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The Role of Military

in

Underdeveloped Countries

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INTRODUCTION

by

John J. Johnson

In Central and South America, Africa, and Asia, hundreds of millions of people are struggling desperately to acquire national personalities and to share the social and material advantages that more privileged societies take for granted. Old orders have crumbled or are crumbling. Leaders have turned their backs on ancient obligations and time-honored practices. The masses, who historically lacked the power of sustained indignation, have now served notice that they will no longer be dissuaded from seeking self-expression. Industrialization has been made synonymous with progress, and progress is demanded -- by revolution if necessary. Tensions have built up and in some cases have reached sinister proportions. The locus of power has often shifted erratically, but always in favor of the new groups or those elements within established groups that are in the greatest hurry. Those in whose favor the stream of politics is running are convinced that their countries' problems are not exclusively their own, that they must and will have help from the outside.

This volume examines the role of the armed forces in the profound and continuing transformation that much of the world is experiencing. The authors are invariably more concerned with those officers who have used armies for extra-military purposes than with those who have devoted themselves to preparing for armed combat. In particular they have addressed themselves to the problems of why transitional societies apparently find it easier to create modern armies than most other modern structures, and why armed forces that have not distinguished themselves on any battlefield and that prepare for wars that never or seldom occur are allotted such a large share of the national income. The basic search throughout, however, is for indications of how politicians in uniform compete with nationalists, state-oriented bureaucrats, and westernized intellectuals. And when officers seize power from civilians, as they have on innumerable occasions in societies at all stages of development, their charismatic qualities and administrative and organizational skills are scrutinized, among other reasons, for an answer to the question of why military governments have promoted national development and democratic practices in some countries and have been a retarding influence in others.

The reader may be impressed with the similarities in the reasons that the military adduce for becoming involved in civilian affairs in such diverse cultures as those found in the Western Hemisphere, the Middle East, and Africa. He may also be impressed with the numerous times that the failure of civilian leaders to act relevantly and consistantly has paved the way for the military to penetrate civilian institutions. The thoughtful reader, who finishes the volume, may want to reflect even further than we who wrote it on the many alternatives open to the young revolutionary,

modest and egalitarian in spirit, when he becomes a middle-aged militarist, enjoying the perquisites of office, the symbols of status, and the benefits of power.

In addition to the general themes and problems that this broad view of militarism presents, each of the major areas of the developing world has its own contribution to make to a better understanding of the military problem.

Latin America affords unusual opportunities to study militarism in depth since many of the twenty republics have been governed by their armies throughout much of their independent existences, which in most cases date from the early nineteenth century. Everyone of these republics teaches a bitter lesson in personalistic control based on military force. Some of the states that have attained a relatively high degree of cultural maturity and have broadened their political bases may serve for the study of the decline of personalism and the rise of militarism on an institutional basis -- the junta -- or even for the conditions under which militarism may decline.

If Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia may be considered representative of the newly independent nations of Southeast Asia, then that region is probably the best one in which to observe the military as a modernizing and westernizing influence. Burma and Thailand afford an additional and unusual opportunity for examining the effects of military training on political behavior and values, because their civilian and military bureaucracies comes from the same social and economic groups and in many cases from the same families.

In the Middle East, militarism is in full flower, and the roles of the military are as diverse as the countries they dominate. Some armies are of recent origin, progressive, and motivated by non-professional incentives. They are concerned for their countries' dignity. They have taken upon themselves the task of giving dynamic impetus to radical change. Others are only gradually divesting themselves of values that were institutionalized far in the past. But whether the armed forces are new, transitional, or traditional, it is abundantly clear that militarism is well entrenched in the Middle East and that a greater effort than most countries can now muster will be needed to dislodge it.

But in the midst of the instability that characterizes the Middle East is newly created and highly stable Israel. It is this country that provides impressive proof that new states, created under relatively favorable conditions, do not have to turn to their armed forces for political, social, and economic leadership, even when they are surrounded, as Israel is, by neighbors who have submitted to the domination of their armed forces. Israel, then, can serve as a check against hasty generalizations about the role of the military in emerging states.

Sub-Saharan Africa has been largely isolated from major military conflicts during the modern era, and many responsible world leaders are

promoting the idea of neutralization of the new African states. But it appears that each of the new sovereign entities will create some type of military establishment, either with the assistance of a single world power or by diversifying its dependency relationships regarding all forms of aid and external involvements. It appears equally certain that the military forces that are formed will be the least developed in the contemporary world. The new states of Sub-Saharan Africa may thus prove to be richly productive laboratories for an analysis of the behavior of leaders of armies without traditions and with limited capabilities as modernizing and stabilizing forces in their relations with civilian officials and civilian institutions.

This volume, as Dr. Speier has pointed out in the Preface, was born of a conference on militarism in the developing states. It was decided to give the contributors a free hand, except that they were requested not to concern themselves with policy-making. Each article bears the stamp of its author's personality, interests, and intellectual orientation. Policy recommendations are kept to a minimum, although the volume contains much from which policy decisions could logically stem.

THE MILITARY IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW STATES

by

Edward Shils

INTRODUCTION[1]

Of the more than thirty states which have acquired sovereignty since the end of the Second World War, the military forces have played an important political role in at least ten. Only in a few of the new states did the armed forces, mostly in the form of guerrilla armies, play a significant role in the attainment of independence. Since then, however, they have ascended to the position of major participants in the exercise of political authority in their states. In Israel, Cyprus and the successor states of Indo-China, guerrilla armies were very important factors in leading the British and the French to grant independence to these countries. In Indonesia and Burma the guerrilla forces created during the Japanese occupation played a modest and by no means decisive part in the liberation of their countries from foreign rule. In at least six of the new states, the military, although of no great moment in the attainment of sovereignty has taken a central position in the political life of the country. Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, the United Arab Republic are now under military rule. In Jordan such security as the monarchy enjoys rests on the army. In Burma the army insisted on its right to govern for many months; in Indonesia the Army and the President are balanced in a relationship of mutual distrust and dependence; in Lebanon the army deliberately withheld itself from participation in the fitful civil war, and in the end the care of the public weal was taken over by a general; in India, a country notable among all the new states for the stable subordination of the military to the civil power, one of the major political crises of recent years broke out over the alleged efforts of the Defense Minister to politicize the army. In the Congo, the mutiny in the ranks of the Force Publique shattered the regime, and such internal support as the inchoate government of Col. Mobotu has possessed derives from the fragmentarily reconstituted army.

In Latin America the armed forces historically have played a role similar to that of the military in most of the new states of Asia and Africa. The older, better established states of the West and the communist states disclose a rather different relationship between the military and the civil sectors of the elite. In most of these countries the military has considerable influence over foreign and defense policy,

[1]Sections of this essay are drawn by the author from his longer study, "Political Development in the New State," in Comparative Studies in Society and History, ed. Sylvia Thrupp, Mouton and Company, the Hague, 1960.

but it plays very little part in domestic policy or its administration. In the United States and France, General Eisenhower has held and General de Gaulle now holds the highest position of state, but neither their incumbency nor their administration has ever owed anything to the armed forces acting on their behalf or at their command. Even Germany, where the glory of the warrior was more prized than in other Western countries and where the army contributed to the downfall of the Weimar Republic, was never ruled by the army in the way that nearly one third of the new states are ruled today.

How are we to account for this predominance of the military in Asian and African societies where, on the whole, martial accomplishments have never headed the list of civil virtues and where, with only a few exceptions, the military has not distin-guished itself on any battlefield? The ascendancy of the military in the domestic life of these states is a response called forth by the difficulties which the new states encounter in their effort to establish themselves as modern sovereignties. Yet it is not inevitable that a newly autonomous regime must lead sooner or later to rule by the military. The fact that it has done so in the new states is evidence that there are weaknesses in these states which cannot be compensated by those political institutions which were inherited or established at the moment of independence. These inherited or established political institutions were mainly parliamentary, representative, more or less democratic, and liberal. Military rule is one of several practical and stable alternative when parliamentary and democratic regimes falter. The obstacles over which these regimes have been stumbling are more serious than the peculiar dispositions of the military elites of these states, although these latter are not unimportant. This is why we shall conduct our enquiry against the broad background of the aspirations of the political and intellectual elites of the new states, their political skills and their inherited culture and social structure, which they attempt to govern and transform in the pursuit of modernity.

There are very few states today which do not aspire to modernity. It is true that not all of them and not all the sectors of their elites pursue each of the constituent elements of modernity with equal vigor and zeal. Nonetheless, in practically every new state, the drive towards modernity is a major factor in the country's public life. Today the leaders of both old and new states feels a pressing necessity to espouse policies which will bring their nations well within the circle of modernity. The most drastic charge brought against them by their opposition among the more or less dedicated is that they are not competent or sincere enough to bring about the true modernization of their country.

Among the elites of the new states "modern" means dynamic, concerned with the people, democratic and equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign and influential. The elites must range themselves against the ancien regime of landlords, sheikhs, chiefs, rajahs, grand viziers in both the old and the constitutional forms. Even when they affirm the past of their country they must stress its adaptability to the

needs of the present. They must make a show of being on the move, and they commonly assert that the mass of the population demands it of them.

Modernity entails democracy, and democracy in the new states, even where it is not representative, must above all be egalitarian. Modernity, in the eyes of the elites of the new states, therefore entails the dethronement of the rich and the traditionally privileged from their positions of pre-eminent influence. It involves land reform, i.e., the breaking up of large private estates, especially those which are owned by absentee landlords. It involves universal suffrage, even where the suffrage is exercised as an acclamation of a single party ticket. It involves breaking the power of traditional interests of chiefs, sultans, and priests. It involves the replacement of monarchies by republics, which often maintain the structure of monarchies. Modernity demands universal public education and equality of access to opportunities for entering into the more influential and better rewarded positions which even an egalitarian regimes cannot dispense with. To be a "modern" democracy implies, according to the prevailing conception in the new statas, that the rulers should be answerable to the people for what they do. Where they are not in fact answerable to them through a legislature which is popularly and periodically elected, then they allege that they exercise a stewardship on behalf of the people, and that they are answerable to the collective will -- that higher will which is more real than the empirical will of their people.

To be modern is to be scientific. A dynamic modern elite aspires to direct change through the use of science. This means that, in principle, it sets its face against the guidance of policy by superstitious practices (by divination, magic and astrology). The elites usually claim to believe that progress rests on rational technology, and ultimately on scientific knowledge. Hence, progress involves the promotion of scientific research and the utilization of the results of that research for the common good. Education is commonly regarded as one way of diffusing the scientific spirit among the new generation, and of breaking the hold of traditional beliefs, and of the traditional privileges associated with those beliefs.

The proponents of modernity - - elites and counter elites - - assert that no country can claim to be modern without being economically advanced or progressive. This is the very center of dynamism. To be advanced economically means being industrialized and having a high standard of living. No country can aspire to be modern and not pay attention to its economic improvement. All this requires planning, employing economists and statisticians, conducting surveys, controlling the rates of savings and investment, controlling imports and foreign exchange, constructing new factories, building roads and harbors, developing railways, irrigation schemes, fertilizer production, agricultural research, forestry research, and so forth and so on. All this requires modern techniques of administration. Modernity to the elites of the new states seems often to call for the primacy of technology, of a technological outlook, and of persons with technological training. Technology is associated with efficiency in administration and above all with honesty. Corruption in administration

is a persistent preoccupation of counter-elites, to whom it is the hallmark of both the old regimes and its heirs.

Modernity requires national sovereignty. And this, in the minds of its supporters, presupposes the existence of a nation which rules itself through indigenous organs and persons. With or without representative institutions, the modern sovereign state is held to embody the essence of its society. National sovereignty means not only autonomy but also an influential and respected place as a modern nation on the world stage. The elites are extremely sensitive to their country's status, among their neighbors and in the world at large, and particularly to any slights or humiliations.

"Modern" means being Western without depending on the West. The model of modernity is a picture of the West detached in some way from its geographical setting; it permits one to affirm the ideals of Soviet Russia and China, which ostensibly have what is worthwhile in the West, while being themselves anti-Western.

Now, what are the "new states," whose aspirations we are discussing? They are states which are not yet "modern." The states of Western Europe and of North America (and the English-speaking dominions of the British Commonwealth) need not aspire to modernity. They are modern. Modernity is part of their very nature. The image of the Western countries and the partial incorporation and transformation of that image in the Soviet Union provide the standards and models in the lights of which the elites of the new states of Asia and Africa seek to reshape themselves.

The new states are "non-Western," both literally and figuratively. They are Asian and African states. Not all the states of Asia and Africa are new. Japan is not a new state. Nor are China, Liberia, Iran, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Thailand. These are all states which have enjoyed sovereignty for a long time. The South American states are not new states. They have had their sovereignty for a long time, although for the most part they have not become modern. They exist in an intermediate zone between the modern, longer established states and the unmodern new states.

Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Cambodia, Laos, Viet-Nam, Ghana, Guinea, the Philippines, Mali, Senegal, the Republic of the Congo, Chad. Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Niger, Madagascar, Mauritania, Gabson, Central Africa, Nigeria and the Congo, are all new states. Their acquisition of sovereignty is relatively recent or is just now taking place. The societies which they rule are old and governed by tradition. The states which rule them, however, are recent creations, even in those areas where independent sovereign status once existed. They are the results of the recession of Western imperialism.

The new states of Asia and Africa have the following properties in common:

1. They have recently acquired independent sovereignty following a substantial period of Western A rule; their indigenous machinery of government is of fairly recent origin.

2. Their social structure, economy, and culture are on the whole highly traditional. Above all, their central political traditions do not include those of a democratic, representative constitutional government.

3. Significant sections of their elites are concerned to transform the society, the culture, and the political life and outlook of these societies; they aspire to modernity.

The confluence of these three properties: the recent acquisition of sovereignty and the attendant creation of the machinery of the modern state; the massively traditional character of the economy, the society and the culture; and the urge towards modernity by political action, define the new states as a significant social category.[2]

II

THE DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

This promethean urge towards modernity places a strain on every resource and aspiration which the elite, including the military elites, of the new states bring to their self-imposed task. The available resources -- the human personalities which have to be enlisted and the moral and intellectual qualities of the elites themselves -- stand at some distance from the ideal sought. The struggle to close that gap is intensified by the recalcitrance of these resources. The institutions of government, central and auxiliary, with which the new states have begun their sovereign careers are meeting with the resistance of the old socieites which must be governed and the pull of the deal of modernity. In this process the old societies and the ideal of modernity are both changing, but in doing so they are pressing hard against governmental institutions.

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[2] New states are not alone in most of their problems. For example, long established states such as Ethiopia or Thailand are characterized by the traditionality of their social structure, and many states with a long history of continuous sovereignty are the scene of conflict between attachments to tradition and the drive towards modernity. Almost all countries outside Western Europe and possibly the United States experience the cultural tension between metropolis and province. Numerous problems in the new states are instances of more general classes of problems which are shared by many states, Western and non-Western, new and old, advanced and underdeveloped, sovereign and colonial. The new states present however a unique constellation of problems.

It is the resultant political order which interests us here. For this reason we shall survey the stock of available resources in social structure, cultural tradition and human qualities and skills with which this journey towards modernity is being undertaken. We shall also try to estimate the influence that these resources exert on the survival of the political regime which commences the journey and on the form which the regime might assume as the journey advances, hesitates, or stops. More particularly, we shall attempt to estimate their influence on the emergence and subsequent fortunes of a military dominated regime.

A. Social Structure

1. Kinship, territory and community. In the societies of the new states, although to very unequal degrees, the status of a human being is very much a function of his kinship and -- in certain of the societies -- of his caste and his linquistic community. These are the things that stand in the way of the ordinary man's becoming a citizen and of the elite ruling on behalf of the whole community and of being thought to do so. The rural kinship system and, where it exists, the caste system, which works in the same direction, obstructs the entry of the rural mass into the citizenry of the modern nation, for they confine the loyalties of the ordinary man to a narrow, locally circumscribed range. By the same token they favor the emergence of leaders who serve these parochial interest. Though these traditional systems of kinship and caste help to stabilize the social structure of the new states, the particularistic spirit they nurture inhibits the formation of that unity of spirit necessary for a modern political society. Institutions that depend upon this spirit for their effectiveness are bound to a fate of recurrent misery and perhaps extinction.

Parochial loyalties make difficult the workings of the rule of the law. Strong attachments to kinship, caste, and local territorial groups create a tendency for judge and administrator to favor his own kind. They operate in this direction even where an impressive public service commission exists.

Inequities in the law cause the lower classes to feel that the government is corrupt, in some cases even worse than the foreign government it replaced, or worse than some alternative regime that might replace it. In poor countries, where government employment is very highly prized, favoritism is interpreted as evidence that the rulers look only to their own personal and communal interest. As a result, the "political gap" between rulers and ruled becomes a major fact of life and a challenge to every modern type of polity.

The parochialism of kinship, caste and locality makes it difficult to create stable and coherent nation-wide parties. Parties tend to become cliques or aggregations of bosses and their clients, overlaid upon a communal, regional or tribal base. Insofar as the regime operates within a more or less democratic constitution and is not dominated by

one great party of national independence, the government tends to be an uneasy coalition of sectional interests. The growth of an opposition that could form an alternative government is stunted, and the state remains under the overwhelming dominance of a single party, in most cases the one directly identified in the public mind with the emancipation from foreign control. Where the large nationalist (Congress-like) party breaks up, the immediate alternative is an unstable coalition of fragmentary parties. (Another alternative is an ideological party which zealously turns its back on traditional and primordial obligations.) Parochial loyalties also determine the legislative policy of the governing party, as a result of which particular groups associated with the old order of society gain or retain advantages.

When a government is considered to represent particular kinship, caste or local interests, the masses -- or rather their politically conscious members -- look upon it as neither just nor representative. Each section of society is fearful of exploitation and suppression by others, and the effectiveness of government is thereby weakened. Thus, too, is heightened the reluctance to participate in schemes for which the government needs the support, not of just the ordinary man, but, above all, the support of those with a modicum of modern education.

Yet to accredit themselves, the governments of the new states must be effective. More than that, they must be strong enough to satisfy some of the demands made of them. If they fumble and if they show that their hearts are only with their own caste or community, they alienate the politically sensitive section of the society and thus perpetuate the "gap" between government and governed. Politicians and the institutions through which they work become discredited. This combination of cynicism and alienation lies at the heart of the movement to replace those whose interest is parochial, sectional and private by an elite that will serve the whole people.

2. Class structure. The economic and social "underdevelopment" of the new states of Asia and Africa shows itself in the size and structure of the urban middle classes. These differ markedly from the middle classes of the advanced countries. The many small retail traders are largely illiterate and have assimilated little modern culture and few modern economic skills. In a number of new states, the larger enterprisers in commerce and finance are ethnically distinct from the rest of the population, e.g., the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Indians in East Africa, the Syrians and Lebanese in West Africa, the Scotsmen, Englishmen and Americans in India, Ceylon and Pakistan, etc., and within the Indian population, the special communities such as Marwaris and Parsees in industry, commerce and finance in Calcutta and Bombay. The new states are absolutely and proportionately under-represented in the whole range of modern middle class professionals, i.e., university teachers, school teachers, physicians, scientists, engineers, nurses, agronomists, chemists, etc. This is partly a function of the structure of the economy of the new states, which afforded few opportunities in the tertiary occupations, and

partly a function of the pre-emption of the best of these posts by Europeans. Lower-level civil servants, clerks in commercial firms and lawyers make up a disproportionately large share of the more or less educated urban middle classes of the new states.

As primarily peasant societies, the new states also lack a stratum of highly skilled industrial workers and of lower-level supervisory workers. The gulf that separates the most powerful and the most wealth -- foreign businessmen, plutocrats of very particularistic local origin, and quasi-feudal landowners -- on the one side, and the least powerful and the poorest on the other, makes the feeling of remoteness from the center of things more pronounced among the poor. At the same time it heightens the sense of separateness among the modern section of the population. It leads the mass of the population and especially the politically interested middle class -- if it is not among the chief beneficiaries of the incumbent government -- to believe that the government acts almost exclusively on behalf of the wealthy, and thus attenuates the sense of affinity necessary for the development of a modern political society.

It is true that in a Western society, split in such a fashion between the rich and the poor, there would be a far more overt antagonism between classes than seems to exist in the new states. Though occupation and wealth are significant criteria of status in the societies of the new states, they are by no means the only ones. Kinship, caste, religious attachment provide others and hence offset the weight of wealth and occupation as determinants of status. Nonetheless, these latter criteria are growing in importance in the "modern" sectors of the population. Insofar as they do, they will intensify still further the differences between the rich and the poor. They will supplement caste, linguistic and ethnic considerations as obstacles to the formation of the concensus that is as much required by a democracy as by a stable modernizing oligarchy.

The resentments it generates are less consciously and explicitly expressed than in Western countries. For one thing, they lack the organized infra-structure necessary for their effective expression. Secondly, there is such a tradition of hierarchy in these societies that the expression of hostility tends to be inhibited much of the time. Resentments, however, are bound to grow as the new states become more urbanized, as they certain will become in the course of economic development and administrative expansion.

The "gap" in the class structure makes for greater alienation at the extremes of the distribution of wealth and income. This alienation will be transformed into hostility through the "politicization" engendered by universal suffrage, and by the propaganda of modern oligarchical regimes. When class consciousness becomes more pronounced, the extreme economic inequality of the societies of the new states can have seriously disruptive consequences. Because there are still few traditions of <u>disciplined</u> class conflict in the new states, and because the "infra-structure" institutions

through which disciplined class conflict can be carried on are still very poorly developed(i.e. the trade union movement, collective bargaining machinery, etc.), class conflict in the new states might well be more violent than in the older, better established political societies of the West. Class conflicts would then take the form of "jacqueries" and organized insurrections, rather than of negotiation and bargaining. Furthermore, the occupational distribution which accentuates the traditional "gap" is further distorted by the disporportionate concentration of the educated middle class in the larger towns. Hence, the middle class that does exist does not exercise the modernizing and integrating influence in the smaller towns and villages which might be one of its more important functions.

How does this type of class structure affect the conduct of the military vis-à-vis the political order? In societies like those of the Middle East, with few opportunities for social mobility, in which the economies are not rapidly expanding and in which there is no corresponding increase in educational opportunities and in posts in the tertiary sector, the army tends to recruit into its officer-ranks the brightest and most ambitious young men of the small towns and countryside. These young men often come from the families of petty traders, small craftsmen and cultivators of small plots. Like their fathers, they are aware of the distance that separates them from the rich and the political elite. Thus there is brought into a potentially powerful position in society a body of intelligent ambitious young men, equipped with a modicum of modern technical education but with little sense of identity with politicians and big businessmen.

Where, on the contrary, the economy expands rapidly and where there is a corresponding increase in chances for social ascent in the civilian sphere, the military is less likely to attract such a large proportion of the more vigorous and more gifted. Hence, the likelihood of a stratum of young officers, resentful against the established order and isolated from its leading spokesmen, is diminished.

3. Educational Structure

(a) The uneducated: The "gap" in the structure of territorial loyalty and in the class structure is paralleled by a wide divergence in the styles of life and the associated outlooks of those with a modern ("Western") education and those without it. There is nothing quite comparable to this in Western countries where the least and best educated share the same language and to some extent an attachment to certain important symbols.

It is not so much what education teaches as it is the fact that the experience of having been to school, especially in countries with a steeply graded system of social stratification and a tradition of the superiority of religious education, gives people an enhanced feeling of their own value and thus deserving the respect of others. It makes them

feel themselves to be at the center of the larger society. Where education is highly valued on religious and vocational grounds and where the mystique of modernity is so strongly operative, those who do not have it tend to feel inferior.

The continuation of the inherited modes of education leaves the ordinary person apathetic to what goes on outside his kinship group and locality. Education does not always arouse human beings from their torpor or widen their interests. The well-endowed and undeveloped intelligence of children and youths in the lower classes does not receive this stimulus in the poor societies of the new states. Thus, links which would relate the mind to symbols of the wider world and unite local and kinship groups with the national society are prevented from forming.

The inability to read greatly restricts the range of knowledge of the world, not only of the world beyond national boundaries but even beyond narrow local boundaries. Ignorance of one's fellow countrymen, a feeling that they are remote and distant, ignorance even of the names of important national leaders impedes the growth of the sense of membership in the national community that is essential to the continuing and intermittent responses to the policies of parties and governments. Illiteracy restricts the capacity for rendering thoughtful judgment on national issues. It fortifies the belief that the government at the center is alien to the ordinary man and is interested only in maintaining and enriching itself.

Nonetheless, it should be added that illiteracy is not necessarily a total barrier against all realistic political judgment. The illiterate peasant or trader is often extremely shrewd about local issues and about his and his community's immediate interests. He is often sharp witted in scrutinizing the performance of his representatives and of those who lay claim to his suffrage. He will often have a sharp eye for deficiencies in the political elite and will be quick to detect local evidence of its misdeeds.

(b) The intellectuals: The possession of a higher education enhances the demand for respect. It also has other very important significances. The educated have received their education in modern schools, in which they have been taught by Westerners or by pupils of Westerners. Many of them have been educated in the West, and these represent the standard by which the other educated persons measure themselves. In dress, in recreations, in tastes, in food and drink, and much more importantly, in their attitude towards what is valuable in life, they diverge considerably from the ordinary members of their societies. Even though they wear their traditional garments in ceremonial and festive occasions, they wear modern clothing in the daily working life. They understand plays and like modern games and spectacles. They believe in science and in salvation through its application; they believe in the value of rational administration and written law and order; they believe in

planning and in large-scale schemes. Their minds are often on what is happening abroad, on what foreigners, expecially in London, Paris, Oxford and Cambridge and to a lesser extent in a few American universities, are thinking and doing. The New Statesman and The Economist are more important for most of them than their inherited sacred texts and myths, and they are often more concerned that their representative in the United Nations should make an impression on the world than they are about the people in village and bush. Being somewhat detribalized, though less completely than they themselves often believe, they think in terms of their nation more than they do in terms of lineage groups. This makes the distance between the educated and uneducated, if anything, even greater than in the Western countries.

The problem is a universal one. In the Western countries, too, the cleavage between a large section of the intellectual classes and the rest of the population is often more tense or more distant than is good for the intellectuals or for society as a whole. The differences between the West and the underdeveloped countries are matters of degree. The greater influence of intellectuals in the political life in the new states renders these differences -- which help to form the "gap" -- more significant than in the modern socities.

Those in the new states who are educated in universities and colleges bear responsibilities which are almost unprecedented in world history. Their fulfillment of these responsibilities is made difficult by the structure of the societies in which they live, the general cultural traditions of the learned and the spiritually endowed in their own societies, and their own traditions as modern intellectuals.

The intellectuals in the new countries have received their education in countries where there is a growing sensitivity to poverty, inequality and injustice. Coming for the most part from countries where the learned and the spiritual have had an aversion to the pursuit of wealth, the modern intellectuals of the new countries have been greatly attracted by the socialistic solutions of social and economic problems proffered by the intellectuals of the large cities (notably those of the United Kingdom and France).

The intellectuals of the new states have, in varying degrees, a deep concern for the poverty of their own countries and a lively awareness of the industrial wealth and high living standards of the advanced countries. Insofar as they are not apathetic or cynical, they are strenuously insistent on rapid economic progress. They are inclined, therefore, to espouse large-scale actions designed for quick results. Given the availability of the Marxist dogma about economic progress under dictatorial conditions, a heavy strain is imposed on the still feeble framework of democratic political institutions.

At the same time that the intellectuals insist on large-scale state

action, they are rather anti-political. They are extremely critical of practically all politicians and are contemptuous of party leaders. They do not provide leadership for coming to an affirmatively critical public opinion. On the contrary, their views constitute public opinion (given the narrow radius of the educated classes), and the public opinion which they represent is seldom constructive. When it is constructive, it is seldom heeded. This drives them further into opposition, rather than into a relationship of positive criticism and discriminating guidance. There is among them, therefore, a disproportionately high readiness to associate themselves with alienated movements aspiring to extremist solutions.

This disposition is supported by another feature of the intellectual's position, namely, his ambivalence toward the people whom he grew up with. Often impatient with traditions and with those who espouse and live by them, he nevertheless shows a preference for the views of the uneducated, and a readiness to order such people about "for their own good." He is willing to flatter traditional beliefs for political purposes, while at the same time he really views them as "prejudices" and "superstitions." Nonetheless, the modern intellectual in the new states often does have a yearning for a deeper contact with the indigenous culture in which he was brought up and with which he is frequently insufficiently acquainted. These two dispositions produce a form of "populism" which, alleging to speak on behalf of the "people," deals with political opponents as alien to the traditional culture, as enemies of "the people." Half sincere and half insincere, the populist praises the wisdom of the simple and the humble while being fundamentally distrustful of them.

The traditions of politics, along with the intellectual's ambivalence toward his own culture and his preoccupation with things foreign, all make for his political alienation. Actually the fact that there are many intellectuals who find no opportunity to use their qualifications in appropriate ways has a similar consequence.

Those new states which inherited an elaborate network of institutions of higher study produce talented, well-qualified, persons who take a responsible part in the public life of their countries. They also produce many who do not fit in, either because there is no demand for their services or because they are not regarded as sufficiently or appropriately qualified. Feeling neglected and condemned by their society and especially by those who rule them, they are convinced of the hostility of politicians and businessmen. Insofar as they do not withdraw into an apolitical state of mind and inaction, they are ready to support those movements which promise to make a "clear sweep" of the ineffectual regimes which are charged with impeding progress.

Political passivity is contrary to the tradition of preoccupation with politics which the intellectuals inherit from the days of the struggle for independence. The conditions of that struggle and the role which the educated played in it, along with the leftist inclinations of

many of the intellectuals and these indigenous traditions which require the learned to be the ultimate force in the polity -- all these give further impulse to this "politicization."

The latter has diverse ramifications. Among intellectuals as well as among politicians, it results in the demand that intellectuals participate actively and immediately in party politics. If they do not, they are alleged to be shirking their responsibilities; those who do not, sometimes feels guilty, whatever their actual role, because they often share this conviction. The assertion of the obligation to be political tends under the conditions of the early years of the new states to breed distrust between those politicians who are actually ruling the country and the politicized intellectuals who do not share this responsibility. The demand so common among intellectuals for heroic politics and the tarnish which the exercise of political authority almost always carries with it result in the development of a disillusioned anti-political attitude.

This development is accentuated by another changed in the relationship between intellectuals and politicians which comes with freedom. During the early years of the nationalist movement politics tended to be in the hands of fairly sophisticated, well educated men, mainly lawyers and a few businessmen. The greatest prosperity of the nationalist movement occurred, however, only when it came into the hands of populist leaders, who, whatever their educational qualifications were, put themselves forward as representatives of the traditional culture, or as rough sons of the people. These sought to distinguish themselves from their forerunners, whom they derogated as "out of touch with the people." Many of the younger intellectuals approved this belittlement of their elders. Then with the coming of independence, when the second generation of nationalist leaders had to take over the burdensome privilege of power, the intellectuals' admiration for the heroic reasserted itself against the drabness and philistinism of the ruling politicians. The latter responded with the same hostility towards their quondam allies as they had earlier shown toward their predecessors. The tension was renewed. In consequence, the intellectuals, while still feeling that rightfully they should be among the rulers, also feel that they are spurned by the very state for whose coming they had worked and dreamed. This has strengthened the "anti-political politics," the politics of withdrawal, which has been growing among the intellectuals of the new states.

This is not, however, a universal phenomenon. In every new state and particularly in those under the tradition of British rule[3] there are civic-spirited, realistic and responsible intellectuals, devoted to the public good, critical and yet sympathetic, interested in the political growth of their society and yet detached enough from immediate partisanship to

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[3] It is too early yet to speak of withdrawal in the new states being formed in French Africa. Such developments do, however, seem to be in prospect.

constitute a corps of custodians of the public good in the present and the future. In each country they form only a small proportion of the intellectual class.

(c) The technical and executive intellectuals: A new sector of the intellectual class has been in process of emergence. This is the technical and executive intelligentsia -- chemists, engineers, accountants, statisticians -- who do not share in the older political traditions of their country's intellectuals and who resemble the "new intellectual class" of the more advanced countries. They are generally more specialized and professional, more philistine and less widely interested in cultural and political matters than their immediate predecessors. It is on these technical and executive intellectuals that the emergency of a stable and progressive civil society depends. The first of these two groups is especially important for the prosperity of a regime of civilian rule, representative government and public liberties; the second is equally congenial to any sort of modernizing regime regardless of whether it is democratic and liberal or oligarchic.

Commissioned officers of the armed forces, particularly those in the junior and middle grades, must be regarded as part of this technical-executive intelligentsia. The training of officers includes such modern subjects as administration, radio and telephone communications, mechanical and civil engineering and ballistics. It is specialized, technical and nonhumanistic. It contains little of the indigenous culture or of the literary and political culture acquired by other sectors of the intellectual class.

In countries like the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East or the Netherlands East Indies where the rulers did little to create either a modern literary-political or a modern technical-administrative intelligentsia, the military officer class represents a disproportionate sector of the modern intelligentsia. Under these conditions they became the chief proponents of modernity in technology and administration. When the state flounders and civilian politicians make a mess of things, these officers feel that the standards given them by their training are affronted.

4. Town and Countryside

The "gap" in the social structure of the new states is again manifested in the wide disparity between the degree of modernization of the countryside and that of the large towns. Because of defective transportation and communication and the narrow radius of markets, modernization is concentrated in a few large urban centers and, within these centers, to a small proportion of the whole. The rest of the society remains bound within the traditional form of life. Even the great national leaders who succeeded in transforming national liberation from a movement of the modern elite into a "mass movement" did not greatly change the balance. The mass of the population in the villages are the objects of modernization and of the political activities which seek

to bring it about, not the initiators in this process. Their preferences and responses are of much concern to the political elite, but they themselves do not participate in the dialogue of rulers and ruled.

The villages become politically interested largely around election time. Even then their political interest remains immediate and local rather than national.

The big cities are the centers of innovation, not just technological but political as well. The best journalists, the more forceful lawyers, the politically alert businessmen and technologists, the most eminent professors, the urban mob, the "verandah boys" spoiling for a fight, the students ready to protest and demonstrate are concentrated in the cities. Except at elections, when candidates are often very seriously questioned about what they would do about some local grievance, the countryside leads a slumbering political existence. The politicians sometimes acts as if it did not even exist. This does not go entirely unnoticed by the villagers who, reinforced in their distrust of the urbanized politicians and the educated, charge them with turning against the traditions of their people.

The junior officer class, especially in the Middle East, participates in this cleavage between the big city on the one side and village and countryside on the other. As the offspring of small landowners, of village craftsmen and traders, the young officers acquire some of the anti-urban prejudiced of their environment. They look on the upper classes of the big cities as the bearers of an effete and decadent culture, and when they become nationalists they condemn the xenophilia of the educated and prosperous. The young officers are apt to be puritanical both because of their upbringing and because of the disciplined existence of the barracks. Much of their time may be spent in garrisons, far away from those with a comparable amount of education. Hence, to them, the big city appears to be a theater of garrulous, self-indulgent politicians, of chattering journalists and of sybaritic idlers. Politics and urbanity become identified in their minds, and in any event, singularly useless remedying the nation's ills.

5. Economic Development

The new states are all rather far down on those lists that rank countries according to their per capita income. In industry they are primarily extractive; and although there are exceptions, as in West Africa, Israel and Malaya, their operating procedures tend to be very traditional.

The modern intellectuals of the new states, who overlap very notably with the political elite and who provide the economists, civil servants and trades union leadership, are almost universally and intensely for economic progress. They differ about its rate of growth and especially about the efficacy of policies that are promulgated and implemented by the political elite but they have no doubts about its urgent desirability. In

principle, they are concerned with the discovery of more and better resources, the increased efficiency of the processing of resources, the accumulation of capital by saving, heavy taxation, capital levies and foreign investments, loans and gifts. Their motives are multiple, and their attention sometimes wanders. Many wish to raise the standard of living of their people and they believe that a modern country to be worth anything at all in the eyes of mankind, must be industrialized, rationalized and "economically advanced." Some are interested in self-aggrandizement, materially and politically, and regard economic development as a private and useful instrument. Some allege that they are compelled to develop because their people demand it.

There is little evidence, however, that there is an intense and persistent demand for economic progress from the mass of the peasantry. The industrial working class is too negligible in most of the new states for their views to be a major force, although their trade union leaders -- who tend to be middle class intellectuals -- are very strongly for economic development as long as it causes no additional hardship to their constituents.

The entrepreneurial classes in the new states have tended to be mercantile and financial, and these are not the fields in which economic progress is sought by the political elite. The industrial entrepreneurial class is very small and tends to operate on a rather small scale -- apart from large foreign firms. There are some middle-sized indigenously owned industrial firms and a large number of very small handicraft enterprises. The political elites do not expect these industrial enterprises to contribute greatly to the economic progress of their society, although in fact they do contribute substantially in many of the new states. Whatever their achievement at the higher level of policy, private enterprises fall under the prejudice of intellectuals and intellectual politicians.

For a variety of reasons, therefore, economic development is conceived as a major task of government. This necessitates a large increase in the size of the civil service and a large increase in its powers, particularly in the powers of the politicians and higher civil servants responsible for economic development. The political repercussions are considerable.

The extension of the size of the civil service is, in one aspect, a force for social stability, since by giving employment to university and high school graduates it reduces their susceptibility to the wiles of demagogic and extremist agitators. On the other hand, the great increase in its size necessarily makes contact with it more frustrating for people who must deal with it. Delays are increased, rebuffs frequent and the populace forms a distrustful image of the government. Murmuring becomes widespread, and tales of irresponsibility, inefficiency and corruption increase.

Meanwhile, at the upper levels of the political and administrative elite, the vast sums of money which must be expended on objects and in modes alien to traditions both of the politicians and the higher civil

service increase the chances of corruption and certainly the number of accusations. The more puritanical sections of the society (especially the army, whose members are in the Germanic and British military tradition) are keenly sensitive to these rumors. These tendencies in some of the new states are accentuated by wastefulness and corruption in the use of economic aid from the more advanced states. In countries where aid is intended for both military and economic purposes, the military becomes involved willy-nilly and so becomes even more sensitive to corruption and more critical of the politicians and civil servants whom it holds responsible.

A third political consequence of policies of governmentally controlled economic development arises from the success or failure of these policies, and the ratio of the actual success to the promised success.

Despite frequent corruption in the management of economic development and exasperating bureaucratic incompetence, the economies of the new states are being considerably, though variously, strengthened by the development policies. The standard of living of certain classes improves, more economical uses are made of certain resources, etc. Nonetheless, the process of economic development through governmental action is probably injurious to the stability of any political regime -- not least, a democratic regime. In addition to this, it seems inevitable in economic development through governmental policy for plans and expectations to exceed achievements, even when achievements are substantial. Critics judge the regimes by their aspirations rather than by their achievements.

The elite is under pressure from its own members, from its competitors in other factions and from public opinion to press on with great haste towards great goals. To this end it often imposes uncongenial reforms on the peasantry and small businessmen. Resentment is increased thereby. More importantly, it makes the elite impatient of obstacles and fearful of criticism. It makes it impatient of parliamentary scrutiny, which is in any case placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the civil service by the large powers which economic planning confers on them.

Thus we may conclude that the large-scale programs of economic development being undertaken in the new states do weaken the already infirm foundations of political democracy or a more oligarchic alternative. It increases social mobility which gives opportunities to both the more skilled and the more unscrupulous. It urbanizes and modernizes and thus affronts those whose attachment to traditional patterns of action and belief are very strong. It usually increases economic inequality and makes it more strikingly visible than it was in its traditional manifestations. It raises expectations and exacerbates demands in the most reactive sections of the population. All these consequences are injurious to political stability, especially in countries where the political and administrative elites are lacking in experience and self-confidence. Yet it must be recognized that without considerable economic progress, the new states would have no chance to become democratic. Extremely poor,

traditional people with a primitive technology could not develop the social differentiation and personal individualism necessary for democracy. Without education, which can be paid for only by a more productive economy, without better communications, without a bigger middle class, and possibly a more developed economic system, democracy would stand little chance. The balance of probabilities is extremely close.

6. The Structure of Authority

With considerable variations the predominant tendency in the societies of the new states is for authority to be hierarchic and sacral. The highly traditional nature of these societies removes much from the sphere of current decision, and much of what requires decision lies in the hands of persons who accede to the decisive positions largely through the qualifications of kinship, age and sex (although not solely through these). Whole sections of the population have no share in the exercise of public authority.

Outside the state the major institutions through which authority is exercised are the kinship and lineage groups and the religious and caste communities. None of these arevoluntary. In many of them there is no publicly acknowledged mode of contending for positions of influence. The "infra-structures" for collaboration in the pursuit of private interests and for the exercise of influence in the wider society are largely lacking.

The sacral properties of authority were somewhat diminished by the exercise of authority by foreigners. This latter fact, however, accentuated and reinforced the hierarchical structure of authority.

The chief effects of the hierarchical structure of authority in both the traditional and the modern sectors of society is to generate either excessive submissiveness among the ordinary people or an extremist egalitarianism by way of reaction against it. Insofar as the people are used to living in a hierarchic society they have little conception of their rights as citizens. Although they can be brought to vote in elections, they do not feel that their preferences will be considered in the decisions of their rulers, and above all they are little inclined to speak out their own views and preferences on the largest questions of policy.

The underdeveloped state of the infra-structure of voluntary associations on a local level and outside the cities deepens the silence of the countryside in matters of day-to-day political concern. It increases the disregard for the interests of the poor in the villages from whom the politicians and administrators are separated by class and caste and by education and culture.

All of these factors favor an oligarchicy, not least a military oligarchy. By tradition and perhaps by necessity the military is a hierarchy and regards such an order as reasonable. It regards the unquestioning execution of decisive and unambiguous commands as right.

It is impatient with the nattering of "public opinion." It is willing to accept the submissiveness of the mass of the population but is unsympathetic toward the poor of the village and countryside in whose interest the urbanized politicians seem to speak. In these various ways, the tradition of hierarchic authority creates a situation which is itself a temptation for those who themselves share that tradition -- a temptation to arrogate political power to themselves.

7. The Gap in the Social Structure

In almost every aspect of their social structures, the societies on which the new states must be based are characterized by a "gap". It is the gap between the few very rich and the mass of the poor, between the educated and the uneducated, between the townsman and the villager, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and the ruled. It is the "gap" between a small group of active, aspiring, relatively well-off, educated and influential persons in the big towns and an inert or indifferent, impoverished, uneducated and relatively powerless peasantry.

Almost every feature of the social structure of the new states conspires to separate the ordinary people from their government. This is a fundamental fact of life of the new states. It is a hindrance to the realization of political democracy -- indeed it renders certain elements of "tutelary democracy" almost inevitable, if it is to be democratic at all. The gap, however, is not something to be bridged by oligarchy. Only a devoted political elite which is wedded to democratic ideals can stir up and guide the population to disciplined political judgment and initiative.

The gap might be described as a result of a high concentration of initiative and interest in the ruling circle. Such a regime can probably accomplish a great deal in many important respects, but it will not be able to create a political society. What is needed is the dispersion of initiative and interest more widely throughout society.

Meanwhile, as long as the gap endures, it will provide a temptation to a nationalistic, populistic counter-elite. In loosely integrated societies, where the civilian elite seems to have difficulty in finding its way, military elites with clear and simple convictions will feel called upon to offer themselves as the proper agents of its closure.

A. Culture

1. Traditionality. The societies in which the new states have come into existence are traditional societies. They are attached to beliefs and rules which guided past practices, and which are regarded as guides to right practice in the present. The attachment to these beliefs is firmer or more intense than it is in modern societies, and it is more widely shared throughout the society. Some of these traditional beliefs incline towards democracy in government or towards initiative in enterprise, but even where the substance of belief is congruent with greater

democracy and progress the general disposition to accept what has been accepted in the past directs the course against modernity.

The substance of the traditional beliefs is also uncongenial to modernity. Most traditional societies are almost exclusively characterized by the absence of elements of civil politics. Citizenship is not among their virtues. Fealty to rulers, respect for the aged, obligations to one's kin, responsiveness to the transcendent powers which make and destroy men's lives, bravery in war -- these are their virtues. A concern for the well-being of the whole population, irrespective of ethnic and kinship bonds, is not so widely diffused.

Individuality, creativity, the empirical attitude, adaptive efficiency, an indifference to or disbelief in the efficacy of supernatural forces, the freedom of the individual, economic progress, a concern for national unity and dignity and an interest in the larger world have little place in the outlook for the ordinary peasant or factory workers, handicraftsman, small-scale trader, or old-style money lender.

Traditionality, however, does not create insuperable obstacles to the development of a modern polity. Traditions often possess sufficient ambiguity and hence flexibility to accommodate innovations. Then, too, patterns of traditional beliefs (and their accompanying practices) do not always form a rigorously unitary whole; some parts are more affirmative towards modernity, or at least less resistant towards innovation. Many traditional beliefs are the consequences of having no alternative beliefs. Once alternatives become available, what once appeared to be immutable may yield to change.

Nonetheless, traditional beliefs do have an inherent tendency toward self-reproduction and mutual support. The intertwinement of the institutions of kinship, government and landownership and cultivation within a locality sustains traditional beliefs and practices and resists assimilation into a more modern culture and a larger national polity.

2. Parochialism, Nationality and Nationalism. The parochialism of the societies of the new states has been commonly observed. The sense of membership in the nation, which is more or less coterminous with the population residing within the boundaries of the new states, is still very rudimentary and very frail.

The military would appear to be outside the circle of traditionality. Military organization has little to do with the structure of traditional society. Its technology, most of its weapons, and its organization are imported. Its training has little in common with traditional education. Its devotion to the idea of the nation is likewise untraditional. Nor is it likely that the officer corps is highly religious in most of the new states. Yet it probably remains a fact that the military have a feeling of sympathy for "tradition," not only for their own military tradition but for the traditional tones of a society as well. Hierarchic dignity, respect for superiors, solicitude for subordinates, solidarity,

and conventionality produce in professional soldiers an attachment to the same phenomena in civilian society. Their humble origins and their separation from urbane pleasures and indulgences sustain this sympathy. The result is distrust towards those who derogate traditional life and rush to overcome it.

The societies of the new states are not coterminous with nations and this, as has been often pointed out, disturbs their functioning as societies and as states. Not only does the failure to identify with the nations obstruct the emergence of the civil spirit necessary for a liberal democratic polity, but this very deficiency sometimes drives politicians into drastic actions to creste that identity. Such drastic actions as the suppression of the Tamils in Ceylon, or of the Ashanti in Ghana, strain the fabric of the state and precipitate crises which necessitate or are used to justify suspensions of liberty. Adventurist policies in foreign relations as in Indonesis may be another response to this internal failure of national unity.

The new states -- in the more extreme instances -- suffer from two divergent tendencies, each of which exacerbates the other: the feeble sentiment of nationality in the ordinary person and the very intense nationalism of some sections of the elite. The causes of these two contrary movements have already been examined in the foregoing pages. But on factor has not yet been mentioned. This is the scarcity of nationwide institutions apart from the civil service. In many of the new states the political parties are regional or communal or tribal parties; civic associstions, insofar as they exist at all are local and communal. The universities are still largely sectional. There is no national ecclesiastical organization which commands widespread participation and assent and which therewith offers an object of national identification.

The military, like the civil service, is an exception. It is ubiquitous, it recruits from all parts of the country, and most important of all, it is national in its symbolism. Insofar as it remains out of party politics it belongs to no particular section of the country. Moreover, the sense of nationality which membership in the army inculcates is likely on the whole to be moderate in intensity. The fact that, unlike a political movement, in its daily life it confronts other tasks than the embellishment and adoration of the nation's symbols means that its nationalistic sentiment is not usually extreme. The fact that it is organized and technical holds in check or moderates the passions which otherwise overflow onto national symbols. These features which make the military into a nationbuilding institution also affect the intensity of national sentiment of the officer class as well. On the whole, except in the United Arab Republic and in Iraq, the officer class, even where it has become politicized, is not as excitedly nationalistic as certain sectors of the political elite. In those two countries, the humiliating defeat of the Arab armies in the Israeli War of Independence must be regarded as a major csuse of the frenzied nationalism in the leaders of the United Arab Republic and the Iraq armies. Like the German military elite after the First World War, they must explain away their defeat by constantly

asserting their nation's claim to pre-eminence.

For these reasons, insofar as the new states avoid going to war among themselves, the military can play a very constructive part in forming a coherent modern and even democratic society. It can serve to integrate diverse ethnic groups into a national community, it can teach skills which are useful in economic development, it can widen horizons beyond village and locality, it can keep young men from being infected by nationalistic demagogy and give them a greater concern for the nation as a whole.

Armies, however, are not democracies. Where the pattern of military organization transcends the boundaries of the army and becomes identical with the state, order and prosperity may be maintained, but the training in democratic civility is a less probable outcome.

3. The Oppositional Mentality. In the period of their birth and growth, nationalistic politics were oppositional politics. Even in the British raj and in most of the African states today where there have been dyarchical arrangements (preparatory to the transfer of power to indigenous governments), the most powerful nationalist agitation has not been about exercising opportunities for civil responsibility. In India where civil politics have been best developed, most of the political effort prior to independence was concentrated on the struggle against the foreign government on behalf of national freedom and not on the exercise of the very qualified and restricted sovereignty which the later constitutions allowed. Political action has been impelled into an oppositional direction in which dramatic symbolic deeds rather than responsible detailed work on practical legislation have been most honoured. This tradition of "demonstrative" and "remonstrative" politics persists in the new states. The hard work of studying the subject matter of bills, contributing in committees to their amendment, and scrutinizing their implementation often has little appeal to legislators and journalists. If they cannot oppose dramatically, they subside into passivity and indifference.

The spirit of opposition is especially strong among university, college and high school students, in whom adolescent resistance to the older generation often takes on a political form. It is also common among those politicians who participated in the movements for national independence and who now find the work of legislation and administration in an independent state too routine and dull by contrast with the exciting experiences of their youth when they were fighting against the foreigner. It is of course strong among intellectuals and it enters into whatever public opinion exists in these countries.

In all countries where opinion is relatively free there is a tendency in highly politicized circles outside the ruling elite itself to be distrustful of politicians, who are frequently thought to be dishonest, wasteful, and selfish. One of the reasons for this is the persistence of the traditions of the struggle for national independence, when heroic and noble opposition was the most approved form of political activity.

Another and deeper reason is the traditional intertwinement of sacral and political authority. Even in the most secular, modern states, these two types of authority are not completely dissociated. The sacral element, however, is held in a condition of latency. In the more traditional societies, the intertwinement is more continuous and more intense -- at least in the expectations of the mass of the population. Politicians who have grown up in the modern sector of their societies, who have a modern education and who, more than the mass of their fellow citizens, have a secular outlook on the world are not objects of awe and affection unless they are very irch in personal charisma.

The details of the management of a modern states are secular affairs. They are matters of expediency and they are markedly discontinuous from the rituala of authority in religion and rule in traditional societies. Politics becomes a "profession," not a "cause," and as such it repels those who still, despite everything, expect authority to have something of the sacred. This strengthens the oppositional mentality.

The gap in the social structure is paralleled by a gap in the cultural system with which the new states have to contend and from which the oppositional military draws sustenance. There is a gap between those relatively free of tradition and those who live under its dominion, between those whose attachments remain parochial and those who are committed to the conduct of a modern state with an elaborate administrative organization and a continuous and heavy program of governmental action.

The oppositional mentality, impatient with the talkative and roundabout methods of representative government, inclines towards oligarchic solutions to the problems confronted and envisaged in the new states. It is not, however, very likely to be overcome in any oligarchic regime. It might be coercively driven into silence, but it cannot be dissolved into a unitary national will any more than the traditionality of the mass can be dissolved into that will. It can be cured only by the practice of responsibility and the development of traditions of disciplined opposition. Meanwhile, in the newly emerging countries, however, where respect for civil order is less deeply engrained, and the tradition of conspiratorial politics "on behalf of the nation" is still strong, and where the reservoir of qualified personnel for politics, journalism, administration, etc., is shallow, the oppositional disposition is costly.

In the democratic regimes of the new states, opposition is an obvious burden. In the oligarchic regimes, which can give the semblance of transcending it, it remains a perpetual source of instability, inclining towards conspiracy and subversion.[4]

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[4]There is a closely related phenomenon which plays a great part in the new states. It occurs both in the new democratic states as well as in those which have becomes oligarchies of all but the totalitarian sort. This is the phenomenon of the "urban mob," which consists partly of menials,

In their own peculiar way, the military of the new states share this oppositional mentality. They did not acquire it through participation in the nationalist agitation against foreign rule, nor by the absorption of the anti-political outlook of the Western European political-literary intelligentsia. They are not anti-authoritarian in the same fashion as many highly educated modern intellectuals. Their opposition to politicians derives from another source.

Their education is technical, and efficiency is one of the standards which they have learned. They tend to be suspicious of flamboyant oratory and of the politics of negotiation, fixing and compromise. Their belief that they are under obligation to a more austere morality makes them especially disapproving of parliamentary politicians and cabinet ministers who traffic in import permits, foreign exchange licenses, government contracts and profitable appointments. This type of anti-political attitude does not make them more sympathetic with the oppositional activities of lawyers, journalists and other intellectuals, whom they regard as part of the same repellent system. Insofar as they collaborate with them, alliance is unstable.

C. Personality

1. Individuality. At the very bottom of all the factors which are likely to determine development in the political systems of the new states is the rudimentary condition of individuality and of the consequently feeble sense of individual dignity and worth within the polity. From this comes the insensitivity to the rights of individuals among both rulers and ruled. It is this deep-lying factor which makes for the frailty of public opinion, its reluctance to criticize authority, its unbridled abuse of authority, and the unempirical, unfactual nature of its political criticism.

Beneath the phenomenon of an "underdeveloped" individuality we may discern some of the following causes: (a) the high level of religious sensitivity and the relatively intense and frequent orientation to sacred entities. The religious orientation in general involves a renunciation of individuality and the absorption of the self into the transcendent, in other words, the annihilation of the self. (b) The strength of the

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servants and workmen away from their families, of refugees and displaced persons and partly of restive students and discontented university graduates. These tumultuous crowds at the centers of concentrated population are equivalent to public opinion in some of the new states. The common civil indifference and the general apathy towards public affairs do not constitute a governor on the turbulence of such bearers of public opinion. Even oligarchies, to survive, must ride on the crest of the waves of such public opinion -- unless they can resort to force on a totalitarian scale. If they do not, the oppositional current penetrates into the bodies required for the maintenance of order, and democratic regimes as well as oligarchies cannot resist their disintegrative influence.

extended kinship system, which relegates the individual's own decisions and preferences to a subordinate position. (c) The poverty of most of the new states. Harsh poverty deadens creative cpacity and individual potentiality.

Life in the military has an equivocal relationship to the growth of individuality. On the one hand, take a youth away from his kinship group and his local community removes him from an individuality-inhibiting force. Furthermore, giving him a wider horizon and training him in skills which are judged from the standpoint of efficiency enhances his self-consciousness and his sense of individual responsibility. Yet military organization imposes an oppressive discipline. It replaces the authority of kinship and traditional belief by the authority of the officer and the organization which stands behind him. It thereby maintains the mechanisms which suppress individuality.

D. Political Structure

The resources which any new state brings to the effort of self-transformation and the obstacles which it encounters include political as well as pre-political things. Thus far, we have dealt predominantly with the pre-political. Political life, however, is not merely an epiphenomenon. The present state of political life has its own consequences for its further persistence or transformation. It would be appropriate therefore to touch briefly on certain features of the political life of the new states which bear on the prospects of development.

1. Universal suffrage. The granting of universal suffrage without property or literacy qualifications is perhaps the greatest single factor leading to the formation of a political society. The drawing of the whole adult population periodically into contact with the symbols at the center of national political life must in the course of time have immeasurable consequences for stirring people up, giving them a sense of their own potential significance and attaching their sentiments to symbols which comprehend the entire nation. The mere existence of the suffrage, however, might in the course of a short time disintegrate the nascent political society, if it is not accompanied by other changed as well.

2. Parliament and politicians. The existence of universal suffrage and the competition of parties where that is allowed create expectations and an opportunity for grievances to be satisfied. It also helps to create the expectation that the government is the appropriate agency for such satisfaction. In societies where there are traditional beliefs in the sacral character of authority such expectations receive sdditional force.

In consequence, any government in an economy of misery but one which speaks through universal suffrage (however much that voice is attenuated and distortedly "bossism," party machinations, etc.) commits itself to a heavy program of action. This commitment works in the same direction as the beliefs of the intellectuals whose views constitute day-to-day public

opinion and the politicians who came from the same school. The government is forced to be highly interventionist, if not outrightly socialistic.

This creates a heavy budget of work for the parliament and the executive in a democratic regime (and for the executive in an oligarchy). The parliamentarian, given his background and the nature of his tasks, must have a very hard time keeping abreast of what the leadership of the government and the expert civil service put before him for his decision. The alternatives are either uncritical submission or undisciplined opposition. (This is one of the ineluctible facts of democracy in the new states.)

The new states are fortunate when their first years are spent under the leadership of one of the great personalities who led in the struggle for national independence. These charismatic personalities are invaluable in binding together such conglomerates as form the societies of the new states. These dominating figures also serve to atone for deficiencies in party organization and in traditions of parliamentary work. Nonetheless, they leave behind them a heritage which is difficult to assimilate since charismatic personalities do not ordinarily build the institutions which are indispensable for carrying on the life of a political society.

Meanwhile, parliamentary life in the new states is not succeeding in attracting the best talents of the nation in the way in which the struggle for independence succeeded in doing. Many of the second rank of politicians are no more than placeholders who gained their nominations through service in the national struggle (with imprisonment, however brief, as a major qualification). Their subservience to the party leadership in the new regime arouses the antipathy of some of the oppositionally minded younger generation, who see in their characterlessness a typical instance of the drab and unheroic nature of party politics. The parliamentarians, too, are aware of their embarrassing situation and decline in self-esteem.

What is impressive in view of these factors is the generally high standard of integrity among many leading politicians in certain of the new states. Here, once more, India stands out, and with it the importance of the deeply inculcated British traditions and the long schooling provided by great Indian personalities such as Gokhale and Gandhi. Other new states which do not share this combination of traditions have been less fortunate, and their democratic regimes have declined in legitimacy and effectiveness or have given way to obligarchies.

3. Party system. Like India, Burma, Israel, Tunisia or Ghana, the new state has been ruled either by an overwhelmingly preponderant party which won national independence or, however feebly, by a coalition of clique-like and sectional parties (e.g., Indonesia, Pakistan before the accession of General Ayyub, and Sudan before General Abboud). The former provides stability and helps to give the country unity; the latter is unstable and keeps the country from settling down or becoming unified under a democratic regime.

Nonetheless, the former has its dangers since it impedes the emergence

of an opposition. The opposition is either discouraged by the odds against it or it is overwhelmed by coercion, its leaders either withdrawing from politics or gravitating towards the extremist party.

4. Civil service. Certain of the new states (Sudan, Ghana and, above all, India) have inherited a superior body of indigenous civil servants from their former rulers. However fortunate they have been in this respect, they have been faced with the pressing task of greatly increasing their recruitment of civil servants. Because they have recruited rapidly they have not always been able to maintain high standards.

Consequently it is generally believed that the efficiency and probity of the civil service have declined in most new states. This in turn has encouraged the feeling of alienation of the people from the government and especially from the politicians whom they hold responsible. When this condition is juxtaposed with the "politicization" promoted by universal suffrage, the gap not only persists but widens.

5. The Armed Forces. Of all the new states, only India and Pakistan inherited large, well-trained armies experienced in warfare and governed by an officer class with a modern military tradition. Although the India Army had to undergo the strain of partition, its two successors survived with their morale unimpaired. Since then they have continued to recruit able young men, whom they have assimilated into their soliderly traditions. The armies of the Arab states of the Middle East are much more recent creations with less actual military experience. The Israeli Army is likewise a new creation from elements trained in the Underground and in the British Army. The Indonesian and Burmese armies are the heirs of guerrilla forces. In the independent states of Africa south of the Sahara, the armed forces are slight. African officers are on the whole new to their tasks. In both French-and English-speaking territories, the African forces amount to only a few thousand men, some of whom saw action in the Second World War. Their African officers are still only a handful of men. The position in Tunisia and Morocco is similiar.

Except for the disintegrated Congolese Force Publique, which had a certain experience of mutiny under Belgian rule, the armies of the new states seem to have a fairly high degree of internal solidarity, particularly when they do not become involved in politics. Their recruits learn to value orderliness and precision. Their training often includes such technical subjects as are taught in engineering colleges or in military academies or in foreign military institutions. Although no army in any new state is modern like the American or Soviet armies, they are usually trained in the theory and practice of the most recent weapons appropriate to their size and tastes. Even if they are not, they have absorbed some of the outlook of professional military technicians.

They are naturally patriotic, and their technical orientation gives a technocratic taste to their conception of national progress. Where the modern intellectual class has an excessively small proportion of persons with technological education and experience, the military will feel some

affinity with these as carriers of the modern technical idea. Where these are too few, as in the Middle East, the younger officers may get the idea that they alone represent the spirit of modernity in their society and that they alone are capable of realizing it.

If the civilian political elite is self-confident and forceful, the military will be less inclined to intrude into the civil sphere, even though the technologically educated sector of the civilian population is small. This has been the case in Tunisia and Morocco. When, conversely, the civilian politicians seem demoralized and bewildered, as in Burma or the Sudan, or corrupt and cynical about the interest of the whole, as in Pakistan or Iraq, the military is more likely to intervene in the political sphere.

A third factor is the tradition of the army itself with respect to abstention from or intrusion into political affairs. In this respect India is the most fortunate of the new states. Its army has inherited the British tradition of sharp separation between the military and the civil spheres. Even the efforts of the present Defense Minister, Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, to poloticize the armed forces have met with no apparent success. (India benefits from having the largest technical intelligentsia and the most able political leadership as well as the best civil service of of any new state.) The Pakistani armed forces inherited the same British traditions as the Indian army, but they confronted a situation of political incompetence and irresponsibility and a much more stunted technologically educated intelligentsia. Their tradition did not prevent their entry into the political sphere; nor in not too different conditions did the similar traditions of the Sudanese officer corps.

6. The Institutions of Public Opinion. To what extent do the institutions of public opinion in the new states contribute to the emergence or maintenance of democracy, political or tutelary? To what extent do they contribute to the emergence of one form or another of oligarchy?

Because of an almost universal paucity of reportorial curiosity and skill, the press does not serve as the eye of the public, on which depends the virtue of the statesman. Seldom does the press inquire independently into any matter of public interest and provide information which is of benefit to politicians, to civic-minded citizens or to government officials. The poverty of the newspapers, the slightness of the tradition of news-gathering journalism, a fear of governmental displeasure, the low status of the newspaper correspondent in comparison with those into whose public conduct he would inquire all tend to hamper the press in its performance of this important function. For this reason public opinion languishes, and when it does express itself, it cannot easily do so in an informed and responsible manner.

The other institutions which ordinarily contribute to the formation of public opinion are likewise feeble. University teachers are either overworked or too few in number to produce a continuous flow of pertinent information about the fundamental trends and problems of economy, society

and polity. There are very few independent institutions for research into basic problems about which a citizenry and civil servant should be informed. The political tradition of the college teacher as a government employee and the fact that in certain of the new states college staffs consist largely of "expatriots" also deprive the country of important sources of political judgment.

The picture is not completely dark. In India a few journalists keep a sharp, informed and discriminating eye on the government. In Nigeria, the Extra-Mural Studies Department of the University College does wonders to form an intelligent public opinion among the middle class. On the whole, however, the "fourth estate" is hardly an independent factor in the formation of informed and judicious opinion.

The institutions of public opinion receive little help from the military. In India the military has the conventional outlook of the British Army, and the press and the intellectuals are regarded by them as something they need not worry about. There is no active antagonism, but little sense of affinity. In Indonesia, the political sphere is regarded by the army as at least in part its own, and the press is regarded as a possible inconvenience to be kept under control. In the Sudan there are recurrent rumors of the governmentalization of the press by the military regime, and pending that the press is kept on a halter. In the United Arab Republic the nationalization of the press has progressed markedly. Indeed, in all the countries in which the military have taken control, with the partial exception of Burma, the institutions of public opinion and above all, the press, have come under severe discipline. The military conception of the right order of society is a business-like conception. It has no time or place for discussion or for continuous criticism or for "exposures." What is necessary according to this conception is a firm hand, and if the press is to be tolerated, it must act in accordance with the directions of this firm hand. Otherwise it must pay the usual price which military superiors demand from recalcitrant subordinates.

III

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The elites of the new states are seeking desperately to create something new. Their aspirations are more dramatic and comprehensive than those of the European revolutionaries who have flourished since 1789.

The elites of the new states, partly because of their own nature and partly because of a world situation in which the West looms so large, are in a rather difficult position. They must orient themselves towards a quite differentiated model of a modern polity which is already visible elsewhere in the world, and which is very profoundly different from what they have inherited. Their model is one of a regime of civilian rule through representative institutions in the matrix of public liberties. It is the same model with which the new states began their careers and

from which they diverge only from a feeling of urgent necessity. Alternatively they might turn to a traditionalistic order, monarchical, absolutistic or feudal, resting on a basis of kinship, landownership and religious opinion; or a modern theocracy, which exercises oligarchic powers on behalf of traditional religious values. Finally a dictatorial communistic regime, drawing inspiration from the Soviet model and explicitly legitimating itself by Marxian doctrine, is not the least of possibilities.

Even the most doctrinaire of politicians can scarcely be expected to have a clear view of the future towards which they wish to move. It cannot be expected of the elites of the new states that they should have such an image of their goal.

The rulers of the new states, although many of them are intellectuals, are usually neither practicing scholars nor systematic theorists. They have not made careful studies of different types of regimes. The regime which they know best is that of the European state which formerly ruled them. Their demands for more self-government have tended generally to run in the same direction. To some considerable extent they remain the prisoners of their former rulers, from whom they have unquestioningly accepted much of their actual and their ideal regimes. Their hunger for modernity, the liberal auspices of their independence movement, and their general tendency towards populism make them incline towards political democracy. Their socialistic disposition, their distant admiration for the Soviet Union, their inchoate ideas about the Soviet polity, the authoritarian traditions of their own society, their impatience with sloth and disorder, and their concern for power make them ready to introduce substantial admixtures of oligarchy.

Their own notions are too undifferentiated and the exigencies of life are too demanding for them to select a single model and then to strive towards it unswervingly. Their standards are elementary, their motives are conflicting, their situation is hard -- painfully hard. They want their states to be modern. They want to be known in the larger world among their fellow new states and among the old states as the creators of a modern state. They need and want to keep order, they want to remain in power, and they work under immense difficulties given by external nature, history and their own predilections. They have so many problems -- keeping in power, keeping public order, keeping some measure of stability on unstable political foundations, improving education, developing professional personnel for medicine, teaching and technology, making themselves heard inter-nationally. It is little wonder that they are sometimes distracted from their ideals. They they concern themselves only with remaining in power and attend to their ideals largely through demagogic speeches and half-hearted dramatic measures such as suppressing the opposition or restricting the freedom of the press or denouncing the former colonial powers.

In the ensuing pages we delineate certain types of regimes which might be outcomes of the interplay of a zealously pursued ideal and intractable necessity. Certain of these regimes correspond fairly

closely to the ideals asserted by the elites of the new states. Others represent the necessities which might impose themselves if ideals fail -- although these "second bests" can become ideals too. The obstinate intractability of the inherited order and the resistance of tradition to ideals learned from books and teaching -- however long expressed and cherished -- will enforce adaptations. These adaptations will run towards concessions to the traditional order, towards the heightening of oligarchic tendencies as a means of overcoming the refusal of the traditional order to enter the modern age and towards the invention of new institutional arrangements through which liberal and democratic inclinations can find hitherto unknown forms of expression.

A. Political Democracy

1. Components. By political democracy, we mean the regime of civilian rule through representative institutions and public liberties.

At the center of this regime is a legislative body periodically elected by universal (adult or male) suffrage. This body is empowered to initiate legislation introduced either through its own individual members and committees or through the leadership of the executive branch, which might be either separately elected or selected from the members of the legislature; it is empowered to enact or reject legislation initiated by the executive. The executive is subjected to review and control through the powers of debate, inquiry and budgetary provision which are vested with the legislative. The executive carries out its policies through a hierarchically organized bureaucracy which is ultimately answerable to its political head or minister, under whose general guidance it operates, and who in his term is answerable to the legislative.

Those who offer themselves as candidates for election as legislators do so in association with, or as the candidates of, one of several contending legislative parties. The party which wins the largest number of seats dominates the legislature alone of it does so in coalition with other parties or with dissident members of other parties; or alternatively, a coalition of parties which together form a majority. In the presidential system, the president must work in collaboration with the majority party in the legislature.

The performance of the government and the legislators must be subject to periodic review and assessment by the electorate and to the scrutiny and criticism by the free organs of public opinion outside the structure of government. Within the legislature, the government is subject to the scrutiny and the criticism of the minority or opposition within the legislative body; reinforced by dissident members of the majority party and independent non-party legislators. The government is liable to dismissal through the loss of a vote of confidence in the legislative or through the loss of a regular election. In these ways, the democratic regime curbs the tyrannical and arbitrary exercise of power by the government and enforces the responsibility of the government and the legislature to certain standards of the public good, of which the electorate is ultimately the judge. Essential to the organs of control and criticism already mentioned

is a judiciary independent of legislative or executive pressure which is required for the protection of the rights of the citizenry in their relations with the government and each other.

All branches of the government work within the framework of a constitution, which may be written or entirely traditional. The conduct of the executive leadership, of the majority in the legislature, of the opposition, of the civil service, the army and the police as well as the judiciary is confined by constitutional and legal limitations.

2. Preconditions. The effective and continuous functioning of the institutions of political democracy in any country, underdeveloped and advanced, depends more or less on the following conditions:

(a) The stability, coherence and effectiveness of the ruling elite. The government of a democracy, like any effective elite, must have confidence in its own capacities and in the support which it will receive. Unlike the elites of other regimes, however, the support it receives from its parliamentary party and from the party in the country at large, as well as from its allies in the other parties (on specific issues) must be sufficient to enable it to act with some measure of confidence or at least without fear of being immediately overthrown or defeated in the legislature, or of arousing aggressive resistance or non-cooperation in the populace.

The government of the day requires the continued acknowledgement of its authority throughout most of the society. To obtain and retain that assent from a critical populace it must be reasonable effective in the promulgation and execution of policy.

A fairly high degree of coherence and organization of the dominant group in the leadership of each of the parties is required. Without this effectiveness in the conduct of parliamentary party and the party machinery, in the maintenance of party discipline within the legislature, and in arrangements for the harmonioua succession of party leaders, it will be severely hampered. Since the democratic regime cannot count on passivity or coercion to the same extent as undemocratic regimes do to maintain its position, mutual and fundamental trust is essential within the leadership of each party, and among the leaders of the different parties as well.

There must be a corps of political leaders attached to representative institutions who feel attached to parliamentary institutions and procedures, who regard themselves as generally answerable to the electorate, who have some feeling of affinity to the nation as a whole, who have some concern for its well-being, and who regard their opponents aa part of the nation and as worthy of respect. The political leaders must, despite differences in party loyalties and conflicts arising from tempermament and ambition, possess a certain measure of mutual regard and solidarity. They must be capable of continuous and sustained effort to keep themselves informed and to be aware of the main implications of major legislative and executive actions.

The effectiveness of the political elite depends in part on the acceptance of its legitimacy by a very substantial proportion of the population, particularly by that section of the population which is politically concerned. For its legitimacy to be accepted it must not only given an impression of a reasonable degree of competence; it must also give an impression of integrity. Representative institutions will cease to find acceptance if it is generally believed that their incumbents are corrupt, that they use their power primarily for the enhancement of themselves personally, or their kinsmen or clients or even of a whole class. Although the probity and disinterestedness of politicians can never be perfect, it must exist and must be thought to exist in considerable measure for the regime of representative institutions to function reasonably well. It is here above all that some of the originally more or less democratic regimes have failed.

The party bureaucracy outside the legislature should not be so powerful as to turn the parliamentary group into a mere register of the party bureaucracy's decisions. Shifting the center of gravity to a point outside the parliament devalues that institution in the eyes of its members and in the eyes of the public. By reducing the public esteem for parliamentary institutions, the self-esteem and the self-confidence of parliamentarians are correspondingly reduced. Their capacity to act effectively and to produce leaders capable of effective initiative is therewith diminished.

(b) The practice and acceptance of opposition. The effective and continuous existence of political democracy requires a fairly coherent and responsible opposition to the ruling party working within the rules of the parliamentary game. This opposition should interest itself not simple in the obstruction and depreciation of the majority. It should be capable of critizing the majority's measures and the performance of the executive on a basis of detailed and realistic information. The opposition should be sufficiently coherent to control or to isolate extremists who do not wish to work within the constitutional system. The opposition must be able to resist the temptations of conspiracy and subversion, and the governing party must likewise avoid the idea that opposition is in itself a step in the direction of subversion. Not very many of the new states have been successful in meeting these requirements.

Where the majority party is overwhelmingly larger than the combined opposition parties there must be adequate opportunity for dissent within the majority on the floor of the parliament and not just in the party caucus -- at least on certain important measures. Otherwise the opposition becomes disheartened about parliamentary institutions, the rank and file of the majority party become indifferent, and the elite of the majority party becomes slack and inefficient.

The majority and the opposition which is satisfied that it works within the constitutional boundaries must together form an effective block vis-a-vis the combined "traditionalistic" and "progressivistic" extremists. Otherwise, especially in a "multiparty" system, it will be very difficult

to form a majority which will be stable and which will at the same time have sufficient room for maneuver.

(c) Adequate machinery of authority. Every regime which proposes an active program requires a competent civil service, well enough trained and organized to carry out the measures taken by the legislature (or the executive leadership). A democratic elite, which is especially dependent on its effectiveness to retain the assent of the electorate, must have at its disposal an honest and efficient civil service. This body of civil servants must be sufficiently detached in its own political orientations and sufficiently loyal to any constitutional government to carry out the policy decided by the political elite, and sufficiently independent to be capable of offering to its political superiors detailed, matter-of-fact assessment of the measures which the government is proposing. It must have esprit de corps and self-confidence to stand up to bullying politicians and to persist in its objectivity and matter-of-factness when it seems easier to fall in with the prejudices and passions of the political leaders. The dangers of such bullying are perhaps even greater in new states than in the older democracies since the lesser experience of politicians in the new states in working with civil servants is likely to result in impatience and the feeling of being deliberately obstructed.

The civil servants must be capable of working harmoniously with politicians of diverse political outlooks and of educational and social backgrounds very different from their own. It is important that the leadership of the legislative branch be able to hold its own vis-a-vis the civil servants but without hamstringing them by excessive interference. Civil servants in turn must avoid being contemptuous of less well-educated politicians. The more experienced the civil servant in the new states, the greater is the probability of such anattitude. Conversely the more demagogic and vain the political elite, the more likely the experienced civil servant will caused the politician to feel that he is being despised even when he is not.

In a democratic polity the rule of law must obtain and must be recognized to obtain. There should be, therefore, a respected judiciary, independent both subjectively and objectively of the legislature and of the civil service, and immune to political passions, confident of its capacities and sensitive to its responsibilities. There should also be a legal profession which has a certain degree of professional pride and which is in some degree accessible to all classes of society.

There must be adequate machinery for the protection of the constitutional order from unconstitutionally initiated changes. This would include

(1) a well disciplined police force, more or less honest and devoted to the government but not lavish or indiscriminate in the use of its powers;

(2) a competent domestic intelligence system which is able to detect

and penetrate subversive bodies without bullying and spying on the entire population; and

(3) a reliable military with a loyal officer corps which does not believe that it is the sole custodian of modernity and national integrity or that it owes more to one constitutional political party than to another. (The civil service, police and the army must accept a binding obligation to the prevailing civil authority.) Finally, the political leaders (especially in the Home or Interior Ministry) must not perpetually quake in fear of subversion but should be capable of quick and realistic action when there is an actual threat.

(d) The institutions of public opinion. A self-confident and self-sustaining set of institutions of public opinion, i.e., press, universities and civic and interest associations, professional bodies, trade unions and local government bodies must be widely spread throughout the different classes and regions of the country. This entails an autonomous set of institutions for gathering, interpreting and diffusing information to the public as well as to the government. It also entails the freedom of expression and association of persons and corporate bodies who can use that freedom to study the course of events and clarify and criticize policy.

This requires, in turn, a corps of journalists, publicists and university and college professors who are curious and well-informed on public questions, who are honest and forthright in their expression and who have organs through which they can express themselves without fear of serious sanctions from governmental or private bodies. There must be a class other than the class of professional army officers which upholds the symbols and the program of modernity. This requires the existence of a modern civilian intelligentsia, which, in its turn, requires a fairly numerous, moderately educated and reasonably politically concerned section of the population (primarily middle class, but also some peasants and workingmen among them). These will constitute the reservoir from which the leaders of public opinion come, the audience for these leaders, and the voice which speaks (in a variety of peaceful ways) to legislators and administrators.

There should be a fairly dense and elaborate system of private and voluntary associations which, in addition to entering into the arena of public opinion, perform significant functions on behalf of their members, through co-operative and self-regulating internal activity, through negotiations and bargaining with similar organizations, and through representation of their interests before the government. These voluntary associations include trade unions and employers' associations, which have the task of protecting or aggrandizing the status of their members in their relationship with other organizations and with the government. They also include professional associations which promulgate and maintain standards of performance and regulate recruitment, cooperatives and private corporations

which produce and distribute commodities, autonomous universities and research institutions which enable their members to teach and to learn by study and research. None of these voluntary organizations should become so powerful as to be able to hold the rest of the society to ransom.

By the performance of such functions, an "infra-structure" of decision and authority is constituted which reduces the amount of authority exercised and the number of decisions made by the state. By membership in such bodies, the citizenry, at least that significant section which makes up the elites of the "infra-structure," is trained in exercising authority and making decisions. Even more important, the citizens become jealous of their rights to exercise authority and become attached to the symbols of their own autonomy. This not only restricts the power of the state, but it also keeps in check those tendencies towards the "politicization" of life which are inimical to the regime of civilian rule, representative institutions and public liberties.

(e) The civil order. Major and prolonged crises that arouse passionate conflicts are mortally damaging to political democracy in the new states. Even in well-established political democracies with a fairly strong civil consensus, a major crisis, like a severe economic depression, endangers the system. In the new states, which have a more tenuous consensus, the danger of crises is all the greater, especially since they are accompanied by very marked disagreements about the efficacy of the existing government and of the constitutional system. Furthermore, major crises require very strong and prompt governmental action, which necessitates the suspension of the routine institutions, e.g., freedom of opposition, of expression and assembly, of parliamentary control, the rule of law, and so forth.

Ultimately, the institutions of political democracy must be accompanied by a wide dispersal of civility. This would embrace (a) a sense of nationality, i.e., a firm but not intense attachment to the total community and its symbols; (b) a degree of interest in public affairs sufficient to impel most adults to participate in elections and to follow in a very general way what is going on in the country as a whole with a reasonable and temperate judgment of the quality of the candidates and the issues. Following from this, a civility would include (c) a general acceptance and even affirmation by a substantial proportion of the mass of the population to the legitimacy of the existing political order; (d) a sense of their own dignity and rights, as well as their obligations, so that individuals and groups will be interested in maintaining their own private spheres, free from the arbitrary intrusions of authority; and (e) a sufficient degree of consensus regarding values, institutions and practices so that each group accepts limits to its own self-aggrandizing tendencies. These qualities should not be intense and they need not be either equally or universally shared. They must, however, be common enough to serve as a leaven in society at large. A society which possesses these qualities we shall call a "political society," one in which "polity" and "society"

approximately coincide in their boundaries. Polity and society are not completely congruous even in the most advanced and best established political democracies. In the new states, there is an even larger gap between polity and society. Of course, the magnitude of the gap varies markedly among the new states. Some are closer to political societies than others.

No existing state -- long established or new -- really fulfills all the preconditions for the effective working of political democracy. In none of the advanced countries do all the politicians or journalists or trade union leaders or business leaders or citizens measure up to the requirements of political democracy. Nonetheless, the occasional vigor of most of the press and the continuous intelligence and vigor of an influential minority of the press, the devotion, acumen and force of character of some of the politicians and the good sense of some of the most outstanding trade union and business leaders as well as a savings remnant of the citizenry manage to keep the system going, despite the continuous disequilibrating pressures. The new states meet even less well the prerequisites of political democracy. Only India and Israel and to a lesser extent Nigeria and possibly Lebanon -- if we overlook the half-hearted civil war of several years ago -- come within hailing distance of this model. Deficiencies in certain of the categories of democratic policy are in some of the states compensated for by exceptional performances in other categories. In India, for example, the outstanding qualities of the political leadership and of a few journalists, the remarkable endowment of the higher civil service, the deeply engrained civil sense of the officer corps, as well as a fairly large reservoir of capable and civil-minded intellectuals, keep the regime as close to political democracy as a large inheritance of cultural, economic, and political obstacles permits. It is largely the personality, cultural traditions and skill of the Indian elite which compensates for the fact that India is not yet really a political society.

Practically none of the other states is a political society either. In most of these countries, polity falls short of becoming congruous even intermittently with the society. Very few of the new states -- perhaps Tunisia and Malaya are exceptions -- have elites which compensate for the underdevelopment of those qualities which constitute a "political society." Many of the new states are sovereign states only in the sense that no other state exercised sovereignty over their territory; they themselves have not yet succeeded in fully establishing a sovereignty that is unchallenged over all the territory that falls within their boundaries. In many of the regimes during the relatively democratic phase, the politicians could not establish any credentials for integrity or effectiveness. In many of them, such as Iraq, Indonesia and the Sudan, the elites have lacked internal solidarity not only among parties but even within parties and cliques. Opposition has very frequently been recalcitrant and factious, and the government has shown itself correspondingly impatient with the opposition. None, of course, not even Indonesia, has been so unfortunate as the Congo

in the first months of its existence in which none of the most elementary requirements of a political order -- a nation-wide civil service, a coherent and reliable police force, a powerful political personality or a national political movement -- has been in existence. There we see how a constellation of mutually antagonistic tribes and a modicum of mediocre demagogy can produce a condition as close to the state of nature as a new state can get.

Under such conditions, even the most favorable, some adaptation of the system is inevitable. The zealous effort of modernization, the doubts and ambivalences of the elites about political democracy, and the narrow radius of public opinion all push in the same direction of a greater concentration of authority than political democracy would countenance.

B. Traditional oligarchy.

If in the foreseeable future the new states are unable to develop into fully proportioned regimes of representational institutions and public liberties, it is equally improbable that they will relapse into traditional oligarchies. Whatever their earlier history, the new states have had no recent experience of larger scale bureaucratic traditional oligarchies. The traditional oligarchic elements which have survived into the present century have crippled and dwarfed existence under the toleration of foreign rulers. They have not earned the affections of the modern sectors of their society, and in consequence, the attractions of the modern sectors of their society, and the attractions of a traditional structure of government are felt only by a small minority. Although there is much sympathy and often active partisanship for the traditional culture, few would care to see an entirely traditional order maintained. Indeed, pratically no one, not even the traditionalists themselves, know what a traditional society would be on the scale of the present day social order. There is too much belief in the desirability of a strong, vigorously modernizing state, quite highly centralized and actively interventionist, for the traditional state to find many proponents.

Traditional oligarchy is not therefore an alternative which has much chance to gain the ascendary in any new state once it has embarked on a modernizing course, and it does not have much more chance to survive in those new states where it is now in the ascendancy. Nonetheless, below the surface of deliberate choice, traditional oligarchy is powerfully magnetic. In almost every type of regime established in the new states, some traces of traditional oligarchy will be found because it is the proper polity of the traditional society which the modernizing elites inherit. Just as the traditional social order cannot be completely dissolved, so the traditional political order inevitably infuses some of its ethos into any modern regime which succeeds it.

In practically every respect a traditional oligarchy is unsuited for modernization. To venture upon a course of modernization in such a regime can only be the decision of the ruler himself, who decides that he is ready to jettison much of what he has inherited. Such a possibility definitely

exists, as the case of Ethiopia seems to show. A ruler might indeed decide on the modernization of his regime, and he might be able to carry it out as long as his legitimacy is unquestioned. In the end, however, a traditional oligarchy would survive the process only as a vestige.

The same end awaits the regime modernized by elites. The traditional order in the new states defies the most repressive measures. It will constantly reassert itself in the most modernized bureaucratic structure, in the modernized party system, and in the fundamental political conceptions of the modern intellectual and political elites.

1. Preconditions.

(a) Addendum on traditionalistic and theocratical oligarchies. A traditional regime appears to have the least chance of any of those which we consider here. Much more probable is a traditionalistic, revivalist regime which, while purporting to embody and enforce traditional beliefs and practices, actually destroys the traditional structure of government and replaces it by a rigorously oligarchic constitution. The traditionalistic oligarchy would seem to be resolutely opposed to modernity, and its legitimacy is sought on the grounds that it protects traditional culture from erosion by modernity. Since, however, it would not leave much of the traditional system intact.

Yet traditionalism in the twentieth century has almost always been nationalistic. It has been concerned not merely with the rightness of inherited practices and beliefs but equally with their superiority to practices and beliefs which have arisen more recently or which have been acquired from abroad, usually from the West. It has been concerned to show that whereas modern practices and beliefs enfeeble the collectivity, the revival of the "traditional" ones makes it strong. But to be strong it has been thought necessary not only to retain past practices and beliefs but also to acquire certain of the practices of modernity which would render the collectivity strong in relation to other collectivities. Modern technology, especially modern military technology, is thus a necessary part of the program of traditionalistic oligarchy.

To modernize technology and administration involves setting into motion processes which are inimical to traditionalism. It means creating a modern intelligentsia which would not be easily assimilated in any "modernizing" traditionalistic regime. A modern intelligentsia would not be ready to resign itself to the ascendancy of a traditionalistic religious elite; its collaboration would be reluctant and its resistance inevitable. A traditionalistic regime in the present age would therefore be inevitably unstable.

But could a new religion, arising as great religions have in the past, out of the turmoil and tension of a disintegrating social order, produce a morale and a will to become a strong nation? An intense religious renewal, now just an admiration for past glories, might well create a society of heroic warriors, a new asceticism, and a devotion to a better order of life.

But could it do this and still retain the rationalism necessary for modern technology and modern administration -- and in the face of the hedonism that is ultimately implicit in the desire for modern economic progress? The creativity of great religious genius, any great creativity in fact, lies in the production of something new and unforeseen. The possibility of a great and fundamental religious renewal that would impel the new states towards modernity is therefore even more deeply hidden in uncertainty than the other possibilities which fall within more secular categories of analysis. It is not entirely out of the question, however, that some religious genius could create a following enflamed by belief in a divinity who calls for modernization or for actions which result in modernizations. What is more probable is a religious movement that aspires to establish theocratic and military oligarchies. These too, and especially the latter, would be very hard put to resist the erosive effect of modernization on their own foundations.

C. Totalitarian Oligarchy

Totalitarian oligarchy is oligarchy with democratic airs. It is moreover an oligarchy with the advantages of a doctrine. The fact that doctrines are created by intellectuals is of considerable importance in the new states because it enables the party with the doctrine to gain the allegiance of educated people. Because of its ostensible anti-imperialism it also fits the mood of the vigorous personalities of the new states. It shares with any other form of oligarchy the fundamental feature of being ruled by a small clique which refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of any aspirations outside itself. Even more than the ordinary civilian or military oligarchy intent on modernizing itself, totalitarianism refuses to admit the legitimacy of public opposition. Whereas a civilian or military oligarchy can compromise with independent centers of power, such as religious communities, kinship groups and even local territorial authorities and private property, as long as they do not aspire to be influential in the public sphere, totalitarian oligarchy seeks to dominate every sphere of life and to annul every center of previously independent authority. A totalitarian regime seeks to apply the oligarchic principle completely and unqualifiedly.

Naturally, the military elite in a totalitarian oligarchy is strictly confined to the sphere of military matters. The political elite will take special pains to see that no deviant political tendencies find hospitality in military circles. Almost equal pains will be taken to inculcate in both officers and other ranks the doctrinal beliefs by which the political elite legitimates itself. For these reasons, political dissidence is most unlikely to take a positive form in the military elites of totslitarian oligarchies. There might be strained feelings at times, and occasionally the professional esprit de corps of the military might be wounded by the politicians' brusqueness, but not much in the way of independent political action is to be expected under any but the most extraordinary circumstances.

The chances of a totalitarian oligarchy being established in a new

state are good. The model is one which is attractive because it offers the prospect of rapid progress, because it provides opportunities for intellectuals to contribute to that progress, and because it promises to sweep away both the "corrupt" politicians and businessmen and the traditional order that supports them, and because it flatters the prejudices of many intellectuals. These chances are furthered by the deliberate action of totalitarian states to infiltrate in various ways into the political elites of the new states through economic and technical aid, through military training, through scholarship and through large-scale propaganda. Actually, military intervention in times of internal crisis is another factor which might enhance the probability of establishment of totalitarian oligarchies in new states.

The chances of a totalitarian oligarchy's carrying out its program in a new state, once it accedes to power, seem less favorable. Although a totalitarian elite could enforce a greater rate of savings and investment, that rate would not be so much greater than what a vigorous elite in a tutelary or political democracy or a modernizing military oligarchy could enforce. It would undoubtedly take less account of vested interests and it could proceed more directly to its goal. In doing so, however, it would create a great deal of alienation and active hostility, to cope with which would require an extremely elaborate and efficient machinery of intelligence and repression. For this purpose it would require an administrative skill which most of the new states cannot yet muster. One of the reasons for their backwardness is their deficiency in administrative skill, and it is unlikely that a totalitarian oligarchy could in the short run remedy this lack any better than any other type of modernizing regime.

Yet if the mass of the population could not be coerced, then the modernizing program would be endangered, and disharmony within the elite and unrest in the population would result. Moreover, traditional orders being what they are, the totalitarian elite could not call forth from the population the unitary will which it needs for its own self-legitimation. Particularistic loyalties can be suppressed, but they cannot be eradicated by drastic methods, which only arouse obstructions. Furthermore, many of these particularistic loyalties would find their way into the totalitarian oligarchy and would case the same impediments to the formation of a modern regime that they cause in the alternatives to totalitarian oligarchy.

D. Modernizing oligarchies.

Pronounced elements of modernizing oligarchies, under the rule of civilian politicians and by no means complete or in all respects illiberal, now exist in Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia, in most of the new states of French speaking Africa and, to the extent that President Sukarno's ability and resources permit it, in Indonesia. In none of these states is oligarchy complete, although an oligarchic urge is expressed in a widely ramifying manner. In fact, civilian oligarchy is one of the chief probabalities confronting the new states. Alarm over the gap between polity and society, distrust of parliamentary politics, and apprehension that the "reactionary masses" of the traditional society will slow down the movement towards

modernity are major motives for the espousal of forms of government which concentrate authority and seem to establish consensus more fully than political democracy.

Both in practice and in principle, oligarchy frequently recommends itself to those in the new states who concern themselves with progress. In all the new states there is, in fact and in theory, a wide-spread belief in the need for a higher concentration of authority and a stronger medicine for the cure of corruption, parochialism, disunity and apathy. In Sudan, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Ghana, Pakistan, Morocco and Tunisia and among elements in Indonesia, Ceylon and French-speaking Africa, oligarchy appears to be the only way to create a modern society with a rational, honest administration and a decisive drive for social progress.

Even to those states with a moderate devotion to parliamentary democracy, the road to effective democracy appears to be so long and so difficult, so full of self-imposed burdens, and the method of getting there so slow that something stronger than democracy is thought to be desirable. The instability of representative institutions, the haste towards modernity and the fear of the gap which both political and tutelary democracy acknowledge and which neither can speedily overcome seem to some politicians, military men and intellectuals in the new states to be an argument for oligarchy. To many who stand outside it, an oligarchy appears to be progressive, efficient, swift, stable, virtuous and consensual.

The aspirstion towards "modernity," entailing as it does in the new states such a preponderance of public authority, would act as an impetus towards oligarchy even if the gap were not so great and if the counter-weight of traditional beliefs and practices were not so heavy. Then, too, inexperience with representative institutions and impatience with opposition makes for oligarchy. Oligarchy is the "natural" theory of the radical nationalist "progressivists" who distrust the bourgeois democracy of the once imperialist Western states.

Most of the oligarchic tendencies in the new states, leaving apart the totalitarian oligarchy of communist inspiration, have no well-elaborated theory. There is little or no theoretical exposition of the pattern of oligarchy, civilian or military, except the general belief that it should be stable, non-totalitarian, strong, honest and businesslike.[5] What is presented at this point, therefore, is more of an elucidation of certain features of these regimes which purport to be strong, stable, honest and efficient, rather than a summary of their explicit principles and aspirations.

It is reasonable to believe that oligarchic regimes are capable of persistence. Even though the persons who rules in an oligarchy might change by co-optation or forcible displacement, the oligarchic regimes

[5]As far as I know, the "theory" of Kemalism, which could perform this function, has few explicit proponents. The eccentric Nigerian mathematician, Dr. Chik Obe, is an exception.

has a toughness which makes it resistant to efforts to replace it by another type of regime. The question is whether modernizing oligarchic elites can succeed in their efforts to modernize their societies, to rule with stability and effectiveness, and to mobilize the enthusiastic support of a politically impotent populace.

The answer must be equivocal. In some respects the oligarchic elites can advance the modernization of their societies. They can improve transportation and communications; they can reform land tenure and introduce irrigation schemes and other civil engineering improvements. It is more problematic whether they can modernize the rest of the economy, particularly industrial production. Civilian oligarchs other than communists, despite their modernizing protestations, are often tied to traditional and conservative interests and are not likely to take radical steps to modernize their economies or to encourage vigorous and unconventional private business enterprisers to do so.

The modernization of the machinery of government and the establishment of public order definitely seem to lie within the capacities of modernizing oligarchies. They can reduce corruption in government -- at least in the early period of their ascendary -- and by their greater decisiveness they can crush public disorders. But in the course of time, modernizing oligarchies must bow before the inheritance which they have received from the previous regime and the tensions which their own methods of ruling engender.

No oligarchy has yet succeeded in mobilizing the entire population behind its projects. It might overcome overt or organized centers of resistance, but the enlistment of enthusiastic approval seems to be the key and the power of modernizing oligarchies -- as is probably the key and the power of every type of regime. Traditional attachments are tremendously resilient, and although the external power of traditional authorities can be broken by oligarchies, there is no necessary correlation between this and the evocation of a zealous affirmation of the modernizing oligarchic elite which has supplanted the traditional elite.

The factors which impede the formation of a civil order also impede the emergency of the unitary collective will, such as it sought by oligarchies. Particularism and traditionality, which prevent the closure of the gap by civility, also prevent the closure by propaganda or coercion. Nonetheless, a modernizing oligarchic regime is impelled to aggressive action against traditional beliefs and practices. The existence of centers of dispersed authority, modern and especially traditional, is intolerable to a modernizing oligarchy. It is a challenge which denies the claim of the oligarchy to mobilize the entire population on behalf of its modernizing program. It is a challenge which can be met only by the most savage and efficient repression or by the long slow process of transforming institutions.

E. Addendum on Modernizing Military Oligarchies.

Except for the Indian and Pakistani armies, none of the armies of the

new states has seen much military action in a major war. With the exception of the armies of Israel, India and Pakistan, none of them has any significant military achievement to its credit. Some of their officers saw action as subalterns or as sergeants in the British or French armies during the Second World War. Some officers have had guerrilla experience. On the whole, however, the importance of the armed forces of the new states derives not from the accomplishments in the conventional arena of military action, but from their role in the domestic life of their own countries.

There are nine new states where in recent years the military has taken a crucial position in politics: Indonesia, Burma, Laos, Pakistan, Iraq, United Arab Republic, Sudan, Jordan, Lebanon. (The Congo is not a state except insofar as it is recognized as such by the United Nations. Turkey is not a new state, but the recurrent and prototypical importance of the military in public life in that country since the last quarter of the 19th Century is relevant here. Of the nine countries, seven are Muslim, and of these only Pakistan and Indonesia are not in the Middle East. Is there some feature of Islam or in the practices of Ottoman rule which has disposed the armies of these countries, more than any others, to enter the political sphere?

Let us consider the latter question first. The Ottoman Empire, unlike the British Empire, did singularly little to educate its subjects. Unlike the British raj, which left nearly a score of modern universities in India, or the Colonial Empire, which beyond the boundaries of India left many universities and university colleges in Africa and Southeast Asia, the Ottoman Empire left nothing behind because it had created nothing. In Turkey there was no modern education, and the first stirrings of modern political interest occurred among teachers and students of technical subjects in military academies, which were in fact the only indigenous modern educational inatitutions of that great Empire. The Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies were probably far more humane administrators, but they did not regard the creation of a modern intellectual and technological elite as one of their charges. At the moment of independence Indonesia was thus even more poorly provided with a modern intellectual class and the institutions for their training than the former Turkish territories.

Pakistan was a part of British India, and its people therefore in a sense had access to the institutions of higher education that the Hindu population had. In fact, however, they did not avail themselves of the opportunity. Despite the great reformer, Sir Abdu Sayeed Khan and the exertions of the British to bring the Muslims forward, they pursued modern higher education only reluctantly. As a result, India inherited a disproportionately large part of the educated class of British India. Although much of it is pretty poor, it contained many eminent intelligences with worthy claims to distinction. Pakistan, on the other hand, was thrust into a situation like the Middle Eastern countries and Indonesia. There was no modern intellectual class as in Muslim countries and -- in this respect they were like Hindu and Buddhist countries -- there was no national ecclesiastical organization. In short, there was no nationally acknowledged elite except a small handful of politicians who, because of

inexperience or lack of moral integrity or because they suffered the disadvantage of co-operation with the Western powers, were unable to establish their effective hegemony over the political life of the countries.

The new states of Africa are in rather a different situation. Some of them appear to have a political elite of marked force of character and intelligence with a moderate amount of experience of party and parliamentary institutions and reasonable practical capacities. They might in some cases incline to oligarchy. Even where their inclinations are otherwise, circumstances might press them towards oligarchy. They are not threatened, however, by military usurpation because they have scarcely any military forces, and certainly no indigenous military elite, such as the Middle Eastern States possess, or a military elite which has grown out of guerrilla warfare, such as exists in Indonesia and Burma.

Those military oligarchies which have emerged have on the whole not been doctrinaire. Only President Nasser has attempted to construct a doctrine, and characteristically he is the greatest demagogue and most frenetic nationalist among the political officers. In Pakistan, the Sudan, Indonesia, Burma, Lebanon (and Turkey) the military seem neither ideological nor expansive. Their aspirations too are rather moderate. They wish to create a political society on a rudimentary scale and to establish adequate machinery of government. Except in Iraq and the United Arab Republic they have not created an autonomous political organization. Indeed, what they generally seek to do is to conduct a polity without politics and without politicians. They attempt to run their country as if it were a large army camp. Parliamentary and consultative institutions are suspended, the civil service is put under rigorous discipline, critics are suppressed or put on notice. Legislation is enacted through decrees, and the rule of law is dissolved. It is a regime of martial law without the draconic punishments which usually attend that regime.

Their program is order and progress, but practically all have placed more stress on order than on progress. In both Pakistan and the United Arab Republic efforts are being made to improve the educational system, to improve agriculture, to provide better housing, but none of these seems to be undertaken with the same urgency as the maintenance of an apolitical order. In Burma the military regime was concerned only with the restoration of order as a precondition for the reinstatement of political democracy. In Pakistan too, the military looks forward to its own replacement by some sort of representative -- but partyless -- political regime. In Iraq, Colonel Kassem toys with the restoration of political parties.

Military oligarchies, if they are to be successful, must be able to achieve certain conditions:

1. Stability, Coherence and Effectiveness of the Elite. Only in Pakistan and in Burma have the military oligarchies been able to avoid efforts by other domestic groups, including military groups, to displace them. Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt have all experienced counter-coups by

military men, mainly younger officers than those who made the first coup d'etat. In Egypt they were successful, and the present elite of the United Arab Republic is a second generation of officers. No noticeable resistance or countermeasures, however, have come from the civilian politicians whom they displaced, nor have they encountered any organized popular discontent.

The elite of a military oligarchy, like every other elite, must demonstrate its effectiveness if it is to retain its position. The easiest way in which it can show effectiveness is by vigor in suppressing attempted Putsches, cleaning up streets, removing beggars from the center of the main towns, prosecuting the beneficiaries of the preceding regime and preventing the spread of rumors of corruption among the new rulers. In these respects the military elites can be quite successful.

Military elites suffer from the disadvantage that once they succeed in these undertakings there is not very much more that they can do to support their own self-confidence and to impress themselves on the public mind. Having very little of a program except what they take over from the planning boards and civil servants of the old regime, for whom they have no respect, they are left in a directionless condition. Since, except for the Egyptian elite, they have no ambitions of conquest, there is a danger that they will come to feel themselves suspended in a void of clean government and clean streets.

They are not businessmen and they are not civil servants with an ideology of economic growth. If they encourage either or both of the latter, they weaken their own hold through the encouragement of independent centers of power and decision. If they do not encourage or tolerate independent activity, they will see the country standing still. This might be all right for the first period of rule when the bearers of public opinion are tired of high sounding phrases and corrupt inaction. After a time, however, the deeply rooted demand for a dynamic modernity will reassert itself, and the military elite will be put on the defensive.

2. The Practice and Acceptance of Opposition. A military hierarchy allows no place for opposition, and military oligarchies accord it no more place. The abolition of parliaments, parties, and the independence of the press -- a feature of military rule everywhere in the new states (except Burma) -- shows that the military elite has no conception of a proper role of constitutional opposition. The local elections organized in the United Arab Republic and Pakistan and reinstatement of parties in Iraq disclose no provision for the constitutional operation of an opposition.

Yet in the nature of things, opposition cannot be avoided. Inaction as well as action will necessarily call forth some opposition, and even though it is prevented from acquiring a corporate or institutional form of expression, it cannot do so indefinitely. The regime will thus be forced to transform itself into a more pluralistic form by amalgamating itself with other, less consensual elements or it will have to take recourse in more drastic measures of oppression.

3. The Machinery of Authority. The military elite can run a country only with the collaboration of the civil service. Even though it denounces, purges, and transforms it, the elite will inevitably be forced into a coalition with the civil service. The armed forces themselves cannot replace the civil service; they can only supervise it, check it, interfere with it and at best penetrate and dominate it. To do more would be to cease being an army, and no oligarchic military elite in any new state has yet undertaken to do that. So much for its positive aspect.

On the negative side it can perform important police functions. It can, in fact, replace the political police with its own intelligence service; it can conduct exemplary trials and execute exemplary punishments. It can take the higher levels of adjudication under its control and so select and bully the judiciary that it becomes a pliant instrument of domination rather than an instrument for the application of law and the award of justice.

4. The Institutions of Public Opinion. In the extant military oligarchies, the ordinary organs of public opinion are forced into a state of attrition. Newspapers are censored or closed down, their ownership and journalists harried or supplanted, their economic organization dominated. Wireless communication, if not already a government monopoly in substance, now becomes an organ of propaganda. Since, however, the professional military man is not ordinarily an ideologist, the universities, such as they are in the countries which have come under military oligarchies, are left more or less alone. Freedom of research and teaching are left relatively unimpaired as compared with the press. In Pakistan, at least, the government of General Ayyub has even created two important commissions, one in education and the other in science, which have carried out their work on a high level and made many valuable recommendations which if implemented will testify to the readiness of senior soliders to respect intellectual freedom and performance.

5. The Civil Order. Believing in obedience, the military oligarchy demands consensus. In the main, however, the machinery which it establishes for its creation falls considerably short of totalitarian procedures and aspirations. Since it has no ideology, it makes no effort to inculcate an ideology into the mass of the population. In many respects it resembles traditional oligarchy, which allows people to go their own way as long as they do not disturb public order or threaten to subvert the oligarchy. Their demands are not intense, and only those who are already politicized feel the pressure of the oligarch's desire for consensus.

To summarize: the military oligarchy is not a complete regime. It has neither a comprehensive program nor a perspective into the future. Like all non-hereditary oligarchies, it has no provision for succession. It is what some of the military oligarchs themselves call a "caretaker regime." But its ideas about what it takes care of are rather scant and, even where well-intentioned, unimaginative. Except for the Burmese military oligarchy, which took power for a specific objective, namely, the rectification of administrative morale and the preparation of new elections, military oligarchies have no definite conception of the kind

of regime to which they wish to transfer power or towards which they wish to move.

F. Tutelary Democracy.

There are many men of good will in the new states who recognize the difficulties of a system of political democracy in states that have not yet become "political societies." They wish to retain as much of the institutions of civilian rule, representative government and public liberties as they can. But they also wish to introduce in principle and in practice, or in practice along, modifications for maintaining an effective and stable government, for modernizing the economy and the society, and for reinforcing and rehabilitating the feeble propensities of their people for political democracy. Some, who would go further, would have a stronger executive than political democracy affords and reduce the power of the legislature and the political parties while attempting to retain the rule of law and public liberties. (Such a regime would be something like that of Bismarkian and Wilhelmian Germany.) Others would maintain representative institutions but confine their powers and those of the institutions of public opinion within narrower bounds. They would retain all the institutional apparatus of political democracy but, recognizing the insufficiency of the cultural and social prerequisites, would attempt to keep the system going more or less democratically through very strong executive initiative and a continuous pressure from the top throughout the whole society.

The state of affairs in India leans occasionally, without deliberate intention or doctrinal preconception, towards the first alternative. The guided democracy that President Sukarno has at time appeared to favor in Indonesia is a more deliberate and drastic movement to concentrate political life in a restricted elite, while keeping the form of parliamentary government and allowing the President's charisma to replace the absent civil order. Ceylon, since the period of the state of emergency, has had a form of tutelary democracy. It has sought to retain much of the parliamentary regime while restricting public liberties to compensate for deficiencies in the civil order. It is however, unclear how much there is of an ultimately democrstic intention underlying the oligarchic and demagogic manifestations in that country.

Tutelary democracy is a variant of political democracy which recommends itself to the elites of the new states. It does so because it is more authoritative than political democracy, and also because the institution of public opinion and the civil order do not seem qualified to carry the burden which political democracy would impose on them. It is not the object of a theory in the way in which political democracy and totalitarian oligarchy have become; it is the "natural theory" of men brought up to believe in themselves as democrats.

We might question whether tutelary democracy is a feasible alternative, sufficiently attractive to gain the suffrage of a democratic elite

experiencing difficulties in attemption to operate a regime of political democracy and sufficiently stable to survive internal and external preasures towards oligarchy. As in so many other problems of the new states, it depends on the moral and mental qualities of the political, military, and intellectual elites. If, as in India, they are sufficiently devoted to the principle of a democratic polity, then they will carry out their tutelary functions through the whole panoply of one representative and liberal institution. Thus far, of the regimes in the new states which have given up the representative institutions and public liberties with which they began their careers, only Burma and Lebanon have reinstated a more or less democratic regime. Indonesia, Ceylon, Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Pakistan, Sudan have not retraced their steps, and Ghana has moved steadily towards oligarchy with parliamentary adornments. Our experience thus far may be interpreted as supporting the view that deliberate restrictions on the working of the institutions of political democracy traverse a road which allows no easy retracing of one's steps.

IV

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

No new state can modernize itself and remain or become liberal and democratic without an elite of force of character, intelligence and a very complex set of high moral qualities.

The path towards modernization is uncertain; the arrival, uncertain. Nor is it any longer possible to retrace one's steps. Countries may never succeed in becoming modern, but they will be unable to return to a traditional society or polity. A state which in any minimal way enters on the road toward modernity through the organization of a modern army and through the establishment of modern intermediate and higher educational institutions has irreversibly turned its back on the traditional oligarchic alternative. Technically trained and professionally formed young officers will be impatient with the slovenliness of the regime of traditional oligarchy, with its combination of indolent oligarchy and mass apathy and poverty. The students and graduates of modern higher educational institutions, however poor their intellectual quality, are provided with ideas of modernity which receive their force from impulses of adolescent rebellion against a repressive traditional oligarchic society. If, as is often the case, the economy is too poor to find posts for them in the sppropriate occupations, then they dominate "public opinion" and become the agents of an incessant turbulence which no mixture of traditionality and oligarchy can withstand.

It is easier not to go back than to go forward. Going forward requires the closing of the gap. There can be no truly modern society in which there is not a greater measure of active unity between the mass of the society and its leaders than exists today in any of the new states. At present, the new states are extremely heterogeneous ethnicslly and

culturally; particularistic religious traditions are powerful among them, and kinship and stratification makes for narrow loyalties. Nationalism, on the other hand, tends to be enthusiastic and dynamic rather than civil, and it leads politicians into demagogy and away from the people. Nearly all the new states confront a vastly preponderant peasant majority which, if it is not apathetic and withdrawn into its own parochial life, is quietly indifferent or actively resistant to the efforts to make it conform to the model the politicians hold before it.

The closure of this gap between the modernizing elite and the mass of the population is the prerequisite of the creation of a political society, of a society which is modern not only in its economy and administration but in its moral order as well.

Oligarchic regimes can tolerate the gap more easily than political democracies because they demand little but acclamation from the masses, and much of that can be fabricated on demand. The greater readiness of oligarchic regimes to use coercion also contributes to this apparent closure of the gap. The actual closure, however, is probable only in a regime of civilian rule, representative institutions and public liberties. The movement towards its closure can probably occur only in some variant of tutelary democracy, which can take the external form of either political democracy or a modernizing oligarchy or some new form peculiar to itself. The regime of civilian rule, public liberties and representative government is a regime built around a wide diffusion of initiative and independence of action and judgment. The traditional order entails the concentration or utter absence of initiative and independence of judgment and action, and in this it is at one with oligarchy. This would appear to make the survival or emergence of political democracy less probably than of oligarchy. Oligarchy is more compatible with the traditional order because it does not suffer as much as democracy from the reality of the gap. Political democracy is in many respects discontinuous with the substantive content of the traditions, i.e., with what these traditions transmit. The much larger amount of voluntary assent and widely dispersed initiative which the regime of representative government and public liberties requires will not be so easily forthcoming in the new states.

The political virtues required for oligarchy are fewer and less demanding on the moral and intellectual powers of a considerable part of the population -- including both rulers and ruled. Oligarchy depends to a much larger extent than democracy on the ability of the elite to use organized coercion where necessary; it can stand and even benefit from apathy in other spheres and at other times. On the other hand, a modernizing oligarchy, nationalistic in outlook, requires for its self-legitimation a unitary public will which can be activated at the command of the elite. It is doubtful whether this can really be produced by the means available to any known oligarchy.

Totalitarianism depends on organized force at the center and demands enthusiastic conformity in untraditional practices in a large part of the

society. There is no reason to believe that a totalitarian oligarchy can create this social unity any better than any other type of regime. It can undoubtedly create the appearance of unity better than a more democratic regime but it cannot do any better in the creation of the reality.

The present low level of the development of individuality in the new states is more congenial to oligarchic than to democratic regimes. Oligarchic regimes which try to create a unified national will gain the further benefit of the most uncommon conversion phenomenon of the leap from the pre-individual condition of primordiality to the trans-individual condition of extreme nationalism. On the other hand, oligarchic regimes which affront the sense of integrity of kinship and local territorial groups by attempting to coerce them simultaneously generate a withdrawal from national symbols and thus enlarge and stabilize the gap.

Democratic regimes have more likelihood of arousing individuality and more to gain from it than any of the oligarchic alternatives. In the long run only a regime of representative institutions and public liberties can cure the oppositional mentality while avoiding withdrawal into apathy.

The oppositional mentality, however, is more inimical to the regime of political democracy and the regime of tutelary democracy than it is to oligarchic regimes. The latter can suppress the oppositional mentality in accordance with their own inherent constitutions whereas democratic regimes cannot do so with the same constitutional ease. The burden for the transformation rests upon the elite. Its chances for success rest on its capacity for self-restraint and its effectiveness in legitimating itself through modernizing achievement, through a due respect for the claims of traditional beliefs and through its recruitment of intellectuals who can reinterpret traditional beliefs, adapt them to modern needs and translate them into a modern idiom.

Are such elites now in existence?

Almost every new states except India, Ghana, Nigeria, and perhaps Tunisia and the Sudan is defective in the quality of its civil servants. All except India and possibly Nigeria lack politicians with devotion to parliamentary institutions and skill in working with them. Of those with substantial indigenous armies, only India has succeeded in inculcating the army with civil loyalty or in maintaining the tradition formed during foreign rule.

India has a large, relatively well-educated middle class, and a very competent higher civil service. The civil arm of its government has established an unquestioned ascendancy over the military arm. Its small -- perhaps too small -- corps of politicians is devoted to parliamentary procedures. Not least of all is the existence of a rudimentary political society. With these qualifications India has the best chance of any new state of stabilizing its present regime of civilian rule, representative institutions and public liberties. It too will have to make some compromise with tutelary democracy.

But even the country with the best chance will probably not succeed in attaining the level set by the model it holds before its eyes. No state ever does. In the new states of Asia and Africa the chances of realizing any of the models which took form in other cultures and under different economic and social conditions seem to be even less.

The likelihood of any oligarchic alternatives fulfilling themselves in the new states is not unqualifiedly good. At the extreme they demand something which is most unlikely to be realized, namely a high degree of mobilization of wills around a single set of symbols, great exertion, and great efficiency. Even if these countries were to be satisfied with the restricted and more realistic program of totalitarian oligarchy and hence settle for coerced order, the security of their power and rapid economic development, they would likely be disappointed. The efficiency on which a totalitarian oligarchy prides itself is likely to encounter great obstacles at every level of society, and ruthlessness will be no substitute for it. Ruthlessness might create an impression of discipline, but it does not beget efficient action on behalf of the goals set by the regime.

In a sense, the regime of political and tutelary democracy, which seems to demand so much from men, really offers a more realistic settlement with the slowly tractable realities of the traditional societies of the new states. If democracy can be understood in a partial sense, in which representative institutions function limpingly -- even more limpingly than in the West -- and public liberties are maintained, it is entirely possible that some form of democracy has, in the long run, the best chance of surviving among the alternative models. But even then in the coming decades it will have to make significant concessions to the gap, and it will be able to survive only if the elite has a very powerful will to be democratic -- only if it is willing to be the teacher and parent of democracy in a society which by its nature does not incline in that direction.

The alternatives are oligarchies. The military variety, which promises to maintain order and -- as an afterthought -- to modernize, does so only by sweeping the disorder temporarily into a box from which it recurrently springs in full strength. The civilian oligarchy, which strives for larger programs, achieves a little in spurts and between spurts sprawls in disorder and oppressiveness. The totalitarian oligarchy by the ruthlessness of its elite and by the vigor of its party machine as well as by the organizational and material aid which it would get from the Soviet Union would appear to have the best chance of maintaining itself once it gets into power. But it too would have to compromise markedly with the human materials which traditional society gives it. It could build industrial monuments and suppress open dissatisfaction, but it could not realize its ideal.

None of the alternatives as they were presented in this paper or as their proponents in the new states think of them has much chance of being fully realized. There is a large realm of disorder between traditionality and modernity, and in this area, in the midst of sloth and

squalor, occasional outbursts of progressive action occur. In the compromises which reality will impose on the struggle between tradition and modernity, this third or middle possibility will undoubtedly intrude in a prominent way.

Our effort to understand the prospects of the new states should not neglect the experience of the Latin-American states subsequent to their gaining independence. But it should also be remembered that the new states of Africa and Asia exist in a period of more rapid communications, and also at a time when the images of the Western democracies and the Soviet Union are more forcibly and vividly impressed on the minds of intellectuals in the new states than the liberal constitutional models of Europe were on the minds of those who created the new states of Latin America.

There is no straight and easy road to the city of modernity. Whatever the road chosen, there will be many marshes and wates on either side, and many wrecked aspirations will lie there, rusting and gathering dust. And those who arrive at the city will discover it to be quite different from the destination which they and their ancestors originally sought.