ARMIES IN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION

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Only a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emergent states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing communist parties. It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in shaping the course of nation-building. Now that the military has become the key decision-making element in at least eight of the Afro-Asian countries, we are confronted with the awkward fact that there has been almost no scholarly research on the role of the military in the political development of the new states.

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR DOCTRINE

The trend of recent years toward increased authoritarian rule and army-dominated governments raises questions which seem only to emphasize the limitations of our knowledge. Is it true, as we have always supposed, that any encroachment of the military into civilian rule is a blow to liberal government and civil liberties? Or is it possible that military rule can, in fact, establish the necessary basis for the growth of effective representative institutions? Have events reached such a state in parts of Asia that we should welcome army rule as the least odious of possible developments and probably the only effective counterforce to communism?[1] We seem to be confronted by two conflicting images of the politician in uniform. The first, derived largely from Latin America and the Balkans, is that of administrative incompetence, inaction, and authoritarian, if not reactionary, values. The second and more recent is that of a dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress and the task of modernizing transitional societies that have been subverted by the "corrupt practices" of politicians. How is it possible to tell in any particular case whether army rule will lead to sterile authoritarianism or to virgorous development?

To answer such questions is to explore two relatively unknown and overlapping areas; Western scholarship has been peculiarly inattentive to the sociology of armies, on the one hand, and the processes of political development and nation-building, on the other. Only in recent years, as Professor William T. R. Fox observed, has the Western scholar's bias against the military been weakened to the point where he is prepared to go beyond the field of civil-military relations and recognize the entire

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1 Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 3, April 1959, pp. 325-345.

range of national security problems as a respectable province of scholarship.[2] Given the hesitation with which we have approached the study of the primary functions of armies it is not surprising that so little systematic thought has been given to the political sociology or armies and the roles that military institutions play in facilitating the processes of industrial and political development. It is hardly necessary to document the fact that we have limited knowledge about the nature of political development in transitional societies and the processes that produce the emerging political institutions. Without greater knowledge of these developments we lack perspective for viewing the rise of authoritarian practices and the emergence of military rule in transitional societies.

Our lack of knowledge about such important matters is probably less significant than the fact that we also lack an appropriate doctrine that, in lieu of tested knowledge, might serve to guide our policy. To put the matter bluntly, for all our commitment to democratic values, we do not know what is required for a society to move from a traditional and authoritarian basis to the establishment of democratic institutions and representative institutions.

When this problem has arisen in the past with respect to colonialism, our typical response has been anti-intellectual and anti-rational: colonial powers should relinquish their authority, and then an automatic and spontaneous emergence of democratic practices and institutions could be expected. Unfortunately, with the passing of colonialism we find we have little advice to give to the leaders of the newly emergent countries who are struggling to realize democratic ways. We have no doctrine to offer them, no strategies for action nor criteria of priorities, no sense of appropriate programs nor sets of hypotheses for explaining the paths to representative government. At best we have been able to piece together some concepts and considerations taken from embryonic theories of economic growth and have suggested that they might serve as guiding principles.

In contrast to our own bemusement, those interested in establishing other types of social and political systems -- and most particularly, of course, the communists -- have a clearer sense of design and of priorities to guide their efforts. More often than not we have found that instead of developmental concepts and strategic plans we can offer only statements about the nature of democratic values and our vision of end-goals of political development. By stressing ends rather than the means we have inadvertently tended to highlight the extent to which the newly emergent states have failed to realize in practice their aspirations. In so doing we have contributed to the growing feeling of insecurity common to most of the leaders of such countries. These are generally men who,

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[2] Conference on Political Modernization, Social Science Research Council, Committee on Comparative Politics, Dobbs Ferry, June 8-12, 1959.

despite their bold exteriors, are inwardly plagued with self-doubts and uncertainties about their ability to run a country. Without clear notions as to the stages that must be passed through if their transitional societies are to realize free institutions, these leaders are in danger of thinking that the gap between current performance and democratic ideals means that their peoples are doomed to failure.

Our lack of doctrine for building a tolerably free society is most conspicuous with respect to the proper role of authority in government. How should the machinery of state, usually inherited from an essentially authoritarian colonial regime, be employed to ensure political development? Can these essentially coercive instruments of the state, which in a democratic order are the servants of the popular will, be utilized to guide a tradition-bound people to democratic values and habits of thought? Or is the result of any such efforts, no matter how well intended, likely to be a drift toward what is essentially an authoritarian order decorated with democratic trimmings? It would seem that these questions might serve as an appropriate beginning for a search for both a doctrine of political tutelage and a better understanding of the role of the military in the process of political modernization.

An underlying assumption behind much of Western political thought is that political institutions are above all else the products of the dynamic forces peculiar to a particular society and thus reflect the distinctive values and the styles of action common to that society. It is acknowledged, of course, that once institutions are established they tend to become dynamic and hence influence the values and the expectations of the population. There is thus an assumption of a circularity of relationships or a state of equilibrium. The fundamental view, however, is still that the dynamics of the system lie within the society as a whole and that it is the institutions which must be responsive. Governmental institutions can display initiative, but fundamental change originates within the society.

When we turn to the newly emergent countries this model no longer seems appropriate. For in these societies the historical pattern has been the introduction of institutions from outside, with a minimum concession to the values and behavior of the people. These fundamentally authoritative structures have thus tended to be shaped according to foreign standards. Rather than responding to indigenous values they have often proved to be the dominant factor in stimulating further changes throughout the society.

These considerations suggest that it might be useful to organize our analysis of the political role of the army, firce, with respect to the political implications of the army as a modern institution that has been somewhat artificially introduced into disorganized transitional societies; and second, with respect to the role that such an army can play in shaping attitudes toward modernity in other spheres of society. By such an approach we may hope to locate some of the critical factors for explaining why it is that the military has been a vigorous champion of progress and development in some countries and a retarding influence in others.

We may also hope to gain a basis for judging the probable effectiveness of armies in promoting national development and eventually democratic practices.

THE ARMY AS A MODERN ORGANIZATION

In large measure the story of the underdeveloped countries is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized for achieving new objectives. This is the problem of establishing organizations that, as rationalised structures, are capable of relating means to ends. The history of much of the Western impact on trsditional societies fits comfortably within this theme, for the businessman, planter, and miner, the colonial administrator, the missionary, and the educator each in his own way strives to fit modern organizations into tradition-bound societies. Similarly, the story of the nationalists and of the other Westernized leaders can be treated on essentially identical terms, for they too try to change the habits of their people by creating modern organizations.

Needless to say, there are not many bright spots in this history, and it is open to queation as to who has been the more tragically heroic or comically futile: the Westerners struggling to establish their organizations in traditional societies, or the nationalist politician and the indigenous administrator endeavoring to create a semblance of order out of chaos. On balance the attempts to establish military organizations seem to have been noticeably the most successful.

It would be wrong to underestimate the patient care that has gone into developing and training colonial armies, and in the newly independent countries the military have been treated relatively generously in the allocation of scarce resources. But in comparison to the efforts that have been expended in developing, say, civil administration and political parties, it still seems that modern armies are somewhat easier to create in transitional societies than most other forms of modern social structures. The significant fact for our consideration is that the armies created by colonial administration and by the newly emergent countries have been consistently among the most modernized institutions in their societies. Viewed historically, some of these armies have been distinguished: the Indian Army, the Malay Regiments, the Philippine Scouts, the Arab Legion, the Gurkha Regiments and the King's Own African Rifles, to mention only the more celebrated ones.

It would take us too far afield to explore the relative advantages military leaders have in seeking to establish armies in transitional societies. We need only note that there is a paradoxical relationship between ritualized and rationalized modes of behavior that may account for the ease with which people still close to a traditional order adapt themselves to military life. Viewed from one perspective, a military establishment comes as close as any human organization can to the ideal type for

an industrialized and secularized enterprise. Yet from another point of view, the great stress placed on professionalism and the extremely explicit standards for individual behavior make the military appear to be a more sacred than secular institution. If discipline is needed to minimize random and unpredictable behavior, it is also consonant with all the demands that custom and ritual make in the most tradition-bound organization.

For these reasons, and for others related to the hierarchic nature of the organization, the division between traditional and rationally oriented behavior is not very great within armies.[1] Indeed, in any army there is always a struggle going on between tradition and reason. Historically, during periods of little change in the state of military technology the tendency has been for the non-rational characteristics to become dominant.[2] Given this inherent conflict in any military organization the question arises as to why the forces of custom and ritual do not readily dominate the armies of the newly emergent countries, and so cause them to oppose the forces of change. In societies where traditional habits of mind are still strong one might expect the military to be strongly conservative. Such was largely the case in the West during the pre-industrial period. By contrast, in most of the newly emergent countries armies have tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to champion responsible change and national development.

This state of affairs is largely explained by the extent to which the armies in these countries have been influenced by contemporary Western military technology. In particular nearly all of the new countries have taken the World War II type of army as their model.[3] In so doing they have undertaken to create a form of organization that is typical of and

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[1]It is significant that the most common weaknesses of civil bureaucracies in the new countries - like exaggerating the importance of procedure to the point of ritualizing the routine, and the lack of initiative and of a pragmatic and experimental outlook - are not as serious drawbacks to smooth functioning of military establishment. On the contrary, the very qualities that have hobbled civil administration in these countries have given strength and rigidity to their military establishments.

[2]The classic discussion of the spirit of militarism as contrasted with the rational military mind is Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Romance and Realities of a Profession, New York, W. W. Norton, 1937.

[3]World War II was in itself a decisive event in the birth of many of these countries and, of course, the availability of large quantities of surplus equipment and arms made it realistic to aspire to a modernized army. American military aid has contributed to making the military the most modernized element in not only recipient countries, but also in neighboring countries which have felt the need to keep up with technological advances.

peculiar to the most highly industrialized civilization yet known. Indeed, modern armies are essentially industrial-type entities. Thus the armies of the new countries are instinct with the spirit of rapid technological development.

The fact that these new armies in pre-industrial societies are modeled after industrial-based organizations has many implications for their political roles. One of their characteristics is particularly significant; the specialization that modern armies demand in skills and functions is only distantly related to the command of violence. There has generally been a tremendous increase in the number of officers assigned to staff functions as contrasted with line commands. As the armies have striven to approximate their ideal models they have had to establish all manner of specialized organizations and departments that require skills that are either in short supply or non-existent in their societies. The Burmese army, for example, in addition to its engineer and signal corps has special sections on chemical warfare, psychological warfare, and even a historical and archeological section. All the new armies have attempted to introduce specialized training schools and advanced techniques of personnel management and procurement. Consequently, numbers of the more intelligent and ambitious officers have had to be trained in industrial skills more advanced than those common to the civilian economy.

The high proportion of officers assigned to staff functions means that large numbers of officers are forced to look outside their society for their models. The fact that army leaders, particularly the younger and more ambitious, generally come from those trained in staff positions means that they are extremely sensitive to the needs of modernization and technological advancement. This kind of sensitivity bears little relationship to the command of physical violence and tests of human endurance -- in short, to the martial spirit as we customarily thin of it. In consequence the officers often find that they are spiritually in tune with the intellectuals, and students, and those other elements in society most anxious to become a part of the modern world. They may have little in common with the vast majority of the men they must command. In this respect the gap between the officer class and the troops, once largely a matter of social and economic class (as it still is to some degree), has now been widened by differences in the degree of acculturation to modern life.

It should be noted that these revolutionary changes in military life have significantly influenced the status of the military profession in different societies and hence have had an interesting effect on relative national power. Cultures that looked down on the military at an earlier stage of technology now accord high prestige to the same profession as it has raised its technology. For example, when armies depended entirely on human energy and animal power the Chinese placed the soldier near the bottom of the social hierarchy; with present levels of advanced military technology the soldier is now near the top of the social scale in both communist and non-communist China. The change has been more in the nature of the military profession than in basic Chinese cultural values. Conversely, peoples once considered "martial" may now show little interest

in, or aptitude for, the new kind of soldiering.

Above all else,however, the revolution in military technology has csused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically underdeveloped. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies.

It might seem that those occupying positions in other modern-type organizations in underdeveloped societies would also feel much the same need for change. To whatever extent this may be so, three distinctive features of srmies seem to make them somewhat more dynamic in demanding changes.

First of all, armies by nature are rival institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test of one against the other. All other organizations operate within the context of their own society; although their initial inspiration may have come from abroad, their primary focus is on internal developments. The civil bureaucracy, for example, can, and indeed has to, deal with its domestic problems with little regard for what other bureaucracies in other countries are doing. The soldier, however, is constantly called upon to look abroad and to compare his organization with foreign ones. He thus has a greater awareness of international standards and a greater sensitivity to weaknesses in his own society.

Second, armies for all their concern with rationality and becoming highly efficient machines are relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on a day-to-day basis. Armies are created for future contingencies, and in many underdeveloped countries these contingencies have never had to be faced. Even in countries where the army is forced to deal with internal security problems, such as Burma and Indonesia, the effects have been mainly to increase the resources available for building up the army according to the ideal model, with remarkably few concessions being made to practical needs. Other modernized organizations in underdeveloped societies have to cope with more immediate and day-to-day problems; hence they must constantly adjust themselves to local conditions. They cannot adhere as rigidly as armies can to their Western prototypes. Just as Western armies have often existed in a dream world of planning for types of wars that never occur, so armies of underdeveloped countries can devote themselves to becoming modernized and more "efficient" with little regard to immediate reality. Members of other modern-type organizations may desire to see social change in their society, but they are likely to be more conscious of the need to accommodate their ambitions to existing conditions.

Finally, armies always stand at some distance from their civilian societies and are even expected to have ways of their own, including attitudes and judgments, that are remote if not completely apart from

those of civilian life. Thus again armies of the newly emergent countries can feel somewhat divorced from the realities of a transitional society and focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world. In consequence they are often unaware of the difficulties inherent in modernizing other segments of their society. Within their tradition all problems can be overcome if the right orders are given.

ARMIES AS MODERNIZING AGENTS

So much for the army as one of the more modernized of the authoritative agencies of government in transitional societies. When we consider it as a modernizing force for the whole of society, we move into a less clearly defined area where the number of relevant considerations becomes much greater and where we are likely to find greater differences from country to country. Indeed, we shall be able to deal only generally with the social and political aspects of military service and some of the more indirect influences of armies on civilian attitudes.

In all societies it is recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier. The underdeveloped society adds a new dimension: the good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to more Westernized ideas and practices. The very fact that the recruit must break his ties and associations with civilian life and adjust to the more impersonal world of the army tends to emphasize the fundamental nature of this process, which involves the movement out of the particularistic relationships of traditional life and into the more impersonal and universalistic relationship of an industrialized society.

Army training is thus consiatent with the direction taken by the basic process of acculturation in traditional societies. Within the army, however, the rate of acculturation is greatly accelerated. This fact contributes to the tendency of army officers to underestimate the difficulties of changing the civilian society.

Probably the most significant feature of the acculturation process as it takes place under the auspices of the army is that it provies a relatively high degree of psychological security. the experience of breaking from the known and relatively sheltered world of tradition and moving into the more unknown modern world ia generally an extremely traumatic one. In contrast to the villager who is caught up in the process of being urbanized, the young army recruit from the village has the more sheltered, the more gradual introduction into the modern world. It is hardly necessary to point out the disturbing fact that the urbanization process as it has taken place in most Aaian, African, and Latin American societies has generally tended to produce a highly restless, insecure population. Those who have been forced off the land or

attracted to the cities often find themselves in a psychologically threatening situation. These are the people who tend to turn to extremist politics and to look for some form of social and personal security in political movements that demand their total commitment. In contrast, those who are exposed to a more technologically advanced way of life in the army find that they must make major adjustments, but that these adjustments are all treated explicity and openly. In the army one can see what is likely to happen in terms of one's training and one's future. This is not the case in the city.

It should also be noted that the acculturative process in the army often tends to be more thorough and of a broader scope than the urbanization process. In all the main Asian cities there are those who still follow many of the habits and practices of the village. They may live still within the orbit of their family and have only limited outside associations and contacts. These people have made some adjustment to the modern world, but they are likely to be faced with even more in the future, and thus remain potential sources of political tension.

It should also be noted that the acculturative process in the army tends to be focused on acquiring technical skills that are of particular value for economic development. Just as the army represents an industrialized organization, so must those who have been trained within it learn skills and habits of mind which would be of value in other industrial organizations. In the West, armies have played a very important role in providing technical training and even direct services in the process of industrial development. The German army trained large numbers of non-commissioned officers who performed important functions as foremen in the German steel mills and in other industries. In the United States the Corps of Engineers, of course, played a central role in the whole development of the West; and after the Civil War army veterans provided considerable amounts of the skill and knowledge which, when combined with the influx of immigrants, provided a basis for much of our industrial development. In Latin America the Brazilian Army has played an important part in opening the interior, in promoting the natural sciences, and in protecting the Indian population. In Asia, too, we can see much the same story being enacted now. Before the war the compulsory training in the Japanese Army provided the whole society with increasing reservoirs of man-power which contributed directly to the development of an industrial society. Army veterans in India have played an important role not only in lower-level industrial jobs, but also in managerial positions. In Malaya and the Philippines the army has been the main instrument for training people in operating and maintaining motor vehicles and other forms of machinery.

Politically the most significant feature of the process of acculturation within the army is that it usually provides some form of training in citizenship. Recruits with traditional backgrounds must learn about a new world in which they are identified with a larger political self. They learn that they stand in some definite relationship to a national

community. In this sense the army experience tends to be a politicizing experience. Even if recruits are not given explicit training in political matters, they are likely to learn that events in their society are determined by human decisions and not just by chance and fate. Within the army the peasant may come to realize that much in life can be changed and that commands and wishes have consequences. Thus even aside from any formal training in patriotism the recruit is likely to achieve some awareness of the political dimensions of his society. It is therefore not surprising that in many of the newly emergent countries veterans have had appreciable political influence even after only limited military experience.

Armies in the newly emergent countries can thus provide a sense of citizenship and an appreciation of political action. In some cases this can lead to a more responsible nationalism. Indeed, the recruit may be impressed with the fact that he must make sacrifices to achieve the goals of nationalism and that the process of nation-building involves more than just the shouting of slogans. At the same time there is always the potential danger that the armies will become the center of hyper-nationalistic movements, as in the case of pre-war Japan.

Because the army represents one of the most effective channels for upward social mobility, military-inspired nationalism often encompasses a host of personalized emotions and sentiments about civilian society. Invariably the men, and sometimes even the officers, come from extremely humble circumstances, and it is only within the army that they are first introduced to the possibility of systematically advancing themselves. In transitional societies, where people's station in life is still largely determined by birth and by chance opportunities, powerful reactions usually follow from placing people in a position where they can recognize a definite and predictable relationship between effort and reward. The practice of giving advancement on merit can encourage people, first, to see the army as a just organization deserving of their loyalties, and then possibly, to demand that the same form of justice reign throughout their society.

Those who do move up to positions of greater respect and power through the army may often carry with them hostilities toward those with greater advantages and authority in civilian society. The tendency of the military to question whether the civilian elite achieved their station by merit adds another conflict to civil-military relations in most under-developed countries. More often than not the military show these feelings by seeking to make national loyalty and personal sacrifice the crucial test of national leadership.

The relationship between armies and civilian leaders varies, of course, according to the circumstances of historic development. For this reason a large part of this volume is devoted to case studies. Broadly speaking, however, it is helpful to distinguish three different general categories of such relationships.

There are first those patterns of development in which the military stand out because in a disrupted society they represent the only effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy. This situation is most likely to exist when the traditional political order, but not necessarily the traditional social order, has been violently disrupted and it becomes necessary to set up representative institutions before any of the other modern-type political organizations have been firmly established. The outstanding example of this pattern of development is modern China from the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 to the victory of the communists. Indeed, it is possible to think of this period as one dominated by a constant struggle to escape from the grim circumstances that obtained when only military organizations survived the fall of the traditional systems. Hence the military became the only effective political entity. Thereafter nothing could be done without them, and yet the military could do little without effective civilian institutions. Comparable situations seem to exist at present in some Middle Eastern countries where Western influence brought a commitment to republican institutions but left the army as the only effective modern political structure in the entire society.

A second category includes those countries where the military, while formally espousing the development of democracy, actually monopolizes the political arena and forces any emerging civilian elite to concentrate on economic and social activities. In many ways this arrangement is reminiscent of the Belgian variety of colonialism. At present, the most outstanding example of this form of rule is Thailand.

A third major category, which is probably the largest, consists of those countries in which the organization and structures essential to democratic government exist but have not been able to function effectively. The process of modernization has been retarded to such a point that the army, as the most modernized organization in the society, has assumed an administrative role and taken over control. In these cases there is a sense of failure in the country, and the military are viewed as possible saviors.

Before turning to our case studies it is appropriate to note briefly some of the broader implications of the role of the armies in transitional countries for international stability. The ways in which new societies are being created will have profound significance for the entire world. At the same time it is unrealistic to conclude that the army's role in the new countries is determined only by domestic developments. The nature of the contemporary international order and the focus of Western policies heve hed a profound influence on military institutions throughout the underdeveloped areas.

There has been a tendency in some quarters to regard the trend toward military rule as favorable to American policy interests. In particular, army rule has been welcomed as promising greater political stability and firmer policies against communism. Unfortunately in the

past we have generally been poor judges of leadership in the new countries. In fact, we have been so anxious to wish the new countries well that we have not been very realistic in appraising their national leadership. We have often placed faith in, and indeed lionized, men who are mediocre by any standard of measurement. The fault is more serious than just a misplaced sense of charitableness, for by refusing to employ realistic standards of judgment we encourage the lack of realism and even quackery in the political life of many of these countries.

In seeking a realistic estimate of the potential role of the military in the political development of particular countries it is also necessary to avoid being excessively influenced by ideological considerations which may be relevant only in advanced societies. We have in mind, in particular, the Western stereotype of the military as a foe of liberal values. This bias, for example, tends at present to take the form of seeing "military aid" as a threat to economic and political development and of assuming that only "economic aid" can make a positive contribution to such form of development. In some cases "military aid" has in fact made substantial contributions to road building, health facilities, communications networks and the like, all of which have directly facilited economic growth. In other cases it has been equally clear that our military aid has seriously retarded economic development by diverting an excessive amount of the nation's energies into unproductive channels. The point is only that in our thinking about the newly emergent countries we must avoid stereotypes and expect many paradoxes.

If we are able to do so, we will be less surprised to note, for example, that it has been through the military that we have best been able to establish effective relations with the most strongly neutralist nations in Southeast Asia. With both Burma and Indonesia we have had considerable difficulties in almost every dimension of our relationships. Recently, however, it has appeared that we have been able to develop more genuine and straightforward relations with their military than with any other political element. Out of these relations have come further possibilities for co-operation. Thus, rather ironically, after the Burmese terminated our program of economic assistance to them, it was possible to re-establish such assistance only by first providing them with military aid. In this way confidence was re-established and the stage set for their reacceptance of economic aid.

This particular example may, in fact, point up a most important consideration about armies in the new countries. For the various reasons which we have mentioned the army is often the most modernized public organization in an under-developed country, and as a consequence its leaders often feel more self-confident and are more able to deal frankly and cordially with representatives of industrialized countries. Military leaders are often far less suspicious of the West than civilian leaders because they themselves are more emotionally secure. This sense of security makes it possible for army leaders to look more realistically at their countries. All of these considerations make it easier for the military leaders to accept the fact that their countries are weak and

the West is strong without becoming emotionally disturbed or hostile toward the West. Since these leaders seem to have less need to avoid realities, they are in fact easier people with whom to deal and to carry on straightforward relations.

It is important, however, to note from the example that it is possible, and indeed it is essential, to expand a narrow relationship with the military into a much broader one. Military aid has had to become economic aid. Satisfactory relations with the military can become a dead end, just as military rule itself can become sterile if it does not lead to an interest in total national development.

This is only to say that while it may be possible to find in the armies of underdeveloped countries an element of stability, we should not confuse this with political stability for the entire society. The military may provide an opportunity and a basis for cooperation, but the objective must remain the development of stable representative institutions and practices. In planning for this objective it is essential to conceive of it as involving far more than just the efficient administration of public policies. It is necessary to keep in mind that in the past the West has come to these societies largely in the guise of administrators. This was the nature of colonialism, and we have tended to step into this role with our emphasis upon economic aid. In cooperating with the military we again are essentially strengthening this role of the administrator. In most underdeveloped countries there is at present a genuine need to improve the standards of public administration. In fact, unless such improvements take place they will be able to realize few of their national goals. However, there is a deeper problem, and this is the problem of developing effective relations between the administrators and the politicians. The disturbing fact is that we can with relative ease help people perform administrative roles, but we have not been particularly successful in devising ways of training people to the role of the democratic politician. In many respects this difficulty is the heart of the problem in our relations with the new countries.

This leads us to the conclusion that the military in the underdeveloped countries can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions. If the new countries are to become modern nation-states they will have to have a class of competent administrators. They will also have to have responsible and skilled politicians. In cooperating with the military in these countries we should therefore recognize that they can contribute to only a limited part of national development. In particular, in assisting them to raise standards in the realm of public administration, we should also make certain that our assistance does not lead to a stifling of an even more basic aspect of political development: the growth of responsible and representative politicians.

THE LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY AS A POLITICALLY COMPETING GROUP IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY

by

John J. Johnson

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Militarism, by which is meant the domination of the military man over the civilian, the undue emphasis upon military demands, or any transcendence by the armed forces of "true military purposes," has been and is a fact of life in Latin America. Since World War II only Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and Mexico have been free of serious military meddling in civilian affairs. In a majority of the other republics the personnel of the armed forces repeatedly have mobilized violence for political purposes. Between October 1945 and the end of September 1957, de facto regimes succumbed to military pressure or armed rebellion in all but five of the twenty republics. During the same span of time four heads of government were assassinated, and one president, under pressure from the military, put a bullet through his heart.

Since 1955, General Peron in Argentina, General Rojas Pinilla in Columbia, General Odria in Peru, General Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, and General Batista in Cuba have been striken from the list of those who based their power on force. General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, General Stroessner in Paraguay, and Luis A. Somoza de Bayle of Nicaragua, who is kept in office by his brother General Anastasio Somoza, Jr., remain in power because they have the military on their side. There are still many political strong men who feel about the need for strong leadership as did ex-dictator Perez Jimenez when he said, "I made every effort to give the Venezuelans the kind of government adapted to them .... We are still in our infant years and we still need halters .... There must be a leader who shows the way without being perturbed by the necessity of winning demagogic popularity."[1]

The pervasiveness of the military in the twenty republics has had the effect of producing a public image that in fact may have become exaggerated to the point of caricature. In popular fiction, as for example in the novels of Azuela and Lopez y Fuentes in Mexico, Roumlo Gallegas in Venezuela, Jorge Icaza in Ecuador, and Alegria in Peru, and in the best of the area's art, for example the works of Orozco, Siqueiros, and Rivera in Mexico, the military man has often been portrayed as the brutal murderer of children, the seducer of women, the destroyer of families, and the annihilator of civilizations. The artist and intellectuals have associated the military with systematic malevolence and irresponsible interference with the due process of law. They have seen

[1] Time, February 28, 1955.

it also as the unwitting partner of the foreigner either in exploiting the depressed masses or in creating disturbances that invite intervention from the outside.

Although the extremists among the artists and intellectuals have tended to damn the military indiscriminately, the facts are that militarism has not appeared with equal seriousness in each of the twenty republics. Certain of the more advanced countries, notably Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, have enjoyed long periods of freedom from military intervention in politics while some of the less developed republics, as for example, Paraguay, Ecuador and Nicaragua, have been plagued with militarism throughout most of their lives as sovereign nations. Furthermore, the military establishments in each of the twenty republics, like the republics themselves, have been characterized by individuality and variety rather than organization and unity. In no one of the nations has the mentality of the military been so uniform as to produce a monolithic front. On the contrary, the armies have constantly quarreled among themselves and with the navies and more recently with the air forces. The differences within and between the various branches existed both when the military was in power and when it was on the political sidelines.

Militarism in Latin America today is a cultural residue of the Wars of Independence (1810-1825) and the subsequent civil disorders. Before independence was everywhere secured, the former colonies had entered a chaotic interlude that lasted until mid-century and in a number of cases well beyond that date. Force was elevated to a political principle as violence engendered more violence and riotous disorder was added to the social savagery of the colonial period. There were seventy revolts in Colombia by 1903, and while many were kept to the local level, one of them took eighty thousand lives. Public and private armies often became the final arbiters of political matters while generals exploited public discontent. Sometimes the initiative was taken by ambitious soldiers, who were often only politicians dressed up in military uniforms. At other times a great landowner, disturbed by decisions adversely affecting him, raised a private force and swarmed over the national capital before officials were aware that he had taken the field. Uprising functioned as electoral devices. Not unusually civilian officials called upon the military to stabilize their regimes. In this climate of force, all that ordinarily remained of representative government was it outward manifestation. Basic laws served as symbols rather than instruments. Facts prevailed against constitutions.

Active participation in the making of political decisions after the winning of independence was a new experience for the military. Although the seven-century-long reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Moors encouraged the growth of a military mentality, and the militant phase of the conquest of the New World gave prestige to the warrior, the Spanish and Portuguese crowns, increasingly secure at home, were able, with relative ease, to bridle their upstart conquistadores overseas. Before the end of the sixteenth century, civilian control was firmly implanted in

the colonies, and the solider-conqueror had passed into oblivion as the colonies settled down to a prosaic existence. Armies and navies were needed in America, but until approximately 1760, when Spain, in an effort to conserve funds, permitted the creation of colonial militias, they were staffed almost entirely by men and officers from the Peninsula, who were expected to return home when their tour of duty ended. Until the formation of the colonial militias in the 1760's, Spain pointedly avoided developments that might have contributed to the growth of a military complex among its colonials.

Militarism was constrained in the colonies but force was not. For extended periods of time the mother countries could make their authority felt only within the administrative centers and their immediate environs. Seldom were they able to provide protection for their subjects on the distant frontiers exposed to Indian forays and inroads by foreigners. In the areas beyond royal protection and royal law, the hacendado was left largely to his own resources as long as he recognized the ultimate authority of the mother country. He was free to assume personal responsibility for the welfare of his family and property, and much like a feudal lord, for the protection of those who associated themselves in one way or another with the hacienda. In such circumstances the hacienda became a social unit whose government was the hacendado. In a very real sense the hacendado was the colonial equivalent of the local boss of the nineteenth century. Like the local boss he represented unregulated force and violence rather than militarism, which is based upon discipline and organization.

MILITARISM IN AN ERA OF CHAOS: 1810 - 1850

The first opportunity for militarists to enter politics came before the end of the Wars of Independence when the contending creole intellectuals and the creole landed elites failed to elaborate acceptable substitutes for a king who had been repudiated and a Church that had been seriously weakened.

The intellectuals had had the first opportunity to provide a viable political system. Centered in the cities and enjoying prestige because of their learning, they had taken the lead in shaping the forces that set in motion the struggles that eventually emancipated the colonials from the tutelage of Spain and Portugal. They were students of the Enlightenment and felt strong antipathy for the authoritarianism of the colonial period, which had deprived them of practical experience in the art of government. Their ideological commitment to individual liberty encouraged them to look to the French Revolution and the independence movement in the English colonies for political formulas. By 1820 they had manufactured charters that were rational in every detail but they failed to harmonize theory and practice. Before the creole intellectuals had an opportunity to devote serious attention to government at the provincial and local levels, anarchy took over.

The landed elites, with wealth and well-defined standards and in

general profoundly Spanish and Catholic in their orientation, entered the political arena when the first signs of anarchy began to appear. They did so not in the interests of high principles, but in reaction to the radical rhetoric of the "intellectual theorists," who threatened the reciprocal obligations that bound the upper and the lower classes. By 1820 the entrenched aristocracies were ready to renounce the imported and sophisticated ideology and institutions to which the intellectuals had dedicated the independence movements. As an alternative to keeping alive the "shibboleths of social and political democracy" the hacendados proposed the obverse of democracy; a return to the political orderliness and the master-man relationship of the past.

The power struggle that developed between the intellectuals and the landed elements soon directly or indirectly involved the other major groups of society -- the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, the popular masses, and the officers of the armed forces. The Church had remained loyal to authoritarian Spain as long as there had been any hope of victory, but once that moment had passed, the Churchmen aligned themselves unequivocally on the side of that majority within the landed elite who also represented authoritarianism and Catholicism. The "accepting classes," tyrannized by convention and with no sense of participation in government and no appreciation of their stake in progress, were found on both sides because choice in the matter was not theirs to make. When disputes arose among the privileged and armies were put into the field, the masses filled the ranks. Many times they were torn from their families and pressed into service, but not always. Among them often were to be found adventurous and unruly lots -- the rough-riding llaneros of Venezuela and Gauchos of Argentina provide the most notorious examples -- who welcomed the opportunity to gamble a day's earnings of a few centavos for the chance of a victory followed by looting and robbing. Like the Church hierarchy, the officers of the armed forces tended to line up on the side of the oligarchy. But unlike the men of the cloth, the men in uniform did not bring them a carefully integrated and fully cohesive ideology that could be used to sustain a long-range program of political action. Also, unlike the churchmen, the officers married the oligarchy only after a courtship with the intellectuals.

The "generals" of the original armies of independence, for the most part philosophers in uniform, were in fundamental agreement with the intellectuals who stayed at home and kept the issues before the people, The Bolivars, Sucres, Carreras, and Belgranos left their families, not as professional soldiers but as idealists who believed in freedom and in the destiny of America. Actually they were dilettantes in the art of military science. They improvised as they fought, and as G. Masur has said, "The battles they directed resembled not so much the considered moves of the chess player as the headlong sallies of gamblers."

Given the non-military background and the philosophic convictions of the leaders, a military mentality might not have developed had the struggle for independence been brief. But it was not brief. Instead, the wars dragged on for fifteen years in the Spanish colonies as armies

fought with constancy against primitive forces, against nature, and against primitive men. By the time they were terminated, a generation had grown up inured to brutality and to the resolution of issues by resort to arms. In the meantime loyalty to the idea of freedom had weakened. The destiny of America had become confused with the destiny of individuals. The concept of military obedience to the State had blurred and become subjective -- military loyalties had become distinct from civic loyalties. Officers had become disgruntled with civilians who could not or would not keep arms and men moving to the front. And day by day the excessive expenditures in life and wealth had drained the former colonies of resources which they badly needed to maintain stability as fledgling nations.

Within the military, idealism broke down and gave way to self-pity and egotism. The man in uniform pictured himself as suffering hardship, exposure, and sickness while civilians enjoyed the comforts of civilization. He destroyed empires while civilians wrangled over the spoils of victory. Soldier Bolivar wrote to soldier-Vice President Santander of Columbia in 1821,"The lawyers are acting in such a way that they should be proscribed from the Republic of Colombia as Plato did with the poets in his. Those men think that the will of the people is their opinion, without perceiving that in Columbia the people are in the army. Really they are." "All the rest vegetate with more or less malignity, or with more or less patriotism, but all without any right other than passive citizens." So "if the llaneros do not complete our extermination it will be the suave philosophers..." Santander was in essential agreement with Bolivar on this point, when he noted that "the liberated, more numerous than the liberators, have possessed themselves of the field."

Once the man in uniform lost contact with the people and came to consider himself unappreciated by society, the stage was set for the total disintegration of all the moral forces and convictions in the name of the independence movement was begun. When that point was reached, officers were free to worry about their place in peacetime societies and to debate their right to govern the states that their swords were carving out of the derelict Spanish and Portuguese empires. It was but a step to militarism, and militarism made its appearance as a retrograde political force when the landed oligarchs indicated their willingness to utilize armies against the people. The liberators turned upon the liberated. For some forty years thereafter "The Marshals of Ayacucho" were always near the center of the political arena. Armies became the permanent enemies of the people when generals took a proprietary interest in the states they had helped to create and assumed the right to judge civil authorities.

Marshals turned statesmen tipped the balance of power at the national level, away from the intellectuals and toward the oligarchs, who were conditioned to the use of force. The victory of the landed elites over the intellectuals was a victory of the countryside over the cities, which had been the original centers of disaffection against Spain and Portugal. The alliance between the military and the oligarch persisted throughout the century because landowners and armies leaned on each other too much

to quarrel seriously even when the landowners found the officers uncontrollable allies.

The existence of armies opened the way to political power for ambitious officers. Those officers of the armed forces who engaged in politics ordinarily did so for one of two reasons, both of which were highly personal. Some were compelled by an urge to indulge their caprices. As men in uniform they were intrepid soldiers of fortune; as politicians they were autocrats. Juan Jose Flores of Ecuador and Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna of Mexico are well-known examples of the type. But officers turned statesmen usually bore a striking resemblance to Max Weber's "charismatic leader," who regarded himself as indispensable and who in office exercised personal authority regardless of the representation of collective interests. The charismatic leaders considered themselves the product of historical determinism and the slow evolution of ethnic and psychological factors that their people had experienced. The Venezuelan writer, Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, supported their assumptions in his apology for the Juan Vicente Gomez regime (1908-1935) when he called them "Democratic Caesars." And Bolivar had had a type of democratic Caesarism in mind when he spoke of the "need for kings with the names of presidents." In the mid-1820's the "Generals of Venezuela" would probably have welcomed the crowning of Bolivar, on the grounds that the people were unprepared to govern themselves. The Liberator Jose San Martin was friendly to the idea of monarchism in America for the same reason, but on the other hand he held no sympathy whatever for rebellious army officers whom he viewed as unstable elements in society.

Since the objectives of the officers were essentially personal rather than ideological, they had to depend almost entirely upon their own magnetism to win followings. Under such circumstances personalism became a fetish; political parties, little more than ad hoc associations of friends. If personalism was the strength of the military leaders it was also their weakness. Because personalism was so basic to their dominance the soldier-statesmen very seldom were able to consolidate their power sufficiently to pass it on to chosen successors. The civilian politicians understood this phenomenon and were secure in their knowledge that sooner or later power would revert to them.

But even when the soldier-statesman was at the peak of his power, the elites had little cause for concern. Acts of brutality and destruction of property often went hand in hand with the seizure and consolidation of power, but prior to 1850 no politically ambitious officer of any standing ever threatened a basic principle of the elite's hierarchy of values. On the contrary, the generals, working within the framework of conservatism they had saved, accepted its upper-class program. They not only accepted the elites' traditions and institutions, but the armies they commanded in fact provided the assurances to the dominant civilian elements that they could fight among themselves over their political, social, and economic preferences without the danger of creating power vacuums into

which the popular masses might rush.[2]

The soldier-statesmen were no more or no less successful than civilian leaders in strengthening the central governments by curbing the power of those hacendados who chose to rule their holdings and neighboring settlements as tyrannical local bosses. The hacendados with the help of shyster lawyers and parish priests, so completely controlled the countryside that they passed legislation requiring citizens to serve as local officials without pay. The unlucky victims, often illiterate and without prestige, were no match for the hacendado who coerced them while he was relieved of direct responsibility for the acts of the government he dominated from behind the scenes. The Colombian experience was repeated with variations in each of the republics. This hegemony of the hacendado in effect meant that regardless of whether the central government was controlled by a representative of the military or by a civilian, the political, economic, and social privileges of only a small percentage of the population were a matter of concern. The rural masses, who constituted as much as 90 percent of the population in certain of the countries, meanwhile, unless forced to bear arms, might be unaware of a shift in the power balance at the national level. In any event they could not be deprived of political, economic, and social privileges because in practice they did not possess any.

The central governments, whether controlled by militarists or civilians, were likewise generally ineffective against the provincial caudillo.[3]

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[2] It is worth noting that despite the extreme instability which characterized the Latin American area for extended periods of time, not once before 1910, when the Mexican peasants finally made their demands felt, were the masses able to effect decisions in their own interests. When the illiterate Rafael Carrera led his horde of humble Indians into Guatemala City in 1838, he did so, not in the name of a new order for the depressed elements, but in the name of Catholicism.

[3] The provincial caudillos were basically the products of pervasive anarchy. Some were little more than bandits, without family background, who profited from the widespread disorder of the day. The prototype, however, was a respectable landowner who arose in response to the need of his peers for protection the State did not provide or who took the field to redress grievances against decisions which were the result of the political, social, and economic extremism that anarchy and instability everywhere provoked. To win a following he depended upon his personal magnetism and the complete confidence of his peers in the assurance that regardless of what he might say for public consumption his and their basic interests were identical. With his fellow landowners as a nucleus he created a private army of peasants and desperadoes. Then with a commission, perhaps from a municipal council, that served to clothe his cause in legal form, he made his bid for power or alternatively defied the government to challenge him in his stronghold.

Occupying a position between the hacendados and the central government, this political hybrid flourished during the half century after Independence. Unlike the hacendado, who had deep roots in the colonial past and who in a very real sense represented passive resistance to centralized authority, the provincial cuadillo was essentially a post-Independence phenomenon and ordinarily depended upon force to achieve his ends. Also, unlike the hacendado, who was primarily interested in shielding his fuedal social and economic institutions, the provincial caudillo was a doer with a broad political horizon. Latin American history is replete with the names of caudillos who leaped from saddles into presidential chairs.

It was because of their armies that the provincial caudillos came to be and are still often associated with militarism. The association was and is unfortunate if for no other reason than that it failed to recognize the essential difference between an untrained and undisciplined mob without legal atatus and led by persons who were first of all civilians, and the legally constituted fighting forces under professional leadership that are associated with militarism in Europe. But there were other reasons why the caudillos should not be associated with militarism. Their attacks were directed indiscriminately against the regular armies and against civilians. Furthermore the caudillos often commanded the only instruments of force available to civilian elements that could be directed against entrenched military-dictators. The rebelliousness of the provincial caudilloa may have helped to enthrone militarism, but caudillism itself was not synonymous with militarism.

As in those areas related primarily to politics and government, so in the religious sphere, the representatives of the military in high public office permitted the civilians to delineate the issues and determine the grounds on which differences were fought out. Militarists were often nonpracticing Catholics, but none challenged the Catholic Church as a religious institution. None of them, moreover, ever made a serious attack on the rights and privileges of the basic social institution upon which the Church rested -- the family. Nor did any military-dictator break new ground in the Church-State conflict, which, like the centralist-federalist issue, occupied a pivotal position around which political storms swirled for a century after independence was won.

Military-statesmen were economic traditionalista at least to the extent that the civilian leadership was. Nearly all of the soldiers who achieved status as politicians previously had accumulated considerable tangible wealth. The constitutions they wrote reflected their property-owner mentality. They favored tax systems that depended overwhelmingly upon customs duties and levies upon exports for revenues which were easily collected. That philosophy of taxation had the effect of guaranteeing the continuance of the latifundia system since the produce of the land rather than the land itself was taxed; unworked land, consequently, could be held indefinitely. Following the lead of the landed oligarchs of the nineteenth century, the military politicians were free traders.

Thus it may be said that in the chaotic period from Independence to

approximately mid-century, the military tempered their actions with sufficient discretion always to make themselves appear safe. Each of them stopped short of revolutionizing existing social and economic systems. Although they displayed a strong propensity toward bullets instead of ballots in order to achieve power, they were politically orthodox. Their social and economic conformity and political orthodoxy in effect made them the tools of those landed elements dedicated to the continuance of old ideas and old formulas.

THE MILITARY IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC CHANGE: 1850-1915

The leavening from Western Europe, Great Britain, and the United States that had originally provided the privileged elements with their rationalization when they moved to cast off the yoke of Spain and Portugal continued to work after they asserted their hegemony. As long as areas remained essentially committed to the principles of the French Revolution and the independence movement of the United States, borrowing ideas from them did little more than help to keep alive "islands of radicalism" that prevented the elites from achieving completely and uniformly the social rigidity their system demanded. Later, as Western Europe, but particularly Great Britain and the United States, entered the mainstream of modern industrial capitalism and Latin America became increasingly exhausted as a result of its fruitless search for exclusively political solutions to its problems, the impact from abroad became decisive. The lesson that the outside world taught was that the political system that Spanish America sought was closely related to economic progress, and that order was requisite to both. By mid-century the leadership in several of the republics, increasingly committed to commercial agriculture and, by extension, improved transportation, and the international trade and finance, had already accepted the proposition that order, even if the order of despotism, and economic progress must have precedence over all considerations. Before 1900 economics dominated the thinking of the articulate groups as completely as politics had fifty years earlier.

Given the inheritance from the colonial period, Latin America's achievements were spectacular. For this work she drew upon unskilled labor, largely from South Europe, and technicians and capital, primarily from North Europe, Great Britain, and the United States. Agriculture for export assumed a predominant economic role, as enormous acreages were put to the plow for the first time in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. The livestock industry was expanded. Mining was revived through modernization. Manufacturing began to leave the home for the more efficient factory system. Banking and finance became a major and vital sector of the economy. Sixty thousand miles of railroads were built. Boats were put upon the principle rivers. Ports were renovated. Thousands of miles of telegraph lines were strung. Steamship lines and cables provided the area with closer ties and faster access to the outside world. Inherent in economic development was the need for more highly trained and better educated laborers. Certain of the republics, notably Argentina and Chile, made serious efforts to meet the need through the expansion of public schools. Before 1915 a major urbanization movement

was underway, and great cities began to appear in response to the requirements of international trade, modern commerce and industry, and expanding governmental activities.

Important social ramifications of the economic transformation were apparent before World War I. Although the elites, except in Mexico and Uruguay, remained at the top of the political hierarchies, their "social monopoly" showed definite signs of deterioration as wealth other than land rose in prestige, and new comers married into old established families. The number of those in the liberal professions, the arts, and the bureaucracies climbed. Two socioeconomic groups became significant for the first time. One was urban industrial labor; the other was composed of the entrepreneurs, managers, and technicians of commerce and industry. Although the Catholic Church as a spiritual institution continued to go unchallenged, except in Mexico, opposition to its temporal activities heightened as secularism and pragmatism, nourished by the economic transformation, fortified the earlier anticlericalism that had its roots in the ideology of the French Revolution and the experiences of the Wars of Independence.

The political area felt the full impact of the changes that had taken place or were under way. In Brazil republicanism replaced monarchism, which was considered by some to be an anachronism in the modern world that Latin America was preparing to enter. Everywhere the hacendados continued to enjoy minimal restraints on their domains, but the provincial caudillos were placed on the defensive as the states came to extend their control over the countryside. The emergence of new groups in the cities offered those in the liberal professions and the arts alternatives to political alliance with the landed elite. New political amalgams appeared, headed by leaders from the middle sectors but popularly based in the working elements of the urban centers. Their emergence meant a fundamental altering of the rules by which the political game was played. Before the end of World War I the leaders of the new amalgams in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico were demanding a greater share of the material and cultural benefits the new technology was making possible and insiating that social guarantees be added to individual guarantees.

Social, economic, and political changes all would eventually leave a deep imprint upon the military, but the most immediate impact upon that institution came from international tensions which were by-products of the transition the area was undergoing. Exhilarated by the impounding of tens of thousands of hard orking immigrants and by the construction of railroads and telegraph lines towards the frontiers, political leaders began to envisage the day when their countries would team with productive citizens and the far corners and empty spaces of the republics would be essential to continued population and economic growth. Those statesmen felt called upon to guarantee, and when possible expand, national boundaries that with few exceptions still ran through vast uninhabited areas. Although most of the boundary disputes were settled through arbitration, peaceful negotiations did break down occasionally. With the examples before them of Chile and Brazil, both of which extended

their boundaries significantly at the expense of weaker neighbors, it was easy for the politicians to justify expanded armies and navies in the interest of national sovereignty. The new concept of the military as an instrument of national foreign policy produced at least two important consequences. In the first place a costly arms race developed, involving Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. In the second place the republics, feeling that the stakes were higher and seeking to make of officers the disciplined servants of state policy, turned increasingly to military professionalization. The latter development was particularly important in terms of this study.

Professionalization meant bureaucratization and specialization. Bureaucratization brought the thinking of the officers more in line with that of other public servants and tended to place added attention on such matters as salaries, promotions, security, pensions, and retirement. Specialization was achieved through the use of officers and military missions from other countries and greater emphasis on scientific training in military academies. Chile took the lead in bringing in officers and missions from abroad when, following its victory over Peru and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific (1879-84), it set about securing its hegemony on the west coast by hiring German officers to train its armies. By 1890 the Prussian system was instituted and the army equipped with the latest German armament. Once Chile made the move, others felt obliged to fall in line. Peru, where antagnoism against Chile ran high, countered by employing French officers in 1896. Brazil called in a French mission in 1905, and Argentina invited a German mission in 1912. Chile took advantage of its military reputation to send military missions to Ecuador, El Salvador, and Paraguay between 1900 and 1906. By 1912 compulsory military service had been established in each of the above mentioned nations.

Under the urge to professionalize, old military academies were modernized and new ones were established. They were often the only institutions of higher learning that offered courses in the pure sciences. At a time when society still tended to look upon an interest in the pure sciences as an indication of intellectual mediocrity, before long the new soldier-sailor was made an applied scientist.

The scientific orientation of the military schools combined with the discipline of military life made them highly susceptible to the positivism of Auguste Comte, which, modified to suit the Latin American cultural climate, stressed the need for order and progress. For example, the army institute in Rio De Janiero under the forceful teaching of Benjamin Constant Magalhaes became a hot-bed of positivism. Students and officer friends of Constant were instrumental in the overthrow of Pedro II. Their teaching and convictions were reflected in the political philosophy of the republican government that followed the collapse of the Empire. The words "Ordem e Progresso" which appeared on the flag of the new republic were borrowed directly from positivism.

Professionalism led to changes in the social composition of the officer corps, particularly in the armies. Both before and after

professionalization became general, the navies, for example, in Chile and Brazil, drew their officer personnel almost exclusively from the aristocracy and wealthy bourgeoisie who were ordinarily of European background. As recently as the end of World War II the Brazilian naval academy, representing a country that was at least 14 percent pure Negro, still publicized the fact that it had never graduated a Negro. The more socially and ethnically democratic armies, with many officers from the lower-middle levels of society and of Indo-European or Afro-European origins, had never attracted large numbers from the aristocracies. Those from the elite groups who became army officers often did so because they regarded the military as the shortest route to political success. When bureaucratization brought a more ordered army life and when learning in science became more essential to a successful military career, the armies lost any attraction they might have had for all but the most determined. Meanwhile, those from the lower-middle sectors which traditionally had furnished the bulk of the officers, were outbid for posts in the new armies by the far better educated and disciplined sons of doctors, lawyers, professors, and industrialists. These young men, who previously had avoided the armies, were now attracted to them for a number of reasons. The new prestige that the armies enjoyed as national defense organizations gave them considerably more appeal among responsible elements than they had as police forces. Some "joined up" to profit from the training in science and administration that would provide them with the opportunity, in due course, to move into the expanding commercial and industrial sectors. Others sought the greater security that professionalization afforded. By background and training the new officers differed from their predecessors. The differences were manifest in the responses of the new generation to developments resulting from the economic, social, and political transitions that the republics were undergoing.

On the vital issue of order versus anarchy, the armed forces, after about 1850, were on the side of order. To be sure, in their scramble for political position irresponsible officers, particularly in the Indo-European countries south of Mexico all the way to Paraguay, contributed to a disorderliness that at times verged on anarchy. Bolivia, where the army made and unmade governments ten times between 1839 and 1872, is a case in point. But in the four states, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico, that by 1915 not only comprised approximately two-thirds of the land and contained two-thirds of the population of the twenty nations but also had clearly established their leadership in the area, the armed forces, contributed, albeit in different ways, to order rather than disorder. In Argentina, where the armed forces were nonpolitical from about 1860 until 1930, they guaranteed the viability of civilian administrations. Except during the civil war of the early 1890's, the armed forces in Chile were apolitical for seven decades before World War I. In that contest, a power clash between the executive and legislative branches of government, the army aligned with the president, and the navy supported the victorious congressional forces. When the strife was ended, civilians immediately resumed full control of the government. In Brazil the army was occasionally unruly, but at no time between 1850 and the coup that led to the abdication of Pedro II in 1889, had the military actually threatened

to take the government into its own hands. In the new republic the military, after naming the first two presidents, became "the arbiter of the nation's destiny in the social convulsions which disturb Brazilian life," a role it still presumes to play. In Mexico, the stern and often brutal military-dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, (1876-1911) gave that nation the only peace it knew during the century following independence. In each of the four states and in certain of the others, as for example Venezuela, national armies were the instruments by which the cruder forms of caudillism were contained and then completely eliminated after 1920. In fact, by the end of World War I, the rise of modern armies equipped with costly armament and backed by the resources of the states marked the death knell of the provincial caudillo, who had only his personal fortune with which to outfit his private army and keep it in fighting readiness. The barricade, the mountain fastness, and the forest gave way before armored cars and machine guns.

Military officers were overwhelmingly on the side of those in the elite and middle sectors supporting technological progress and modern industry. The army officers of both Argentina and Chile were in the forefront of those clamoring for modern transportation and communication. The railroad system of Uruguay, along with Argentina's, the best in Latin America, was initiated and promoted by generals become presidents. The military-statesman Antonio Gusman Blanco (1870-1889) in Venezuela probably did more to modernize that nation than all other leaders combined in the century following independence. The guatemalan soldier-statesman, Justo Rufino Barrios (1871-1885), who lived and perished by the sword, is remembered as a symbol of technological progress in chaotic Central America of the nineteenth century. There are good reasons to doubt that the Mexican Revolution of 1910 would have succeeded had it not been preceded by the great era of building and modernization that the pax Porfiriana made possible. The Brazilian army officers responsible for the overthrow of Pedro II justified the act in part on the ground that the aging Emperor failed to appreciate the importance of technological progress and industrial expansion in the modern world.

The approval that the new crop of officers gave technology and industry was a natural consequence of their family backgrounds and professional experiences. Many came from families that accepted the traditional basic social and economic values but also belonged to the most liberal, Western European-oriented segment of society. Their fathers and grandfathers had provided the theoretical arguments in favor of modern industrial capitalism, which they associated with Western Europe and against agricultural feudalism inherited from Catholic Spain. To the intellectual background that the officers acquired from their [illegible] the professionalized armies added a practical understanding of the machines produced by nineteenth-century technology.[4]

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[4]The support given technology and industry by the armed forces did not result from any expectation that industry would free them from

The armed forces hailed the coming of the machine age, but their inability to accept all the consequences thereof soon placed them in an anomalous position. Their interest in technological modernization, which at the time was linked with liberalism and anticlericalism in the public mind, served to loosen their ties with the more conservative elements of the landed elite and the Catholic Church and thus to break the solid phalanx that the privileged elements had presented to the public at large. By the same token their support of modernization tended to place the officers on the side of the rising foreign-dominated commercial and industrial elements of the cities. But neither their family backgrounds nor the discipline of military life prepared them for the sudden appearance of anarchist-led mobs of urban laborers preaching the overthrow of established governments and demanding the end of regular armies and navies. No sector of society in Latin America of 1914 had been awakened socially to the point where it could understand defiant strikers screaming for the destruction of the very properties that gave them a livelihood. Consequently when the untried mobs, historically and economically ignored and politically voiceless, appeared to threaten the status quo, the armed forced retreated to their prepared positions beside the more conservative elements of society.

The same considerations that caused the officers to reject the workers encouraged them to look askance at the alliances that politically ambitious members of the middle sectors were organizing in collaboration with urban industrial labor just prior to World War I. Aroused by politically conscious immigrants, the workers played an aggressive two-fold role in those alliances. First, many of them could meet the suffrage requirements; and when free elections were held, they could hand over relatively large blocs of votes. Second, on those occasions when politically entrenched groups ignored democratic processes, the workers gave the political unions a militancy that the middle sector intellectuals were psychologically unfitted to furnish. An articulate and demanding labor element that would parade and if necessary fight in the streets was a direct challenge to the armies and navies, historically the only mobile striking forces in the republics. Any doubts of that challenge were removed when, during the Mexican Revolution, labor leaders in the cities worked with General Alvaro Obregon to raise the "Red Battalions" that contributed importantly to the victory of Venustiano Carranza's forces over those of Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa.

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dependence upon foreign sources for war material, one of the reasons that the military in many of the republics supports economic nationalism today. Prior to World War I neither military governments nor civilian governments, except those in Uruguay and mexico, were in any way committed to economic nationalism. In fact, for the period under discussion, there is no significant evidence known to this author to suggest that the armed forces ever seriously considered the implications of the alienation of non-replenishable natural resources or the granting of long-term monopolies to foreign-controlled public utility companies.

Since World War I the transformation from feudal agriculture to industrial capitalism -- well under way by the turn of the century -- has continued. There have been modifications of objectives. There have been speedups and slowdowns. There have been successes and failures. There have also been signs of settling down as the republics have adjusted to their new way of life and status in the modern world. But above all there has been a sharpened focus on the goals and aspirations of the people as they struggle with the mid-century's crisis of growth.

The breakdown of normal international trade channels during two world wars and a major depression, plus the prestige associated with advanced technological capabilities, have given the republics a new economic mentality and intensified their determination to strengthen themselves industrially. The economic problem has been made the fundamental political problem. Integrated iron and steel plants have taken the place of railroads and light industry as symbols of progress. Foreign capital has come under increasing suspicion. Planned economies have been substituted for the free-trade economies of the nineteenth century.

Encouraged by highly favorable governmental policies, nonagricultural activities have developed to the point where they provide more than 50 percent of the gross national product in several of the republics -- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico, Uruguay, Colombia, and Cuba. But there have been dramatic failures. Industry has not been able to generate capital expansion on the scale needed, and it has been able to absorb only a limited part of those entering the labor pools. Except perhaps in Mexico, agriculture has been neglected. The problems of inequitable land distribution and its inefficient use remain unresolved, and in certain instances still unstudied. The republics' efforts to diversify their export economies have been remarkable for their failure. Figures for 1956 show that fifteen republics derived more than 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings from a single commodity. Ninety-three percent of Venezuela's foreign exchange came from petroleum; 83 percent of El Salvador's, 77 percent of Colombia's, and 67 percent of Brazil's from coffee. Bananas earned over 50 percent of the foreign exchange of Ecuador, Honduras, and Panama.

The strong current of migration from the countryside to the cities, evident before 1914, has attained flood proportions since then. The area as a whole was 33 percent urban in 1925, and 44 percent urban in 1955. Between 1945 and 1955 Colombia's urban population expanded 58 percent, Venezuela's 57 percent, Mexico's 50 percent, and Paraguay's 48 percent. Latest available estimates show Argentina's total population to be 63 percent urban, Cuba's about 58 percent, Chile's 52 percent, and Uruguay's perhaps 50 percent. Primate cities have become the rule. At least 40 percent of Uruguay's population are found within the confines of Montevideo. Greater Buenos Aires contains 25 percent of Argentina's population. Twenty-five percent of Chile's total inhabitants live in Santiago and 15 of Mexico's in Mexico City. Even more apparent

than the population concentration in the primate cities is the concentration of wealth, intellectual and managerial skills, and schools on the one hand and on the other the squalor and poverty found in them. The economic orientation since World War I has been one factor, but only one, in the population shift that has taken place since 1914. Urbanization has in fact resulted largely from non-industrial causes -- shortage of land, rural poverty, new consumption patterns and amusements, the centralization of government and concomitantly the rise of public bureaucracies, and the introduction to city life as a result of compulsory military service.

Economic growth, the upward surge of the cities, developments abroad, and time itself have had deep social implications since World War I. The industrial entrepreneurial element has grown in numbers and prestige. The bureaucrats have proliferated. The intellectual middle sectors have expanded more slowly than other middle groups, and their social position has been challenged as wealth vies ever more successfully with intellectual skills as a basis for prestige. Industrial workers counted in the thousands in 1900 are now figured in the hundred of thousands. They have discarded anarchism. By choice or circumstance they have come to look upon the State as their protector. Society in general no longer regards the urban laborer as an unruly and unknown quantity but accepts him as an individual constantly faced with emergency problems and consequently impatient with the rate of social and economic change.

The Catholic Church, particularly in the last decade, has changed its attitudes and tactics so as to maintain or improve its position in every one of the twenty republics. The Church has re-examined the ideology of constitutional democracy in light of the achievements of social christian groups in Europe. The present view of the Church in Latin America is that a system of freedom is in the end the best for its interest.

The overwhelmingly evidence political fact of the past half century has been the gradual displacement of the traditional ruling elite by middle sector leaders who made their first bids for power prior to the end of World War I. With the popular support of working groups they have on various occasions and for extended periods controlled decision making in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. Currently they appear to be dominant in Bolivia and Venezuela. The growing influence of the urban middle groups has produced a new set of national concerns and has spawned new political tactics and objectives. Essentially social-economic issues have supplanted basically political-religious ones. Political parties that provide a common ground for those who have similar educational, occupational, and social backgrounds have been substituted for the family as the focus of political thinking. Because the middle groups generally have depended upon the electoral support of the masses rather than upon arms to attain office they have favored general enfranchisement. They have removed property requirements, reduced age and literacy requirements, and granted suffrage to women. These measures have been highly successful. In Brazil the number of eligible voters multiplied ten times between 1930 and 1955, reaching about 16,000,000 in the latter year. In Chile the number of registered voters rose over 300 percent between 1937

and 1958. In Mexico the number of votes cast in 1958 was 300 percent higher than in 1940. In Bolivia 126,000 votes were cast in the 1951 presidential election and 955,912 in that of 1958. Approximately 40 percent of the total population of Venezuela qualified for the 1958 elections. Nine million out of a total Argentine population of approximately 20,000,000 cast votes in the elections of 1958.

In their search for working class support the middle groups have ranged the political spectrum. In Uruguay they have raised respect for democratic processes and the dignity of the individual to unprecedented levels for the Latin American area. In Mexico they took over and perpetuated a political party, which has monopolized power for three decades by controlling the nation's electoral machinery. Elsewhere they have not hesitated to make a mockery of democratic principles.

Regardless of their political orientations, the middle sector political leaders have felt the need to promise not only economic progress but social progress. They have thereby contributed to the revolution of rising expectations. They have charged the states with the responsibility for the care and welfare of the distressed. They have written the duties of the states into constitutions that stand as great social documents in contrast with earlier ones that were little more than political treatises. The constitutions ordinarily have been anticipatory and addressed to aspirations and hopes rather than immediately realizable objectives based on past experiences. They have served, nonetheless, to attract the working groups to those who administer the law in the hope that they may attain what by law is theirs. This social-political duality is found in implementing legislation and makes the separation of the two aspects practically impossible.

Economic nationalism has served as an additional cohesive force holding the middle group-working sector political alliances together. Immediately after World War I economic nationalism was presented in abstract terms, largely by intellectuals. With the onset of the Great Depression, however, it began to be taken over by the governments and brought down in concrete and politically charged form to the masses. As such, it was soon raised to the level of a major political ideology and there it has remained.

Because the alliances often began to weaken soon after victory was achieved, their political successes have not excluded the militarists, except in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and perhaps Mexico, from very active and often decisive participation in politics. But social and economic changes have produced differences in the type of military participation. In several of the nations where the militarists have engaged in politics, officers have developed a new concept of the military's role in government and society. Under the influence of the new concept, the armed forces have sought, in most cases successfully, to discard their traditional subservience to an all-powerful dictator and instead have organized in such a way that when intervention takes place it is in the name of the armed forces rather than an individual. The role of the armed forces in

Venezuela under the old tyrant Juan Vincente Gomez and subsequently, evinces, perhaps in exaggerated form, the transformation that has taken place. In practical terms the new interpretation of the military's political role has produced a widespread substitution of military juntas for strongmen. The governments that were set up immediately on the overthrow of Rojas Pinilla in Colombia and Perez Jimenez in Venezuela are recent examples of full-fledged, military-dominated juntas. Normal practice produces a junta in which each branch of the armed forces is represented, as well as civilian elements. Members of the juntas control the ministries, while the officers protect the interest of their respective branches. The juntas are by definition transitory and several have terminated their rule, but the leaders they permit to take over are committed to them.

Unlike their predecessors in the nineteenth century, when officers "declared for the general will," the present set of military-statesmen have felt compelled "to define the content of that will." They have argued as did Nazis and Fascists, with whom they had close contact after 1930 through military missions and professional travel abroad, that in the context of current happenings a strong executive is needed both to restrain forces of disorder and to institute necessary reform. Once national socialism was accepted, its principal characteristics were applied as the Latin American milieu permitted. Regimentation was one of the consequences. Prior to assuming the presidency, Peron warned Argentine cadets that France had collapsed because of internal disorder. Like their fascist models but in sharp contrast with their predecessors who, despite their apparent ruthlessness, were haphazard in enforcing the decrees they issued, the new soldier-statesmen have sought to leave little to chance. They have attempted to brainwash their subjects through mass media of communications. They have used schools and controlled labor unions for the propagation of their private versions of totalitarianism. They have employed economic sanctions against the monied elements. Social planning, which has been a strong pillar of military-controlled governments, has made the imposition of economic sanctions easy. Representative democracy, which earlier Caesar-statesmen had invariably proclaimed to be their ultimate objective, has been lumped with imperialistic capitalism and discarded, while the methods and objectives of totalitarianism have been made ends in themselves.

The political methods and objectives of the military-statesmen have clearly distinguished them from their civilian counterparts. But what of their social and economic views as opposed to those of the civilian leadership? The answer would appear to be that on most major issues there has actually been a complete meeting of the minds or where differences remain they are rapidly being reduced. What is the evidence?

While the officer corps in the various countries, in general, view industrial labor with more caution than does the middle sector leadership, the military's attitude towards industrial labor has undergone major modifications since World War I. Most notable has been the acceptance, at times grudgingly, of the workers as a growing force in the evolution

of the area and the recognition of them as a politically competing group. There have been differences of opinion as to what constituted acceptance and recognition. In Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela the armed forces generally have reserved the right to impose restrictions on the political activities of labor. In Brazil the military has feared the growing influence of labor and has been prepared to interfere with the normal constitutional process whenever it has appeared that no alternative course could preserve the status quo. Alarmed by the demagogic appeals of the Vargas administration to the lower classes, the armed forcea openly intervened in political affairs in 1954. In Mexico the armed forces first worked with labor in the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (P.R.I.), and then peacefully accepted labor's rise to the number one spot in that party during the administration of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40). In Chile the armed forces have stood by as the political influence of labor has soared to the point where at times it has appeared that labor would usurp national leadership, as for example, in the first months of the Gonzalez Videla regime (1946-52). In two republics, Argentina and Cuba, the armed forces have gone so far as to form coalitions with labor. Peron drew his basic strength from the armed forces and labor, which were so evenly balanced in the power structure that experts could not agree on which element was the more powerful at any given time. General Fulgencio Batista in Cuba combined the army and labor into a party that sustained his rule during the years 1933-44 and supported his return to power in 1952.

As they have done ever aince World War I and even earlier, the armed forces have identified themselves with induatrialization. In fact, the technical skills of the military personnel have made them the bearers of modernity as represented by industrialization. Officers have become increasingly concerned with what they consider to be the military liabilities involved in dependence upon more industrially advanced countries for war material. Thus it was that during World War II the military was instrumental in pushing President Vargas into demanding that Brazil produce airplanes. At the same time Peron was insisting that "the national defense demands not just industry but heavy industry." The officers also have a vested interest in the State corporations concerned with industrial development through occupancy of top positions in them. As suggested earlier, their academic training and profeasional experience have given them akills that are in short supply in the area. And those skills, combined with the influence that the armed forces enjoy, have opened the way to top level positions in the autonomoua and semi-autonomous institutes and agencies set up by the states to promote industrial growth. Under Peron, the chief of the Railroad Administration and the head of the National Energy Administration were army officers, and the Ministry of Defense was charged with establishing an iron and ateel industry. In the spring of 1959, armed forces officers in Brazil were known to hold the following positions in public agencies related to industrial development:[5]

[5]The list is not complete and should be considered suggestive rather than conclusive.

Minister of Transportation and Public Works; director general, National mails and Telegraph Service; president, Radio Technical Commission; president, Merchant Marine Commission; administrator, Leopoldina Railway Co. (state owned); president, National Petroleum Council; president, National Steel Company; superintendent, National Oil Tanker Fleet; director general, Civil Aviation; secretary general, National Co-ordination Council of Food Supply; president, National Executive Commission for Coal Production Planning; director, Food Supply Service; chairman, National Price Control Board; president, National Commission on Nuclear Energy; president, National Transportation Council; "plus many more in Petrobras." In most cases persons holding the above posts were drawing one half of their active duty aervice pay in addition to the generally higher non-military governmental salaries. Furthermore, they received half credit applied to their military service because such posts have been decreed by the President to be "of military interest."

The armed forces have seized the banner of nationalism and are flaunting it. In every republic, with the possible exception of Venezuela, the military is at least as ardently nationalistic as the middle sectors. In Brazil, where nationalistic thinking has become institutionalized in the orientation of the Security Council, Armed Forces Staff, and the Command and General Staff of the Army, the hard core of nationalism resides in the armed forces. Given the anti-imperialistic and totalitarian propensities of the armed forces, their glorification of a narrow and perverted nationalism is hardly surprising and will continue. It associates the armed forces with civilian elements in the swelling resentment against the exactions of "economic imperialism." It cultivates the national spirit while undermining the atomistic assumptions of liberalism. It serves as a vehicle for the suppression of individual liberties and the adoration of collective power, and thus provides a justification for national socialism. The armed forces have staunchly supported the "slogans of a sensitive political dignity" and particularly in recent years that contention of political nationalism which holds that each state has the right to determine the limits of its sovereignty over adjacent water and submerged lands. But they have thrown their best efforts behind economic nationalism, which they hold, guards against the depletion of irreplenishable natural resources by foreigners and gives the best guarantee that industrial complexes essential to strong military establishments will eventually make their appearance. In supporting economic nationalism the armed forces have played directly into the hands of civilian extremist groups of both the right and the left.

CONCLUSION

One would be sanguine to forecast the end of armed forces influence in Latin America, despite certain favorable developments in that direction since 1955. Impartial, objective thinking based upon past experiences does not permit such optimism. Democracy has seemed to triumph over tyranny before. Militarism has in the past often developed outside the field of popular realities and may be expected to do so on occasion in the future.

Moreover, the basic social and economic realities that have contributed historically to dictatorship and militarism remain in varying degrees in all of the republics. Literacy rates have been bettered, but the number of illiterates is growing yearly. Only a few Latin Americans have had prolonged acquaintance with functioning democratic systems, and as a consequence there is a serious lack of understanding of, or practical experience with, democratic institutions. Although personal loyalty is giving away to social solidarity, a strong personalist tradition in government persists in many of the republics, a favorable atmosphere for the militarists. If urban labor raises the price of its political support beyond the reach of the middle sector leaders, who must increasingly consider the demands of the domestic business man, it could on occasion become highly susceptible to the demagogic appeals of politically inspired army elements. From time to time civilians will encourage the military, as they have traditionally, to take an active part in politics, as did the editors of the conservative O Estado do Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo, Brazil) on October 9, 1955, when they accused the armed forces of "legalistic fetishism" because "they did not dare cut deeply enough to remove the gangrene which had invaded the national organism." It must be expected that from time to time the area's economic underdevelopment, characterized by single-crop production and gross unevenness of land distribution, property, and opportunity, will lend itself to exploitation by those civilian and military politicians who offer simple solutions to complex problems and who promise to telescope the economic process.

Even when the low prestige of the armed forces causes them to withdraw from active political competition, they will remain at once instruments of power and political factors. Functioning as veto groups, they will be in a strong position to preserve their privileged status and to protect the relatively large share of the national budget they receive in most of the countries -- in 1954 , in Argentina 23 percent, Brazil 33 percent, Chile 23 percent, Ecuador 40 percent, and Venezuela 16 percent. On some occasions when the armed forces are in political eclipse, individual officers will find themselves at the fulcrum of the power balance. And whether in public favor or not, the man in uniform in the foreseeable future will remain in the public eye and in a position of influence as the true technocrat in a continuing technological transformation.

But all conditions and developments have not been on the side of militarism, much less of militarism as it historically has been known in Latin America. The transformation of the area has now progressed to the point where all groups, including the military, must constantly re-examine their position in the light of rapidly moving events. Military regimes are currently discredited, graft-ridden, and are generally considered to be more venal than the civilian administrations they replace.

Despite the long military record of the area, the armed forces have failed to develop any significant amount of "military comradeship" or to form interbranch cliques. There have been minor exceptions.

Smarting from their defeat by the Paraguayans in the Chaco War of the 1930's, the Bolivian army appearad to generate a degree of comradeship out of the feeling that they had been sacrificed by irresponsible politicians dominated by foreign interests. But the revolutionary victory of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in 1952 sent the army into limbo and it has not reappeared as as organized, disciplined body. In its place is a militia of the "people's variety," similar to the type that was formed in Cuba after Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. The Grupo de Oficiales Unidos in Argentina, founded in the 1930's and apparently instrumental in bringing Peron to power, and the Club Militar in Brazil, which traditionally has represented the collective thinking of those who control the army, are examples of military cliques that have exercised political influence. But there has never been in this century a threat that there might develop a military caste with class interest and traditions to protect. Rather, as suggested earlier, antagonisms and bitterness repeatedly have led to acrimonious intra- and interservice rivalries that not unusually have ended in military executions. These differences have involved the armed forces in politics, but they have at the same time served to weaken them as cohesive political units.

The military can no longer automatically be associated with the conservative landed aristocrats and the Catholic Church. Quite the contrary has been the case in some instances, and the number may be expected to grow. In Brazil the first stirrings of social unrest and vaguely expressed demands for modifications of traditional institutions were voiced by young military officers -- The Tenentes -- in the mid-1920's. The movement they initiated culminated in the revolt of 1930, which marked the end of the so-called "Old Republic," and they have been near the source of power since then. Peron made the landowners the scapegoats of his regime. In most republics the militarists have been free to work with the Church or in opposition to it. Not unusually military-dictators start on one side and end up on the other. Furthermore, the military leadership, which continues to come from the middle sectors, may be expected to remain closely associated with those groups as they gain in prestige and influence vis-a-vis the old elites. Also, when the militarists do take power, the intricacies of modern society and government will dictate that they use large numbers of civilian advisers, who will in most cases hold middle sector convictions. This development along with the decided leanings of the military in favor of industrial development and technological change suggests that when military governments do exist they will tend to be oriented towards the urban propertied elements rather than otherwise. On the other hand, the pressures for the redistribution of land are building up in many of the republics so that it is becoming politically injudicious to defend the interests of the great landholders. Politically, then, the militarists who seek power in the foreseeable future may be expected to bid for popular support from the same socioeconomic groups -- ranging from the urban workers through the bureaucracy and professions to the owners and managers of commercial enterprises -- as the middle sectors have for a half century. The social and economic slogans of the militarists need not differ substantively, and probably will not in most cases, from those offered by the civilian elements.

Political participation is now so broad that the politicized sector has become unwieldy and in most of the republics is no longer susceptible to direct military action. As the suppression of the popular will becomes increasingly difficult, soldier-statesmen will be forced, more often than in the past, to test their political conclusions and will be driven to seek a broader base for their power. The military governments of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, and Batista in Cuba fell as a result of civil opposition.

The growing complexities of modern governments and society may adversely affect militarism in the Latin American area. State planning has led not only to expanded bureaucracies but also to some improvement in the civil service systems, as for example in Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil. As the presidential monopoly of appointments is destroyed, uprisings, designed to drive incumbent presidents and their appointees from office in order to impose a new president and his appointees will tend to decline. The myriad problems of modern government make able professional soldiers increasingly aware that permanent solutions must be found through institutions, not through force. General Pedro E. Aramburu, as provisional president of Argentina, took this position in justifying his decision to hold elections and to return the government to civilians in 1958. Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, President of the Government Junta in Venezuela, in announcing plans for holding elections, said that although sometimes it might be necessary for military men to be in government, their basic function was not to govern but "to stand as guarantors of the constitution."

In the international area two circumstances may serve either to restrain the militarists or to redirect their political thinking. The Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance signed in 1947 and administered through the Organization of American States and already invoked in the cases of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic and Haiti, has effectively decreased the likelihood of international wars in the region. This suggests the possibility, particularly in the lesser developed countries, that military establishments may find it progressively more difficult to justify their existence as national defense organizations. At the same time, it appears, missile warfare has reduced the importance of the area's defense units to the point where they no longer figure in United States calculations. If this be true, the bilateral military pacts signed in the early 1950's no longer have substance. If they are discontinued, as has been recommended by members of the United States Congress, the armed forces in several of the republics will be deprived not only of a source of modern armament but also of the prestige of being linked with the United States in the Hemispheric defense chain.

On a somewhat different level, there is a growing body of evidence that training programs for bringing young officers to the United States have interesting political possibilities. In the United States academies and training schools the Latin American trainees rub shoulders with future United States officers who rigidly separate their professional and

political interests. The United States attitude toward the role of the military has apparently had some effect. It is known, for example, that many, in fact almost all, of the officers who participated in the initial acts against Perez Jimenez had had assignments in the United States, as did many who early withdrew their support from Rojas Pinilla in Columbia. From all this it might be concluded that if Latin America must continue to content itself with militarism, which seems likely, it might benefit from having at least a hard core of officers who trained in the United States, might at times serve as countervailing forces against their military colleagues, of either the right or left, who would selfishly usurp power and impose totalitarian dictatorships.

MILITARISM AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA*

by

E. Lieuwen

1-25-61

The recent decades of rapid change and social crisis in Latin America brought the armed forces back into a position of political prominence they had not held since the nineteenth century. At the time of World War I, a declining fraction of the total area and population was dominated by the military, and by 1928 only six Latin American countries containing but 15 per cent of the total population were ruled by military regimes. Then, abruptly, following the onset of the world depression in 1930, the trend was reversed. There occurred a striking relapse into militarism. A rough measure of this phenomenon, though not always foolproof, was the number of presidents in uniform. In Argentina, for example, after several decades of civilian rule, eight out of ten presidents between 1930 and 1957 were generals or colonels. In those countries which had never developed a civilian tradition in politics, like the republics of the Caribbean and Central America, the military tradition not only continued but was reinforced.

By 1936 half of Latin America was ruled by governments predominantly military in character. Armed forces regimes were frozen in power during most of World War II. Towards the end of the war the discrediting of military fascism and all forms of totalitarianism helped bring on a noticeable thaw in Latin America. By 1947 only seven out of twenty governments were headed by army officers. Then, following the outbreak of the Korean War, there occurred a new upsurge in military rule. The twentieth-century high was reached in 1954 when thirteen of twenty Latin American republics were ruled by military presidents.

This re-emergence of the armed forces upon the Latin American political scene, this sudden reversal of definite trends away from military rule was a consequence of the progressive crumbling of the traditional order during the twentieth century. In the resulting political chaos, the armed forces were provoked to intervene against newly articulate groups who were threatening the status quo. The motives and justifications of the armed forces varied. Devoted professionals intervened in the name of their legitimate duty to preserve internal order. Latent militarists were motivated only by political ambitions. Officers with idealistic leanings believed it their duty to promote social justice. In some cases, such as Argentina in 1930 and Peru in 1948, the armed forces took over at the behest

*Much of the substance of this chapter is drawn from the author's longer work, Arms and Politics in Latin America, Praeger, New York, 1960.

of the beleaguered civilian oligarchy. In others they acted on behalf of rising popular oligarchy. In others they acted on behalf of rising popular forces, as in Guatemala in 1944 and Venezuela in 1945. In Colombia, in 1953, the army took over when a stalemate developed in the battle amongst competing civilian forces. In El Salvador, after 1930, the strength of the civilian oligarchy declined without a concomitant growth in responsible labor and middle class groups. Accordingly power went by default to the army, the only organized and disciplined force available for administering the affairs of the nation.

If the armed forces had remained neutral, or had they been non-existent, or unable to exercise effective control, unruly civilian elements would have made Latin America even more unstable than it actually became. The threatened use of force by rival, extremist civilian groups, such as the White Guard and the Red Militia in Chile, the pro-Prestes partisans and the Integralistas in Brazil, and the fascistic Gold Shirts and the labor militia in Mexico, in fact made it almost impossible for the regular army to remain aloof from politics. Nonetheless whenever the armed forces assumed political power, whatever their actual motivation, they always maintained that they were forced to act by the failure of civilian government, that they came to power only with the purest of patriotic intentions and not until grave national circumstances made their intervention imperative.[1] This attitude, so prevalent since 1930, dated from the Independence period when the military first displayed a conviction that it had a duty to step forward in times of internal crisis. Only in a few countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Colombia, where professionalism had really taken root had the military's concept of its role changed.

The political dominance of the armed forces after 1930 was based upon several considerations. They controlled the means of violence, the sine qua non for political change in most countries. Advances in armament technology and improved military capabilities had made the armed forces at one and the same time more confident of their superiority over civilian elements and less hesitant to use that power for political purposes. The absence of international wars left the newly modernized armies with time on their hands to pursue extramilitary objectives, including political ones. Finally, developments abroad gave encouragement to militarism in Latin America. Nazism, fascism, and Francoism had a definite impact upon the area's armed forces in the 1930's. Some officers, like General Jose Uriburu in Argentina, were attracted by pro-Fascist propaganda. Others, like Colonel German Busch and the young officers in Bolivia, were indoctrinated in National Sociolism by German military advisors. Still others, like Colonel Juan Peron, were encouraged to play politics as a result of travel and study in Europe. Quite naturally, national security considerations during World War II encouraged the officer corps everywhere

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[1]For a typical military view, see Colonel Sosa de Quesada, Militarismo (Havana, 1939), pp. 25-27.

to assume a larger role in national affairs. After 1947, furthermore, the increasing militarism in Latin American politics reflected, at least partially, the coming of the cold war. Latin American officers were impressed by the increased political role of military men in the governments of the great powers. Many of them undoubtedly convinced themselves that in the world's hour of peril, with the new emphasis upon security, military men all over the world would increasingly have to assume responsibility for making political decisions.

Militarism was contagious. The examples and techniques of Peron were observed by Major Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Columbia. Similarly, General Manuel Odfia's successful coup in Peru in October of 1948 gave encouragement to Colonel Perez Jimenez, who emulated him the following month in Venezuela.

THE OFFICER CORPS

Essential to an understanding of the social significance of the developments described above is a close examination of the role of the military leaders themselves. For, as might be expected, Latin America's twentieth century economic, social, and political metamorphosis was clearly mirrored in the officer corps. The dramatic struggle that occurred between the old and the new, the farm and the city, and the partisans of the traditional oligarchy and the supporters of the emergent forces resulted in institutional upheavals in the Latin American armed forces as far-reaching and profound as those that occurred in civilian society.

After World War I there began to appear in the lower echelons of the officer corps increasing numbers of representatives from the rising urban middle groups. The sons of industrialists, bureaucrats, and urban professional men began to acquire the educational background and the modern, progressive outlook that made them superior cadets in the military academies. As in the past, men who chose a career-in-arms continued to come from the middle class, but the military representatives of these new urban groups, unlike the traditionally rural-oriented officer, had no strong ties with either the landed oligarchy or the church hierarchy. Consequently, they had, at least initially, little enthusiam for perpetuating the role of the armed forces as a guarantor of the traditional social order.

The social identification of the new-type officer with the urban groups where he originated was probably the fundamental cause of the junior officer uprisings that began to occur in Latin America's armies in the second quarter of the twentieth century. In general, the conflict was between the old and the new generation, between the generals, on the one hand, and the majors, captains, and lieutenants on the other, with the colonels often pulled in both directions. Such cleavages were not new in Latin America; what was new was the social basis of the split.

Almost invariably, Latin America's twentieth century popular revolutions were led by the young officers. They were the sponsors of fundamental change and reform, the underminers of traditional institutions, the proponents of public welfare measures. As the leading advocates of militarized, authoritarian states, they were apt to speak scornfully of decadent democracy. Their revolutionary zeal was by no means entirely altruistic for changes they advocated in the makeup and role of the armed forces meant unparalleled opportunities for promotion. Extreme nationalistic policies meant expansion and enrichment of the state apparatus upon which the military was dependent for its income.

Post-1930 militarism, therefore, went much deeper than in the past. It was much more complex as new social forces (labor and middle groups) and new military factors (politically influential navies and air forces) were added. Thus, those who stood for the old-type military dictatorship, backed only by the landed oligarchy and the upper clergy and often favored by foreign investors, had to face an entirely new, modern type of military competitor for political power.

Generally speaking, the new leader did not create the new sources of power. More often than not, the environment called forth the man. Inasmuch as the whole Latin American milieu was changing, so was the road to power. The new technique was to ride to victory at the head of popular reform movements. The new social philosophy was not primarily the brainchild of the leader himself. His articulate expression of popular demands, demands in which he himself often did not believe, was a weapon, a technique utilized for the enhancement of his personal power.

His relationship to the armed forces, the institution out of which he rose to power, was a curious one. He did not become the head of a revolution by his own individual initiative, as had the caudillos of old. Rather, he represented a substantial cross-section of the junior or middle-rank army leadership, concentrated in a conspiratorial clique, like the Group of United Officers in Argentina or the Patriotic Military Union in Venezuela. These young officers thought of themselves as enlightened members of a new, modern generation. Believing that the unimaginative generals were behind the times, they sought to bring the armed forces into more sympathetic relations with the rest of the society. They were also interested in power, which could be had by gaining popular support, by playing the role of saviors of the downtrodden masses.

To win his battle against the oligarchy, the revolutionary leader had to pose as a representative of the lower and middle income groups. He had to make them believe that an enlargement of his own power would lead to a parallel advancement of their interests. If the people responded to his vilification of the old regime and his messianic promises, he was well on the way to the establishment of a kind of plebeian dictatorship.

Such rulers were generally inclined towards authoritarianism, despite the fact that they might have the majority of the people behind them.

Opposition leaders could be effectively handled by simply condemning them as enemies of the people. Particularly troublesome elements, such as the conservative press, were usually quashed by organized violence, generally by ad hoc police or security forces acting in "the people's interest."

Every successful new leader announced a revolutionary reform program reflecting popular demands. The people supposedly would rule; they were the state; their new leader was its representative. He proposed to rebuild the national economy along modern lines. His program involved economic nationalism, planned industrialization. He gave lip-service at least to demands for agrarian reform, promising to curb the power of the landlords and the foreign capitalists. He promised greater benefits, in the form of wages, housing, and social security, to workers and peasants. In a typical case, the beneficiaries of these material gains were content with the vicarious enjoyment of political power through identification with the military dictator; but his colleagues were not. They had originally brought him to power, and he was still dependent upon them. To decrease this dependence and thereby increase his own power, he appealed to the people. To this end he often built up organized labor as a counterpoise to the armed forces, a technique used by Cardenas, Peron, Arbenze, and others. And this alliance was frequently as essential to the cause of fundamental reform as it was to the military's drive for power, for unless labor shared in the aspiring dictator's ambitions, material and social improvements were impossible. Unfortunately, the army officers had a way of losing their enthusiam for drastic change once they had effected a successful revolution. Labor was then caught in a dilemma and, generally speaking, chose to accept the harsh alternative of more economic democracy at the expense of less political democracy.

The first of these new-type military rulers, officers who rose to power as leaders of popular movements for fundamental change and reform, was General Venustiano Carranza in Mexico, who in 1915 appealed to the new social forces and paid lip-service to -- but did not fulfill -- their demands. His successors, Generals Obregon and Calles, were more attentive to such demands. Prior to 1930, Major Carlos Ibanez of Chile was the only other new-type leader on the Latin American scene.

Between 1930 and 1957, fifty-six military men held the presidential office in the twenty Latin American republics for as long as a year. Of these, twelve were new-type, reform-minded leaders. Included in this category were Major Ibanez of Chile (1930-1931), Colonel Peron of Argentina (1945-1955), Colonel Rafael Franco (1936-1937) and General Felix Estigarribia (1939-1940) of Paraguay, Colonel German Busch (1936-1938) and Major Gualberto Villaroel (1943-1946) of Bolivia, General Rojas Pinilla of Colombia (1953-1956), Colonel Antonio Remon of Panama (1952-1955), Major Arbenz of Guatemala (1950-1954), General Cardenas of Mexico (1934-1940), Sergeant Fulgencio Batista of Cuba (1933-1944), and Major Oscar Osorio of El Salvador (1948-1956). In three countries, the young officers who had conducted revolutions sustained reform-orientied, civilian-led regimes in power. This was the situation in Brazil under Getulio Vargas (1930-1945),

Venezuela under Romulo Betancourt (1945-1947), and Romulo Gallegos (1947-1948), and Ecuador under Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra (1944-1947).

During the years 1947-1959 each of the reformist military regimes was overthrown, usually either by conservative army officers or by young officers, originally leaders of the revolution, whose zeal for reform had withered before the winds of labor-leftist extremism. The counter-revolution brought to the fore officers whose mission it was to halt the social revolution. In this they were never completely successful, for the changes wrought by the reform regimes were generally too fundamental to be undone. In most cases, labor-leftist political activity was sharply curtailed or prohibited. Although most of the social and material gains already attained were preserved, no new ones were forthcoming. In economic policy, however, the military leaders of the counter-revolution generally appropriated much of the developmental, industrializing, modernizing, and nationalistic programs of their predecessors.

It is, of course, extremely difficult to make reliable generalizations about the socio-political attitudes of the officer corps in a single country, let along in Latin America as a whole. This is so because the struggle among the military groups vying for power was seldom resolved. Sometimes revolutionary young officers would win control, only to lose it again to their more conservative seniors, as in Chile in the period 1925 to 1932. Sometimes senior officers would attempt a liberating revolution, as in Colombia in 1953. Sometimes junior officers originally liberal would turn conservative, as in Brazil between 1930 and 1945 and in Venezuela between 1945 and 1948. At other times the officers who originally sponsored a military distatorship would later bring it to an end, as happened when Peron and Rojas Pinilla were ousted. Occasionally the three branches of the armed forces would be split along divergent political lines.

Struggles within the officer class were complicated by ideological cross-currents and fierce personal and professional rivalries. Many officers in the lower ranks wanted more pay and more rapid promotions. Senior officers convinced of the inevitable political triumph of the new social forces sometimes compromised with them in order to preserve their own positions. In the larger countries, generals interested in keeping pace with modern military technology, thereby improving the capabilities of the nation's armed forces, sometimes supported the new nationalism and industrialization.

Through Latin America the army was the strongest and the most politically-minded of the three services; it reflected social tensions most accurately. It was also in the army, that intra-service rivalries were most severe. Air forces had no significance in Latin America until World War II. Navies, though less politically-minded than armies, usually remained unified, fundamentally conservative institutions. Their officers generally came from the upper classes; consequently, in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, a naval career carried more social

prestige.[2] However, the navy's aristocratic tendencies were moderated by the democratic views of British and United States professional advisors. Conversely, before World War II, authoritarian attitudes of Latin American armies were reinforced by German, Spanish, and Italian military missions.

THE MILITARY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL REVOLUTIONS

Wherever genuine, broadly-based social conflict appeared in Latin America army officers were forced to take a stand, either support the aggressive lower and middle-income groups or defending the oligarchy. Thus the pattern of revolution underwent radical change and became more serious. The former comic-opera, barracks-type revolts were superseded by revolutions of a genuinely social character.

The following pattern of revolution was often found in Latin America in the second quarter of the twentieth century. Urban middle-class and labor groups, increasingly aware of the revolutionary changes that had occurred in Mexico, the United States, and Western Europe, began to feel they deserved a better life than the old order had provided. Aware of their potential power, they found themselves frustrated politically by the repressive, anti-constitutional measures of the entrenched regime. At this juncture, the young-officer group, also frustrated in their ambitions, made common cause with the rising popular groups. Together they collaborated in forcibly bringing down the ancien regime. Revolutions of this type arose in some countries from direct military initiative, as in Bolivia in 1936; in other, e.g., Guatemala in 1944, the young officers were inspired to revolt by civilian groups pressing for reform. Also, though it was the armed forces that did the actual fighting, they often lacked enthusiasm for running governments and wielding political power. In Colombia in 1953, for example, they stepped in with extreme reluctance only after the traditional civilian leadership had amply demonstrated its incompetency. In Argentina a decade earlier, however, the colonels' clique believed it had a continuing mission to manage the renovation of the nation.

However deep the causes, these twentieth century Latin American revolutions appeared on the surface very much like palace revolts. Nearly always, preceding a revolutionary attempt, there was plotting by "disloyal" officers. As in the past, a secret clique did the organization and planning. In Bolivia in 1936 it was the Santa Cruz Lodge, in Argentina in 1943 the Group of United Officers, and in Venezuela in 1945 the Patriotic Military Union. The leader of the conspirators circulated a reform program designed to attract his colleagues. Then, as the tensions inside the armed forces increased, officers who had no real desire to intervene in political processes had to weight carefully the probable outcome of the impending crisis and make their gamble. Loyalty to the incumbent regime would be

[2] This was not true in Colombia, however.

rewarded if the rebellion failed, punished if it succeeded. Neutral, innocent bystanders might be suspected by both sides.

The revolt generally began by the carefully prearranged seizure of a key garrison, either in or near the capital. If a sufficient number of outlying garrisons joined the initial uprising, an assault was made upon communication centers, the presidential palace, and loyal military installations. If the revolt succeeded, the Junta Revolucionaria of a Junta Militar became a transitional regime, administering the transfer of power to a constitutional government more or less consonant with the wishes of supporting civilian groups. The junta's job was to remove from their official posts both the military and the civilian partisans of the defeated regime in order to guard against counter-revolution. Usually the revolutionary junta reorganized all branches of the administration, decreed a certain amount of reform legislation, and, after an interim rule of one to three years, arranged for elections designed to restore constitutional government. The transitional period was generally far from smooth. Conspiring officers, no longer united against a common foe, found the aftermath of victory filled with conflicts, ideological and personal. In jockeying for power, junta membership frequently shifted until finally it reflected a balance of the forces, military and civilian, which had sponsored the revolution.

Such were the surface manifestations common to nearly all twentieth century Latin American revolutions. To determine whether they were of the "palace" variety or represented broadly based social movements, one must look at the forces supporting the rebels and their programa. Generally speaking, a sine qua non for fundamental revolution was a prior revolt inside the armed forces; that is, junior officers had to seize power from their superiors, as for example in Chile in 1925, in Brazil in 1930, in Argentina in 1943, and in Venezuela in 1945. In these cases, junior officers conspired with politicians representing popular groups that demanded social reform. Following the military coup, a basic change began in government. The middle groups would take over the task of administering the government, labor reform legislation would be promulgated, and the new regime's economic policies would be characterized by exaggerated nationalism. On the other hand, when a revolt occurred without an accompanying upheaval in the armed forces, the revolutionary change was generally superficial, a mere changing of the guard. No social or economic reform took place. Often reaction set in, as in 1930 in Argentina, in 1946 in Bolivia, and in 1948 in Peru.

Popular pressures made it no easier to conduct revolutions in the face of resistance by armed forces loyal to the government. On the contrary, the technological advance in weaponry -- the machinegun, the tank, the airplane -- and the development of modern systems of transport and communications notably increased the repressive power of the armed forces over the civilian population. Lenin's dictum that "no revolution of the masses can triumph without the help of a portion of the armed forces that sustained the old regime" applied to Latin America in the twentieth century. Each day, as armament grew more elaborate, as police

organizations adopted modern equipment and new methods of surveillance, the possibility of successful civilian uprisings or local rebellions became more remote.

But the frequency of revolutions in Latin America underwent no notable alteration. For the new repressive powers of the armed forces were offset by the defection of key officers or groups of officers. For example, as recently as January, 1958, the mightily-armed, dictatorial regime of General Marcos Perez Jimenez in Venezuela was toppled with surprising ease when defecting naval and air force officers made common cause with popular forces. What technology and modernization did was to make certain that the armed forces would always play a dominant role, on one side or another, in any revolutionary contest.

Contrary to what one might expect, the fundamental revolutions, except for the unique upheavals in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba, were no bloodier than the palace revolutions, for the masses of the population, though they exerted pressure, did not generally participate in the actual fighting. Except in Colombia in the decade following World War II and in Mexico during World War I, social change took place in Latin America without civil war. For this result, the continued use in the twentieth century of the nineteenth century revolutionary techniques was largely responsible.

It was sometimes possible to launch insurrections and to keep them going even though the armed forces remained loyal to the government. This could happen, however, only when the terrain was suitable for guerrilla warfare and when the rebels received clandestine support from sympathetic civilians.[3] These conditions enabled the famous Prestes column in Brazil in the mid-1920's to hold out successfully for more than three years against the government forces. Similarly favored Colombia guerrilla forces continued to operate for more than a decade after World War II. More recently, the rebel forces of Fidel Castro successfully defied the Batista regime. In these cases the strategy of the rebels was to wear down the morale of the government forces by long-term operations on an ever-increasing scale until defections or frustration made victory possible. Although this technique had heretofore not proved successful in defeating an incumbent regime, Castro's forces were able to carry through to victory in the first days of 1959.

The enlisted men did not play a leading or determining role in the social revolutions. Unlike in Russia in 1917, extensive fraternization between the regular troops and the revolutionary elements of the civilian population did not occur in Latin America. Commanders, in line with modern practice, effectively isolated the men in the ranks from the

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[3] See Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (London, 1943), pp. 49, 61.

civilian population by confining them in barracks, bases, and various military installations. Also, the illiteracy and general political apathy of the rank and file tended to make them docile instruments in the hands of the officer corps. As a result, civilian opponents of a military regime often tended to build up an emotional resentment to anyone in uniform and to identify all soldiers with the regime they hated.

Only for a brief period in the early 1930's, when the depression brought discontent over loss of pay and deterioration in living conditions, did the men in the ranks become restless, and then in only a few countries. In 1931, the soldiers of the 5th Regiment in Peru made an abortive attempt to seize the government. The sailors' mutiny in Ecuador in April of 1932 likewise failed. Success came in only one instance, in Cuba in 1933, when the enlisted men, led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, overwhelmed the officers, took over the government, and made themselves officers.

This Cuban experience was the exception to the general rule that the Latin American officer corps kept the loyalty of the common soliders and maintained discipline. Officers recognized that their own position depended on a contented rank and file; hence they usually ousted civilian governments which refused to provide for them adequately. Some reformist military presidents, in an effort to alleviate their extreme dependence upon the officer corps and to guard against conspiracy, cultivated the men in the ranks with extraordinary emoluments and favors. Their aim was to secure from the enlisted men primary loyalty to the chief of state rather than to their immediate military superiors. But it did not work. Peron and other military dictators who tried this technique ultimately failed.

Civilian revolutionaries, however, were sometimes able to gain support from special groups within the military. In several countries the military cadets, whose careers had not advanced sufficiently to give them a predominantly military outlook and whole youthful idealism could be exploited by astute political crusaders, were attracted to revolutionary causes. In Colombia in 1948 and Bolivia in 1952, the police, who were in much closer day-to-day contact with the civilian population than the armed forces, made common cause with the rebellious populace.

Revolutions were most sweeping when the regular army, the ultimate guardian of social order, was overwhelmed, as in Mexico in 1914, in Bolivia in 1952, and Cuba in 1959. These, however, were not well-planned revolutions, but spontaneous outbursts of popular antagonism manifested in violent, often uncontrollable, uprisings. Only in these three countries, moreover, in the aftermath of victory, was it possible to deal with the basic problem of land reform. Elsewhere even the most radical military reformers stopped short of sponsorship of a program of land redistribution. Genuine agrarian reform in Latin America was perhaps

impossible without the destruction of the officer corps, recruited as it was from the middle and upper middle social ranks, which believed firmly in the sanctity of private property. A reform regime that attacked the latter soon forfeited the goodwill of the officers, as was demonstrated in Venezuela in 1948 and Guatemala in 1954.

NATURE OF THE NEW MILITARISM

After World War II, the reform-minded military regimes that came to power in various Latin American countries had a decisive influence in the promotion of political democracy, economic development, and social change. The late Vernon Fluharty has described the significance of this type of militarism particularly in Colombia, a not untypical example:

> Rojas Pinilla has turned the clock forward on social achievement for the masses. He gave them status and a sense of their importance, if only because his government has emphasized their welfare. That lesson they will never forget, and nothing less will be acceptable from other governments to come ....
>
> In this sense, paradoxically, the military dictator is making a substantial contribution toward democracy. Every social, educational, political, and economic gain in status is a step toward the creation of the substantive basis upon which true popular democracy may one day rise in Colombia ....
>
> Ultimate accomplishment of this process may require many Rojas Pinillas .... But the military dictatorships make their necessary contribution, a lasting one, with their emphasis upon substantive democracy. Nothing will be quite the same after they have come, spoken to and for the masses, and gone their way. It does not even matter, in the long run, whether they were sincere in their solicitude for the people, or merely self-seeking. The important thing is that the masses will not forget. They will slowly grow into the new concept that they, too, are men, and they will demand more from the parties in the future than ever they dared demand before .... Sooner or later those demands will be met ....
>
> Even though it may appear negative and temporary, this contribution is a gain for the future of popular democracy in Latin America.[4]

Until the appearance of reform-minded officers, governments in Latin America had paid little attention to the masses. The latter unquestionably benefitted, materially and psychologically, from the social and economic

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[4] Dance of the Millions (pittsburgh, 1957), pp. 316-317.

reforms introduced by the new-type military leaders. Although the latter were not practitioners of genuine democracy, their new policies tended to bring about greater equality in income and social position, without which political equality could never have a solid, long-term basis. Many of the military regimes, moreover, regardless of whether they had popular backing or were reform-minded in a social sense, achieved a certain amount of material progress by fostering industrialization, the development of communications and public works projects, and by enforcing political stability without which national economies tend to stagnate and even to retrogress.

An officer's professional training often equipped him for the Ministry of Communications or of Public Works or other technical posts. In Brazil it was the army that explored the virgin interior, set up telegraph and wireless stations, developed agricultural colonies, and helped the Indians to advance in civilizations. The army undertook similar tasks in Peru in the 1940's and in Bolivia in the 1950's. In Mexico and Argentina the armies played key roles in economic development by opening up new roads and constructing schools and hospitals. In Cuba, after 1936, they assumed a pedagogic and social function when they took charge of the new Escuelas Rurales Civico Militares designed to combat illiteracy and improve rural living conditions. In Chile, during World War II, the army helped alleviate the import crisis by manufacturing agricultural implements and bicycles.[5]

It can be said in behalf of the armed forces, also that they often played an anti-despotic, political role, intervening to terminate the impossible tyranny of one of their own errant colleagues or to supply a corrective to the excesses of civilian politicians. For example, they terminated the Vargas dictatorship in Brazil in 1945 and that of Peron in Argentina a decade later. They also served the cause of genuine political democracy in Chile in 1924 when they stepped in to break the deadlock between popular President Alessandri and the oligarchic-controlled Congress.

In many cases, genuine patriotism was the dominant motivation of the military interventionists. Their stabilizing role in Brazil has been aptly described by Alan Manchester:

> That the nation has been able to survive the incredibly rapid transition to industrialization without discarding its basic political structure is due in no small part to the army. Under the leadership of the General staff the army has been the stabilizing factor which has stopped the political pendulum from swinging too far from the center. It terminated the dictatorship when the need for that regime was over and stood aside

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[5] Jose Cavero Bendzu, El ejercito en los democracias panamericanos (Chorillos, Peru, 1944), pp. 7-10.

while the civil leaders laid the foundations for a real democracy. It stepped in again when the political leadership swung too far to the opposite extreme. It has played a conservative, stabilizing role since its rise to decisive influence in 1930.[6]

What might be called the predatory side of militarism, however, far overshadowed its beneficent and progressive aspects, even when military regimes rode to power on a program of social reform. In the constitution of every Latin American country there were clauses which unequivocally defined the legal position and functions of the armed forces, generally as follows:

1. The president of the republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

2. The armed forces are a professional, non-political body, which may not deliberate on matters relating to the service.

3. The fundamental aim of the armed forces is to guarantee the defense of the nation, to maintain internal order, to guarantee constitutional rights and to enforce the laws.

Yet in almost every Latin American country the president was effectively commander-in-chief of the armed forces only when he was a military man who had come to power by revolution. Duly elected civilian presidents were generally powerless to call erring generals to order; for they were considered ephemeral rulers by officers, whose position gave them continuing and assured power until retirement. Also, with few exceptions, the armed forces were in fact not strictly professional, no matter what the law said; rather, they were highly political groups. They "deliberated" on all matters, particularly "on matters relating to the service," that is, on budgets, manpower, equipment needs, etc. Finally, they frequently flouted the constitutional rights they were supposed to "guarantee"and ignored the laws they were pledged to enforce. Whatever role the armed forces played in a revolution itself, the new civilian government was never permitted to alter the armed forces' traditional role as the ultimate arbiters of political disputes, nor to trim their customary share of the budget, nor to interfere with their pay, benefits, discipline and promotions. Reform regimes were obliged to confine their activities to non-military matters. Presidents Bustamente of Peru and Gallegos of Venezuela learned this lesson the hard way in 1948. Similarly, Presidents Velasco of Ecuador and Vargas of Brazil in the 1940's and again in the early 1950's failed in repeated attempts to exert executive authority over their respective nation's armed forces.

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[6]"Brazil in Transition," in South Atlantic Quarterly, April, 1955, p. 175.

The armed forces, in brief, have generally held themselves above the law. True, there might be lengthy constitutional discussions between the lawyer-politicians and the officers, but the latter always won with the incontrovertible argument of force. The central issue was: Are the functions of the armed forces delegated to them by the State, or do the armed forces already possess, both inherently and permanently, rights and functions independent of those specified in the ephemeral constitutions?[7] In most Latin American countries the military insisted that the latter was the case. As regards military matters, they were a state within a state, for they insisted on complete autonomy. As for politics, they were in fact above the state in claiming for themselves the inherent right to change governments at will.

Accordingly, the military abrogated to itself the power of deciding when constitutional rights had been violated and when the time had arrived to enforce the law. Though there were obvious cases where military intervention was needed to curb irresponsible military and civilian politicos, it was highly questionable, in most instances, whether military intervention was in fact justified. On all too many occasions the armed forces acted arbitrarily and in utter defiance of the duly constituted authorities and the popular will. A most notorious case of irresponsible militarism occurred in 1948 in Venezuela, when the armed forces took it upon themselves to substitute a military junta for a popularly elected government. Then, in 1952, when the military were overwhelmingly defeated in an election, they simply refused to honor the popular mandate. Similarly, in Peru in 1948 and in Cuba in 1952 military leaders toppled democratic governments, then kept themselves in power by force in the face of popular opposition.

Predatory military governments could maintain their rule only by tyrannical methods. Accordingly, they set up bodies of secret police, ostensibly "to enforce the law," but actually to throttle opposition. While such methods were obviously inimical to freedom and democracy, political expediency prompted the military to conduct their despotisms behind a constitutional facade. All Latin American constitutions sanction the declaration of a state of siege, in times of grave national emergency, making the "temporary" suspension of conatitutional rights perfectly legal. Under such conditions, and after all the potential rival parties and candidates have been effedtively suppressed, the military dictator can be elected "democratically," without opposition. This was the technique used effectively by Generals Odria, Rojas Pinilla and Batista.

The fact was that military training did little to equip an officer with the skills necessary for running a modern state. Because his professional career isolated him from the main currents of society, his understanding of national problems was apt to be defective. And as

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[7] Javier Basan Peres, El ejercito en la constitucion y en la politica (Mexico, D.F., 1952), pp. 16-17.

technical advances made military affairs more complicated and as new economic tasks and social responsibilities had a similar effect on the tasks and social responsibilities of civil administration, it became each day more difficult for a soldier to become also a statesman.

Then too, military training was inherently antithetical to democratic values and procedures. A political leader concerned with these values, Eduardo Santos, has written:

> The military profession is poor schooling for learning the difficult art of government, for to govern well means to interpret, to reconcile, to respect the rights of all, to give freedom of expression to every opinion, to abide by the laws and never subordinate them to personal caprice, to have the courage to rectify mistakes, to ask for and listen to advice, to have patience, to realize that one owes one's power to the will of the people.... All this is difficult for the military to understand and accept, accustomed as they are to the blind obedience of their inferiors, the dry voices of command, and the narrow horison of their profession, which rarely encompasses the element of humanism.[8]

As he wrote this in 1956, the ex-President of Colombia (1938-1942) was witnessing, from exile, a good example in his own country of how a fine professional soldier (General Rojas Pinilla) could prove utterly inept in the business of running a government. Rojas Pinilla, a devoted, conscientious career man, had risen to the number one post in the army by sheer dint of energy and professional excellence. As one of the more promising middle-grade officers he had been selected for advanced training abroad. Having brilliantly led the Colombian Battalion in the Korean War, he returned home to become Defense Minister, the top military post in the republic. Unhappily, his country, ever since 1948, had been in the throes of a near civil war, with crime and violence widespread. Confronted by a deadlock between the Liberal and Conservative parties, public opinion demanded that something be done to stop the bloodletting.

The only individual in a position to halt it, Pinilla seized the reins of power with broad popular approval. But since he had no experience in the complex business of governing, he was forced to seek advice from other generals. Also, he often stubbornly followed mistaken civilian advice. He knew how to meet opposition only with force. His crude efforts to launch a popular political movement of his own ended in failure. Frustrated by repeated failures (a severe blow to his pride), he became increasingly tyrannical, thus rekindling furious civil strife

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[8] "Latin American Realities," in Foreign Affairs, June, 1956, p. 256.

in the countryside. In 1957 public opposition reached the point where his military colleagues had to unseat him.

Below the presidential level, the competence of military men for high political posts was also open to serious question. In the aftermath of the military revolts that occurred after 1930, and particularly after 1948, there was a tendency to assign cabinet posts to men in uniform.[9] It was not surprising that the Fascist-inspired revolutions in Bolivia in 1937 and Argentina in 1943 produced all-military cabinets, but the trend was noticeable elsewhere too. The War Ministry had nearly always been an army post, but under the Ibanez government in Chile in the mid-1950's, the Ministries of Labor and Interior, also, were headed by army officers. In Venezuela, after the 1948 revolution, army officers headed the Interior and Communications Ministry, and acted as Governors of the Federal District. The extreme was reached in Peru with the all-military cabinet of General Odria, in which colonels headed the Ministries of Public Health, Education, Labor, Interior, Treasury, and Justice, and a rear admiral conducted Foreign Relations. Obviously, these officers' professional training did not include the schooling in medicine, economics, law, politics, diplomacy, and public administration that their official tasks demanded. Mexico under Cardenas had an all-general cabinet, but the ministers hed no real responsibilities. Cardenas appointed the old revolutionary generals so as to control them. Actually, they were mere figureheads in a government run by competent civilian technicians.

Though young officers led social revolutions in many republics in the 1943-1953 decade, the armed forces represented, on balance, a static social force in Latin American politics. Military regimes which really promoted reform were the exception; political intervention by the armed forces was more often than not a conservative holding action. The military did not keep pace with the dynamic Latin American society, but rather identified themselves with crumbling traditionalist forces, thus impeding social progress. To use a phrase of C. L. Sulzberger, "Their response to the social revolution was inappropriate." They were inclined eventually if not immediately, to make a negative response to, and to dissolve by force, majority popular parites.

As suggested earlier, even when idealistic young officers led a genuine social revolution, they nearly always perverted its aims in the end. Reform-minded military leaders always came to power without a majority of the people behind them. Drawing on their reservoir of popular support during the honeymoon, they launched ambitious projects of economic development and enacted social welfare measures. Yet, somehow, such regimes invariably moved toward authoritarianism and tyranny. It was as though the new military rulers were psychologically unprepared to accept authentically popular solutions to their nation's problems. Why?

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[9] Jesus Silva Herzog, "Las juntas militares de gobierno," in [redacted] americanos, July-August, 1949, pp. 9-10.

Let us described a generalized case which is hypothetical but quite typical. A young officer leads a military coup d'etat and announces a program of reform. His head is then turned by his sudden attainment of tremendous personal power; he is reluctant to let it go. Then, too, his revolutionary zeal is nearly always greater than that of his colleagues, whose ardor cools fast in the aftermath of victory. Consequently, the social program begins to slow down. Also, the victors, in accordance with accepted traditions, demand spoils; and the illicit enrichment of the new military elite, including the reform-minded dictator, soon makes the new government appear more and more like its exploiting predecessor's. The dictator's mounting problems are complicated by his political incompetence and his often ill-conceived, ruinous economic policies. All of this gives new courage to the traditionalist opposition, especially when they are jointed by many who had originally supported the liberal revolution. Faced with mounting resistance, the dictator tightens his control and increases its brutality in a desperate attempt to hold power. Ultimately, the armed forces split. And when that happens, the days of the dictator are numbered.

Such was the fate, in a general way, of Ibanez (1930-1931), Franco (1936-1937), Busch (1937-1938), Villaroel (194301946), Peron (1945-1955), Arbenz (1950-1954, and Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). Neither they, nor their military colleagues, gave evidence of possessing the ability or the determination to solve their nation's problems in an orderly, progressive fashion.

Even reform-minded military rulers showed little competence in dealing with national economic problems. They were particularly inclined toward ruinous financial policies. Almost invariably, they were poor planners. Their drive for economic independence often led to over-hasty industrialization programs. The case of Peron in Argentina is a good example. His shortsighted emphasis upon industry led him to neglect agriculture, the principal source of funds for investment in industrialization. Lopsided economic policies brought the nation to the brink of disaster. In Colombia, Rojas Pinilla got into trouble when his ambitious programs of public works and economic development left the country near bankruptcy.

One of the chief impediments to real economic progress in nearly all Latin American countries, whether the regime was military or not, was the inflated demands the armed forces made upon government revenues. Traditionally, since the turn of the century, the armed forces' reported share of the national budget has averaged about 20 to 25 per cent annually in most Latin American countries.[10] However, official figures of war and navy departments do not tell the entire story. Sizeable appropriations for the armed forces, amounting to perhaps 5 per cent of the total budget, were concealed in appropriations for the Ministries of Interior, Public

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10 Inter-American Statistical Yearbook, 1940, pp. 512-541.

Works, and Communications. In Paraguay, after the 1954 coup, the share of the armed forces went up to 50 per cent, and in Colombia and Cuba military budgets also rose sharply because of civil wars. In the total Latin American picture, however, these increases were at least partly counterbalanced by sharp declines in Mexico after 1938, in Bolivia following the 1952 revolution, and in Costa Rica following the abolition of the army in 1948.

Although budgetary percentages generally remained constant, the expenses for Latin America's armed forces in absolute figures grew tremendously. This was because total national expenditures, with the growth of statism and big bureaucracies, had risen rapidly. For example, national budgets were several times larger in 1958 than in 1939. To some extent the increase reflected the high cost of modern military equipment.

The capital that annually went for the armed forces salaries, ammunition, and equipment obviously contributed little to the economic development of a country. Civilian reformers like Arevalo of Guatemala, Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, and Betancourt of Venezuela found it hard to condone expenditures which were utterly wasteful -- wasteful because in their view the armed forces had no real military function to perform. There was no danger of invasion, and the maintenance of internal order was being capably handled by the nation's police forces. In addition, the continued high military budgets served to strengthen the political power of the military. Yet these were fixed expenditure items which no government, either civilian or military, could alter. The War Minister or Defense Minister, a representative of the armed forces rather than of the government, made it unmistakably clear that the military would brook no curtailment in their traditional budgetary share. Whenever a military regime was established there usually occurred a further build-up of the armed forces, with stronger emphasis upon military items in the budget. In the four Latin American governments that controlled their armed forces (Mexico after 1938, Bolivia after 1952, Costa Rica after 1948, and Uruguay since before World War I), reductions occurred in the military's percentage of the budget.

In the Latin American tradition, military dictators used their office for purposes of illicit enrichment. Almost inevitably military dictatorship led to corruption. Not that civilian governments were above reproach in this regard, but in the case of military regimes the most pressing demands on the national treasuries which had to be met immediately after a successful revolution were those of the new leader's military supporters. This was usually the first stage of corruption. The second came when the problem arose of consolidating power through the attainment of some popular backing for the regime. For this purpose funds were needed which were free from legal control. Established political parties already had resources of this kind, but military regimes, lacking them, dipped into the national treasury.

The new leader did not generally hesitate for long to join his associates in their peculation. In some cases he set the example. Nearly all military rulers prepared for the inevitable day when, driven from power, they would have to live out their days in exile. The case of Venezuela's military dictators were spectacular but none the less typical. The corrupt pattern was fixed by General Juan Vicente Gomez, who during his long rule appropriated from the public treasury hundreds of millions of dollars for himself and substantial amounts for his family and military associates. After his death in 1935, his successors, Generals Eleazar Lopez Contreras (1935-1941) and Isaias Medina Angarita (1941-1945) carried on the dishonorable tradition. Each, during his term of office, made off with about $13 million, then, following the 1945 revolution, retired in New York.[11] Yet the young officer who helped lead that revolution and emerged as dictator in 1948 was worse than his predecessors, for he took with him into exile in Florida an estimated one quarter billion dollars.

In the five-year period from 1954 to 1959 it was estimated that Latin America's fleeing military dictators carried out of the area upwards of one billion dollars. Indications are that Peron escaped with as much as $700 million, Perez Jimenez with more than one-quarter of a billion dollars, Batista with more than $200 million, and Rojas Pinilla, Magloire of Haiti, and Arbenz with smaller, yet sizeable fortunes. Meanwhile, those still in power were providing for their own retirement. General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, had over the years perfected his systematic graft until his income was in the neighborhood of $30 million. In similar fashion, corrupt use of political power has made the Somoza family of Nicaragua one of the richest in Central America. But thievery by the heads of state was only part of the story. Under the Peron regime, favored generals like Humberto Sosa Molina and Franklin Lucero became multi-millionaires. Colonel Pulido Barreto, Perez Jimenez' ordinance chief, was said to have amassed $100 million through parking meter collections, transportation concessions, and various other business operations.[12]

Not all politically powerful military men were dishonest. Colonel Remon of Panama, though he had enriched himself considerably as police chief, was a model of integrity in the presidential office. Also General Ubico of Guatemala (1930-1944) obtained a reputation for honesty. Leaders of the armed forces in Brazil usually did not acquire reputations for

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[11] Venezuela, Ministerio de Relaciones Interiores, Sentencias del jurado de responsibilidad civil y administrative (Caracas, 1946), I:303-334, II:3-46.

[12] Obviously, statistics on the amount of embezzlement or peculations can rarely be documented. The best one can do is make an estimate, as has been done in this paragraph, from a variety of opposition charges, newspaper reports, and the rumors that circulate in official circles.

illicit gains. But these examples were exceptions to the Latin American rule that peculation of public monies on a large scale was characteristic of militarism.

Corruption in high places hindered economic development. Stanislaw Andrzejewski maintained that the armed forces' "parasitic appropriation of the surplus produced by the economically productive civilian sectors of the society was one of the most powerful factors inhibiting technical progress."[13] This "surplus," in countries with exceptionally predatory military regimes, like those in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, might be any amount in excess of the bare subsistence requirements of the mass of the population. Corruption caused would-be investors and entrepreneurs to lose confidence. The breakdown of many a nation's economy under corrupt military dictatorships was hastened by the flight of private capital.

In the final analysis, militarism destroyed the true military function of armed forces by undermining its ability to defend the country and to preserve internal order. Deep involvement in politics produced institutional upheavals within the armed forces and a general undermining of discipline among the officers. It diminished even the limited role which they might have played in providing for Latin America's security during World War II and the cold war.

GROWTH OF PROFESSIONALISM

Despite the post-1930 upsurge of militarism, professionalism continued to build upon the initial advances that began around the turn of the century. A leading factor in the new trend was the anti-militaristic pressure exerted by the civilian population. In Mexico in 1914, in Costa Rica in 1948, in Bolivia in 1952, and in Cuba in 1959, the people destroyed militarism by violent revolution. And though it reappeared in Mexico and Bolivia in the post-revolutionary period, civilian authority eventually emerged supreme. In twentieth century Uruguay, civilian leaders tethered the militarists, restricting them to two proper functions: defending the country against external threats and preserving internal order.

In other countries, the armed forces yielded to pressure from hostile civilian groups and retreated from the political arena. In Chile and Colombia, where the armed forces had developed a non-political tradition during the first quarter of the twentieth century, the military intervened to arbitrate the socio-political crises (in Chile under Ibanez in 1925, and in Colombia under Rojas Pinilla in 1953), but in neither of these cases did intervention achieve its objective. Popular animosity against bungling and failures forced the military in Chile and Colombia to abandon politics in a hurry. After 1955, similar anti-militaristic pressures

[13] Military Organization and Society (London, 1954), p. 162.

exerted by the mass of the people were evident in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

Since the military, however, still had a monopoly of physical power, the principal impetus towards professionalism had to come from within the armed forces. In every country where the social struggle raged, the military organization was torn by two struggles: One reflected the country's social crisis; the other, in all respects equally important, was the contest between the professionalists, the group of officers who held that the military should confine themselves to military duties, and the militarists who insisted on playing politics. After World War I, the former were in the ascendant, but after 1930 the militarists held sway. After 1955, with the collapse of military dictatorships in Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Haiti, the professionalists again appeared to be gaining the upper hand.

Curiously enough, militaristic regimes gave stimulus to professionalism, not, to be sure, by the example they set, but because the dictators themselves feared militarism. For this reason, rulers like Peron and Perez Jimenez encouraged professionalism, advising young officers to stick to their military business, to stay out of politics.

A growing element in the officer corps was becoming conscious of the proper role of the armed forces in the nation's affairs. The concept of the "good soldier" began to be more clearly understood, and was reinforced by travel and training in Western Europe and the United States and by the activities of foreign military missions in Latin America. Officers began to recognize that modern military technology required increased specialization, that genuine military expertise demanded years of training and experience and the digestion of a tremendous body of knowledge, and that gaining the technical proficiency needed to qualify as a superior professional soldier was a full-time job that left no room for political dabbling.

The rise of military professionalism in Latin America after 1930 was not an indigenous phenomenon. Rather, that region's armed forces drew heavily upon ideas and programs already adopted in more advanced countries. During the 1930's German professionalist influence continued to prevail in Southern South America; French missions were active in central South America (Brazil and Peru), and Italian missions, particularly in Ecuador and Bolivia. The United States did not establish military missions until the eve of World War II and then, soon after hostilities began, achieved a monopoly upon such activity in Latin America. The attitudes of United States officers toward their profession and their role in society, and indeed the very training in the arts of war which they imported, did not fail to influence somewhat the outlook and the attitudes of their Latin American colleagues.

However, despite the growth of professionalism militarism has been and still is an endemic political phenomenon in Latin America. It

continues to have two sides. It is at times progressive, at times predatory; sometimes both at once. In a region of extreme social stratification, backward economies, and great political apathy, with little respect for, and little tradition of, orderly, democratic, constitutional procedures, governments have necessarily rested upon force. Inevitably, therefore, the armed forces have played a determining political role, be it for good or for evil, for progress or for reaction.