THE MILITARY IN THAI POLITICS

by

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Military leaders have played a dominant role in the politics of Thailand for a long time. This role has not gone unchallenged and the military has experienced its ups and down, but for 24 of the years since the kingdom became a constitutional regime in 1932 the military, particularly the army, has ruled. Army officers have led the ruling group, dominated the institutions of government, and set the style of Thai politics. An appreciation of the history, organization and interrelationship of political and governmental institutions is fundamental to an understanding of the reasons for this characteristic of the country's politics. Regardless of which leader is nominally in control, government goes on and on much the same path. The fact that the ruling class is small and largely overlaps the bureaucracy is at the root of this situation. The ruling class, consequently, is responsive to a political public whose interests it shares to a great extent. Its political concerns have been narrow, where not actually personal, and conflicts have revolved largely around the basic question of political status -- how shall the rewards of goods, prestige, and power be distributed within the ruling class? This state of affairs results from the fact that other institutions which might reflect divergent streams of public opinion, e.g., the elected National Assembly (when there has been one) and the private press, are vociferous but weak. The social structure has obstructed the development of effective political parties or social organizations. Commercial interests are often considered to be alien and are politically intimidated. As a result they seek their ends through personal influence. The great and fundamental class of cultivators, absorbed in a peasant's world of work and religion and largely removed from socially revolutionary pressures, is politically inarticulate.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF TRADITIONS AND HISTORY

Military officers in modern Thailand have their roots in the traditional bureaucracy. Their historical origins are therefore the same as those of civil officials.[1] There is no indication in the kingdom's history of the existence of any other group comparable to the professional military services and officer corps of the present. Fighting was not an

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[1] Similarly it is difficult to distinguish in terms of political power the roles of royal and non-royal officials in traditional Thailand. Office, status, and power were apparently fully merged, and office holders might be either royal or non-royal nobles. The differentiation of statuses and roles of various kinds has been a major trend in the history of modern Thailand. For further discussion see George M. Kahin (ed.), Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959, pp. 6-7, 12-13.

esoteric art to be maintained by a cult or school. All political leaders were soldiers in some sense of the word; all were necessarily prepared and able to organize and lead armies. But there was no warrior class. In effect, the ruling group was bureaucratic and official, and all its members -- civil and military -- were equally subordinate to the throne.

Although there was little distinction in role between military and civil officials, there were certain characteristics of the traditional organization of the state which accounts for the historical position of the military in the present Thai political system. One of these characteristics was the formal distinction of title and paraphernalia between civil and military officials which provided an accepted set of symbols for use in building a modern army. Another was the ancient practice of military officers' holding high political position. The present military officer group is heir to these traditions.

The distinction between military and civil officials became not only formal but also functional during the period of the national reorganization, i.e., from the fourth to the seventh reigns of the Bangkok dynasty (1851 to 1932). In this period a class of professional military officers was created, and the military became a separate institution. Its outstanding characteristics were centralized organization, professionalization, institutional pride, and a dedication to nationalism. But it should be emphasized that while the military was highly bureaucratized it was not unpolitical. High princes were leaders in the reorganization of the military from the beginning. In 1905 the crown prince became by law commander in chief of the army. In 1912 the King became head of a newly created Council of National Defense, which equated military and civil affairs.

The military was a source of considerable pride to the government in this period of national reorganization. Because it had a modern military force Thailand was able to join the Allied Powers in World War I. This effort, which included sending a small expeditionary force to France, was one of the primary talking points in the negotiations which led to a complete revision of treaties between Thailand and the major world powers in the early nineteen twenties. Moreover, national pride in the military was not diminished by any question of having to share credit with foreign advisors because the army had been reorganized and rebuilt solely by Thai officials. This process certainly had its influence on the outlook of the national elite.

Military dominance in politics since 1932 is in part an outgrowth of the relationship among the parts of the government before 1932. The sovereign power was an absolute monarch. The question of the relationship between ministries and the throne was of such importance that it obscured any potential difficulties between the civilians and soldiers. The ministries drew their authority and budgets from the throne, and whatever conflict and competition there was among units of government took the form of seeking greater influence at the throne. Such conflict was no doubt present at Bangkok prior to 1932. Walter A. Graham, who was a careful and well-informed observer, makes the following remarks in regard to allocation

of funds which indicate that there was debate about the configurations of the budget:

"The question of funds is, however, a difficulty. There are many demands upon (Siam's) purse, and irrigation, improvements of communications and other works tending to the development of her natural resources are of the utmost immediate importance if her future welfare is to be assured. At present she is trying to finance her economic reform and to build up a strong war machine at one and the same time, and there are signs of an inclination to starve the former for the benefit of the latter."[2]

Moreover, for much of the period from the late nineteenth century until the coup d'etat in 1932 the distinction between political and administrative functions of the government was obscured by a broad common interest in modernization, maintaining independence, revising treaties and expanding government activities. The question of political power became pressing only with the declining urgency of the struggle for independence and legal autonomy (especially after the renegotiations of treaties in the early 1920's), the impact of world economic depression on the national budget, and the divisive effects of western antimonarchist thought. It initially centered on the issue of a real or supposed monopoly of power by members of the royal family. On this issue non-royal officials -- civil and military -- held a common position. They were opposed to royal officials, and any potential conflict between soldiers and civilians was submerged in this more immediately important conflict.

THE MILITARY IN POLITICS - CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

Prior to the coup d'etat of 1932, the military, along with other Thai bureaucrats, had been subject to a variety of forces which were influential in the formation of the decision to strike against the government. Military officers regularly from the late 19th century on had been sent abroad for study in Europe and were infused there with a taste for "progress" and the "up-to-date" if not for democracy. But when they returned home, any expertise or sense of self-importance they had acquired abroad was frustrated by the high princes and their intimates, who held a monopoly on the top posts and the making of important decisions. Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena,[3]

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[2]Walter A. Graham, Siam (London, 1924), pp. 318-319.

[3]Thai usage in personal address is always a source of confusion to the foreigner. This is because of the nearly obligatory use of titles, and because the given (first) name is most commonly used. The terms Chao Phraya, Phraya, Phra, and Luang, are titles which find their Western counterpart in military ranks, also used in Thailand. Thus a man can properly be called Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena but he may also properly be called Colonel Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena, or Colonel Phraya Phahon, or merely

leader of the 1932 coup, once said, "At the very base (of my reasons for joining in the coup) was the birth of the feeling that in the government at that time, high officials and princes acted according to their whim and were not willing to pay heed to smaller people even though there were reasons for believing them. The big boys mostly felt that the soundness of the opinion of lesser people was not important. What was important was whether or not it pleased them."[4] In addition to the lower officers being generally frustrated the Ministry of Defense was disturbed in the early 1930's by substantial budget cuts. The extent of this disturbance was indicated by the fact that Prince Bowordet, Minister of Defense from 1928 to 1931, resigned over the cut in the military budget. Such s political resignation was in itself an important event. It could not fail to add to the dissatisfaction among the military. Its impact upon those officers who participated in the coup was sufficient to persuade them to support the noble prince for the position of premier after June 1932.[5]

The nature of the coup d'etat within the narrow political system which Thailand had at that time lends a certain retrospective inevitability to the eventual dominance of the military. The literature on the preparation of the coup, which appears to have begun many years before in Paris, gives no indication that any other method of political action was contemplated. It is difficult to imagine any action which would have had any hope of success without military participation. Furthermore, the civil participants evidently had no misgivings about military participation since the paramount objective was to isolate and intimidate members of the royal ruling clique.

The events of June 1932 provided the springboard from which the military plunged into the political life of modern Thailand. Its ability since then to maneuver in the shifting currents has kept it there. The first sixteen months of the constitutional regime were decisive. Although the four senior leaders of the coup had been colonels, the role of the military had not been overwhelming, and in the initial stages of the new regime civilians held a dominant position. Military officers comprised only sixteen of the seventy persons named to the House of Representatives. The first Premier was a civilian, chosen, it has been reported, in preference

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Phraya Phahon. In recent years titles have not been granted and are not often used. Thus Field Marshal Luang Phibun Songkhram becomes Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram or Field Marshal Phibun or (for convenience) simply Phibun.

[4]Kulab Saipradit, Buanglang kan pathiwat 2475 (Behind the Revolution of 1932) Bangkok, 1947, p. 110.

[5]W. Ch. Prasangsit, pathiwat rathaprahan laekabot chalachon nai samai prachathipathai haeng prathet thai (Revolution, Coup d'Etat and Revolts in Thailand during the Democratic Period), Bangkok, 1949, p. 30.

to a candidate put forth by the military. The first constitution was written by a civilian, and the committee appointed to draft the permanent constitution was mainly civilian. Under these circumstances the civilians might have emerged as the leading force in the government had they remained unified. But they did not. Before the end of the first constitutional government a serious division developed between the younger men, who had promoted the coup and were fired with the idea of revolution, and the older, more conservative bureaucrats who had been invited into the government after the coup to lend solidity and respectability to the new regime.

Fractures began to appear in the government in the first part of 1933. After several months of tension the differences among the discordant elements led to a crisis when a dispute arose between Dr. Pridi Phanomyong, the youthful intellectual leader of the coup, and Phraya Mano, the older more conservative bureaucrat who, although not a participant in the coup, had been ordered to serve as Premier. The dispute, which initially involved an economic plan, developed into a virtual counter coup, in which Phraya Mano closed the National Assembly. This was a blow at the coup group as a whole. Several military leaders of the group with the approval of many high civilian officials reacted by seizing power and reopening the Assembly. Their position, which might be considered a prototype for subsequent reactions on occasions of military intervention, was characteristically lofty and impartial. They were opposed to the ideas of Pridi and the methods of Mano. Thus for the second time in a year the proponents of constitutional government revealed their dependence upon military support.

The indispensability of the army having been demonstrated, the important question for the future was who was to turn the army into his personal constituency? The answer to the question was complicated. Within the ruling group the military and civilian elements were in uneasy balance and the period of Phraya Phahon's government (1933-1938) was one of inner conflict in the military. Luang Phibum Songkhram, because of his role in the seizure of power from Phraya Mano and in the suppression of a rebellion in October 1933, emerged as the most prominent of the young army officers. In 1934 he became Phraya Phahon's Minister of Defense. The dynamic manner in which he built up the military, as well as the ruthless way in which he suppressed opposition to himself and the regime, cemented his grip on the army organization. During his tenure the budget of the defense establishment doubled. He also undertook a campaign of public relations which emphasized the indispensability of the military to the nation. He made speeches comparing his administration favorably with the royal administration and saying that a strong military was necessary to prevent other countries from bullying and oppressing the kingdom.[6] By his activities he constructed a solid constituency in the army. Thus based, his influence surpassed that of his rival, Dr. Pridi, and in 1938 he succeeded Phraya Phahon as Premier.

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[6]Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition, University of Chicago Press, 1939, pp. 54-55.

Between 1938 and 1944, Phibun Songkhram and the army were firmly in control of the country. Phibun instituted a nationalist policy directed initially against the Chinese minority in the country and then against France on the borders of Indochina. The latter conflict brought Thailand under the umbrella of Japan's developing strength in Southeast Asia. In December 1941 Phibun took Thailand into Japan's camp and linked his fate and the political position of the army to Japan. Phibun's coming to power and the increasingly warlike situation in which the country found itself meant greater influence for army officers in the government. Civilians continued to cooperate, although with less and less enthusiasm. One by one the more important civilians withdrew or were ousted from the government. Thus the military established their role of political dominance.

THE ARMY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

The overthrow of the Phibun cabinet in 1944 was the first direct challenge to the position of the army in politics after the take-over in 1932. It occurred when, confronted by the decline in power of Japan, with whom the armed forces had associated their fortune, and by increasing hardships in Bangkok, civilians took heart and moved against Phibun and the group of officers around him. With Phibun on the side lines the influence of the military went into a decline. From his ouster in 1944 until the coup d'etat of 1947 only five army officers held posts in eight cabinets.

In the process of revising the constitution in 1946, the civilians -- Pridi and his followers -- who had come to rely heavily on parliamentary strength attempted to use the rationale of a professional government service as a barrier to military politicians. Section 66 of that constitution prohibited permanent officials (including military officers, of course) from holding political posts. This provision was maintained in the three constitutions that were in effect between 1946 and 1951, but it did not appreciably deter ambitious officers of the services. Despite this constitutional support the military dramatically returned to power in the coup of 1947 in an action that was fundamentally against Dr. Pridi's civilian parliamentary group. Initially, the coup group had the cooperation of the Democrat Party, a civilian parliamentary group opposed to the incumbent regime, but this cooperation dissolved with a few months. Of the 36 leading figures of the coup, 33 were army officers, two were air force officers, and one was a police officer.

In the words of its leader, the coup of 1947 was carried out to "exonerate the honor of the army which had been trampled under foot."[7] At the same time, the military leadership assumed the authoritarian role of savior of the nation from "the dishonesty and evil of various kinds in the government circle,"[8] and thereby took as its trust the guarantee of

[7] W. Ch. Prasangsit, op. cit., p. 170.

[8] Ibid.

orderly and good government. Such a posture served admirably to rationalize the authority of military leaders in politics.

The three services did not support the coup with equal enthusiasm. The leaders of the coup were predominantly from the army, and there were competing groups with support from the navy and marines as well as in the National Assembly.[9] The coup leaders beat back two serious challenges to their power from other military groups -- one in 1949 and the other in June 1951. As early as 1948 an attempt to undermine their control of the army itself was stopped short.

Encroachment by parliamentary politicians was tolerated, while opposition within the armed forces was a potential threat. But in late 1951, after a thoroughly unsuccessful attempt by navy leaders to seize power, the National Assembly was dissolved. On the authority of the coup group the constitution of 1932 was reinstated, including the tutelage provision by which half the assembly was appointed by the government. By means of this consolidation the leadership of the coup d'etat group achieved overwhelming political power. By putting loyal officers and followers in all controlling posts, the army has been able to maintain its control and authority over the bulk of the government's organization.

CONTROL OF ARMY

It is difficult to distinguish by observation between an army leader with a political role and a politician whose constituency is in the army. But analytically there is a distinction. It is clear that in Thailand only an army officer can call upon the loyalty of the army to support him. But it is not clear at what rung on the political ladder an officer ceases to be an army man and loses his personal contact and influence with the action units. Wherever that may be, he comes to rely on his manipulation or placation of intermediate officers who themselves have other alternatives.

The events of 1952 to 1957 are instructive in this regard. After institution of the half-appointed parliament in November 1951, the coup d'etat group was firmly in control of all the military services, the police, the administration in general, as well as the National Assembly. But within the group were three cliques or potential cliques: The first

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[9]There are three military services in Thailand -- army, navy (including marines), and air force -- as well as a para-military police force. The three services are administered by the Ministry of Defence, and the police is a department of the Ministry of Interior. All of these services have distinct political roles and each has at least some troops available for deployment. The political distinction among them appears to be less ideological than organizational. This is not the place to elaborate the cliquish nature of Thai political life, but it is relevant that the various services have been from time to time associated with one or another conflicting clique which may or may not be mainly military.

centered on Phibun Songkhram, the second on Phin Chunhawan-Phao Siyanon, and the third on Sarit Thanarat. In retrospect it appears that in 1952 the leaders of these three cliques each had a different level of relationship to and influence over the army. Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram lost his direct contact with the army commanders of regimental level probably no later than 1944 when he was retired from the Supreme Commander's post by Pridi. When the group came to power in 1947 he was important because of his great fame and because he symbolized the honor of the army. But it was General Phin Chunhawan who was active in recruiting army commanders to the coup. In 1952 Phin was making his last stand as army commander. His political activities had already extended far beyond the army into business and variety of other matters. His clique was being transformed by his son-in-law Phao into a complex organization which combined control of the police, the government parliamentary group, and other activities.

By 1952 General Sarit, who had joined the 1947 coup as a regimental commander, was in command of the army in Bangkok and thereby probably in effective control of the army's political activities. He replaced Phin as commander-in-chief of the army and was promoted to Field Marshal in 1954. By this time the coup d'etat group was in a process of dissolution. What evidently happened was that as General Phin became more involved in political activities outside the army he lost control of it. His position came to depend on the power of his son-in-law General Phao whose influence in the army was meager. At the same time, Field Marshal Phibun's position in power depended upon the mutual support of Field Marshal Sarit and General Phao, who were about the same age and inevitably in competition to succeed Phibun as leader. These two cliques were mutually exclusive, and the rise to the top by one of them would be incompatible with the expectations of the other. Between 1955 and 1957 the cliques intensified their differences, the Phibun and Phin-Phao groups finally being ousted by Sarit, who, backed by the army, moved in to "clean up the mess."

New elections, administered by a caretaker government appointed by Field Marshal Sarit, were conducted in December 1957. They were carried out in a quiet atmosphere, and public interest was low. After the election Sarit tried to form a new parliamentary group, which was intended to amalgamate the various elements of parliamentary support, appointed or elected. Sarit, suffering ill health, named his immediate deputy in the army to the Premier's office and went abroad for medical treatment.

The new government was faced with a number of financial and political troubles which weakened its authority. Falling revenues obstructed the drafting of a satisfactory budget. Disparate elements in the government's military and parliamentary support presented conflicting claims and demands, and the difficulties were exacerbated by opposition politicians and newspapers. The government was not capable of decisive action. The situation moved from one minor crisis to another until October 1958 when Field Marshal Sarit suddenly returned to the country and, in another bloodless coup, overthrew the constitution and set himself up as a military dictator.

In January 1959 a new temporary constitution was decreed. It provided for an appointed assembly with the dual function of a legislative body and a constitutional assembly. The government was given broad discretionary powers. The Field Marshal took the Premier's office himself. A tough line was proclaimed against dissident elements and corruption. A number of the loudest parliamentary and journalistic opponents of the government were jailed and one man was executed for political crimes. The Sarit group had again established tight army control on the machinery of the government in the pattern of the coups of 1947 and 1951. The situation was unchanged in mid-1960.

THE ARMY AS A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

What is the reason behind the fact that the relative power of the army among the various bureaucratic agencies has been overwhelming since 1932? Is it not that an army is a bureaucratic agency par excellence? There are certain characteristics, inherent in an army, whose combined effect is an ability to act decisively at the opportune moment. In this regard the army is superior to rival organizations. Not the least of these characteristics is control over weapons. But arms along are not sufficient to explain the phenomenon.

After armed strength the most outstanding of the army's characteristics is the nature of its organization. The organizing principle of a modern army is its unequivocal heirarchy. This principle, whatever troubles it may have caused the armies of modern Western democracies, is admirably fitted to the traditional modes of social organization in Thailand. Even though the Thai army is historically an innovation, their hierarchical structure is completely harmonious with Thai attitudes.

Research in connection with the psychological content of social organization carried out in the village of Bang Chan in central Thailand by associates of Cornell University is very suggestive in this context. The research of the Cornell group is based on limited sources, namely, a few villagers, and extrapolation, of course, has its usual risks. Yet the homogeneity of Thai society makes plausible the extension of some of the Cornell conclusions. Given Thai social organization, urban as well as rural, political as well as domestic, military as well as civilian, these judgments are reasonable.

The essence of the analysis is that the Thai understand social organization only when patterned in subordinate-superordinate terms. In the words of L. M. Hanks, Jr. and Herbert P. Phillips, "Group coherence depends on status inequality. It is difficult for an equal to give anything of value to an equal or to command his 'respect.' Indeed he stands as a potential competitor for favors. Group solidarity requires ... framing unambiguously the relative rank of each."[10]

[10] "A Young Thai from the Countryside," in B. Kaplan (ed.), Studying Personality Crossculturally, 1959 (in press). Other parts of the Bang Chan study are in preparation by Lauriston Sharp, and R. B. Textor, as well as Hanks and Phillips.

The military is, of course, very successful at "framing unambiguously the relative rank of each." In a society with a social-psychological taste for hierarchy, a military organization (qua organization) will likely be a strong one, particularly in comparison with that which seeks to follow more egalitarian principles. To strengthen its organization the Thai army can call upon the disciplines of loyalty and swift punishment. Respect, deference, and loyalty to one's superiors are also important elements of traditional Thai social thought, and its army is able to tap these feelings without being embarrassed by any novel ideas of equality and freedom. Such feelings, which lead naturally toward good discipline, are also reinforced by a system of courts martial.

The army has further means to develop solidarity and esprit de corps. With its own distinctive uniforms and insignia, ranks and titles, and other symbolic apparatus of the organization as a whole, or of particular units, members of the army can be expected to have an allegiance to the organization as well as to individuals in it. Members of the army, particularly the officers, become concerned about the place and role of the organization on the national scene. The army's honor becomes an issue of personal honor. The fate of the army is the fate of each officer. This esprit, built upon an in-group psychology, can be further itensified by a general attitude of partiotism. The army's role as the defender of the nation makes it appear uniquely important that its dignity and honor be upheld.

Soldiering, moreover, is now a profession. The esoteric arts of government are combined in the army with the esoteric arts of warfare. The management of large units of men is matched by the management and operation of large machines and weapons. The sciences of tactics and strategy are in the possession of the army. The fate of the nation, it is maintained, depends upon the degree to which army officers are permitted to practice these arts and sciences unencumbered by petty and niggling demands. Esprit de corps and in-group attitudes, while to some extent characteristic of all governmental units in Thailand, are practically nonexistence outside the bureaucratic organizations. Hence the ability of the military, particularly the army, to mobilize large numbers of men for coordinate action has given it a distinct advantage in controlling political action.

Since the beginning of the constitutional regime the Ministry of Defense has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, and within the ministry the army has been the dominant service. The ministry's appropriation is succinctly stated in a few lines in the annual budget, and there is no indication that nonmilitary agencies make inquiries into the military's expenditures. The Ministry itself is staffed almost entirely by officers under discipline. The position of the army is indicated by the fact that all ministers have been army officers as have been the permanent undersecretaries. The army's share of the defense budget invariably has been greater than that of the other services.

The Ministry of Defense engages in a number of extra military activities. It directs several industrial enterprises, including a fuel-distribution organization and factories producing batteries, leather goods, glass, woven cloth, and canned food. Military units operate a majority of commercial radio broadcasting stations in the country. The Ministry is a major shareholder in the Military Bank (Thanakan Thahan), a private commercial venture. This type of administrative autonomy is widespread in the government, but in the military it is highly developed for two reasons. One is the very simple consideration that the army wants it that way and can insist on it. The second is that the military has control of far greater financial resources than other agencies and therefore has an unusual degree of flexibility. Such administrative free-wheeling has a tendency to run away with itself and has become increasingly difficult to bring under outside control.

The military not only enjoys great administrative autonomy but is judicially independent. Soldiers live under strict military law and are tried in military courts. The sway of military law has at times been extraordinarily broad. For example, in 1939, when a group of conspirators was brought to trial for revolt, it was decided by the government, then under Phibun Songkhram's firm control, that because some of the accused were army officers all of them should appear before a special court under military law.[11]

Finally, the recruitment and training of its own personnel make up perhaps the most important aspects of the autonomy of the armed service. These activities are particularly important in regard to the officer corps. The army as well as the other services maintain cadet academies which receive large numbers of applicants because of the prestige of the military officer's role. The staff, consequently, can be quite selective in choosing personnel, a process that in itself helps to create the image of the officer corps as an elite group. The graduates of the military academies are generally freed from routine administration, which is left to graduates of civil universities, who are obliged to spend a period of them in the service. Control over education permits the army to mold the mind of the officer candidate, including his attitude toward politics. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that military officers in Thailand share certain attitudes and ideas which distinguish them from civilians.

It may help to explain the soldier's role in politics if we consider some of his allegiances. The first has to do with his attitude towards the nation. One of the most important justifications of the military is its purpose as bearer of the national honor, defender of national independence, and symbol of national status in the world community. In a selection of messages to the army on Army Day 1955 we

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[11] Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, February 6, 1939, p. 23.

find the following statements that support the above view. "It is a matter of certainty that the Thai army is an up-to-date army equal to the armies of other countries.... It is a certainty that the army is capable of maintaining the independence of the Thai nation very firmly and in a way that is fitting to the honor of the Thai nation as well...."[12] "Thailand is a country which is independent and fully sovereign; so it must have an army to shield, defend, and maintain its independent and sovereignty undivided.... During the time that I was commander-in-chief of the army, I tried to the best of my ability to bring about rapid progress in the army so that it would be the equal of the armies of independent nations of the same rank, and I tried fully to develop our army speedily beyond those of our neighbors which have just recently joined the ranks of independent nations...."[13] "The highest duty of a soldier is to shield and defend the nation from the threats of its enemies so that the people can live happily and at peace. Soldiers receive the highest honor and trust from the nation...."[14]

A second allegiance of the Thai officer is to the simple virtues: love of duty, love of honor, and love of nation, to mention only the foremost. How the academy seeks to inculcate these virtues in the young officers can be seen from the diagram reproduced below. It is taken from the Army Day book and is introduced by the following statement:

> "The present Cadets Department has heavy activities in conducting affairs for the cadets. It is necessary to work 24 hours together without finishing. But pride may be surely taken in the elements combined in the plan for the inculcation of character in the (academy)."

Finally, the soldier is oriented toward action and leadership. The military academies put a great deal of emphasis upon qualities of leadership in the training program. One may assume that deciveness and even aggressiveness are rewarded to a greater extent in the army than elsewhere in the Thai bureaucracy.

Imbued with a sense that the nation's fate and honor depend on him, along with a somewhat limited view of moral and political virtue, and a tendency to act rather than to reflect, the Thai officer does not long hesitate to press his case and that of the army itself. What is good for the army is good for the country. His ethics make few demands on restraint or patience, and his conception of virtue sustains a self-confidence that

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[12] Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram in wan kong thap bok (Army Day), Bangkok, 1955, unpaged.

[13] Field Marshal Phin Chunhawan, Ibid.

[14] King Phumiphon, Ibid.

is reinforced by his experience as an army officer who is seldom questioned or challenged by subordinates. In short, he tends to be decisive, active, and assured.

In contrast with the indoctrinated and politically minded officer, the common soldier of Thailand is generally indifferent to politics. His social horizon is not likely to extent far beyond his village, and his education is at best four years of elementary school. In the services he is schooled in loyalty and obedience to superiors. As a two-year conscript his devotion to the army is limited. In short he is a politically indifferent and docile pawn in the leaders' political game.

In addition to strength of organization and tendencies of character which fit the army well for the game of bureaucratic politics, qualities which are not exclusively associated with the army, there are others peculiarly its own. They fall under three heads: mobile force, leisure time, and effective rationale.

Because control of the capital means effective control of the government, the army units based in Bangkok are crucial for maintaining the political role of the army. They are under the single command of the First Army. Precisely how many troops there may be in the Bangkok area is not public knowledge, but the figure is certainly much higher than any other group could muster. The men are all compactly located to the north and east of the city and can be rapidly activated by telephone. Among the troops stationed in Bangkok is at least one battalion of tanks, which inevitably appears at each periodic declaration of emergency. Since the declaration of an emergency is not an unusual occurrence, one may assume that the army has a standing plan for such occasions. The orderly establishment of patrol by army units at key locations in the city at times of declared emergency is one of the more impressive displays of organized activity to be observed in the city of Bangkok. Its significance is surely not lost on politicians.

In the many coups and revolts since 1932 that have involved a show of force or sustained fighting the army has never failed. On the six occasions when the army took the offensive to change the political situation, namely, June 1932, June 1933, November 1947, November 1951, September 1957, and October 1958, the seizure of key points in Bangkok and the arrest of certain leaders proved sufficient for success. On the three occasions when fighting took place, October 1933, February 1949, and June 1951, the army successfully beat back moves to oust it from power. In the first of these -- the Bowordet Rebellion -- the fighting was in fact between certain upcountry garrisons and the combined force of the Bangkok army garrisons and the navy ground forces. In those of 1949 and 1951 the army fought with the cooperation of the air force and the police against naval and marine troops. This history of the use of force in politics clearly indicates that the army has been sufficiently determined and strong to impose its will on its opponents, and probably will continue to be.

The leisure time which an armed force enjoys in a state that is the size and in the position of Thailand has to a large entent been devoted to political activities and intrigue. As has been indicated, the military has served occasionally as an instrument of diplomacy, as in the First World War and Korea, in both of which Thailand was represented by token forces. Presumably the military would ordinarily devote its attention to planning for defense from external attack, and considerable ataff effort does go into such work. But there must be serious doubts about the Thai military as an instrument of national defense.

Such doubts arise not from an inability or unwillingness to fight. It is rather a question of whether or not the defense of Thailand is or will be a matter of its own independent military action. In the early twentieth century, when Thailand was squeezed by France and Britain, its only defenses were diplomatic. From 1909 to 1941 Thailand lived at peace under the umbrella of European imperialism. Japan substituted a parasol in 1941, with little resistance from Thailand. The switch back in 1945 came without fighting. At present Thailand is on the marches of the free world, its fate largely in the hands of the United States and China. Whatever its capabilities, Thai military has been largely untried.

The army leadership, freed, perhaps unconsciously, from a sense of responsibility for defense, has therefore been at leisure to plan action in the political arena. In this respect the military has an advantage over all other government organizations, since the latter have continuing administrative obligations to keep them occupied. The police, for example, who share the use of force with the military, are charged with such a variety of duties that they cannot undertake strong political action against the military.

The third function of the army -- the maintenance of internal security -- furnishes a rationale sufficient to justify the army's political activities. The question of what actually constitutes a threat to internal security is a subtle one, as any student of the history of civil liberties knows. In the recent history of Thailand, the military on various occasions has taken it upon itself to judge this question and has overthrown governments, suppressed dissident elements, and beaten back counter coups in the name of civil order.

THE ARMY IN THE SYSTEM

By its success, the army is confronted with the tensions that pervade the Thai political system: an authoritarian tendency, at once welcomed but illegitimate and irregular; and an egalitarianism, which is legitimate but does not work. At present, the authoritarian pattern, demonstrated by the army's dominant position, is ascendant and is bolstered by social tradition. The removal of the throne from politics in 1932 by no means ended traditional attitudes toward authority characterized by uncritical acceptance of orders from above. As has been indicated, such attitudes survive in

the psychological content of social relations, and the army has become their most powerful repository. In turn they form the basis of much of the army's own solidarity and, given their pervasiveness throughout the government, provide the psychological means (supplemented by organizational strength and arms) to control the government. In its relationship with other groups and institutions the army seeks to subordinate rather than to eliminate. There is no indication that the army's leadership has any desire to revolutionize the nation's social or economic system. In general it has been conservative and in some respects reactionary, and this in spite of the fact that its dominance is a result of the reduction of royal power. The army has always accepted the view that it should rule the country through the bureaucracy, a bureaucracy that by Asian standards is very successful. The army has also developed such congenial working relationships with business interests that they are not likely to be precipitously destroyed.

But at the same time its own authority to rule is extra-legal. Its legitimacy is open to challenge from any group which dares. Such challenges under the circumstance tend toward open power conflicts occasionally involving shooting. To give the appearance of some legitimacy the army has made a show of adherence to constitutionalism, and in doing this has repeatedly created problems for itself. The National Assembly as a symbol of constitutionalism has been particularly troublesome in this regard. Those members who are appointed can, of course, be controlled, but elected members have resisted the more subtle techniques of authority: Their stentorian voices have often been stilled, but only by offices, privileges, and other bribes. An increase in tension has been evident in recent years, and perhaps only by such means as Sarit's current practice of postponing constitutional decision can peace in Thailand be maintained.

Figure 1

THE INCULCATION OF CHARACTER IN THE ARMY ACADEMY



Source: wan kong thapbok 2498 (Army, Day, 1955).

MIDDLE EASTERN ARMIES AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS

by

Manfred Halpern

THE ARMY'S TRADITIONAL ROLE

Soldiers have governed a majority of the middle Eastern countries almost continuously for at least a millennium. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in 1960 the army ruled five of the fifteen countries between Morocco and Pakistan (the United Arab Republic, Turkey, Sudan, Iraq, and Pakistan), and constituted the principal organizational support of the government in seven others (Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Algeria). Since 1930 military coups have overturned governments on eighteen occasions in this area, and on many other times pressure from the army or an army faction proved decisive in altering the composition of government and the direction of policies.

There has never been a tradition in the Middle East of separating military from civilian authority. Quite the contrary. The common way for a leader in traditional Islam to form a state (that is, to achieve rule over people not his own) was to conquer. The easiest way for a tribal leader to create a realm, or for a sultan to defend it, was to lead his own armed forces. Religious conversion might create the initial force of the empire or bring about its first adherents (as exemplified by the beginnings of the Islamic empire), but conquest was invariably its main motive force. The Prophet Mohammed and the Caliphs after him always bore the responsibility of being "Commander of the Faithful." Once the conquered realm had grown so large that the ruler could no longer rely on his own tribesmen to defend it, he customarily resorted to mercenary or slave armies. Thereafter, it was only a matter of time until, in the absence of strong civilian institutions, the ruler became the captive of the army he had created.[1]

Thus, within two hundred years after the Prophet Mohammed's death in 632, the caliphs of Baghdad had lost all but their titular power in the Islamic empire to mercenary soldiers. By 1100, the greatest Islamic medieval philosophar, al-Ghazzali, had acknowledged the fiction of the Caliphate and admitted that "government in these days is a consequence solely of military power and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of

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[1] See Ibn Khaldun, The Muquaddimah, An Introduction to History, New York, 1958, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, esp. Vol. I, pp. 252-286, 305-307, 311-347; Vol. II, pp. 103-155.

military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph."[2] The sultans of the final Islamic empire, the Ottoman Empire, often suffered the same fate in Constantinople and, with greater frequency, so did the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, Cairo, and other peripheral areas which sometimes acknowledged the suzerainty of Constantinople. What is novel today in the Middle East is not control by army officers. What is new are the groups for which the army speaks and the interests it represents.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS

In this century, army coups reflect larger forces and issues than were once involved in the frequent changing of the guard. In the Middle East where kings, landowners, and a bourgeoisie of middlemen and traders are declincing in power or have already yielded their place, and where workers and peasants are only beginning to enter politics, the army has become the principal political actor and instrument of a new middle class. This new middle class is essentially nonpropertied. Its members are either salaried or determined to be so, and are prepared to resort to revolutionary action if necessary. The merchants and middlemen of the Middle East are not and have seldom been in a position comparable to their counterparts in Western Europe. In no Middle Eastern country today do their capital, skill, and organization compare with what the government can muster. Only the new, salaried, middle class, clustered around a core of civilian and military politicians and administrators, is capable, through control of the state apparatus, of ushering in the machine age by controlling it, and leading the quest for status, power and prosperity.

Currently, the pressures that make for organizations and organization men are much more desperate in the Middle East than in the West. In the Middle East there are few important jobs available outside the large organizations and institutions that are controlled or guided by government. Those who cannot find employment in them usually count for little and are often unable to sustain themselves. There is little hope for prosperity in private ventures. Indeed, more organization is urgently needed for aggregating separate interests, bargaining among them, and executing a common will.

The political core of this new class is possessed of a driving interest in ideas, action, and careers -- in all three and not merely one of them. Its leading elements are not exclusively intellectuals. Many of them, new to the realm of modern ideas, are eager for action and careers. That they are interested in more than action distinguishes them from the tribal sheiks and military commanders who made themselves sultans in earlier generations. Generally speaking, the men of this new class are committed to nationalism and social reform. They are also committed to fashioning opportunities and institutions that will provide careers

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[2] Kitab al-Iktisad fi'ltikad, p. 107, cited by Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, London, 1950, Vol. I, p. 31.

for all who have skills. This involves them in actions novel to their society and so distinguishes them from politicians of earlier periods. They know that without new ideas and new actions careers will not open or remain secure.

The new middle class is distinguishable from all other classes in the Middle East because it is composed of persons who think and act as individuals rather than as representatives of families or groups. It is the first class in Middle Eastern history to draw from all social groups without regard for family connections. It is the first class for whom successful communication depends on the ability to persuade other individuals; it cannot depend upon the implicit consensus of the past. Unlike the traditional elite of landowners and the trading bourgeoisie or the tradition-bound artisans or peasants, the new middle class is the first class in the Middle East to be wholly the product of the transition to the modern age. Unlike the present new generation of peasants and urban workers, it is already sufficiently powerful to begin molding the structure and functions of modern society. It is the first class for which the choice in the spectrum between democracy and totalitarianism is a real one.

Only a minority of the Middle East's new middle class, however, actually holds jobs and draws salaries.[3] A far larger proportion are jobless, although they possess the necessary qualifications for the positions already held by those who are considered middle class.

This new class, whose unfulfilled aspirations have made it revolutionary, has discovered that the force of arms can give reality to its quest for ideas, action, and careers. Together with the military, it has become the great champion of nationalism and social change.

FROM PRAETORIAN GUARD TO ADVANCE GUARD

The transformation of the army from an instrument of repression in its own interests or that of kings into the vanguard of nationalism and social reform usually began with its unintended subversion by its traditional masters. Their royal commanders wanted to borrow the "cutting edge" of Western civilization the better to defend themselves against its encroachments.[4] The change came first in the Ottoman Empire, where

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[3] For example, by 1947, about a third of all Egyptians with primary school education or higher held government jobs. By 1953, about 46 per cent of total expenditures went for government salaries and wages. (Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, Princeton, 1957, p. 83.) In Iraq between 1950 and 1955 about 10,000 Iraquis graduated from the Colleges of Law, Commerce, Arts, and Sciences, but only 1,250 of them found jobs in government and business. (Al-Hawadith, a Baghdad daily, September 17, 1955.

[4] Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran, Cambridge, 1951, p. 51.

the sultans in the late eighteenth century began to invite European army instructors and, in so doing, opened the door to new ideas regarding administration, production, and ultimately to new objectives. With the deposition of Sultan Abd al-Hamid II in 1908, it became "clear that `... the sultans had moved into a new era, no longer had to deal with secret palace intrigues or the revolt of disaffected sections of their troops, were faced with the openly expressed will of political parties -- representatives of large groups of the people -- ... backed by responsible military forces."[5] With the victory of Kemal Ataturk in the early nineteen-twenties, the transformation of the army was completed in Turkey.

Elsewhere European powers, assuming control of Middle Eastern countries before and after World War I, often created and trained the first modern and efficient local army units. But they also delayed the rise of independent strong armies in Iraq until 1932, in Egypt until 1936, in Syria and Lebannon until 1945, in Pakistan until 1948, in the Sudan until 1954, and in Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan until 1956. Outside of Turkey, army revolts were not instinct with the spirit of social reform until the Iraqi army coup of 1936.[6] It was the Egyptian army coup of 1952 that marked the beginning of the end for traditional army regimes in the Arab world.

The modernization of the armed forces of the Middle East, though a powerful catalyst for internal social change, was of no avail against foreign enemies. Mohammed Ali's successors were defeated by British armies in 1882; the fight of the Arab armies in Syria and Iraq in 1920 against the French and British Mandate was in vain; the Iraqi army was overwhelmed by British troops in 1941; the Iranian army, the special favorite of the modernizing Reza Shah, yielded without fighting to British and Soviet occupation in 1941; the Ottoman Empire was defeated by European arms and Arab rebellions in World War II; the modern Arab armies were defeated by Israel in 1948; the modern Egyptian army by Israel, Britain, and France in 1956.

Defeats have not been due to a lack of courage and competence. The core of the Tunisian and Moroccan army is composed of experienced World War II, Indochina, and guerrilla fighters. The majority of the Libyan,

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[5]A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty, Oxford, 1956, pp. 71-72.

[6]See Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, Oxford, 1951, pp. 83-115. In the Arab world the first inklings of a new spirit in the army had come in 1882 when the revolt of 'Arabi against Turkish and Circassian predominance in the Egyptian army officer corps and foreign control of Egyptian finances attracted the sympathy and support of oppressed fellahin who bore the brunt of paying the foreign debt. That rise, however, was followed by British occupation and nearly five decades of British control over the Egyptian army,

Sudanese, and Pakistani army are veterans of World War II. Individual officers in all Middle Eastern armies have risked their lives in combat. The Algerian Army of Liberation is being tested now (1960). Still, no local army is strong enough to defend itself against any non-Middle Eastern power, and among the fifteen here under discussion, none is as strong as the neighbor whose attack it most fears.

This relative military backwardness is inescapable, given the present distribution of power in the world and the degree of industrialization, research, planning, and organization required to maintain a modern war machine. Despite this truism the modernization of Middle Eastern armies has in every instance been intended to provide a defense against foreign aggression.

Since World War II all middle Eastern states, traditional or modern, even the more isolated countries of Yemen and Afghanistan, have spent millions of dollars to make their armed forces more modern and powerful. For the five year period between 1954 and 1959, the sums expended ranged from about $50,000,000 for Yemen to about $1,000,000,000 for Egypt.[7]

It was defeat in the Palestine war that set off the first chain of army coups in the Arab world under the leadership of the new middle class. Defeat in that campaign was a most unexpected shock and encouraged radical attempts to correct the situation. The debacle also illuminated, more clearly and dramatically than any other, the relationship between external and internal weaknesses in the Arab World. "Listen," said a comrade to Nasir as they lay surrounded by Israeli troops at Fâluja, "the biggest battlefield is in Eqypt," while Nasir felt himself "thrust treacherously into a battle for which we were not ready, our lives the playthings of greed, conspiracy and lust, which have left us here weaponless under fire.... Over there is our country, another Faluja on a larger scale."[8]

The Arab fighters in the Palestine war soon discovered that their rulers had failed them. After decades of talk about Arab unity, their leaders were divided on war objectives, and several were plainly giving priority to seizing more Palestinian territory than to gaining ultimate victory. Their rulers were also incompetent. After years of anticipating this particular war, they could not plan a common military or diplomatic

[7]In Saudi Arabia the king today possesses three armies: the White Army, based on loyalty to Wahhabi religious doctrines (the remnants of the Ikhwan who helped King Ibn Saud capture his kingdom), the regular Saudi Army, based on conscription and tribal levies, and a large Royal Body-guard, based on individual selection.

[8]Gamal abd al-Nasir, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Washington, 1953, pp. 22-23. See also Costi Zuraky, The Meaning of the Disaster, translated by R. Bayly Winder, Beirut, 1956, and Musa al-Alami, Ibrat Filastin (The Lesson of Palestine), Beirut, 1949, summarized and translated in The Middle East Journal, October, 1949, pp. 373-403.

strategy. Furthermore, they were corrupt. They appointed commanding generals without regard for military ability and failed to buy adequate arms. After the defeat of Arab arms, these same rulers did everything they could to keep the reasons for the debacle from being investigated. Intent on maintaining their old favorites in office, they redirected the army to its old business of internal repression. If there had been any doubts that they were incapable of directing reform programs, these actions removed them. Indeed, the conduct of the leadership encouraged some army officers to plot coups d'etat and made others more sensitive to the poverty, disease, exploitation, and illiteracy that characterize contemporary life in the Middle East.

THE ARMY'S SPECIAL VIRTUES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

One reason why officers showed an acute awareness of the chronic ills of their countries during the late 1940's was that as young men they had entered the army in the first place to escape the frustrations of civilian life, in particular, the failure of the elite to expand the civilian economy and to give greater responsibility and status to the civilian bureaucracy. This phenomenon, first observable in the Ottoman Empire before 1900,[9] was evident in Egypt by the late 1930's. In Egypt "not infrequently, high school teachers and lawyers, dissatisfied with their professions, or believing that their ambitions can better be attained in the army, enter military schools and resume their public careers in the military service. General Nagib is not the only one who had a background in law before he entered military training, and those who for a short time served as teachers may be counted in the hundreds."[10]

The more the army was modernized, the more its composition, organization, spirit, capabilities, and purpose constituted a radical criticism of the existing political system. Within the army, modern technology was eagerly welcomed and its usefulness and power appreciated. By contrast, the political system was inert, inefficient, and greedy. Within the army, merit was often rewarded. In civilian politics, corruption, nepotism, and bribery were rampant. Patriotism as well as a sense of duty were more clearly defined and more deeply felt by the military than by the leaders of political institutions.

As the army became modernized and professionalized, the traditionalist elements within the civilian sector found army service less to their taste,

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[9]Ernest E. Ramsour, Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, Princeton, 1957.

[10]Majid Khadduri, "The Role of the Military in Middle Eastern Politics," American Political Science Review, June 1953, p. 517. (This article is reprinted as "The Army Officer: His Role in Middle Eastern Politics," in Social Forces in the Middle East, Ithaca, 1955, pp. 162-184.)

in large part because it was harder for them to compete on terms relevant to the new tasks of the military and acceptable to the code of the new middle class. "Except for the royal family, there was no aristocracy, and the sort of landowners and traders who might have led the Armed Forces were too busy enjoying their wealth to be bothered with military service. The officer corps in consequence was largely composed of the sons of civil servants and soldiers and the grandsons of peasants."[11] The change in control came quickly once the ground was prepared. The British permitted Egypt to open its military academy to all social ranks in 1936 and two years later Nasir and several of his fellow conspirators in the Free Officers Group graduated from the Academy's first class in 1938.

As the army officer corps came to represent the interests and views of the new middle class, it became the most powerful instrument of that class. The Army's great strength lay in the kind of men who joined it, the opportunities at their disposal, and the weakness of competing institutions. In contrast to most Middle Eastern political parties, armies are disciplined, well-organized, and able to move into action without securing the voluntary consent of their members. In contrast to modern Middle Eastern bureaucracies, armies are less likely to diffuse responsibility within the hierarchy and are more prone to rebel against the status quo. This combination of discipline and defiance is not unusual in the Middle East. Only in Turkey, Tunisia, and Morocco have political parties (and in the latter two countries also trade unions) shown superior capabilities, and thus shaded the political importance of the army. Almost everywhere else, modern armies have offered the most power to those who most wanted it. They have served as national standard-bearer when others who claimed that role proved irresponsible and ineffective. They have supplied an education in modern technology when industry was too scant to provide it, a disciplined organization without peer, a unity in the face of the corrupt and unprincipled competition of domestic interests and the threat of foreign imperialism. Little wonder, therefore, that many of the most enterprising members of the new middle class have been attracted to it.

The special caliber of the army leadership has been evident. Willingness to fight for one's convictions was more common in the army than in the political system. Almost all of the military men who gained political prominence in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, and Jordan during the nineteen-fifties had risked their lives in military battles and their liberties in political conspiracies. To have fought bravely a generation earlier when the cause was exclusively nationalism no longer counted, as the generally popular assassination of General Nuri in Iraq and King Abdullah in Jordan made plain. To have led or participated in contemporary guerrilla activities, however, or to have risked or endured imprisonment for political activities, counted for much (as the contemporary Tunisian and Moroccan leadership demonstrates), even when

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[11]Mohammed Nagib, Egypt's Destiny, New York, 1955, pp. 14-15.

one was a civilian. The army, however, often had more power and hence opportunity to translate courage into action than either politician or bureaucrat.[12] Nasir said much the same thing when he noted that "the situation demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive framework. . . . composed of men able to trust each other; a force with enough material strength at its disposal to guarantee a swift and decisive action. These conditions could only be met by the army."[13]

The compulsion upon army officers to take over the government, once their numbers were sufficient, was overwhelming: to have such dreams, knowledge, and capabilities, and yet to yield to a traditional elite and a political system that lacked all the virtues the army possesses was something they could not endure. When the traditional elite assigned to the army the primary task of maintaining domestic order, it gave to the army what was in effect a political mission. It thus also offered the army the temptation of making political choices.

In almost all other middle Eastern countries where the army had already seized control (in modern times) its opportunity for intervention could scarcely have been greater. Constitutions were too new and too often imposed from outside to express a consensus among people who still believed that law could be based only on the word of God, who had long put all laws in question through their casuistry and tyranny, or who were not yet agreed on the methods and objective of government. Parliaments, parties, political brokers, and bureaucracies remained blunt and ineffective instruments so long as they remained under the rule of kings and landlords. Elections were almost invariably rigged; the press, silenced or controlled. The traditional elite itself failed to establish organized and responsive relationships with the rest of the population. It had always exploited the politically inarticulate and it had disaffected the loyalties of the new generation of the politically conscious and capable by failing to deal effectively with social change or national loyalty in doubt by retaining unusually close relations with former imperial powers.

When the Middle Eastern military finally determined "to occupy high political office through the weapons of its own profession,"[14] it did so with a minimum of violence.

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[12]Mosadeq fell from office in large part because he tried, having only the power of a Prime Minister and party leader, to break the alliance between the monarchy and the army and, from the outside, to reorganize army leadership. Courage he had, but his power was not equal to that of the army. (L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics, New York, 1955, p. 206.)

[13]Nasir, op. cit., p. 42.

[14]Khadduri, "The Role of the Military in Middle Eastern Politics," op. cit., p. 511.

THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES

We know little about the internal structure of the more potent governing bureaucracies in the Middle East; hence the blanks in the table below. Certain categories of facts were entirely beyond reach, and hence no rubric appears for them. Among these are: (1) the average age of officer ranks (colonels tend to come to political power in their thirties. Are majors, who are usually in their late twenties, too young to initiate coups?); (2) the number of officers in each grade (in several Arab states there appear to be very few generals. Are colonels in their thirties stimulated to political ambition in part because they have reached the top in the army?); (3) the number who graduated from military academies at home or abroad (Sandhurst, St. Cyr, Benning, Moscow) or who rose without schooling. (The difference between Ayub (Pakistan) and Nasir (Egypt) may in part be the difference between the English Military Academy at Sandhurst and the Military Academy of Egypt: how important are school ties?) The table, which clearly shows a trend toward the schooled officer who enters a local academy as a result of passing examinations and is often promoted in the same fashion, cannot tell us why candidates choose the army. It is true of all Middle Eastern civilian and military bureaucracies that there are many more applications than vacancies.

The relative economic power of the army is suggested by the large sums allocated to it. National comparisons are difficult to make, however, not only because of lack of information but because certain sums (Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, for example) include foreign military aid; others (for example, Syria) do not. The salaries paid are generally high, considering that the average annual per capita income in most of the Middle East ranges from $50 - $150. Moreover, army pay does not include free food, housing, medical care, transportation, and other fringe benefits. Further research might usefully compare the salaries of the military bureaucracy with those of the civilian bureaucracy and those of merchants and professionals. Similarly, it would be profitable to compare the size of officer corps and armies with the hard core and following of past or present political parties in each country. (Figures available for other Middle Eastern countries suggest that estimates for the blank spaces should be made on the basis of one commissioned officer for every 15-30 men.)

All figures cited in the table below may be considered correct within a ten per-cent margin of error.

Country	Size of all Military Forces in 1959[a]	Size of Officer Corps	Size of all Military Forces in 1949	Total Population	Expenditures for Military Forces	Yearly Pay of Colonel	Yearly Pay of Second Lieutenant	Yearly Pay of First Sergeant	Yearly Pay of Private
Morocco	30,000[b]	900	20,000 (1956)	10,000,000 (1958)	$45,000,000 (1958)				
Tunisia	12,000	250	1,500 (1956)	3,650,000	15,000,000 (1959/60)			$960	
Libya	4,500		1,500 (1952)	1,000,000					
Egypt	80,000[c]		70,000	23,000,000	225,000,000 (1958/59)				$32
Syria	60,000		25,000	4,200,000	80,000,000 (1959/60)	$2,200	$1,200	700	200
Sudan	12,000		5,000 (1954)	10,000,000					
Saudi Arabia	30,000[d]	1,000		6,000,000	150,000,000 (1958)	2,000	1,000	600	480
Yemen	10,000			5,000,000					84
Lebanon	9,000	250	4,000	1,500,000	8,000,000 (1956)	3,500	1,200	500	375
Iraq	50,000		45,000	6,000,000					
Jordan	35,000[e]	1,700	17,000	1,500,000	75,000,000 (1959/60)				
Iran	150,000	11,000	110,000	22,000,000	440,000,000 (1956/57)	1,350	700	400	2.76
Turkey	460,000		400,000	28,000,000		3,700	1,500	1,300	1.32
Afghanistan	50,000			12,000,000					
Pakistan	260,000	13,000	200,000	85,000,000	230,000,000 (1956/57)	4,500	1,250	200	60

[a]The term "military forces" includes army, navy, and airforce, but not police forces, which are often considerable.

[b]In addition, there are about 10,000 National Police.

[c]In addition, there are about 25,000 auxiliary troops, used as territorial and frontier guards.

[d]About half of these constitute the Saudi Army, half the tribal White Army; a portion of the former, the Royal Guard Regiment, is about 2,500 strong.

[e]In addition, there are about 15,000 Frontier Guards.

COUNTRY	SELECTION AND PROMOTION OF MEN	SELECTION AND PROMOTION OF OFFICERS
Morocco	Former Moroccan members of French army and former members of guerrilla Moroccan Army of Liberation.	Moroccans trained as former NCO's in French and Spanish armies or as officers in French and Spanish military academies.[f] New also at Moroccan Academy. Promotions by ability and political reliability.
Tunisia	Former members of guerrilla fighters and French army and now selection among conscripted of loyal Neo-Destout Party youth members. Promotion by education, ability, and political reliability.	Tunisians trained as former NCO's in French army or as officers in French Military Academy. Promotions by ability and political reliability.
Libya		
Egypt	Enforced universal conscription for three-year periods. Promotion by examination.	Written examination for admission to Egyptian Military Academy. Promotion initially by examination, higher ranks by political reliability and length of service.
Syria	Universal conscription and volunteers. Promotion by seniority and proficiency.	Graduation from Military Academy. Promotion by political reliability and length of service.
Sudan	Life-time volunteers who until recent years tended, like former conscripts, to come largely from Negroid pagan tribes of southern Sudan.	Written examination among graduates of secondary schools for admission to military college. Until 1954, all officers were northern Moslems.
Saudi Arabia	Three-year volunteers with occasional impressments. Special selection for ability and political reliability for Royal Guard Regiment.	Volunteers from among families with political and social prestige. Promotion by personal influence, political reliability, length of service, efficiency.
Yemen	Lifetime volunteers with occasional impressments. Some non-commissioned ranks are retained by inheritance within specific families.	Volunteers from among families with political and social prestige. Promotions by personal influence.
Lebanon	Volunteers for prolonged periods.	Christians, graduates of French military schools, predominate in numbers over Moslems and Druses.
Iraq	Conscription.	
Jordan	Three-year enlistments. Promotion by education and time in grade.	
Iran	Unevenly enforced conscription for two-year periods. Promotion by education and time in grade.	Graduation from Military Academy. Promotion by personal influence and political reliability.
Turkey	Enforced universal conscription for two-year periods.	Graduation from Military Academy. (All high school graduates are required to train for 18 months as reserve officers.) Promotion by seniority.
Afghanistan	Unevenly enforced conscription for two-year periods.	Graduation from Military Academy. Promotion by personal influence.
Pakistan	Seven-year volunteers, three-quarters of them drawn from Punjabis, second Pathans (both West Pakistani) are given physical, aptitude, and intelligence tests before admission.	Senior officers British-trained, usually Pathan or Punjabi (both West Pakistani). Junior officers commissioned during World War II. Thereafter 4-day tests and interviews before admission to Military Academy.

[f]An unusually large number of officers are drawn from Berber-speaking tribes unlike the Moroccan population at large of whom only about one-third are Berber-speaking; the rest speak Arabic.

CONTRASTS IN THE HISTORY OF MIDDLE EASTERN ARMIES

The histories of the armies vary as much as the histories of the nations they represent. The contrasts between Turkey and Syria are especially instructive. Turkey has had every reason to take pride in its military tradition and strength. Its army under Kemal Ataturk created modern Turkey in the face of military intervention by Western armies and maintained it in the face of threats from the USSR. Its prestige has helped it to secure better food than it had had for hundreds of years. After 1924, the army as an institution left the political arena. It believed it could afford to do so because its own men were solidly established in the top positions of the executive and the Grand Assembly.[15] Social reform, economic progress, and international recognition were patently the fruits of its success. By making it obligatory for all fellow-officers active in politics to resign from the army, Kemal Ataturk also neutralized the latter as a ready springboard for further coups. Later regimes compelled all high school graduates to serve 18 months as reserve officers and so linked civilians to an army that served as a school for citizenship, literacy, and obedience.

The Turkish army would probably have been content with only its veto power if its professional strength had been kept up and if the broad objectives of Ataturk had suffered no retrogression. Its reentry in politics in May 1960 was due not to its own ambitions but to Premier Adnan Menderes attack on the inheritance of Ataturk. He had made concessions to religious traditionalism, curbed political freedom, and weakened the economy. Above all, he attempted to utilize the army as a police force for destroying the opposition party. To maintain its neutral role in politics, the army overthrew Menderes, but gave every promise of withdrawing to its barracks and its accustomed role as "Guardian of the Revolution."

The Syrian army, by contrast, has suffered from many political and military handicaps. For centuries Syria had been governed as a province or possession of other empires. For only ninety years in the past thirteen hundred was it the seat of an imperial realm under the Umayyad dynasty. When it finally achieved its independence in 1946, its frontiers were arbitrarily drawn up by Europeans. A sense of military loyalty and mission was difficult to create in such an entity.

Under Ottoman rule until the end of World War I, Syrian officers served in Ottoman armies only outside their own country. Under the French mandate, Syrian officers were outranked by French officers, and the enlisted men were deliberately recruited by the French from linguistic and religious minorities. While the French remained in charge, the politically most active

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[15] For figures demonstrating the preponderance of the military until 1937, see Frederick W. Frey, "The Two-Edged Sword: The Army in Turkish Politics," (mimeographed), June 1960, drawing upon his larger study of Turkish parliamentary politics now being completed.

urban Arab Moslems were clearly discouraged from applying for military service since they were also the most nationalist Syrians.[16]

To turn this Syrian army into a truly national instrument after 1945 was an immense task that was far from completed when, in 1948, it was called upon to fight the Israelis. Its defeat stimulated the Syrians to grant the army henceforth the largest appropriation in the national budget. By the end of 1951, the country had 23,000 men under arms but was probably capable of defending itself only against an unlikely invasion by the Lebanese.

Profound discontent with civilian incompetence and corruption gave rise to a succession of military coups between 1949 and 1953. But the rapid changes in military rule from General Huzni Za'im to Colonel Sami Hinnawi to Colonel Adib Shishakli and their early collapse proved that the Syrian army was also still too weak to impose its will on the nation's civilian population. The failure of these three military dictators after 1953 convinced the more radical military factions that the army could probably assure its predominance by going one step further -- breaking the social and economic position of the traditional elite and relying entirely on the political movements of the new middle class. By early 1955, there seemed to be agreement among army leaders on this objective. The extreme right had been eliminated.[17] An uneasy collaboration had been stimulated among moderate, leftist, and communist army elements by the growing pressure upon Syria by Western and neighboring pro-Western states. Between 1955 and 1958, civilian leaders could no longer play politics without consulting the army.

The reemergence of the army in politics did not cure the ills of Syrian society.[18] By 1958 the dominant army faction faced a desperate remedy -- to

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[16] Military schooling, however, can also fashion modern nationalists. One son of a landed family of Hama, attracted by the free education at the nearby military school (much as a number of now prominent civilian Americans were drawn by its technical excellence and free tuition to West Point), emerged to become Nasir's principal ally in Syria, namely Colonel Sarraj. (Most of the material in the last two paragraphs and this footnote is drawn from sn unpublished manuscript by Professor R. Bayly Winder, "The Modern Military Tradition in Syria," prepared for the Faculty Seminar of the Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, March 5, 1959.)

[17] In April 1955, Col. Adnan Maliki, the assistant chief-of-staff and G-3 of the Syrian Army and one of the principal army adherents of the socialist Ba'th Party, was assassinated by a member of the Syrian National Social Party, representing the extreme right. This act provided the justification for a successful purge of the right wing of the army.

[18] The first two army coups are analyzed by Alford Carleton, "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949," Middle East Journal, January 1950, pp. 1-12. All of them are dealt with by Nicola A. Ziadeh, in Syria and Lebanon, New York, 1957, pp. 93-172, passim.

preserve Syria by making it part of Egypt.

In nine Middle Eastern countries, independent civilian rule had preceded the creation or modernization of the army, and so provided an opportunity for fashioning the military as a civilian instrument. In Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, and Pakistan, however, the government proved unable to exploit the advantage it initially enjoyed. In Jordan a large number of officers are already in jail or in exile: it is only as a body that the army has not crossed the line to stand against the King. Libya's army is still in process of creation, and hence its role is not yet fixed. It may intervene in politics if the country does not soon agree upon a new ruler after the death of the aging, childless King.

In only two Middle Eastern countries, Tunisia and Morocco, do armies remain subordinate to civilian rule. Beginning in 1956, the civilian leadership of the dominant Neo-Destour Party carefully selected the officers of the army, the national guard, and the police from among politically reliable elements of the guerrilla resistance movement. In 1957, officers trained in the Arab East who might sympathize with Nasir were eased out. The present cadre of officers appears eager to maintain the regime to whom it owes its position. Professional ethics alone, however, would not keep it from intervening in politics if it did not approve of President Bourguiba's successor.

The main body of the Moroccan army was recruited by French officers among Berber-speaking mountain tribes in a country that is predominantly Arab in language and culture. After independence in 1956, this army, though still largely commanded by French-trained Berber officers, was enlarged from 20,000 to 30,000 men by the addition of guerrilla fighters of the Moroccan Army of Liberation. It is under the control of the King instead of being responsible to a civilian cabinet. Until recently, the army has had no political temptations, hence no political tests.

Whether this state of affairs will survive the split which took place in the Istiqlal Party in 1958 is doubtful. Public criticism has already begun. At its 1958 meeting in Tetuan (July 25 - August 1), the Moroccan Student Congress attacked the Moroccan army as a "parade-ground" army which should be purged of its "anti-national and anti-popular elements," and called for its submission to civilian authority. In effect, the Congress demanded the transfer of control from the King and the more conservative officers to the more radical wing of the Istiqlal. In 1959, at its meeting at Agadir (August 22-28), the Student Congress spoke even more sharply, this time with the support of the two largest organizations in Morocco -- Ben Barka's Istiqlal group, which has since become the National Union of Popular Forces, and the Union of Moroccan Labor (UMT), the National Union's trade union ally.

The example of the Pakistani army, which seized control of the government in 1958, illustrates why the situations in Morocco and Tunisia may be explosive. Prior to the coup, the Pakistani army had been carefully recruited. Regiments were often composed of the sons of earlier recruits. Its officer

corps had been selected from the leading families of India's martial tribes. The status of officers was as high as that of the top echelon of the India Civil Service. For several years after Pakistan became independent in 1947, army officers lived better than most civilians, enlisted men better than civilian workers.[19]

But the rapid change in the relative position and character of social classes in Pakistan, especially during and after World War II, was soon mirrored in the composition of the officer corps. Elements from the new middle class entered in large numbers through emergency commissions granted to civilians during World War II by promotion from the ranks, and since 1947 by national examinations. The sons of notable families who once constituted the core of the officer group have since risen to the top, but they no longer directly shape the perspectives of the battalions. From a way of life, the army was converted into a job. As the new middle class entered the army, its political battle-cries also became those of the army.

It is unlikely that the army will remain apolitical. As elsewhere in the Middle East, when the ruling institution owes its survivsl exclusively or predominantly to the army, or lacks the strength to confirm its own successor, armies are not likely to remain outside of politics.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTERVENTION BY MIDDLE EASTERN ARMIES

Political intervention by armies that have long been apolitical tends to differ in the first stages from intervention by armies whose officer corps has already become a latent or disguised political party. A previously unbroken record of loyalty to authority usually means that the coup is staged by a commanding general, urged on perhaps by a faction within the civilian regime. The break with the past is therefore not sharp, at least at first. The general usually has little need to consult many of his fellow officers before taking action, and because of his attitude toward politics he tends to be inexperienced and disdainful of all political acts except those that depend on charisma and command.[20] His initial conservatism, however, is likely to yield in time to pressures from an officer corps that has become conscious of its political opportunities and a public that has become increasingly articulate.

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[19] In 1957 there were over 3,000 applications for 80 officer candidate vacancies at the Pakistan Military Academy.

[20] For a detailed exemplification, see Helen Kitchen, "The Government of General Abboud," and "The Army" in the special Sudan issue of Africa Special Reports, January 1959, pp. 3-4, 17, and 5; also Peter Kilmer, "A Year of Army Rule in the Sudan," World Today, November 1959.

An army's intervention in politics is also affected by ideology and circumstance. During 1958, the army intervened in Lebanon to fashion a new compromise among competing political and ethnic groups and hence, paradoxically, to assure its own political neutrality. The army intervened in the Sudan to support a moderate regime that its civilian friends could no longer sustain. It intervened in Pakistan to bring about those political, social, and economic reforms that previous regimes had been unwilling to undertake. It intervened in Iraq to alter the entire social structure.

LIMITATIONS OF ARMY RULE

As a ruling power, an army has several extraordinary advantages. Because of historical circumstances, Middle Eastern armies tend to produce more able, honest, and decisive leadership than any other institution. Because of its vantage point and the values for which it stands, an army can also speak more convincingly than most other institutions about the changes that a society requires to defend itself.[21] For those who want to make a force march into the modern age, the army can impose a revolution from above. Armies in power, however, are often subject to the vices of their virtues. The special problems they face in relating themselves to the rest of the body politic and in ultimately yielding again to civilian control deserve analysis in some detail.

An army's weapons are its strength, but in the hands of the new middle class arms have a way of being most effective if they remain unused. For an army to use force indiscriminately is to risk internal division and splitting itself off from the rest of society. Skillful as the leaders are, they are usually less skilled than politicians in gaining consent by means other than direct command. Its system of communication is very efficient for messages that move from the top down; it works less well for those that start at the bottom. However adequate an army may be on the field of battle, it is not particularly good at economic planning and development. Even in what might be considered their own province, few Middle Eastern leaders have succeeded in working out calculations of probable weapon requirements in the face of the most probable strategic needs. Nor can they make certain that they will be able to buy what they need or make any sound estimate of what their potential enemy may be able to buy to offset such weapons.

It is an army's business to calculate sacrifice and to furnish a sense of duty for making it. But to calculate who shall pay for economic development by remaining poor, or working harder, and what moral price must be paid forchange in the social order takes reason and courage of a different sort. Its esprit de corps is due in large part to its separation from civilian society, its training in a unique style of life, its special uniform, its monopoly of weapons. How readily will such a body encourage participation

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[21] Guy J. Pauker, in "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," World Politics, April 1959, pp. 325-45, makes a similar diagnosis and prescription for that part of the world.

in political activities or feel obligated to account for its stewardship? In short, there is the serious problem of conversion. Politics is not warfare, and an enemy's virtues can remain virtues only if society as a whole can be converted into a garrison state.

Having experienced the effectiveness of a hierarchic, disciplined organization, army leaders turned politician often have trouble organizing their newer and far larger constituency. It was perhaps natural for Nasir to suppose "that the whole nation was ready and prepared, waiting for nothing but a vanguard to lead the charge against the battlements, whereupon the nation would fall in behind in serried ranks. . . .as the ordered advance proceeded toward the great objective. . . . . Crowds did eventually come, and they came in endless droves -- but how different is the reality from the dream! The masses that came were disunited, divided groups of stragglers."[22] But when a whole society is in process of revolution, there are no "serried ranks." Social unity can only be built by dealing with the problems of society: it will not jump into being by command.

Efforts by Middle Eastern military leaders to form mass parties, with the exception of Kemalist Turkey, have so far failed. One reason is a grave shortage of vital skills. The traditional hierarchy of valued occupations has not yet changed and is out of balance with modern needs. There are too many lawyers and clerks, and too few organizers, managers, and engineers, especially at a time when the vast majority to be mobilized are illiterate and pre-modern in values and skills. Neither in Egypt nor Syria, where attempts by army leaders to form political mass movements have so far failed, are there sufficient experienced cadres for such a task, or even for making the army itself into "a popular university in which citizens learn to perform their duty, to collaborate, and to sacrifice."[23] Even the officers with political experience are usually skilled only in agitation and conspiracy among small groups, not in persuasion, mediation, and organization among large ones.

Discouraging as things often look in the Middle East, its people are at the beginning of the most far-reaching of revolutions, that is, the modern age -- a transformation of what men are, what they will believe, and how they will relate to each other. The charismatic leader (frequently a military man) is still the most attractive political remedy in the Middle East. For most Middle Easterners, in fact, the issue has not yet become military vs. civilian rule. The question for the mass remains: Which leader has the more powerful charisma. When men "renounce loyalty to the tribe and the divinities of the tribe, their responsiveness to sacredness, their readiness to discern sacredness does not necessarily die; instead it seeks new objects. . . . The nation becomes the charismatic object (and) the political leaders who live in the modern sector of their respective societies, and who are usually less immediately involved in a traditional way with the sacred, are legitimatized in their own eyes by their permeation with

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[22] Nasir, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

[23] Speech by Fawzi Silu, broadcast by Radio Damascus, March 4, 1952.

the sacredness of the nation."[24]

But great and powerful as are the uses of charisma, rulers and ruled no longer share the same moral or intellectual universe -- not even the same universe of action. There will be no common universe unless the new middle class first creates it. The army's monopoly of force is no longer as efficacious as it was in the Islamic past. Force today cannot, by itself, hope to remold the relationships of individuals and social classes, once thought natural and God-given, into a new balance capable of motion.

THE ARMY AS A PARTISAN IN CONFLICTS WITHIN THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AND WITH OTHER CLASSES

Among the limitations of army regimes there is one that is far-reaching, yet one that cannot be transcended: the army in politics cannot become an institution above the battle. It intervenes as a partisan, representing a new class with whom the majority in the country does not yet share a common consciousness shaped by a common experience of life. It is itself a sensitive mirror of internal conflicts within the new middle class. It will be unable to avoid factionalism within the ruling junta unless the whole junta, or its dominant faction, is securely anchored in a well-organized movement representing at least the new middle class.

To create a modern prosperous society involves decisions about what shall be sscrificed, changed or rewarded. The fact that the interests of the new middle class are national in no way implies that the role it assigns to others will correspond to the interests of other classes. The contrast between the planner's insistence on postponing rewards and the peasant's or speculative merchant's eagerness to reap them now is great enough -- especially in a part of the world where scarcity and uncertainty have always loomed so threateningly -- to create valid and deeply-felt distinctions between political parties -- indeed, between styles of life.

Such distinctions need not, however, become overtly antagonistic. The sense of class interests is sometimes still blurred: the new middle class has only recently emerged as a class, and tribal and family loyalties remain strong among peasants and workers. Although the disciplined organization of a majority of urban workers into trade unions in Morocco and Tunisia within the last decade demonstrates how quickly the Middle East is changing, the mobilization of peasantry and workers by the new middle class is just beginning in most countries of this region. Middle Eastern political and social stability, therefore, has scarcely yet been tested, even by the new army regimes.

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[24]Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," World Politics, October 1958, pp. 3-4; p. 2.

There are obviously different ways of eliciting sacrifices, sharing sacrifices, and establishing goals for which such sacrifices are to be made; and there are ways of minimizing the antigonism of conflicting interests and values as the new middle class translates its objectives into the mission of the entire nation. Also, in relation to foreign nations, it is possible for nationalists to hold different conceptions of the national interest. What determines these choices on the part of the new middle class and its principal instrument, the army? The burden of a particular past, the skills and resources available and the awareness and opportunities to utilize them, differences in individual character and temperament and the exigencies of particular local power constellations -- all these help mold the decisions that are made. An elite in power, whatever the social class from which it springs, faces problems and temptations in the very business of maintaining itself that help to distinguish it from those who have the same hopes and interests but not the same responsibilities. In short, membership in a particular social class is by no means the sole determinant of policy decisions. Differences in political choices among members of the new middle class, however, also reflect differences in the structure of that class and the variant character of its class consciousness.

Soon after the triumph of the new middle class, it becomes apparent that there is not room for all, and that, although they are agreed on the need for the transformation of their society, they are not of the same mind as to what to do with their historical opportunity. The clash is likely to be especially bitter between the young, educated and employed and the young, educated -- and unemployed. The leaders representing the new middle class often reach the top in their thirties (Ataturk, Nasir, Karami, Seraj) or their forties (Kassim, Ayub). Almost all are authoritarians who do not intend to let go the reins of power until they die. Nor do the administrators in government, business, journalism and the schools, mean to depart before the head of state to whom they owe their position. When youth wins out early and retires late, all the young men who follow are unlikely to acquire a stake in the status quo and hence in moderation. Yet "youth" is not a passing phase in this region of the world where half of all the people are under 20 years of age and where population grows so quickly and opportunities so slowly that men in their forties may still have almost all the innocence of youth -- being untouched by careers, status, and power. When those who made the revolution linger but do not increase the range of employment for those with talent, energy, and ideas, then the young, even as they grow older will have no difficulty in becoming radical, extremist, or both.

This very condition also stimulates the growth of radical or extremist factions within the ruling elite. If the latter cannot provide for greater social mobility, some members of the regime, sensitive to their own growing insecurity will be tempted either to organize coups d'etat or to maintain their power by shifting their support to this ever growing would-be and have-not middle class. Such alliances are easily fashioned, far more so than any alliance between the new middle class and the workers and peasants. This, in fact, is the most characteristic form of contemporary Middle Eastern politics, since the new middle class that has "arrived" and the would-be

middle class share common capabilities and a common vocabulary. Repression can only delay such an alliance. Moreover, given the present pace of Middle Eastern development, the outs are usually bound to become much more numerous than the ins.

The army cannot escape politics because it cannot avoid taking sides, though that involves making domestic enemies even before the new nation has been united. It must also build responsive and responsible institutions for discussion, decision, and review if the body politic is to survive disagreements born of a social revolution. An army regime content with a holding operation against the most rapidly growing segment of the new middle class -- the young, who have few links with tradition and little chance of status and useful jobs -- would soon find itself split even within its own ranks. To set lower standards of achievement, therefore, is to make sure of failure or its obverse, institutionalized terror.

MAKING ARMY REGIMES UNNECESSARY

The final touchstone of achievement for an army regime is its success in making its continued existence unnecessary. This it can accomplish by transforming itself into a civilian regime or, much less likely, yielding supremacy once again to civilian institutions. Armies have been created for holding societies together. For governing itself and achieving other social and economic ends, mankind has evolved a number of more useful, if at times equally authoritarian, institutions. To create an environment in which these institutions can function has been the announced purpose of all army regimes derived from the new middle class. In the Middle East this transfer of power may be easier than in other cultures. Most officers turned politicians, as we have seen, joined the army not so much in pursuit of the military life as in pursuit of a career in the most powerful, dynamic, and expanding bureaucracy the country offered.

How can army rulers and their constituency make sure of such a transfer? The Middle East cannot yet duplicate the evolution of military rule in Latin America. It still lacks a strong property-owning and industrially productive upper middle class, and in most areas, well-organized trade unions -- groups which in Latin American increasingly act as countervailing forces to the military. In several Latin American countries, there are also expanding economic opportunities which make an army career relatively less attractive to the most ambitious than it formerly was, though perhaps at times at the price of attracting the less able. In the Middle East, the evolution toward more lasting civilian rule faces greater obstacles.

Turkey represents the one instance in the Middle East where transformation of army rule into civilian rule has actually taken place with apparently

enduring results.[25] Turkish history suggests, however, that the prerequisites are likely to remain scarce for a long time in other countries of the area.[26] It will be difficult for others to read the Kemalist "grammar of politics." No one has yet written a book to explicate it. It is doubtful that Ataturk himself methodically planned his extraordinary brew of positivism and pragmatism for creating a prosperous, secular society. And there are few underdeveloped countries as fortunate as Turkey at the advent of Ataturk -- underpopulated, culturally homogeneous, a majority of its peasants owning their own land and largely isolated from urban politics, and the urban population prepared for reform by a century of discussion and united by victory over foreign foes.

Nasir, operating with far fewer assets than Ataturk, has so far, with great political skill, eliminated the Revolutionary Command Council -- the core of his fellow-conspirators -- as the principal organ of government. For it he has substituted a civilian cabinet (retaining only a portion of former Council members for its portfolios). In addition, he created a parliament of freely proposed candidates who could not be formally nominated until they had been carefully screened by him prior to a free election. With this cadre of secondary leaders, linked in part to the people and not disloyal to him, and a partially reformed bureaucracy, Nasir has made major progress toward civilian involvement in government.[27] At the same time he has converted many army officers into government administrators, diplomats, trade union supervisors, and directors of government-owned corporations.

In Iraq, General Kassim's relationship to civilian institutions has consisted so far only in the precarious business of playing political parties off against each other. In Pakistan and the Sudan, the ruling generals have eliminated all parties and made no effort to form any of their own.

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[25] On pp. , it is suggested that the Turkish military coup of 1960 is the exception that appears indeed to prove this rule.

[26] See Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, July 1952, esp. pp. 543-552. In Iran, Colonel Reza Khan established a new royal dynasty in 1925, but civilian government has for most of the period since then and is now deeply indebted to army support.

[27] The formation of the United Arab Republic has, however, centralized all decision-making in Cairo, making the Egyptian bureaucracy more powerful than the Syrian and the Egyptian parliament less important within the UAR. Union has also severely handicapped the operation of civilian influence in the Syrian region. So far Syrian civilians have no regular autonomous channel to Cairo. Recent UAR-wide elections (on a pattern similar to that for the Egyptian parliament) for local and regional officers of his reconstituted single political party may be the first step in creating such additional channels.

Establishing autonomous civilian institutions, however, is only the first step toward the end of army rule. The army is not likely to be tempted to confine itself once again to its proper business until all major professions of the new middle class, and especially the army, have a secure status in society and the body politic, and the nation has secure status in the international community. It remains all too easy for the army to insist on an extraordinary role for itself in the Middle East as long as there are no sure barriers to the renewed outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities, Arab rivalries remain chronic, and Western nations remain tempted to try to regain lost positions in the area by military intervention. Furthermore, Soviet intentions toward its Middle Eastern neighbors remain uncertain, the Soviet bloc and the West freely compete in supplying local arms, and Middle Easterners remain acutely sensitive to show their strength after centuries of foreign rule. Spectacular success at the foreign and domestic tasks of government is probably the surest guarantee that a military regime will transform itself, and that the rest of the army will become a professional interest group, or at least no more than a political veto group. Failure, even the threat of it, readily reinforces the original nature of a military regime as a hierarchy of organized violence.

The modern age has made it difficult for Middle Eastern armies to return to the barracks. They are aware that they could not defend themselves for long against aggression by any one of the great powers, even in a war involving conventional weapons. They may recognize that the most effective prolonged defense against such encroachments is probably guerrilla warfare, but preparations for such fighting are hardly suitable for internal political stability. They cannot plan for weapon systems adequate to meet the challenge of their local neighbors because a single lucky purchase can upset existing balances. Even armed internal repression for the first time runs counter to the acknowledged ideology of the new middle class leadership. At such a point in history the professional task of Middle Eastern armies becomes obscure and even uninviting.

There is likely to be a permanent end to army rule only when the body politic has a strong core of the new middle class that has established firm links with workers and peasants. The new middle class, by itself, will be unable to keep the army out of politics as long as the latter remains better organized, better trained, and better armed. The civilian component will not be able to maintain the predominance and unity it may from time to time achieve if there arises an inviting opportunity for minority factions to gain strength by winning the allegiance of workers and peasants.

PROBABLE PROBLEMS AND TRENDS DURING THE NEXT DECADE

So far the army has been under relatively conservative or moderate leadership. It has generally concentrated on ridding the country of evils it associates with imperialism, corruption, and inefficiency. It has moved only gradually into a program of basic and integrated reforms for creating a new society. Such leadership is unlikely to go unchallenged for long.

To many Western observers, it has seemed that among the officers who have come to the fore as politicians in the Middle East during the Twentieth Century, colonels like Nasir constitute one extreme fringe; and generals like the late Nuri al-Sa'id of Iraq, the other. That view fails to take account of a vital historical change. Men like Nuri who base their power on a calculus of personal relations -- upon the tribal sheikh whose uncle was killed, whose nephew was rewarded, whose own pockets were filled; upon the expectation of favors through a third cousin; upon fear of losing a favor not earned on grounds of talent or skill -- are men of an earlier political age. By the very nature of the ties that created their power such rulers are kept from engaging in any reforms that might harm existing relationships.

A view of alternatives reaching no father than from Nuri to Nasir is bound to be short-sighted.

There are generals in power today like Ayub (Pakistan), Shehab (Lebanon), and Abbud (Sudan), however, who are more modern in outlook than Nuri, even if not as bold as colonels like Nasir. The power of these ruling generals of Pakistan, Lebanon, and Sudan is based, not merely on seniority, but on their successful transmigration in spirit and skill from the outlook of traditional landowners and tribal chiefs, who once were the generals of the Middle East, to the perspective of the new propertied middle class. These generals have had a rare incentive for making this transition and developing a moderate conservative orientation. Their vested interest, the army, is an institution whose mission rests on ancient principles, whose relative strength gives these leaders a sense of security, whose membership and purpose gives them a national perspective, and whose character demands the perpetuation of such conservative values as discipline, hierarchy, honor, competence, and hard work. At the same time, their relative detachment from their social background by virture of their service in the army, their inescapable interest in technology, and in maintaining the army's strength, and indeed, the country's, makes them realize that they must make great alterations in existing conditions if their interests are to prosper.

Such a perspective may not be enough.[28] The small propertied middle

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[28] Indeed, army organization may make it peculiarly difficult for generals to succeed in politics unless they are uncommonly blessed with charisma, political skill, or incompetent opponents. It can hardly be a statistical accident that colonels far out-number generals and majors among emerging politicians in all underdeveloped areas. Is it that majors can still hope for advancement, generals are already content, colonels without illusions about a future left unremedied? Is it that generals are seldom in direct command of operational units, that captains and lieutenants command units too small for overthrowing of government, and that majors are normally the assistants of colonels who command units just large enough for the purpose, and that colonels therefore are best situated for properly assessing where the army as a whole will stand? Is the difference in age between generals

class in the Middle Esst usually does not appreciate how many radical and rapid changes will be required in their society before a much larger, and hence stable, and stabilizing propertied middle class can come into being. (Thus, few share-croppers are likely to get farms of their own under General Ayub's land reform because farms of less than 500 acres -- and in many instances, farms of larger acreage -- are exempt from expropriation. Most of the officers who now support the general, though by no means all Pakistani officers, come from such farms.) Unless their perspective widens, it may well be said of some of these generals, as it has been said of their European counterpart:

> The new Premier wants to tidy up the governing apparatus. But his disdain for the party system borders on the dangerous and his personal experience of economics is most limited. . . . In terms of France's shifting political kaleidoscope, one might describe de Gaulle's aspirations as neither Right-Wing nor Left-Wing, but of the extreme Center. How extreme can the Center become?[29]

As for military leaders drawn directly from the salaried new middle class, the Nasirs must perforce be counted among the moderates, or else we shall have no words left to describe the extremists when they appear. Especially if army rule is politically and economically unproductive, there is little reason to suppose that new middle class leadership in the Communist Party, in neo-Islamic totalitarian movements like the Moslem Brotherhood, or in secular fascist movements like the Syrian Social National Party could not ultimately achieve a similar degree of hierarchy, organization, discipline, emotional commitment, and readiness for violence and so challenge army regimes through mass demonstrations -- or infiltration of the armed forces.

Communist, fascist, and neo-Islamic colonels and generals have so far only briefly crossed the horizon. To speak only of communists: Turkish communist armies fought in support of Ataturk until 1921. Ten Pakistani army officers, including Major Generals A. Khan and W. Ahmed, and Brigadier M. Latif, were tried in March 1951 for participating in what the government called a communist conspiracy to seize control of the country. Colonels Yussif Sadiq and Khaled Muhi ad-Din were accused of communist sympathies by Nassir and excluded from the Revolutionary Command Council in 1953. (Khaled Muhi ad-Din, after having been allowed to become editor of al-Nissa, was imprisoned by Nasir on March 9, 1959.) Over 650 Iranian officers accused

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and colonels sufficient to imply that a general's coup will reflect political perspectives of an earlier generation and hence, given the rapidity of change in underdeveloped areas, perspectives already less relevant to the task than those of a colonel?

[29] C. I. Sulzberger, "De Gaulle: -- Just How Extreme is the Center?" The New York Times, June 14, 1958.

of conspiring with the Tudeh Party or the USSR were arrested in the fall of 1954, and several score of them were sentenced to death. General Afif Bizri, thought by many to be a communist sympathizer or party member, became Chief of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of Syrian armed forces in August 1957, while Lt. Col. Mohammed Jarrah, who had similar views, became Assistant Chief of the Gendarmerie at the same time. Both retained their offices until early 1958. In Iraq, after the July 1958 coup, a number of officers with communist sympathies came to hold important positions in government.

Particular military regimes may be able to deal effectively with subversion by extremists. The military itself, however, is not immune to subversion. The evolution of the new middle class and the modern age is still recent in the Middle East. We have not yet had a full sampling.

Army leaders can fail again and again as politicians without the army's ceasing to be the principal source of political leaders reflecting various strata of the new middle class. At present, army officers in most Middle Eastern countries are drawn almost entirely from the new literate middle class. Enlisted men are almost entirely from illiterate tribesmen and peasants, without chance of promotion from the ranks. As literacy spreads and universal conscription is increasingly enforced, the divisions of society will be increasingly reflected through all the ranks of the army. If these divisions remain unbridged, and the army's leadership and its rank-and-file divide to fight in opposing causes, the army may suffer a prolonged eclipse both as a political and as a military institution. In that event there may be no segment of society to take the place of the army -- no group that by its common interests and norms can set limits to personal leadership, yet give continuity to authority. There will be a vacuum instead for the individual opportunist or fanatic to move into.