

## THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL

by

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In discussing Israel, it is almost a matter of protocol to begin with the following observation: Israel is so exceptional among other countries of its class that it provides a check against hasty generalizations arising from a comparative study. This is certainly true of the role of the military in Israel compared with that in other "underdeveloped countries."

By some of the usual criteria, Israel is an underdeveloped country. Yet it is also true that it is an exceptional underdeveloped country. It had a strongly and persistently adverse balance of trade, running at a rate of \$200 million to over \$300 million, throughout the 1950's; but its exports of goods rose from \$44 million in 1952 to \$134 million in 1957, and have continued to rise thereafter.<sup>1</sup> Productivity was rated by the Israelis themselves as unsatisfactory. The annual output per worker of \$1,000 to \$1,200 in 1957 may be compared with about \$2,000 in the more technologically advanced European countries, and about \$600 in Japan.<sup>2</sup> Other criteria make Israel's classification as an underdeveloped country still more uncertain. In education and, particularly, public health it is comparable to far more prosperous and stable lands, and its "per capita net domestic product" is in a range defined by countries like Italy at the lower end and Denmark at the other.<sup>3</sup> Thus it already enjoys a level of per capita income that, according to a recent study of the Middle East economy, is about as high as one can expect in this area in the foreseeable future.<sup>4</sup>

So, too, Israel's security problems and its position in international affairs posed threats equal in severity to those of Japan, where not only forced development and total preparedness but militarism seemed essential in order to meet them. Nor are the potential internal crises less menacing in Israel than those which, among its neighbors, have led with regularity to military regimes. Yet, as we shall see, in the relation of the military

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<sup>1</sup> Nadav Halevi, Estimates of Israel's International Transactions, 1952-1954 (Jerusalem: Falk Project, 1956) p. 55; Economic Report of the Minister of Finance (budget address delivered to the Knesset on Wednesday, January 29, 1958) pp. 14 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 9 ff.; Daniel Creamer et. al., Israel's National Income, 1950-1954 (Jerusalem: Falk Project, 1957), p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> A. J. Meyer, Middle East Capitalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 17; cf. also pp. 2-5.

to civilian institutions, Israel is similar, not to countries with parallel problems, but to secure and stable countries with firmly rooted democratic traditions.

Thus, when comparative researches produce hypotheses on the role of the military in underdeveloped countries, Israel will, no doubt, provide a convenient control by which to test many of them. There will be no attempt in this paper to collate generalizations of this sort, common in the literature of social and political science at least in the form of unsupported assumptions, in order to check them against the case of Israel. However, certain common beliefs about the role of the military in comparable situations played a part in forming the ideas and actions of those who founded and who now conduct the Jewish state. Such generalizations, directly encountered in the material of this study, must be considered in our analysis.

### ZIONIST MILITANCY

Military conceptions and militant attitudes, as well as military functions, though not the military as a distinct group, have played a significant role in the history of Zionism and the social and political relationships of the Jewish state. This is not as platitudinous as it sounds. Self-defense has been considered so universal a function of group behavior that some sociologists have believed it to be the original cause of society, and others are unable to regard any group of people lacking it as anything more than a sub-group of a larger social structure to whose authority it is subject. Yet the Jewish people, according to the virtually unanimous opinion of its historians, represent an exceptional social entity, undeniably integral and distinct, unified by a social consensus, and regulated by a traditional authority structure of its own. Deprived of sovereignty and the means of self-defense, and everywhere subject to rule or oppression by others, these people have survived for millennia, unsupported by a state or an army. Even in the early periods of Jewish political independence, if we can trust the Bible, the Jews thought of themselves in the image of David facing Goliath. Not in power nor in might, but in God's spirit, they were told, must be their trust. During the long centuries of Exile the picture of the Jews as a people without a country, without a government or an army to defend them, relying for their survival entirely upon their devotion to a traditional law, became firmly fixed. In the Messianic dreams of the Jewish people, to be sure, the kingdom of David was to be restored, following a series of apocalyptic wars. But the compensating triumph of the Jews at the end of time was imagined as an era of universal peace and disarmament in which all peoples would be remade in the image of the children of Israel.

Of course, the Jews are not and never have been constitutionally committed to pacifism or to anarchism. Without the means of defense they were forced to be non-resisters; without the powers of sovereignty they had to rely on social and moral pressures for internal government. But neither non-resistance nor principled opposition to the state were Jewish dogmas. Since the rise of Zionism, Jewish historians have begun to seek traces of Jewish rebelliousness, and to study the attempts to restore Jewish sovereignty

in Palestine throughout the millennia of Exile.<sup>5</sup> This search for Zionist roots in the past does not alter the fact that the militancy which was the emotional core of Zionism was a break with the dominant pattern of the past.

In 1771, Moses Mendelssohn, the Jewish sage and philosopher of Berlin, received a confidential document composed by "a person of station" which seems to have outlined a plan for reestablishing the Jews in a state of their own.<sup>6</sup> He rejected the idea because, as he said, the long oppression of the Jews had deprived his people of all "vigueur" and left them with piety and patience as their sole virtues; they were incapable of the activity and exertions required to erect and maintain a state. More than a century later, the first Zionists made a similar appraisal of the Jewish character; but instead of resigning themselves to this opinion, they rebelled against it and sought to overcome it.

A mystique of militancy arose among them.<sup>7</sup> Not only did they abandon the principle of non-resistance to oppressors and pious submission to Exile until God in His own time willed to bring redemption, they violently opposed it as a national shame and dishonor. Their slogan became "auto-emancipation" by the collective efforts of the Jews themselves, not emancipation by humanitarian gentiles. When pogroms broke out in Russia, they protected themselves by organizing self-defense squads instead of hiding in cellars. When Jewish settlements in Palestine had to be defended against raids by Bedouin or fellaheen neighbors, they demanded, as a matter of principle, that Jewish guards defend them. The ruthlessness of the Turks, who demonstrated again during the First World War the traditional ferocity of rulers towards minorities in the Near East, taught the Palestinian Jew how precarious was his position. The totalitarian assault on European Jewry in the Second World War confronted all Jews with a situation in which last-ditch resistance was the only free choice left to them.<sup>8</sup> Three generations of continual crises thus reinforced the spirit of militancy which arose with Zionism. This spirit has persisted to the present day and is directly related to the

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<sup>5</sup> See the works of scholars as different as Benzion Dinur and Cecil Roth; or even Gershom Scholem, whose interest in the mystical movements is related to the interest in antinomian Messianic trends in Judaism that arose among Zionist intellectuals at the turn of the century. See Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York: Doubleday and Herzl Press, 1959), pp. 291-327 for an indication of the pertinent intellectual-emotional climate.

<sup>6</sup> Moses Mendelssohn's Gesammelte Schriften, V (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1844), 494.

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter III of Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, in press.

<sup>8</sup> See Ben Halpern, "The Partisan in Israel," Jewish Frontier, August, 1948.

role played by the military in Israel.

### THE DIPLOMATIC USES OF A JEWISH ARMY

A militant attitude need not, of course, express itself in specific military functions or in the use of military power. Among the Zionists there were, indeed, many pacifists of undoubted militancy who, either on grounds of principle or of realism, decried proposals to seek military solutions to Zionist problems. Self-defense in the Russian ghettos and guard duties in Jewish settlements in Palestine were a matter of honor. But no one really supposed that Pan-Slav anti-Semitism would be cured by the successful defense of a Jewish quarter. As for the Jewish defenders of the settlements in Palestine, their consistent attempt to avoid bloodshed and seek all possible social and cultural contacts with their Arab neighbors, beginning with Hashomer in the first decade of this century and continuing in the Hagana policy of the late 30's, was dictated both by tactical necessity and by fundamental doctrine. In other words, they wanted peaceful relations with the Arabs both for the sake of peace itself and because it was essential for successful colonization.<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, some Zionists were aware of the history of other nationalist movements, which suggested that military means might prove effective in achieving their goals. Political analogies are rarely precise guides to varying situations. Nevertheless, in the case of Israel as in other cases, they served to suggest strategic and tactical approaches initially adopted for the solution of certain nationalist problems. Such initial approaches had their effect upon the final event, even if they were found irrelevant to the particular situations that had to be faced and hence were not followed out in detail.

A jumble of general notions and particular analogies concerning the ways in which the Jews might use an army or the capacity to mobilize one in order to achieve national sovereignty could be derived from the examples of nationalist movements throughout the nineteenth century. Long before organized Zionism arose, certain rabbis of the early and mid-nineteenth century, who ardently advocated return to Palestine and renewal of a Jewish polity there, drew a moral from the success of the Balkan nationalist uprisings and urged military training among Jews.<sup>10</sup> However, Jews were not settled in large numbers in Palestine even at the end of the century;

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<sup>9</sup>Eliyahu Golomb, The History of Jewish Self-Defence in Palestine, 1878-1921 (Tel-Aviv: Zionist Organization (n.d.)), pp. 42 ff.; cf. Ben Halpern, "Hagana and the Terrorists," Jewish Frontier, March 1947.

<sup>10</sup>Eliyahu Golomb, The History of Jewish Self-Defence, pp. 8 ff.; A. A. Bonar and R. M. M'Cheyne, Narrative of a Mission of Inquiry to the Jews from the Church of Scotland in 1839, Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1843, pp. 392 ff., 394 ff.

hence a direct application of the methods of Balkan nationalists was hardly possible. Not a simply military uprising, but skillful diplomatic use of the Jews' capacity to create an army -- an approach suggested by Cavour's rather than Garibaldi's tactics -- seemed the more useful pattern to adopt. This view, moreover, was explicitly and repeatedly propounded by non-Jews who advocated a Jewish restoration in Palestine, whether for its own sake or for other reasons. Napoleon, for example, issued an appeal to the Jews to join his armies and, by helping to overthrow Turkish rule, restore their ancient sovereignty in Palestine.<sup>11</sup> British adherents of the Jewish restoration, committed by British policy to upholding Ottoman rule as long as possible, took a different line. While the Turkish empire stood, Jewish settlers could provide a garrison for its insecure southwestern march that would be loyal to the Porte and grateful to their British protectors. If the Ottoman regime finally collapsed, the grateful Jews would prove a reliable buffer state for protecting the eastern approaches to the Suez Canal.<sup>12</sup>

The Zionists were not at first inclined to the diplomatic use of the Jew's capacity to create an army. Even Theodor Herzl, the father of the World Zionist Organization, referred frequently to a Jewish army in his plans for a Jewish state, but he gave it no serious attention as a tactical tool for achieving sovereignty. The difference between his plans for a Judenstaat and other projects of Jewish colonization, he once said, was that what he had in mind was the kind of social body that would naturally be defended by its own armed forces.<sup>13</sup> His plans for a Jewish company to develop and govern Palestine under a concession granted by the Sultan included elaborate plans for a Jewish militia to maintain internal security and for Jewish armed forces on land and sea to contribute to the external defense of the Ottoman realm.<sup>14</sup> But he did not rely on these proposals to persuade the Turks to agree to his project. Indeed, at one time he counted on the Turks' rejecting a Jewish army in Palestine to give him an excuse for backing out of an agreement if the Sultan accepted his other terms. The main inducement he offered the Porte for agreeing to a Jewish homeland in Palestine was his offer to stabilize Ottoman finances; but he was far from certain of being able to make good on his promise should he be

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<sup>11</sup>See Franz Kobler, "Napoleon and the Restoration of the Jews to Palestine," New Judea, August, October, November and December, 1940, and February 1941; also B. Dinaburg, Sefer Ha-Zionut, II (Tel-Aviv; Mosad Bialik, 1938), 161-168, 194-198.

<sup>12</sup>See B. W. Tuchman, Bible and Sword (New York: NYU Press, 1956), pp. 113-143.

<sup>13</sup>Theodor Herzl, Tagebuecher, I (Berlin: Juedischer Verlag, 1934), 483.

<sup>14</sup>Adolf Boehm, Die Zionistische Bewegung, I (Berlin: Juedischer Verlag, 1935), 705-709.

put to the test. If the Turks accepted one set of proposals but rejected the military provisions, and he found himself unable to muster the financial resources he had promised to make available, he could then say that the deal had broken down over the disagreement on its military terms instead of admitting his financial incapacity. He said, in fact, that he deliberately<sup>15</sup> included the armed forces provisions with just this contingency in mind.

It was not until World War I that a wartime Jewish army or the long-range Jewish military potential was seriously considered by Zionist diplomacy as a tool for winning Jewish sovereignty in Palestine. Vladimir Jabotinsky and others of the same mind hoped that by organizing a Jewish legion to fight with the Allies they might gain standing (a la Cavour) in the postwar peace conference.<sup>16</sup> Chaim Weizmann and his colleagues in London developed the thesis of an alliance between the Jews and Britain for building a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine as a safeguard for British communications through the Suez Canal.<sup>17</sup> In Palestine itself, a group of settlers organized to provide military intelligence to the British before the invasion.<sup>18</sup>

The Jews did gain a hearing and substantial benefits at the Versailles Conference, but not because of Jewish battalions or other tokens of military strength. It was the Arabs, rather than the Jews, who were able, under British shepherding, to follow Cavour's example successfully.<sup>19</sup> And Weizmann very soon discovered that any future diplomatic success with the British would have to rest on firmer grounds than the attractions of a Jewish military alliance for British strategists. As he reported to the first postwar Zionist Congress, if it was the safety of the Suez Canal that was the cardinal point, then British army and navy strategists had other plans for insuring it.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Herzl, Tagebuecher, I, 599.

<sup>16</sup> See Joseph Schechtman, Rebel and Statesman (New York: Yoseloff, 1956), pp. 201 ff.

<sup>17</sup> See Chaim Weizmann, Trail and Error (London: Haper, for East and West Library, 1949), pp. 190 ff.

<sup>18</sup> B. Dinaburg (ed.), Sefer Toldot Ha-Hagana, Vol. I, Bk. I, (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 1954), 353 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East (London: Bowes, 1956) pp. 116 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XII. Zionisten-Kongresses in Karlsbad (Berlin: Juedischer Verlag, 1922), pp. 279 ff.

During the Mandate period, one of the major issues for Zionists was whether the political conditions obtained under the Balfour Declaration, as interpreted by the Mandatory, were sufficient for achieving the Zionist goal. Those like Weizmann, who believed in working under the status quo, had no occasion to dwell on the analogies of Cavour's or of Garibaldi's tactical methods. Jabotinsky and other opponents of Weizmann, who did not believe the Zionist aim could be achieved without a radical alteration of the regime in Palestine, were naturally more inclined to think and act as if they were reincarnations of such nationalist soldier-diplomats. But, in fact, Weizmann and his allies did not definitely renounce military-diplomatic methods, nor did Jabotinsky plan a Jewish uprising in Palestine. The former organized a Jewish brigade to take part in the Second World War; and while the fact that the enemy was now Hitler made other reasons for Jewish participation in the war unnecessary. The Brigade, exactly like the 1917 Jewish legion, was also intended to establish a political claim to a Jewish commonwealth after the war. As for Jabotinsky, in spite of the military form he gave to his youth organization, his strategic plan, until very late in the day, was to gain better terms from the British by active lobbying rather than by military demonstrations.<sup>21</sup>

The differences between the Weizmann and Jabotinsky camps led to the creation of rival organizations. In due time the split extended to the paramilitary groups that were set up to defend the growing Jewish settlement in Palestine. For example, the Jabotinskian formations began to adopt independent policies. Jabotinsky's New Zionist Organization had hoped to force the hand of the World Zionist Organization by independent political activity on behalf of a "maximal" instead of a "moderate" program. It demanded a Jewish state, not just a Jewish national home; a Jewish majority, not immigration according to absorptive capacity; and both sides of the Jordan, instead of the western side alone. Its own hand was now forced when some of its subsidiary groups began adopting military instead of political tactics, and proclaiming military not merely political aims.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS

Following World War I, there were historical precedents, not only for the role of the military in achieving national sovereignty, but for the possibly abnormal as well as normal roles that might be played by military formations in the internal affairs of a prospective state. Unfortunately, these analogies were no more suitable for predicting the actual problems of a Jewish national home or a Jewish state than they were for revealing the international problems of Zionism. Nevertheless, in an appreciable measure the various Zionist parties considered such analogies as something either to follow or to avoid even when the precedents were not fully applicable to the specific problem. At the same time, the situation which

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<sup>21</sup> See Chapters II, VII, and VIII of Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State.

confronted the Jewish settlers from the very beginning called for military methods.

Agricultural settlement in Palestine -- in the early days, even urban settlement outside the walls of Old Jerusalem -- was always risky. At an early stage young Jewish immigrants, especially those who had been organized as self-defense squads in Russia during the pogroms, saw it as their duty to provide a corps of guards against raids on the Jewish villages. Thinking of themselves as Cossack settlers or as Jewish Bedouins they planned not only to provide a countrywide guard service but to establish armed villages or nomadic encampments at the strategic frontiers of the Jewish settlement. Apart from the efforts of these politically oriented idealists, the defense of Jewish settlements during the period of Ottoman rule was at once simpler and more direct. Each village made its own arrangements, choosing some of its own numbers to serve as guards, contracting with the countrywide organization of Jewish guards, or simply paying neighboring Arab villages for protection.<sup>22</sup>

When the British assumed the Mandate, the situation changed radically, though the need for self-defense did not disappear. In fact, the security problems of the Jewish community became more pressing, in spite of the fact that the British tried to maintain internal security at a higher level than had the Turks. For the first time the Jews were confronted by coordinated, countrywide attacks in towns and villages. Instead of sporadic, local raids designed to run off cattle or steal equipment, these were based on political and religious agitation. And the tighter control exercised by the British restricted the possibilities of local defensive organization with a new stringency.

The Jews, for their part, had begun from the outbreak of World War I to think of their security problems in countrywide and political rather than local and police terms. At first it was thought that the Jewish battalions that had come with or joined the British forces in Palestine might garrison the country when other units were demobilized. Instead, the staff of the British expeditionary force and the British military administration treated the Jewish battalions as a political nuisance. When the battalions attempted to resist the mob attacks on Jews in 1920 and 1921, the British command impeded their efforts and when Jewish soldiers did take action, the British imposed severe penalties. Instead of serving<sup>23</sup> as a garrison for Palestine, the Jewish battalions were disbanded, internal security being entrusted to a newly created Palestine police force. Not only was this force largely Arab, but in the beginning, at least, it included active leaders in Arab paramilitary and political organizations whose loyalty the British themselves did not

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<sup>22</sup> B. Dinaburg (ed.), Sefer Toldot Ha-Hagana, Vol. I, Bk. I, p. 68 ff., 193 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., Vol. I, Bk. II, 516 ff.

trust, and whom they preferred to keep under their eye.<sup>24</sup>

Under the circumstances, the Jews had again to organize defense on local and unofficial or semi-official rather than countrywide and official lines. The mandatory system of internal security, while more effective than Turkish control against thieves, bandits and blood feuds, was not set up to deal with coordinated uprisings against Jewish settlements or against the government. Army reinforcements had to be called in to restore order in the country at large upon the outbreak of such political violence. Though unwilling to permit an open Jewish defense organization, the mandatory from time to time recognized the need for it, at least to the extent of establishing sealed armories in Jewish villages, recruiting Jews for official guard and patrol duties, and cooperating to a limited extent with the secret Jewish defense organization.<sup>25</sup>

With each Arab outbreak it became increasingly clear that against politically directed countrywide attack there must be a politically oriented countrywide defense. Moreover, British policy shifted over the years in a way that posed new military tasks for the Jewish clandestine organizations. These included attempts to break the British blockade against Jewish immigrants, to defend existing settlements, and to prepare for the creation and defense of a state.

Such functions obviously required a far-reaching reorganization of the Jewish defensive formations. The local guard units had to be unified under tighter central control, and new organizations had to be created and kept mobilized for tasks going far beyond a static defense of settlements. But such reorganization encountered difficulties arising from political divisions within the Jewish community.

Of the many hostilities that split the community, that between the Zionist Revisionists who followed Vladimir Jabotinsky and the socialist workers organized in the labor federation, Histadrut, was perhaps the most intense, and was carried over into the sphere of military organization and doctrine. Both the Revisionist rightists and the Socialist Zionist parties were highly aware of the contemporary analogies to their conflict and, even though the Jewish community in Palestine had as yet no real power to fight over, they sometimes acted as though a coup d'etat on the one side or a proletarian dictatorship on the other were a real possibility. There was much talk of "breaking" the trade unions or crushing the fascists, of political assassinations and mass marches. Physical

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Ibid., pp. 644,; E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 Series I, vol. IV (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1946- ), pp. 360 ff.

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P. L. Hanna, British Policy in Palestine (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), pp. 88 f., 95 ff., 120 ff.; J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), pp. 48, 84, 92 f., et passim.

violence was not known. Youth groups and similar formations on both sides were occasionally employed to carry out the tactics of a rudimentary civil warfare. Yet for lack of any tangible power to seize, the only conceivable objective was to foil the potential seizure of power by the other party rather than to seize power oneself.<sup>26</sup>

Defense against attack by outsiders was, however, a necessity common to all. This consideration made possible the cooperations of all parts of the community in the Hagana,<sup>27</sup> organized in 1921. On the other hand, as the danger from attack increased the issue concerning the political future of Palestine and of the Jewish community became more acute. The years between 1936, when the most determined Arab revolt began, and the creation of the Jewish state in 1948 marked a period when the need for unity in the Jewish defensive organization and the political obstacles to achieving it were at their greatest. The manner in which this problem was solved had a determining effect upon the role subsequently assumed by the military in Israel.

#### RIVAL ZIONIST PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, 1936-1947

The early months of the 1936-1939 Arab uprising saw all elements of the community unite in the Hagana. The labor settlers, who had formed the core and provided the active leaders of this countrywide defense organization, were joined not only by the civic guards and individual recruits from "middle class" towns and villages but by their right wing opponents, the Revisionists. A council of the Hagana, representing a coalition of the whole community, was formed as the civilian supervisory authority of the secret defense corps. This unity did not last, however. Revisionist-led Hagana members, opposed to the policy of havlaga (self-restraint) observed by the corps, soon set up the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi as a separate body, and, in 1938-1939, carried out a number of retaliatory bombings against Arab centers.

During the Second World War the Arab uprising was suspended, and the Jewish military formations had to concern themselves with new needs and new issues. The proper aims and methods of Jewish arms now had to be defined primarily in relation to British policies rather than Arab activities. In their strategic objectives vis-a-vis the British, the Hagana and the newly organized Irgun Tz'vai Leumi followed a parallel course during the World War II, even though they remained separately organized and continued to differ in their tactical doctrines. Ben-Gurion defined these objectives for the "dissident" as well as for

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<sup>26</sup> Hurewitz, Struggles for Palestine, pp. 48 ff.

<sup>27</sup> The official title was Irgun ha-Hagana (The Defense Organization).

the "disciplined" military formation when he spoke of fighting with the British in the war against Hitler as though there were no British anti-Zionist policy, and fighting the British anti-Zionist policy as though there were no war.<sup>28</sup> Both formations, though separately, campaigned for the creation of a Jewish army to fight on the side of the Allies, and both, though separately, ran Jewish refugees through the British blockade into Palestine. But a third organization, the FII (Fighters for Freedom of Israel), or the Stern group, as it was called, which arose during World War II, not only operated separately from the Hagana and the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi, but pursued different objectives. From its very inception, the FFI, undeterred by the fact that Britain was then fighting the arch-enemy of the Jews in Europe,<sup>29</sup> declared outright war against the British Mandate. As the Second World War drew to a close, the creation of a Jewish state was the common objective of all three organizations; but only the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi joined the FFI in declaring war on the Mandatory.<sup>30</sup> All three continued to remain separate.

Thus during the period preceding the creation of Israel, those whose immediate strategic objective was to establish the Jewish state found themselves in an extraordinary situation. There were three separate Jewish military organizations actively resisting the British government in Palestine, each under its own independent command, each with its own tactics frequently uncoordinated and often conflicting with the others', and the greatest of them, the Hagana, devoted to a strategy radically different from that of the other two. Nor was the area of conflict between the three underground forces confined to military operations in Palestine. All three extended their operations far beyond the bounds of that country, with the Hagana and Irgun Tz'vai Leumi in particular organizing refugee transports, raising funds, and conducting propaganda throughout the world. Representatives of each group abroad explicitly or implicitly claimed a status similar to that of a government-in-exile and pursued by diplomatic methods the objectives sought by arms in Palestine.<sup>31</sup>

Of the three armed groups, only the Hagana had the support of a civilian organization that represented the entire Jewish community in Palestine as well as the organized Jewish consensus throughout the world. And only the Hagana was controlled in its aims and methods by its civilian counterpart. Deriving their authority from the prestige of the armed groups they served, the agents and official spokesmen of the Irgun

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<sup>28</sup> David Ben-Gurion, Ba-Ma'arakha (Tel-Aviv: Mapai, 1947- ), III, 18.

<sup>29</sup> Israel Scheib, Ma'aser Rishon (Tel-Aviv: Ha-Matmid, 1950), pp. 66 ff.

<sup>30</sup> Menahem Begin, The Revolt (London: W. H. Allen, 1951), pp. 42 ff.

<sup>31</sup> See Ben Hecht, A Child of the Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 515 ff.

Tz'vai Leumi and the FFI supported and defended, but in no way controlled, the activities of those bodies. Their claims to representing the true consensus of the Jewish people constituted a denial of the view that the established Jewish official bodies, such as the Jewish Agency for Palestine, were truly representative and authorized.

Thus the three military organizations of the Jewish community in the 1940's stood in opposition and in potential conflict on two fronts. They represented opposing views on what might be called the foreign policy of the Jewish commonwealth, then struggling to be born, as well as on who constituted the sovereign power of the community and hence, by implication, the authority to rule it. Whether these oppositions resulted in actual conflict depended on the tactical necessities as well as the strategic conceptions of the rival groups; and these were not necessarily the same for all concerned.

The primary aim of the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi and the FFI was to determine the course of the Jewish community's struggle against the British. In this matter, the dissident groups had a clear tactical advantage over the Hagana. They could determine the character of the Jewish resistance movement simply by taking independent action. The Hagana, in order to confine Jewish resistance to the limits of its own strategy, could not rely simply on its own internal discipline; it had to prevent actions by the dissident groups that went beyond those limits.

The dissidents were also in open opposition to the disciplined Hagana on the front, for their claim to represent the sovereign will of the nation was a direct challenge to the official quasi-governmental bodies supported by the organized Jewish consensus. However, to turn opposition into open conflict then and there was as unrealistic, strategically and tactically, as it had been in earlier decades. The control of power in the Jewish community, based as it was on voluntary adherence rather than compulsion, was not such as could be seized by direct action of military groups. On the other hand, all three military organizations, and not merely the official Hagana, depended on the support of the public for success in their operations and even for success in maintaining themselves; for all three were underground groups that could escape suppression by the British army and police only if the public protected their secrecy and helped support them.<sup>32</sup> The public opinion that was involved, moreover, extended beyond Palestine Jewry to include Jews throughout the world. The need of all the paramilitary bodies for public acceptance was a constant factor that made impossible an internecine battle for power. Furthermore, it established a limit beyond which the three rivals could not permit open conflicts to develop on the external front.

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Gerson Rivlin, "Some Aspects of Clandestine Arms Production and Arms Smuggling," Inspection for Disarmament, ed. Seymour Melman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 191 ff.

The conflicts were also lessened as the differences in strategic aims and tactical methods grew smaller. During the war the official organizations and the organized consensus declared themselves openly for a Jewish commonwealth to be established in Palestine after the war. This eliminated what had been the main political issue between the World Zionist Organization and the New Zionist Organization. In consequence, the Revisionists disbanded the latter and rejoined the parent body. The military organizations, however, continued to differ on strategies. At the close of World War II, the two dissident organizations agreed that the common political goal of creating a Jewish commonwealth must be sought by driving the British out of Palestine, whereas the Hagana demanded a limited resistance to oppose, not the mandatory authority itself, but only certain anti-Zionist policies. The two strategies and the tactics dictated by each threatened to conflict, especially when vigorously pursued. The dissident organizations, acting independently, did, in fact, expose the community and the disciplined Hagana to risks. The Hagana, in order to make its own strategy prevail, on certain occasions took measures to prevent actions planned by the dissidents and even struck directly at their organizations by capturing their fighters and turning them over to the British. But to carry hostilities to these lengths was to risk losing the civilian support essential to both groups. An alternative to open conflict, short of a merger of all the rival organizations, was possible only if the separate organizations could coordinate their operations by compromising on strategy and tactics. In the course of the Hagana's struggle against British anti-Zionist policies, its own operations perforce became more activist and militant, and the restrictions on tactical operations became looser. This made it possible for all Jewish resistance groups to coordinate and even combine operations, an arrangement that was loosely and insecurely maintained in the period preceding the creation of the Jewish state.<sup>33</sup>

#### MILITARY REORGANIZATION DURING ISRAEL'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

When it became clear that the British were actually going to leave Palestine, that the Jewish state would actually be established, and that it would be attacked both by Palestine Arabs and the Arab states, Jewish strategy and tactics had to be radically altered. The strategy of the FFI and the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi, historically directed to the struggle against the British, became entirely irrelevant. The Hagana strategy of protecting the rights and continued growth of the Jewish national home from Arab attack and British political restriction had to be revised. It was the emerging Jewish state that now had to be protected, and the anticipated attack changed in scale from communal to international warfare. Tactically, too, none of the existing military formations was adequately prepared for the nature and scope of the new tasks. In the case of the FFI, both methods and organization were completely irrelevant to the new situation, while the Hagana, given time, might hope to transform its methods and

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<sup>33</sup>Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, pp. 156 ff., 195 ff., 231 ff., 240 ff.

organization in order to cope with it. As the attack on the emerging state developed in a succession of phases, the necessary reorganization was achieved.

The strength of the FFI toward the end of 1947 is usually estimated at "a few hundred" fighters. These were originally trained for typical terrorist operations in very small units, but cooperation with the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi had taught them something about the tactics of raiding on a platoon scale. The Irgun Tz'vai Leumi is generally supposed to have had fewer than three thousand fighters, who were trained for raiding and street fighting. The Hagana was the only body with units adequately trained for operations at company strength over open ground. The most effective force consisted of the eleven active and four reserve companies of Palmah ("assault groups"), organized in four battalions, and amounting to about three thousand men. In addition, Hagana had a full-time staff of command and training personnel of about four hundred, about ten thousand men organized in Hish ("field forces") for regional offensive action at company strength, and over thirty thousand organized in Him ("guard forces") for local static defense. As the recognized military agency of the community it could also call in men and women trained in the British and other armies during the Second World War, Jewish supernumerary policemen, and other more or less trained personnel. It should be mentioned, too, that, unlike the FFI and the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi, who were in no way prepared either strategically or tactically to meet an attack by Arabs, the Hagana maintained both a tradition and an organization that served as well for this contingency as for resisting the British. On the other hand, the Hagana was equipped and trained for warfare at a level of armament not much more powerful than that of the FFI and the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi. It had no tanks, planes, or artillery in 1947 to match the equipment of the regular Arab armies that might attack, and, of course, it had no units organized and trained in the use of such weapons. When David Ben-Gurion demanded reorganization at this level, the Hagana was not fully prepared to provide the necessary leadership.<sup>34</sup>

The struggle, beginning immediately after the November 29, 1947, when the UN resolved to partition Palestine, went on until May 15, 1948, under the restrictions of an expiring British Mandate. Even so communications not needed by the British for their withdrawal and hence unprotected were likely to be permanently cut by Arab forces, and isolated Jewish settlements in areas the British no longer policed were left entirely to their own defenses. It accordingly became necessary to develop tactical mobility in relatively large units in order to carry out the primary strategic tasks of that period: to reopen vital communications and to relieve those besieged settlements it was decided to hold. After May 15, 1948, regular Arab armies, equipped with tanks, artillery, and aircraft, opened up an attack in force. The subsequent fighting took place,

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<sup>34</sup> General Staff Historical Branch, Israel Defence Army, Toldot Milhemet Ha-Komemiut (Tel-Aviv: Ma'arakhot, 1959), pp. 71 ff.

moreover, under the constant attention of the United Nations and of interested great powers, who sought to impose truces and to control the fighting, and if possible resolve the issues, by diplomacy and pressure. The Jewish defense accordingly had to be directed at securing Jewish strategic and political objectives and blocking those of the Arabs; and it had to be conducted in close coordination with the political struggle of the civilian authorities of the Jewish state in the UN, as well as with their activities in direct support of the armed forces.

The Hagana alone possessed the capabilities for this type of fighting. It had operational units which were already prepared to some degree for the type and scale of fighting that they would have to face, it had ready reserves that could be mobilized, and it was strengthened from the beginning by general conscription. Moreover, it had the capacity to coordinate its mobilized forces with a static defense organized on a countrywide scale. It had planned and trained for much larger operations than were possible before, and had gained some experience in actions conducted on a relatively large scale during the months before May 15, 1948. It was awaiting the end of the Mandate to obtain delivery of artillery, aircraft, and armor that was being feverishly sought abroad, so that, in the course of time, it might match the firepower of the Arab armies.<sup>35</sup>

That self-defense against the impending Arab attack was of primary importance at the moment and that the Hagana alone could conceivably meet the new challenge were indisputable facts. As patriotic bodies concerned primarily with achieving an independent Jewish state, the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi and the FFI had to integrate their own resources into the organization that could achieve their aim most effectively.

On the other hand, if the two underground organizations were to think primarily in terms of the internal relations of the Jewish community, the situation suggested quite different conclusions. The establishment of a Jewish provisional government and the withdrawal of the British, create for the first time in Zionist history a real power structure that could conceivably be the object of a revolution or coup d'etat. For such a purpose as this, a small band of determined men might suffice. Moreover, the external policies and military strategy of the new Jewish state, based as they were on acceptance of the principle of a Palestine partition, offered opportunities for an irredentist movement, which properly led, might succeed like Pilsudski's instead of failing like D'Annunzio's coups d'armes. The beleaguered community of Jerusalem, where the dissident organizations had always been particularly active, was not at first in the same position as other territory controlled by the Jewish state. This offered an opportunity to apply the tactics of the irredentist.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 80-161; Shaul Ramati, The Israel Defence Forces (Jerusalem: Israel Digest, 1958), pp. 5-8.

The traditions of the Zionist Organization governing corporate and party relationships within its structure and carried over into the governmental practices of the new state made it possible to avoid the need of deciding explicitly between submission to central authority and rebellion against it. Both the voluntary character of the World Zionist Organization and the Palestine Jewish community, by whom the new provisional government was established, and their tradition of radical democratic electoral methods favored the pattern of coalition rule. Thus the initiative of relatively small groups, not only in social and economic, but in essentially political and even military affairs, was encouraged by this situation. Accordingly, it was possible for the pre-state dissident military formations to maintain a considerable portion of their identity and organization even while being integrated into the structure of the new Jewish army and accepting its discipline.

It was also characteristic of this somewhat ambiguous power structure that even though the provisional government's ordinance of May 28, 1948, setting up the Israeli army, expressly forbade the existence of other military formations, the process of integrating them into the army went forward through negotiation. The FFI, for example, whose members at first were ready to accept mobilization as individuals, were, after a week of talks, taken into the new set-up in groups on May 29, 1948, their old commanders receiving ranks agreed upon between the two parties. Some of the leaders of the underground movement also received exemptions from military duty to allow them to organize a civilian political party and youth movement. The negotiations between the state and the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi took longer, but on June 1, 1948, reached more or less the same arrangements: Irgun units were to become units of the Israeli army, their commanders were to receive appropriate ranks, and their arms were to be handed over to the Israeli army and government. An exception, insisted on by both FFI and the Irgun Tz'vai Leumi, was Jerusalem which, according to the partition plan, was to be an international city and not a part of the Jewish state, and where, consequently, both dissident groups not only reserved independence of action but, sought to concentrate as much of their material and manpower as possible.<sup>36</sup>

While all this was in accord with Zionist precedent, it was far from what at least Ben-Gurion felt the new situation demanded. Moreover, like any other contract between parties opposed in purpose, it was a breeding ground for conflicting interpretations. Consequently, occasions arose one after another to test the clarity of purpose and firmness of resolve on both sides: whether the dissidents were prepared to exploit to the full their opportunities for a coup d'etat, on the one hand, and whether the central authorities were ready to risk a test of arms, on the other, in order to establish a more normal structure of political-military social controls. In each case, the dissidents showed no more than a vague inclination toward power, while the central authority proved

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<sup>36</sup> Toldot Milhemet Ha-Komemiyut, pp. 52 ff., 235 ff.

sufficiently determined to assert its position.

About a thousand of three thousand Irgun soldiers and part of the FFI units were integrated into the Israeli army, but only part of their arms were handed in. What remained of the men and supplies was reserved for any independent action that might seem desirable, and for Jerusalem in particular. In the middle of June 1948, the Irgun ship Altalena, bearing 900 men and a cargo of rifles, machine guns, and anti-tank munitions, arrived off the shores of Israel. Negotiations for the disposal of the cargo were of no avail. After a two-day clash at Kfar Vitkin between Irgun men (including some units withdrawn from their army stations) and the army, the ship slipped away with the Irgun commander, Menahem Begin, on board. Arriving at Tel Aviv, Begin called upon Irgun men to hold the beach and neighboring streets and announced his intention to address the Tel Aviv populace from the ship. The army commander, ordered to seize the arms or prevent their delivery to the Irgun, asked for artillery with which he then decided the issue. At the second warning shell, the ship was struck and caught fire. On the following day, there were some inconclusive and irresolute efforts to remove the men and arms of the FFI and Irgun to Jerusalem and to set up a separate government there, but no concerted rebellious action took place. The dissidents returned to the army and submitted to the discipline of the government. In Jerusalem, however, their units continued to remain independent and active.<sup>37</sup>

On September 17, 1948, the UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated in Jewish Jerusalem. The Israeli government, though unable to identify the killers, took drastic action against the dissident organizations in the Jerusalem area. The Irgun units in Jerusalem were ordered to disband and to hand over their weapons to the army. About two hundred FFI fighters, including their organization leaders and commanders, were arrested. This marked the end of the independent military formations in Israel. The bitterness aroused by the harsh suppression of armed dissidence now finds expression chiefly in efforts by the Irgun, still active in the civilian form of a political party, to use the Altalena incident as propaganda for getting votes.<sup>38</sup>

One further, related phase in the disciplining of Israel's military formations remains to be noted in this historical review. The Israeli army had inherited from the Hagana itself certain elements of a pluralistic organization. Even before the provisional government was set up, Ben-Gurion, taking responsibility for the department of defense of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, had insisted that the commander of the Hagana be responsible to him rather than to the representative council of groups participating in the secret militia. Eventually, as Minister of Defense of the Israeli government, he had to enforce this view by dismissing the

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid.; Begin, The Revolt, pp. 154 ff.; Scheib, Ma'aser Rishon, pp. 356 ff.

<sup>38</sup>Toldot Milhemet Ha-Komemiyut, p. 292.

incumbent commander, Israel Galili. This brought him into conflict with the left-wing party to which Galili belonged. The conflict became much sharper when Ben-Gurion decided to disband the Palmah staff. Palmah (Plugot Mahatz - "assault units") had been the mobilized arm of the Hagana while the Mandate still was in effect. Its members, though drawn from all parts of the community, developed strong ties to the largest federation of communal settlements, Ha-Kibbutz ha-meuhad. They were based on labor settlements, working half-days and training half-days. A significant part of the Palmah membership were youth groups training to establish labor settlements themselves, and its command included a strong contingent of Ha-Kibbutz ha-meuhad leaders. Moreover, in the last years of the Mandate, the Ha-Kibbutz ha-meuhad leaders set up a separate political party, with foreign and domestic policies of its own. The Palmah served at least symbolically as an expression of this political separatism. In the organization of the Israeli army, the Palmah staff continued to exist apart from the general staff and area commands, controlling recruitment, basic and tactical training, as well as indoctrination of Palmah inductees. On October 7, 1948, Ben-Gurion, as Minister of Defense, ordered the Palmah staff disbanded. After an appeal to the Supreme Command, a final order by the Chief of Staff on October 29 carried out this measure, to take effect on November 7, 1948.<sup>39</sup>

Thereafter the Israeli army (though not the government), was organized as a tightly controlled, unified and centralized body, and no independent military or paramilitary organizations existed by its side.

#### THE ISRAELI DEFENSE ARMY TODAY

In considering the role of the military in Israel we have referred from time to time to revolutionary or semi-anarchic situations in other countries. We have done so because the protagonists in this history were themselves aware of such precedents, regarded them as analogical in some degree to their own circumstances, and were presumably influenced by them. However, the objective situation (some pertinent aspects of which have been noted already) made these analogies obviously inapplicable in many crucial details.

In considering the contemporary situation in Israel, a new state and a country in many respects still undeveloped, the analogies that come to mind concern the other new states and undeveloped countries, many of them near neighbors of Israel, discussed in the present volume. So common has been the seizure of power by the military in those countries that certain explanations of this phenomenon have become familiar, not only among scholars, but among politicians as well.

A frequently advanced thesis is that a society commits its destiny,

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Ibid., pp. 53 ff.; cf. Amitai Etzioni, "The Israeli Army: The Human Factor," Jewish Frontier, November, 1959.

together with its supreme authority, into the charge of a dictatorial regime because of critical emergencies. Countries with democratic as well as those with authoritarian traditions have often in history submitted voluntarily to military rule during crises, particularly in the face of an overpowering external threat. However, this generalization is so broad that its converse can also be plausibly defended. Israel, for instance, has been in deep crisis ever since its birth; and the threats to its existence, in the form of hot and cold wars professedly aimed at its annihilation, have been acute and unremitting. Not only has Israel met these threats without resorting to a military regime, but the external pressures may have served to unify the country and so provide a basis for stability underlying its manifold domestic crises.

One might conclude, then, that in seeking an explanation of military regimes, one should look not to a society's external situations but to its internal, structural crises.<sup>40</sup> But here too, Israel is an exception, for it is well supplied with domestic problems that deserve to be called both critical and structural. Its absorption of new immigrants en masse has hardly seen its like in all history. Indeed, this problem is so far from being solved that it is customary in Israel to speak of the "Second Israel" when referring to the recent immigrants, drawn mainly from African and Asian Islamic countries, in contrast to the Yishuv, the settled community of prewar immigrants, who came largely from European, Christian countries. A country still deriving a large portion of its national income from gifts and well aware that in great part their flow will cease in the near future is obviously facing a critical economic situation. Lastly, a country that is blessed with a dozen political parties in its Parliament and twice this number in general elections and is without a written constitution because it fears acute dissension on religious and social issues seems beyond a doubt to suffer from a critical weakness in its political structure. But these conditions, either separately or in combination, have not produced a military regime in Israel.

Nevertheless, the relationship between crises, whether external or internal, and military regimes seems too reasonable and well confirmed by other cases to be abandoned simply because it is not borne out in Israel. One might avoid a negative conclusion in two ways: by predicting a collapse of democracy in Israel if its crises continue to persist unresolved or by seeking to refine the definition of the critical conditions that produce military regimes. The first line of approach is best postponed until after a full consideration of the present situation in Israel. The second approach (as in a number of papers in this volume)<sup>41</sup> has often led to the hypothesis that military regimes result from crises in societies

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The author is indebted to Herbert Goldhamer for this suggestion.

<sup>41</sup>See the essays by Victor Alba, Manfred Halpern, John J. Johnson, and Lucian W. Pye.

where Westernization has produced disorientation of values, power vacuums, technological gaps, economic maladjustments or similar symptoms of "dis-equilibrium" -- and where the military or, more particularly, the officer corps can be identified with a social-economic, politically self-conscious class that is either for or against Westernization in whole or in part.

Israel could not be said to disprove this highly specific hypothesis, even if its democratic regime continued to defy crises, for it does not satisfy some of the specified conditions. Israelis may worry about the cleavage between the "Second Israel" and the Yishuv -- but the Yishuv itself, into which the "Second Israel" is being continually absorbed, involves relatively small distinctions of wealth, social status, or hereditary power in comparison with any advanced industrial society, let alone underdeveloped countries. Nor does Westernization or the adoption of scientific techniques and values create politically significant cleavages in Israel. Above all, the military is not a distinct group, consciously set apart from the populace at large, nor is it identified with or drawn from a specific social-economic, politically conscious class. Finally, the armed forces do not stand out from the rest of the society by virtue of a monopoly of technological or administrative skills. The educational, administrative and technological practices applied in the pre-state as well as post-state organization of society at large do not differ fundamentally from those needed for the maintenance, management, and defense of a modern state and the training and use of its army.

A brief survey of the present organizational pattern and relationships with the civilian community of the Israeli army reinforces this conclusion.<sup>42</sup> Only in a few countries like Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland are the armed forces so thoroughly identified with the entire people, and perhaps not even in those countries are the armed forces so thoroughly integrated into civilian pursuits and purposes of the social organism.

The regular army of Israel is made up of a very small group of career soldiers (comprising a very few non-coms, and a disproportionate number of high-ranking commissioned officers) and the men and women who, beginning at the age of eighteen, are currently undergoing a two (for women) or two and a half year conscription. With the exception mainly of women exempted for religious scruples, the conscription is effectively enforced and readily obeyed. All able-bodied young Jews of the conscripted age group are in active service together. For these recruits, the army is to a pre-eminent degree the place in which they join the Yishuv. The armed forces, in addition, contain in their reserves all men to the age of 49, who continue to engage in annual training maneuvers well into the forties. It is indeed, a nation in arms.

Officers in the Israeli army, both non-coms and commissioned (these distinctions do not have the usual significance), are drawn from the

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<sup>42</sup>See Itzioni's article "The Israeli Army" and Ramati's pamphlet, cited above.

conscripted by means of tests, and not from any class of society or school background outside the army. They are broadly representative of the entire range of the population, although, for lack of background, the new immigrants from Asian and African countries are very much under-represented.

All soldiers who lack it are given intensive training in Hebrew, and are taught Jewish history, the geography of Israel, and the three R's. Men chosen for officer's training are given tactical indoctrination by the army at various levels, while those selected for higher ranks are enabled, when necessary, to complete their secondary education and undertake advanced instruction. Indoctrination is given regularly by the company commander to his men on current external and domestic affairs, but in such a way as to avoid issues controversial among Israeli parties.

Great emphasis is placed on creating rapport between leader and led. The men are encouraged to discuss grievances and problems at indoctrination sessions. Distinctions in rank are not emphasized with a high degree of formality, though more strictly than was the case in the Hagana. Lieutenants, not sergeants, are the face-to-face leaders, and officers generally are expected to operate in battle far to the front of what would be normal in many other armies. The Israeli army is notably chary about issuing battle decorations, and, as a small force, does not abound in high ranks for its commanding officers.

The career officers in Israel's army constitute a relatively young group and seem destined to remain so in the foreseeable future. There is an active turnover at the top, leaving openings for mobility in the entire corps. Four chiefs of staff have already retired at an early age (after four years of service, in a typical case) in order to enter civilian pursuits. This precedent may mark the beginning of a pattern, since high-ranking officers are much in demand for business and governmental posts, and retirement with pension rights after ten years is possible. The officers themselves, though considered to be the most distinguished of public servants, tend to view professional life outside the army as a more normal and ultimate goal in life.

The Israeli army has depended to an unusual degree upon civilian support in both its strategic and tactical plans and in its very organization. It has already been noted to how unusual an extent the strength that Israel can mobilize in time of need is made up of reserve forces. In addition it should be remarked that, following Hagana precedent, Israel's defenses depend on the ability of its armed settlements and local militia. These fixed points of defense are intended, ideally, to free the field forces for counterattack. Indeed, the armed villages may also serve as bases from which counterattacks can be launched. Accordingly the army has much to say about the location of new villages. Where youth movements are able to organize and train groups to settle on border farms, they are kept intact and trained specifically for this purpose by the army during the conscription period. The responsibility of a regional commander on the Israeli staff thus includes not only the field forces but

the village defenses of his area. And, finally, the offensive campaigns that the Israeli army can expect to carry out are confined to brief, relatively short-range actions that do not present major logistical problems.

With such an organization, the country's military budget can be allotted to an unusual degree to the "muscle" rather than the "fat" of military power, to operational rather than administrative categories of expenditure. This aim has also been pursued by relying on available civilian facilities -- medical services, transport -- either entirely or as available reserves.

On the other hand, the Israeli army, as well as the ministry of defense, also supplies services that would normally be provided by civilians. This was particularly marked in the early years after 1948 when the army undertook to train refugees in methods of camp management and hygiene and came to their aid in such emergencies as floods. The importance of the army as an agency for absorbing young immigrants into the general Israeli social brotherhood and providing basic educational background has often been noted. This influence extends beyond the period of conscription. Girls drafted for army training form a significant part of the school teachers available for immigrant settlements on the border. The men chosen for leadership in the defense of such villages are trained by the army not only in tactics but in the fundamentals of the history, geography, and institutions of Israel. It is customary not only for older settlements to adopt particular army units and care for the personal needs of the soldiers, but for army units to adopt new border villages as their particular charge.<sup>43</sup>

The services rendered to civilian society by the defense ministry should also be noted. This ministry, hoping to reduce the country's reliance on imports of arms and, if possible, to improve the budgetary position, has established a munitions industry and a number of maintenance shops of more than military importance. The former had become an exporter of light arms and has led to the development of civilian industries working as subcontractors. The latter, particularly those for aircraft, have developed a flourishing business of servicing civilian aircraft, both domestic and foreign. Further possibilities of this kind are, of course, also contained in the research activities that the ministry of defense (among other government agencies) conducts.

Thus, not only is Israel a nation in arms, but the Israeli army is in the fullest sense an army of civilians. The latter is undoubtedly a

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<sup>43</sup> These functions of Israel's army have been of particular interest to some other Afro-Asian nations. The Israeli military are particularly proud of their share in their country's program for promoting friendly contacts and cooperation with these countries. See Arnold Rivlin, "Israel and the Afro-Asian World," Foreign Affairs, April, 1959.

necessary corollary of the former but it must be said that Israel welcomes the corollary and does a great deal to extend its application. Not only do civilian, egalitarian attitudes pervade army life to the very limit that discipline permits, but military attitudes make up a part of every Israeli's life, including his civilian activities. Actual soldiering does not involve commitment to a whole new set of values, but only a special training in values and skills that affect Israeli life throughout the whole range of its institutions.

That Israel is still highly unstable, heterogeneous, and precariously situated is well known. In similar conditions the role of the military has often become socially pathological. For the reasons suggested above, this has not been the case in Israel. One may hazard the prediction that it is also quite unlikely to be the case in the future.

If one wishes to construct hypothetical circumstances in which a military coup d'etat in Israel might take place, the critical area for analysis is likely to be Israel's political system.<sup>44</sup> Based upon an electoral system that encourages a plurality of small parties and necessitates government by coalitions, Israel's political set-up exhibits characteristic symptoms of instability. The same situation, in the classic parallel case of France, has repeatedly led to Boulangist attempts and successful Bonapartist and De Gaullist conquests of power. A military coup and takeover in Israel might then be predicted, on this analogy, under two different conditions: If economic pressure upon the population should acutely increase and government by coalition collapse, the right wing opposition might upset the entire (by then discredited) parliamentary regime by mob and paramilitary action. Alternatively, if government by coalition should collapse and the right wing opposition threaten a coup, the army chiefs, loyal to Ben-Gurion, might themselves take over in order to protect the tottering regime.

The analogy upon which this analysis is based, however, seems inapplicable to Israel, so that the prediction lacks probability. In spite of an electoral system (based on proportional representation and a single country-wide election district) that encourages party fragmentation, in spite of the resulting need to govern by shifting coalitions, and in spite of an unexampled expansion, in the size and the heterogeneity of the electorate, Israel has displayed a remarkably stable political structure through four successive elections. One major party, Mapai, has consistently received a third to two-fifths of the seats in Parliament. Its rivals, none of which has ever reached half its size, are so scattered to the right and left of Mapai that, far from finding an issue that unites them all against the major governing party, they succeed rather in uniting with the Mapai against each other. Thus Mapai has been so essential and has bulked so large in every government coalition that there is some justification for

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<sup>44</sup> Such an analysis was suggested by J. C. Kitchen and W. Z. Laqueur, who read the original draft of this paper.

the view that Israel (like a few other new states that have avoided military rule) represents essentially a single party government.<sup>45</sup>

To make this observation even more pertinent, as well as more precise, one should note further that while Israel has a unicameral legislature, it has a kind of two chamber government (using that term in a broad, pragmatic sense). The national labor federation, Histadrut Ha-Ovdim, constitutes a kind of second chamber powerfully involved in all questions of economic and social policy. In the Histadrut, Mapai consistently governs with the support of a clear and safe majority. Taking this factor into account, some observers strongly doubt the apparent indications of political instability in Israel. They assume, instead, that we are witnessing the development of a stable institutional pattern, whose elements, under French conditions, have led from one constitutional crises to the next.<sup>46</sup>

If this view should turn out to be mistaken in the relatively near future, it will be for quite other reasons than those predicated by the analyses outlined above; and the outcome, too, will accordingly be quite different. The political system of Israel may increasingly appear, to political scientists, as remarkably stable, but the political leaders of Israel are not at all happy about its practical inconveniences. If Ben-Gurion could have his way, the electoral system would be replaced tomorrow by a system of majority elections in a plurality of election districts. A reform to achieve this end cannot be confidently anticipated, for this is one issue upon which Mapai's rivals have so far found it easy to command a parliamentary majority in opposition. But if the reform should take place, it would probably increase still further the stability of political structure in Israel and render still more improbable any analysis based on the assumption of critical weakness at this point.

Not only -- and not even especially -- an examination of Israel's political institutions, but considerations of quite another kind really explain the confidence with which most observers regard Israel as an effective democracy. To make democracy succeed in a new state requires a suitable tradition and a predisposition to democracy among the people, great courage and a modicum of talent among the members of the parliament, and qualities of imagination and strength of purpose among the leadership. To paraphrase what Charles B. Marshall has said about Pakistan: If democracy is to be established in fact as it is asserted to be in form, it must be on the basis of early and significant accomplishment, for otherwise the practices of colonial government will be reestablished in their old grooves.

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<sup>45</sup> See the contribution by Edward Shils to this volume.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Etzioni, "Alternative Ways to Democracy: The Example of Israel," Political Science Quarterly, June, 1959.

It is significant that those who consider the circumstances under which a military rule might come to Israel are likely to construct a hypothesis that involves a military coup undertaken in support of the existing regime rather than an uprising led by the opposition. The characteristic symptoms of an anti-democratic popular movement -- loss of prestige by the parliamentary government, mass disaffection with democracy, and even the determination to seize power by all or any means on the part of the opposition leaders -- are not strongly in evidence in Israel, nor were they ever so throughout the history of the Zionist movement. And similar objections apply to the supposition that in a critical situation the present leadership might use the army to take over as a preventive measure. The facts of life, as we have noted, make such a supposition academic. The army is too firmly integrated with the entire civilian structure to be the easy tool of partisan politics, and the whole political system of Israel is by now too well established for any immediate structural crisis. Apart from all this, and above all this, the confidence in Israel's democracy is founded on the feeling that democratic traditions and attitudes are well rooted in the people and leaders of Israel. Whatever the crises, one may expect them to be solved within the framework of democratic principles and procedures.



## THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

by

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Armies have been the last of the authoritative structures of government to be created in all but a few of the forty-odd political entities of Sub-Saharan Africa. With few exceptions, national armies are either non-existent, or they are fragile structures still heavily dependent upon external support for their maintenance and development. This embryonic and underdeveloped character of Africa's military establishments, coupled with the precipitate and unexpected termination of European rule, underscores the ominous power vacuum that exists throughout that vast continent. Africa lacks what many of the other new states of the former colonial world have had, namely, an army which could be a modernizing and stabilizing source of organizational strength in society, a last stand-by reserve which could be called in, or could take over, to prevent external subversion or a total collapse of the political order. Thus, at this stage at least, there is little that an analysis of the situation in Africa can contribute to the effort to identify common patterns in the role of the military in underdeveloped countries. In Africa that role must be examined largely in terms of current trends and future potentialities.

In this essay we propose to analyze those factors and forces which affect current efforts to create and to build national military establishments in Sub-Saharan Africa. We will first examine the character of those policies and practices of the European colonial power that help to account for the different politico-military situations found in this area. We will then focus those dominant trends in the post-colonial period that have led to variant patterns of military development, with special emphasis upon the character of dependency relationships. We will conclude with an analysis of selected issues and problems involved in Africa's attempt to establish national armies, namely, the idea of demilitarization or neutralization of Africa, the urge towards Pan-African unity, the question of civil-military relationships in the new states, and the role of armies in the modernization of Africa.

### THE COLONIAL LEGACY

As Africa thrusts itself upon the world stage and seeks to become fully participant in the modern state system, it is still very much a prisoner of its immediate colonial past. For seventy-five years European colonial powers, acting in concert and individually, have dominated over 90 per cent of the African continent. Although similar in the totality of control they have exercised, their policies and practices have differed markedly. As a consequence, African leaders are heirs to a mixed legacy. All new states share certain common disabilities; yet each is distinctive from the standpoint of the development of its institutions and economy and the capacity it has to face the challenges of independent

statehood. Given the brevity of their independent existence, what they are and what they may become over the next decade will in large measure be determined by what they did or did not inherit from their colonial experience.

One striking feature of Sub-Saharan Africa is its comparative isolation from major military conflicts during the modern era. In part this is due to its geographical location and particularly to the massive Sahara Desert, the world's largest arid waste stretching without a break from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and nowhere less than a thousand miles wide. It is also explained by the fact that with two notable exceptions, Africa has been almost completely controlled by imperial powers that were allies in all major wars since its formal partition commencing in 1885. Before that it was indeed the "Dark Continent." The two exceptions are the comparatively brief and minor military encounters between Anglo-French and German forces during World War I in the former German colonies, between Italian and Ethiopian forces in the mid-1930's, and between Allied and Italian forces in Ethiopia during World War II.

At the time of Africa's partition, and on subsequent occasions, the European powers concerned endeavored to minimize actual or potential military conflict in Africa by various forms of international agreement. At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, they established principles and rules for the peaceful partition and occupation of the continent. An effort was also made to include provisions in the Berlin Act for the permanent neutralization of a large area of middle Africa known as the Conventional Basin of the Congo.<sup>1</sup> Mainly because of strong French objections this effort proved abortive, although the Act did include a provision that the signatories had the option to declare any of their territories neutral, which status other signatories were obliged to respect. Except for the Independent State of the Congo (subsequently the Belgian Congo), which was declared "perpetually neutral," this option was never exercised.

Recurrently during Africa's colonial period, efforts were made to secure international agreement on the "nonmilitarization" of the African peoples and the "demilitarization" of parts or all of the continent. Most of these proposals were never seriously considered, although limited success was achieved in the effort to control the trade in fire-arms and

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<sup>1</sup>The initial proposal for the permanent neutralization of the area was made by Mr. John Kasson, the American delegate at the Berlin Conference. He argued that "Middle Africa should not be drawn into purely European conflicts and that this vast area should be spared 'the destructive effects of foreign wars.'" See George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Conference (New York: Macmillan, 1923), p. 259.

ammunition and the importation of the latter into the African territories.<sup>2</sup> The General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890 regarding the slave trade provided for the international control of the trade in fire-arms and ammunition in all of Africa south of the Sahara and north of the Union of South Africa.<sup>3</sup> This agreement was subsequently reaffirmed and largely enforced. Moreover, in their own interests the colonial powers maintained very firm control over the importation and use of all arms and ammunition in their respective territories. Although control of the slave trade provided the original rationale for control over African access to arms, another consideration acquired growing, if not transcendent, importance, namely, the danger that armed Africans posed for the European presence. This was perhaps put most succinctly by Field Marshal Smuts in 1917:

I hope that one of the results of this war will be some arrangement or convention among the nations interested in Central Africa by which the military training of natives in that area will be prevented, as we have prevented it in South Africa.<sup>4</sup>

In the end, efforts to secure a general international agreement on the nonmilitarization of the African peoples failed. France's intransigence regarding the use of African manpower as a reservoir for her own defense establishment was one of the many reasons. However, the principle was embodied in the mandate agreements between the League of Nations and the Mandatory powers responsible for administering Germany's former African colonies (Togoland, Cameroons, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, and Southwest Africa). A characteristic clause in those agreements provided that "The Mandatory shall not establish any military or naval bases, nor erect any fortifications, nor organize any native military force in the territory except for local police purposes and for the

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<sup>2</sup>In surveying the nature of the "colonial problem" in the late 1930's, largely in response to Germany's demand for the return of her colonies, a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs observed that "A general agreement on demilitarization would make some readjustment easier, but such agreement appears to be unattainable without an effective system of collective security, especially as one great colonial power, France, depends to some extent on colonial manpower." The Colonial Problem (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 104.

<sup>3</sup>Article viii of the Brussels Act offered the following rationale: "The experience of all nations who have intercourse with Africa having shown the pernicious and preponderating part played by fire-arms in Slave-Trade operations, as well as in interne@ine wars between native tribes . . . ."

<sup>4</sup>Beer, op. cit., pp. 275-76.

defense of the territory."<sup>5</sup> In practice, however, this principle was largely ignored. Moreover, at the outbreak of World War II, there was fairly general acceptance of the concept of the "automatic belligerency" of the mandated territories of those European powers that were themselves in a state of belligerency. Finally, under the United Nations Charter, the administering authority of a trust (mandated) territory is given the positive duty "to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security," and for this purpose it may, among other things, erect fortifications within the territory and recruit African volunteers for service outside the territory. Thus, by the beginning of the post-World War II period all international attempts to demilitarize and neutralize Africa had been abandoned.

### FORMER BRITISH AFRICA

The policies and practices of the four major European colonial powers -- Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal -- differed so radically, particularly as they affected actual and potential development, that the character of their respective legacies must be examined separately.

Three distinctive features of British policy have had a particularly significant impact upon military development in those areas of Africa that were or are under United Kingdom control. One has been the policy of indirect rule, under which traditional authority structures were recognized and used as intermediate agencies in colonial administration. This policy became a fetish of British administrators but was not everywhere effective. It was most successful in those areas where there were identifiable traditional authorities commanding effective control over traditional states and kingdoms. Under this policy, millions of Africans were "administered" through traditional political structures by remarkably few Europeans and a minimum of organized force. It was a policy that maximized economy in control mechanisms, first by fostering the preservation of traditional sanctions, and secondly by decentralizing responsibility for a substantial portion of the control function, including, in particular, the maintenance of internal security.

A second feature of British policy has been that African manpower was not mobilized for military service except in a crisis. Not until World War II were African troops employed outside of Africa. During World War I more than 10,000 combatants and 10,000 porters were sent from British West Africa to the campaign in German East Africa (now

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Article 4 of the British Mandate for Tanganyika, H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1948), p. 304. The other mandate agreements were similarly worded, although for the French African mandates an additional clause was included providing that troops raised in the mandated territory for local defense might "in the event of general war, be utilized to repel an attack or for the defense of the territory outside that subject to the mandate." (p. 68)

Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi); and the King's African Rifles of British East and Central Africa expanded from 2,000 to more than 20,000. At the end of hostilities, however, there was rapid demobilization. During the interwar period there were only 19,000 Africans in army units in all of British Africa. During World War II more than 372,000 Africans were enlisted in the British Army. Approximately 166,000 of these served at least part of their enlistment outside of their own territories, more than half in Burma. Again, at the conclusion of the war there was rapid demobilization, and the number under arms dropped back to the prewar figure.

A third facet of British rule in Africa has been the differential response of the United Kingdom government to demands for self-government, an acknowledged objective of British policy. Response to such demands has been determined by three factors: (1) the tendency of the British to treat each territory separately and to insist upon a distinctive pattern and pace of political development, (2) the degree of pressure from African nationalists, and (3) the presence or absence of white settlers. In areas of white settlement (e. g., the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias, and Kenya), it seemed natural to the British to allow control over territorial governments to be progressively devolved upon their "kith and kin" overseas. The latter were regarded as the logical heirs to the responsibility for exercising trusteeship over the African masses. This willingness to bestow self-government upon resident European minorities was first demonstrated in the Union of South Africa in 1909, and subsequently in Southern Rhodesia in 1923. During the interwar period an increasing measure of power was devolved upon the small European minorities in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. However, the rise and spread of African nationalism after 1945 called a halt to this general trend, and since 1958 the United Kingdom Government has reversed this policy and is now prepared to concede self-government to African majorities in all those territories over which it retains control. The relevant point is that these policies have led to very different patterns of political, and hence military, development in former British territories. For the purpose of our present analysis, these territories fall into four categories: the Sudan, British West Africa, British East and Central Africa, and British Southern Africa.

### Republic of the Sudan.

The Sudan is the one African state south of the Sahara to emerge from the colonial period with a modern military establishment possessing the attributes of an independent national army. The Sudanese Defense Force, established under British and Sudanese officers in 1925, was in 1956 commanded exclusively by a Sudanized officer corps. A military academy had been established in Khartoum capable of providing an adequate flow of professionalized leadership. Both officers and men, the latter long-term enlistees under a program designed to provide a career, were seasoned by combat in World War II and then given recurrent training which fitted them into a spit-and-polish organization along British lines. Equipment was selected to conform both to conditions and terrain

and to the financial capability of the country, and consisted primarily of light arms and artillery designed for mobility. Following the 1955 revolt of southern Nilotic troops against northern Arab officers, the problem of ethnic imbalance was partially overcome by the amalgamation of diverse elements in all units wherever stationed.

The Sudan had always been treated differently from the rest of British colonial Africa. As a condominium it came under the British Foreign Office. Recruitment of British officers for service in the Sudanese administration and army was highly selective. Indeed, as a dependency the Sudan was beneficiary of the best Britain had to offer as an imperial power. The creation of the Sudan Defense Force received very special attention and represents a model in building an army for independence. By the time of independence the Sudanese army satisfied most important criteria by which a modern national army of a sovereign state might be judged.

A major consideration underlying British military policy in the Sudan was the pivotal position the territory occupied between Britain's strategic interests in the Middle East and in East Africa. As Britain sought to make the Sudan a counterpoise to Egyptian influence in the area, the splitting of the historic ties between Egypt and the regions of the upper Nile was one of those interests that the development of an effective Sudanese force helped to further. In the first two decades following the establishment of the condominium in 1899, Egyptians were widely used both in the administration and in the army in the Sudan. Following the Egyptian-led mutiny in 1924 Egyptians were expelled from the army and were rapidly removed from positions in education and administration. This was the beginning of the process of progressive Sudanization.

When the Sudan Defense Force was established in 1925 it was without Egyptian officers. Those Egyptians who remained in the Sudan up to the eve of World War II were few in number, including even those whose coming helped make the country "a land of exile for (Egyptian) Army officers in disfavor."<sup>6</sup>

The Sudanese forces made a significant contribution in the North African campaign of 1942. At its conclusion they did not join in the European war, but returned to the Sudan to serve as a strategic reserve against Egyptian unrest. That this was regarded as a continuing function was apparent in the fact that there was only limited demobilization of the Sudanese army at the end of the war. The loss of the Indian Army -- historically a key force in Britain's imperial defense system -- provided an additional reason for the maintenance of the Sudanese Army as an effective military unit following World War II. This was reinforced by the fact that the postwar British Labour government was not prepared for both political and economic reasons to offset the loss of the Indian

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<sup>6</sup> Anwar El Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (London: Allan Wingate, 1957), p. 17.

Army by an equivalent commitment of military manpower recruited and kept under arms in the United Kingdom.

One of the major features of the development of the Sudanese army during and after World War II was the appointment and promotion of some seventy Sudanese officers. Most of these officers were promoted during combat in World War II. Several Sudanese achieved general officer rank, the first being Brigadier Abdullah Kahlil, who served as Premier for two years before the military takeover in 1957. As in India, this reflected a deliberate policy of the British government of giving priority to the promotion of indigenous officers during combat. Not only was there a shortage of trained British officers, but there was also the prospect of progressive advance towards Sudanese self-government. The latter became ever more apparent as a result of increased agitation from Egypt. Thus, commencing in 1953, when it was recognized that the Sudan was approaching the threshold of independence, the British launched a crash program of officer training. In the succeeding three years this program produced nearly four hundred junior Sudanese officers. When independence was achieved in January 1956, the Sudanization of the officer corps was virtually complete.

#### British West Africa.

British military policy in her West African territories (Nigeria, Gold Coast (Ghana), Sierra Leone and the Gambia) differed markedly from that pursued in the Sudan. In the political sphere, however, the pattern and pace of development in Ghana was almost identical with that in the Sudan, and Nigeria was not far behind. Moreover, Southern Nigeria and Ghana were somewhat more advanced than the Sudan in economic and educational development. The major difference between the Sudan and the West African territories was in the rate and degree of Africanization of the administration, and particularly in the development of a national army seasoned in combat, officered by Africans, and equipped and trained to perform the functions of both internal security and national defense. There are at least two explanations for this difference. One, to which reference has already been made, is that the Sudanese army was deliberately nourished and developed not only as a balance against Egypt, but as a force available for general employment in the Middle East. The second explanation is that Britain did not anticipate that its presence and influence would be seriously challenged in tropical Africa for several decades to come. Thus the Sudan benefited from its proximity to Egypt and from the assumptions that its peoples were actually and potentially better prepared for independent statehood.

The military units formed in the British West African territories were all part of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). During peacetime the utilization of these units was determined by the Colonial Office; during wartime, by the War Office. Although central facilities for the RWAFF were concentrated in the Gold Coast (Ghana), and naval units were based mainly upon Lagos, there was considerable decentralization during peacetime to the colonial governments of the separate

territories. Each of the latter not only maintained its own regimental units; it also had a degree of discretion in the movement of territorial units beyond territorial boundaries. Moreover, even during wartime, when highly centralized control over all units was required, recruitment was still carried out on a territorial basis. As a consequence of this policy of "territorialization," the military formations in each dependency were able to preserve substantial organizational continuity and recognizable career channels. And as each territory moved towards independence it has had its own embryonic "national" army.

Although nascent national military establishments did tend to emerge within RWAFF, there was only a beginning made in the Africanization of the officer corps. This absence of an indigenous officer class was one of the principal reasons for the rapid demobilization of West African troops at the close of World War II. It was also the primary stumbling block in the attempt to create an African Army to replace the Indian Army in the imperial defense structure. The problem was further aggravated by Britain's own officer shortage. Once Britain embarked upon partial remobilization to meet her European NATO commitments, she could not spare officers for the training and development of military forces in the colonies. The Conservative Government, which came to power in 1951, had pledged to make greater use of colonial manpower; yet it was compelled to admit failure because of the shortage of British officers. By the mid-fifties, the continuing officer shortage, coupled with the dramatic upsurge of African nationalism, made the creation of an "African Army" a politically unrealistic, and technically hopeless, objective.

Britain's need to utilize United Kingdom facilities for the training of officers for her own establishment, together with the absence of officer training facilities in West Africa, precluded a repetition of the successful crash program for officer training that had been carried out in the Sudan between 1953 and 1956. Thus when Ghana secured its independence in 1957 no more than ten per cent of the officers in its national military establishment were Ghanaian. Three years later Nigeria secured its independence, following eight years of intensive preparation; yet no more than twenty-five per cent of the members of the officer corps were Nigerian. In neither country had African officers ever held a significant command or staff position. The same situation characterizes the military establishment of the smaller territory of Sierra Leone, due to receive its independence this year (1961).

One special feature of the military establishment in British West Africa during the colonial period was the tribal and areal imbalance in recruitment to the ranks and to the officer corps. Officers and non-commissioned officers in technical or clerical positions have tended characteristically to come overwhelmingly from the more developed southern coastal areas, with some tribes predominating over others. The "other ranks" have tended to come from the northern regions. Thus, for example, at the time of Ghana's independence more than ninety-two per cent of the Ghanaian officers were from the coastal areas and sixty-two per cent of the troops came from the far north. This imbalance is partly explained

by the differential impact of modernity and education; the peoples of the southern coastal areas are much more advanced educationally than those of the northern hinterland areas. The educational requirements for cadet training insured that southerners would predominate among officer recruits. But this is only a partial explanation. There were important political reasons for selective recruitment of "other ranks" from more politically quiescent, less nationalistic, groups. One of the major functions of the military establishment was to suppress internal uprisings and disturbances. It was far safer to recruit military personnel from those tribes and areas least likely to be involved. That the British could have established greater representativeness was well demonstrated by the wider voluntary recruitment carried out successfully during World War II.

The real significance of this feature of the colonial legacy is that the pattern of differential recruitment that was politically the best during the colonial period may not be the best after independence has been achieved. This is well demonstrated by the mutiny of southern Sudanese troops against their northern officers. That event forced the Sudanese government to recognize and act against the problem of tribal imbalance in the Sudanese army. It remains to be seen whether the new states of former British West Africa can avoid a similar experience. In the event of a serious domestic disorder in northern Ghana, for example, would the predominantly northern "other ranks" loyally obey a southern President and southern officers in a pacification operation? The essential point is that although the new West African armies have bequeathed a "national" personality as a result of the policy of territorialization of the RWAFF, they are not "national" in composition.

#### British East and Central Africa.

The British territories in East and part of Central Africa have lagged far behind those of West Africa in political, economic, and educational development. This is explained by the later intrusion and lesser impact of the West in this area and by the presence of European settlers. The latter were accorded preferential treatment and permitted to exercise a decisive influence upon official policy. The effect of this influence has been to retard African advancement in all sectors, including the military establishment.

The military units of this vast region (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia) have been constituent parts of the King's African Rifles (KAR). The KAR, like the RWAFF, has been under Colonial Office control during peacetime and under War Office control during wartime. Yet KAR has always been more decentralized than the RWAFF. Each of the separate colonial governments has tended to press vigorously and continually for greater economy and force reduction. This parsimonious and parochial attitude is largely explained by the fact that each colonial government has had substantial budgetary autonomy and that tax-conscious European settlers have had a strong influence upon the territorial budget. As a result, effective co-ordination of the KAR during peacetime has been very difficult. During World War II it was made easier because of War

Office control and the establishment of an East African Governors' Conference responsible for allocating materials and co-ordinating inter-territorial recruitment. At the end of the war, however, there was rapid demobilization and a reversion to a highly decentralized pattern.

Only a beginning has been made in the Africanization of the officer corps of the KAR. Limited educational opportunity and settler influence have heretofore prevented this. As a result of the rapid pace of political developments, however, steps have been taken to accelerate Africanization. Commencing in 1957 East Africans have been eligible for appointment to Sandhurst. By the end of 1959, however, only one African, one Goan, and two Asians had received such appointments. At this rate it is clear that whether independence is achieved separately by the individual territories, or collectively as a federation, the military establishment of a self-governing East Africa will have very few African officers. There will either continue to be a heavy dependence upon the United Kingdom or there will be promotion of untrained and unqualified Africans to officer rank. Much depends upon the development of African nationalism and the character of political relationships between the new African governments and the United Kingdom.

#### Southern Africa.

The Union of South Africa has always restricted military training to Europeans. Southern Rhodesia, its northern neighbor, pursued a similar policy prior to its becoming a constituent, and the dominant, unit in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. When the Federation was formed, the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian regiments of the King's African Rifles were made a part of the Federation defense establishment. These regiments were officered by Europeans, but the "other ranks" were Africans. In the Federation army all officers are Europeans, and Southern Rhodesian Africans are not eligible for military training. As defense was made a responsibility of the Federal government the net effect of this amalgamation has been to preserve the racial oligarchic character of the Southern Rhodesian military units and to give Southern Rhodesian Europeans control over the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian regiments.

The racial discrimination in military recruitment to the South African and Southern Rhodesian armies is, of course, only one of the several strategems for the maintenance of white supremacy. As Europeans constitute only 20 per cent of the population of the Union and 7 per cent of the population of Southern Rhodesia, this racist policy requires full utilization of resident white manpower through universal military training, as well as the organization of militia units in one form or another. Since 1912 the Union has required registration of European males at the age of seventeen, followed by military training for a four-year period. The smaller ratio of Europeans to Africans in Southern Rhodesia has made it necessary for the Southern Rhodesian government, during recent emergencies, to advertise in London for white volunteers for the armed forces. Moreover, in its campaign to increase white immigration to Southern Rhodesia, the government has offered special inducements

to retired British officers, particularly those with previous service in the KAR. These are some of the special burdens imposed by the policy of nonmilitarization of Africans in these two European oligarchies.

In addition to the compulsory training of all physically able white males, and the maintenance of reserve formations, the Union of South Africa has developed a weapons manufacturing capability. During World War II the Union was able to supply most of the materiel needs of her own forces, as well as those Southern Rhodesia units that were placed under the combined Southern Africa Command. The development of this capability was achieved through various forms of handicrafting and sub-contracting. Since the war the munitions industry has been maintained by government subsidy in order to maximize South Africa's self-sufficiency in material and military supplies.

The sharp division between Afrikaner and English cultural groups in the Union is reflected in the composition of the Army and the white police force. Since the (Afrikaner) Nationalist Party acquired power in 1948, it has carried out a program of thoroughgoing "Afrikanerization" of all power structures in the society, with particular emphasis upon the army and police. The officer corps of the armed forces has been made overwhelmingly Afrikaner, and Afrikaners constitute more than ninety-five per cent of the police force. Consumed by fear and insecurity, the present regime has made every effort to ensure its ultimate military control over, not only the African masses, but also the English-descended component of the European oligarchy. This has resulted in destroying one of the key elements in the British tradition, namely, the political neutrality of the army and public service.

#### FRENCH AFRIQUE NOIRE

French military policy in her African possessions differed markedly from that of all other African imperial powers. From the very beginning France regarded her African possessions as reservoirs of military manpower for the defense of her position in Europe and other parts of the world. Throughout the nineteenth century Senegalese troops were employed in metropolitan France and in overseas conflicts: in the Napoleonic wars, in the Crimean War, in Mexico, in the War of 1870, and in the Moroccan War of 1912. They provided the bulk of the forces for the French conquest of French West and Equatorial Africa as well as Madagascar. Not a few French colonial historians have noted, "sans les tirailleurs, nous n'aurions pas d'empire africain."<sup>7</sup> The need to offset the growing German preponderance in manpower, which became even more urgent after the War of 1870, merely intensified the application of a much older policy.

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<sup>7</sup>"Without the (native) skirmishers, we would not have an African empire." Quoted in Shelby Cullom Davis, Reservoirs of Men: A History of the Black Troops of French West Africa (Chambery: Imprimeries Reunies, 1934), p. 50.

During World War I, a total of 181,000 troops from Afrique Noire served in the French army, a total of 680,000 from all of the African possessions. In 1917 there were thirty-one Senegalese battalions on the Somme; at the time of the Armistice there were on all fronts ninety-two battalions of Senegalese tirailleurs. After the final collapse of Vichy authority in Africa during the Second World War, there was a progressive mobilization of troops from French Africa, beginning with the 9th Colonial Infantry Division, which served with the French First Army throughout the Rhone Campaign. Fifteen thousand troops from French Black Africa served in the French expeditionary Force in Indochina, and more recently thirty thousand West African troops were involved in the North African war and the Suez invasion. Thus in France's major military ordeals during the past fifty years, Black Africa has been a contributor of no little significance.

Recruitment of Africans to an active military role in the French armed forces has not been limited to France's major conflicts; rather, by a decree of 1919 permanent conscription was introduced in West and Equatorial Africa in accordance with a plan to maintain an African military force of 100,000. During the interwar period approximately 10,000 were conscripted annually, according to territorial quotas filled by lot, although the bulk came from Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Chad. At the famous Brazzaville Conference of 1944, which proposed revolutionary changes in the colonial system in French Africa, there was a remarkable silence on the issue of military conscription. Indeed, during the period between World War II and final independence, conscription was maintained with little contention. When objections were raised, they were directed to the cost of peacetime armies as a deterrent to economic development rather than to the principle of using African combatants in overseas conflicts. It is surprising, for example, to discover the limited criticism of the use of African troops by France in the Algerian struggle.

The military organization in French Black Africa paralleled the structure of colonial administration, namely, the centralization of control at Dakar and Brazzaville, the capitals of the two federations of French West Africa (AOF) and French Equatorial Africa (AEF) respectively. Within French West Africa there were three subcommands. From headquarters at Saint Louis, the First Brigade was responsible for Senegal and Mauritania. The Second Brigade, with headquarters in Bamako, covered the territories of Soudan (now Mali), the Ivory Coast (which until 1947 included Haute Volta), and Guinea. The Third Brigade had its headquarters in Niamey and covered the territories of Niger, Dahomey and Togoland. The military units in French Equatorial Africa were more tightly controlled from a center at Brazzaville, although a measure of discretion was left to commands at Fort Lamy in Chad and at Bangui in the Oubangui-Chari (now the Central African Republic). Although additional units were formed during the postwar period, this same type of command structure continued to prevail. This was true even after 1956, when the French commenced progressively to devolve greater power upon the individual territories. Internal security and defense

were regarded as functions for centralized control.

Given the policy of assimilation and the underlying assumptions of a permanent Franco-African union, there was no reason for developing "territorial" military establishments. Boundaries of military formations and political divisions coincided to meet military convenience. The concept of developing embryonic "national" armies was nonexistent; the only legitimate "nation" was France, with its overseas departments and territories, une et indivisible.

As the French policy of assimilation meant that independence was not a legitimate political objective, agitational activity was directed towards the achievement of equality within the system. The French were particularly responsive to pressures for greater equality from African veterans and members of the armed services. Early in the Second World War the latter were granted the right to vote in Senegal. In 1946 this privilege was extended to all African veterans and soldiers on active duty throughout French Afrique Noire. It was also granted to widows of veterans who "lived and died in the service of France." A decree of November 18, 1947, established military pay scales according to duties and assignments, thereby removing long standing pay differentials between metropolitan and colonial troops.

During the postwar period steps were taken to accelerate the Africanization of the officer corps of African military units. Although education has been a limiting factor, the number of African officers in military units of former French Equatorial Africa now exceeds fifty; in former French West Africa there are more than three times this number. By these and other measures the French have sought, not only to avoid disaffection, but also to make military service attractive.

### BELGIAN CONGO

Inexperienced in imperial responsibilities, sublimely confident in the rightness of its cause and the wisdom of its methods, and insensitive to burgeoning social and political forces demanding expression, the Belgian government pursued a policy of rigorous but benevolent paternalism. The Belgians surpassed all other imperial powers in providing for primary and technical education; yet at the time of independence only sixteen Congolese had secured a university degree. Though every effort was made to provide increased opportunities for Congolese to become skilled artisans and prosperous commerçants, political rights were firmly denied and political leadership ruthlessly suppressed. The Belgians created one of the largest peacetime military establishments in tropical Africa -- the 25,000-man Force Publique -- but at the time of independence only three Congolese had achieved sergeant-major rank, and there were no Congolese officers. As a colonial system designed to preserve European tutelage for an indefinite period, Belgian rule was unquestionably the most efficient and enlightened on the African continent. As such it was admired and applauded even by some Western liberals who felt uneasy about the denial

of political liberties. As a colonial system designed to prepare Africans for independent statehood, however, one could hardly have contrived a greater failure. The present chaos in the Congo is Belgium's colonial legacy to Africa.

The striking feature of the Congo is that the Belgians neither created, nor did they allow to emerge, a central indigenous power structure capable of holding the Congo together. The Sudan lacked a strong nationalist movement, but it had its army, officered by Sudanese, and a bureaucracy capable of this task. Both Guinea and Ghana lacked an indigenous army and a bureaucracy, but during the decade preceding independence the French and British allowed monolithic national political parties -- the PDG and CPP respectively -- to develop under indigenous leadership. These parties commanded effective control and legitimacy throughout the country. Nigeria lacked a national army and bureaucracy, but during an eight-year period of preparation for independence, competing political parties struggled for power within central institutions which tended to acquire a measure of legitimacy. The parties became progressively more national in organization and program, and their leaders became habituated to working in a national coalition. In contrast, it was only during the last few months of colonial rule that the Belgians began to train Congolese army officers and senior civil servants, to develop national representative institutions, and to permit the emergence of national political leadership and parties. Consequently, when the centralized Belgian authority structure was withdrawn, either power gravitated to provincial or tribal leaders or chaos ensued.

In the development of the Force Publique, Belgian authorities were preoccupied with the danger of mutiny along tribal lines. This was in part due to the fact that tribalism was a significant factor in the Congolese military revolts of 1895, 1897, and 1900. Moreover, the syncretistic religious movements which constituted the main form of political expression from the early 1920's onwards were essentially tribal in character, being strongest among the Bakonga of Leopoldville Province. To meet this problem, the Belgians pursued a policy of mixing tribal elements within each military unit. Although this policy quite possibly minimized the likelihood of tribal military rebellion, it also meant that in the absence of an esprit de corps developed from shared experiences in combat or otherwise, there was a lack of cohesion in each unit. In appraising events since the mutiny in July, 1960, one is struck by the "rabble" character of these troops.

In terms of assigned functions the Force Publique was little more than a para-military police organization. Unlike any other military formation in Africa, it had never been employed in combat or in a defense effort either within or outside Africa. The central purpose of the force was to preserve internal security. During the last months of Belgian rule, the Force Publique was engaged in almost continuous police duty in centers of major actual or potential disturbance. Military escorts were assigned to competing African politicians. No other class in Congolese society was so overworked; yet no other class appeared destined to get so

little out of it. Indeed, when the Congolese troops demanded some of the fruits of independence, such as higher pay and status, their Belgian commander retorted with a remark that is regarded as one of the several factors precipitating the mutiny: "Independence is for the civilians."

#### PORTUGUESE AFRICA.

The so-called Portuguese "provinces" of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea constitute the last remnants of white colonialism in Africa. Unilaterally declared parts of Portugal in 1951, these territories are administered through an authoritarian quasi-military hierarchy from Lisbon. The keystone of Portuguese policy is the ultimate assimilation of Africans to Portuguese culture. Admission to "assimilado" status is governed by law. An "assimilado" legally acquires all the rights and duties of a European Portuguese, including service in the military forces. Although there is no barrier to their advance within the military hierarchy, there are only a few instances in history where an "assimilado" has in fact reached the higher ranks. Although the Portuguese have been in Africa more than 300 years, the number of Africans who have attained "assimilado" status is extremely small. In Angola, which has the highest number, there are no more than 30,000 in a population of five million. At the current rate of formal assimilation, it would take several centuries for the entire African population to attain full status.

Africans from the nonassimilado class (the indigena) are recruited into the Portuguese officered military establishments in the overseas provinces. However, metropolitan units in strength are present at all times in the territories. In times of emergency, such as the Congo crises and the more recent Angolan uprising, Portuguese troops are airlifted from Europe. African police and sepoys (soldier-informants) are extensively used to maintain the authoritarian system of police control. As elsewhere in Africa, however, even the most authoritarian government is unable to control the extensive movement of Africans from one country to another. There is bound to be a progressive infiltration of ideas and political agitation from neighboring territories in which nationalism is more developed. Despite the "winds of change" blowing with increased violence around the periphery of its "provinces," Portugal has by word and deed expressed its determination to maintain its presence in Africa. In the absence of dramatic reform by way of developing indigenous civil and military cadres, one can anticipate a repetition of what has occurred in the former Belgian Congo.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ARMIES IN AFRICA'S NEW STATES

The foregoing brief survey of the military policies of the European colonial powers illuminates the widely variant types of politico-military situations the new states of Africa confront as they seek to develop national military establishments. At the one extreme are the Sudan and Senegal, which began their independent existence with armies that had

experienced combat and officers who had graduated from military schools. At the other extreme are the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In those countries Africans have been denied military training as well as the hope of attaining independent statehood under African leadership. Between these two extremes one finds a wide range of situations in which embryonic national armies exist but Africanization of the officer corps has only just begun. In the discussion that follows we will be concerned with some of the common problems in the development of national armies in the new states.

At the outset it should be noted that, with few exceptions, each former colony has emerged as an independent sovereign entity. The only exceptions to this general trend have been the union of the former British Somaliland with Italian Somalia to form the new Republic of Somalia, the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia in a new Federation of Ethiopia, and the union of the former British Togoland with the former Gold Coast to form the state of Ghana. Although several attempts were made to create larger unities under colonialism (for example, the Federations of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the oft-proposed East African Federation), the general trend has been for each separate territory to seek and to acquire independence. African nationalism was originally pan-Africanist in character, but in the thrust towards independence it became increasingly "territorialized." Having to agitate and struggle for independence within the confines of discrete territorial systems forced the development of a territorial consciousness and personality. Moreover, after achieving independence new forces have moved in to consolidate and to strengthen territorial separateness. Thus far, these forces have proved stronger than the spirit of pan-Africanism and the logical developmental requirements for large-scale unities.

The perpetuation of Africa's territorial fragmentation into the era of independence has forced a corresponding "territorialization" of military organization. It has already been noted that the Royal West African Frontier Force finally gave way to the embryonic national armies of Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; and that the same tendencies towards disintegration are also in progress in the case of the King's African Rifles. Guinea's independence, followed by the breakup of the Mali Federation, and the final collapse of the Franco-African Community, has resulted in a dismantling of the pan-African military formation created by France in Afrique Noire. Moreover, this progressive fragmentation of Africa's military establishments has been hastened by the different domestic and foreign policy orientations of the new states. Ghana has severed her military connections with Senegal, in part because of the different political orientation of the leadership groups in those states. New alignments have been formed, such as the new Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, but there is no evidence thus far that these new efforts to achieve a broader unity will result in the creation of united military commands. For the predictable future it must be assumed that each of the new sovereign states, big and small, will seek to create some type of "national" military establishment of its own.

The second assumption that seems inescapable under present circumstances is that for the foreseeable future none of the African states will have or will be capable of developing the capacity to become self-sufficient in military supplies and equipment and in professionally trained cadres. As in all other spheres of development, they will for some time continue to be heavily dependent upon the external world. The character of their respective dependency relationships in the military field will undoubtedly reflect both the political orientation of the governing elite in each state and the predisposition of foreign powers to help provide military materiel and training.

The general trend among the new states is to diversify their dependency relationships regarding all forms of aid and external involvements. This impulse is the logical consequence of neutralism. In practical terms this means that there are strong political pressures to move from the single dependence upon the former metropolitan powers, which existed at the time of independence, to a multiple dependency upon several foreign powers. The more "positive" or "pure" the neutralist orientation, the greater the effort will be to distribute dependence among other neutralist states as well as the East and Western blocs. The reasons for this trend are understandable. A lessening or termination of dependence upon the former colonial power dramatizes one's independence and strengthens the feeling of being completely free. Diversification of dependency relationships encourages competitive bidding by external powers, thereby maximizing the amount of aid proffered. It provides a sense of security and strength not otherwise attainable. It also renders the governing elite less vulnerable to charges from opposition elements that it has "sold out" to a particular foreign power. There are, in short, powerful psychological and political reasons for the diversification of foreign involvements.

There are also strong practical reasons for continuing effective relationships with former metropolitan powers. Nowhere is this more true than in the development of a national military establishment. In most other fields diversification is relatively easy. In the military sphere there are distinct advantages in maintaining continuity in military supplies and equipment and in training standards and techniques. This means, of course, the continuation of an already established, or the development of a new single dependency relationship. An army must have standardized weapons, ammunition, and training. These are not uniform among supplying nations; yet uniformity is almost imperative for the receiving nation. Thus, over against the strong political impulse to diversify dependence there is the practical imperative of single dependence upon one external source.

The implications of these several considerations have undoubtedly been weighed by the leaders of Africa's new states. The strong political pressures for diversification, however, appear increasingly to outweigh the practical arguments for continued dependence. For the purpose of analyzing the character of their dependency relationships, African states can be classified into two categories: those strongly oriented

towards multiple dependency, and those that are willing to maintain a single dependency relationship.

#### MULTIPLE DEPENDENCY STATES. (Ghana-Guinea-Mali; Sudan Somalia)

Although these five states differ in many respects, they share a determination to diversify their dependence upon the external world. Even here, however, there are wide differences in the degree to which multiple dependency relationships have been established. Thus the Sudan maintains fairly close links with Britain; Mali has assumed a posture of defiance towards the French connection, yet she still depends heavily upon France in the military sphere; and Guinea has moved so far towards a single dependence upon the Eastern Bloc that some question the purity of her neutralism. Three of these new sovereign entities (Ghana-Guinea-Mali) constitute the so-called radical wing among African states in that they are strongly pan-Africanist, militantly nationalistic in terms of extinguishing residual European influence on the African continent, and much more predisposed towards collaborative relationship with countries of the Eastern Bloc. As such, they constitute a dynamic pole of attraction for the more revolutionary and nationalistic elements in all of the other African states. They claim to be, and in many respects they are recognized as being, the carriers of the unfinished "African Revolution."

The termination of British rule in both the Sudan and Ghana was accomplished with considerable good grace. Both territories commenced moving towards independence around 1948; the Sudan achieved her independence by her own unilateral declaration -- uncontested by the British -- in 1956, and Ghana reached full sovereignty one year later by agreement with the United Kingdom Government. In both states power was progressively devolved upon African leaders during the interval between 1948 and independence. After independence was attained, both states continued to maintain close ties with Britain in many fields, including the development of their military establishments. Ghana has progressively moved towards a dispersion of her military dependence upon other members of the Commonwealth, as well as upon Israel. Although still dependent in part upon the United Kingdom for the selection of senior officers, as well as for officer training and most military equipment, Ghana has sent cadets to India and Pakistan. Development of air training has been assigned to an Indian Air Commodore, and arms have been purchased from Australia and New Zealand to enable her to more than double the size of her army. Through this policy of diversification within the Commonwealth, Ghana has been able to reduce her single dependency upon Britain by establishing new relationships with countries whose equipment and methods of training are within the British military tradition and weapons system.

As previously noted, upon independence, the Sudan possessed an army that had achieved a relatively high level of autonomy. Because of strong political pressures -- both domestic and within the Arab League -- compelling her to pursue a course of strict neutralism, the Sudan subsequently

turned to the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, and the United States for assistance in the acquisition of armor for her mobile forces. Despite this movement towards diversification, the Sudanese have maintained close links with Britain, which has remained responsive to Sudanese requests for assistance. In fact, since 1956 Anglo-Sudanese relations have remained cordial.

Throughout the postwar period Guinean and Malian political leaders have been more emphatically "nationalistic" than other leaders in former French Africa. When Guinea rejected the Community by voting "non" in the de Gaulle referendum, France immediately terminated all forms of support and withdrew all French personnel in the army and civil service. Guinea's immediate request to other Western nations for assistance went unanswered; she then turned to the Soviet Bloc and obtained prompt aid. Czechoslovakia has undertaken to provide arms and equipment as well as military training. When the Mali Federation of ex-French Soudan and Senegal was ruptured, the new Mali Republic (Soudan) interpreted French recognition of the dissolution as an act voiding all Franco-Malian agreements, including the agreement that arms would be acquired exclusively from France. In contrast to its petulant behavior in the case of Guinea, France ignored the change: aid continued and officials and technicians remained as if no change had occurred. Mali has since negotiated economic aid agreements with other countries, but in military affairs she has continued her sole reliance upon France. Thus despite her wish and intention to terminate a single dependence upon France, and her strong belief in the principle of multiple dependence, practical considerations and French willingness to continue aid have thus far preserved the earlier relationship.

#### SINGLE DEPENDENCY STATES.

Most of the remaining African states, both independent and emergent, continue to depend heavily upon a single foreign power. The present leadership of these states is willing to accept this dependence as a transitional means towards the achievement of complete independence in all spheres. The practical considerations favoring such a transitional relationship have transcended the political and psychological pressures for diversification. Yet the latter are present and are bound to increase, particularly in the light of heightened agitation by the more radical states. This trend was most dramatically manifested in the debate in the Nigerian House of Representatives on ratification of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement. In that debate the opposition pledged that if and when it comes to power, it will repudiate the agreement, which they believe compromises Nigerian sovereignty. The trend is also evident in the recent steps taken by the Ivory Coast and other former Community states to weaken further their connection with France. However, for the time being the governing elites in these states have officially accepted, and rationalized, a single dependency relationship.

This predisposition on their part is matched by a willingness, if not eagerness, on the part of the former metropolitan powers to provide

inducements to the maintenance of existing military training and armaments connections. Britain, France, and Belgium provide officer training without charge to the African countries militarily dependent upon them. Each has supplied arms to its former dependencies, although there have been disagreements regarding requirements. France has undertaken to provide basic equipment for the armed forces for each new state within the Community; the latter, in turn, have committed themselves to acquiring arms exclusively from France. Britain has encouraged the development of a Commonwealth dependency, rather than relying exclusively upon United Kingdom support.

France's commitment to the military development and support of the new states previously under her control (Guinea and Mali excepted) is determined in part by need and in part by the position each held within the pre-independence defense system of Afrique Noire. The defense forces of the two former trust territories of Togo and the Cameroun are the least developed and require the greatest assistance. The Republic of Togo had no military establishment prior to independence, and the new army of the Republic of the Cameroun is led entirely by French officers. Among the states that remained within the Franco-African community, Senegal, the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), and the Republic of Chad are the most developed militarily. Dakar, the capital of Senegal and former capital of French West Africa, is a major administrative and military center; and Brazzaville plays a similar role for the new states of former French Equatorial Africa. Chad has a special importance because of its strategic position and because it is an area of high recruitment. These three states inherited the bulk of France's heavy investment in military facilities and are therefore crucial for her military position in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Nigeria is in many respects unique among Africa's new states. Because of its size and its population -- greater than all of the other West and Equatorial African states combined -- it stands as a giant among pygmies. Despite the belated development of its military establishment, it has a far greater military capability than any of the other states. Africanization of its officer corps is further advanced than that of Ghana, despite the fact that the latter attained independence three years earlier. It has a more diversified and mobile military establishment, including a small but expanding Navy. Its comparative superiority and greater military potential are in part the result of a broader resource base, but are also the product of special, even preferential, treatment by the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Nigerian defense agreement provides for British assistance in the rapid Nigerianization of the officer corps, which at the time of independence was only one-third Nigerian. Substantial British aid has also been given for the development of the Nigerian Navy. If Nigeria's single dependency relationship with the United Kingdom remains politically tolerable, Nigeria could develop a military establishment certainly equal to, and potentially greater than, that of the Sudan.

As the Congo approached independence Belgium undertook exclusive responsibility for the organization and training of the Force Publique in the post-independence period. Thirty Congolese cadets were sent to the Belgian military academy as the first contingent in what was envisaged to be a gradual process of Africanization of the officer corps. Immediately after independence these cadets were recalled by Premier Lumumba, but they were subsequently returned to Brussels when pro-Belgian Colonel Mobutu assumed control over the army. Since then, Congolese military forces have been divided into three commands: two dependent upon Belgium (Mobutu's forces in the Leopoldville area and Tschombe's forces in the Katanga) and one dependent upon the Soviet Bloc and the United Arab Republic (General Lundula's pro-Lumumba forces in the Stanleyville area). Although a detailed analysis of these and other developments in the strife-torn Congo is beyond the bounds of this paper, there is one lesson to be gained from the Congo tragedy; namely, where a single dependency relationship with a former colonial power is strongly opposed by important political forces within a new state -- as the Belgian connection has been opposed by pro-Lumumba forces in the Congo -- the latter are driven to seek countervailing support from other foreign powers hostile to that relationship. In the contemporary world this inevitably means Sino-Soviet support.

#### PAN-AFRICANISM AND INTRA-AFRICAN RELATIONS.

There is a growing cleavage between single-dependency states and multiple-dependency states. The basis of this division is not merely a disagreement regarding the relative merits of single vs. diversified dependence. It is far more profound. The real issue is that African nationalists interpret the existence of a single dependency relationship with a former Western colonial power as evidence of continued colonialism or neo-colonialism. Moreover, as most militant African nationalists are pan-Africanists, they also regard such relationships in particular, and differential external involvements in general, as the chief obstacles to the realization of a broader African unity. The more radical pan-Africanist states, such as Ghana, Guinea and Mali, consider it their mission first to bring about total emancipation of the continent from European influence and then to work for the creation of a United States of Africa. Thus motivated and driven, they are instinctively hostile towards any type of close dependency relationship between an African state and a former colonial power. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the contrasting positions they and the other African states have taken on the question of African leadership in the Congo. The division between the two groups is one of the primary sources of tension in contemporary Africa, and it is bound to reappear in any similar context.

The tension and rivalry generated by the division among Africa's states over their respective dependency relationships intensifies the drive to develop and expand their national military establishments. Internally, governments confronted with militant opposition elements feel compelled to expand their military and police forces to maintain internal security.

This has been manifest most clearly in the Republic of the Cameroun, which has been under an almost continuous state of martial law as a result of the existence of revolutionary groups supported by the radical African powers against the allegedly pro-French Camerounian government. Externally, the division between the two groups has broader implications than the mere competitive buildup of defense forces. The existence of close military relations between an African state and a former European colonial power tends to nudge the radical neutralist states into an ever-closer identification of their interests with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The implication is obvious: the omnipresent potentiality of intra-African rivalries is reinforced and exacerbated by Cold War rivalries.

The determination of the radical powers to eliminate all single dependency relationships between Africa and Europe was demonstrated anew at the Casablanca Conference held in January 1961. There they joined with Morocco and the United Arab Republic in a decision to establish a NATO-type African organization to ensure their common defense and the "consolidation of liberty in Africa." Their plans envisaged the creation of a Joint African High Command comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of the participating states. As on previous occasions they vigorously attacked the presence of foreign troops or the establishment of foreign bases in Africa. It is to be expected that these states will persist in their efforts to constitute themselves a core area of a larger African political union. It remains doubtful, however, that in the predictable future such a union will be formed involving the actual surrender of sovereignty. In the meantime the activities of the radical powers continue to exacerbate existing rivalries with other states less repelled by close relations with Western nations.

Beyond these tensions generated by the issue of residual European influence, there are a variety of objective bases for conflict among Africa's new sovereign states. The most obvious are disagreements over present boundaries, most of which were haphazardly drawn during the European "scramble" for Africa. In the Horn of Africa, for example, relations are very strained between Somalia and Ethiopia because of the former's continued agitation for the creation of a Greater Somalia. Tensions exist between Ghana and Togo as a result of the recurrent demand by Ghanaian spokesmen for the integration of Togo into Ghana. These and other interstate conflicts strengthen "territorial" nationalism and lead inevitably to an accelerated drive to develop "national" military establishments.

#### AFRICAN ARMIES AND MODERNIZATION.

African leaders are deeply committed to the goal of rapid modernization. Materially, it means higher standards of living and the end of poverty, illiteracy, and disease. Psychologically it means the extinction of the stigma of primitiveness and backwardness and the final achievement of equality with the rest of humanity. Politically, also, they are committed, because as leaders of nationalist movements it is they who made independence the symbol of a brave new world. They must demonstrate visible material progress.

The yawning gap between the expectations they have created and the limited capacities they have to secure their fulfillment accentuates their heavy dependence upon the external world. The urge to overcome this dependence strengthens the trend towards strong government and the compulsory mobilization of local material and human resources (what Sekou Toure calls "investissements humains"). The authoritarian trend is also furthered by the internal tensions and threats of separatism that characterize these nascent national communities. The heavy demands for sacrifices from the population as well as the high potential for civil strife explain why the maintenance of internal security and the development of a police and military establishment have become major preoccupations of the governments of the new states.

A military establishment has two types of costs, neither of which a modernizing society can easily afford. An army is not only a heavy burden upon limited financial resources; it also restricts alternative utilization of scarce training facilities and educated manpower. The impact of these costs upon Africa's new states varies considerably, partly because of different economic capacities to bear the burden, and partly because of the differential defense support given by former metropolitan powers. As previously noted, France has undertaken to provide all basic equipment for, and to subsidize a large share of recurrent maintenance costs of, the military establishments in the new states of former Afrique Noire (Guinea excepted). Belgium made a similar commitment regarding the Force Publique in the Congo, but developments after the mutiny of July 1960 largely prevented its fulfillment. Britain has not been prepared to maintain sizeable direct military subsidies after independence, although like France and Belgium she provides officer training to cadets from African countries. It remains questionable how long these variant forms of transitional support will continue to be provided. Given the strong political pressures upon African leaders to take an increasingly emphatic neutralist position in world affairs, it is not improbable that there will be a progressive reduction in both direct and indirect forms of metropolitan military support.

Current defense budgets of Africa's new states are not high when compared with those of the more developed countries, but in view of their limited resources and heavy developmental demands, the military establishment can become a heavy burden. Ghana spends more than 8 per cent of her budget, and Guinea nearly 10 per cent upon defense. Immediately prior to independence, Nigeria devoted less than 5 per cent of its revenues to its military establishment, but this figure is expected to increase considerably during the next few years. In most new states there tends to be a sharp increase in defense costs during the first few years following independence, mainly because the metropolitan power either provided, or its presence made unnecessary, major items of defense. The increase also results from the heavy capital costs of establishing "national" military training institutions, as well as from the characteristic expansion in the size of the military establishment to meet enhanced internal security requirements and new international security functions.

There are, of course, extremely important nonmilitary functions which African armies perform in African societies. Lusian Pye's proposition that armies are powerful forces in the modernization process is certainly supported by the African experience. The mobilization and training of nearly one-half million Africans during World War II was unquestionably one of the major developments in launching the great transformation that is currently in process. The new recruits learned how to speak, read and write a lingua franca; they became habituated to modern sanitation and health practices; they had experiences beyond their own territory -- indeed, beyond Africa -- which served to broaden their horizons of interest and knowledge; and, above all, they learned a wide variety of new skills appropriate for participation in a modern society. During and since World War II, service in the army has been of critical significance in the socialization of a numerically small but strategically important segment of the present generation of Africans.

In the course of postwar demobilization it became abundantly clear that the modern sector of African societies could not absorb more than a fraction of the World War II veterans, most of whom were no longer satisfied with their prewar village life. However, many did return to the villages and became agents of acculturation, and a new stimulus in agitation for modernity. In Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, and several of the French territories, veterans assumed key roles in the growth of postwar nationalism. Veterans organizations were formed and have operated as influential pressure groups for higher pensions and greater governmental attention.

The governments of Ghana, Guinea and Mali have organized workers' brigades for veterans and unemployed youths. The Ghana Builders' Brigade, organized along the lines of the Civilian Conservation Corps in the United States during the 1930's, had by 1959 enrolled 11,000 of a prospective 25,000. Similar types of para-military workers' organizations have been formed in both Guinea and Mali. This method of mobilizing the human resources will undoubtedly be emulated by an increasing number of the governments of an increasing number of other new states, partly because of the imperatives of rapid economic development, and partly because of the growing gap between the large numbers of youths leaving primary school and the limited number of career opportunities in the society.

Military expansion offers an outlet for the flood of youths who will acquire an elementary and middle-range education under greatly expanded educational programs. Yet there are dangers. The life of a private does not offer either the status nor the income which most Africans tend to think education should provide. To fill the lower ranks of an army with these elements would probably not result in a stable military organization; rather it could provide heavy support for adventurist government and policies in both domestic and foreign spheres. On the other hand, long-term enlistment in a military organization committed to productive developments, such as the construction of roads, dams and irrigation projects, would offer a greater incentive,

especially if useful skills could not only be acquired, but could also be ultimately transferred to an expanding industrial sector.

#### CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS.

Apart from the Sudan, which in almost every respect is a special case, the question of civilian supremacy has not yet become a serious issue in the new states of Sub-Saharan Africa. There are several reasons for this. One is that civilian leaders are not confronted with established armies that could, in their eyes, conceivably challenge their authority. One of the traditional techniques for the maintenance of civilian control has been a calculated limitation in the size of the military establishment. At the moment, in most of Africa, this is an irrelevant consideration; civilian leaders are deliberately seeking to create and expand the army. As its creators they have full authority to determine its size, function, and scope of activity. A second factor is that nothing in their past colonial experience would tend to make present leaders sensitive to the issue of civil-military control. The governments they have experienced under colonialism have not been threatened by the presence of large local forces. The only approximation of a military-dominant Algeria-type situation in Sub-Sahara Africa was the Mau Mau Emergency in Kenya, during which the military were at times clearly predominant. Otherwise, during crises most colonial governments depended heavily upon the importation of troops from neighboring territories or from the metropolitan country. Once the crisis was over, the imported troops would depart. Most members of the present generation of Africans have been habituated to government by a civilian bureaucracy.

The role of the Force Publique in the Congo crisis has had a profound impact upon the thinking of many of the civilian and military leaders in Africa's new states. The Sudanese military coup was understandable, given the manifestly superior organizational strength of the army compared to other structures in Sudanese society. The Congolese Force Publique, however, had no indigenous officers, no service tradition, and commanded little popular respect and support; yet, in the absence of other power structures, even this armed mob was willing to follow untrained leadership and was able to exert a surprising degree of control over both civilian leaders and events. This demonstrated the determinative influence which a small military force could exercise in a situation in which countervailing institutions or power groups are absent. Perhaps it has been an awareness of such a potentiality that has persuaded such a passionate nationalist as President Nkrumah to continue British officers in key command positions in the Ghanaian army. These and other factors suggest that as they expand their military establishments, African civilian leaders are bound to become increasingly sensitized to the issue of civil-military relations and to the need to develop safeguard and controls to ensure civilian supremacy.

Relations between civilian and military leadership in the new states will be determined in part by the pattern of recruitment to the officer

corps. With few exceptions, present leadership in most of middle Africa is the product of Western educational institutions established during the colonial period. At the primary and secondary levels these were overwhelmingly Christian missionary institutions. Admission to primary school was nonselective in character. There was no preferential treatment for particular classes; the object was to spread the gospel. Admission to secondary and technical schools was based almost exclusively upon merit, although in British areas certain fees were required. This meant that there was a bias in favor of the children of Africans working in the modern sector of the society, such as clerks, artisans, cash-crop farmers, and teachers. Until the post-World War II period, when colonial governments commenced to offer scholarships, access to university and professional education was weighted heavily in favor of those Africans whose parents could afford to send and support them abroad. During the past decade, however, virtually all Africans pursuing higher education in African universities have been recipients of government scholarships. In the main, therefore, the educated class, from which army officers are necessarily recruited, represents a fairly comprehensive cross-section of African society. Insofar as there is an imbalance in terms of ethnic, tribal or class origins, it is a reflection of the uneven impact of missionary educational activity and the bias favoring children of those Africans already drawn into the modern commercialized sector of African society.

Another factor affecting recruitment to the officer corps concerns the comparatively low prestige attaching to a military career, at least until quite recently. Because of restricted access to officer rank, very few educated Africans were attracted to a career in the army. Business and commerce, the civilian professions -- teaching, law, journalism and medicine -- and political careers were the main attractions. Even today if one were to poll African students in secondary schools and universities, it is doubtful that very many would designate army service as their career choice. This attitude is bound to change, but probably only very gradually.

In the Sudan and Ethiopia a special problem exists in the form of a generational cleavage in the officer corps. The Sudanese army illuminates this problem most clearly. Most of the senior officers are long-service "old soldiers" appointed and promoted in combat during the Second World War. The junior officers are the product of the accelerated officer-training program launched in 1953. Since the military coup of 1958 there have been recurrent "plots" uncovered in which the more militantly nationalistic and better educated "Young Turks" have allegedly attempted to displace the senior officers of the older generation. The same generational cleavage exists in the Ethiopian armed services, indeed, throughout the entire Ethiopian bureaucracy. Were Liberia to expand and modernize her military establishment, a similar type of tension would probably develop between the two sets of officers recruited under different circumstances and according to different standards. In all of these cases the cleavage is not simply one of age differential; it is also based upon the different levels of competence of the two groups.

In most of the other African states an officer corps is being created largely from scratch; hence the generational problem does not exist. Yet there is another equally serious problem likely to emerge from rapid Africanization and the simultaneous expansion of the military establishment. The operation of these twin processes means that over a very short period of time the officer corps will be filled with officers of roughly the same age. Those first on the scene will be catapulted into senior rank and the later arrivals will fill the junior ranks. Unless there is continuous expansion of the military establishment there will be a serious "promotional freeze" for nearly two decades. The possible consequences are both obvious and ominous, namely, intra-corps jealousies, intrigue and conspiracy, and recurrently attempted "coups" by the frustrated junior ranks; the application of pressure upon the government to expand the army and engage in adventuristic activities; or a military takeover to provide the career-thwarted officers access to status, perquisites and prestigious positions in the civilian bureaucracy. Whether these or other developments occur will depend upon the development of attractive careers in civilian life, the governing party, and the bureaucracy.

In Africa's new states the national goals of the civilian policy-makers (the politicians), the bureaucracy, and the army are substantially the same: stability and order, national unity, and rapid modernization. These are the goals of the educated African nationalist. Under such circumstances experience elsewhere indicates if the civilian regime becomes stalemated in its pursuit of these goals there is a high probability that the military will intervene. At the moment there is a race between the politician's efforts to organize these societies and the growth in the capacity of the military establishment to perform this task if they fail. Thus, when the Sudanese army assumed power in the Sudan, it did so not just to establish order, but because the latter was a requisite for modernization. Its actions in the field of economic and educational development since it secured power provide evidence to this effect. Again, those officers involved in the coup in Ethiopia in December 1960 based their plea for popular support on the failure of the Emperor to free the country from its backwardness:

"Development plans have not been executed in practice and the long strides being made by the newly independent African states have made the people of Ethiopia realize that these new nations are advancing pretty fast, leaving the people of Ethiopia behind."

African military leaders can be expected to show signs of restlessness if their nations do not progress. The possession of arms is the primary feature distinguishing them from the other educated modernist elements; certainly it is not their objective which differentiates them. In the long run African civilian elites will secure their own positions vis-a-vis the military most effectively by modernizing their societies.

Achievement of the widely accepted goals of professionalism and, particularly, corporate responsibility for Africa's armies poses another problem of accommodation if governments undertake to realize pan-Africanist territorial amalgamations. It is one thing for a government and an army to agree, in effect, upon national modernization. It is quite another for a civilian elite, either tenuously recognized as legitimate or in control by means of authoritarian techniques, to direct its armed forces to engage in foreign aggressive operations. One of the results of military pan-Africanism would be the subordination of separate defense establishments within a regional army. This at once challenges the corporate sense of identity developed by the officer corps in each new state. To the degree that this has been achieved the latter may not respond to any and all demands of their civilian governments, especially where their corporate existence is threatened.

It is clear from the survey of African military institutions presented in this chapter that, except for the Sudan and Senegal, African armies are perhaps the least developed in the contemporary world. Indeed, in many of the new states they are quite literally in the process of being established. It is impossible at this stage, therefore, to present any firm conclusions or to make any meaningful generalization regarding the behavior of African armies. The most we have been able to do is to survey the more important features of the colonial period that have provided the foundations upon which the new African leadership will have to build, and to raise some of the more relevant issues regarding the future development of African armies.

As new African states thrust themselves on to the world stage and declare their intention to develop armies like other sovereign states, one hears with increasing frequency new proposals for the demilitarization and neutralization of Africa. On the eve of the abortive 1960 Summit Conference, for example, Britain proposed that the Western allies trade an African arms embargo for an equivalent Soviet commitment in the Middle East. In August 1960 Mr. Chester Bowles proposed an African Charter according to which outside powers would limit military aid to the new African states. The notion of controlled armaments for Africa figured prominently in President Eisenhower's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1960:

"I hope that the African states will use existing or establish new regional machinery in order to avert an arms race in this area. In so doing they would help to spare their continent the ravages which the excesses of chauvinism have elsewhere inflicted in the past. If, through concerted effort, these nations can choke off competition in armaments, they can give the whole world a welcome lesson in international relations."

As intro-African rivalries and Cold War issues become increasingly intertwined, and as competitive bidding for armaments among rival African

groups becomes ever stronger, the idea of neutralizing Africa and of restricting African armaments will undoubtedly be advanced with increasing vigor. Yet, as we have seen, the idea is not new. From the beginning of the scramble for Africa until World War II, every effort was made to keep Africa out of world politics and her people apart from the rest of the human family. Is continued preferential -- or at least differential -- treatment of Africa at this stage realistic? Does it not reflect a persistence in the minds of the best-meaning persons that Africans are still the special wards of the rest of mankind? The intrusion of the Cold War and the armaments race into Africa is an obvious tragedy. But attempting to deny African states, as distinguished from other sovereign states in the world, the full sovereign rights to develop military establishments of their own smacks of that holier-than-thou paternalism that has historically conditioned the West's posture towards the continent. The non-African world can neither expect nor demand that Africans manifest a special restraint or a higher morality. Disarmament and control of the military is a universal, not an African, problem.