

A ROMAN GENERAL'S OPINION OF MILITARY CRITICS

LUCIUS AEMILIUS PAULUS, A Roman Consul, who had been selected to conduct the war with the Macedonians, B.C. 168, went out from the Senate-House into the Assembly of the people and addressed them as follows:

In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass that territory should be entered; where Magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet.

And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if any thing is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on trial before them.

These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation.

I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment.

What then is my opinion?

That commander should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent; by those who have made the art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger.

If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia.

He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his traveling charges shall be defrayed.

But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot.

The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any but such as shall be framed within our camp.

*Titus Livius, born 59 B.C., died A.D. 17.

"A REPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM", REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE ROGER HILSMAN,
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT THE
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION MEETING, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

In the period when Mr. Acheson was Secretary of State and General Marshall was Secretary of Defense, it is said that the two men had a special understanding.

Whenever anyone said, "This is a purely military problem," or "This is a purely political or diplomatic problem," then whoever said it had to leave the room.

In South Vietnam we are confronted with an extraordinary example of the way military decision and action are interdependent with many other decisions and enterprises. The war there is a guerrilla war, any successful means on countering guerrilla war are as much political as military, for the long-run task is nation-building.

This guerrilla war is a form of hidden communist aggression, an internal war, if you will. As President Kennedy has said, "Their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by others -- by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone -- assassins who have taken the lives of four thousand civil officers in the last twelve months in Vietnam alone -- by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent nations."

This war in the shadows may well be one of the most decisive battles of our time. My subject is a report on one of these shadow wars, the one in South Vietnam, and I would like to start by giving you my outline: There is a guerrilla war in South Vietnam so I would like, first, to say something about guerrilla warfare in general -- the conditions in which it arises and a strategic concept for fighting against it. Second, I would like to tell you how these ideas are being applied in South Vietnam. And, finally, I'd like to give you a report on how things are going there in South Vietnam.

There is something about guerrilla warfare which gives rise to legends. It is part of the operation, in fact, to see that the enemy is full of rumors which keep him in the dark as to facts.

But in appraising the uses of guerrilla tactics we should certainly try to separate legends from realities.

So it seems useful to begin with the elementary observation that guerrilla warfare is possible only in two very special sets of circumstances:

The first is, when the main body of the enemy is otherwise engaged. When France was occupied by the Germans in World War II, virtually the entire population hated the Nazis. There was a well-organized and supplied guerrilla movement — the Maquis. But so long as the German Armies had nothing else to do, the French guerrillas could not be effective. There were many individual acts of sabotage and violence, but not much else. At any time that a small guerrilla band attacked, the Germans could counter with overwhelming force.

But after D-Day, when the German Divisions were fully engaged in fighting the Allies, the Maquis became a formidable and effective force.

The second set of circumstances is now the more usual setting for guerrillas when they operated in the emerging, still developing countries of the world. In much of the world today, the different communities that make up what we think of as Nation-States are isolated from the Central Government — isolated by lack of communications or by the terrain, as in mountains, islands, or the desert, but more importantly isolated in psychological and political sense.

The basic situation in many underdeveloped areas is that the villages are turned inward on themselves. The people are living there as they have for hundreds of years, with few ties to their Government. They appear rarely to have strong political convictions one way or another. In my personal experience in Southeast Asia during World War II where a few of us in the OSS were sent behind the enemy lines to organize bands of guerrillas against the Japanese, it seemed to us that perhaps ten percent of the people had some sympathies for our side and perhaps ten percent had some sympathies for the Japanese but eighty percent of the populace did not have much awareness of the struggle being fought out in their country. Much less did they have ideological convictions. Even with white faces we recruited a guerrilla force that was larger in numbers than the Communist guerrilla force in South Vietnam today.

My point is that in these underdeveloped, but at the same time

ancient cultures, the villagers are isolated from each other and from the Central Government in a way that we in the West are not equipped by our experience to understand. The villagers are turned inward on themselves and identify not with the Nation but often only with their family, clan, and village.

Let me illustrate my point.

Recently some friends of mine made a tour of the border areas of such a country. They visited forty villages. In ten of these villages no one had ever seen a Government Official of any kind -- neither the District Chief nor the Province Chief, much less a Representative of the National Government. They also visited a town, where one would expect the people to be better informed than those in the villages. There they talked to a shopkeeper, and one would expect a shopkeeper to be better informed than, say, a laborer. They asked the shopkeeper who the King of the Country was and he proudly named him and pointed to a picture on the wall -- which had, incidentally, been furnished by the United States Information Service. He was asked who the Prime Minister was, however, and inexplicably named not the Prime Minister of his own Country, but the Prime Minister of a nearby country. It seems that the nearby country had radio broadcasts which he could pick up on his transistor radio and he naturally assumed that since he could hear the broadcast the Country must be his own.

What happens when a village with people as isolated as these is visited by a tough band of armed marauders? The villagers are unarmed and the guerrillas are armed. It is not surprising that the villages give or sell the guerrillas rice. It is not surprising that the guerrillas can recruit a few young men to join their guerrilla band with promises of adventure and good things to come. In such circumstances the people do not have to be "against" the Government for a guerrilla unit to thrive. The people do not have to support the guerrilla for a guerrilla movement to thrive.

(Any comparison with our own world must be far fetched, but one may ask whether the citizens of Chicago supported the gangs which flourished in the twenties? The shopkeeper who was hit by "protected you" racket did not "support the gangs", but he often had no choice but to go along with them. Government protection seemed far away, and the threat from the hoodlums was close by. The same is true in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the villages are not only isolated, but also both unarmed and unprotected.)

Against this background, I would suggest two principles as a strategic concept for countering guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

The first principle is that fighting a guerrilla war in an underdeveloped nation requires as much political and civic action as it does military action. President Roosevelt once said that "Dr. New Deal had been succeeded by Dr. Win The War", but in guerrilla wars in underdeveloped Nations both Doctors are needed. Military action and a Social New Deal have to proceed together. The isolated villages must be tied into the governmental structure — at District, Province and ultimately the national level. The goal is to create a network in which information about the needs of the villagers can flow upward and Government Services can flow downward.

This flow of services from the Government must go all the way across the board — feeder roads so the villagers can get their products to markets; radios and radio stations so their minds can be opened up to the outside world; food from a prosperous part of the country when famine strikes in another part of the country; education for the young; books and magazines for the old so that they will not lose their literacy for lack of something to read as so often happens; and medical services.

I know that it is familiar to those of you in this audience, but it is not familiar to most Americans just how heavy some of the ancient but now controllable scourges of mankind weigh on the peoples of the world. In parts of Thailand, 80 percent of the people are infested with the liver fluke. Hookworm devilitates the populations in most of Asia. The World Health Organization, our own Aid Programs, and the efforts of many of these countries in their own behalf have made enormous strides in controlling Malaria. But countless millions of people are afflicted with controllable diseases against which no progress has really been attempted.

You in this room could list these diseases and their consequences much better than I. But let me make two points.

The first is that controlling many of these diseases is not only a question of hospitals, X-Ray equipment, and a high proportion of Doctors to total population. Much can be done by teaching the villagers the elementary facts about sanitation, by Medical Technicians trained to deal with one or two particular diseases, and by an adequate supply of modern drugs.

The second point is that it is often these one or two endemic but controllable diseases that stand in the way of economic progress and development, and hence contribute greatly to Communist opportunities for subversion and aggression by guerrilla warfare.

To sum up this first principle -- that the villages must be tied into the governmental and national fabric -- let me say that it is well for us to remember that in these parts of the world it is a revolutionary idea that the people of a country can expect their Government to help them, protect them. They have never asked what their country can do for them, much less what they can do for their country. Indeed, there are millions of people who do not know what a country or Government is. If we are looking for a revolutionary appeal to excite and inspire these people, it is the simple concept that Government exists to serve and protect them.

My second principle concerns the military side of fighting guerrillas, but in a peculiarly political way. The principle is that in fighting guerrillas, military operations must be so conducted as to achieve political ends. Stated another way, the principle would be that to fight guerrillas you must adopt the tactics of the guerrilla himself.

Orthodox military tactics are aimed at taking and holding territory. Military formations designed for these purposes are large and slower moving. The guerrilla on the other hand, does not aim to take territory, but to win recruits and alienate the people from their Government. The guerrilla's purpose is well served when large military formations sweep the countryside, for this tends to make life difficult for the villagers and, hence, to make the villagers turn against their Government. Thus, for political reasons the military tactics used against guerrillas should be those of the guerrilla himself -- small roving units constantly patrolling and ambushing. Finally, these tactics should be designed to cut the lines of communication between the guerrilla and the thousands of villages to which he goes for food and recruits.

You have heard of the so-called strategic hamlets and villages that are now being built in South Vietnam. This is a concept that was developed in Malaya during the Communist Guerrilla War there, and is now being applied in South Vietnam.

You remember my earlier point that in underdeveloped areas the

villagers are not necessarily pro-guerrilla. But unless there is some way of protecting them from Maurauding Guerrilla Bands they will be obliged to give or to sell food to the guerrilla and to listen to his propaganda.

One purpose of the strategic village is to give villages this protection -- or, rather, to help the villager to protect himself. Without arms or protection the villager cannot refuse to give or sell his rice to the Communists, for fear of retaliation. Without protection, the villager is afraid to pass on information about the Communist guerrillas to the Government.

A second purpose of the strategic village is to control the movement of people and supplies. Identity cards are issued; and curfews are imposed. Thus anyone on the roads and trails at night can be assumed to be a Communist.

Through the use of Identity Cards and intelligence from the people, the small group of hard-core Communists in a village of several hundred people can be identified and arrested. The barbed wire and curfews deny the guerrillas easy access to the villages. If the guerrillas need rice, they must attack a defended village. Thus the whole war is turned around. Instead of the Government forces chasing the Communists and falling into ambush, the Communists must attack the villages and so fall into ambushes themselves.

It should be stressed that the strategic hamlets are not concentration camps. The purpose is to keep the guerrillas out of the villages, rather than keep the villagers in. Inevitably, of course, when one throws a barbed wire fence around a village there is a degree of regimentation. But this is a type of war and some form of regimentation cannot be avoided. There is a parallel in our own history. The early settlements of America had stockades around them and life went on behind the stockades for a long time. Our ancestors did not like the rule that everyone had to be inside the stockade at sundown. They did not like to bring up their children in such an atmosphere, but they built the stockades as a first step towards a way of life in which stockades were no longer necessary.

Now let us see how the South Vietnamese Government is applying these principles against the Communist guerrillas.

There are 15,000 - 20,000 hard-core, full-time Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, and many thousands more sympathizers, part-time Communist guerrillas, and political and propaganda agents.

South Vietnam is a nation of about 14 million, so this does not represent a mass movement.

But in an underdeveloped country with poor communications, with mountains and jungles, terrorists and subversive agents in these numbers can cause much damage.

The major concentrations of the Communist guerrillas -- who are commonly called the Viet Cong -- are in the mountains near the Laotian border in the North; in the mountains extending eastward toward the coast in the central region of South Vietnam and southward toward Saigon; and in the Mekong River Delta area, including the plain of reeds, West and South of Saigon.

The Communists try to maintain the fiction that this is a civil war arising spontaneously from within South Vietnam.

This is not true. The Communists in North Vietnam are directing this guerrilla movement. For years, they have been sending in trained men to be the cadre for the Communist Viet Cong battalions. These trained men slip into South Vietnam over various overland infiltration routes that lead from North Vietnam through mountains and jungles and by junk landings along the South Vietnamese coastline. And let me make this clear -- by using these infiltration routes and conducting a guerrilla war the Communists are committing aggression. The guerrilla movement in South Vietnam is directed from outside by an enemy nation. It is interference by military force in the affairs of another nation.

What comes over these infiltration routes? The answer is -- largely trained men. These are jungle trails -- not roads -- and the men must walk. They can carry food for their journey. They can carry arms and ammunition. They can carry medical supplies. They can carry money. And they can carry specialized equipment, such as radios and perhaps some light automatic weapons.

The food for the guerrillas in South Vietnam must be obtained in South Vietnam itself. Moreover, by hitting army, security, and police units suddenly and in superior force, the guerrillas are able to assure themselves a local supply of arms and ammunition and reduce their dependence on long supply lines from the North. This is demonstrated by analyzing the equipment captured from the Communist Viet Cong. The arms captured from the Communists are old weapons left over from the

days when Vietnam was a French Colony, those that the Communists have captured from the South Vietnamese forces, or homemade guns, mines, grenades and even crossbows with poison arrows.

Thus there are two lines of supply for the Communist Viet Cong. The first is the infiltration routes which supply largely trained men -- officers, and non-commissioned officers -- and specialized equipment and supplies. The second are the hundreds of jungle trails leading into thousands of South Vietnamese villages, like spokes on a wheel. It is from these villages that the Communists get food, recruits, and the raw materials from which to manufacture arms and ammunition. As I said before, the villagers do not necessarily support the Communists, but when the Communists have access to the villages they can obtain the supplies by both intimidation and purchase.

This, then, is the enemy situation. The South Vietnamese Program for dealing with this situation has three objectives:

The first is to strengthen the regular army and security forces and increase their mobility.

Here the United States Aid is vital, and the vigorous program instituted by Secretary of Defense McNamara has been having magnificent results. As you have read in the papers, the United States has furnished arms and equipment and, most importantly, helicopters which give the regular South Vietnamese Army lightning mobility to reinforce people attacked by the Communists, and to seek out and pursue the Communists in the mountains and jungles.

The second objective of the program is to cut the infiltration routes.

The Geneva Agreements neutralizing Laos specify that the territory of Laos shall not be used for these purposes. Whether the North Vietnamese will keep their word remains to be seen. But in any case the South Vietnamese are not powerless. As you can see from a glance at the map, these infiltration routes must in some instances wind their way for long distances inside South Vietnam before reaching the areas of Viet Cong concentration, and the South Vietnamese are taking measures to cut these routes inside South Vietnam itself.

An important part of the measures to cut the infiltration routes

is the recent decision to arm the Montagnards. The Montagnards are the mountain peoples of South Vietnam -- hardy, courageous men. Recently thousands of Montagnards have fled into the lowlands to get away from the Viet Cong whose modern arms were too much for the only weapons the Montagnards had -- spears, and bows and arrows.

The South Vietnamese Government decided to equip the Montagnards with modern weapons, furnished by the United States. The Montagnards are trained in the use of these weapons, and sent back into their home territories to establish strategic villages of their own in the mountains through which the infiltration routes pass. Our special forces training officers estimate that about 23,000 square miles are already under the Montagnards' protection and that in four months the total may be 40,000 square miles. According to reports, 7,000 Montagnards have already been trained and given weapons and another 3,000 are being trained.

The third objective of the South Vietnamese is the strategic village program I have mentioned, which is designed to cut the major routes of supply and deny Communist access to thousands of unprotected villages.

This program calls for putting defenses around existing villages -- barbed wire, watchtowers, and ditches filled with bamboo spikes and booby traps. It calls for giving each village a radio which the villagers can use to call for reinforcements by helicopter if they are attacked by a Viet Cong force too large for them to handle. It calls for arms for the villagers to use themselves when attacked.

There is one misconception about this program I would like to correct. These plans, unlike those in Malaya, do not call for relocating villages except in rare circumstances. In general, the defenses are to be put around existing villages. Although there are one or two places in heavily penetrated regions where villages have actually had to be regrouped, these are the exception, not the rule.

The strategic villages will provide protection. At the same time, the South Vietnamese plan to use the strategic village idea as a way to tie the villagers into the governmental structure and to provide the villages with Government Services -- Health, Education, Agricultural Services, Police Protection, and good village Administration.

South Vietnamese Government Plans call for civic action teams sent by the provincial and national governments which will not only help the villagers in setting up their defenses, but will also expand the political, social, and economic base for integrating of the villages into the national fabric. For example, these teams include a medical technician, a school teacher, an agricultural credit representative, a public information representative, two or three public administration advisors, and a youth activities representative, as well as a Police Advisor, a Civil Guard Liaison Officer to man the radio that calls for reinforcements if attacked, and a squad of soldiers to issue weapons to the villagers and provide training in their use.

When this program is completed, in addition to the protection afforded, the South Vietnamese should have a much improved structure that will permit information about the needs of the villagers to go up the ladder of Government and services to meet their needs to come down.

On the military side, it will provide hedgehock of defended villages, zones of defended villages which will act as a meat grinder when the Communist guerrillas venture into them. Each of the villages will have its own self-defense corps to resist attack. In the empty spaces between the villages, Civil Guard Units will patrol and lay ambush during curfew hours. If the Viet Cong come into the zone, they are very likely to run into a Civil Guard ambush. Even if the Viet Cong do not run into an ambush, sooner or later they will run out of food and be forced to attack instead of being chased. The guerrilla is ambushed rather than ambushing.

This then is the theory, and the program for putting theory into practice. The final question is now, how is it working out in South Vietnam.

So far we have grounds for guarded optimism.

Vigorous support for Secretary McNamara and the Department of Defense has given the South Vietnamese Army new confidence. It is attacking the Viet Cong and has been having gratifying success.

Over 2,000 strategic hamlets have been built, and 1,000 of these are now equipped with radios as a result of United States Aid.

Not all of these strategic villages are perfect. Some do not have enough arms and equipment. In some places, too, there has not yet been

enough money to pay the villagers for the time they have spent on building the village defenses and inevitably in some villages there is some resentment.

On the other hand, the early returns seem to indicate that the villagers' morale and their attitude toward their Government are much better than some press reports might lead us to believe.

There have been some very positive press statements that the Government of South Vietnam is unpopular with the villagers. But how can one generalize about the attitude of some 12 million villagers? There are no Gallup polls. I myself do not know the answer to this question and I doubt seriously that anyone does.

I can, however, give you a few hard facts that may be at least straws in the wind.

First, one would expect that if the villagers were anti-Government and pro-Viet Cong they would defect to the Communists when they were given arms. Of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none that has gone over to the Communist side.

Second, if the villagers were merely indifferent to their Government they would sell their arms to the Communists -- and the Communists have offered very high prices for these arms. But of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none where the arms have been sold to the Communists.

In fact, the villages have used their arms to fight the Communists. Of the villages that have been armed so far, only a few as yet have been attacked, but all of them have fought when attacked and fought well. Only five percent of the village radios have been lost as a result of Viet Cong action, and we really expected the rate to be much higher. More than this, in the last few weeks a high percentage of the Viet Cong killed have been killed by villagers resisting Viet Cong attack.

Let us take one week as an example. During one week in August, over 600 Viet Cong were killed as against less than 100 killed among the pro-Government forces. And of these 600 Viet Cong killed, two-thirds were killed not by the South Vietnamese regular Army, but by villagers armed through the strategic village program. This, I think, is an encouraging indication of the attitudes of the villagers.

In sum then, although the plans are just beginning to be implemented, the results are encouraging. The defection rate of the

Viet Cong has risen and the recruitment rate has gone down. Just in the last two months there are areas of South Vietnam that are now safe that only last spring could not be entered without a company of armed guards.

There is a long way to go. It took seven years to eliminate guerrillas in Malaya. It may take less than this in Vietnam or it may take more, but it stands that we have reason to feel confident that in the end the South Vietnamese -- with our help -- will win.
Item.

THE INSURGENT BATTLEFIELD

(Talk at Air Force Academy by Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, USAF 25 May 1962)

I.

This is a little talk on some "facts of life." It's not the usual one about the bees and the flowers. It concerns some hard facts you should know for your life, as an American military man, on today's Communist insurgent battlefield. You'll need your eyes wide open when you get there.

Today's battlefield is the result of a strategic flanking movement. For some time now, the Communist leaders have made it plain that they expect to conquer the world. The short road to conquest could only be taken by making full use of military power. Our own great and alert strength has served as a military deterrent, which has forced the Communists to take the long way around in trying to reach their goal.

This "long way" is conquest by subversion in all of its aspects, supported by guerrilla forces when needed. The Communist guerrilla operations increasingly have involved American military men. Our military advisors, in assisting the armed forces of free foreign nations, simply have had to learn how to give practical advice on fighting Communist guerrillas, or else. The "or else" is the penalty of seeing an ally go under.

Our military effort along these lines, in what we now call "counter-insurgency," has been greatly heartened by the personal interest of President Kennedy. The U. S. military establishment is responding with tremendous vitality. The top echelon, including Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General LeMay definitely, are dedicated to making our effort succeed. You probably have noted that they get out to the critical areas, in person, to make it count most where it's needed most. Further, in "counter-insurgency," we have new military doctrine, new staffs in the Pentagon, new command structures in the field, special units, and new courses on the subject in our military schools and colleges.

All of this splendid effort, its organization, its training, its equipment, are working towards having what it takes to win...at the point of decision...on the insurgent battlefield. It boils down to a

pretty lonely spot. At some place, on the insurgent battlefield, it comes to a unit of an allied military force, with an American military advisor, right up against the enemy. That American had better know his stuff. One day, that American might be you.

You'll be key man, on the spot.

In case it is you, let me help you get prepared for that moment. The best start I know is to get oriented to the insurgent battle and to its battlefield. When you locate your own vital part in these surroundings, all your heritage, and training, and equipment will start clicking into place.

What, then, is this battle?

What does the insurgent battlefield look like?

II.

The battlefield is a whole country, when Communist guerrillas are active.

If we were to map it truly, to show what it really looks like as a Communist insurgent battlefield, we would have to put in all the people in the land. They are the dominant feature of this battlefield, above all else. We would see the battle for what it is: to win these people. When the people are won, along with them go the terrain, the wealth of the land, the whole existence of the nation.

The strategy and tactics which take place on this battlefield are based on winning the people. As long as they are, the battle starts getting won. When strategy and tactics are used which don't contribute to winning the people, the battle starts getting lost.

Thus, on our true map of the battlefield, we would see a nation's entire population. Among the people, from one side, we would see the Communists hard at work, attracting and coercing, to gain control of this population. Among the population, from the other side, the government side, we would see the adherents of the government at work to maintain the loyalty and support of the people. When these two polarizing forces are thus competing, it's the one that can build up and maintain the strongest attraction force that wins. If the force on the government side is weakened, by diffusing the polarization, by shutting off vital parts of it, the government loses.

On a Communist insurgent battlefield, the military man is most often the government representative who is out among the people. The armed forces usually are the largest organization in the government. When the shooting's on they're out in the countryside where the enemy is. Their uniforms tell the people plainly that these are government men.

Magsaysay gave a dynamic role to the Philippine citizens in uniform during the Huk campaign. This dynamic role was called "civic action." In it, the soldier citizen became the brotherly protector of the civilian citizen. Meaningful help to the people, a regard for the dignity of man, and true military courtesy were the essential elements. Civic action formed a bond of brotherhood between soldiers and civilians. When the soldiers and the people joined together, the Communist guerrillas could no longer hide among the people, and were defeated.

This polarizing force is not new to warfare. Those of you who crack your books will recognize it as Sun Tzu's first "constant factor" in the art of war. This practical soldier of 2,000 years ago called it the Moral Law. Mao Tse Tung put this into a code for the 8th Route Army. The code was known as the "Three Rules and the Eight Remarks." Essentially, this code implemented the concept of the people as the water where live the troops as the fish. In Communist North Vietnam, this same forceful principle is used. It is known as the "three recommendations" and is Point 9 of the Military Oath of Honor. General Giap, the Communist commander, stressed the "profound significance" of this code in the defeat of the French.

III.

The Communists put a lot of patient, long work into preparing the insurgent battlefield. They have a lot of resources in place, by the time they field a guerrilla force. Not all of these resources are surfaced when the insurgency is initiated. Significant action elements have a clandestine role, to weaken the government side, up close. Thus, the location of Communist forces would look quite different on a Communist operation map from the Communist order of battle seen on the usual government intelligence map. It's only when a massive intelligence effort is made by the government that the two maps start looking the same.

The Communist preparation of the battlefield in Vietnam began about 40 years ago. That is, it took about 20 years of preparation before the Communists started to field guerrilla forces.

The Japanese invasion and occupation gave the Communists the popular resistance cause they sought. However, the Japanese mostly behaved themselves in Vietnam, due to their deal with Vichy. So, the anti-Japanese war wasn't much of a Communist guerrilla effort, except in gaining experience which paid off after that war in organizing and leading a later guerrilla war for a more dynamic popular cause, freedom from French rule. Many non-Communist Vietnamese fought for their country's freedom from the French, under Communist leadership, without being aware that the leadership was Communist. When they caught on that they weren't fighting for freedom, but to impose Communism on their country, they quit the Communist guerrilla ranks by the thousands. Many of the hardest fighters against the Communists in Vietnam today were once on the other side. A million of them moved South, when North Vietnam was given to the Communists.

If these Vietnamese sound naive, remember that there were many people who once believed that the Chinese Communists were only "agrarian reformers." Even closer home and more recently, remember the people who thought Fidel Castro was merely a liberal reformer. The Communists run an expert confidence game.

Incidentally, in Vietnam, the preparation of the battlefield began with the entry of a tiny handful of Communist agents in the 1920's. They joined in with laborers brought from Singapore by French plantation owners, to build the railroad in Central Vietnam. The U. S. Army Special Forces now have a camp in Vietnam, close to where the first Communist cells were located. As these first Communist agents recruited local Vietnamese cadres, they picked up Ho Chi Minh, who received his higher Communist training later in Paris and Moscow.

The Communist insurgent battlefield in the Philippines got its first preparations at about the same time. The first agents were Malay-Chinese. Later, there was help not only from the Chinese Party, but considerable help from the American Communist Party. The American Communists were mostly merchant seamen in the early days. During the Huk campaign, one of the American Communists -- his name was William Pomeroy -- sneaked up into the hills to join the Communist guerrillas. They wouldn't have him as a fighting man. Instead, they assigned him to teach in one of their jungle schools, which they called "Stalin Universities." As he prepared to teach a class in local Communist history, he found that all reference to help from the American Party had been deleted in the local history given him. When he protested that there wouldn't have been a Philippine Party unless the American Party had helped so generously, he was disciplined. The enemy, the

newly independent Philippine Republic, was being smeared as the puppet of the United States. It would hardly do to have the Philippine Communist history vulnerable to the same charge! In reality, the hard driving force behind Communism in the Philippines has been Chinese right along.

IV.

In the years of building an organized force below the surface, the Communists use patience and masterly guile, supported by a highly effective international system. The system was originated by Lenin. It is the well-known complex of international and national "fronts," which Lenin thought of as "transmission belts," running power and resources from the international to the national.

Most people don't recognize one of the hard-core Communist cadre when they see him. Sometimes, the disguise is helped by overly enthusiastic anti-Communists, unwittingly. As part of the enthusiasm, Communists are portrayed as having a Stalin mustache, if not Krushchev's bald head. They are given the look of a crafty "muzhik." Helpfully, they wear red stars on a cap or peasant blouse. Some of them are even said to eat babies for breakfast.

So, when a softly-spoken person, looking much like one of the neighbors, moves in on a social structure, as a Communist agent, it is small wonder that he is hard to recognize. He uses local issues in his persuasion, as he carefully recruits and readies others to be as he. In some countries, the Communist cadres even praise U.S. aid—when it is popular to do so.

In Vietnam, some of the mountain tribes file their teeth. So, when the Communist agents were selected to work with the tribes a few years back, the first ones in had their own teeth filed.

We have noted, then, that the battlefield is prepared by the Communists over a long period. This is going on today, in nation after nation. If you are assigned to one of our 40-odd MAAGs and military missions in friendly countries, you would do well to be concerned about what your opposite number among the Communists is doing. The chances are more than good that there is such a person, quietly teaching proletarian military science to the cadre, or quietly running a secret logistics system. Will you be doing a better job for the Free World than he is for his?

V.

With the Communist apparatus in place on the battlefield — which is a nation, remember — the Communists then play the breaks for a chance to win that nation. They are set to use political action, or military action, or a combination of both, to win their goal. War has been declared all along, from the time the first cadres were in place.

The political action is known as "the legal struggle." It has all the legality of an Al Capone running for mayor of Chicago, plus skilled use of inflammatory local issues. Some artful murders, with the victims usually meeting "accidents," some skillful character assassinations, applied terror, loud noises from "front" organizations, and a timed coup to seize the key spots — these are the ingredients of "the legal struggle" at its climax.

If the political action doesn't go too well, then the military action is added, to apply naked power to the campaign. Or, if a really patriotic national rebellion gets started, the Communists move in fast with their military cadres, to capture its leadership.

When the Communists surface their guerrillas on the battlefield, we come to the "counter-insurgency" phase with which our military establishment is rapidly becoming so familiar.

The practices of Communist guerrilla warfare are varied enough for days of talk. To give you a "feel" for this enemy, here are some brief comments on three topics: population control, fiscal support, and troop discipline.

Population control: Communist guerrillas control the population by using both salesmanship and intimidation. The political officers with the guerrilla units are usually younger men. They use the "hard sell," reminiscent of our brasher door-to-door salesmen. They sell the joys of Communism, including the joy of bumping off the landlord, along with the sureness that Communism is coming anyhow, so join now.

The guerrilla unit's political officer has a primary aim. He needs a secret organization within the village, to help support his unit. He usually establishes means for justice, policing, and the collection of supplies and intelligence.

In an insurgency, when it is said that the Communists rule the

village at night, it is this apparatus at work. The magistrate holds a court. Marriages are performed. Sentences are carried out. Taxes and other supplies are collected. It becomes the village secret, often totally unknown to the government.

When there isn't time for the political officer to work in the village, or when the village is hostile, terror is used. A quick, brutal lesson is given to the villagers. Senior villagers are often the victims. They are kidnapped from their homes at night. The next morning, their severed heads adorn poles on paths to the village. Next time the Communist guerrillas come around, the scared people give help. A villager who assists the government troops is sure of some punishment. If a village has a police force which is too active in patrolling the neighborhood, hunting guerrillas, it is lured out into the countryside. While the police are out of the village, the guerrillas slip in and murder the police families. Other police, in other villages, get the idea, and are afraid to go out on patrol and leave their families unprotected.

Fiscal support: Although the Communist agent apparatus is supported largely by outside, or international funding, the Communist guerrilla lives off the land. At times, he grows his own food. Mostly, however, he depends on the systematic collection of food and supplies in the villages. At harvest time, a farmer is told what share of his crop must be put aside for Communist collection. Villages not only provide funds and food, but also boats, vehicles, and cargadore labor.

Crime pays, for the Communist guerrillas. One method they use is kidnapping, for ransom. Another is highway robbery, although it is more normal for them to collect toll. They set up a check point, stop busses, trucks, and private vehicles, and collect a head tax. If any of their victims look suspicious to them, they are apt to be taken prisoner or killed on the spot.

Bank robbery is resorted to, at times. However, it is easier to collect money for "protecting" the bankers, gangster style. In Asia, the banker or money-lender out in the countryside is usually the local Chinese merchant. Paying "protection money," for him, is just a normal way of life, a form of "squeeze."

Kidnapping, highway robbery, and squeezing the money-lender are all current practices of the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam. In the Huk campaign in the Philippines, the Communist guerrillas staged some

melodramatic train robberies, in real Jesse James style. In Vietnam, the Communist guerrillas simply blow up the tracks, wreck the train, and strip the bodies of the victims.

Troop discipline: When a village youth is recruited by Communist guerrillas, there is a romantic appeal to it. He is going to get away from daily chores and live a roaming life of fun and excitement.

The youth quickly finds that the Communist guerrilla unit is run with iron discipline, political indoctrination, and conditioning through "self-criticism." Once in, the only sure way of leaving the unit is death. If captured by government forces, he can be sure that he will have to answer for it to his Communist masters, later.

"Iron discipline" means prompt and severe punishment for any infraction of the rules. Death is as common a punishment as it was in the Middle Ages. A new recruit is often taught the rules dramatically. He is given the assignment of dealing out the punishment. I recall one case. Two village boys joined a Communist unit which was passing through. A few days later, it returned to the neighborhood of this village. One of the boys sneaked off to say hello to his parents. When this was discovered, the other boy was ordered to go to his friend's house and kill him in front of his parents. He did so. If he hadn't, he would have received the same punishment. This act, of course, cut him off from family, friends, and village. All he had left to him was his guerrilla unit and the Communist leaders. He had taken a big step forward, towards becoming one of the "hard core."

Political indoctrination is a Communist guerrilla strength. It is "troop I&E" that never stops. There is at least one formal session every day. During the day, there are quick, informal sessions. The political officer conducts these sessions, and goes right along with the troops on all operations. If you watch a Communist guerrilla unit on the march, when it stops to "take ten," you will see the political officer use the time to give a lecture.

The political officer also is responsible for the "self-criticism" sessions. The French have given the name "auto-intoxication" to the act of "self-criticism," and this is quite descriptive. It's an act in which the military man publicly confesses his weaknesses, particularly any form of selfishness.

For example, after a successful raid, the guerrillas return to their base tired but jubilant. After they've had their rest, the

political officer conducts a "self-criticism" session on the raid. The commander must state where he had a wrong or selfish thought -- in the planning and during the action. The key is, he must see himself as imperfect, state these imperfections openly in public, and vow to overcome impurity of thought or behavior next time. Each of the men goes through the same procedure, publicly. Serious deviations, of course, are punished.

The steady, day-in, day-out psychological conditioning of the "self-criticism" process makes the Communist guerrilla a fanatic. He automatically starts thinking of the group first, himself last.

VII.

Admittedly, this "guided tour" of the Communist insurgent battlefield has been a quick one. I hope the main points will stick with you. They are:

1. The enemy's objective is to win control of the people living on the battlefield. When he wins them, he wins all else.
2. The enemy prepares the battlefield carefully, over a long time. His battle line probably looks different than the government's.
3. Although the enemy tries to give his guerrillas a local appearance, often they have international strengthening. Cut off this outside support, and they would start failing.
4. The Communist guerrilla is a tough, resourceful, and fanatic enemy. He trains long and hard. He is conditioned psychologically.

It is only natural, when describing a tough enemy, to picture him as a little larger than life size. He will picture you the same way, when you are out on the battlefield yourself and become effective.

If you recall, I pointed out earlier that all of our massive effort finally comes down to some small, lonely point on the Communist insurgent battlefield. This is where the final decision comes. This is where the American, when he is true to the spirit of his heritage, is more than a match for the fanatic Communist.

What is it, really, that you, and I, and other Americans find so precious to defend? What we defend are the principles of free men. These principles are clearly set forth in the Bill of Rights in our

Constitution, to fulfill the promise in our Declaration of Independence. So, we have man the way we see him -- an individual, born to be free, endowed by the Creator with "certain unalienable Rights." And, we have man the way the Communists see him -- a cipher, a zero man, born to be one of the mass slaves of the State.

One final story. A true one. It happened several years ago in Vietnam, before we had MAAG advisors out with the Vietnamese units. President Diem saw one of the MAAG advisors and asked him to go out and stay for some days with a Vietnamese general. The general was commanding an operation against insurgents, near the Plaine des Joncs.

President Diem pointed out that the Vietnamese general was a good fighting man. He needed little advice on how to fight and win. But, said President Diem, this highly moral soldier is an aloof man. So please teach him how to love the people. You know, the way you do, as an American.

I appreciate that this sounds highly idealistic and, perhaps an unusual chore for a military man. However, even President Diem's enemies admit that he is a tough and practical realist. He was right on the vital dynamic bean of successful counter-insurgency, when he asked this American's help.

Similar stories are being lived every day in Southeast Asia, by Americans who are giving of themselves, not just doing another tour of duty. Each place these Americans are, the cause of freedom grows. One of them is worth a hundred others who don't live up to the American spirit.

When your turn comes, be like them. Serve in the spirit of American principles. As you do so, you will be right in the forefront -- of giving the Communists a memorable licking -- of helping the cause of freedom, everywhere!

MOUNTAIN TRIBES OF SOUTH VIET NAM.

Languages and Dialects

Linguistically, Southeast Asia does not form any sort of a natural entity. This is also true in the case of the mountaineer dialects. Although there is some difference of opinion among linguists as to proper grouping of the languages, most authorities classify mountaineer dialects into three broad divisions according to the degree in which they have been modified by the tongues spoken by neighboring peoples who have advanced to a higher stage of civilization. The three are:

Dialects of the Malayo-Polynesian origin, one of the most widespread linguistic families in the world, spoken in the Indochinese peninsula, in the Malayan Peninsula and the Philippines. They are polysyllabic, non-tonal.

Dialects of Mon Khmer origin, sometimes grouped under the term Austro-Asiatic. This family is represented in parts of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaya, as well as in Viet Nam. These dialects are monosyllabic and tonal.

Dialects of Tibeto-Chinese origin, which include Burmese and Thai. They also are monosyllabic and tonal.

However, in many cases there is a transfer of words from one language to another, making neat, firm classifications impossible. Vietnamese, for example, is pre-dominately a Thai language but contains so many Non-Khmer elements that some linguists place it in that group; in addition, Vietnamese has been enriched by a vocabulary of Chinese administrative, military, literary and philosophical terms.

In the Highlands, language is the greatest distinction that can be made between tribes. For the most part, each dialect is mutually unintelligible to members of other tribes. Since the development of a language follows its people's cultural evolution it is only through contacts with foreigners that these dialects expand. Most of the mountaineer languages belong either to the Mon-Khmer or the Malayo-Polynesian families. Mountaineer speaking Tibeto-Chinese dialects are represented by refugees from the North speaking Tai, Muong, Miao-Yao and Kdai. The Mon-Khmer languages of the Highlands have been divided into three groups:

The southern area: Koho, Chrao, M'Nong.

The Kontum area: Halang, Bahnar, Sedang, Rongao, Bonom, H'rey, Jesh.

The central area: Katu, Pokoh, Tauoi, Bru.

Since the dialects are innumerable, there is virtually only one method, employed by all the groups, of communicating ideas or transmitting thought among them. It consists of the use of certain conventional signs. The more common of these are triangular or hexagonal figures of bamboo or rattan, measuring one foot eight inches in their greater dimension and hung in some conspicuous place. These geometrical forms warn the traveler of impending danger or notify a prohibition against crossing the boundary of a "taboo" village.

Another method of communication is by means of a string with a series of knots. This practice recalls the quipos which were in use among the Peruvians and Mexicans to record important events and as a medium for the transmission of thought. Suppose two friends want to arrange an appointment to meet in several day's time. They present each other with threads which have the same number of knots, as many knots as there are days to elapse before the meeting. Every day at sunrise each of them unties one of the knots. When at last there are no knots left, they know that the appointed day has arrived.

Chief Tribes

Bahnar (Subgroups: Tolo, Golar, Alakong) - Est. pop. 75,000.

Found mainly in Kontum and Ankhe; some in Pleiku and Binh Dinh provinces. Are located South of the Rogao, and Bunom, northeast of the Jarai, east of the Song (in the Phuong Long area) in Binh Dinh province... The Bahnar have a bilateral kinship system, the type of family found in the United States. Apparently they do not have a clan organization, the village being the social unit with elders (kha) exercising great authority and responsible for electing a head man as administrator. Their language is of Mon-Khmer stock, but many understand Jarai, Sedang, Vietnamese and French. Import tribe.

BIH - Estimated pop. 20,000. Found south of Ban Me Thuot, between the Rhade and the Muong. Language is Malayo-Polynesian, similar to Rhade; many understand Rhade.

BONG MIEU - A small group of villages (est. pop. 500) in Bong

Mieu district in southern Quang Nam. Located between the Katu and Cua. Language family unknown.

BONOM (subgroups: Monom, Menam) - A fairly small group (4,000) in Kontum province (Plateau G. Vilum, Pomplong and Konbrait areas). Located between the Bahnar, Sedang and Hrey. Sometimes are called Bahnar, but appear to be a separate group.

ERU (subgroups: Brou, Baroo, Muong, Leong, Leung, Kalo, Leu Van Kiu) - A fairly large group (40,000) in Quang Tri province with main centers around Khe Sanh (Huong Hoa: 20,000) and Cam Phu (10,000) along the Quang Tri-Savannakhet highway. Group is also found on northern side of 17th parallel and west into Laos. Language is of Mon-Khmer family.

BUDIP - Moang Diep - The so-called feather people in Budang (Phuoc Tam area of Phuoc Long province). Located south of the Mnongs. Their language is similar to Mhong, but is not mutually intelligible.

BULACH - A small (5,000) and little known group in Phuoc Long province. Located north of the Budip. The group is accessible only via a single dirt road in poor condition. Language is similar to Mhong and Budip.

CHAM - Remnants of a highly civilized nation that once dominated the entire Indochinese peninsula, group was conquered by the Vietnamese and almost disappeared. They are not mountaineers. Present population estimated at between 20,000 and 80,000. Located between Phan Rang and Phan Ri with some down the coast near Binh Tuy (Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces). Have a matriarchal tribal organization; civilization is in a state of decline. About 6,000 Cham in Viet Nam are Moslem; the rest practice a degenerate form of Brahmanism. Language is Malayo-Polynesian but most speak Vietnamese well.

CHRAC - Estimated pop. 15,000. Located in southern Long Khanh and southwestern Binh Tuy, probably some in northern Phuoc Tuy. They live south of the Lagna River and east of the Tayh Linh road; south of the Koho group.

CHRAO (subgroups: Ro, Bagieng) - Fairly small group found in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. Little information available about them.

CHURU - A fairly small (18,000) group in southeastern Tuyen Duc Province (in the Dran east of Dalat). They are closely related to the Cham and sometimes call themselves Cham. Language is Malayo-Polynesian, similar to Roglai: most speak Vietnamese.

GAR (subgroups: Mhong Gar, Pnom Gar) - A group estimated at 10,000 found in the La Thiet district in southeastern Darlac province and in the Dakao area of Tuyen Duc province. Similar to, yet apparently distinct from, the Mnongs.

HALANG - A group estimated at 4,000 living in the very rugged, roadless mountain area west of Dakto in Kontum province. Located west of the Sedang, south of the Jeh and north of the Jarai. Many speak Jarai.

HREY (subgroups: Hre, Dvak, Bavak, Kare, Tava) - a large (120,000) group in Quang Ngai province and parts of Kontum (extending from west of Quang Ngai to west of Bong Son). Language is of the Mon-Khmer family; many speak Bahnar and Vietnamese.

HROY (Bahnar Cham) A fairly small group in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces. Sometimes regarded as Bahnar, but language appears to be Malayo-Polynesian rather than the Mon-Khmer of the Bahnar.

JARAI (sometimes spelled Jorai, Djarai or Djirai subgroups: Puan, Hodrung, Hrue) - Estimated population 150,000. A powerful and bellicose group, considered very important mountaineer tribe. Found mainly in Pleiku province; smaller groups in Kontum and Darlac provinces; others in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. Located south of the Bahnar and north of the Rhade; centered around Pleiku and Cheo Reo. Language is of the Malayo-Polynesian family similar to Rhade. The Jarai do not have a clan system, but a matrilineal kinship system.

JEH (subgroups: Die, Yeh, Jeh Perak, Jeh Brilar) A fairly large (15,000) group living in southwestern Quang Nam province, between the Sedang and Katu groups. Mon-Khmer stock.

KATU (subgroups: Attouat, Kao, Khat, Thap, Ngung Ta, Ngung Huu) A large (30,000) group found in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces centered in the An Diem region. Located in a 100 by 100km. area south of the Polo, north of the Jeh. Area very inaccessible. Mon-Khmer language family.

KOHO (subgroups: Chil, Lat, Tring, Sre, Maa, Rion, Nop) An estimated 100,000, found mostly in Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong provinces, but also in Binh Tuy, Quang Duc and Long Khanh provinces. Main centers are around Dalat (20,000), Djiring (30,000), Fyan (10,000) and Elao (40,000) with a few at Song Pha and Dran. The Maa live near Elao; the Rion near Fyan, the Sre near Djiring; the Tring, Lat, Chil near Dalat, and the Song Pha, Dran and Nop between Djiring and Phan Thiet. Their language is of the Mon-Khmer family; many of them understand Vietnamese. The Education Ministry has published a Koho dictionary as well as texts in Koho. Increasingly important tribe.

KUA (Kor, Traw) A fairly small (20,000) group known chiefly as suppliers of cinnamon. Found in the Trabong area of Quang Ngai province and the Bong Mieu area of Quang Nam province, located between the Jeh and Hrey groups; some speak Vietnamese.

LANGYA - Population estimated at 9,000. Live in some 60 villages (with one long house per village) near Phuoc Son in Quang Nam province. May be related to the Jeh. Language is Mon-Khmer.

MAN (subgroup Yao) - A very large (2-4 million) group, found for the most part in northern North Viet Nam and in China. Some came south as refugees and are now located 20km north of Ban Me Thuot. Most speak Chinese and some speak Vietnamese. Theirs is a totem religion and they have a strong family system. In the north they are nomads who live by themselves in distant mountain reaches.

MNONG (subgroups Nong, Rolam, Preh, Biet) - An estimated 20,000 in the Highlands, spread over a large area. Largest centers are in the Ban Don area west of Ban Me Thuot and in the Dak Song area of the Bih. Generally located south of the Rhade. Language is Mon-Khmer, most closely related to Koho. Some understand Rhade and Vietnamese.

MUONG - Another large tribe found mainly in the North, with an estimated population of 211,000. Some 5,000 Muong refugees live a few miles from the leprosarium near Ban Me Thuot; another group, estimated at 3,000 live near the Pleiku airport. Their language is related to Vietnamese and almost all of them speak Vietnamese; they have a Quoc-Ngu script. The Muongs share almost all the basic religious concepts of the early primitive Vietnamese; their social organization has often been described as a replica of Vietnamese society before the advent of Chinese influence in Viet Nam.

NUNG - A tribal group found in North Viet Nam. About 1,000 came south as refugees and are now located in Tung Nghia, near Pleiku and

Song Mao. Their language belongs to the Thai family, closely related to Tho. Most of them speak Vietnamese.

POKOH - An estimated 10,000 living in Thua Thien province near the source of the Mekong river; located north of the Katu. A distinctive group that plucks eye-brows and tattoos dots on the body. Often live in villages immediately adjacent to the Tau-oi groups.

RANGAO - A group estimated at 10,000 living in northeastern Kontum province, between the Bahnar and the Sedang. Sometimes classed as Bahnar or Sedang, but appear to be a separate group.

RHADE (sometimes spelled Rade or Thode: subgroups; Mdhur, Adham, Elo, Kodrao, Krung) - Most influential mountaineer tribe in the Highlands. Estimated population 100,000. Found throughout Darlac province and part of Khanh Hoa province; also southward along Cambodian border. Located south of the Jarai, north of the Bih and Muong, centered around Ban Me Thuot. The Rhade have a matrilineal kinship system, i.e. the females own the house, tools, gongs, jars and other important family items. After marriage the husband goes to live in the wife's home. Children take the mother's family name; daughters inherit the mother's possessions. Lineages form into clans and it is forbidden to marry within the same clan. Land is owned by the clan; land administration is handled by a representative called the Po Lan whose duties are specifically prescribed by Rhade custom.

ROGLAI (apparently often spelled Raglai; subgroups; Rai Seyu) A large (40,000) group found north of Nha Trang and south of Binh Tuy in the Ban Goi district of Khanh Hoa province; also found in Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, closely related to the Cham and the Chru. Language is Malayo-Polynesian apparently with southern and northern dialects; some dialects mutually intelligible with Cham. Many speak Vietnamese.

SEDANG - A large (40,000) group found in the northern half of Kontum province also Quang Nam and Binh Dinh. Considered to be mainly significant Highland group live in independent villages. Social organization similar to Bahnar, but, more individualistic. Are similar to the Steng, located south of the Jeh, east of the Hrey, centered around Dak Gle and Dak Sut. Language is Mon-Khmer family; many understand Bahnar, Vietnamese and French.

STIENG - a fairly large (23,000 in Viet Nam) group, fairly significant. Very numerous in Cambodia. Live in some 650 villages centered in Phuoc Long and Quang Duc provinces; found west of the Koho, south of the Mhong. Bulos are a subgrouping. Are individualistic and independent minded. Some speak Vietnamese.

TAU-OI - a fairly small (5,000) group in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces; centered around Cho Fuan and along the upper Sekong River northwest of the Pokoh group. Language is Mon-Khmer; some understand Vietnamese.

THAI (White and Black) - Montagnards of North Viet Nam. Some 6,000 have come south as refugees and settled in Tung Nghia; an estimated 500 are in the Ban Me Thuot area. The Thai are the most important Montagnard group in North Vietnam. The name however is hardly more than a linguistic classification so heterogeneous is the group. Language is related to the Lao-Thai-Shan family; most of them understand Vietnamese.

THO (sometimes called Thoma, subgroup: Embree) - Originally from northern North Viet Nam along the China border. An estimated 5,000 came south as refugees and settled near Bangoi and Song Mao in Phan Ri province; a few are near Tung Nghia. Their language is of the Thai family, closely related to Nung. Most of them speak Chinese and Vietnamese.

Mountaineers in North Vietnam: Among the northern tribes whose names may be encountered are: the Kelao or Kalao, the Laqua, the Lati, the Lolo (sub-group Ho), the Meo (including the Black, White and Striped Meo - so-called for the design on their clothing) and the Nhang or Nyung.

(USIS)

PROVINCES OF VIETNAM

(Alphabetical listing with names of subordinate districts and cantons and numbers of villages in each)

USOM/Public Admin. Div.

Unofficial as of Feb. 1, 1962

Province (Tinh) (Chief town in parentheses)	District (Quan) (District Hq. in parens.)	Canton (Tang)	No. Vill.	Reg. #	Pop. & Area (est.)
AN GIANG (Long Xuyen)	An Phu (Phuoc Hung)		11	SVN-W	812,737 3,833 sq. kms.
	Chau Phu (Chau Phu)	Chau Phu An Luong	6 9		
	Chau Thanh (Phuoc Duc)	Dinh Phuoc Dinh Thanh	6 7		
	Cho Moi (Long Dien)	An Binh Dinh Hoa	5 7		
	Hue Duc (Ba The)	Dinh Phu	5		
	Tan Chau (Long Phu)	An Thanh An Lac	4 4		
	Thot Not (Thanh Hoa)	Dinh My	8		
	Tinh Bien (An Phu)	Qui Duc Thanh Tin	5 3		
	Tri Ton (Tri Ton)	Thanh Le Thanh Y Thanh Ngai	4 5 3		

CVN-H Central Vietnam Highlands, CVN-L Central Vietnam Lowlands,
SVN-E South Vietnam East, SVN-W South Vietnam West

For further information, call Mr. Lien, USOM/PAD, Ext. 425

Province -----	District -----	Canton -----	No. Vill.	Region -----	Pop. & Area
AN XUYEN (Quan Long)	Cai Nuoc (Cai Nuoc Ngon)		6	SVN-W	275,001 4,952 sq. kms.
	Dam Doi (Tan Duyet)		4		
	Nam Can (Nam Can)		2		
	(Quan Long) (Quan Long)		4		
	Song Ong Doc (Cua Song Ong Doc)		3		
	Thoi Binh (Thoi Bihh)		4		
BAI XUYEN (Khanh Hung)	Gia Rai (Phong Thanh)	Long Thuy	6	SVN-W	581,400 5,571 sq. kms.
	Ke Sach (Ke An)	Dinh Tuong Dinh Khanh	4 7		
	Long Phu (Long Phu)	Dinh My Dinh Phuoc Dinh Hoa	5 3 7		
	My Xuyen (Bai Xau)	Nhieu Khanh Nhieu Hoa	5 5		
	Thanh Tri (Cho Nga Nam)	Thanh An Thanh Loc	5 5		
	Thuan Hoa (Nga Tu Cho My Tu)	Thuan My Thuan Phy	3 4		
	Vinh Chau (Binh Chau)	Thanh Hung	5		
	Vinh Loi (Vinh Loi)	Thanh Hoa	5		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
BIEN HOA (Bien Hoa)	Can Gio (Can Thanh)		5	SVN-E	242,397 1,403 sq. kms.
	Chau Thanh (Binh Truoc)	Phuoc Vinh Thuong	9		
		Phuoc Vinh Trung	5		
		Long Vinh Thuong	4		
	Di An (An Binh Xa)	Chanh My Thuong	4		
		An Thuy	4		
	Long Thanh (Phuoc Loc Xa)	Thanh Tuy Thuong	8		
	Nhon Trach (Phu Thanh)	Thanh Tuy Trung	7		
		Thanh Tuy Ha	6		
	Quang Xuyen (An Thit)	An Thit	4		
BINH DUONG (Phu Cuong)	Ben Cat (My Phuoc)	Binh Hung	6	SVN-E	297,842
		Binh An	4		1,672 sq. kms.
	Chau Thanh (Phu Cuong)	Binh Dien	7		
		Binh Phu	5		
		Binh Thien	2		
	Cu Chi (Tan An Hoi)	Long Tuy Ha	7		
		Long Tuy Trung	7		
	Dau Tieng (Dinh Thanh)	Binh ThanhThuong	8		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
BINH DUONG (cont'd)	Lai Thieu (Tan Thoi)	Binh Chanh	10	
BINH DINH (Qui Nhon)	An Lao (An Hoa)		20	CVN-L 809,345
	An Nhon (Nhon Hung)		13	
	An Tuc (An Khe)		32	
	Binh Khe (Binh Phu)		9	
	Hoai An (An Duc)		7	
	Hoai Nhon (Bong Son)		11	
	Phu Cat (Cat Trinh)		11	
	Phu My (My Quang)		15	
	Van Canh (Canh Thinh)		10	
	Vinh Thanh (Vinh Quang)		20	
	Tuy Phuoc (Phuoc Nghia)		18	

<u>Province</u>	<u>District</u>	<u>Canton</u>	<u>No. Vill.</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Pop. & area</u>
BINH LONG (An Loc)	An Loc (Tan Lap Phu)		21	SVN-E	65,422 2,334 sq. kms.
	Loc Ninh (Loc Ninh)		10		
BINH THUAN (Phan Thiet)	Hai Long (Knahh Thien)		7	CVN-L	259,611 4,404 sq. km
	Hai Ninh (Song Mao)		8		
	Ham Thuan (Phan Thiet)		10		
	Hoa Da (Phan Ri Thanh)		6		
	Phan Ly Cham (Huu An)		10		
	Thien Giae (hoa An)		10		
	Tuy Phong (Lien Huong)		7		
BINH TUY (Ham Tan)	Ham Tan (Tan Tan)		6	SVN-E	36,596 4,030 sq. kms.
	Hoai Duc (Kiem Duc)		6		
	Tanh Linh (Lac Tanh)		6		
CHUONG THIEN (Vi Thanh)	Duc Long (Vi Thanh)	An Ninh	7	SVN-W	304,283

Province	District	Canton	No. Region Vill.	Pop. & area
	Kien Hung (Go Guao)	Kien Dinh	10	
	Kien Long (Vinh Thuan)		6	
	Long My (Long Tri)	Thanh Tuyen	9	
	Phuoc Long (Phuoc Long)	Thanh Binh Thanh Yen	4 4	
CON SON Island (Con son)				SVN-W 1,231 64 sq. kms.
DARLAC (Ban Me Thuot)	Ban Me Thuot	Ea Tam Cu Kek Cu ewi Drai Sap (No canton)	10 4 6 5 2	CVN-H 146,949 12,808 sq. kms.
	Buon Ho	Cu Kuk Cu Kti Cu Dlieya	3 5 4	
	Lac Thieu	Dak Lieng Yang Lak Krong Ana Krong Bong Dak Phoi Dak Rohhyo Nam Ka	3 3 4 4 2 2 2	
DINH TUONG (My Tho)	Ben Tranh (Duong Hoa Lac)	Hung Khon Thanh Quon	8 7	SVN-W 674,773 2,220 sq. kms.
	Cho Gao (Binh Phan)	Thanh Phong Hoa Hao	6 7	

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
GIA DINH (Gia Dinh)	Giao Duc (An Huu)	Phong Phu An Phu	5 5		
	Go Cong (Long Thuan)	Hoa Lac Thuong Hoa Lac Ha	8 7		
	Hoa Dong (Dong Son)	Hoa Dong Thuong Hoa Dong Ha	9 7		
	Khiem Ich (Thanh Hoa)	Loi Trinh Loi Hoa	11 9		
	Long Dinh (Long Dinh)	Thuan Tri Thuan Binh	13 13		
	Sung Hieu (Dong Hoa Hiep)	Phong Hoa Loi Thuan	5 6		
	Binh Chanh (Binh Chanh)	Long Hung Trung Long Hung Thuong Tan Phong Ha	6 4	SVN-E	654,202 706 sq. kms.
	Go Vap (Hanh Thong)	Binh Tri Thuong	7		
	Hoc Mon (Thoi Tam Thon)	Binh Thanh Trung Long Binh	6 6		
	Nha Be (Phu Xuan Hoi)	Binh Tri Ha	7		
	Tan Binh (Phu Nhuan)	Duong Hoa Thuong	6		
	Thu Duc (Linh Dong)	An Dien Long Vinh Ha An Dinh	6 4 5		
	Cam Lam (Cam Loc)		15	CVN-L	271,749 5,536 sq. kms.
KHANH HOA (Nha Trang)	Dien Khanh (Dien Thanh)		29		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Khanh Duong (Ea Ksung)	Krong Jing Krong Hing	2 3		
	Ninh Hoa (My Hiep)		20		
	Van Ninh (Van Gia)		9		
	Vinh Xuong		12		
KIEN GIANG (Rach Gia)	Ha Tien (My Duc)	Ha Thanh Binh An Thanh	2 3	SVN-W	345,944 6,828 sq. kms.
	Kien An (Dong Yen)	Thanh An Thanh Bien	5 4		
	Kien Binh (Thanh Hoa)	Thanh Tan Ngoc Hung	3 5		
	Kien Luong (An Binh)		5		
	Kien Tan (Tan Hiep)		5		
	Kien Thanh (Vinh Thanh Van)	Kien Hoa Kien Tuong	4 4		
	Phu Quoc (Duong Dong)		2		
KIEN HOA (Truc Giang)	Ba Tri (An Duc)	Bao An Bao Thuan Bao Tri	4 6 5	SVN-W	551,055 2,155 sq. kms.
	Binh Dai (Binh Dai)	Hoa Quoi Hoa Thinh	6 7		
	Giang Trom (Binh Hoa)	Bao Loc Bao Phuoc Bao Thanh	5 6 7		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Ham Long (Tien Thuy)	Bao Duc Bao Ngai	6 7		
	Huong My (Huong My)	Minh Hue Minh Quoi Minh Phu	4 5 4		
	Mo Cay (Da Phuoc Hoi)	Minh Dat Minh Dao Minh Ly Minh Thien Minh Thuan	5 3 4 4 4		
	Thanh Phu (Thanh Phu)	Minh Tri	7		
	Truc Giang (An Hoi)	Bao Huu An Hoa	8 8		
KIEN PHONG (Cao Lanh)	Cao Lanh (My Tra)	An Tinh Phong Thanh	4 8	SVN-W	267,137 2,615 sq. kms.
	Kien Van (Binh Hang Trung)	Phong Nam	7		
	Hong Ngu (An Binh)	Hong An Hong Phuoc Hong Quang	3 2 6		
	My An (My An)	My Duc My Phuoc	3 2		
	Thanh Binh (Tan Phu)	Thanh Lien Thanh Khiet	5 3		
KIEN TUONG (Moc Hoa)	Chau Thanh (Tuyen Thanh)	Moc Hoa Ha Moc Hoa Thuong	2 3	SVN-W	54,968 2,297 sq. kms.
	Kien Binh (Tan Hoa)	Kien Binh Dong Kien Binh Tay	3 2		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Tuyen Nhon (Thuy Dong)	My Binh Ha My Binh Thuong	3 3		
	Tuyen Binh (Binh Thanh Thon)	Tuyen Binh Ha Tuyen Binh Thuong Tuyen Binh Trung	4 3 2		
KONTUM (Kontum)	Dak Sut	Dak Rolong Halong Die Sud Dak Pek Die Nork Bong Tul	4 5 4 1 4 5	CVN-H	83,731 11,231 sq. kms.
	Dak To	Dak To Dak Brong Kou Hring Dak Mot	4 3 6 3		
	Kontum (Plei Mang La)	Kong Tum Ya Ty Plei Krong Halang Kon Sotin Kon Monay Ha Mong	4 4 5 4 4 7 14		
	Tou Mrong	Tou Morong Vir-Ngieo Mang Buk Kou Kleang	8 2 1 2		
LAM DONG (Bao Loc)	Bao Loc (Bao Loc)	Dai Hoa Dai Thuan Tan Ma (No canton)	4 3 4 1	CVN-H	58,634 4,726 sq. kms.
	Di Linh (Di Linh)	Chau Thuan Dan Tuc Thuong Hiep Thuong Lien	2 3 2 4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
LONG AN (Tan An)	Ben Luc (Long Phu)	Long Hung Ha	8	SVN-W	493,191 2,332 sq. kms.
		An Ninh Trung	4		
	Binh Phuoc (Duong Xuan Hoi)	Tan Thanh	6		
		Thanh MucThuong	5		
		Thanh Muc Ha	4		
	Can Duoc (Tan An)	Loc ThanhThuong	5		
		Loc Thanh Trung	4		
		Loc Thanh Ha	5		
	Can Giuoc (Truong Binh)	Phuoc Dien Trung	9		
		Phuoc Dien Ha	6		
		Duong Hoa Ha	5		
	Duc Hoa (Duc Hoa)	Duc An Thuong	6		
		Duc An Ha	4		
	Duc Hue (My Qui)		3		
LONG KHANH (Xuan Loc)	Tan Tru (Tan Tru)	An Ninh Ha	6	SVN-E	86,683 2,971 sq. kms
		Chu Cu Ha	6		
	Thu Thua (Binh Phong Thanh)	An NinhThuong	5		
NINH THUAN (Phan Rang)	Dinh Quan (Dinh Quan)	Cuu Cu Thuong	4	CVN-L	137,238 3,498 sq. kms.
			3		
	Xuan Loc (Xuan Loc)	Binh Lam Thuong	7		
		Binh Lam Ha	7		
	An Phuoc (Hau Phuoc)		4		
	Buu Son (An Son)		8		
	Du Long (Cam Ly)		4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Thanh Hai (Khanh Hai)		12		
PHONG DINH (Can Tho)	Chau Thanh (Truong Thanh)	Dinh Bao Dinh An	8 7	SVN-W	378,507 2,500 sq. kms.
	Phong Phu (Thoi Thanh)	Thoi Bao Dinh Thoi	7 5		
	Khac Trung (Co Do)	Phong Thuan	4		
	Khac Nhon (Bay Ngan)	Phong Da	6 4		
	Phung Hiep (Phung Hiep)	Dinh Phuoc Dinh Hoa	4		
	PHU BON (Hau Bon)	Phu Thien (Plei Mang)	Chutse Ia Sol Ia Hiao Ia Piao Tolo Tonia	3 3 5 2 3	
	Phu Tuc (B. Ban La)	Duc Binh Phu My	8 5		
	Thuan Man	Trung Ia Robol	4 3		
PHU YEN (Tuy Hoa)	Dong Xuan (La Hai)		7	CVN-L	346,348 7,169 sq. kms.
	Phu Doc (Tuy Binh)	Phu Hoa Phu Trung Phu My (No canton)	3 4 5 1		
	Hieu Xuong (Hoa Phong)		7		
	Son Hoa (Cung Son)		13		
	Song Cau (Song Cau)		5		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Tuy An (Chi Thanh)		14		
	Tuy Hoa (Tuy Hoa)		17		
PHUOC LONG (Phuoc Binh)	Bo Duc (Phuoc Le)	Phuoc Le	1	SVN-E	32,308 4,764 sq. kms.
		Dag-Huyt	1		
		Bu Yam Phut	1		
		Bu Yu	1		
		Bu Prang	1		
	Don Luan (Doan Duc)	Bu Yum	1		
		N'Dreng	1		
		Tan Thuan	1		
		Thuan Loi	2		
	Duc Phong (Bu Dang)	Bu Dang	2		
		Bu R'Lap	1		
	Phuoc Binh (Son Giang)	Khun-Narr	2		
		Xor-Nuk	1		
		Khun Klenh	1		
PHUOC THANH (Phuoc Vinh)	Hieu Liem (Song Be)		2	SVN-E	65,255 2,947 sq. kms.
	Phu Giao (Bo La)	Chanh My Ha	5		
	Tan Uyen (Tan Uyen)	Chanh My Trung (No canton)	11 3		
PHUOC TUY (Phuoc Le)	Long Le (Hoa Long)	An Phu Ha	3	SVN-E	143,108 2,784 sq. kms.
		An Phu Tan	4		
	Dat Do (Phuoc Tho)	Phuoc HungThuong	3		
		Phuoc Hung Trung	2		
		Phuoc Hung Ha	3		
	Duc Thanh (Ngai Giao)	Co Trach	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
	Long Dien (Long Dien)	An PhuThuong	6	
	Xuyen Moc (Xuyen Moc)		5	
	Vung Tau (Bung Tau)		5	
PLEIKU (Pleiku)	Bon Huong*	Trung	4	
	Le Trung (Le Can)	Dak Doa	4	
		Lac	4	
		Plei Bong	3	
		Plei Brel Dor	4	
		Plei Ngo	4	
		Plei Pion	3	
		Plei Roh	5	
		(No canton)	10	
	Degroi*	Dak Bot	2	
		Degroi	2	
		Mang Yang	2	
		(No canton)	2	
	My Thanh*	Plei Dolim	3	
	Phu Nhon (Don Hoa)	Plei Kly	3	
		Phu Tai	3	
		Plei potau	3	
		Cu Dre	2	
		Plei You	2	
		Prong	4	
		(No canton)	2	
	Plei Grut*	Plei Tell	8	
	Le Thanh (Duc Hung)	Plei Del	6	
		Plei Pomuk	5	
		(No canton)	2	

*These are "Administrative Offices" under the jurisdiction of a large district to supervise a certain number of cantons administratively.

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Plei Donao*	Plei Donao	6		
		No canton	2		
QUANG DUC (Gia Nghia)	Duc Lap (Tu Minh)		8	CVN-H	29,598 5,743 sq. kms.
	Khiem Duc (Ta monng)	Son Khe	5		
	Kien Duc (Sung Duc)	Kien Minh Kien Dao	5 2		
QUANG NAM (Hoi An)	Dai Loc (Xa Loc Xuan)		9	CVN-L	601,450 9,902 sq. kms.
	Dien Ban (Binh Dien)		31		
	Duy Xuyen (Xuyen Chau)		17		
	Hieu Duc (Giao Tri)		14		
	Hoa Vang (Thuan Nam)		21		
	Thuong Duc (Kim Xuyen)		21		
	Que Son (Son Thanh)		17		
QUANG TI (Tam Ky)	Hau Duc (Tien Tra)		14		335,400 1,409 sq. kms.
	Hiep Duc (Dong An)		6		
	Tam Ky (Tam Ky)		27		
	Thang Binh (Binh Nguyen)		20		

* See preceding page

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Tien Phuoc (Phuoc My)		14		
QUANG NGAI (Quang Ngai)	Ba To (Ban Thuan)		24	CVN-L	658,348 4,359 sq. kms.
	Binh Son (Binh Van)		24		
	Chuong Nghia (Thuong Uyen)		10		
	Duc Pho (Pho Dai)		15		
	Ming Long (Minh Tam)		14		
	Mo Duc (Duc Vinh)		12		
	Nghia Hanh (Nghia Chanh)		8		
	Son Ha (Ha Trung)		14		
	Son Tinh (Son Long)		20		
	Tra Bong (Tra Khuong)		13		
	Tu Nghia (Tu An)		14		
QUANG TRI (Quang Tri)	Ba Long (Ba Luong)		7	CVN-L	276,551 4,741 sq. kms
	Cam Lo (Cam Nghia)		13		
	Gio Linh (Gio Le)		6		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Hai Lang (Hai Tho)		23		
	Huong Hoa (Huong Van)		14		
	Trieu Phong (Trieu Thanh)		18		
	Trung Luong (Trung Giang)		3		
TAY NINH (Tay Ninh)	Hieu Thien (Thanh Phuoc)	Giai Hoa	6	SVN-E	287,373 4,064 sq. kms.
		My Ninh	6		
		Triem Hoa	3		
	Khiem Hanh (Bau Don)	Thanh Binh	5		
	Phu Duc (Gia Loc)	Ham Ninh Ha	5		
	Phu Khuong (Phuoc Hoi)	Ham NinhThuong Loc An	8 3		
THUA THIEN (Hue)	Phuoc Ninh (Ninh Dieu)	Hoa Ninh Phuoc Hung	8 6	CVN-L	452,598 4,876 sq. kms.
	Huong Dien (Dien Hai)		8		
	Huong Thuy (Thuy Chau)		14		
	Huong Tra (Huong Son)		2		
	Nam Hoa (Thuong Bang)		13		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Phong Dien (Phong Nguyen)		7		
	Phu Loc (Loc Tri)		8		
	Phu Vang (Phu Duong)		15		
	Quang Dien (Quang Phuoc)		7		
	Vinh Loc (Vinh Hung)		11		
TUYEN DUC (Dalat)	Don Duong (Don Duong)	Xuan Lac	2	CVN-H	56,109 4,773 sq. kms.
		Lac My	2		
		Linh Nhan	2		
		Tu Trang	3		
	Duc Trong (Tung Nghia)	Ninh Thanh	3		
		Son Binh	2		
		My Le	3		
		Dinh Tan	3		
	Lac Duong (Binh Ninh)	Phuoc Tho	2		
		Da Tan	3		
		Nha Lac	2		
VINH BINH (Phu Vinh)	Cang Long (Binh Phu)	Binh Khanh	3	SVN-W	535,378 2,880 sq. kms.
		Binh KhanhThuong	4		
		Binh Phuoc	2		
	Cau Ke (Hoa An)	Tuan Gia	8		
	Cau Ngang (My Hoa)	Binh Tri	4		
		Vinh Loi	4		
	Chau Thanh (Phu Vinh)	Tra Nheu	3		
		Tra Binh	3		
		Tra Phu	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Long Toan (Long Toan)	Vinh Tri	5		
	Tieu Cau (Tieu Cau)	Ngai Thanh	5		
	Tra Cu (Ngai Xuyen)	Ngai HoaThuong	4		
		Ngai Hoa Trung	3		
		Thanh HoaThuong	2		
	Tra On (Tan My)	Binh Le	3		
		Thanh Tri	5		
		Binh Thoi	3		
	Vung Liem (Trung Thanh)	Binh Hieu	3		
		Binh Trung	3		
		Binh Quoi	3		
VINH LONG (Vinh Long)	Binh Minh (My Thuan)	An Truong	3	SVN-W	550,540 1,900 sq. kms.
		An Ninh	4		
	Chau Thanh (Long Chau)	Binh Long	4		
		Binh An	3		
		Long An	4		
		Phuoc An	3		
	Duc Tan (Cai Tan Ha)	An My Dong	4		
		An My Tay	4		
	Cho Lack (Son Dinh)	Binh Hung	3		
		Binh Xuong	3		
		Minh Ngai	3		
	Duc Thanh (Hoa Long)	An Khuong	2		
		Ti Thieu Tien Nghia			
	Lap Vo (Binh Thanh Dong)	Phu Thuong	5	SVN-W	
		Phong Thoi	2		
	Minh Duc (Chanh Hoi)	Thanh Thieng	4		
		Binh Thieng	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
	Sa Dec (Tan, Vinh Hoa)	An Thanh An Trung An Thoi	6 5 2	
	Tam Binh (Tuong Loc)	Binh Thuan Binh Pou Binh Dinh	3 2 3	

41 Provinces 229 Districts 322 Cantons 2,542 Vill. 12,359,136*

*Excludes the populations of the following autonomous cities:

Saigon Prefecture	1,400,000
Da Nang (Tourane)	104,797
Hue	103,367
Da Lat (Dalat)	48,843

Grand total of population of the Republic of Vietnam 14,016,643

Source of information: - Official Journal of the R.V.N.
- National Institute of Statistics (for pop.)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Provinces

<u>Names</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Chief Towns</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Province Chiefs</u>
1. An Giang	SVN-W	Long Xuyen	812,737	Major Nguyen Van Minh
2. An Xuyen	SVN-W	Quan Long	275,001	Lt.Col. Pham Van Ut
3. Ba Xuyen	SVN-W	Khanh Hung	581,400	Lt.Col. Nguyen Linh Chieu
4. Bien Hoa	SVN-E	Bien Hoa	242,397	Major Tran Van Dinh
5. Binh Duong	SVN-E	Phu Cuong	297,842	Major Tran Van Minh
6. Binh Dinh	CVN-L	Qui Nhon	809,345	Mr. Bui Thuc Duyen
7. Binh Long	SVN-E	An Loc	65,422	Major Nguyen Duc Mai
8. Binh Thuan	CVN-L	Phan Thiet	259,611	Lt.Col. Nguyen Quoc Hoang
9. Binh Tuy	SVN-E	Ham Tan	36,596	Major Le Duc Dat
10. Chuong Thien	SVN-W	Vi Thanh	304,283	Major Nguyen Hien Diem
11. Con Son	SVN-E	Con Son	1,231	Major Le Van The
12. Darlac	CVN-H	Ban Me Thuot	146,949	Major Hoang Thong
13. Dinh Tuong	SVN-W	My Tho	674,773	Major Lam Quang Tho
14. Gia Dinh	SVN-E	Gia Dinh	654,202	Major Nguyen Duc Xich
15. Khanh Hoa	CVN-L	Nha Trang	271,749	Major Le Tap
16. Kien Giang	SVN-W	Rach Gia	345,944	Major Nguyen Van Que
17. Kien Hoa	SVN-W	Truc Giang	551,055	Lt.Col. Tran Ngoc Chau
18. Kien Phong	SVN-W	Cao Lanh	267,137	Lt.Col. Dinh Van Phat
19. Kien Tuong	SVN-W	Moc Hoa	54,968	Major Le Thanh Nhat
20. Kontum	CVN-H	Kontum	83,731	Capt. Hoang Van Dinh
21. Lam Dong	CVN-H	Bao Loc	58,634	Major Nguyen Van Tai
22. Long An	SVN-W	Tan An	493,191	Major Nguyen Viet Thanh
23. Long Khanh	SVN-W	Xuan Loc	86,683	Major (Nhuyen Huynh) Huynh Van Du (Actg)
24. Ninh Thuan	CVN-L	Phan Rang	137,238	Lt.Col. Nguyen Kim Khanh
25. Phong Dinh	SVN-W	Can Tho	378,507	Major Le Van Tu
26. Phu Yen	CVN-L	Tuy Hoa	346,348	Major Duong Thai Dong
27. Phuoc Long	SVN-E	Phuoc Binh	32,308	Major Do Van Dien
28. Phuoc Thanh	SVN-E	Phuoc Vinh	65,255	Major Ho Trung Hau
29. Phuoc Tuy	SVN-E	Phuoc My	143,108	Major Le Qui Do
30. Pleiku	CVN-H	Pleiku	124,508	Mr. Ton That Chu
31. Quang Duc	CVN-H	Gia Nghia	29,598	Col. Ho Nghia
32. Quang Nam	CVN-L	Hoi An	601,450	Major Vo Huu Thu
33. Quang Ngai	CVN-L	Quang Ngai	658,348	Mr. Nguyen Van Tat
34. Quang Tri	CVN-L	Quang Tri	276,551	Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Quynh
35. Tay Ninh	SVN-E	Tay Ninh	287,373	Major Vu Duc Nhuan
36. Thua Thien	CVN-L	Hue	452,598	Mr. Nguyen Van Dang
37. Tuyen Duc	CVN-H	Dalat	56,107	Major Ngo Nhu Bich
38. Vinh Binh	SVN-W	Phu Vinh	535,378	Major Le Hoang Thao
39. Vinh Long	SVN-W	Vinh Long	550,540	Major Le Van Phuoc
40. Quang Tin	CVN-L	Tam Ky	335,400	Major Than Ninh
41. Phu Bon	CVN-H	Hau Bon	325,000	Major Pham Dinh Chi
		(Cheo Reo)		

Total population: 14,016,643

PLANT PROTECTION IN VIETNAM

The Plant Protection Service of the Government of Vietnam (Directorate of Rural affairs) is composed of Five Divisions as follows:

1. Entomology Laboratory.
2. Plant Pathology Laboratory.
3. Domestic and Foreign Plant Quarantine.
4. Regulatory.
5. Field Control.

The Field Control Division is by far the largest Division and has received much more emphasis than the other four Divisions.

This Service was newly created this year from existing small fragmented units of two Directorates. Additional personnel have been hired and trained during the current year. The total personnel employed is 120 people, the larger number being Provincial Plant Protection agents. There are 40 of these agents, one in each province. (USOM Provincial Representatives should contact these agents locally and discuss their programs and problems)

Due to the urgent need at the farmer level for insect, rodent and plant disease control facilities and work, the major objective of this project is to reduce the existing crop losses caused by these pests by at least 50% by the end of 1963.

Other objectives are the normal type of development of the remaining four Divisions. This development will be slow due to the heavy emphasis on the field control operations.

The following information on rat control operations in Central Vietnam will suffice to illustrate the type of field operations planned and the rural population reaction that is anticipated.

Field Rat Control

Field rats are a major problem all over Vietnam. The rat population in the ten lowland provinces of Central Vietnam has been increasing at a rapid rate for the past two years. By June of this year the problem was so serious that widespread appeals were being made for help by the rural population. The Government at Provincial level was in turn appealing to the National Government who was urging USOM for assistance. It is estimated that 35 - 40% of all agricultural production in these ten provinces was being lost due to the action of the rats. At least one province reported a total crop loss of 70 - 80%. The situation was such that in some districts the farmers were refusing to plant new crops as they felt it was useless in face of the heavy rat population.

These ten provinces are the poorest in Vietnam. The food situation

was acute even before the large rat build-up. As a result, following the rat population explosion, widespread hunger and near famine conditions were quite widespread.

The Vice President of Vietnam considered the situation serious enough to call and preside at a high-level meeting to consider what could be done. The Director of USOM along with others were invited to this meeting. A course of action was agreed to by both sides.

USOM was to purchase 30 S.T. of rodenticide, of which 10 S.T. was to be air shipped. The GVN was to negotiate with the French Aid Mission in an attempt to obtain an additional 18 M.T. of rodenticide.

The ten tons of rodenticide from the USA arrived by air in May. This was quickly repackaged locally in 100 gram plastic bags. Farmers leaflets were printed giving precautions in using, mixing and baiting instructions etc. Posters were prepared, printed and distributed throughout the control area. Training classes were held for villagers throughout the ten Provinces. Widespread newspaper and radio coverage was also given to the coming control campaign.

It was decided to conduct the control operations in three phases. Each phase to follow the preceding one by roughly three months. All agencies of Government at Provincial level were mobilized to assist in the campaign.

The first phase was to use the ten tons of zinc phosphide rat poison airlifted from the USA. The second phase would use the 20 tons coming by surface from the USA. The third phase is to use the 18 tons coming from French Aid.

In June the repackaged ten tons were distributed to farmers in the control area. The baiting period covered a ten day period. All ten provinces started baiting on the same day. Spectacular results were immediately obtained. Huge numbers of rats were piled up throughout the area. Large pits were dug to bury the dead rats. Tails were cut from all rats and saved for counting purposes.

Prizes were to be awarded to those killing the most rats. The prizes awarded at provincial level were quite valuable, the most common one being a mature buffalo.

During the ten days of baiting between 12 and 15 million rats were killed. The population participated in the campaign wholeheartedly with the result that tremendous goodwill was generated due to the Government help. All rat poison was distributed free with the farmers themselves providing the materials to be mixed with the poison.

Each package of poison was labeled as a free gift to the farmers from the Government of Vietnam and USOM. During an extensive field trip while the baiting was in progress it was noted that the rural population was highly appreciative and pleased.

At this time the second phase of the program is now in operation. It is being conducted exactly as the first phase except that 20 short tons of poison is being used instead of ten. The number of rats killed will probably be smaller this time due to the great reduction of the rat population following the first phase. The third phase will follow in a few months. At the completion of the third phase the rat population in these ten provinces is expected to be at an all time low.

Many such campaigns as this one will be carried out in the future against rats, insects plant diseases in all sections of the country.

LIST OF MAAG RADIO STATIONS

AN KHE
AN LOC
BAC LIEU
DAD LOC
BAN ME THUOT
BARIA
BA TO
BEN CAT
BEN TRE
BIEN HOA
BINH DINH
BINH TUY
CAN THO
CAO LANG
CAO LANH
CAU MAN
CA MAU
CHAN PHU
CHEO REO
DAK ROTAH
DALAT
DA NANG
DA NINH
DI LINH
DONG HA
DRAN
DUC MY
GIANGHIA
GIA RAY
GIAENGIA
GO CONG
HA TAN
HA THANH
HAM TAN
HIEP KHANH
HOI AN
HUE
KHAM DUC
KHANH HOA
KHANH HUNG
KIEN HOA
KON BRAI

MOC HOA
MY THO
NHA TRANG
O MON
PHAN RANG
PHAN THIET
PHU BAI
PHU CAT
PHU CUONG
PHUOC LE
PHUOC TUY
PHUOC DIEN
PHUOC THANH
PHUOC VINH
PHUOC LONG
PLEIKU
QUANG NGAI
QUANG TRI
QUANG TRUNG
QUAN LONG
QUI NHON
RACH GIA
SADEC
SOC TRANG
SONG BE
SONG MAO
TAN AN
TAN CANH
TAN CHAU
TAMA
TAM KY
TAY NINH
THU DAU MOT
THU DUC
TIEP KHANH
TRA VINH
TRUC GIANG
TRUNG LAP
TUY HOA
UI THANH
VINH LONG
VI THANH
VUNG TAU

INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR
RURAL PROGRAMS

The Government of Vietnam's new Rural Programs which are centered on Strategic Hamlet concept offer an excellent opportunity for psychological exploitation and at the same time require a great amount of informational support.

Informational support for the Programs is being developed centrally by the concerned GVN Ministries assisted by their USOM counterparts and especially our Agriculture Information Officer. The USOM Commedia Division and USIS are also assisting in preparing these materials which take the form of pamphlets, posters, labels, films, radio-tapes, newsstories, etc. Existing GVN and US distribution channels will be used for getting these centrally prepared materials to the countryside.

You should also familiarize yourself with all information activities in your province and the personnel responsible for them to insure that you get good local back up for Rural Programs. Please keep us advised of any additional support you may require for this work.

The psychological aspect is lost if not properly done. Since our Rural Programs are aimed at improving the lot of village people and providing them the basic necessities to rapidly enhance their social and economic conditions, the informational materials should always indicate this and that it is the GVN which is worried about them and doing something for them.

The Strategic Hamlet Symbol which appears on the front of this guide connotes "building a new society and a better life"; it should appear on everything reaching the people and should be with us everywhere!

It is expected that you, working at local levels, will develop with your Vietnamese associates ideas and methods for getting them across to support the psychological aspects of the rural effort you are making. We ask you to share these ideas with us since they may be something which can be used elsewhere in the country.

For instance, pamphlets can be printed locally, local newspapers can carry the message, prizes and awards can be given, lotteries can be held; the opportunities are endless if you will explore them. The MAAG Psywar advisers can help you too and will be interested in the chances for intelligent exploitation provided by the Rural Programs.

We consider this work of vital importance and will help you whenever you ask...

cc: Carroll Wilson, Agriculture Div.
Stuart Hannon, Commedia Div.
Eberhart, USIS

