



# POW-MIA FACT BOOK



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JULY 1991

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.....	3
STATE LISTING OF UNACCOUNTED FOR SERVICEMEN.....	4
THE INDOCHINESE HOLD THE ANSWERS.....	5
ARE AMERICANS STILL HELD CAPTIVE IN INDOCHINA?.....	8
EVIDENCE OF CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL.....	9
THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT.....	12
U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING	15
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.....	24
"DOG TAG" REPORTS.....	27
JCRC MISSION STATEMENT.....	29
U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII.....	31
"OPERATION DESERT STORM".....	34
MISSING AND UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS FROM WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR	35



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301

AMERICAN PRISONERS AND MISSING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

As of July 1, 1991, there were 2,273 Americans still unaccounted for as a result of U.S. involvement in the conflict in Southeast Asia. A breakdown by country of loss follows:

INTRODUCTION

This fact book has been prepared in support of the U.S. Government effort to ensure that public awareness on the POW/MIA issue is based on current, factual information. It outlines the extent of the problem and summarizes U.S. Government efforts to resolve this humanitarian issue of national concern.

President Bush, his entire Administration, and a strong bipartisan consensus in the Congress are deeply committed to obtaining the fullest possible accounting for our POW/MIA. The President affirmed his commitment to achieving this objective when he stated:

*"We will do everything that a government can to recover the missing, and if we discover proof of captivity, we will take action to bring our men home."*

The establishment of the U.S. POW/MIA Office in Hanoi will, hopefully, lead to fuller disclosure by the Vietnamese on the fates of our missing servicemen and civilians. We are encouraged by the Lao Government's agreement to a year-round plan of expanded cooperation and we look forward to implementing the joint operations to which they have agreed.

These government-to-government activities are our best avenue for the return of any Americans who may still be held or the recovery of their remains to U.S. soil. These efforts are most effective when backed by a knowledgeable and united citizenry. It is in this spirit that we publish this fact book.

The President's words make clear that he considers resolution of this issue a matter of highest national priority, a commitment which is shared by the Department of Defense. We feel particular kinship with those who are still missing and are fully committed to achieving the goal of the fullest possible accounting. Our efforts will continue until we have reached that goal.

*Dick Cheney*

AMERICANS UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

COUNTRY OF LOSS	PW/MIA	KIA/BNR	TOTAL
North Vietnam	348	233	581
South Vietnam	450	625	1075
Laos	333	195	528
Cambodia	37	46	83
China	4	2	6
Total	1172	1101	2273

As categorized by their parent military service following Operation Homecoming in 1973, 1,259 men were officially listed as prisoners of war or missing in action, and 1,124 as killed in action/body not recovered. By the early 1980s, reviews of each loss incident by the parent services led to a presumptive finding of death in each case except one. That individual is listed as a prisoner of war as a symbolic gesture of the Administration's commitment to this issue. The presumptive findings of death, made for administrative and legal reasons, do not change the way the USG proceeds to determine their fate. We assume that at least some of those categorized as either POW or MIA could be alive, and those considered KIA/BNR as unaccounted for until their remains are returned.

U.S. LOSSES BY SERVICE COMPONENT

COMPONENT	PW/KIA	KIA/BNR	TOTAL
USA	357	319	676
USN	120	328	448
USMC	104	179	283
USAF	554	269	823
USCG	0	1	1
Civilian	37	5	42
Total	1172	1101	2273

## U.S. SERVICEMEN UNACCOUNTED FOR, BY STATE

Alabama - 42	Nebraska - 21
Alaska - 2	Nevada - 8
Arizona - 23	New Hampshire - 10
Arkansas - 26	New Jersey - 59
California - 227	New Mexico - 17
Colorado - 39	New York - 144
Connecticut - 37	North Carolina - 56
Delaware - 5	North Dakota - 16
District of Columbia - 9	Ohio - 113
Florida - 77	Oklahoma - 47
Georgia - 43	Oregon - 43
Hawaii - 10	Pennsylvania - 113
Idaho - 11	Rhode Island - 9
Illinois - 94	South Carolina - 30
Indiana - 66	South Dakota - 8
Iowa - 38	Tennessee - 42
Kansas - 35	Texas - 146
Kentucky - 21	Utah - 19
Louisiana - 29	Vermont - 4
Maine - 17	Virginia - 54
Maryland - 35	Washington - 55
Massachusetts - 55	West Virginia - 23
Michigan - 72	Wisconsin - 37
Minnesota - 41	Wyoming - 6
Mississippi - 18	Puerto Rico - 2
Missouri - 48	Virgin Islands - 1
Montana - 21	Other - 7

NOTE: Does not include 42 civilians

## THE INDOCHINESE HOLD THE ANSWERS

The U.S. Government has repeatedly urged the Indochinese governments to meet their humanitarian obligation to provide the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in their countries. While these governments assert that they hold no live Americans and have increased cooperation on accounting efforts, it is clear that the Indochinese governments, in varying degrees, have considerably more information on missing Americans than they have provided.

As a matter of highest national priority, the United States is committed to repatriating any Americans who may still be held captive, to obtaining the fullest possible accounting for Americans still missing in Southeast Asia and to the return of all recoverable remains.

Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV)

There is considerable evidence to indicate that the Vietnamese Government has knowledge concerning the fate of U.S. servicemen lost in Vietnam, especially over the northern part of the country, and in areas of Laos and Cambodia which were under the control of Vietnamese forces during the war. For instance, throughout the war a wealth of information on specific U.S. aircraft loss incidents was published by the SRV government controlled media. Further, public security, militia and regular military units established an effective nationwide ability to capture and process prisoners of war, investigate crashed aircraft, bury remains and report incidents to central authorities. Burial of an American prisoner, whether in the North or South, was to be reported to Hanoi as quickly as possible along with sketches of the burial site. In 1978, a Vietnamese mortician provided the U.S. with credible and convincing information on over 400 American remains which were warehoused in Hanoi; since that time, only 247 identifiable remains have been returned.

Lao Peoples Democratic Republic

As part of "Operation Homecoming" in early 1973, nine U.S. servicemen who had been captured in Laos were released in Hanoi. These men had not been captured by the Pathet Lao, but by Vietnamese soldiers operating in Laos. Later in 1973, a peace agreement was signed between the Royal Lao government and Pathet Lao forces. While the United States was not a signatory, the agreement specified conditions and provisions for the exchange of prisoners of war, regardless of nationality, and information on the missing. Publicly, the Pathet Lao had often stated that


they held scores of Americans; after signing the agreement, they claimed to hold only U.S. civilian pilot Emmet Kay, whom they had captured on May 7, 1973 and that the Central Committee had been gathering information on missing U.S. personnel, but cautioned that they could probably provide information on only a "feeble percentage." In 1978, the Lao Government provided the remains of four persons to a visiting congressional delegation. Two of the remains were determined to be those of indigenous Southeast Asians. One of the remaining two was identified as a USAF pilot whose plane was shot down on the Lao/Vietnam border; the fourth set of remains is still unidentified.

The Lao Government's failure to provide the U.S. with information on our missing servicemen can in part be explained by the fact that more than 80 percent of the Americans missing in Laos were lost in areas then under near-total control by Vietnamese forces. These losses were primarily in eastern Laos, along the Vietnam border and the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex. It is believed that the Vietnamese Government has records on these incidents and could account for many of these men. At U.S. urging, both the Vietnamese and Lao have agreed in principle to cooperate with us in an effort to resolve these cases.

#### Cambodia

In eastern Cambodia, where most missing Americans were lost, Vietnamese forces' presence and control were similar to that in eastern Laos, and most incidents involving U.S. personnel occurred in contact with Vietnamese forces. Vietnamese military records and reports should contain information on these Americans. It is doubtful that the current leadership in Phnom Penh can provide a significant accounting for Americans missing in Cambodia unless information in the possession of others was provided to them. Information on a small number of American civilians, including journalists who reportedly died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, may appear in records of that era.


The following map shows Vietnamese controlled areas of Laos and Cambodia during the war. The overwhelming majority of Americans missing in Laos were lost in areas controlled by the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops. This is also the case in Cambodia.



## ARE AMERICANS STILL HELD CAPTIVE IN INDOCHINA?

Only the communist governments of Indochina know the answer. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the loss incidents of some Americans, to include those we know were captured, the U.S. Government's efforts are predicated on the assumption that some are still alive. This position is bolstered by the failure of the Indochinese Governments, particularly Vietnam, to provide information and remains which could account for these individuals, as well as a continuing flow of refugee and other reporting.

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO PROVE THAT AMERICANS ARE STILL DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL, THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US PRECLUDES RULING OUT THAT POSSIBILITY. ACTIONS TO INVESTIGATE LIVE-SIGHTING REPORTS RECEIVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE NECESSARY PRIORITY AND RESOURCES BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AT LEAST SOME AMERICANS ARE STILL HELD CAPTIVE. SHOULD ANY REPORT PROVE TRUE, WE WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO ENSURE THE RETURN OF THOSE INVOLVED.



## EVIDENCE OF CAPTURE OF U.S. PERSONNEL

The following are examples of cases in which Americans were lost under circumstances in which the governments of Indochina should have information as to their fate. The capture of these men is substantiated by evidence such as post-capture photography, eyewitness reports, propaganda broadcasts, intelligence reports, etc. These cases represent only a sampling of Americans for whom we expect an accounting.

ROBERT ANDERSON  
USAF  
VIETNAM



EUGENE H. DEBRUIN  
CIVILIAN  
LAOS



DAVID HRDLICKA  
USAF  
LAOS



COL Anderson's F-4 aircraft was downed over North Vietnam on October 6, 1972. He and his back seater ejected and were in radio contact with rescue forces. Anderson said, "I have a good parachute, am in good shape and can see no enemy forces on the ground." Radio Hanoi reported the capture of a number of U.S. pilots that day, yet Anderson's plane was the only one lost. His back seater was immediately captured and released during "Operation Homecoming" the following year.

Captured in September 1963, DeBruin was photographed with his surviving crewmembers (all foreign nationals) and in later years was joined by other Americans. In 1966 one of the Americans and a Thai national successfully escaped from the Pathet Lao and provided information on DeBruin. The Lao Government has pledged to furnish the U.S. with a written report regarding his fate, but they have yet to provide that information.

After bailing out of his plane over Laos in May 1965, COL Hrdlicka was seen on the ground and a flight member circling above believed he saw the American being led away by his captors. Information obtained from nearby villagers and "ralliers" indicated Hrdlicka was a prisoner. His captivity was further substantiated by a photograph published in a Soviet newspaper and a May 1966 broadcast of a recording he allegedly made. The Lao Government has so far failed to live up to their 1986 promise to furnish a written report on information they might have on Hrdlicka.

PHILIP TERRILL  
JAMES SALLEY  
USA  
VIETNAM



In March 1971 Viet Cong and Hanoi radio broadcasts recounting the capture of two Americans appears to describe the circumstances surrounding the loss of SP5 Terrill and MSGT Salley. In addition to sighting reports of the two men, their status was confirmed by former U.S. POWs who said both men died after capture. Salley was on the Viet Cong died in captivity list, but Terrill was not.



CHARLES SHELTON  
USAF  
LAOS



LAWRENCE HOLLAND  
USAF  
VIETNAM



COL Shelton was in radio contact with nearby aircraft and indicated that he was in good condition, on the ground, after having ejected from his disabled jet. A villager reported that he witnessed Shelton's April 1965 capture and subsequent "rallier" reports substantiated the Air Force officer's status. COL Shelton is the only American servicemen the U.S. Government still lists as a POW; this is for symbolic purposes as intelligence reports indicate that he and Hrdlicka died in captivity in the mid-1960s. As in the cases of DeBruin and Hrdlicka, the Lao Government has yet to provide the official report which was promised in 1986.

On June 12, 1965, MAJ Holland's F-100D aircraft was downed by ground fire. He ejected and was seen landing near a village in South Vietnam. A helicopter was sent to the location, but rescuers were unable to get to Holland due to gunfire. They did see his limp body being dragged away. Subsequent information indicates that Holland was killed by Viet Cong soldiers after he opened fire on them. He was reportedly buried in the immediate vicinity of the incident; however, the Vietnamese have furnished no information on him.

DONALD SPARKS  
USA  
VIETNAM



PFC Sparks was captured on June 17, 1969, when his patrol engaged in a firefight in South Vietnam. Sparks and another soldier were wounded, and as the members of the patrol withdrew, they saw North Vietnamese Army personnel stripping Sparks of his clothing and weapon. The following day a U.S. patrol returned to the ambush site and recovered the body of the other American, but there was no sign of Sparks. Almost a year later two letters written by Sparks on April 11, 1970, were found on a Viet Cong soldier. In the letters, which were determined to be authentic, the young soldier mentioned that he had received a foot wound, but it was healed. He added that he had not seen another American during his ten months in captivity. Three Americans released during "Operation Homecoming" reported that in the spring of 1970, while enroute to a new camp in the same province where Sparks was lost, a Vietnamese guard mentioned that a POW named "Don" was moving slowly because of a wounded foot, but would soon join them. "Don" never arrived at the camp.

SOLOMON H. GODWIN  
USMC  
VIETNAM



WO1 Solomon Godwin was captured in Hue on February 5, 1968 during the beginning of the Tet offensive. WO1 Godwin was detained in the hills outside Hue until July 1968, when he and another American PW, who returned during Operation Homecoming in 1973, began their journey to North Vietnam. WO1 Godwin's health was deteriorating rapidly and he died during the march northward. The returned PW was told to sign a document verifying that WO1 Godwin died on 25 July 1968. The place of death was also recorded on this document, although it was illegible to the surviving American.

## THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Efforts to resolve the POW/MIA issue have varied depending upon the priority placed on the issue by the U.S. Government, the international political situation at the time and Vietnam's perception of self-interest in responding to these and internal political developments. Success in accounting for all U.S. personnel missing in Vietnam, as well as over 80% of those missing\* in Laos and Cambodia, depends primarily upon the seriousness of Vietnam's cooperation. For this reason, the following brief chronology describes the political environment affecting the level of Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue:

1976-1978: After the end of the war, Vietnam's objective was to be accepted in international fora, such as the United Nations. For example, in 1977, when the U.S. opted not to veto their UN membership, the Vietnamese responded by suddenly repatriating the remains of more than 20 Americans. At the same time, U.S. - Vietnamese negotiations were exploring the possibility of normalizing relations; however, this was later scuttled by Vietnamese demands for war reparations and their invasion of Cambodia. U.S. policy at the time was that accounting for missing Americans was "a hoped for by-product" of the normalization process.

1978-1982: Following the breakdown of normalization talks, contact with Vietnamese officials virtually halted, as did the return of remains and any form of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

1982-Present: The U.S. made clear that resolution of the POW/MIA issue was a humanitarian matter that rested on international standards and that it was in Vietnam's interest to treat it that way, regardless of the state of U.S./SRV diplomatic relations. It was also made clear that the U.S. domestic environment, absent such treatment, would dictate that the pace and scope of U.S./SRV relations would be directly affected by cooperation on this issue. In April of this year, greater specificity was given to this policy through a "roadmap" of concrete steps that could be taken by the U.S. in response to SRV cooperation that would enhance the pace and scope of our overall relationship.


Laos: The United States maintained diplomatic relations with Laos throughout the war and since. Since 1982, U.S. policy has been to work toward upgrading the bilateral relationship; the principal measure of Lao sincerity in that process was to be their cooperation to resolve the POW/MIA issue. This policy was amended in 1985 to include steps to counter production and

trafficking of narcotics. Since the initial stages, the Lao Government has significantly improved the level of POW/MIA and counter-narcotics actions, and the U.S. has sought to respond by providing humanitarian assistance to the Lao people within legal and policy constraints.

Cambodia: Immediately after the end of the war, there was no dialogue and no interaction between the U.S. and officials in Phnom Penh. The tragic situation which evolved in Cambodia, including the Khmer Rouge takeover in 1978, their subsequent overthrow by the Vietnamese which installed the Heng Samrin regime and the still unresolved conflict combine to form a set of negative political circumstances. Since nearly 85% of the 83 Americans listed as missing in Cambodia were lost in areas then controlled by the Vietnamese, there is some hope that Vietnamese records and personnel may have relevant information.

The chart on the next page illustrates the number of remains returned and identified as Americans by year and by country from which they were returned.

# 310 U.S. REMAINS RETURNED AFTER 1973



## U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING

United States Government policy regarding the POW/MIA issue is coordinated through the POW/MIA Interagency Group (IAG). Membership in the IAG includes the Defense Department, the White House National Security Council (NSC) staff, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National League of POW/MIA Families. The IAG develops policy concerning the POW/MIA issue, monitors implementation and assesses current efforts, while evaluating new initiatives and approaches to expedite the fullest possible accounting.

Most Americans felt that with the signing of the agreements ending the war in Indochina, accounting for our missing countrymen would finally begin. The then Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), North Vietnam, was expected to honor Article 8 of the Paris Agreement which specifically provided for repatriating POWs from all sides, as well as exchanging information about the missing and returning the remains of those who died. These points were conditional only on the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from Vietnam. The agreement ending the war in Laos had less specific articles which pertained to repatriating and accounting for POWs and MIAs of all nationalities.

To implement Article 8, the Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was established. Prior to the fall of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, under the auspices of the FPJMT, numerous meetings were held where the U.S. negotiators continually pressed for information on the missing. During this same period, despite the lack of cooperation from the Vietnamese communists, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), augmented by members of the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CIL), Thailand, and other units, were able to conduct limited searches. These efforts halted in December 1973, when a search party visiting a pre-announced site was ambushed by communist forces and an American was killed. During March 1974, North Vietnam returned the remains of 23 U.S. servicemen who died in captivity.

In the first six years after the fall of the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. Government officials had intermittent and largely unproductive contacts with the Vietnamese on this issue. The House of Representatives established the Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia which, during its 15 month tenure (1975-76), had several contacts with the Vietnamese in Hanoi, Paris, and the United Nations. In 1977, President Carter appointed Leonard Woodcock to head a Presidential commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. This commission visited both Vietnam and Laos to discuss the POW/MIA issue. It was during their March 1977 visit that the Vietnamese

\* As of July 1, 1991

first announced that they had established an office to seek information on missing Americans and to recover remains. In addition, Vietnamese officials visited the JCRC and CIL in Hawaii in July 1975; technical level meetings were held in Hanoi in October, 1980 and May, 1981.

#### Stepped Up Efforts

To implement President Reagan's 1982 decision to make resolution of the POW/MIA issue a matter of the highest national priority, a position since reiterated by President Bush, the United States Government has consistently utilized all available diplomatic avenues to persuade the governments of Vietnam and Laos, as well as the current leadership in Cambodia, to cooperate fully on this humanitarian issue. In addition to emphasizing the humanitarian nature of the problem, we have stressed that it is in our mutual interest to resolve the POW/MIA issue in a timely and comprehensive manner.

Progress has been painfully slow, punctuated by periods of cooperation and halts, primarily due to Vietnamese attempts to use the issue for political advantage. Nevertheless, our policy of separating this and other humanitarian issues from political questions has produced concrete results.

Over the past ten years, senior U.S. officials have met with Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) officials on 20 occasions seeking to establish the necessary level of cooperation on the POW/MIA issue and other urgent humanitarian concerns. In addition, 32 technical-level meetings were held, and 13 joint field operations have been conducted. For the first five years, the Vietnamese promised more cooperation than they delivered. Despite verbal agreements to separate humanitarian issues from political ones, the Vietnamese often tied pledges of POW/MIA cooperation to political questions. Whether this pattern was due to internal political differences or a calculated strategy to exploit this issue in a mistaken belief that U.S. concessions on political questions would be possible, the result was the same -- the raised hopes of the American people and the POW/MIA families were dashed, and Vietnam's image in the United States suffered.

Each policy or technical meeting was important in its own right; the meetings described below were key in furthering the effort.

In February 1982, a U.S. policy-level delegation held talks in Hanoi which resulted in SRV agreement to hold four technical meetings a year between the U.S. JCRC/CILHI and the SRV Office for Seeking Missing Persons. The first meeting was not held until December 1982, with the second coming in March 1983, and the third in June 1983. The Vietnamese then interrupted the schedule.

In October 1983, White House and National League of Families officials met in New York with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Discussions focused on overcoming obstacles to advance serious, high-level negotiations between the two governments and lay the groundwork for future cooperation.

A policy level delegation, led by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and comprised of officials from the White House, League of Families, State and Defense, traveled to Hanoi in February 1984. Agreement was reached to accelerate cooperation and de-link the POW/MIA issue from U.S. - Vietnamese relations in other areas. Hanoi also agreed to focus initial efforts on the "most accessible cases in the Hanoi/Haiphong area" and those listed as having died in captivity in southern Vietnam. A technical meeting was held in August. In October, U.S. Government and League of Families representatives met again with Foreign Minister Thach in New York. He renewed and strengthened the February commitments and agreed to set an early date for the next technical meeting, held later that month in Vietnam.

Following a March 1985, policy-level delegation to Hanoi, a delegation in August, led by a member of the White House staff, returned to discuss Hanoi's announced agreement to resolve the POW/MIA issue within two years. Prior to the delegation's arrival, the U.S. presented a proposed joint plan to accomplish that objective, which would have concluded with nationwide joint investigations of live sighting reports, surveys and excavations. The U.S. plan also provided an extensive list of U.S. supporting actions. Vietnamese officials did not react to the joint plan, but provided their own plan and requested U.S. reaction. In September, a follow-up meeting was held in New York at which time the U.S. provided comments on Vietnam's two-year work plan. The SRV agreed for the first time to a joint crash site excavation, which occurred in November, 1985. In addition, six technical meetings took place that year.

In January 1986, a high level U.S. Government delegation went to Hanoi where senior Vietnamese officials reaffirmed that the POW/MIA issue is a humanitarian one and reiterated their pledge to resolve the issue within two years. They also agreed to investigate any POW live-sighting information that the U.S. might present. While a technical meeting took place in Hanoi in February, the Vietnamese postponed the planned April meeting to protest U.S. Government retaliatory actions against Libya to counter international terrorism. The delayed technical talks, subsequently held in June, provided a forum for ongoing Vietnamese criticism of the U.S. for not fulfilling its commitments to the Vietnamese plan.

A May 1986 policy level meeting with the Vietnamese in New York was followed by a June technical meeting and a White House-led interagency delegation to Hanoi in July. This group met

with Foreign Minister Thach to formalize U.S. commitments to support Vietnam's unilateral two-year plan, but rejected any political linkage. The meeting also resulted in agreements that technical talks would be held in August and October; that at least six such meetings would be held per year; that U.S. and SRV forensic specialists would consult in Vietnam; and that the SRV would provide the U.S. with written results of its investigations into reports of live sightings. Moreover, the SRV agreed to permit U.S. experts to accompany its officials on investigations in accessible areas, discuss specific crash sites for excavation and accepted an invitation to visit the U.S. technical facilities at the JCRC and CIL in Hawaii. While the August and October technical meetings did take place, the Vietnamese began publicly to back away from some of their commitments.

In January 1987, U.S. proposals for technical discussions in Hanoi were rejected by the Vietnamese, as was a similar proposal the following month. In an effort to increase momentum for resolving this pressing humanitarian issue, President Reagan named former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA (Ret.), as Special Presidential Emissary to Hanoi for POW/MIA Affairs. Following difficult negotiations to establish an agreed upon agenda, General Vessey led an IAG delegation to Hanoi in August, 1987.

During these meetings, General Vessey obtained agreement to resume and expand cooperation on POW/MIA and other humanitarian issues of mutual concern. The two sides reaffirmed the need to focus first on discrepancy cases and on Americans listed as having died in captivity in South Vietnam. Representative case files were provided for Vietnamese consideration. General Vessey also indicated that the U.S. could not consider direct aid to Vietnam due to existing law but would address within policy and legal constraints certain humanitarian concerns of the Vietnamese people, specifically by encouraging American non-governmental organizations to provide prosthetics assistance to Vietnam's disabled. This was later expanded to encompass child health and survival assistance.

General Vessey continued to maintain contact with Vietnamese officials and in September 1987 led a delegation to New York for a meeting with Vietnam's Vice Foreign Minister to discuss the progress on commitments made the previous month. Two technical meetings in Hanoi, between U.S. representatives and their Vietnamese counterparts, also took place before the end of 1987.

In 1988, Vietnam agreed to initiate joint field investigations aimed at resolving "compelling" cases that General Vessey had previously provided and to expand their unilateral efforts. This agreement in principle was reached during a June meeting in New York between a U.S. delegation, led by General Vessey and Vietnam's Foreign Minister Thach. It was followed by a Vietnamese return visit to the JCRC and CIL

facilities in Hawaii, where they were briefed on technical and forensic capabilities to enhance the accounting effort. During the July technical meeting in Hanoi, the Vietnamese presented proposals for the joint activities and, at a subsequent meeting, agreed to begin the joint investigations on 25 September. In all, six technical talks on the POW/MIA issue were held in 1988, and unilateral remains repatriations by the Vietnamese significantly increased. A separate U.S. team continued to meet with the Vietnamese to address their humanitarian concerns. Further, there were three 10-day periods of joint investigations, along with a visit by a U.S. forensic team to examine remains unilaterally made available by the Vietnamese.

Throughout 1989, the joint investigative efforts continued in Vietnam, five in all, along with four technical meetings and additional visits by the U.S. forensic team. Concrete results from the joint investigations were disappointing. In another attempt to improve the pace of results, General Vessey again led an IAG delegation to Hanoi in October. These discussions resulted in agreements which, if seriously implemented by the Vietnamese, would expedite resolution of the issue.

Activities in 1990 followed along the lines of 1989, with a technical meeting in January followed by two periods of joint investigations in February and May. On September 29th, Secretary of State James Baker and Minister Thach met in New York. During the meeting Secretary Baker stressed the need for rapid POW/MIA progress and agreed to permit Thach and a Vietnamese delegation to travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with General Vessey and the POW/MIA Interagency Group. On October 17, 1990 a Vietnamese delegation, headed by Vietnam's Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, met in Washington, D.C. with General Vessey, and senior U.S. representatives. At this meeting, Minister Thach agreed to all U.S. proposals, to include improved cooperative planning for joint investigations, increased unilateral remains repatriations and serious cooperation to locate and make available wartime documents and records. Thach also agreed to assist in facilitating access to witnesses to incidents of loss and to military units involved in operations in which U.S. personnel were captured or casualties occurred. He agreed to additional military participation in the joint activities and to allow the U.S. teams to stay on-site until thorough investigations of selected cases are completed.

On April 19 and 20, 1991, General Vessey again led an IAG delegation to Hanoi to meet with Minister Thach and other Vietnamese officials. At these discussions, General Vessey reviewed the progress in implementing steps agreed upon in their October, 1990 meeting. Both governments agreed that a temporary POW/MIA office would be established in Hanoi to facilitate rapid resolution of unresolved cases of missing U.S. personnel and provide an administrative and logistics support base for all POW/MIA activities in Vietnam. The office will also facilitate and/or conduct investigations of live sighting reports, conduct

information research, and assist the Vietnamese in unilateral remains repatriations. The office is scheduled to be formally opened in July of 1991.

Though progress on accounting for the missing has been slow, the results are measurable. In all, since General Vessey and Foreign Minister Thach first met in August 1987, 16 technical meetings have been held, and 13 joint activities have been conducted. During the period from August 1987 to the present, the Vietnamese unilaterally repatriated remains which resulted in accounting for 119 Americans. Five remains recovered during joint investigations have also been identified as Americans.

#### LAOS

Our sustained effort to obtain the cooperation of the Lao Government has met with increased success. A visit by the National League of Families in September 1982 was followed by several high level U.S. - Lao meetings in 1983 and 1984. These discussions resulted in two visits by the JCRC, the first in Laos since 1975. During the second visit, JCRC and CILHI representatives surveyed the requirements to excavate a crash site in southern Laos. After a substantial delay due to Lao Government objections to a purported private cross-border foray, an unprecedented joint operation took place in February 1985, in which a U.S. - Lao team conducted a full-scale excavation of a U.S. Air Force AC-130 aircraft shot down near Pakse, Laos. The team recovered human remains and some personal effects which resulted in accounting for the 13 men missing in the incident. This first excavation was a major step in efforts to develop a sustained pattern of cooperation with the Lao Government on the POW/MIA issue. It was conducted with excellent cooperation by Lao officials.

In addition to regular diplomatic dialogue through the U.S. Charge, numerous high-level POW/MIA meetings with the Lao occurred during 1985-86, including discussions in New York and Vientiane, Laos. In July 1985, Laos agreed in principle to a second excavation during the coming dry season, and in September of that year Lao representatives traveled to Hawaii for an orientation, briefings and consultations with Department of Defense, JCRC and CIL technical personnel.

The following February, a joint excavation was conducted of an AC-130 which was shot down in March 1972, in Savannakhet Province, southern Laos. The aircraft had a crew of 14 on board and, although this site had obviously been disturbed, a significant quantity of remains and personal effects was recovered. Thus far, as a result of detailed forensic and anthropological examination by the CIL, nine of the Americans who died in the crash have been individually identified.

During July 1986 policy-level discussions in Vientiane, the Lao agreed to provide written reports on their investigations of

several unaccounted for Americans and to consider other unilateral activities. In August 1987, following the Vessey mission to Hanoi, an IAG delegation met in Vientiane. At this meeting the Lao agreed to expand POW/MIA cooperation, and the U.S. Government acknowledged the humanitarian problems of Laos, agreeing to address and respond to them where possible and to encourage private humanitarian organizations increase their efforts as well.

The following year, numerous policy-level discussions were held in Washington D.C., New York and Vientiane, resulting in increased humanitarian cooperation. In May and December of 1988, joint surveys and excavations were conducted. The Lao Government representatives made a December visit to the JCRC and CIL facilities in Hawaii to gain better understanding of the technical process of accounting for POW/MIA.

In January 1989, a White House-led IAG delegation traveled to Vientiane for policy-level discussions with the Lao Foreign Minister and Vice Foreign Minister on POW/MIA and other bilateral issues. The Lao agreed in principle to the need for investigating cases of U.S. personnel last known alive in Lao control and committed to a year-round work plan and excavation of two crash sites. This was followed by Lao - U.S. consultations in Vientiane in which the work plan and joint recovery operations were discussed. Two joint excavations were subsequently conducted in March and May. In early November, a State Department led IAG delegation reached agreement in principle to an expanded joint program of activities for 1990. During the remainder of the year, several successful joint surveys took place.

In February of 1990, agreements were reached between the U.S. and Laos to broaden the level and scope of POW/MIA cooperation. Plans included conducting the first joint investigations into cases of Americans known to be alive in Pathet Lao captivity during the war, expanded survey/recovery operations into areas of Laos previously not accessible to the U.S., continuation of the large-scale joint excavations and agreement in principle to three-way (Lao/US/DRV) cooperation in an effort to resolve incidents of Americans missing in areas of Laos under control of Vietnamese forces at the time of loss. Important to the broadened cooperation was the Lao Government's commitment to permit joint activities in areas of Laos not previously open to U.S. officials. In 1990, three joint excavations and numerous site surveys were conducted.

In meetings with Lao ministerial officials during a 4-6 December 1990 trip to Vientiane, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (PDASD/ISA) Carl Ford emphasized the advances in Lao cooperation on the POW/MIA and counter-narcotics issues, the possibilities for provision of humanitarian assistance by the Department of Defense and the progress in U.S.-Lao relations in recent years.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phoun Sipaseuth responded positively to Mr. Ford's presentation and reiterated his Government's desire to continue improved cooperation on POW/MIA and counter-narcotics activities.

Carried over from the 1990 year-round program, the first investigation into incidents involving Americans last known to be held in Pathet Lao control occurred in early 1991. During April, 1991, PDASD/ISA Ford met in Vientiane with senior Lao officials. The purpose of the meeting was to present to the Lao a significantly expanded POW/MIA program for the remainder of 1991, as well as a U.S. Government proposal to address Lao humanitarian concerns. If fully implemented, the POW/MIA proposals agreed to by the Lao will expand both the level of activity and access to areas throughout Laos in which incidents occurred. Activities will include further joint investigations of discrepancy cases, small scale joint surveys and recoveries and joint crash site excavations.

So far in 1991, two joint excavations have been conducted, bringing to 13 the total number of site recovery operations since 1983. In response to Lao humanitarian concerns, the Department of Defense has provided in excess of 30 tons of humanitarian medical supplies and has constructed a five room school in a remote Lao province.

#### CAMBODIA

As in Laos, over 80% of the 83 Americans listed as unaccounted for in Cambodia were lost in areas controlled by Vietnamese forces. In addition, the tragic dislocation and chaos which have been inflicted on the Cambodian peoples have severely complicated the task of resolving these cases.

In January 1984, officials in Phnom Penh joined the SRV and LPDR in issuing an Indochina Foreign Ministers Communiqué indicating willingness to cooperate with the United States on the POW/MIA issue. Between February 1984 and July 1986, the United States repeatedly asked the Vietnamese and Lao to urge the Phnom Penh regime to resolve the issue of Americans unaccounted for in Cambodia. Similar appeals for intervention were made through international humanitarian channels and the National League of Families; however no positive response was received.

In September 1987, after earlier receiving from the National League of Families case files on all Americans missing in Cambodia, Phnom Penh Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Hun Sen publicly stated that his government had more than 82 remains of Americans. The United States responded by asking an international organization represented in Cambodia to pursue this matter directly with Phnom Penh.

Through subsequent exchanges initiated by Senator Charles Robb and the National League of Families, Phnom Penh finally agreed in 1990 to accept a U.S. team of forensic specialists to examine 28 remains and 6 were repatriated to the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii, for further study. It now appears that none of the remains are Americans.

The U.S. has continued to seek Hanoi's cooperation in resolving the fates of Americans in which losses occurred in Vietnamese controlled areas of Cambodia. It is hoped that current momentum toward achieving a political settlement will succeed in returning peace to the Cambodian people and also enable the U.S. to find answers on Americans still unaccounted for in that country.

In summary, significant strides have been made in recent years, and the fates of some men have been resolved, but there is still much work to be done. Though all involved are frustrated with the pace, the U.S. Government is pursuing every available avenue to determine if Americans are still held captive, to account for the missing and to resolve this issue in the shortest time possible.

## INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

### Wartime Activities

With the 1964 buildup of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia, a regular flow of captured documents, as well as enemy POWs, and refugee interrogation reports developed. In early 1966, the Intelligence Community increased the emphasis on collecting information on POWs and MIAs. U.S. installations and organizations worldwide became involved in obtaining information.

Following Hanoi's June 1966 announcement that captured airmen would be tried for war crimes, intelligence efforts were intensified. A network of debriefing and interrogation centers was developed to coordinate with local governmental intelligence agencies in Vietnam and Laos. Sources were debriefed, or interrogated in depth, on information they possessed. The scope of the worldwide effort was expanded to include collection of all media coverage and photographs of POWs, and communist radio broadcasts were carefully monitored for information.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established in late 1961, was assigned a limited responsibility for POW/MIA analysis until mid-1966. After that time, DIA's role expanded, and the following year the Agency assumed chairmanship of the Interagency POW Intelligence ad hoc Committee. In December 1971, DIA chaired the Defense Department's Intelligence Task Force which supervised the worldwide intelligence efforts focused on the POW/MIA problem and expedited communication with the policy makers. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in April 1975 resulted in a vast reduction in the level of field reporting assets and severely restricted access to key geographic locations.

### Current Efforts

In 1982, renewed high level emphasis on resolving the POW/MIA issue resulted in intelligence collection priorities being raised. The U.S. intelligence community affords top priority to gathering and analyzing data which could relate to Americans missing in Indochina. DIA is the focal point for POW/MIA intelligence and the number of authorized personnel in their Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action has been increased threefold and is augmented by U.S. intelligence assets and resources throughout the world.

Indochinese refugees continue to be a major source of POW/MIA reporting. Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, we have acquired more than 13,400 reports associated with the issue of

missing Americans. Only 11 percent of the total - 1,473 reports - relate to sightings of individuals believed to be Americans; however, 94 percent of these have been resolved in that they correlate to individuals who have since been accounted for. Another 25 percent have proven to be fabrications on the part of the source. Of the remaining sighting reports, 3 percent (44 reports) relate to individuals described in a captive environment. These take under priority investigation in an effort to confirm the information. The other 3 percent (less than 50 reports) relate information on individuals who appear to be living freely in Indochina. The balance of the refugee information - nearly 12,000 reports (89 percent) - relates to "dog tag" reporting (46 percent), as well as crash and grave site information from the war years (25 percent), and hearsay reports of living Americans (18 percent).

DIA has primary responsibility for evaluating sighting reports of possible living Americans, and in recent years formed a special team to carry out collection and debriefing efforts. Largely focused on interviewing potential sources of firsthand sighting reports, team members are located in refugee camps throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Collection and follow-up actions are also conducted throughout the Defense Attaché system, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, U.S. embassies worldwide and DIA or other military organizations. With the opening of the temporary U.S. POW/MIA office in Hanoi, a senior DIA analyst will be included on the staff along with the JCRC and CILHI personnel. The DIA representative will spearhead in-country investigation of sighting reports and U.S. research efforts to gain access to relevant documents in Vietnamese archives which can assist us in resolving cases and in achieving the fullest possible accounting.

All POW/MIA intelligence information is channeled into DIA for analysis. Any reporting which can possibly be correlated to a missing man, regardless of its substance or reliability, is provided to the individual's parent service for prompt transmittal to the next-of-kin.

### The Intelligence Role in the Joint Investigation Process

As a result of the joint investigations ongoing in Vietnam, and those more recently initiated in Laos, we have the opportunity to obtain new information which may relate to our missing men. Detailed field reports on each case are generated by JCRC and CILHI investigators and forwarded to DIA for analysis. The investigative process proceeds on the assumption that the individual is alive and continues until the man is located alive or evidence is obtained which confirms his death. Investigations and negotiations continue until remains are recovered or determined not likely to be recoverable.

In analyzing the information obtained, it is first compared with data in U.S. files reflecting the known facts of the specific incident. The information received from local eyewitnesses is evaluated as to credibility, plausibility, cohesiveness of the source's account and the amount of information supplied. From this, analysts identify what more is needed and recommend follow-up investigation; often this results in a request that the Vietnamese furnish data from their files. If the evidence indicates that the missing man is dead, absolute proof of death is sought and the possibility of remains recovery is assessed and pursued. A case is not considered resolved until the man is returned alive, his identifiable remains are returned or the U.S. obtains convincing information as to why neither is possible. In all cases, clear and convincing evidence must be obtained before a judgment is rendered.

Despite the many reports received and the technical means available, no single report or combination of reports and technical sensors has thus far offered conclusive proof that Americans remain in captivity. Nevertheless, the knowledge that some of the missing initially survived their loss incident, combined with the fact that we do not know what the next report may bring, precludes ruling out the possibility that some Americans may be alive in Indochina.

#### "DOG TAG REPORTS"

Over the past decade, one type of report has been received most often by the Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing In Action. These accounts are referred to as "dog tag" reports. Since mid-1982, over 5,100 of these reports have been received, and more arrive daily.

In most "dog tag" reports, a person or persons -- many of them residents of Vietnam -- claim to possess the remains of one or more Americans. As proof, they offer data copied from military identification tags ("dog tags"), tracings or photographs of "dog tags", authentic "dog tags" or other identification documents. Almost 3,800 U.S. military men have been named in these reports. Of these, 90 percent served in Southeast Asia and returned alive to the U.S. Another 6 percent were killed, but their bodies were recovered, identified and returned to the U.S. for burial. Thus, it is impossible that their remains are held by the people claiming to have them. Only 4 percent of the "dog tag" reports name an American who is missing, suggesting that his remains or personal effects have been recovered from a battlefield or crash site. However, the evidence indicates it is unlikely that these items were recovered by private citizens.

In many cases, several different people claim to have the remains and/or personal effects of each of the named men. Frequently, sources profess to have recovered the same items on a different date or at a different location. This indicates that the people did not recover data from battlefields or crash sites. For instance, two of the men whose remains and dog tags several persons claim to have found, are in fact former POWs who returned alive -- their "dog tags" had been kept by their captors.

Further, throughout the war the communists enforced a policy to find and bury Americans killed in action and to send to central authorities a report of the burial site along with the personal effects and identification taken from the body. They continually stressed that this was important to the "political struggle." Thus, the Government of Vietnam should have knowledge of the missing men whose names have appeared in "dog tag" reports.

Often there are tragic aspects to the "dog tag" reports. Many of the sources have been led to believe that possession of American remains will be financially rewarded or assist in their resettlement in the U.S. This has prompted some people to pay for the "dog tag" data. In fact, the U.S. provides no rewards

or assistance for POW/MIA information, maintaining that resolution of this issue is a humanitarian matter. Offering such rewards could serve only to exacerbate these problems.

Considering the policy and practices of the Vietnamese Government to collect information material evidence on U.S. casualties, coupled with the patterns in the "dog tag" reporting, the evidence indicates that the majority of these reports reflect information and personal effects recovered by Vietnamese forces, not private citizens. Years of investigation and analysis have shown that the "dog tag" reports have been instigated by elements of the Vietnamese Government in an effort to influence and exploit the POW/MIA issue. Nevertheless, each report is carefully analyzed to determine its validity.

#### JCRC MISSION STATEMENT

The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) is the only government organization which has as its sole mission resolving the status of U.S. military and civilian personnel who remain unaccounted for as a result of the Southeast Asian conflict. The JCRC was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1973 and is under the operational control of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command.

From its headquarters at Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii, and a liaison office at the American Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand, the JCRC staff of 36 personnel performs specialized functions which are fundamental to achieving the fullest possible accounting for Americans missing in Southeast Asia. The JCRC headquarters staff consists of casualty data, negotiation assistance and operations specialists. Linguists fluent in one or more Southeast Asian languages also serve on the Headquarters and the Liaison Office staffs.

JCRC linguists take the first steps toward casualty resolution by obtaining information on unaccounted for personnel. The linguists are also skilled interviewers who visit refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Macau to interview refugees who have fled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. They prepare over 900 initial interview reports annually. Casualty data analysts identify crash and grave sites of missing Americans and attempt to determine whether Americans are still held captive in Southeast Asia by correlating the refugee reports with data contained in case files of unaccounted for personnel.

The Commander, JCRC, along with the Commander, CILHI and specialists from both organizations meet several times each year with officials of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in a technical exchange of POW/MIA information and analyses. The technical meetings are devoted solely to discussing issues concerning unaccounted for Americans. Discussion materials are prepared by JCRC and DIA for coordination and approval by the POW/MIA Interagency Group. Since September 1988, the meetings have provided a forum for obtaining greater SRV cooperation and evaluating the results of joint investigations in scheduled locations throughout Vietnam.

Accompanied by SRV officials, the linguists/interviewers gather information from Vietnamese officials and citizens who may have knowledge of missing Americans. These ongoing investigations are an important step toward resolving the status of Americans unaccounted for in Vietnam. Team members also survey potential crash and grave sites for future remains-recovery operations.

With regard to recovery efforts in Laos, the Lao agreed in January 1989 to a year-round program of cooperation. By mid-1989, JCRC and CILHI experts had conducted multiple site surveys and two recovery operations at helicopter crash sites. Operations in Laos have expanded measurably since the first joint excavation in February, 1985. If fully implemented, the 1991 POW/MIA program agreed to earlier this year offers the potential for significant progress.

JCRC operations personnel plan and direct the recovery operations and investigations in Laos and Vietnam. These activities require special airlift, field communications, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, and logistics support. All recovery operations are conducted in close coordination with, and support from, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory. JCRC is also the primary agency for repatriating to U.S. soil remains recovered in Southeast Asia. As part of each such event, JCRC personnel plan and conduct ceremonies to honor appropriately those who died serving our nation.

Achieving the fullest possible accounting of missing Americans will continue to require the concerted efforts of all involved agencies. The JCRC will continue to play a central role in this effort by collecting and analyzing POW/MIA data, engaging in technical discussions with Southeast Asian governments, and conducting field investigations and recovery operations.



## U.S. ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, HAWAII (CILHI)

During the Vietnam conflict, identification of the remains of service members killed in Southeast Asia was the responsibility of the two mortuaries in Vietnam, located in Saigon and Da Nang. In March 1973, during the withdrawal of US military personnel from Vietnam, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) was established at Camp Samae San, Thailand, to assume responsibility for search, recovery, and identification of remains of US service members killed in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. In May 1976, the CIL was relocated to Honolulu, Hawaii, and is currently a field element of the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center of the Total Army Personnel Agency in Alexandria, Virginia. The unit has an authorized strength of 30 military and 12 Department of the Army civilians.

After relocation, the mission was expanded as follows:

- Conducts search and recovery (S&R) operations in the Pacific area for World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War dead.
- Applies anthropological and other sophisticated scientific techniques in the processing of remains to establish individual identity.
- Accumulates and catalogs information of American and allied personnel listed as missing in action (MIA) and those declared dead but body not recovered (BNR).
- Performs humanitarian missions as directed by competent authority.
- Provides world-wide emergency support to the Army Memorial Affairs Program and, as required, to the Departments of Navy and Air Force for the search, recovery, and identification of remains.

The process of identification begins with the recovery or return of remains. Remains have been received via three avenues: through CIL's own S&R missions with the cooperation of host countries; through official turnovers in which a foreign government provides previously recovered remains to the CIL; and through other unofficial friendly or refugee sources.

The CIL fields S&R teams capable of conducting thorough area searches and excavations at crash and burial sites to recover remains and personal effects. Crash-site recoveries conducted by the S&R team often uncover significant information that can aid in the identification process, such as where remains and personal effects were found in relation to major components of an aircraft.

In the past, the CIL has dispatched its S&R teams on missions to Laos, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, New Britain, Melanesia, the Republic of the Philippines, Canada, Korea, and Malaysia.

Receiving remains through official turnovers from other governments has been the primary means by which remains have been returned from Indochina. Forty-three such repatriations have occurred since the CIL was established. Typically, a joint repatriation team, consisting of members of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and the CIL, travels to the foreign country returning the remains. The team conducts an appropriate honors ceremony as the remains are placed on a U.S. Air Force aircraft for return to the United States.

After remains are received at the CIL, forensic and other investigative techniques are applied in the processing of the remains to establish, when possible, individual identities. The CIL employs physical forensic anthropologists and odontologists who perform the identification examinations.

Since the remains received by the CIL are frequently fragmented and commingled, the first step in the identification process is to segregate them into separate and unique individuals. After the segregation process is completed, all dental and anthropological findings are documented on a series of charts, forms and special narrative statements. Anthropological data can be obtained from skeletal remains to determine age, race, sex, muscularity, handedness, height, and indications of injuries the individual may have received or abnormalities which might have existed. The CIL has radiographic and photographic equipment to aid in examination and documentation of the skeletal remains.

After the analysis of dental remains is completed by the forensic odontologist, the findings are entered into the Computer Assisted Postmortem Identification (CAPMI) System. With the CAPMI system, dental information obtained from an unknown set of remains is rapidly sorted against the antemortem dental base, which at CILHI consists of the composite antemortem dental records of those missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War. It is important to understand that the purpose of the CAPMI system is not to make identifications, but to increase the efficiency of the investigative team. The system is designed to provide the investigator with a list of possible matches for each set of remains. It is then up to the forensic odontologist to examine each listed record manually and make a determination as to the degree of certainty of any identification based on dental comparison. The CAPMI system has proven to be an invaluable management tool at the CILHI, saving the forensic odontologist countless man-hours that would have been required to make several difficult identifications to date.

Concurrent with the anthropological and dental analyses, the casualty data analysts use existing intelligence information to identify casualties which could be associated with the remains. The CIL maintains files on all individuals who are unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Data from these files are correlated to a map search which narrows the possibilities for potential association. This "circle search" is done using maps and computerized data to identify known incident or crash sites falling within an established radius of the reported recovery site of the remains in question. The files of all individuals known to be lost in that circle are analyzed for available identifying data.

If no association is made using the CAPMI system, or no dental structures were recovered with a set of remains, the anthropologists and forensic odontologist then compare the files identified by the casualty data analysts through the "circle search" method with the information obtained from the remains. If no match results from a comparison of the circumstances of the incident or crash and the characteristics of the individuals involved in the incident with the determinations made by the forensic specialists, the radius of the circle search is expanded to include additional individuals for comparison until a match is found or all possibilities are exhausted.

After thorough documentation of the comparison is completed, the CIL makes a recommendation which is reviewed by a team of professional consultants, normally consisting of two senior board certified physical anthropologists and one senior board certified forensic odontologist. Recommendations for identification which are concurred with are provided to the next of kin through the parent Military Service. The next of kin may exercise the option of soliciting a private opinion from an expert of their choosing. The opinion of the independent expert, if obtained by the next of kin, is returned to the Army's team of professional consultants to be considered before all information is submitted to the Armed Forces Identification Review Board (AFIRB) for the final decision to approve or disapprove the CIL's recommendation. The AFIRB consists of one primary voting member each from the Departments of the Army, Navy (or Marine Corps, if applicable) and Air Force as designated by their respective Departments. The members are in the grade of Colonel, Navy Captain, GS-15 or higher.

After the AFIRB has approved an identification, the remains depart Hickam AFB, Hawaii, with full military honors, for Port Mortuary, Travis AFB, California, where they are held pending disposition instructions from the next of kin. If the team of board certified professional consultants or the AFIRB disapproves a CIL recommendation, the case is referred back to the CIL for further review and processing.

**"OPERATION DESERT STORM"**

During the war, a total of 49 American military personnel were listed as missing in action. A number of American journalists were also reported missing in or near enemy controlled territory. These journalists were all captured and released by the Iraqis. On May 22, 1991, the status of the last American listed as MIA in Iraq was officially changed to KIA. While the remains of 13 American servicemen were never recovered, available information indicates they were killed during combat operations in Southwest Asia.

A breakdown of the 49 military personnel listed as missing in or near Iraqi controlled territory during the war follows:

	TOTALS	USA	USAF	USN	USMC
CAPTURED & RELEASED	23	7	8	3	5
KIA, BODY RECOVERED	13	0	7	3	3
KIA, BODY NOT RECOVERED	13	0	10	3	0
MISSING IN ACTION	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	49	7	25	9	8

As a result of utilizing the lessons learned from Vietnam and previous wars, there are no remaining MIAs from Operation Desert Storm. The establishment of a Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) prior to the onset of hostilities and the coordination among DIA, the National Prisoner of War Information Center within the Department of Defense, the service casualty officers and other relevant agencies led to a quick resolution of all MIA cases. Additionally, improvements in communications technology and a terrain that was less hostile than the jungle of Indochina led to more rapid location and identification of crash sites and remains. Of the 13 servicemen listed as Killed in Action-Body Not Recovered, 12 were over water where location of crash site and recovery of remains is more difficult.

**MISSING AND UNACCOUNTED FOR AMERICANS FROM WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN WAR**

Although many years have passed since the conclusion of World War II and the Korean War, the U.S. Government has ongoing efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for while serving their country in these wars. Approximately 78,750 Americans were unaccounted for from World War II, and there were about 8,200 from the Korean War; however, there are many differences between those wars and the war in Vietnam.

World War II ended in a clear-cut victory; the U.S. had access to the battlefields, so extensive searches could be conducted. Nevertheless, many men were lost and not recovered. The U.S. Government makes an effort to recover remains from World War II whenever possible. Since 1979, more than 110 sets of World War II remains have been recovered from Papua, New Guinea and returned to Hawaii for identification. Additionally, teams have conducted excavations in Guam, Okinawa, the Solomon Islands and Wake Island, to name a few. As recently as July 1990, the remains of 4 U.S. personnel were recovered from Papua, New Guinea.

In the case of Korea, 8,177 Americans are unaccounted for, including 389 who were at one time listed as prisoners of war. For the past 32 years, the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) has called upon the Korean People's Army/Chinese People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) Military Armistice Commission to account for the 2,233 UNC POWs, including the 389 Americans known or believed to have been under enemy control during the Korean War for whom we have received no accounting. In August 1982, the UNCMAC also requested, for the first time, the repatriation of any UNC personnel buried in North Korea.

The UNC has attempted to influence the other side by returning the remains of four CPV soldiers discovered in the Republic of Korea and by returning the bodies of post-war North Korean civilians who had drowned and washed ashore in the South. Also, the U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia met in Geneva with Chinese representatives 77 times from 1955 to 1957 to discuss the accounting for missing Americans. Other than the 4,023 UNC remains, including 1,868 Americans, returned by the KPA/CPV in 1954, there has been little progress, despite U.S. and UNC efforts, on resolving the cases of American still unaccounted for in North Korea. In the past two years, North Korea has continued to decline cooperation through the UNCMAC channels. However, a total of 16 remains were turned over to U.S. Congressional delegations. These remains are undergoing analysis at CILHI in an effort to obtain individual identifications.

In 1984, in South Korea, the U.S. Army excavated a battle site base on information received from representatives of Project Freedom, an organization which is seeking the recovery of American remains in the Republic of Korea. However, none of the exhumed remains were determined to be American. In mid-1985, after extensive research into archive material, Army personnel determined that excavation of a different battle site would not be warranted because of previous, well-documented searches by graves registration personnel.

The well publicized report by a former U.S. military attache in Hong Kong, who in 1955 obtained hearsay information of 700 soldiers being taken to Siberia, is under investigation. The attache's source was a Polish citizen who reportedly witnessed about 700 soldiers getting off a train on the Sino-Soviet border while the train's undercarriages were changed from standard-gauge to broad-gauge width. According to the attache, the Pole was in Hong Kong, en route to Australia. The U.S. Government requested Australian assistance in locating the Pole, but the Australians were unable to find him due to the lack of a name or address. There is a good possibility that the soldiers the Pole saw were captured members of the French Foreign Legion being repatriated after the Indochina War.

Discussions with the North Koreans on the subject of unaccounted for personnel are conducted by the UNCMAC, which provides updated information to the KPA/CPV MAC as it surfaces. The UNCMAC acts on behalf of all 16 UNC member nations, as well as the Republic of Korea, whose men fought and died in the defense of freedom in Korea. At every opportunity, the U.S. Government continues to press for the fullest possible accounting of Americans still missing as a result of the Korean War.