple. I think again we talk about the psychological struggle. Today the people look at this situation in Vietnam like this: If America, a country with such power and such strength, cannot even settle a problem in South Vietnam, how are we going to expect the rest of the world to still look at America as the leader of the free world?

I think this is a very important issue involved in the whole conflict in Vietnam. I think particularly now is the time for us to show our strength.

In a country like America, and I myself, talking as an American citizen—and I have many experiences debating with many of our professors—maybe it is time for us not to depend so much on theories, on diplomatic analysis, but take some practical advice and end this Vietnam war.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would just like to say this: You then feel that they are quite clear on what we are talking about as to what a pause is? Do you think we clearly understand them when they say "unconditional, permanent cessation," that they mean exactly what that says?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think they understand us perfectly.

Mr. GALLAGHER. You don't go along with the theory that we are talking of apples and oranges, and if we could only talk about some merger of those apples and oranges, that we could come to a solution. You really feel—I don't think some of the people on the other side of the Capitol understand, and some of the professors who have been here, that there is a clearly enunciated program set out by both sides, that we say we could pause and accept a pause and then go ahead and talk, but on the other hand they say a pause is not good enough. "What we want is for you to promise to the world unconditionally and permanently that you will cease bombing."

You feel, having seen both of them, the issue is clear cut?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Right.

One point I want to mention. We are gallant people. We want to be loved and liked. Let's face it, our friends are not going to like us and love us. If we have strength, they will respect us.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I have to ask you this, Madame Chennault. I agree this is probably right, but on the other hand Mr. McNamara could pick up the phone this afternoon and get into the war room in Saigon and he could probably win this war this afternoon sometime. But the impact of all that—how could we win the war? Shall we destroy

North Vietnam as a viable society? And then if we do, of course we can do that, that is quite easy——

Mrs. CHENNAULT. When we talk about winning the war, to what degree? This is another point. Actually when we talk about winning the war, we are just seeking for the right kind of negotiation. Am I correct?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Winning the war means depriving, in our terms, depriving the Communists of having the control of South Vietnam, so freedom, or whatever choice of government they want, they can have.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. You have to have the Communists willing to come into the conference room and talk terms.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Not necessarily. They just go home and let the people in South Vietnam fight it out.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. When I was in Vietnam, actually in a way it was humorous, but yet to come to think of it, it is rather tragic. They estimate that it will take, is it, $300,000—I am not sure of the figure—anyway, it would take a lot to kill one Vietcong. Someone said to me "Why not give them a thousand dollars and tell them to go home?"

Mr. GALLAGHER. We will probably try that.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. They said "All right, everybody will join the Vietcong and lay down the arms and go home."

When you look at the suituation, what we are seeking is what we have in Korea, we still have North Korea and South Korea, but they have stopped fighting. Let these two parts of Vietnam establish their own governments and let them compete with each other. Today South Korea shows more strength and more progress than North Korea. This will be the final issue of Vietnam, too.

If the war should cease as to fighting maybe North Vietnam and South Vietnam would have the opportunity to compete with each other. I think this is the way I understand it, that we want to try to give the people a chance, and tell the Vietcong "All right, go home now. Don't fight any more." This is a very clear message.

Then you ask me how are you going to stop this?

Mr. GALLAGHER. You said we should show more decisiveness and strength and bring this war to a close, I think that is what you said. How do we do this? We can't bomb this war to a close and really win anything.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes. Today you know that many of the supply lines are not completely closed. Some people criticize the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, because we are going to kill the civilians. On the other side, what about our men? Four hundred and fifty thousand Americans out there, and every day they are being killed.

In war I don't think that you can refuse to take that into consideration.

Mr. GALLAGHER. You would not have any objection to bombing Haiphong?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think you have to continue the bombing. At the same time tell the civilians to evacuate. In the Second World War how many civilians were killed? In the Korean war, many civilians were killed. First you have to consider your own people, and then—well, the civilians of North Vietnam, if they are killed, this is a war.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The hesitance is because we are trying to consider

the people in South Vietnam and North Vietnam, and somehow get the message across with a minimum of killing. You don't really feel——

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think the longer we wait, the more people will be killed. This is the danger. Just by hesitation, by indecision, this is not going to help us. We are talking about sending more men to Vietnam. I am not really for that kind of method of keeping on needing to send more men.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If they are down to fighting 13-year-olds, it seems to me they will be down to 8 pretty soon.

Mr. CHENNAULT. They are in bad shape, too. Look at the enemy's side, they are in bad shape. As we show more strength, there is possibility they will be willing to come and talk peace. Until then we will have to keep on carrying on this war.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What do you mean by "carrying on the war"? I happen to support the President's program. What more can we do?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. One thing that I would suggest. Let's stop the people in this country from constantly saying that we must stop bombing, that we must now talk peace regardless of what condition. I think this is the confusion. We have been sending the Communists the wrong message. We have been sending the message "All right, we are willing to talk. Don't you fight us any more."

I don't think this is the kind of message that will get us anywhere. If we send the message to them that we are determined to fight if they don't stop, they will understand this kind of message.

Mr. GALLAGHER. You don't think they have that already?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I would say that they don't quite get it. Even I don't quite get it.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We have a lot of people there——

Mrs. CHENNAULT. You have people there——

Mr. GALLAGHER. If they are down to 13-year-olds——

Mrs. CHENNAULT. One week we said we are going to stop bombing and talk peace. We make lots of noise, and the Communists just laugh at us——

Mr. GALLAGHER. You are talking of certain selected Senators?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Right.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. May I interrupt to say that I would like to get the hearing back on the track; that is, exploring our policy as to what it was and what it should be in trying to prevent future situations like Vietnam.

I think we could discuss all afternoon how we could win in Vietnam, or how we could bring the war to an end. Let me ask this one question, and then we can get away from the Vietnam war. There is a tendency to classify people in the United States as either doves or hawks and I have been called an eagle. Which category, if any, is delaying the winning of the war in Vietnam—the hawks or the doves? Which group is contributing the most to a delay in the Vietcong coming to the negotiating table?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think this question is very difficult to answer because people always even ask me "Are you a hawk or a dove?"

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I was about to ask the same question.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. A superhawk.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think in war——

Mr. GALLAGHER. I wouldn't say you were a dove.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. In war today, particularly in Vietnam, the military people, the generals, they are doing the right things. I think we should give them the opportunity to try to bring this war to a close.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much.

Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Way in the beginning of everything, before you got to be so interesting I couldn't think of it any more, you used the word that they "confess." What do you mean when you use the word "confess"?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I am talking about the Red Guard.

Mrs. BOLTON. Yes.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. In the classroom, maybe in the morning, they will go to the class to study history, mathematics, and in the afternoon, every afternoon they have meetings, and the meeting is more or less like a confession meeting. You criticize each other.

Today this is the way the Communists train the students. That is why I mentioned they are all very outstanding speakers, because they have been trained that way to protect themselves. Each day if you don't talk, another student told me, if you don't talk then you must have a guilty conscience because you are keeping quiet. If you talk too much, then they say "Now you have really committed so many mistakes, how are you going to correct yourself?"

Each day they have this kind of continual bombardment of confessions, of checking each other to build up the suspicions against each other. I do want to mention one thing about the family tradition in China. Many of the people in this country say "Now China can never go completely Communist because they believe in the family traditions." The family tradition is completely broken in China.

For one example, for the last few years Mao Tse-tung and the regime have been advocating that students should go down to the farm. They call it "Shah fong," it means go down to your lower level to work with the workers, the farmers. Many of these so-called intellectuals, naturally they don't want to go. College students, every year they have to go to the farm maybe two or three times a year to work, and they don't like it.

So how do they build up the hatreds between the parents and the children? If the father is working for the government or for a firm, the president or the head of the firm will tell this man "Now your son is supposed to arrive at a certain farm on a certain day—February 5 he is supposed to be there." They will ask the father "Do you understand this?"

The father will say "Yes."

"All right, if your son is not there on February 5, do not come back to work."

So naturally the father will have to force the son to go. Yet the son does not want to go. This is the kind of conflicts which are happening in the family. The father, because of his job, maybe he has to support his wife and the rest of the family, he will have to force the son to go. This creates hatred between the parents and children.

This is one way for them to break the family system. When I asked them "Do you still believe in the family tradition?" this young boy and the others said "What family tradition? We don't talk about this any more. There isn't such a thing any more in China."

Mrs. BOLTON. We could sit here all day long listening to you because we just don't have people coming here who have been there in the way you have, who go so frequently as you do. We have great confidence in you.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Anytime you want to talk to me, just call me.

Mrs. BOLTON. It has been a pleasure being here with you this morning. Your headquarters is here?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I have an office here in Washington. I take trips quite frequently. I try to keep myself informed. Sometimes I have some rather tough audiences. I have the protesters, the marchers, the professors who believe that communism is good for the world, and so forth. I have been well prepared.

Mrs. BOLTON. We will trust you wherever you go.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What can we learn from our experience in Vietnam where the rural populations were mobilized by the Communists through promises of land reforms, what can we learn from that experience? Do you think it necessary to broaden—I am coming back to my earlier question—do you think it necessary to broaden the democratic institutional base of most of the developing countries before the rural population can be mobilized by communism?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. To answer your question in two parts, even in Vietnam the situation today is changing. Two years ago the Vietnamese people told me "At the front door the national army comes and collects taxes, at the back door at the same time the Vietcong is collecting taxes." The situation is changing now. We have more people there now. The farmers have better protection.

Now I think we are doing better work because once we move into a village or to a certain area, we will try to protect the people and also try to bring in the head of that village and say "Now this is your responsibility to take care of these people. We will try to protect you the best way we can."

I think before this was organized, because of the war, the army—and our not having enough people there—maybe in the morning the national soldiers occupied the village, and in the evening after they moved out, the Vietcong moved in. This is a situation that is changing gradually now.

Our President is also talking about the Delta Area where most of the rice is being produced, and so forth; we are beginning to move into that area. The Vietcong have occupied most of that area before. But gradually they are being moved out and we are moving in. This is a very important change.

At the same time the other countries I think are doing the same. We must remember in Malaysia how long the British fought the guerrillas: over 10 years. When anybody talks about how we are going to be able to end the war tomorrow and everybody can come home, it is fooling ourselves.

Korea: Ten years after the cease-fire we still have to have men stationed there to protect freedom.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have the impression, Mrs. Chennault, that on the basis of your observations from your visits to rural areas of Vietnam and seeing firsthand, some of the pacification and rural construction efforts on our part, that you are satisfied that progress has been made?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Definitely.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Perhaps there might be some additional improvements. Can you suggest some?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think again we need more Asian people working there. When I went out to certain areas—I won't mention the name of the areas—I did not tell the American Embassy, I did not tell the Chinese Embassy, because I thought that at the time it would be unfair for them to be responsible for my safety, so I went out with a Vietnamese and Chinese in an old beatup car, and I just wore a shirt and slacks and people looked at us and thought we were Vietnamese. The people on the farms told me and some of the Chinese workers told me, at a certain time, it might be dangerous, sometimes the Vietcong tried to sneak in. But they said "Don't worry," because farmers realize now that this farm they work on belongs to them. Whatever they produce is going to be theirs. And they have a sense of belonging, what they work on is going to be their products, so they take better care of it. Because of this, they try to protect whoever comes to help them. This man told me "Don't worry. If there is any suspicion of any Vietcong trying to sneak in, we will inform you," and they try to protect us because we are trying to help them.

This is the thing that is encouraging.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. From your observations, have you found overwhelming support for General Ky and the Saigon government, or is there some displeasure and feeling that rural reforms and land distribution is not in pace with their desires?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. To say that General Ky is a perfect leader would not be the truth. Of course like every leader he has shortcomings. However, today I think he is considered the best leader his people can have at this time. Certainly in the last 2 years he has shown his strength.

After all, their country has gone through 25 years of war. They are trying to experience, shall we say, self-government. I think when we find a man who can at least hold his country together, it is also to our advantage to give him support. The Ambassador he sent over just recently, Dr. Bui Diem, is one of the very capable men in Vietnam and one of General Ky's most able lieutenants. By the way, he was with the civilian government, with Quat, 2 years ago. He was the only member of the predecessor government that General Ky has kept with him. He is a very able man.

I think just this action by General Ky shows his strength and his ableness by sending this capable civilian to Washington. I think he realizes today the most important place to keep good relationships is with America.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Madame Chennault, I think a key phrase in your answer to me was "for this time." For how long do you visualize a military type government will have to be there before a civilian government can come in?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think this will depend on how soon we will be able to bring this war to a close. I think a military victory will help to bring political stability and economic improvement. Of course all this works together. It depends on the timing and how we are going to bring the war to a close.

I have every reason to believe that General Ky himself actually—in fact, he told me once and we have had many conversations together and he said "When the war is over, when my country has peace, I want to go back to fly an airplane. I don't want to sit in an office."

Mr. ZABLOCKI. He told the same thing to the subcommittee when we visited. Then you will agree that a military government is not the answer for Vietnam, or any southeast Asian country for the long run?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I have observed history in many countries in Asia. Outstanding revolutionists seldom make good administrators. Does that answer your question.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It certainly does.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Could you give us your thinking on Indonesia a little bit more. I know you have touched on it. I was concerned as to what General Suharto will do with Mr. Sukarno, and the economic situation there and what hope you see for that country?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Of course we all realize that Indonesia is the richest country in the whole of Asia, or maybe in the whole world. Their natural resources are so great. There is no reason for that country to become the poorest in Asia today, all due to Sukarno's mismanagement.

Today when people question whether the revolution to strip the power from Sukarno is almost over they ask, "But why don't they sort of dispose of him?" I have heard two schools of thought.

One group says "All right, let him get out of Indonesia and take all his women with him." The other side says "Well, he still has certain supporters, particularly in the middle part of Indonesia, for instance Java," and also I was told that some of the police are also his supporters. General Suharto is careful not to try to create any more trouble.

I don't think Suharto wants any more fighting. If and when Sukarno goes, he would like to see him go quietly. They were successful in sending his fourth wife, this Japanese woman, to Japan. I think at that time they were hoping that he would follow her.

But up to now it seems to us that Sukarno is still not willing to give up his title, or even to leave the country. I talked to some of the students, and asked them their opinions about Sukarno, and many of them feel that maybe we shouldn't push him too hard, maybe we can ignore him and let him make his own mistakes and eventually he will just disappear. Let's hope this is true.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Do you feel this is the time for the United States, even on a limited basis, to consider bilateral aid, or do you feel that any aid that goes to Indonesia should be on a multilateral basis?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think it won't hurt for us to wait for a little while more to see how things are going to go.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. There is no assurance necessarily that General Suharto looks to the free world, but there is one thing we are reasonably sure about, that he is not tied to Peking, isn't that correct?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. He is not tied to Peking at all. Of course every country, as I have observed, is sort of taking the "wait and see" attitude. I am sure it won't be very long now until the decision will be made: within, shall we say, a few months. Then we will have an answer. I think the answer will be encouraging.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. The other thing you mentioned, of course, on this Asian participation, do you think an Asian peace corps over there would be a good program similar to the U.S. Peace Corps, working with these countries in that general area?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Talking about the U.S. aid, one of the criticisms we have from many of the countries who have received aid is this, that naturally we send them aid, and yet we are not making full use of their available local personnel. I think this is the area we might explore more.

In other words, there are many talented people over there; let's use them. It is cheaper to use the natives. Suppose you send one American to Taiwan; that amount of money would be able to employ 10 Chinese.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. The important point is not the cost. It is the acceptance of the person working in the recipient country. As we indicated earlier, and even in your testimony, what the Koreans and Taiwanese are doing in South Vietnam probably in a sense is far more important to the political struggle that is going on in South Vietnam than many of the dollars that we are spending there.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Right. You are correct. This is another advantage about using the Asian people, "Asia for the Asians," and we make use of that for two purposes, to save money and get a better result.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mrs. Chennault, how about Japanese aid? Do you think they will do their part and will it be accepted?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think the Japanese today have the highest standard of living in the whole of Asia. Taiwan comes second. They are doing well. I think today Japan has been receiving U.S. aid and has accomplished so much, and it is their responsibility to do part of this job to help the other nations, too.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. They would be accepted by southeast Asia?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think so.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gallagher.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think time is running out. I heard your exchange with Mr. Broomfield about the future of Indonesia. I happened to be out there a month or two ago. It would seem to me that the greatest blow the Communists have really suffered is Indonesia.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I think that the attention has been centered on that fact, the fact that here was the fourth largest country in the world, and it has come 180 degrees——

Mrs. CHENNAULT. It is encouraging, this political change.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If there is to be some structural balance of power there, it would have to be within Indonesia and Japan.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think this failure of the Chinese Communists in Indonesia, Africa, will also bring about movement in China itself. In other words, they have been spending money in sending people, infiltrators, to those countries, yet it proved not as successful as they wanted it to be. This is encouraging to the other people in the world.

It is an inspiration to some of the people who are seeking freedom. We realize that it is going to take a long time. If you have been to Indonesia you can realize the problem of that country, it will take a long time to restore stability. Once the political stability is established, however, the other free nations will go in and give them aid.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Just one other question. As an active observer of events in southeast Asia, do you find it strange that the very people who

now advocate most strongly are leaving Vietnam to the Vietnamese so that they could find their own level of political development, that they are the very same people who found Diem's regime oppressive and advocated to President Kennedy that we ought to do something about those horrible South Vietnamese, that we couldn't let them get away with that sort of thing, and the fact that by our indicating to those forces who would be opposed to Diem—I find it strange now that while Diem was repressive, that these very people who said he was repressive would say that any sort of repressive leadership would be acceptable as long as we get out and leave Vietnam to the south.

What is your comment on that?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Up to the Second World War I think we found that kind of atmosphere and attitude toward China, as you remember, saying that the Chiang Kai-shek government was not perfect and that we should bring in this reformer, Mao Tse-tung. He couldn't be a Communist. Again in the Korean war the same thing happened. I suppose in a country like America where we believe in freedom and believe in giving people the choice of government and so forth, that due to our kind democracy in many ways sometimes we make certain unavoidable mistakes in our foreign policy—maybe not intentionally, but still they are mistakes. But I feel this way, if we are humble enough to learn from out mistakes of yesterday, then we should be brave enough to face the challenge of tomorrow.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madame Chennault, does our State Department—have they ever asked you for your views on this particular subject?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I suppose I talk to all kinds of people in this country, including some of our State Department people. But as you know again in our kind of system every boss has so many advisers that sometimes it is hard for them to know which one to listen to.

Mr. WHALLEY. Officially, they have never asked you officially for your views?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. No: just as a private citizen.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Madame Chennault, you have indicated I believe we ought to exercise some restraint in attempting, so far as attempting to influence internal political developments in the nations of Asia. Of course you have demonstrated that we have different cases that require different actions. You stated as one of the more important events in Asia, cooperation among free nations there. You have mentioned us as the leader of the free world: at this level do you feel that Asia accepts this Nation as a Pacific power with a legitimate interest in Asian affairs and a right to participate in leadership along with other free nations of Asia? I am talking about cooperative efforts with other nations of Asia.

Mrs. CHENNAULT. I think today more and more the Asian nations realize in order to bring Asia forward they will have to bring a new look of economic cooperation, and they realize they can't do this alone. They are very realistic about it. That is, that America has the strength and power and wealth to help them. And we should also look at it the same way. In other words, not because we love them or they love us. It is all due to circumstances, the need of cooperation to keep the balance of power.

Last summer in Seoul nine nations, the Malaysian, Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese, and so forth, all these countries had a conference in Korea. I understand the Americans were there also as observers. They were talking about their own protection of Asia and how to improve their economic development. This is the kind of thing that never happened before. Also the Asian Bank Corporation was established in October last year for all the free nations in Asia to work together to improve their trade. I remember our Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Fowler—after he came back—I happened to talk to him and he was so impressed with all this cooperation among the free nations.

He mentioned this is the kind of thing that we should encourage. I think that when Asia is better off, when they can stand on her own feet, then gradually the Communist infiltration will be eliminated. Today it is not a question of whether the people like us or not like us, it's that they realize America is the only country that has the power to help them, they are very realistic and practical.

In the old days, of course, the French, the British, the Dutch, the Germans, the Spanish, all these countries had certain control of certain countries in Asia. The Communists have been talking about let's eliminate the colonialism, imperialism, get them out of Asia, gain your independence, and so forth. As Americans, we should make known that we have no ambitions, no desire to gain any territory in Asia.

Mr. BUCHANAN. They do understand this?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. Yes. They know we don't care about controlling any land, but we do care about their being independent, that they help us to stop the Communist expansion. I think we can work along that line and the world will have hope.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do I understand that you would favor, as other witnesses have before this committee, our moving toward multilateral aid?

Mrs. CHENNAULT. This I cannot just answer in one sentence. I don't believe in giving aid to every nation, and I repeat that. Some of the nations I don't know which side they are on. Maybe some of them, even the Russian and Chinese Communists, don't want to help, because they don't show any significant wanting to help themselves.

Those are the countries where maybe we should wait and see. Let's keep our strong friends on our side and help them, and at the same time build up some of the weaker countries and make them stronger. But there are certain places we have to draw the line. After all, we have to think about America too.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Madame Chennault. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have a few questions, Madame Chennault, but we have labored you long. You have been an excellent witness. May you take some comfort and satisfaction from the obvious sincerity, interest and enthusiasm that the subcommittee has displayed in your testimony. Thank you very much for coming. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following was submitted by Mrs. Chennault for inclusion in the record:)

THE CHICOM'S "GREAT SOCIALIST CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

1. How did it begin?

The "great socialist cultural revolution" is a significant problem which, at present, figures most conspicuously on the China Mainland and has also attracted

world-wide attention. It is significant not only because it unveils the complete failure of the Chicom rule for sixteen years on the China Mainland together with their existing crises, but also because it will directly affect the future destiny of the Chicom regime, and also indirectly affect the anti-communist posture of the entire world. Hence, it makes realistic political sense to make a deeper study and have a unified recognition of this problem.

Since the establishment of CCP in China, the struggles between the leftist and rightist factions therein have been continuous and cyclic with the power of the two factions alternately waning and waxing. Since the CCP seized the political power sixteen years ago under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, Mao's leftist adventurous line has clearly predominated as a result of his consolidated power in leading the party and his advocacy of Stalinism. Due to Mao's fanaticism and arrogance, his policy line lacked the flexibility in making readjustment. He did not retreat in the face of the agricultural setback; instead, he made a greater "leap forward" and finally brought about a great agricultural debacle.

Initially, it was the overwhelming majority of peasants on the brink of starvation who opposed Mao's leftist adventurous line. When the agony of the peasants became clear to the intellectuals, the latter's opposition movement was also precipitated. Therefore, two main camps of anti-Mao movement were thus formed, and the actions of these two camps were responsive to each other. For instance, after the counter-liquidation movement occurred in the rural areas in 1956, the "bloom and contend" movement of the intellectuals occurred in 1957 and in the same year, the secession-from-commune movement occurred again in the rural regions. Since 1962, these opposition movements have developed into a very serious situation, namely, all the 1930's intellectuals in CCP were involved. Even Chou Yang, who had been the hangman in the past literature and art purges, took no exception and went so far as to play a leading role in opposing Mao.

Finally, the Chicoms became aware of the severity of such combined opposition. Mao's leftists realized that the 1930's intellectuals had dominated such academic fields as philosophy, history, literature, education and journalism. Their actions were well-organized, planned and directed. They had such means of propaganda as newspapers, magazines and publishing organizations, and they also won the support and response of the great masses. Should these 1930's intellectuals initiate a coup d'etat the Chicom regime would be in the danger of being immediately overthrown. Therefore, the only choice the Chicoms had was to initiate a great cultural revolution at that moment.

In a CCP conference held in September, 1965, Mao Tze-tung said: "The reactionary ideology of the bourgeois class must be criticized." In November, 1965, the Shanghai Wen Hui Daily published an article written by Mao Wen-yuan to criticize the newly compiled historic drama entitled "Hai Jui's Dismissal from Office" to attack Wu Han, Deputy Major of Peking City. (Hai Jui was a famous official at the end of Ming Dynasty. He was dismissed from office just because he took good care of the people.) This drama hinted at the dismissal of Peng Te-huai and Huang Ke-cheng by Mao. This article was immediately transcribed by the Liberation Army Daily. The Chicoms declared that this was the beginning of the current revolution and that it had been under the personal leadership of Mao Tze-tung in Shanghai.

In April 1966, the Chicom Youth League convoked the 3rd Plenary Session of its 9th Central Committee, adopted a resolution calling forth "all youths throughout the country to launch a movement for better learning of Mao Tze-tung's writings", and brought out the first call for "carrying the great socialist cultural revolution through to the very end". On the 14th of April, Shih Hsi-min, Deputy Director of Chicom Cultural Department delivered a report on the subject entitled "To hoist high the great banner of Mao Tze-tung's thinking to firmly carry through the great socialist cultural revolution" before the 30th conference of the standing committee of the Chicom National People's Congress. It was in the same conference that Kuo Mo-jo made his self-criticism. Thus the prelude was unfolded.

2. What are its true facts and significance?

As stated by Chicoms themselves, the current great cultural revolution is the 5th stage of "socialist revolution", the 5th time of "literature and art purge" and the 3rd time of "ideological struggle" (*1). The Chicoms stated again that this is an "ideological class struggle", a "struggle between the bourgeois line and proletarian line" and a "struggle between the restoration and anti-restoration of capitalism" with the purpose of destroying the anti-party and anti-socialist black line so as to prevent a "Hungarian incident" from happening on China Mainland.

If we discard those terminologies which are used to conceal the true facts and make our own comprehensive observation, it is evident that, in essence, the current Chicom great cultural revolution covered all the purges in the past, and in purpose it is a general liquidation of all those who are anti-Mao and anti-Communist. If viewed from a different angle, it is a life-and-death struggle carried out by CCP under the pressure of the anti-Mao and anti-Communist situation created by the combined effort of anti-Maoists intellectuals and the great masses of peasants and workers both within and without the CCP.

In the light of this basic recognition, the current "revolution" bears the following noteworthy significances:

First, during the five times of Chicom liquidations, each time "the revolution" has become more and more extensive and furious. This means that the control power of the Chicom regime is constantly declining and the opposition power is waxing. This fact would give a demoralizing answer to those who believe that "the Chicoms have been able to control the China Mainland effectively."

Secondly, the universal and anti-Communist and anti-Mao movement on the mainland participated in by Chicom's important cadres is actually the result of failures both in interior administration and in foreign affairs of the Chinese Communists, particularly those leftists under Mao Tze-tung. These failures can again be imputed to Communism which is basically an adverse current in the present democratic era and to Maoism which is a source of chaos and unrest that threatens world peace and security.

Thirdly, the break-out of this "revolution" is closely related to the Peng Te-huai and Huang Ke-cheng case which was brought about by the utilization of Peng and Huang by the Russian Communists as a tool to oppose Mao Tze-tung. Therefore, those who had been purged recently were mainly accused of following the line of revisionism. The support publicly given by the Russian Communists to those intellectuals who were purged also showed that the long disputes between Moscow and Peking has reached to the point of no return.

Fourthly, there had been a great massacre that "liquidated the reactionary" by purging more than twenty million people and a continuous long period of unended struggles for all these years. However, the Chicoms today still face strong anti-Communist and anti-Mao power. This signifies a complete failure of the ideological education as stressed by the Chicoms for sixteen years without interruption and also shows that the people on the mainland, particularly the intellectuals and young students are not willing to accept Communism especially "Maoism" and have universally awakened to gravitate toward democracy and freedom.

3. What are the major changes and the present development?

From 1965 to April of 1966, all written criticisms were mostly confined to the field of laterature and art. In May 1966, the Chicom Liberation Army Daily leading the Red Flag, the Kuang Ming Daily, the Liberation Daily and the Wen Hui News, started a clamorous attack on those who followed the "anti-party and antisocialist black line" and the so-called cultural revolution has thus turned from the literature and art purges into an ideological struggle. The purge of Peng Chen, First Secretary of the CCP Peking Municipal Committee, and Lu Ping, President of the Peking University, on June 3rd implies that the so-called cultural revolution has again changed from an ideological struggle into an ideological purge of ranking party cadres in the CCP.

Since then, the "revolutionary" struggle has spread to every corner of the China mainland in addition to its continuation on the higher levels in CCP. Persons to be struggled with range from members of the CCP, Political Bureau and Department of Propaganda to members and secretaries of the CCP peoples' commune committees, to the presidents of the Universities and colleges, to teachers of junior middle schools, and members of the graduate schools of the Science Institution, to specialists of nuclear physics, and all the intellectuals of the 1930's. They were to be swept away as "monsters and freaks."

The Chicom State Council declared on the 17th of June, 1966 that the enrollment of students for advanced schools would be postponed for a semester in order to study the new rules of enrollment and the curriculum. The Chicom stated that the entrance examination system would be abolished to give way to party recommendations and selection of "workers, farmers and soldiers" for the perpetuation of proletarian dictatorship, and that class struggle and Mao Tse-tung's thoughts would be listed as primary subjects for advanced education.

The General Political Department of the Chicom Liberation Army convened a conference in Peiping on June 29th, 1966. In the conference, Chen Chi-tung,

Deputy Director of the Culture Department, General Political Department was denounced and it was declared that "We must play an important role in the current great proletarian cultural revolution so as to completely destroy the anti-party and anti-socialist black line botb in military and civil circles." Thus, "The Third Great Struggle in the Armed Forces", as named by the Chicoms, has started within the Liberation Army. The first struggle occurred in 1958 when the Chicom Chief of the General Staff Su yu and the Cultnre Department Director Chen I of the Chicom General Political Department were accused of following so-called bourgeois military line. The second struggle occurred in 1959 when the so-called anti-party group of leftist opportunism, inclnding the Chicom Chief of the General Staff Hnang Ke-cheng and the Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai, were purged. The current third great struggle not only pnrges Chen Chi-tung, a member of "key personnel of anti-revolutionary group", but also replaces the Chicom Chief of the General Staff Lo Jui-ching with Yang Cheng-wu.

The purged Chicom key personnel so far include. Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Chow Yang, Wa Han, Teng To, Lin Mo-han totalling more than one hundred persons. The organizations involved include some fifty colleges and universities, more than ten newspapers and hundreds of magazines. In comparison with the former purges of the Chicoms, the current one is unprecedented in scope.

The People's Daily stated "this great proletarian cultural revolution has actually just started" and believed it wonld last a long period of time.

4. What is the possible future development?

1.) It will be a 'long and furious struggle'. (remarkes by Chou En-Lai)—This struggle has been under way for over a year since it started in September 1965. In other words, there are still a great number of anti-Mao and anti-Communist members and followers of revisionism within the CCP including ranking personnel who mnst be purged and liquidated.

If the opposition power should be suppressed for the time being, new oppositions, larger and more powerful will occur one after another. Undonbtedly, graver consequences will follow the cnrrent struggle.

2.) Change from internal contradiction to external contradiction—. We may say that this is tantamonnt to alleviate their internal contradiction by expanding their contradiction with the outside world. The Yugoslavian Zagreb Vjesnik Daily has expressed a view, "The Stalin's purges were stopped in the Soviet Union by WW–II. Bnt what will stop them in China, as soon as they pick up avalanche speed?" We think that although there may not necessarily be another world war to serve the Chicoms, once the Chicom's internal split becomes so serious as to defy remedy, they will very probably initiate an adventurous external action in Asia so as to distract the people's attention from the internal problems.

3.) A graver threat to the world peace because their military dominates the party and politics. Since the "Liberation Army Daily" takes the lead in the current struggle, and Lin Piao, Chicom's Defense Minister, appears to be in the lime light in the present phase of "Cultural revolution", with such activities as the publication of a letter of his to the industrial and communications departments, urging them to enforce the "revolution", and bis take-over of all administrative power over the research on nuclear weapons, inclnding the newly-bnilt second atomic weapons research base at Tsing-hai, from the Academy of Science, to be under his direct control. All these indicate that Lin Piao and the "Liberation Army" under his command play an important role of control and command in the current "Great Cultural Revolution". As we know, the Chicoms are a totalitarian regime with "violent revolution" as its basic policy, while Lin Piao is a "Militarist" who has shouted "Long live the victory of the People's War" and advocated to envelop the "cities" of Western Europe and North America with the "rural villages" of Asia and Africa. The combination of these factors will surely bring abont chaos and unrest in the world.

5.) Conclusion:

The above is the general situation of the Chicom's "Great Socialist Cultural Revolution". In order to offer an integral impression, let us sum up as follows:

Viewed from its cause, the Chicom's "Great Socialist Cultural Revolution" is another stage of struggle and liquidation gradually enlarging in scope since the Chicoms occupied the mainland sixteen years ago. It is a kind of snppressive action which the Chicoms are forced to take by the serious situation resulted from the politieal and economieal failure, in which the- anti-Mao and anti-Communist movements within and without the party, especially of all the intellectuals, are becoming widespread.

Viewed from the progress of the struggle, the "revolution" has changed from a literature and art criticism to an ideological purge, and involved the struggle of political lines of the higher levels within the CCP. Not only are the scope and violence of the struggle unprecedented in the Chicom history, bnt so many hardcors cadres of the Chicoms and leading intellectuals are also involved in this struggle. This clearly illustrates that the Chicoms have lost all the people's allegiance and that the whole internals of the Chicoms are also splitting.

Regarding the most probable development of the said "revolution", we estimate that it will be a long and violent struggle, might lead to a greater division within the Chicoms and will not presently come to an end. However, the Chicoms, with their military in power, may probably initiate adventures in the form of outward aggression so as to alleviate their internal contradiction in case that their internal situation should deteriorate to such degree as to defy remedy.

Finally, we must point out the resultant effect on the Chicom regime by this cultural revolution. As a Chinese proverb goes, "To prevent the people from talking is just like to prevent the rivers from flowing", which implies that the people's opposition opinion can only be tolerated and countered with enlightment, and can never be checked by force. The publications, essays, dramas, musics, etc. under the Chicom control expressed themselves differently, but they had one point absolutely in common and that is to condemn all the Chicom's inhuman political measures and to appeal for the people's interests.

NOTE 1

A. Five times of Literature and Art Purgatory Criticisms:
   1. Criticism of "Wuhsun's Biography" in 1951.
   2. Criticism of "Study on Dreams of Red Chamber" written by Yu Ping-Pai in 1954.
   3. Purges of Hu Feng and Pan Han-nien in 1955.
   4. "Anti-rightist Struggle" against the "Chiang—(Chiang Pai-chun) Lo—(Lo Lung-Chi) League" in 1956.
   5. Current "Great Socialist Cultural Revolution".

B. Three times of Ideological Struggle within the CCP:
   1. Purge of Kao Kang and Yao Sou-shih in 1952.
   2. Purge of Peng Te-huai and Huang Ke-cheng in 1959.
   3. Current "Great Socialist Culture Revolution".

C. Five stages of Socialist Revolution:
   1. Movement of three anti's and five anti's in 1952
   2. "Social Reform for Capitalist Indnstry and Commerce" between 1952 and 1957.
   3. Anti-rightist struggle between 1956 and 1957.
   4. "Anti-rightist Opportunism Struggle around 1959 (meaning the Peng-huang incident).
   5. From the Socialist Education Movement in 1963 to the Current "Great Socialistic Cultural Revolution".

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1967

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will come to order, please.

We meet today in continuation of the hearings on rural institutional development in Asia. The subcommittee's interest and concern about institutional development needs and what the United States is doing in this field extends to all of Asia. However, in order to gain a better understanding of the full range of U.S. efforts, the subcommittee has selected for study just four countries—Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, and the Philippines.

For these four countries, the subcommittee will obtain from executive agencies a complete detailed presentation concerning U.S. efforts in the rural development field. The Department of State and AID have agreed to make available to the subcommittee various officials from these countries including our Ambassadors and selected AID personnel who conduct our programs in the rural areas.

In consideration of the problems concerning the availability of these field personnel, the subcommittee has agreed to suspend, after today, further hearings on the AID program until the week beginning April 16. This will permit coordination of witnesses and facilitate the orderly, continuous, detailed presentation of the four country programs selected for review.

Although the AID sessions will be suspended temporarily, the subcommittee expects to hear other witnesses between now and April 16.

Out witness today is the Honorable William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for International Development. He is accompanied by the Honorable Rutherford M. Poats, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Far East, Agency for International Development. Mr. Gaud has a prepared statement, which I will ask him to read for the benefit of the members. Mr. Gaud.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. GAUD, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GAUD. Thank you very much for the opportunity of appearing before you to discuss rural institutional development in southeast Asia. It is the part of the world in which these programs are the most important, and it is the part of the world where it is most difficult to make them effective. You have chosen well to concentrate on the four countries of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Over the past 20 years, we have seen a dramatic change in the focus of American aid programs. During the Marshall plan period, U.S. assistance was geared almost exclusively to economic recovery. The countries we aided had the necessary economic, social, and political institutions and skills. The people of Europe had a strong tradition of involvement in the economic, social, and political lives of their countries. Nation building was not a problem. The countries of Europe were basically strong integrated national units. Consequently, economic recovery, as distinguished from development, was our primary concern.

Today, development is the primary mutual concern of the United States and the less-developed countries. And we have come to understand that it is not simply economic development. Economic, social, and political progress are all necessary, because these three aspects of development are interdependent.

Quite obviously, the challenge is much more complex than it was 20 years ago. Nation building and the development of the necessary institutional structures in the less-developed countries present new problems and require new skills and knowledge.

We have come a long way in developing techniques to meet the challenge. AID now employs a variety of economic assistance tools that foster institutional development in the less-developed countries. For example:

1. Technical assistance to both central and local levels of government on economic and social policy formulation and to improve administrative capacity and performance:

2. Assistance in the formation and strengthening of voluntary associations for institution building—including labor unions, farmers' cooperatives, savings and loan associations, and village-level community development programs;

3. Program loans to finance a great variety of import needs of private industry, many of them small, thereby helping to build private enterprise: self-help terms of these loans induce governmental economic policy changes beneficial to private enterprise, among other objectives:

4. Loans to help intermediate credit institutions so that businessmen and farmers will have sources of long-term capital vital to private sector growth.

The Congress—and particularly the Foreign Affairs Committee—has increasingly recognized the breadth and complexity of the development process in which AID is involved. I believe that it could be said that this recognization began with the "people-to-people" concept of the point IV program initiated by the Truman administration in 1948. Another milestone was section 413 of the Mutual Security Act, which stressed greater participation of the private sector in the process of the development. Then came the Humphrey amendment of 1961, which emphasized the significance of cooperatives and popular participation in democratic growth. In 1962, the Zablocki amendment, which stresses community development, added another major milestone.

Last year, the Congress enacted title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act which focuses on the importance of democratic private and local government institutions, which also originated in this committee and

emphasizes that we still have much to learn about institution building and about involving people in the development of their countries. Now this subcommittee is holding hearings on rural institutional development in southeast Asia.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The countries we assist in southeast Asia are diverse. Their stages of institutional development vary considerably.

South Vietnam is the victim of 20 years of war which has retarded creation of governmental and private institutions as well as disrupting its economic development.

In Laos, the United States is helping to maintain the security and independence of the nation in line with the Geneva accords of 1962. Laos is handicapped by ethnic and political divisions, a lack of economic, infrastructure and extreme shortages of trained manpower. The North Vietnamese continue to supply the Pathet Lao in their insurgency movement and to station sizable military forces within Laos. They also use Laos as a supply route to South Vietnam.

Thailand has an old and well-established structure of government, but it has not been linked closely with the people in the rural villages. The King represents to Thailand's many regions and ethnic groups a personal and powerful symbol of national integration. Thailand faces an insurgency movement in parts of the north, northeast, and south, but, fortunately, not on a nationwide basis.

The Philippines have a comparatively long history of democratic government and development of democratic institutions on both national and local levels. But recent economic and social progress has not been sufficient to insure stability. Dissident activities in central Luzon reflect the needs to accelerate the development pace.

With these diversities clearly in mind, I can state that our aid programs in all four countries—South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines—might fairly be said to have a number of interrelated goals:

First is security—a prerequisite to any successful development program. A nation must be able to resist external aggression and internal subversion. In Vietnam, the United States is helping the South Vietnamese resist large-scale external aggression as well as foreign-supported internal subversion. Thailand faces an insurgency movement of serious potential in the northeast. The Lao are struggling to maintain defenses against Communist efforts to chip away at areas of Government control. Fifty-six percent of the Lao Government budget goes for national defense, including 80,000 troops. The Philippines, with which the United States has very special ties, is again confronted with insecurity and a still minor threat of rural agitation by pro-Communist insurgents.

Second, and most comprehensive of all, is the goal of nation building. Only if there is a strong sense of nationhood can there be the organization and commitment of effort required to achieve rapid progress. Nationalistic feelings in southeast Asia can be a positive force in the development of that part of the world.

Third is the goal of better administered, more responsive governments, particularly local governments in the rural areas. A fact of life in southeast Asia is that central governments have been too divorced

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from the needs and aspirations of the rural peoples. The political power was entirely in the cities; communications were largely one-way—down to the people. Mutual commitment based on mutual advantage, between villages and government, and creation of effective and responsive local governmental institutions are the evolutionary goals of all these four countries today.

Fourth is correcting the dangerous imbalance of economic and social advantages toward a better break for the rural communities. The demands for a better life reached the majority of southeast Asian living in rural areas later than urban centers, but they now are changing the political realities throughout southeast Asia. The worldwide demand for more agricultural production adds urgency to rural development. The sharp disparity between living standards and opportunities for the rural and city dwellers in southeast Asia makes poor political and economic sense.

I would now like to discuss briefly how we and the governments concerned are contributing to the achievement of these interrelated objectives through rural development programs in South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The South Vietnamese have coined a phrase—which we translate as "revolutionary development"—to describe what they are trying to do to build a nation. Revolutionary development is a complex of security, political, economic, and social measures designed to create effective local government-people relationships and improve the lives of the villagers. The revolutionary development process consists of two phases—

The securing phase in which the military establishes and maintains security in an area while the revolutionary development cadre—especially trained groups of 59 South Vietnamese—and other teams of local security forces and civil specialists initiate the task of developing a responsive and strong local governmental structure in the villages, and

The development phase when more extensive economic and social development efforts occur.

AID supports the revolutionary development program in a number ber of ways—with supplies, transportation, funds, training assistance, and advice. Perhaps most important, we have through our provincial representatives helped the very dynamic minister of revolutionary development spread the concepts and operational guidance to Vietnamese, Americans, and other foreign personnel working in the program throughout Vietnam.

Some progress has been made in institutional development supporting this quiet revolution. Here are some examples in four important areas of emphasis.

Improving the lot of the farmer

With U.S. help, the Ministry of Agriculture has developed an extensive educational program for farmers, including the distribution in 1966 of over 4.5 million educational leaflets. This kind of Government service did not exist 5 years or so ago.

Young farmers' "4–T Clubs," patterned after the American 4–H Clubs, have been organized in all of the provinces. They now have over 81,000 members in 2,200 clubs, some for boys and some for girls.

Agricultural extension has been strengthened—24,000 farmers attended training sessions in 1966, and it is projected that 29,000 will do so in 1968.

Over 10,000 demonstrations on how to use fertilizer are planned for 1967. Fertilizer use has grown from 100,000 metric tons in 1962 to 276,000 metric tons in 1965.

Farmers have become more willing to try new crops and techniques. For example, Vietnamese farmers devoted more than 50,000 acres to soybeans during the 1966 growing season. In 1964, soybeans accounted for 15,000 acres.

The growth of agricultural cooperatives and farmers' associations is impressive. In 1964 there were 328 cooperatives and farmers' associations—in 1966, 425. The membership in these organizations has grown from 187,192 in 1964 to 235,455 in 1966. We project a total membership of 390,000 during 1968.

The Agriculture Ministry's Plant Protection Service has been strengthened in furnishing vital, immediate impact services. Vietnamese and American experts have trained, and worked closely with, farmers to prevent losses from insects, disease and rats. About 1,400,000 acres—approximately 35 percent of the farmland—were treated for insects and diseases in fiscal year 1966.

Construction and repair of irrigation canals has continued. Over 100,000 additional acres were irrigated in 1966.

A rural electrification program, through three cooperatives, brought electricity to 144,000 more rural people in 1966, and scores of hamlets are getting their own electric generating systems annually.

Education

By 1965, approximately 6,400 hamlet school classrooms were built. In 1966, 2,300 more were added. Many of these were largely self-help projects which now provide an elementary education to 540,000 children who otherwise could not be in school. Education, in Vietnam as in our own country, is the foundation for nation building and popular participation in the development process.

Teacher training programs have been significantly expanded. They are expected to reach a cumulative total of 11,620 teachers by the end of 1967, as opposed to 2,875 in 1964. AID has helped build and equip four teacher-training schools and continues advisory services through a contract with Southern Illinois University.

A large-scale textbook program, consisting of over 2 million books for elementary schoolchildren and training programs for teachers in the use of the books, was successfully carried out in 1966. A total of 9 million textbooks had been distributed by the end of 1966. This U.S.-supported activity is administered through the Ministry of Education in such a way as to strengthen its Educational Materials Department.

Vocational training is expanding. AID has helped build and equip the Phu Tho Teacher Training Institute in Saigon and three regional technological institutes, and continues to strengthen. In 1966, we placed particular emphasis on polytechnic schools and on 20 rural

training schools. More and better trained graduates of the College of Agriculture have entered the rural communities.

Agricultural training has improved in quantity and quality.

AID has completed constructing and equipping the Saigon Medical and Dental College for the University of Saigon, and has provided for teaching faculty through contracts with the American Dental Association and the American Medical Association.

Special educational programs for Montagnards and other ethnic groups in South Vietnam have been started. Programs such as these can be particularly important to the goal of creating an integrated nation.

Public administration at the local level

This year is bringing in rapid succession the drafting of a constitution and the coming elections of hamlet chiefs, village councils, national legislature, and president. This remarkable surge toward representative, constitutional government in the space of 1 year will greatly advance the political development of a viable and progressive South Vietnam.

AID's public administration advisers are assisting in working out procedures to assure fair village council elections (April 2–April 30), and the election of hamlet chiefs and deputy hamlet chiefs (May 14–June 11, 1967).

Salaries for village and hamlet officials have been increased and leadership training encouraged, through the revolutionary development teams.

The national institute of administration has increased its full-time student capacity by 50 percent in 1966. In addition, the institute provided part-time courses for 700 trainees. There are now about 150 students at the institute who will be returning to rural areas to live and work. It is expected that there will be 300 by the end of 1968.

Centers for local officials in administration have been built in over 30 provinces and are operated currentely in 13 of the 43 provinces. We expect that there will be about 25 in operation by the end of 1967. In 1966, 5,380 local officials received training at these centers.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I want to announce there is a quorum call. With the approval of the members of the committee, I would suggest that we continue until the second quorum call, come back, and if there is a vote, we will suspend for 20 minutes and try to finish this afternoon. Proceed, Mr. Gaud.

Mr. GAUD. We also have a number of programs which are concentrating on helping Vietnamese youth.

In 1966, some 7,000 secondary school and college students—2,000 more than in 1965—participated in civic action programs in Saigon and 33 provinces. Other youth organizations, such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Buddhist and Catholic student groups, the national voluntary service, and the voluntary youth association are working on a variety of socioeconomic development projects.

The South Vietnamese Government is actively recruiting capable young people for service with the revolutionary development teams, which now number over 30,000 members. Their youth and zeal constitute strong motivating factors in the villages and hamlets. Over 50 percent of the rural development workers are under the age of 35.

Activities such as these directly affect rural development in Vietnam. Each, in its own way, builds individual initiative and integrity and supports institutional development.

LAOS

Nation building in a long-range job in Laos, a country that is deficient in most of the basic economic, social, and political institutions needed for stability and progress.

The United States is providing Laos with assistance directly aimed at meeting the immediate Communist threat. We are also contributing to economic development, in part through supporting extension of Lao Government services to the rural population, bolstering the governmental structures in villages, and aiding the self-help efforts of the villages themselves. The centerpiece of our rural development in Laos is the village cluster program.

AID and Lao Government efforts in the cluster program are concentrated in 13 areas that contain 340,000 people or about 20 percent of the rural population. The typical cluster has two young international voluntary service Americans and one AID community development worker who act as catalysts, helping to determine the needs of the villagers and stimulating the creation of local organizations through which national and international resources can flow.

Economic and social development in the village cluster is encouraged by construction of schools, dispensaries, roads, wells, and dams, with substantial self-help labor and materials from the villagers. Training is provided through informal advice by community development personnel, and through formal training by local leaders. Economic improvement focuses on increased agricultural yields through more rice production using better seeds and through encouragement of secondary crops.

In the village cluster program, AID has been working with existing institutions on the local level. At the same time, we encourage the central government ministries and departments to work directly with these local institutions, and thereby help create a productive relationship between the central government and the rural populace.

The cluster program started about 3 years ago. We believe the cluster program has contributed significantly to the strengthening of the local institutions and leadership.

The cluster program is reinforced by substantial activities in agriculture, health, and education, which promote development and national integration by extending Lao Government services to the rural population and bolstering the self-help efforts of the villagers themselves.

Work in agriculture concentrates on production of more food, principally rice. It includes support of a joint agricultural development organization. The ADO is a public utility that offers the villager credit for needed items from water buffalo to fertilizer, and purchases rice, when necessary, to provide farmers a fair return.

The integating force of primary education already has been amply demonstrated in Thailand. Programs in this field are particularly important in a country with as many ethnic divisions as are found in Laos. AID has built or helped to build or enlarge over 700 elementary

schools, and five teacher training schools. This year some 2,600 Lao are being trained as teachers, compared with only 102, 10 years ago. About 2.5 million textbooks in the Lao language have been provided for children in the elementary schools who previously had few texts and none in their own language.

A quarter of a million Lao, at least one-tenth of the total population, are refugees from war and Communist oppression. Many of these hope to return to their tribal hill homes, but substantial numbers are being resettled by the Lao authorities with technical and material help from AID. The problems of developing local institutions and wide participation among these displaced peoples are more difficult, but no less urgent, than in the village clusters.

THAILAND

AID is working with the Thai Government to provide improved Government services and broaden popular participation in decision-making in those parts of Thailand, particularly the northeast, where Communist subversives have been building support and initiating insurgent activities. The Thai are seeking to develop in the Government more sensitivity to and ability to respond to local needs. They are trying also to find better means for villagers to come to grips with their own problems and allocate resources and effort to their solution.

Thailand is a monarchy. Effective political power in Thailand, however, is concentrated in a Council of Ministers composed both of military officers and civilian ministers. Thailand does not have a formal constitution, but a Constituent Assembly is in the process of drafting one.

The largest unit of Government below the national level is the Province. There are 71 Provinces, each headed by a Provincial Governor. The Provinces are divided into districts of which there are 550, each administered by a district officer—the key administrative link between the National Government and the people.

The basic social unit in Thailand is the rural village, each of which has an elected village headman. Groups of three to 20 villages are organized into townships. These are, in turn, headed by a township chief, elected for life by the village headman within that jurisdiction.

The joint Thai-AID programs bearing on rural institutions are designed to take advantage of the strengths of the present political system, while making needed changes. The Thai Government provides the cost of all personnel and operating expenses of the projects, and of course takes the necessary legal and administrative steps. AID offers technical advice in areas such as training, research, programing and evaluation, and imported commodities such as vehicles, construction equipment, demonstration fertilizers, insecticides and other agricultural or rural industrial equipment.

There are four joint United States-Thai efforts directly related to rural institutional development.

The accelerated rural development program

The Thai Government, with AID assistance, established the accelerated rural development program in 1964, in six Provinces in the northeast. The program was designed to provide Provincial Governors with increased capacity to respond to local needs. Its con-

tinuing purpose is to develop the rural economy, to support the growth of local government institutions, and to strengthen ties between the people and the National Government.

In its initial stages, the accelerated rural development program consisted primarily of Provincial construction of roads and small public works. Today, however, the program stimulates and coordinates the activities of national agriculture, health, education, and community development ministries at the Provincial and local levels. Actual planning and implementation of projects are now carried out largely by a staff under the Provincial Governor rather than by the Central Government. With AID support, the accelerated rural development program expanded in 1965 and 1966 from six to a total of 14 Provinces.

The developing democracy program

In 1956, the Thai Government authorized the creation of township councils throughout the country. Ten years later, it became evident that these groups would need more direct assistance and encouragement to participate effectively in promoting the growth of democratic institutions. To meet this need the Thai Cabinet on March 8, 1966, authorized the developing democracy program, with the purpose of revitalizing township councils as instruments of local government.

In 1966, the Thai Government, with AID assistance, expanded its training for township council members on the role of local leadership, the methods of identifying local problems, and practical means for solving them; and support for the township councils to enable them to carry out local projects planned by local leaders.

Village leader training program

The village leader training program, which is conducted by the Thai Government with AID assistance, seeks to bring a degree of self-government to the lowest level of Thai political organizations—the village. In areas where the Thai Community Development Department has adequate coverage with community development workers, village committees have already been formed. The committees are composed of the village headman, the school teacher, and five to nine people elected by the villagers.

The Thai Government has encouraged these committees to function as a forum for the identification and solution of village problems. It has assisted in the development of these committees through training programs similar to those in the developing democracy program.

This program serves the dual function of improving leadership skills of village officials and of promoting discussion of village problems on a self-help basis. The long-term objective is to stimulate the development genuine self-government at the village level.

Department of Local Administration program

The purpose of this project is to assist administrators in their efforts to become more effective and responsive to local needs. The program is aimed primarily at the functions of the Department of Local Administration at the Provincial and district levels. Under the AID program, assistance has been provided in establishing and operating a District Office Academy at which the principles of modern government administration are taught to all new district officers.

In addition to those four programs aimed directly at developing local institutions throughout Thailand, AID has continued its agricultural development program. In 1966, AID supported the development of the rural economy by assisting the Thai Government in improving agricultural production and marketing techniques. These efforts emphasize institution building through support of agricultural research, establishment of credit facilities, provision of agricultural extension services, and formation and expansion of farmers' associations.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gaud, we will suspend for about 10 minutes to answer a rollcall.

The subcommittee stands in recess.

(A short recess was taken.)

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will resume its hearings.

Mr. Gaud.

Mr. GAUD. Mr. Chairman, I come now to the Philippines.

THE PHILIPPINES

In the context of southeast Asia, the Philippines has a comparatively long history of democratic government with associated development of democratic institutions on both the national and local levels. The problem in the Philippines is not so much the creation of new democratic institutions, but the strengthening and improvement of existing ones.

While this democratic system has spawned a vigorous and rapidly growing private sector, particularly in manufacturing within the greater Manila area, few of the benefits from industiral growth reach the rural people.

The rural population of the Philippines still comprises 65 percent of the total population and constitutes the lowest per capita income grouping. In most cases, the farmers live at a subsistence or near subsistence level. Land tenancy is still prevalent, and food production, particularly rice and corn, fails to meet national requirements.

The major attack on these problems must come from the Philippine Government itself. The Marcos government recognizes this and it is commencing to act accordingly. An increased percentage of the Philippine Government's development budget is being allocated to rural and agricultural development. The Government is marshaling a major, comprehensive program to increase rice and corn production.

The objective of this program is to concentrate available resources on rural and agricultural development in 11 priority provinces, working through existing institutions at all levels of government. While improved utilization of central government institutions remains essential to this effort, increased attention is being given to use of the provincial and municipal governments.

Promising results have been attained in the last 2 years through AID's pilot programs in two provinces and within these provinces focusing on pilot municipalities. The provincial governors in these areas have assumed leading roles in development of their provinces with a focus on improved public services, provincial roads, increased agricultural production, encouragement of agri-business and the first stages of programing and planning of provincial development pro-

grams. Programs in the pilot municipalities have demonstrated the striking results that can be achieved when field employees of the national departments work together as a team with local personnel. Modest AID inputs, for items such as a motorbike for extension workers or assistance in devising supervised credit plans, can provide catalysts for Filipino actions.

As individual programs in the pilot provinces prove effective, they are being extended to the remainder of the 11 priority provinces.

At the national level attention is focused on providing infrastructure, predominantly roads and irrigation facilities, improving provincial education through construction of schools and printing of textbooks, increasing and improving agricultural credit, and providing a wide variety of extension services.

At the provincial level the national government's efforts will be supplemented by accessory public works such as farm-to-market roads, local credit institutions such as private rural banks and farmers' cooperatives, pilot projects in rural electric cooperatives, agri-business, and, most importantly, coordination at the provincial levels of services extended by the central government.

It is also within these priority provinces that initial implementation of 1963 land reform law is being stressed. Priority is in the heavily populated central Luzon plain where the Huk insurgency was based in the early 1950's.

The U.S. Government's assistance to the Philippines supports and complements these efforts in the following ways:

Increased financial support and advice for rural banks, the Agricultural Credit Administration and farmer cooperatives;

Planned support for two new rural electric cooperatives;

Financing of a contract to study grain storage, marketing, and handling practices in the Philippines;

Support for various agricultural extension services carried out by the Government.

Technical assistance and commodity input for the pilot province programs, now being expanded to 11 provinces.

Title IV, Public Law 480, program with the local currency generated slated for the 11-province program.

Title II "food for work" for support of public works at the provincial level.

Equipment, tools, and technical assistance for provincial equipment pools.

Technical support and planned development loan assistance for water resources and irrigation; and

Commodity support for printing 25 million textbooks.

Mr. Chairman, this in broad outline is what we and the Governments of South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines are trying to do in the area of rural development. We in AID still have a good deal to learn in this area. Rural development in less developed countries is not a field in which the United States—or any other country—has had much experience or in which we have much knowledge.

We know that we will have a continuing need for better tools of rural development. Accordingly, these are some of the steps we have taken to add to our knowledge:

The Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group

The Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) was formed in 1965 by AID in cooperation with the Asia Society. SEADAG is a group of social scientists from the universities, foundations, the National Academy of Sciences, and other nonprofit entities.

Membership in SEADAG is on a personal basis; it is related to scholarly interests in southeast Asian development. Participants are from 30 universities and 15 other nonprofit institutions. Kenneth T. Young, onetime Ambassador to Thailand, and now president of the Asia Society, is the chairman. He appeared before you last week. The activities of SEADAG are evolving, but fall essentially into four categories:

Advisory discussion.—In advisory discussion, specific aid plans, programs, and policies are discussed with AID participation within the broad perspective of southeast Asia geography, resources, endowments, and human ecology. The political and sociological aspects of development receive no less attention than the economic.

Research.—While there is both immediate and continuing value in advisory discussion, a necessary and basic complement is research on southeast Asia. SEADAG groups and seminars, therefore, have as one essential purpose the identification of gaps in knowledge of the southeast Asian development process and the corresponding research needs.

Information flow.—AID can supply the prominent scholars in SEADAG with many unclassified or declassified materials on southeast Asia. Thus, SEADAG has become an information clearinghouse and an information exchange activity.

Technical assistance.—The institutional resources for technical assistance are measured by the competence and interest of the faculty or staff of the institution. SEADAG brings together, on an interdisciplinary basis, social scientists who know where interests and competence in their disciplines can be found in the United States.

SEADAG is no longer an experiment. We look forward to its continuing advice on the development process in southeast Asia—economic, political, and social.

The Academic Advisory Council for Thailand

The Academic Advisory Council for Thailand is an outgrowth of SEADAG. The Council, which was formed to advise AID on assistance to Thailand, consists of seven members. It provides a gathering point for academicians professionally interested in Thailand. The Council has close association with the Far East Bureau of AID, and it also has a direct advisory and research link to the AID Mission in Bangkok. A SEADAG political scientist is now a member of the Research Division of the Bangkok Mission.

AID Mission Research Division

The AID Mission in Thailand has a Research Division consisting of an anthropologist, an economist, and a political scientist. The Research Division conducts studies on subjects such as innovation and leadership in rural Thailand, the past and potential role of cooperatives in Thailand, and the impact of feeder roads in the north and the northeast of the country.

Through the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand, the Research Division keeps in touch with work being done by the U.S.

academic community and seeks to apply conclusions to the planning and evaluation of joint United States-Thai programs, such as the accelerated rural development project. Thai and American experts examine ARD activities as they are implemented to determine how they can be sharpened and improved.

Mr. Chairman, in this report on rural institutional development in southeast Asia I have tried to deal with both the practical implications of the subject and AID's continuing efforts to improve its tools of rural development programs. Ultimate results, of course, depend upon the government and peoples of the countries themselves. AID can help, but it cannot do the job. The determination and resources of the less developed countries hold the key to success in the rural areas of southeast Asia.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Gaud.

Generally on the basis of your report on rural institutional development some of the fears and concerns of the subcommittee as heard from witnesses in the past would be allayed. For example, in your statement you say that AID can help but it cannot do the job. I applaud this. We also have heard that Asia should be for Asians, we should employ more of the people from the area in our programs.

However on page 12 of your statement, the language you use in the third paragraph raises a very basic question that has been bothering many of us.

In describing AID's efforts in the village cluster program you state "The typical cluster has two young International Voluntary Service Americans and one AID community development worker who act as catalysts, helping to determine the needs of the villages and stimulating the creation of local organizations through which national and international resources can flow."

There are three things in this statement that worry me. I wish you or Mr. Poats would comment. The first concerns the U.S. personnel acting as catalysts. Where are the Laotian government personnel? The second, is where you speak of determining the villagers' needs. What is the nature of this assistance? Are these needs of the nature that one of our witnesses described the other day? He referred to the construction of a concrete toilet in Thailand. It was useful as a symbol of progress but had little meaning within the contex of the daily life of the average villagers.

The second concern I might add, adds credence to the charge that we are playing God, that we are making the determination as to what they need. Many of our witnesses have said they are far better equipped to know what they want if we let them make the decision.

The third question deals with our—and I quote again from your testimony—"stimulating the creation of local organizations." How permanent or long-lasting can such U.S.-stimulated institutions be? Also what happens to these cooperative or coordinated activities within the villages when the "U.S. catalysts" leave?

Mr. GAUD. Let me make an attempt to answer those questions. Why have we a community development worker there? Where are the Laotians? I think the short answer is that there are so very few Laotians who are trained and who have the knowledge to do these jobs. There is a very, very thin layer of trained people. As I said earlier, it wasn't so long ago there were not more than 100 Lao being

trained as teachers. They simply don't have many trained technicians. They have few people who have been to college or high school. They don't have sufficient people with the capability to program, to develop institutions, to go out and teach. So, if we are going to do anything at all in a country like Laos, we have to work, at least in this period, with outsiders. I think any intelligent program in Laos should have two components: First, people working in the village clusters, as these IVS youngsters are—and they are mostly youngsters; and second, a training program to train the Lao so they can take the place of the IVS people. I think we are doing a good deal in the way of building up education and training so that ultimately the Laotians will be able to take the place of these IVS people.

As to determining the needs of the village cluster, are we playing God? Are we merely erecting monuments to progress, such as concrete privies?

I would say, "No." I haven't been to all of these village clusters. But I have been to some of them. I have been much impressed by the down-to-earth attitude of the people working in them. The needs that they are filling are reasonably modest needs, better seed, fertilizer, feeder roads, the simplest kind of dispensary and medical equipment to teach them the elements of environmental sanitation.

It is at a beginning level, you might say. It is a natural question: Why can't these people figure out these things for themselves? Why do they have to have anyone tell them what their needs are? If the Laotian farmer doesn't know what fertilizer is, we can't do as much to help him. If he has applied water in a wasteful way, how can he learn better unless somebody comes and teaches him?

It seems to me, also, that your question is a thoroughly valid one. The question is really: Do our programs make sense? Are they related to the real needs of the people? On this it seems to me we have to keep our eye on the program all the time. I think we are doing just that in Laos.

Your third question pertained to stimulating the creation of local organizations. Are they effective; do they last when the IVS boys and girls leave?

Well, in Laos it is too early to tell. But certainly these types of institutions can be developed and they can become effective. And my mind jumps at once to a program that we are carrying on in East Pakistan. The man who was conducting that program for a number of years is Ben Ferguson. He is a farmer from the Middle West.

He went out to Pakistan for AID. His primary interest was in trying to increase the production of rice in the area in which he was working. He got the farmers together and formed a farmers council and taught them, working together, how to plant their rice, how to cultivate their rice, and how to use better seed so their crops would be greatly increased.

Ben Ferguson was very successful. The farmers council gradually expanded its activities from dealing only with rice, to dealing with other problems of the community, restoring culverts and small bridges, little irrigation projects, building small schoolhouses, digging wells, the same sort of thing that we are doing in these village cluster programs.

So the farmers council began more and more to take care of the needs of the villagers and moved on to become governing councils of these villages, dealing with political programs. Today Ben Ferguson has moved on and he is working elsewhere, in another part of our program in Pakistan. He has trained Pakistanis to take his place. The institutions still exist. They are run entirely now by Pakistanis.

This to me is a model of what we are trying to do in Laos. Whether we will be successful in every case is a question. Obviously we won't in every case.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You believe, then, that the local leaders have the incentive and the determination to carry on a program even after the U.S. aid and U.S. catalysts leave?

Mr. GAUD. I do believe that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Would it not be better if they were invited, or in some way became a part and a party to, the determination of what is in their interest, that there would be a greater success?

Mr. GAUD. They do play a part in that determination. You are quite right, they should. It seems to me that the extent of the part they play depends on their capacity. Here, I would contrast the two situations in Laos and Thailand.

Our effort in Thailand is devoted almost entirely to supporting programs that are originated by the Thai Government. The network of government is much better established in Thailand and the number of trained civil servants is much larger than in Laos. Therefore, while building on existing Government programs is possible in Thailand, this is not generally the case in Laos.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If I may add one question, since the International Voluntary Service was mentioned. I have had an opportunity to observe the tremendous contribution that the IVS is making, particularly in Laos. Also in Vietnam, especially in the Montagnard country, U.S. personnel were proudly relating the number of their successes, the schools built, the fertilizer used, and so forth. Later I learned this was mostly IVS and not AID. I was impressed that apparently the IVS effort was much more successful at a cost lower than our AID program.

My question is: Should we place greater emphasis on efforts of this sort rather than having an AID program, a bilateral government-to-government-type program?

Mr. GAUD. I would analogize the IVS to the Peace Corps. As you know, the IVS operates on a contract with AID. We hire them to do jobs that we think they can do.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. They are getting a lower salary than the AID people for doing a better job.

Mr. GAUD. We do not have that many AID people doing the same kind of job that the IVS people are doing, Mr. Chairman, in Vietnam and Laos. Most of our AID people are supervisory.

STATEMENT ON HON. RUTHERFORD M. POATS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR FAR EAST, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. POATS. It is a different level of manpower. We are operating in Vietnam, for example, largely with local subordinate agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Poats, in your differentiation between IVS and AID, would it be fair to say that in AID are the chiefs and in IVS are the Indians?

Mr. POATS. Yes.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We need more Indians.

Mr. Broomfield.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I have no questions.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gaud, one of the things that struck me during your statement was the statement made by a former witness about the necessity of getting very good people on these jobs. Could you comment about the type of training the men go through who operate, for example, these several programs you talk about in Thailand? Your comment a few minutes ago was that you had many "youngsters" over there. Could you give us a profile of the type of training they have, language training and development training, and how long that lasts, what the age of these people are?

Ambassador Reischauer, when he was here, made the comment in his statement that he would like to see much greater emphasis put upon training because he thinks that no matter how well organized the program is and how good it is, if you don't have the right people in the right spot, then you can do more harm than good.

Mr. GAUD. The youngsters that I was speaking of were the IVS people who work for us under a contract. The technicians are not youngsters.

Mr. POATS. The training programs for our people who will work in these countries are by far the largest in the Agency. Under the present plans, we have scheduled more than 400 people who will work in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand at the University of Hawaii's special training school. Most of them will go to Vietnam. We also have a training program for agricultural extension workers at the University of Florida.

We have a training program for rural engineers at Fort Belvoir. In these programs, they receive from 3 to 7 months of language training, which is quite intensive. Interspersed with that, and separate from it, are the programs of training in their specialized fields—agricultural work for tropical cultures, for example.

These programs are guided and adapted by our own experienced field people who approve the instruction and participate in it. The IVS has an on-the-job language training program in these countries and a preliminary briefing program before the trainees go out to the field. Most of the people, of course, are selected because of backgrounds adaptable to the job, preferably agricultural backgrounds with college training in agriculture.

That is not a uniform requirement. We certainly need to expand the training of people for Laos and, to some degree for Thailand. We hope to be able to run all of our new people going to those countries through the training program. But we have a dilemma in meeting our current requirements; sometimes we can't spare the time for all of the training which might be desirable.

Mr. HAMILTON. How many months of training do these people have?

Mr. POATS. It depends on the specialization. But the rural development officer will have about 2 to 3 weeks of orientation and about 7

months of training, followed by some more local orientation in the field before he goes to work.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of salaries are they paid?

Mr. POATS. They are paid the grade of FSR–3 down to 6, which would be from about $7,000 or $8,000 up to about $19,000 a year, depending on their background, previous salary, and earnings.

Many of them are present AID employees transferred to these jobs.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have a recruitment program?

Mr. POATS. Yes; we have a very intensive recruitment program, particularly for Vietnam, which involves both massive campaigns in major population centers of this country and campaigns through the universities and the professional societies.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gaud, again referring to Ambassador Reischauer's testimony, he says "I think it is a mistake to offer aid on specified conditions." Do you agree with that?

Mr. GAUD. No; I don't. There are many conditions under which I would think it would be a mistake to offer aid. It would be a mistake to offer aid and tie political conditions to it, for example. But I think we are saps if we give aid without tying economic conditions to it, without trying to make sure it is going to be sensibly used, and without being sure that the countries to which we are giving the aid are making good use of their resources. Therefore, if Ambassador Reischauer is making a general proposition, I don't agree with it.

Mr. HAMILTON. He goes on to say "particularly if the conditions are political," they are offensive. I take it you would agree with that part of it.

Mr. GAUD. Yes; and it probably would be ineffectual.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you have any question in your mind about the efficacy of aid where you have this donor-donee relationship that exists, big countries giving to the small countries? Is there something in that relationship that inherently causes a lot of problems for us?

Mr. GAUD. I don't think so. It obviously can cause problems for us under some circumstances. It does so with some countries. It causes the most trouble for us, I think, when we don't give a country as much aid as it wants. But it does not generally do so when we insist upon self-help, or insist upon sensible conditions—what I call sensible conditions of performance.

I don't think problems are inevitable, I don't think trouble is inherent in the relationship. I also feel that wherever possible—and it is not always possible—that it is wise and it is desirable, where there are a number of countries giving aid to a single recipient, for those countries to work together. To the extent that they can, they should work through a consortium, through a consultative group, or through informal agreements to determine what aid will be given to the recipient country, what terms are to be imposed, and what techniques would insure better performance on the part of the country. In that way, the impact of a single donor upon a recipient would be diminished.

For example, many times we have found it useful and, I think, wise to have the IMF take the lead in working out a stabilization program for another country. We have often felt it wise to let the IBRD take the lead in working out certain types of programs, certain types of reforms with a recipient country.

In other words, recognizing that problems can arise out of this relationship, we should take whatever steps we can to minimize them. But there have been a great many examples over the years, when we have carried on bilateral aid programs, when we have acted quite independently in doing so and when, as I see it, there haven't been any problems.

Mr. HAMILTON. Finally a point of clarification. Under Vietnam you discuss programs that we have in operation there, pertaining to agriculture and education, vocational training and the like. Under Thailand you talk about programs that seem to have more to do with developing political leadership.

Do you also have political leadership programs in Vietnam? Is there some reason for this different emphasis in the two countries?

Mr. GAUD. Maybe Rud Poats would have a better answer to your question. But I would answer it this way. There is much more in the way of formal government institutions, local, provincial, and national in Thailand than you have in Vietnam. There are a number of government programs—Thai Government programs—directed at strengthening those institutions and we are working with them.

We think the programs make sense. We are happy to work along with them. In Vietnam one starts from much farther back. There are fewer institutions. They aren't as effective even as the ones in Thailand. But on the other hand, the purpose—not the whole purpose, but one of the main purposes—of the revolutionary development program and the teams is to build local government.

In other words, these teams go into the villages and they deal not only with health problems and with agricultural problems, but they also try to find out what the grievances of the people are, what the defense problems are, and so on. They try to set up and strengthen whatever local governmental institutions there are.

Mr. POATS. I think it is possible to differentiate these local leadership training programs in Thailand today because they have been more separately developed by the Thai Government. The revolutionary development and related agriculture, public administration, and other programs in Vietnam are a composite of activities which are not as separable as in Thailand.

But the revolutionary development program in Vietnam is, as Mr. Gaud said, primarily thrust at creating local government institutions and relationships with the people, which is a political purpose.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gaud, you say you have come a long way in developing techniques to meet the challenge. Do you have anyone in your group making a constant study of the projects in the past to correct any inefficiencies or to improve the ones that you are now putting into effect?

Mr. GAUD. Yes. We try to carry on what you might describe as a constant evaluation of our projects, in the form of annual reviews of our programs and of their effectiveness. Every mission director is charged with the responsibility for doing this within his mission.

We in Washington, each year as a part of the budget cycle, review all of the programs going on in the recipient countries. We try to check on them at that time. In addition, we have another practice—

that of sending out evaluation teams composed of two or three men, of whom at least one, and maybe two, will be former mission directors. These teams go out to these countries to review and evaluate what is going on.

Then from time to time—not on a regular basis but quite frequently—we will send a team of agriculturalists, for example, as we did to Turkey, to review the entire agricultural program, and see if it is up to par, or if it ought to be changed.

So we do have a practice of both regular evaluation and spot evaluation.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gaud, in your statement you refer to the developing democracy program in Thailand. May I read to you from the transcript of the last hearing of this subcommittee in which Dr. Robert Tilman discussed that program. I am going to make this brief.

He says:

I have been struck by the developing democracy program in Thailand. Perhaps I should add that this is a laudable attempt to create a township level council and utilize this as a forum for the villagers to express their views on politics or on what needs to be done. How have we gone about creating it? I say "we" because I have a strong suspicion that we had a great hand in creating the idea of a Tambon Council. The Ministry of Interior published something like an eight-page order detailing the creation of Tambon Councils which has been sent out to the village heads concerned to be posted on the walls for the people to read. Of course, most don't read. It is eight rather detailed pages incorporating one expression from the Gettysburg address, which is not exactly indigenous to Thailand, and employing language that reads something like the oath from a low-level U.S. security check. One requirement was even for a "belief in constitutional government," which is interesting since Thailand has not had a constitution for almost a decade.

What is your reaction to that description?

Mr. GAUD. Again forgive me for turning over the microphone to Mr. Poats. I understand it is a Thai program, not an American program. I believe Mr. Poats knows a little more about the genesis of it than I do.

Mr. POATS. This was a revival of the Tambon Council idea put forward by the Director General of Local Administration, who is also the mayor of Bangkok. It was his personal enthusiasm. Our people certainly worked with him, encouraged him.

I think you will find in many Thai statements references to American and British and other national statements of political philosophy. You certainly find that even in Indonesia.

I don't know of this eight-page document, but I do know that the system does not rely on issuing documents so much as on action programs aimed at the establishment of these councils. Under these programs, officials go around and bring the local leadership, teachers, businessmen as well as government officials together and discuss what needs to be done.

It is, under the circumstances, a remarkably democratic process. I don't believe we know yet whether it is going to continue to develop into a fully viable form of local government.

Mr. FRASER. Let me move, if I may, to a related question. Mr. Gaud, you said when a worker in the villages, in the clusters, goes in to work with the people that they may not know, for example, that

fertilizer can increase productivity. They need someone to tell them that, or to tell them that there might be a more useful way to utilize water. That would be one approach.

The other approach might be to ask the people what was worrying them. Since they didn't know about fertilizer, that might not be worrying them. Since they had no other notion of how water might be used, that might not be worrying them.

The first approach which you described is essentially one of trying to deal with the economics of the village. The second approach would be one that might deal more with the politics, the political feelings and attitudes of the village. I would judge in terms of what is happening in these societies that the latter is probably more important than the former.

That is to say, if the government is going to appear to be responsive from the point of view of the person who lives under it, it needs to be prepared to respond to how he feels, rather than to be an administrator bringing to him something about which he has no prior thoughts or knowledge or concern. What do you say about that?

Mr. GAUD. I think that could be. I would not try to rate economic and political factors and say that one was more important than the other. I think that economic development, improvement of the standard of living, individual and group achievement, accomplishment of social reform in a particular situation, and political institution, are all important. They are all interrelated.

I don't mean to quibble, but I think that one of the problems in Laos—and it would not necessarily be true in another country—is that there is little identification between the Lao villager and his central government or any government. This is one of the things that we are trying to establish. Here, as in the case of fertilizer, the villager wouldn't miss it because he didn't know about it. He wouldn't look to his central government as a place to complain.

In Laos, much work has been done in the way of building political institutions and in approaching the country's institutional problems.

Frankly, I have a large question in my mind with respect to this whole business of the developing countries achieving political maturity through programs directed at political development. I have an even larger question in my mind as to how effectively anyone from the outside can approach the problem directly.

Mr. FRASER. I am not trying to pose that question. Here is a case of intervention that we have described, of a worker in a village cluster. There are two ways, among others, to approach it. These are not necessarily exclusive. But one is that we are going to come in and teach them to do things that they don't know how to do themselves. The other is to come in and inventory their grievances. This is the way the Communists would work. That is a political approach. I don't know about the question of external intervention. I only know the Communists have been working very successfully around the world. To the extent there is any external input, they seem to have had successes.

Mr. GAUD. It could well be, Mr. Fraser.

Mr. POATS. May I comment on that? We set out in this cluster program to get something started. We had very little to work with. Gradually more human talent is becoming available. The Lao work-

ers are getting involved. Elements of the government—from the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, and so on—are increasingly devoting their time to these clusters to the extent that the other areas feel they are being neglected. The process is, I think, very close to what you are suggesting. The village leader and the senior citizens of the village and the educated people of the village are brought together in a community center and they discuss what the villagers' problems are. The American's role there is a muted one. He has talked to the people in the village. He has talked to the fundamental educator of the Lao Government. He says in the meeting in response to comments and suggestions that, "Yes, we can help you get that. We can help you do that. Or this is the way it is done in another village or country." And he is not laying out a list of things that he has decided should be done. The process doesn't work that way.

We are also trying to get more training into rural development, as Mr. Gaud said. Each of these village clusters has, to some degree, a local leader training program which is producing, on a basic scale, local community development workers from that village to stay there and work. Some of them are paid and some unpaid. We are adding this training element to everything we are doing there.

For example, the National Education Center, which is designed to produce elementary and secondary school teachers, has in its curriculum very substantial community development extension programs. So that these teachers when they go out are not only teachers but activists of rural development.

Mr. FRASER. On the question of training, it is a wise thing to help train people in the country. We also train our own people. I understand that the Hawaiian training is about to be taken over by the Foreign Service Institute here in Washington. In its entire history, so far as I know, it has never undertaken to give training of the kind that is required for people that work at the village level.

Mr. POATS. The Hawaii program is to be evaluated the middle of this month to determine to what extent we should continue it. I think it is quite clear that it will be continued. The training requirements are far greater than the Foreign Service Institute could handle alone. I think this will be determined by the evaluation and that it will be continued.

As for the FSI, language training is its special field. They can also do training in sociology, history, and so on. As for the training in the field—the specialist related programs, we are going to be assigning experienced AID people from the field to do that instruction.

Mr. FRASER. I have some clippings of the Hawaiian school. They send the people into the island of Hawaii and they have a chance to live among people of different ethnic origins and a culture somewhat different from what they are used to. If the training is back in Washington where do you plan to put them out for instruction?

Mr. POATS. We wouldn't be able to give them that training advantage in Washington. That is one of the advantages of the Hawaiian school. But its plant can't take the training load that is coming up this year. So we have to divide the training load.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Gaud, to what extent is there communication with private voluntary agencies in the field? Is this something in which there is communication and coordination?

Mr. GAUD. Yes, sir. It is very extensive, as I am sure you know. We have a great many voluntary agencies working in these four countries, particularly in Vietnam, but also in some of the others. I think we have rather effective coordination with them in terms of knowing what their programs are, making sure that our objectives are related, and that we are working in the same directions. And we give them a great deal of support. In fact, most of them couldn't operate without our help.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As usual it has been a pleasure to have you testify, Mr. Gaud. You have not told us, roughly, the relative effort that the United States is making in the four countries that we have been comparing today. Could you give us some indication of how much aid is going into these four countries? I don't mean exact figures, but just roughly a comparison.

Mr. GAUD. You mean out of the total AID program?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes.

Mr. GAUD. Into these four countries?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Comparing these four countries but not with respect to the total budget. How much aid, for instance, goes to the Philippines as compared to Thailand? I am not looking for classified figures, needless to say, or exact figures, but just how they compare.

Mr. GAUD. Much of the largest amount of aid—many times more than in any of these other three countries and even a good many more times than in the other three countries put together—goes into Vietnam. For example, for fiscal year 1968, the President is asking the Congress for a total of just over $2.5 billion, of which $550 million is for Vietnam. That is more than 20 percent. Next in importance in terms of dollar amounts to Vietnam is Laos. Next comes Thailand. The least aid goes to the Philippines. The reason the Philippines has received less aid than the other three countries is primarily because there is no need for a larger amount of what you might call security aid. The Philippines does not have a red-hot situation comparable to those in Vietnam, in Laos, or in northeast Thailand. Then, too, we have not been satisfied with the past performance on the part of the Philippine Government. We hope the justification for more aid will grow under the Marcos government, but there isn't justification at present for a large amount of development aid.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As I anticipated, Mr. Gaud, you have anticipated my next questions. I asked the question because the amount of aid that is going to South Vietnam is so tremendous that it raises in my own mind whether they can really absorb this amount when they are not meeting the prerequisites which you set out in your statement as being essential. I think that was the expression. I am talking about your language on page 4. You say, "As an example, a prerequisite to any development program is security." Surely that is the one thing we don't have yet in South Vietnam. Yet we are putting in over a half billion dollars worth of aid into that country. I am not arguing against this necessarily, but by your own terms these criteria cannot be met and yet we are going ahead anyway.

By the same token, you refer to the goal of nation building. One of our problems is that in Vietnam we don't really have a nation yet.

Yet we are not waiting until there is this awareness of the necessity of the nation itself doing more than it has. We go ahead, gorging it with aid. I do think you run into the practical problem of whether this is wise. I would assume that the AID program is again going to be a target in Congress, perhaps more this year than before, because of the kinds of questions that we are discussing right now.

Mr. GAUD. Vietnam is Vietnam. Thank heaven there is no other program like it and I hope there never will be. To date the largest amount of money that we have been putting into Vietnam has been (I am talking about aid, not about the military program or our own defense fund) the stabilization program, to try to keep the country afloat, to avoid a runaway inflation. Without that it seems to us the country would have gone down the drain before this. Our whole effort would have been wiped out.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Roughly what dollar figure are we talking about with respect to stabilization?

Mr. GAUD. In the last 12 months it was $300 million that we put in the commercial import program. The Vietnamese put a good deal of their own money into this stabilization program. You know what happened. On the one hand we started a tremendous military construction program. The Vietnamese were also building up a tremendous construction program. Our troops had an awful lot of money. A tremendous amount of local currency was let loose on the economy. At the same time the production and transportation of goods were disrupted, and you had a classic setup for runaway inflation.

If the Vietnamese Government had been strong, if it had been in the United States or in the United Kingdom or Germany, the solution would have been obvious. A stabilization program would have been instituted through increased taxes, and other standard measures. In the summer of 1965 the Vietnamese Government wasn't up to that. The only solution was the short-term one of increasing the supply of goods in the country. We and the Vietnamese launched it together through our commercial import program. That program has come in for a lot of criticism, and deservedly so, because it grew much faster than we were able to keep controls on it. But in my mind it was a successful program because we did not have runaway inflation in Vietnam. It bought time until the summer of 1966, when the IMF worked out a devaluation program with Vietnam. Then taxes were raised, and the Government was able to get moving on the long-term conventional ways of attacking that kind of problem.

I say that program, which has been expensive for us, and has cost more of our money than anything else, was directed to the problem of security. We had to prevent the country from collapsing. Deplorable, regrettable, unfortunate, but there it was.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Actually your discussion of security was with respect to the military operations.

Mr. GAUD. That is right. I was referring to the military side. You are quite right. It is the old story. It is the thing that has characterized the aid program from the days of the Marshall program and the Truman doctrine. Our basic objective is a long-term one of helping these countries get stronger and become independent members of a free society. That is our basic objective.

But we are always being diverted and we cannot ignore short-term problems. Whether it is in northeast Thailand, northeast Brazil,

Panama, or in Vietnam, this long-term problem cannot be confronted until we dispose of the short-term problem.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are you reflecting a situation in South Vietnam which is chaotic, and you have to grapple with developments that are not really controllable? There has been widespread criticism and a suspicion that we did not have our aid program in South Vietnam under control. There have also been reports that there are major revisions of our policy in Vietnam, new people going out, and a new team approach. This has not been played up, but there is an apparent effort on the part of the administration to change its approach. Is this an effort to overcome the somewhat chaotic conditions which have characterized some of the AID operations in the past? Or am I trying to get you to commit yourself to something you don't want to say?

Mr. GAUD. I would put it a bit differently. As far as the commercial import program is concerned we moved fast. We moved the goods out there faster than we could increase the capability of the ports to handle them, the capability of the warehouses to house the goods and the transportation capabilties to move the goods, faster than we could train Vietnamese as customs inspectors, auditors and so forth. There was a period—there is no question about it—when the controls on that program weren't anything like that which we wanted. Today I think that we have made great progress in this respect and we now have that program under control. That is one side.

There are also our programs in the villages and provinces. There, our main effort that we are making today pertains to the business of trying to strengthen the fabric of the Vietnamese society—economy, government, and all the rest of it. This main effort is being made through this revolutionary development concept, through these teams of 59 men and women who work in the villages. It is, roughly speaking, the third approach that has been made to confront this problem. None of us know what the real answer is. None of us know exactly how to strengthen the Vietnamese Government or any government by tying the villages and Provinces in an orderly way to the center. We are all groping and trying to find the most effective way to do it. We hope that this is going to work. It is much too early to tell.

One thing devils us particularly. It is the lack of security. It is difficult to carry on any program in a village where the headman is afraid to sleep in the village because he may be kidnapped, or where the teacher is afraid he will be shot. Until there is greater security in these villages, we can't do very much.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The frankness of your response develops evidence that can be used against as ambitious a program as we are currently engaged in. In other words, there is a suspicion, which may not have an adequate foundation, that we are engaged in a bottomless pit. Some believe we are pouring too much, both militarily and in a nonmilitary way, into a very small country, thereby creating stresses and demands upon the Vietnamese that are impossible for them to meet. For that reason, some believe we might make more substantial, longlasting progress if we made haste more slowly.

In other words, is it possible for Vietnam to digest as much as we are putting into that country, purely on a nonmilitary basis? If you add also the strain of our military effort and the contributions we are making to that country, doesn't it make it even less wise to go at this so vigorously?

Mr. GAUD. Mr. Poats is tugging at my elbow and says he would like to quote some figures.

Mr. POATS. Out of this half billion dollars or so of aid about $300 million, as Mr. Gaud says, is in the commercial import stabilization program. That leaves about $200 million for the project program. Of that $200 million, about half is in projects of the sort that we normally think of in AID programs. The balance is in relief and logistic support which is not required in a normal situation. Logistics operations of all sorts—ports, transportation in the country, airlift, refugee relief, and direct medical care—is a huge program in itself. These are not typical AID programs. These are war theater operations.

As for the $100 million left for project operations, we are talking about programs that serve a substantial part of the population which is in secure areas. There are about 4,500 hamlets which are secure. There are more being secured right along. We work in all the district towns, all of the Provincial capitals, and Saigon. There is a great area in which there is security to operate. About $85 million of this project program can be directly attributed to rural development activity; that is, in agriculture, about $20 million; education, $12 million; revolutionary development village projects, $19 million; related public administration projects, $2 or $3 million; public works in the countryside, $20 million; and part of the salaries and staff, about $10 million. That does not include about $40 million in fertilizer which was programed for the commercial import program.

Second, the point of nation building is not stated by Mr. Gaud as a prerequisite but as a goal. The goal is clearly the target of these revolutionary development and other rural programs. We think that the management of these programs does require too large a proportion of foreigners. We wish it didn't. But we constantly see needs that have to be met urgently if we are going to deal with the mixture of political, economic, and social aspects of the war and get the job done. They have to be met so urgently that we can't wait for the conventional slower pace of training or what can be done purely by indigenous initiative and effort. There is local initiative in this program. The revolutionary development minister is clearly the key figure and the creative person in this whole effort. He is first class.

The revolutionary development workers scheme is a Vietnamese villager scheme. They bring together the villagers, determine what they say they need, and act as extensions of the thin Vietnamese professional structure at the district and province in satisfying those needs. That is also true of the Provincial Council, a mixture of Americans and Vietnamese who determine jointly the nature of a province program. This is true of the agriculture programs and all the rest. These are Vietnamese programs to the maximum extent we can make them, but we do compromise in areas where we think it is prudent.

For example, there is a large element of American initiative in the direct medical care program. There had been extensive American initiative in the past in the refugee relief program. But we are very happy to say these days that the Refugee Commissioner is making the decisions, taking initiative, organizing staff, to run this program with less and less American initiative.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you for the comprehensive answer to my question, Mr. Poats. I stand corrected on suggesting that nation building was a prerequisite. I am not sure how a goal can be a prerequisite.

Mr. Gaud says security is both a goal and prerequisite. But the reference was only to security. If I could have one quick question about the Philippines, which gets comparatively little notice——

A lot of the criticism of the AID program is that we give aid to many countries. I wonder how significant our aid is to a country like the Philippines and if there is some foot-dragging on the part of the Filipino Government why we don't provide even less than we do.

In other words, isn't this a place where we would not necessarily have to focus on certain aspects within the Filipino's focus, on certain promises which it seems to me is what we are doing in part.

Could you comment briefly on the situation with respect to the Philippines?

Mr. GAUD. Yes. I think you are right. For the last couple of years, until this last fall, our aid to the Philippines was comparatively miniscule—about $3 to $4 million, if I may be permitted to call that miniscule.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. As long as you are in Washington, I think it is permissible.

Mr. GAUD. It took the form of technical assistance and very limited technical assistance. Within the last year, we have been encouraged by the way in which the Marcos government has been tackling what we believe to be the fundamental problems of the Philippines—for example, the great need for increased agricultural production, weeding out of corruption, improved tax administration—problems of this sort.

We have indicated that we are prepared to go forward to help the Government further in these and other areas. As yet, Mr. Frelinghuysen, we have done little. How much we will do will depend entirely on whether performance equals promises, so to speak. The general tenor of your remarks, I agree with 100 percent.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you very much.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gaud, referring to the Philippines, you do have under consideration an enlarged program for the Philippines. Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. GAUD. This is primarily the 11-province program which is basically a Philippine program which we are supporting.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are we going to enlarge our support?

Mr. GAUD. If things go well; not otherwise.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Gaud, there were questions raised by previous witnesses before the subcommittee about the evaluation of our AID program as well as a reference made to the importance of research. They emphasized the importance of such research.

In your report, you have on page 25 a reference to a small research team in Thailand.

Do we have a similar research unit in Laos, Vietnam, or the Philippines?

Mr. GAUD. We don't have any such unit at any of the other places that you suggest. We have in South Vietnam some people with this

type of training who are making an input into our programs but we don't have anything really comparable to this unit that you speak of.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are you confident that the research program in Thailand can contribute much to the improved effort there?

Mr. GAUD. We hope so.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then, why don't we establish similar units in the other countries?

Mr. GAUD. As far as Vietnam is concerned, we are trying to do the same thing through contracts with agencies outside the Government.

We are obtaining the same sort of advice that these people would give through contract rather than through direct hire people. We don't, as I said, have anything like this in the other two countries that you speak of.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you believe that we should?

Mr. GAUD. I believe our programs should all be worked out and devised with these implications, these objectives, in mind.

But I am not at all sure, sir, that we need a specific unit of this kind in all our missions. We need that kind of attitude in looking at our programs.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. What would be the criteria under which you would make that judgment, whether a research unit is important or not in one or another country?

Mr. GAUD. I don't know. I can't answer your question.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is research important?

Mr. GAUD. Very definitely.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If it is important, it ought to be important in all countries.

Mr. GAUD. We have done, as I am sure you know, very little in this field to date. This unit in Thailand, as far as I know, is the first of its kind.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The purpose of these hearings is to satisfy how we can improve our aid efforts. If the witnesses have placed such emphasis on the desirability of research to improve our programs rather than going willy-nilly, I think we ought to give serious consideration to this.

Mr. GAUD. I agree we need more research——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I am hopeful that something will be done to give proper emphasis to this problem area——

Mr. GAUD. We will certainly do our best on that.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The size of the unit need not be great.

Mr. GAUD. Right.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. One witness, Dr. Huntington, suggested that an Office of Political Development be established within the Agency of International Development.

What is your reaction to such a suggestion?

Mr. GAUD. Mixed.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You lean which way?

Mr. GAUD. As you know, Mr. Chairman, as a result of the title IX amendment last year, we have embarked on a rather extensive study of this whole question and how we should deal with it. I would

rather not commit myself on it at this time. We do expect to report to the committee on it. I have very serious reservations as to the wisdom of establishing such an office. I feel very strongly that we should examine, analyze all of our activities, keeping very clearly in mind the fact that social, economic, and political progress are all-important if we are going to achieve our basic objective of development. I think we have to increase our analytical capability to do this.

I think we have to give added program emphasis to local governmental institutions and voluntary associations. I am not at all clear, however, that we should establish in the Agency a unit for political development.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you see any good in having an Office of Political Development?

Mr. GAUD. I think there is a great deal of good in our having qualified people on our staff——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Then, why wouldn't you want to establish one?

Mr. GAUD. I hadn't quite finished. I see a great deal of good in having on our staff people who have the education, the background, training, experience in this field. I am not at all sure it is desirable for us to have a separate political development unit.

I think that we should be aware of the impact of our programs all around, all across the board. I think we should clearly work, to the extent that we possibly can, toward increasing popular participation in development in these countries and that we should do what we can to encourage the growth of democratic and free institutions in these countries.

I am not at all clear that we should advertise, or that we should have as one of our primary objectives, political development as such.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Economic development efforts which fail to pay attention to resulting political development is useless.

Mr. GAUD. I agree. As I say, I think political, economic, and social objectives are related.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Because we are so closely associated with politics——

Mr. GAUD. Sir?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. As Members of Congress, are we giving too much concern to political aspects of our aid?

Mr. GAUD. I don't think so. I don't think so at all.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Many of us have seen our AID people abroad and have observed such a lack of political understanding that we were appalled.

Mr. GAUD. I don't think you are overemphasizing it. But I would like to point out that the AID agency isn't the only Government agency that operates abroad on behalf of the United States.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Just one more question on this point.

If you find it desirable to have people within your organization with a consciousness of political development, how can you have them without an organization or office?

Mr. GAUD. I think we should have people on our staff, and we do have people on our staff, who have an awareness of this problem and who have some understanding of it. Our experts on rural development, many people in our training field—there are a great many

people scattered through the Agency who have, both here and abroad, what I conceive to be the proper type of background for handling this problem in the AID framework. I don't think we have to have a separate unit. I am not ruling that out. As I said, we are still studying this and haven't come up with a conclusive answer.

What we want above everything else, I think, is an attitude—a frame of mind, an understanding of the implications of what we are doing. We can achieve that in one of several ways.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are you trying to say that AID has to have within its organization economists, agricultural experts, and other technicians, and that political experts would sort of sandwich in between?

Mr. GAUD. I didn't mean to convey that impression. What I was saying is we need all types of qualified personnel to make up a rounded program.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. May I ask another question, Mr. Gaud——

Mr. FRASER. Can I ask one question in there? Mr. Gaud, I am not going to ask for the answer to this now, but because it fits into this discussion I would like someone in the Agency to prepare a statement. You referred to Ben Ferguson earlier. I have heard his name several times. He is an operator? He is an action type?

Mr. GAUD. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. He is the violinist—not the music critic?

Mr. GAUD. That is right.

Mr. FRASER. What I would like to get from you is how to maximize his type of people. I know some people seem to be born with it in the political field. The Agency has a lot of people around the world. I would like to know what kind of systematic program can be developed that gets people to acquire the insights and abilities he has developed. I won't ask for the answer now.

Mr. GAUD. I hope we can answer your question. I am not sure that we can.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Do you have other questions?

Mr. FRASER. No.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In testifying on "U.S. policy toward Asia," the Honorable Kenneth Young suggested the establishment of an Asian Service Corps in the U.S. Government that would have specialized knowledge and familiarity with that half of the world. He suggested that such a group, receiving large-scale public and private support, could close our "knowledge gap" on Asia. Has such a proposal been discussed within AID or, to your knowledge, at other levels of government?

Mr. GAUD. I have never heard of the proposal before.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The proposal was made before the subcommittee early last year and I thought that a paper has been made available to the Executive branch of Government with the hope that some consideration would be given——

Mr. GAUD. I will have to look into that and let you know.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee would appreciate receiving your views on such a "corps" after you have had an opportunity to study it. We hold your views in high esteem.

(The information follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
Washington, D.C., April 5, 1967.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: This is in response to your request, on March 9, 1967, that I comment on the Honorable Kenneth T. Young, Jr.'s proposal for the establishment of an Asian Service Corps.

Ambassador Young's proposal has not been submitted to the Agency for study and consideration. But we have reviewed with interest Ambassador Young's brief references to it on pages 490 and 495 of "United States Foreign Policy Toward Asia," Report of the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific May 19, 1966.

On the basis of our sketchy knowledge of this proposal, I can comment that the Agency does have many officers who specialize on Asia and who spend successive assignments there. We cooperate with foundations and institutions of higher learning in many ways, including contractual relationships. We are trying to close our "knowledge gaps" with the assistance of the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand, and the employment of scholars as consultants and on direct hire.

When the Agency can obtain additional information on Ambassador Young's proposal for an Asian Service Corps, I will be pleased to comment further.

Thank you for your request for my views.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM S. GAUD.

Mr. ZABLOCK. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. One final question, Mr. Gaud.

What aspects of development aid to Asia are best done through regional institutions?

What can best be accomplished by bilateral aid and can institutional building be done as effectively through AID as through multilateral channels?

Mr. GAUD. I don't know that I can answer that question in a few words.

Generally speaking——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. With the hour being as late as it is, Mr. Gaud, would you care to provide that for the record?

Mr. GAUD. No, sir. If you don't mind, let me deal with it and if you want me to supplement my answer, I will be glad to do it.

I don't really think that, in terms of results, you can necessarily draw a rigid line between bilateral aid programs or regional aid programs or multilateral aid programs.

It seems to me that most, or many, development projects can be carried out just as effectively by the one as by the other. I think there are real advantages in regional institutions, as I conceive them, and I would call your attention to the Asian Development Bank, a regional institution. I think these institutions are important and they have something that we don't have, in that the countries of the region belong to them.

They contribute resources to them. They work in them and they thereby get involved in their own problems and in the problems of their neighbors. And over a period of time, it seems to me, these institutions tend to develop political cohesion in the region which might not otherwise exist or which would be slower to develop.

I think that these regional institutions have these tremendous advantages. Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, for example, are obviously very effective in terms of development. They can do a great many things if they are efficient, and I consider the World Bank a highly efficient organization.

It seems to me, however, that from our standpoint—from the standpoint of the United States, there is one very important distinction between the multilateral institutions and the bilateral AID program. In the latter, we keep control of our funds. We decide to what countries we will give aid and when we will give it and on what terms and whether we will give it at all.

I believe there is a strong element of national interest in an aid program. I believe we should keep control of our funds. We should have a bilateral aid program and it would be a mistake for us to abandon the bilateral aid program and rely entirely on multilateral institutions.

At the same time, and I think I said this earlier, I believe it is important and useful for us to work with other aid-giving countries, work with the World Bank and IMF in ways in which we will still retain control of our funds.

I think it would be disastrous from the standpoint of the United States to give up its bilateral aid program. I think it is an important element of our national security and policy.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It depends then on the type of assistance to be given as to whether it would be on a bilateral or multilateral basis?

Mr. GAUD. Yes, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. In other words, it cannot be said that all aid money from now on could be best handled if it was just channeled through multilateral institutions or channels?

Mr. GAUD. I think that would be a tremendous mistake.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I hope we will not make that mistake.

Mr. GAUD. I hope not.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Gaud.

(Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

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