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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (16 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674078

21 February 1968

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SUBJECT Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCOMARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSPOR OF within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIELD
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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14 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1967, RCS, CSFOR - 65, VIC MODEL AA (U)

accepted gains, 1,400 went to the 3d NVA Division, 600 to the 5th NVA Division, and 500 to the B3 Front. An additional 400 infiltrators are considered as possible gains for the 3d NVA Division.

(3) Enemy Losses During the Period.

August

<u>FORCES</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>*DOR DISABLED</u>	<u>VCC/NVA</u>	<u>INDIV WPNs</u>	<u>C/S WPNs</u>
US	545	191	134	135	6
PMARF	376	132	85	211	22
ARVN	566	198	157	130	10
Total	1,487	521	376	476	46

Net Change 392

September

<u>FORCES</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>*DOR DISABLED</u>	<u>VCC/NVA</u>	<u>INDIV WPNs</u>	<u>C/S WPNs</u>
US	539	188	127	227	8
PMARF	363	127	47	181	19
ARVN	530	186	137	164	0
Total	1,432	501	311	572	27

Net Change 173

October

<u>FORCES</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>*DOR DISABLED</u>	<u>VCC/NVA</u>	<u>INDIV WPNs</u>	<u>C/S WPNs</u>
US	624	218	147	280	31
PMARF	129	45	26	49	4
ARVN	367	128	88	196	9
Total	1,120	391	261	525	44

Net Change 213

*Based on MACV estimate that for every 100 enemy killed by body count, an additional 35 die of wounds or are permanently disabled.

(4) Enemy Strength within II CTZ as of 31 October 1967.

21,311
10,612
3,612
16,895
11,815
64,245

NVA Troops
VC Regulars
Administrative Service
Military (VC Irregulars)
Political Cadre
Total

f. LONG RANGE PATROL (LNP) COMPANY:

(1) ORGANIZATION:

(a) The organic I FFORCEV Long Range Patrol unit - Co E (LNP), 20th Inf - was activated 25 September 1967 by authority of USARV GO 4916, 26 September 1967. Organized under Modified Tables of

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Period Ending

Organization and Equipment (MTOE) 7-157B (Infantry Long Range Patrol Company - Field Force), the unit is authorized one officer and 21 enlisted men in addition to the eight officers and 200 enlisted men authorized by TOE 7-157B.

(b) Co B (LBP), 20th Inf, is organized to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition missions in the II CTZ; it has a limited capability for executing small scale combat raids.

(c) Based on USARV guidance, I PROCEV LOI 2-67 dated 23 September 1967, directed the commander of Co B (LBP), 20th Inf, to organize his unit from selected personnel of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, and pipeline personnel of the 14th AF Bde. Selection of personnel was to be accomplished by 15 October 1967; an additional 15-day period was authorized for personnel screening and replacement. On 31 October 1967 the unit was at 90% of authorized strength.

(d) Originally based at Phan Rang, Ninh Tam Province, RVN, Co B (LBP), 20th Inf, moved to Camp Bnari, Pleiku Province, RVN, closing on 22 October 1967. USARV GO 5271, 14 October 1967, attached the unit to HQ, 4th Inf Div, for administration and logistics, effective 15 October 1967.

(2) TRAINING:

(a) Organic: Upon assignment to the I PROCEV LBP Co, all personnel immediately entered a vigorous program of physical conditioning and instruction on subjects appropriate to combat operations in RVN. Since the unit's personnel are airborne qualified, and 38% have had combat experience, only refresher training on basic skills was required. Special emphasis was placed on sharpening individual qualification in map reading and jungle navigation. This one week training period was administered by platoon at the company base camp (originally at Phan Rang, and later, at Camp Bnari).

(b) Recardo: After the initial conditioning and training period, the 1st Patrol Platoon personnel attended the MACV Recardo School at the Trung, Thanh Hoa Province, RVN, for a period of two weeks. Here concentrated instruction was provided on ground patrol techniques, escape and evasion, mines and booby traps, sniping, tracking, small unit tactics, communications and aircraft entry and exit techniques. This platoon, consisting of one officer and 43 enlisted men, completed the Recardo School LRP course on 22 October 1967. On that date, the identically organized 4th Patrol Platoon arrived at the school for training.

(c) Advanced: LBP unit personnel completing the MACV Recardo School then began a specialized training program at the base camp or with active LRP units in II CTZ. Individual skills were refined to meet the high standards required in long range patrolling. This phase of training will continue until 1 December 1967, when the 1st Patrol Platoon becomes operational. As each successive platoon completes Recardo training, it will undergo the advanced training. The final company training objective is fully operational status for the four patrol platoons and supporting elements by 31 December 1967.

(3) TECHNIQUES OF TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT:

(a) The fact that Co B (LBP), 20th Inf, is not yet operational makes difficult any comprehensive discussion of tactical techniques. However, sufficient experience has been gained from major units under operational control (OPCON) of I PROCEV to arrive at con-

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