

## PART V

### PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM:

#### AN EVALUATION AND A THEORY

### SYNOPSIS

Chapter XIII is an effort to offer a positive critique of previous and current pacification policies and programs in Vietnam utilizing earlier chapters for most of the analysis. In Chapter XIV a theory for pacification in Vietnam is suggested, followed in Chapter XV with a proposed management control model for implementation of the theory.

The theory and model have been formulated with attention to both the failures and successes of previous efforts, and the social, political, and administrative parameters in the Vietnamese situation. The concept of the fulfillment of an orderly, indigenously motivated social and political revolution is proposed as the motivational source for the pacification enterprise. National policies consonant with reform and orderly revolution, and based on various proposals of Vietnamese nationalists, are presented as a "platform" on which pacification policy would be built. Administrative and procedural reform is also discussed--vis a vis pacification requirements.

The proposed role of the United States in the pacification effort is elucidated, including specific recommendations for more effective use of manpower, money, and materials.

More meticulous attention is given to province level pacification operations, including control systems and procedures.

## CHAPTER XIII

### EVALUATION OF PACIFICATION

Previous chapters have indicated many of the problems and failures associated with pacification. Chapter XIII is an effort to evaluate pacification as a whole process which involved many component programs. Continuing with the provincial perspective of other chapters, the first section will deal with inspection and the problems of field evaluation.

#### I. INSPECTION AND FIELD EVALUATION

The accent on the strategic hamlet campaign had been on rapid expansion in order to bring an early conclusion to the conflict. There was little room for thorough inspection and evaluation of progress. Inspection staffs were small and the methods of inspection were elaborate and time consuming. The field inspectors were never able to cover adequately the areas assigned them. Provinces had no officially constituted inspection staffs, and the result was that operationally committed individuals--the cadres, district chiefs, and province chiefs--did most of the inspection.

As has been noted, breathtaking goals set by the Presidency were often reported as reached by the provincial authorities who used the trick of "imaginative" reporting. Few officials at any level felt they could afford to report unfavorable results.

Such an atmosphere hardly encouraged thorough evaluation among provincial administrators. By October, 1962, observant officials were alarmed at the lack of inspection and increasing signs of program inadequacies.<sup>1</sup>

Inspections by Province Chiefs, who were often accompanied by Sector Advisors and USOM Representatives, tended to be formalized and they did not permit the depth analysis of the hamlet situation needed to ascertain the real security status. For occasional higher level visitors, the Province Chief or District Chief had showcase projects geared for "inspection readiness" at all times--as noted earlier.

As the New Life Hamlet campaign got underway in 1964, more stringent and frequent inspections were attempted, but there was still a shortage of inspection officials. In 1965, procedures were instituted to tighten inspection methods and control by Corps and Division headquarters. Hamlets could not receive economic and social aid until they had been certified by a Division inspection team as "pacified." Sometimes the consequence was program delays of several months because of overworked inspection staffs.<sup>2</sup>

However, the methodology and criteria for inspections were improved to the point that many hamlets were reclassified

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<sup>1</sup>The writer was present at a Vietnamese I Corps briefing in October, 1962, in which a frank appraisal of problems was given and the need cited for more inspection teams.

<sup>2</sup>In Quang Tri province the USOM Representative informed the writer that refugees from the Viet-Cong could not be aided because the hamlet in which they had sought refuge had been declared by inspectors as not yet pacified.

as "not pacified" through closer scrutiny. Increased Viet-Cong activity was another important factor in the downgrading of pacification accomplishment in many hamlets.<sup>3</sup>

American advisors faced similar shortages of time and transportation in their inspection efforts. The most remote and least visited hamlets were often those which urgently needed checking. The advent of helicopters for Sector use increased field visits but usually shortened the duration at any single location--especially in less secure areas. Helicopter crews were cautious about long stays in any one place. Again, inspection performance suffered.

As noted earlier, optimistic reporting was not only a Vietnamese phenomenon. Top level encouragement in MACV was easily coupled with the encouraging statistics provided by local Vietnamese. The bad news was harder to find. Under Diem, Americans nearly always talked to officials who owed their jobs to the regime--not the local voters. American remoteness from contact with the peasant viewpoint was a critical problem in field evaluation, particularly among MACV advisors. Subtle problems of the existence of Viet-Cong village infrastructure and rigged elections were not easy for an American to discover, even if he spoke Vietnamese. It was much easier to check defense perimeters and weapons, and to listen to statistics from the local hamlet official. The most difficult evaluation problem

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<sup>3</sup>See Figure 3, p. 78.

of all was the hamlet which tried to make peace with both sides by fulfilling the formal demands of the Government and secretly permitting the Viet-Cong free access.

However, field visits brought a surprising amount of data to the surface which indicated the inaccuracies of lower level reporting and poor quality control. On other questions, such as economic programs and local corruption in his area, peasants often commented with frankness, providing valuable data. Such spot checks in Quang Nam began to reveal an image of the hamlet program quite different from the reports to USOM in the province from official government sources.

Both Americans and Vietnamese needed a larger number of qualified personnel for field inspection, who were themselves not responsible to the regular administrative channels. The Permanent Bureau for New Life Hamlets in Saigon assigned inspectors on an ad hoc basis from their regular staff, mostly concerning questions of misuse of funds and commodities. But there was no regularly functioning system for program evaluation and review at the highest level.

#### Criteria for Local Security Evaluation

Demonstrated examples of Viet-Cong influence over "completed" strategic hamlets in Delat areas in mid-1963 eventually led to an intensive search for new criteria to determine whether a hamlet or an area could be called pacified. The revision of the six-point criteria, discussed previously, was a considerable improvement over the previous strategic

hamlet criteria. The weakest point was failure to identify and eradicate the Viet-Cong infrastructure. One common sense question often put by an American advisor got quickly to the point: Will the pacification cadre sleep in the hamlet? If so, it must be pacified. Other clues could be found in the number of men willing to bear arms or serve as officials, the amount of intelligence data volunteered by the people, and the trend in Open Arms returnees to the hamlet. Perhaps the best indicator was the demonstrated willingness of hamlet people to defend themselves in a Viet-Cong attack. However, one could not assume that no reports of attacks meant the hamlet was pacified, for Viet-Cong entry could have been tacitly permitted with no report to or by local officials because of fear of Viet-Cong reprisal.

Attention was also given in 1964 to more accurate classification of pacification status on a district and province level. The Vietnamese Government and MACV required monthly submission of a status map using these color symbols: dark blue, (pacified); light blue, (undergoing pacification); green, (cleared of Viet-Cong units); white, (unpopulated); red, (Viet-Cong controlled); and deep red, (Viet-Cong base areas). Unfortunately the classification itself prohibited accurate categorization of large areas in some provinces. In Quang Nam, ARVN would move its regiment around several districts, staying a few weeks in each place, but without concomitant systematic pacification efforts. Invariably the communist incidents would go down with

the ARVN troops present. This was taken as an improvement in the security status of the area and the map report would be changed. Then incidents would soar again when ARVN moved somewhere else.

Green areas thus "cleared", or free of major incidents, implied a security condition of positive Government achievement. There was no room in the classification for the truly contested area, ruled at night by the Viet-Cong, but by the Government during the day. This was the standard situation in most of Quang Nam and many other provinces in early 1964.

A feasible approach to assess the security status of a contested area must include a variety of information, particularly from observation and interrogation of the peasants. The "grapevine" usually kept the local citizens aware of where they could go and what they could do. Many officials relied on such local intelligence to determine their own activities and travel. But the maps sent to MACV and ARVN in Saigon did not reflect this data.

The subtle factors that are the ingredients of security are not always quantifiable, particularly in the marginal areas where the need for correct classification matters most.

For maps or any other reporting system to be useful a carefully constructed military-political-social-economic pattern for a given area would have to be developed, using a combination of overt and covert information systems. This would consider total behavior of the area including: 1) enemy

activity, 2) Government presence, and 3) peasant behavior.

Despite active American advisory efforts, inadequately coordinated intelligence and information systems have remained a serious block against the capability of province and higher level administrators to have an accurate picture of the field situation. Even the overt data on many government activities in a hamlet or area may not be known as a whole by province estimators.

On the American side, the problem of a new culture and language further removes the advisor from an easy assessment of a given community or district. The inadequately based interpretations, when neatly quantified, color-coded, and placed on a briefing board may appear as clear "evidence" on which top level American policymakers must rely to make far reaching decisions.

The inference of this section is that clearer criteria and a bigger and better mechanism for inspection are needed. An improved approach would involve comprehensive knowledge of the area being inspected, adequate criteria to determine the efficacy of the Government pacification program there, and freedom on the part of inspectors from administrative or other involvement with those in charge of the operation. The inspection criteria and field information available to the evaluator must each form a framework within which the bits and pieces of the inspection experience are fitted for a meaningful picture of the situation as it is and as it should be.



## II. A SUMMARY CRITIQUE OF VIETNAMESE PACIFICATION EFFORTS

Considerable attention has been given to the strategies of pacification and their cultural context, (in Parts I and II) and to the content of specific programs and structures, (Part III). In the rest of this chapter, the writer will attempt to provide a meaningful summary of what went wrong in the pacification process and why, primarily from the provincial perspective. American advisory efforts will be discussed separately.

Four fundamental factors in the conflict in South Vietnam have undergone critical change since the strategic hamlet campaign was formally launched in 1962: 1) The Viet-Cong strength in the countryside has made a "quantum leap" from its position of early 1962; 2) The fragile political and administrative system of the Ngos was followed by two years of administrative and political chaos that drastically weakened the counterinsurgent effort; 3) Popular political and social upheaval in the aftermath of Diem's fall has provided both a vitality and a fluidity on the social scene; and 4) The counterinsurgent military capability was revolutionized by substantial American troop inputs.

Further, the feedback of previous pacification failures has changed the climate of peasant receptivity and capability in the creation of a rural security system. Repeated troop withdrawals have reduced the credibility of government promises

to protect the rural communities. Thus, pacification efforts and plans should not be judged outside the conditions of the period in which they were applied.

It is particularly difficult to evaluate individual program components of the campaigns by themselves. The right economic program at the wrong time may fail to function at all because it preceded adequate security preparations. Or the same program could be erroneously considered successful when, in fact, the fruits of the venture ended up strengthening the insurgent system by bigger communist tax collections.

#### Objectives in Pacification

As noted in Chapter V, Ngo Dinh Nhu and the Americans were not really saying the same things in describing the intent of the strategic hamlet program. The USOM advisors had hoped to duplicate the genuine and successful appeal to popular support which had won against the Huks in the Philippines. Nhu was apparently dreaming of a new era of popular support for the regime drawn from the grassroots by the same techniques of human engineering the communists had employed in China. Without the motivated and skillful apparatus of the communists, the "revolution" became an ordeal for the peasant and official alike, in which false appearances were offered and willingly taken for reality itself. There was neither security nor popular support.

By mid-1965 pacification operations showed the signs of lack of a coherent policy by the Vietnamese. Search and destroy

operations were widely practiced and resources control efforts were underway in some areas. Economic, psychological, and social programs were being used almost everywhere to obtain popular support, but these usually lacked adequate police or military protection to make a popular response possible. The Viet-Cong apparatus could be found almost anywhere.

Surveys conducted in several provinces during 1965 had begun to focus official attention on what the peasant wanted. The fundamental desire was always the same: protection. The unproductive admixture of high economic and propaganda input and part-time security support is shown in the following vignette from Binh Thuan province:

On February 23, the VC ordered 150 families of Tuy Hoa village to move out of their hamlets and return to their former homes by February 25. Ten families moved out. The province organized a rally of the people with both the Province Chief and the District chief exhorting the people to resist the VC demands. The people replied that it was a difficult decision to make as the government was only able to protect them in the day time and they were subject to the VC at night. Since the province does not have the capability to provide security in this area, it appears doubtful that the people will continue to resist the VC. The province plans to develop 48 self help projects for this quarter.<sup>4</sup>

Although much of the operational confusion may be a problem of poor management, the regularity of the lack of coordination suggests that policymakers in Vietnam have not accepted as pacification dogma the priority role of protecting the peasant. Experience has shown it is the only road to

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<sup>4</sup>AID province report, Binh Thuan, February, 1965.

obtaining his support.

At the end of 1965, the new cadre training program appeared to be taking this problem into consideration. The new pacification cadres were operating in armed teams to insure the safety of the hamlet people and themselves as the cadres worked to win their confidence. This protection is the only platform on which the cadres can build the confidence which will lead to popular participation in self defense.

Protection has been projected as the fundamental precondition on which other programs of political participation and economic and social development may take place. These other areas have also been clouded by thinking in terms of ad hoc projects apart from an integrated plan. The considerable talk about revolution has yet to lead to a ~~comprehensive~~ plan for its motivation and implementation--particularly as a reciprocal process in which the grassroots community affirms and defines its revolutionary interests.

### The Pacification Apparatus

Civil administration. The scope and significance of pacification in Vietnam necessitates the consideration of the entire government structure as the "pacification apparatus." Almost every ministry has some tie to the rural areas and thus either helps or hinders pacification by the way its officials operate in the field.

The physical and psychological devastation wrought by Viet-Cong terror among rural officials was complemented by a demoralization of the bureaucracy that was induced by the behavior of the Ngos themselves. Donnell comments:

Normative ambiguity and the Ngo's own Messianic political complex combine to induce such extremely important dysfunctional results as unreliable reporting from lower administrative levels and consequently unrealistic planning and decision-making at the top level. For provincial officials kept in anxiety about their standing with Saigon are afraid to report actual difficulties and reverses encountered in carrying out Saigon's orders and tend instead to submit optimistically slanted, statistically impressive reports which convey to the Presidency a false sense of official achievement throughout much of the country. In the strategic hamlet program this has been evident in the official eagerness to report quantitative gains and to produce "showpiece" hamlets and other projects which may symbolize dramatic progress to a VIP making a flying inspection trip but which often yield only artificial and temporary results.<sup>5</sup>

After the fall of Diem the bureaucracy continued to be paralyzed by the endless political shifts that imperiled positions of all officials of any consequence. These dislocations seriously affected provincial pacification operations by blocking effective decisionmaking in Saigon and at Corps levels, and particularly by forcing a top-to-bottom shuffle within the province itself. Many provinces changed chiefs as often as four or five times in a single year, beginning in 1964.

Corruption is another factor that hampers pacification in two ways. First, if the villagers do not get the money

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<sup>5</sup>Donnell, "Politics in South Vietnam," op. cit., p. 535.

intended for them, then the program is hurt. Second, it goes to the corrupt local official and everybody knows about it. In a Bien Hoa province survey, the people noted that all the officials had begun driving motor bikes and living in brick houses, where they had previously ridden only bicycles and had lived in ordinary houses.<sup>6</sup> This local corruption is perhaps the most serious of all because it is the most visible to the peasant and confirms exactly what the Viet-Cong has been saying about the Government. Public executions notwithstanding, there was little evidence in early 1966 that the policy of eradicating corruption was being seriously implemented.

The vast amount of American aid channeled through the frail and antiquated government administrative mechanism has made it difficult to enforce anti-corruption programs. A great number of military and civilian officials at all levels are involved and would resist reform efforts.

Procedures and delays. The Saigon bureaucracy was still burdened with involved procedures and excessive delays in 1965. The quick response needed in emergency pacification programs was not yet a possibility. A great deal had been accomplished by USOM and Vietnamese planners to simplify funding procedures by 1965, but much more appeared to need correction. The comparatively routine operation of releasing payroll funds to the

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<sup>6</sup>United States Information Service, "Rural Opinion in Bien Hoa Province" (Saigon: 2 July 1964), p. 6. (Mimeographed).

provinces was delayed in several major programs in 1965. The Vietnamese civil servant's pay check has a close relation to his performance level--as in any nation. Some provincial cadre systems have operated for periods of several months without any pay during 1964-1965.

There is urgent need for administrative studies at every level to pinpoint the bottlenecks arising from unbalanced work loads, ill-defined and circuitous decisionmaking processes, and lack of systematic responsiveness to trouble warnings coming up from lower echelons. South Vietnam's Government has been impacted with administrative demands probably unparalleled in the history of any nation. But the fundamental task of revolutionizing its level of efficiency to meet these staggering administrative requirements has hardly begun.

Responsiveness to the population. An abiding failure of the Government apparatus has always been its isolation from, and interest in, the peasant. Their pay and promotions come from above and that is where the reverent attention of the typical civil servant is riveted. The concept of the civil servant as public servant, responsive to the people, has yet to take hold in Vietnam.

Military forces. The relation of ARVN to pacification has been a constant problem. Although individual commanders have carried out successful pacification efforts (such as Duc Duc in Quang Nam and Phuoc Choau in Quang Tin), the overall pacification

performance has been poor. Prepared for conventional war, ARVN still lacks solid civic action orientation and training in effective pacification procedures. Some competent civil administrators and advisors prefer not to have ARVN around when pacification is underway. Coordination and long term commitment of forces, essential to pacification, have not been obtained, as a rule. Regular military commanders have refused to turn over command of ARVN forces to the Province Chief in whose area the units are operating, thus bifurcating the pacification responsibility. Following the concept of "search and destroy" in populated areas poses a serious problem for subsequent pacification efforts.

The problem of behavior and command of military forces extends beyond ARVN. Regional Forces and Popular Forces have had their problems with the population as well. Although the Province Chief usually commands all non-ARVN forces in his province, this does not mean these commands are coordinated. There are several types of local anti-guerrilla forces, not previously discussed in this study, which are under district and province command. In Long An, there were fifteen different types of armed forces in the province by 1965.<sup>7</sup>

Pacification Cadres. The cadre system was a neglected aspect of pacification until 1965, when the training of the

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<sup>7</sup>Interview with David Shepherd, former USOM Province Representative, Long An, 1965.



new Rural Construction cadres began. The ten week course is a substantial improvement over previous cadre systems. The attention to the establishment of revolutionary elan in the greatly extended training period, and the assignment of the cadres in balanced teams with specialized components are highly realistic steps forward. The test of the success of the new system will probably come in its relation to existing, local administrative structures in the provinces whose personnel have not been trained in the spirit of reform that was inculcated in the cadres.

#### Planning and Scheduling

The persistent problems of overambitious and uncoordinated planning have often been cited in the study. Planning for pacification has usually been carried out against deadlines that prohibit the thoroughness of research essential to success. Planning has been project-centered instead of system-centered. The technical services coordinated with their own ministries and the military elements with their own chain of command. However, there has been little attention to the socio-economic status of the village, district, and province and how various new programs would meet the need of each community and the province as a whole. Also, there is still little correlation of these diverse programs in terms of timing, manpower, and financial resources. In fact, there has been little effort to build an adequate provincial mechanism for program coordination.

Allocation of manpower. The personnel needed for all pacification purposes has steadily risen each year. No comprehensive study of manpower availability for pacification programs has ever been made, however. In 1964 and 1965, key pacification programs were crippled by the ARVN draft calls. By the end of 1965, even the new Rural Construction Cadres had not been guaranteed immunity from the draft. The preeminence of military policy over a coordinated pacification approach to this problem reveals again the result of unreconciled objectives and their aftermath.

Management of more skilled manpower resources has also been capriciously handled, with skilled and one-of-a-kind technicians being assigned to positions unrelated to their specialties. The failures to secure adequate manpower for almost every program are testimony to the urgent need for a thorough study of the use and needs of Vietnam's manpower.

Scheduling. A key management problem in pacification has been the control and ordering of program inputs--in men, money, and materials--so that the correct resource in the proper amount arrives at the appropriate time. Many instances have been cited to show the high cost to the pacification process of improper implementation. The precision required for pacification operations, while hardly as technical as for the launching of a space satellite, may be just as important to the success of the pacification effort. The many human factors, and other

unpredictable elements characteristic of a less advanced nation, do not lessen the responsibility for realistic scheduling.

Economic planning. The reorientation of programming towards military, social, and political objectives has led to inadequate consideration of the larger or local economic significance of the pacification programs. The input of American armed forces and construction teams has raised local prices, as noted previously. Such inflation effects Vietnamese buyers as well as Americans and may be a serious problem for a government seeking social stability.

The national economic programs projected for quick returns may not speak to pressing but long term local requirements. More comprehensive planning based on local conditions is needed. This, too, requires economics experts and more adequate local data supplied by field research.

Increasing attention has been given to careful control of rural economic inputs in order to avoid strengthening the Viet-Cong position. Much of the pacification assistance prior to 1965 may well have aided the Viet-Cong more than the peasants who were the primary recipients. It is quite possible by an economic project to increase the Government stature in an area at the same time that it strengthens the Viet-Cong movement, through giving the latter access to food or medicine.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Charles Wolff, Jr., "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities" (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, May, 1965). Unpublished paper.

A long term economic problem in pacification planning has not been faced by Americans or Vietnamese. The enormous systems of Government field services, including thousands of teachers, health workers, extension experts, and physical facilities, have been financed by American-backed national projects. At some point, the capability of Vietnamese resources to assume these costs must be estimated and proper projections made.

### Operations

Provincial operations have suffered from the traditional procedure-bound practices of many static bureaucracies. Local procedures to release funds for emergencies have been a constant problem. The greatest difficulties have come on large projects (such as relocation) requiring massive amounts of paperwork and approvals by the Corps pacification office. Lack of promptness and administrative flexibility have frequently taken the psychological thrust out of relocation payments, aid to families of deceased soldiers and officials, and battle damages.

Despite the seeming omnipresence in Vietnam of Vietnamese information programs, a surprising amount of Government assistance has reached the recipient without adequate psychological "packaging." Bags of wheat intended for families of wounded militiamen, pushed off the back of a truck by a roadside village with no explanation, may do more harm than good. Proper psychological exploitation requires "public relations" training of every member of the pacification apparatus.

A continuing weakness of the operations stage of the pacification process is the tendency to go ahead with unrealistic schedules at the expense of quality performance. As yet there has been no systematic effort to review progress and problems during the operational period in order to adjust schedules, resources, methods, or goals.

Most of the failures that occurred in the operational phase of pacification were rooted in poorly defined objectives, uncoordinated and unrealistic planning, and a governmental apparatus that was inadequately trained and staffed. The recurrent failures are also related to lack of management flexibility to adjust while operations are in progress. There is a lack of planning and evaluation in association with field operations in Vietnam. Too often each element has its own functional separation and a non-concurrent time frame, with all the planning "pre-natal" and all the evaluation post mortem. The need is for a fresh concept of all three as parts of a dynamic management activity in the field situation.

### III. THE AMERICAN ROLE IN PACIFICATION

Preceding chapters have suggested some of the problems faced by American representatives in Vietnam. The role of American personnel has varied widely. By 1965, the advisory efforts were statistically overshadowed by the presence of combat forces and military and civilian support systems. The enormous American presence undeniably has increased American

leverage at the highest levels, although no agreements have been formalized to say so.

The direct role of United States Forces in pacification operations had just begun in mid-1965, and adequate perspective on their performance is impossible at this writing. However, the fundamental problem of maintaining internal peace is first of all up to the Vietnamese. The American combat forces may provide a shield behind which effective government administration may function, but substitution of an American government apparatus--civilian or military--would miss the whole logic of the pacification enterprise.

The equally unfortunate opposite of direct American rule has characterized the American military effort. Any advisor needs leverage in getting his points across and MACV has not had the power needed. Persuasion has its limits. Sector Advisors have had some control over the approvals for MAP equipment, but their influence through day to day approvals via the province release agreement has enhanced their position for a good hearing by the Province Chief on many other matters. All that most advisors to ARVN can do is ask for action from their senior advisor, who himself has similar limitations with his counterpart. Although joint command of ARVN units would be unwise from many viewpoints, other levers of influence could enhance military advisory effectiveness. Approval systems for MAP inputs at each level of command would probably be sufficient, and entirely

within the established tradition of the province release agreements.

In training for MACV advisory assignments, there is great need for emphasis on Civil Affairs studies. Sector Advisors need more preparation for their specific assignments and should be carefully selected in terms of capability to work in a civilian administrative context.

### USOM Provincial Operations

Despite the changes of top level leadership and the removal of approval powers in the provinces, the USOM provincial system served a combination advisory and auxiliary role to the Government. In matters of pacification, the USOM chain of command could often get action from various Saigon government agencies where Province Chiefs had failed. This availability of an alternative channel, while not ideal from an administrative standpoint, was a pragmatic effort to overcome traditional Vietnamese red tape. The political and administrative upheavals during 1964 and 1965 further indicated the need for the alternate channels of contact, and at the same time reminded the Americans how far they were removed from control of the situation. Addition of field specialists in other USOM Divisions further improved the communication with Saigon. The USOM Representative usually encouraged the Province Chief to use more initiative in responding to local pacification problems. The presence of USOM helped the Province Chief share the heavy responsibility for innovative actions. His administrative

capability was usually increased, not inhibited, by USOM assistance.

Failure by top level Americans in the spring of 1964 to insist on correlation of new monetary and materials inputs through joint planning led to colossal blunders in the rushed schedules and unrealistic plans. The need for full communication and coordinated administrative and policy support at all levels of the American mission was demonstrated.

Further, USOM Representatives and MACV Sector Advisors often did not know what orders had been given by either the Corps commanders or the Ministry of the Interior until they had been carried out. Americans should have at least been informed of significant orders regarding pacification implementation prior to execution.

The changes in Province Chiefs and other pacification officials forced a heavy operational load on many USOM Representatives. As perhaps the only official with any experience in his position, he ended up pressing for policies that should have originated with the Province Chief. Other province representatives were operationally oriented from long years of such experience and sometimes preferred to "get things done by themselves," such as delivering commodities to a hamlet in the USOM truck. As James Killen often made clear, this was use of USOM administrative talent in an improper role. To the operator on the ground, it was sometimes the only way to accomplish certain missions.



Many USOM representatives had served in civil or military bureaucracy for years, and some had learned to get by with a minimum of effort and a good report. Others faced the frustrating administrative problems with a resigned attitude of getting as much done as possible--knowing it might not be enough.

For pacification in Vietnam, the 50 per cent or 75 per cent performance was not enough, however. The failure of USOM at all levels to have a clear understanding of, and demand for, quality and thoroughness in the pacification effort doomed the programs to failure. The Hop Tac campaign began as such an approach in 1964.

It is not clear, at this writing, whether American advisory inputs are adequately integrated with the Vietnamese pacification system to insure coordinated planning and operations. It appears that the upper level American advisors have had significant impact on the pacification strategy initiated in late 1965 but these new programs were only beginning at the province level.

Experience in pacification programs has shown that Americans have not used their influence enough to effect political and administrative reforms necessary for successful pacification.<sup>9</sup> The many personal and parochial interests that have threatened to divert the announced revolutionary ambitions of every South Vietnamese regime since Diem, make successful pacification a

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<sup>9</sup>For a cogent discussion of non-intervention and American aid see Montgomery, op. cit., Chapter VI.

near impossibility. More American pressure, skillfully and discretely applied, at hundreds of pressure points, may be able to move the Government towards its announced goals.

The Lansdale team has demonstrated a remarkable talent for personalized contacts among key Vietnamese, which is another important element in effecting change. Like most other human beings, Vietnamese leaders dislike formalized encounters over their individual or corporate misbehavior. Such costly episodes took place before and after Diem's fall.

Perhaps the greatest role that Americans can play in Vietnam is to provide steady pressure and support to keep the Vietnamese leaders at every echelon headed towards their own announced national goals of revolutionary change. AID has constantly moved in the direction of recruiting more able leadership for provincial representatives and providing these personnel with more in-service training. Most Provincial Representatives are trained for nine months in language and area studies before beginning their overseas tours, and more sophisticated training approaches were being developed in early 1966.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The character and strength of the insurgent threat have forced a choice by Vietnamese leaders between capitulation to the communists or the radical reshaping of their own political and social system to speak to the demands of the peasants and the growing revolutionary political forces. Concomitant with

this revolutionary program must be an equally revolutionary change in the motivation and management of the Vietnamese government and armed forces.

Ironically, the enormous foreign aid inputs, the extent and complexity of the pacification process, and the efficient governmental system of the Viet-Cong necessitate parameters of performance from the Government far higher than that of other emerging nations. There is no room for mediocre operations with high graft tolerance and small doses of popular participation.

It may be that the revolution cannot be accomplished at all. But it is quite clear that the Vietnamese cannot do it without American help. And it is equally certain the Americans cannot do it alone. If it is to be done in tandem, improved management and better motivation training to implement revolutionary goals are the first tasks of both nations. The steady escalation of money, materials, and manpower inputs without adequate management can only increase the magnitude of American failure and prolong the agony and futile aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

## CHAPTER XIV

### A PACIFICATION THEORY FOR VIETNAM

Some of the following proposals appear to be already in the process of application in Vietnam.<sup>1</sup> The arrival of the Lansdale group in 1965 probably accounts for the increased emphasis on the political and psychological approaches described briefly here. Many of the approaches proposed by Lansdale are similar to what he and his associates tried in anti-Huk campaigns in the Philippines and in Vietnam 1954-1956. The political blood pressure of Vietnam is high and its administrative metabolism is dangerously low. The supreme test of the advisory input is to stimulate and stabilize the Vietnamese leadership, without supplanting or suppressing it. Only a skilled ringmaster can insure that the elephantine American presence in Vietnam does not overshadow the true stars of the show: the Vietnamese themselves.

So far, the pacification process has involved a plethora of programs, often worthy in themselves. These need integration through carefully defined and faithfully followed larger objectives. Secondly, the pacification system requires a more skilled

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<sup>1</sup>The writer assumes responsibility for the presentation of the proposals that follow. However, he has drawn freely on ideas, proposals, and programs from many sources, and has chosen to plan along lines that would augment the approach being attempted at the beginning of 1966.

government apparatus, equipped with stronger motivation and management methods commensurate with the enormous task of implementation which it faces. These pacification objectives and the means of their implementation are the concern of Chapters XIV and XV.

The Central Pacification Objective: A Revolution in the Life of the Peasant

Revolution has been an overused word in South Vietnam. The Ngo regime countered the communist claim to the term by its own "Personalist revolution." Subsequent regimes further abused the concept by their unfulfilled promises. As employed here, revolution refers to a process of fundamental, orderly change in the life of the peasant and his community. The revolution would also have national connotations of independence, conversion or expulsion of the communists, and the advancement of the nation as a whole. Misused as it has been in the past, revolution still appears to fit the mood of the young and the rising new leadership in Vietnam. The primary focus here is what most concerns the peasant.

The rural revolution would involve the establishment of peace and order to displace the insecurity of war and terror. It would give the peasant free and open political participation in local village affairs and eventually in all levels of political life. He would increase his standard of living by learning how to grow more food and by receiving, or

being able to buy, better seed, livestock, and fertilizer. His children would be assured a primary school education and possibly more. His health care would be improved through better trained staffs and closer facilities. He would be better protected from the extremes of his own government through guarantees of equality before the law, and he would be protected from corruption and other abuses by having direct access, through elected representatives and/or grievance and redress systems, to the highest levels of government. A land reform program would provide him with more equitable land distribution and legal title of ownership, in areas where serious inequities now exist.

An important aspect of these revolutionary goals as a platform for pacification is the method in which they would be achieved. The peasant would participate in the selection, planning, and establishment of effective security, schools, health facilities, etc. The revolution would not necessarily mean the abandonment of all his previous ways of living, except as the peasant desires.

The "new life" would be open to all South Vietnamese, so long as they pledged their support to the Government and its campaign to destroy the communist insurgency. There would be no division of communities by favoring those who supported the Government and depriving families whose kin were with the Viet-Cong. However, villages under Viet-Cong control or caught in a contest between the two sides would not receive

those types of assistance which, if used by the Viet-Cong would aid their war-making capability. The variability of programs to fit the security of areas will be discussed later as part of a province strategy.

The national pacification effort would focus on establishing complete control of the most heavily populated areas: around Saigon and to the South and West, which is the heart of the Delta, and in the populous valleys of Central Vietnam. In these areas complete resources control procedures would be followed along the expanding perimeter, with controls being gradually relaxed in the inner areas as the perimeter widens. Highland areas would not (and could not) be tightly controlled, but full support of self-defense programs among loyal tribesmen, assisted by Vietnamese and American combat forces, would keep the enemy dislocated. The intent would be to impede traffic on supply lines from the North that pass through the highlands and to seal more completely the support from the major population agglomerations in the Delta and central coastal regions.

The special province experiments in variable pacification emphasis described in Chapter VII, are appropriate to the theory. Such areas as An Giang would have intensive social, economic, political programs appropriate to the region. This could be expanded to include Ninh Thuan and Tuyen Duc provinces. The most insecure and heavily populated regions would involve forced relocation, possibly including whole villages, in the manner of the Malayan campaign.

The strategy would not mean total elimination of the insurgent threat. It would, however, deprive the enemy of access to his major food sources which are the heavily populated areas. Scattered communities could also opt for relocation, but even if not relocated, their assistance would probably not sustain the large Viet-Cong forces now in Vietnam. These units would be forced to retire to less populated areas and would probably be further reduced by high surrender rates under the pressures of food shortages.

From this stalemate, security for the vast majority of rural Vietnamese would have been obtained, and the war confined to less populated regions. In a sense, the insurgency would have become more "manageable," and at least more endurable for the country as a whole. Combined pressures of air attacks on the North and a slow but steady increase in the pacified zone might lead to a negotiated communist withdrawal.

#### Rehabilitating the Governmental Apparatus

The foregoing "platform" for revolution and the supporting objectives are neither new, nor a promise of a panacea. But even these modest goals would be quite unrealistic without a major renovation of the Government's apparatus in response to the problems analyzed in earlier chapters.

Recent developments in Vietnam, particularly since the beginning of the Ky regime in June of 1965, have demonstrated a willingness, even a determination among the leadership,



to reshape some of the antiquated machinery of government. The strengthening of the Ministry for Construction (pacification) is an example. Steady support and pressure by the American Mission, in league with the more progressive political and administrative leadership might go a great deal farther. In addition, major changes (some of them apparently in process of realization at this writing) would need to be made in the American Mission and the approach of many of its advisory elements.

The American advisory establishment in Saigon needs to be much more intimately involved in the problems and procedures of pacification that reach the Vietnamese national level. There should be a move at every echelon towards a combination of offices, operations centers, and report analysis units. This movement towards physical proximity should be enhanced by a studied effort at increased personal and professional interchange among counterpart elements in civilian and military organizations. Offices concerned with the same functions should be under the same roof. Americans should spend more time talking about pacification problems to Vietnamese, instead of other Americans. The proximity and increased interchange need not affect command relations or usurp sovereignty. Inevitably it would improve communication. Americans should be guaranteed the right to know, at any level, changes in plans and policy and they should be privy to many decisions, particularly those which deviate from previous agreements. In short,

Americans should be consulted and informed on all significant policy matters, and proximity would help make this policy feasible.

Just as communication is improved horizontally at every echelon by greater proximity between American and Vietnamese, vertical proximity between echelons should be increased. Improved radio service has assisted in linking Saigon with field units, but a prompt response system on either Vietnamese or American side is still lacking. Reporting should be action-oriented at both ends. Procedures for approval of plans and emergency projects and for funding need to be studied carefully and streamlined and systematized so that processing delays are highlighted for extra attention. A management system for implementing pacification at every level will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Civil Service system. The procedural and decision-making failings of Vietnamese administration have been discussed previously. But a great deal could be done to revive the sagging morale and performance of the people in the system, particularly at the lowest level, by a fairer pattern of promotion, higher pay, and removal or retirement of the most corrupt and incompetent leadership. Regularity of pay and rewards for performance would do wonders for the system. The rewards could be tied to adoption of improved management techniques--starting with the pacification mechanism. These reforms could be carried out gradually by the strengthening of

the Civil Service Commission of the government and appropriate studies (assisted by American advisors) to develop the improved policy without disrupting the previous apparatus completely.

Training. The endless political indoctrination sessions of the Ngo regime served only to demoralize or bore most civil servants. Political indoctrination is needed, but it should be more along the lines of changing attitudes towards one's job and particularly towards the relation of the Government as servant of the people. Strangely, Dale Carnegie techniques might be quite useful--with proper amendment for the Vietnamese social system. Although one can expect too much in the effort to install revolutionary zeal, if it is combined with higher pay, hope for the individual's future, and the satisfaction of relevant involvement in significant national efforts, the value to the pacification effort is substantial.

However, it is essential to encase training in a total context of supervisory improvement. All echelons must receive training, both in the worthy cause and program of the revolution and in the particular techniques the civil servant can use to further that revolution.

The excellent training and team system of Rural Construction cadres would have real possibility of success if permitted to operate in a revitalized Governmental mechanism. Without this larger context of administrative support the cadre program cannot be expected to succeed.

American training. A radical change in American advisory training should be geared to coincide with the training received by their Vietnamese counterparts. Attention to creating an attitude and capability permitting empathy for the Vietnamese revolutionary goals should be ingrained in the American advisor before he sees Vietnam. Motivation and human relations techniques should be tested and sharpened in laboratory sessions simulating Vietnamese administrative and social situations. In short, the American must share the sense of urgency of the revolutionary cause and be sufficiently equipped with language and other skills to nourish these attitudes among his Vietnamese associates.

Vietnamese armed forces. Such training is appropriate for every advisor at each level, particularly including those to be attached to regular military units. Perhaps the reorientation of the Vietnamese army leadership towards the populace is equal in importance to the reform of the civil system. The public relations skills of the National Police and Popular, Regional, and Regular Forces will make or break resources control, vis a vis popular support and tolerance, and the Open Arms program as well.

Joint Operations Control Network. In order to achieve full coordination, information, and prompt attention to field problems, a pacification operations control center should be established at every echelon from Saigon to each district, with

a prescribed reporting and control system uniform throughout the network. The Malayan control system, while overly complex in some respects, has continued to be used long after the emergency was officially declared to be over. Converted to a socio-economic development control network, the identical operations room and similar techniques were serving the new purpose in 1966.<sup>2</sup>

The complexity and enormity of the Vietnamese pacification effort call for a mechanism at least as efficient as the "operation rooms" of Malaya. With a simplified and rational management review and evaluation methodology inculcated in Vietnamese and American personnel, such a network could provide almost instantaneous sharing of field problems at whatever echelon must review them to achieve action. Dual communications systems could be maintained separately, but tied into a single headquarters at each level. However, the operational aspect of each center should be kept uppermost. Low level "telephone answerers" in such centers would reduce them to telephone exchanges.

Each center should be, in fact, a focus of data, plans, and progress on all activities subordinate to its echelon of responsibility. All intelligence activities would be focussed into an adjacent Intelligence Center, and the Pacification Bureau should be nearby as well. Armed Forces should be

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<sup>2</sup>New York Times, 12 April 1965, p. 30.

coordinated through the same center or from a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) tied by a secure telephone line.

#### Provincial Pacification Administration

Efforts to decentralize decision-making and disbursing functions met with enough success in 1962-1965 to suggest a fuller application of the principle. Although general pacification planning guidelines and matching lump allocations could be released and approved at the national level, there should be more latitude to revise plans, programs, and schedules, as situations change, using the operations control network when higher levels were required for decision.

All armed forces operating in the province, including those of ARVN, should be under the command of the Province Chief, except in special Viet-Cong controlled areas. These could be designated as special military zones under ARVN.

Perhaps the most critical need is to emancipate the province from the control of Corps and Division commanders. The buildup of Corps-area staffs in USOM may be useful from an internal supervisory point of view. Many provincial representatives felt that the regional mechanisms, USOM and Vietnamese military (particularly the latter), only delayed and diluted the capability of Saigon to deal with civil problems. Regional "desks" with responsible officials in charge could sort out the field traffic at the Saigon level without the detour through Corps. The theoretical decentralization to Corps, in fact,

added to the administrative dilemma instead of simplifying it, particularly by strapping the Province Chief to Division and Corps commanders.

Logistics. Warehousing and transportation were non-existent in some provinces when USOM began its provincial operations. There is still a long way to go. To increase the flexibility of the provincial apparatus, warehouses should be built and stocked beyond projected program requirements (keeping in mind inventory limits on perishables). Emergencies, procurement delays, and irregular local building schedules are the "given" of pacification. Extra space in warehouses is needed in order to be prepared for irregular inputs and outputs. The benefit of a ready supply for the peasant community makes these extra investments worthwhile. Smaller district warehouses, within the reach of local transportation devices, can aid and facilitate direct pick ups of materials by the hamlets.

#### A Variable Province Strategy

A useful device for approaching pacification was suggested by George Tanham and Frank Trager in their concept of "three wars" in Vietnam.<sup>3</sup> The black, gray, and white categories coincide with enemy, contested, and friendly areas. In planning a province (or national) program quite different guidelines must

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<sup>3</sup>George K. Tanham and Frank N. Trager, "The Three Wars in Vietnam," Army, May, 1964.

be set for each.

Black areas are the special focus of ARVN operations, development of agent nets, and intensive Open Arms activity (usually via air broadcasts and leaflet drops). Agitprop teams may enter some of these areas for quick visits. Assassination teams, directed towards Viet-Cong officials can weaken the Viet-Cong Government structure. Gray areas are of many shades of Government control. In some places there is an alternation of control, almost by agreement, with the communists owning the night. The Viet-Cong may collect taxes, hold rallies, and conduct terror, but not with the complete freedom they enjoy in their areas of absolute control.

Surprise checkpoints for resources control, hamlet searches, and expanding agent networks should be projected for such areas. Economic planning must be selective, in an effort to control inputs to the communist system and to clarify the relation between loyalty and assistance. However, the latter can be a wooden rule and prohibit some creative thrusts for peasant appreciation and a "pre-pacification warmup." The gray areas have many government supporters who cannot show their hands, but can supply vital intelligence data. Most of this must be received, and can be rewarded, on an individual basis. Safe development inputs could include a school, if built on a self-help basis and if the area is secure enough for classes to be held. Visiting medical teams could aid even the grayest areas if drugs given out were consumed on



the spot. A wide variety of psywar activities would be an excellent preliminary liaison with the populace, particularly with armed support. Drama teams and movies would maintain a tie with hamlets on the list for future pacification. Province newspapers could be distributed in any gray area.

White areas, considered completely secure, would have the full force of political, economic, and social assistance. Regional Forces would be removed, and control of the area would be in the hands of the police and reduced Popular Forces. Hamlet and village officials would be elected. Full scale agricultural, community industry, and public works programs would be introduced where invited and economically feasible.

Planning and research. Little attention has been given to proper balancing of local community interests and broader province concerns in counterinsurgency economic and social programs. The Rural Construction Cadre Teams have Economic Development units which need to seek out relevant local data and have it matched by experienced and trained planning counsel at the province level. Many province Economic Sections have been little more than statistics collectors. They are needed for research support and long term planning counsel vis-a-vis the short term local projects. Province planning staffs must provide the larger rationale for the burgeoning programs. A hodgepodge of roads, that do not form a larger system and a hamlet school construction program that leaves

no higher schools for the new graduates to attend, can cause an expensive feedback from government programs. Manpower studies, economic feasibility surveys, and integrated provincial development studies can not only scuttle unsound project ideas in time, but can also open new avenues for useful programs.

Despite the proposed unity of all armed forces and civil agencies under the command of the Province Chief, the problem of effective correlation and scheduling of program inputs remains as the foremost challenge to pacification. Chapter XV will suggest a possible system for effective implementation.

## CHAPTER XV

### A MODEL FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The employment of integrated program management systems, using the techniques of interlocking networks and the "critical path" concept, has become routine in many government and industry circles. The Critical Path Method and Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) are two very similar and well known methods of integrated program management.<sup>1</sup>

Essentially, these methods are the application of logic to an operational problem through a systematic and internally cohesive methodology. Steadily improved over the years, these methods have aided in the achievement of substantive savings in time, money, and manpower. This chapter is an effort to apply the heart of these concepts to the management of pacification in Vietnam.

The application of PERT to development programming is relatively recent. The Government of India and AID are using PERT in "Operation Hardrock," a minerals survey project. Development loans in India may eventually include a PERT-oriented implementation plan as a part of the agreement.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The PERT concepts applied here are taken from PERT Guide for Management Use (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963).

<sup>2</sup>Interview with James Carson, formerly AID/India, Industry Division, 1966.

In March, 1966 a PERT specialist was sent by AID to Thailand to examine the possibilities for applying the method to rural development programming.

American implementation systems for the production of defense "hardware" are too complex and computer-oriented for direct application in pacification. The basic discipline and postulates of such systems, however, could be adapted to the pacification process.

In the proposed model an integrated management system would be applied only in those activities involved with pacification. The American reporting and program mechanisms would also be geared to the new system.

Introduction of the new method would require brief but intensive training of all officials who would be involved. The terms, concepts, and sequence of the management process should become ingrained as a way of thinking before operations begin. The fundamental value of such a system is, in fact, its internalization by participating officials.

#### The Methodology of Network and Critical Path Concepts

The management process involves several steps which form a cycle: 1) Establishment of objectives, 2) Development of plans, 3) Determination of schedules, 4) Evaluation of progress, and 5) Decisions and actions to revise activities in the previous steps, based on results of the evaluation.

Objectives.<sup>3</sup> Overall objectives must be clearly defined and supporting objectives, in the form of specific programs and projects, should be itemized. Lower echelons would accept objectives and supporting programs from above and would formulate consonant local objectives. The planners would have to consider province-level programs by type of activity (education, health, agriculture, etc.) and also in terms of their interrelation with each other as scheduled for application in a given rural community (as in Figure 26).

Planning. The process of planning to realize the objectives involves assignment of tasks, estimation of manpower and resource requirements, ordering of the sequence of activities, and the estimation of time required for each activity. A network of activities (see Figure 27) is constructed, working back from the end objective to the starting point, correlating activities in the sequence necessary for their individual initiation and completion. An "event" denotes a point at which an activity is completed or begun. Each event in the network is numbered. No succeeding event may have a lower number than a predecessor event. Each activity receives minimum and maximum estimates of the time required for its completion. Activities that depend on other activities for their initiation or completion

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<sup>3</sup>See Figure 26 for objectives specified through a work breakdown structure for a local pacification program.




Figure 26. Sample Work Breakdown Structure:  
Hamlet Pacification Plan.




Figure 27. Sample Implementation Network:  
Hamlet School Construction.

are tied together by events. An activity is portrayed by a line between two events. A "dummy" activity is simply a connecting line which does not represent a time lapse. An "interface" is an event which transfers responsibility for a plan to another part of the network.

The construction of a comprehensive network forces the relating of each event to others in terms of sequence and time necessary for completion. It shows the planner what time frames will be necessary in parts of the network to keep other parts from being delayed. Figure 27 illustrates very simply the importance of proper sequence in the construction of a school and the recruitment and training of a teacher. Although the local pacification cadre need not prepare a complex drawing such as Figure 27, he would need to perceive the importance of each of the paths of activity in the network necessary for success of the project. The "critical path" is the longest estimated time period from start to completion--computed by totalling all maximum activity times in the network. When a fixed completion date is necessary, then the network may be revised by changing the manpower or material inputs or revising the end objective. The planner does not, however, set calendar dates during the planning phase. This is reserved for the scheduling function.

Planning goals are set in terms of quantity, quality, time and cost. Activities would be estimated for cost just as it would for time--although war conditions and American aid make this factor less critical than time. Setting clear goals for quality in pacification is vital.



Scheduling. The selection of calendar dates within which the task will be done, must be based on the time lapse estimates of the plan. Scheduling must involve consideration of the availability of men, machines, and materials for the specific project during that time. Schedules must fit into each other in terms of the use of shared resources. Local holidays, rice harvesting periods, and the rainy season are examples of scheduling factors in Vietnam. The planning and the scheduling functions are interdependent at all times. If the schedule cannot permit what the plan calls for, the plan must be changed. The schedule cannot vary the sequence of the work. There can be only one approved schedule for a plan at one time.

Evaluation of progress. The most dynamic function of the integrated system is the use of a continuous flow of relevant data on results and forecasts. The reports need not detail events that had been calculated in the plan and scheduled. It is only necessary to receive simple confirmation that the schedule is being fulfilled, or that it is not and for what reason. The system should be able to supply indicators showing future difficulties by evaluating problem points to determine their influence on other parts of the network.

Information that leads to revision of schedules for delivery of materials, training, and funding may affect other components in the network. Relevance, accuracy, and timeliness are essentials of integrated management reporting and evaluation.

### Pacification Operations and the Implementation Model

A PERT system in Vietnamese administration would be difficult if not impossible, given the inadequacies of administration, lack of coordinated command, and highly filtered communication between the provinces and the central government. Assuming these problems could be ameliorated, many other cautions would need to be taken. However, given the complex elements in pacification programming, an adequate implementation system is essential to meet the objectives.

If the specialists in charge of introducing the system attempted to mirror the complexities of computerized systems characteristic of the United States the effort would fail. The basic concepts could be applied, however, even at the lowest levels, using picture symbols to convey the sequential and coordinative aspects of a simple low level system. Compared to engineering programming in the United States the range of error in planning and estimation would be large--amid the unpredictabilities of the conflict and the less precise social factors affecting every facet of the system. However, PERT requirements for correlating all the events of the network and the allocation of resources to meet estimates for each activity would greatly increase planning accuracy over previous attempts. Most relevant, however, would be the flexibility of the system to adjust its planning errors made obvious as the campaign develops.

It is also true that a PERT-type system would probably be a very bad failure or a substantial success. It could not be done half-way. Again, this is precisely the character of program management essential in the pacification enterprise.

A large staff of inspectors and monitors at the beginning of the system would be essential to discourage false and irrelevant reporting--and slow decisionmaking in response to requests from the field.

The endemic tendency towards centralized planning and policy-making could lead to abuse of improved field control, inhibiting the limited but vital democratic participation of peasant communities in the choice and pacing of projects. Extra effort would be required to keep the two way flow essential for a truly responsive government apparatus.

With properly trained personnel and protection from elements threatened by the innovation, a PERT-type management system would bring unparalleled flexibility in the use of the meager manpower supply. Cadres and support personnel could be placed in the locations where extra effort was needed. More efficient and simplified flow systems for funding could gear releases to match the requirements of work plans approved by the year or quarter. The plan and its schedule would be a single blanket authorization for many of the routine budget items. The only changes of these items would be those requested through the reporting system. If an official was reticent

about reporting his failings, the funds and materials stacking up at his door by uncorrected schedules would remind everyone of his failure.

Thus, such an integrated implementation system would have the complementary virtues of automatic handling of routine budget matters, as well as the flexibility to develop revised policies, plans, and schedules where required.

The repeated failure of pacification programs can usually be explained by poor timing, unclear objectives, and uncoordinated use of resources. The undefended hamlet, whose trained men are without arms, its moats without fences, and its own radio safely stored in the district headquarters, could be avoided. The crucial confluence of activities into a single event (see Figure 28) that technically puts a hamlet on its own defensively must have received all the inputs of supporting networks or it only invites defeat. It is in tiny administrative failures like this that hamlet after hamlet has stepped away from the government side to the Viet-Cong.

Using Figure 28, the province-level schedulers could apply the prescribed sequence for establishing a security system to insure that sufficient arms and fence materials, etc. are supplied the village at the proper time. The province pacification bureau would visualize its larger scale province-wide tasks in a similar manner, treating each of the villages as part of a comprehensive security system for the province as a whole. If an aspect of the program was forced to be decelerated (such as




Figure 28. Sample Implementation Network:  
Hamlet Security System.

non-availability of fence materials or weapons) construction and training schedules could be revised and completion dates changed.

In the frightening context of unstable politics and Viet-Cong omnipresence, some form of comprehensive, coordinated, and reliable management implementation must be developed if the considerable resources of the Government and its allies are to be properly utilized. A PERT-type implementation system, if conscientiously applied in concert with other administrative changes, could be pivotal in the pacification enterprise.

## CHAPTER XVI

### CONCLUSION

This study has closed with the subject of research in medias res. It was that way three years ago when the study began. But there is a significant difference--from the American viewpoint. The Vietnam problem has become a virtual dictator of domestic and foreign policy. It has introduced the average American to his first sustained awareness of revolutionary war.

Inside the Government, Vietnam has helped focus attention on the need for a methodology and personnel to cope with the conflict. The conventional systems for economic and military assistance have revealed serious gaps in American preparedness for its role in Vietnam and similar conflicts.

While the United States has traditionally declared its public support of democratic institutions abroad, the concern for political development has been "a purpose without a policy."<sup>1</sup> The policy use of political development has been narrowly expressed in stopping communism or as a means to the furtherance of economic development.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Robert A. Packenham, "Political Development Doctrine in the American Foreign Aid Program," World Politics, XVIII (January, 1966), p. 210.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 213.

The failure to evolve and articulate an adequate raison d'être for political development raises deeper questions.

There is a question as to any serious American desire to share knowledge of its democratic institutions and expertise. Liberals and conservatives, often so passionately interested in the preservation of certain aspects of the free society for domestic consumption, have largely ignored an active American role in the fostering of democratic institutions. Too often the American role in Vietnam has been defended or rejected on the grounds of national pride and prestige rather than responsibility towards development of a free society.

Whatever the reasons for this failure in national purpose, the deeper meaning of the Vietnam problem may be its challenge to Americans to reexamine the gap between a love of their own democratic institutions at home and concern for the growth and survival of such institutions abroad. The knotty problems of pacification are intricately intertwined with the issues of political development and intimate American involvement. These pose a challenge to the thoughtful American to ask some basic questions of value and obligation--questions that transcend the easy legalisms of "self-determination" and "non-intervention."

What is the proper defense of democracy? Is there a better choice than purely military intervention or the once easily purchased coup d'état? The sophisticated methodology and quasi-religious motivation of communist insurgency are



pressing the West for a more sustained and creative response.

This is the larger context for the problem of pacification in Vietnam and the American role in its implementation.