COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

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FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

СССР
КОМИТЕТ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИТЕТ
СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH IN MOSCOW: Progress and Pitfalls

by Mark Kramer

The British writer and literary critic Lytton Strachey once remarked that "ignorance is the first requisite of the historian — ignorance, which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits."[1] By this criterion, historians studying the Soviet Union were remarkably lucky until very recently. Unlike scholars of American politics and foreign policy, who had the daunting task each year of poring through thousands of newly declassified documents, specialists on the Soviet Union normally were forced to go about their work without reading a single item from the Soviet archives. Soviet authorities exercised tight control over all official documents and archival repositories, and no procedures were in place to release any of these materials to the public. For nearly 75 years, the information available about Soviet policy-making was so sparse that Western scholars often had to rely exclusively on published sources, supplemented by a few interviews.

Now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, several of the key Soviet archives have finally been opened — if only on a limited and sporadic basis — for scholarly research. This development has brought both benefits and drawbacks. The focus here will be mainly on the drawbacks, but that does not mean the benefits have been negligible. As recently as three to four years ago, the notion that Western and Russian scholars would be permitted to examine sensitive postwar documents in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry or the Central Committee of the

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NEW FINDINGS ON THE KOREAN WAR

Translation and Commentary by Kathryn Weathersby

While the opening of Soviet archives brought high expectations for quick answers to long-standing questions about the Cold War, those of us working in the Soviet archives have found that they are like other historical collections; individual documents contain only fragments of the information we seek. It is only after laboriously sifting through a great and varied mass of records that we can begin to piece together even one part of the intricate story of the Cold War.

Occasionally, however, we come upon a single document that directly answers a major question. The document excerpted below, "On the Korean War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations," is one such find. It is a survey of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Korean War that was compiled in 1966 by so far unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. The apparent purpose of this internal history was to provide background information for the small group of Soviet officials who were at that time engaged in discussions with the People's Republic of China and North Vietnam over possible Soviet assistance to the Viet Cong in their war with the United States.[1] This document thus tells us something about Soviet atti-

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Soviet Foreign Policy During the Cold War: A DOCUMENTARY SAMPLER

On 12-15 January 1993, in the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences building in Moscow, the Cold War International History Project sponsored the first scholarly conference on Cold War history to be based on newly available archival sources in the former Soviet Union. CWIHP organized the conference in collaboration with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its Russian acronym), which houses the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee. Over four days Russian and American scholars presented roughly three dozen papers, on topics ranging from the Cold War's origins to the Sino-Soviet split to the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the superpower crises over Suez, Berlin, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba. (Several of these papers have since been published by CWIHP in revised form as Working Papers—by Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-62, and by Kathryn Weathersby on Soviet policy and the origins of the Korean War, 1945-50—and more are slated to appear as working papers and in a forthcoming edited volume.)

An essential precondition to the holding of the conference was a written agreement by SCCD that all participants, whether Russian or foreign, would receive equal access to released materials, that all materials released for the conference would be made available to the world scholarly community, and that "no restric-

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ploshchad'") and is described as the opening segment of "Series I — Directories and Informational Materials." The entire issue consists of a directory of more than 1,000 documents released from the Presidential Archive and TsKhSD for the trial of the CPSU at the Constitutional Court. The 140-page directory provides an annotated list of documents in chronological order from March 1940 through December 1991. The vast bulk of the documents come from the Gorbachev period, especially the years 1989 to 1991, which account for roughly 62 percent of the total. Because the directory includes detailed subject and name indexes, it is an incomparably better finding aid than the scattered, disorganized lists for Fond No. 89 at TsKhSD, which previously were the only means available of keeping track of what had been turned over to the Court. One can only hope that future issues of *Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten'* will, as promised, offer additional compendia of the holdings of Fond No. 89 that are as convenient to use as this directory is.

The journal *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, as well as its new supplement, is obviously not — and does not pretend to be — a substitute for on-site research in the archives, but it certainly is a welcome successor to the now-defunct *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* ("News of the CPSU CC"), which featured a few new documents every month when it was published between 1989 and August 1991.[75] *Istoricheskii arkhiv* goes far beyond that and thus helps compensate for the clampdown at TsKhSD and the continued lack of free access to other key archives. In particular, the publication of materials from the Presidential Archive enables researchers to peruse valuable documents that would otherwise be unavailable. Although the new journal and supplement may not be able to live up to their projected publication schedules of six and four issues a year, respectively (only one issue of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was put out for 1992, and the first for 1993 was not published until May), they both should be appearing more frequently once the inevitable delays associated with the start-up of an ambitious new project have been overcome.[76] Provided that the adverse repercussions of the TsKhSD controversy do not interfere with the publication of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, the journal in its latest incarnation will be an indispensable resource for specialists on the Soviet Union, as well as a model of what can be gained from cooperative archival efforts.

The "Morris Affair"

From the fall of 1992 through the first few months of 1993, access to the postwar holdings of the CPSU Central Committee steadily increased. That trend came to a jarring halt, however, when a document from TsKhSD about U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in Vietnam was suddenly publicized in April 1993. The controversy surrounding this document was the ostensible reason for the clampdown at TsKhSD, but it seems likely that archival officials had been intending to restrict access anyway and that they merely latched onto the Vietnam document as a pretext for their actions. (The evidence to this effect includes, among other things, the firing of Vladimir Chernous, which occurred long before the POW document came to light.) Regardless of what the precise connection was between the uproar stemming from the Vietnam document and the sudden clampdown at TsKhSD, the repercussions from the incident were important enough to warrant at least a few comments here about the so-called "Morris affair."

In December 1992 and January 1993 an Australian researcher named Stephen J. Morris, who was affiliated with Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, worked at TsKhSD with documents concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese relations in the early 1970s. Morris hoped to write a book about Soviet policy during the Vietnam War, and he asked the Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project to help him gain access to materials at TsKhSD. As with all other researchers who sought aid in gaining access, CWIHP agreed to intervene on his behalf. Although Morris was not then formally listed on the conference agenda, CWIHP subscribed to the general principle that all interested scholars deserve equal access to the archives and invited him to attend the conference and present findings based on his research. Morris's research proceeded smoothly until early January 1993, when he came across a 25-page translation into Russian of a report that was purportedly delivered by the deputy chief of the Vietnamese People's Army (VPA) General Staff, General Tran Van Quang, to a meeting of the North Vietnamese Politburo on 15 September 1972.[77] Morris had ordered the document in the same way he would have requested any other item, and the archival staff delivered it to him in a perfectly routine manner.[78] Contrary to what was later alleged in the Russian media, nothing that Morris did in ordering and receiving the document was at all unusual. His discovery and subsequent use of the report were in full conformity with TsKhSD's rules. Contrary to charges made by the Vietnamese government, it is inconceivable that the document could have been planted or forged, or that Morris could have been steered to it in any way. Any doubts about the authenticity of the *Russian* document can thus be safely laid to rest. (Questions about the authenticity and accuracy of the Vietnamese original are of course a different matter.)

The translation was one among many items that Morris requested and received at TsKhSD in early December 1992 and January 1993. Initially he worked with some of the other materials, unaware of what he would find in General Quang's report. When he finally turned to the translated document, he was surprised to discover an extended discussion of American POWs two-thirds of the way through what was otherwise a routine assessment of the war's progress. Morris was even more surprised — indeed, quite startled — to read General Quang's assertion that North Vietnam in 1972 had been deliberately "keeping secret the number of American prisoners" in the hope of "using the issue to resolve the political and military aspects of the Vietnam question." According to the translation, the real number of American POWs at the time was 1,205, a figure three times higher than the 368 prisoners that the North Vietnamese government had publicly acknowledged it was holding. The report claimed that "the U.S. government itself does not know the exact number of POWs," and warned that any disclosure of the true figure would simply be a "premature concession to the United States" that would "cost us [i.e., North Vietnam] a great deal" of leverage.

Elsewhere the translated report specified the political goals that the North Vietnamese authorities hoped to achieve by secretly holding the American POWs. The document provided detailed statistical breakdowns of the 1,205 American prisoners by rank, military specialty, place of capture, place of imprisonment, and even "ideological orientation." The translation left no doubt that the publicly-cited figure of 368

covered only the POWs whose "progressive political leanings" made them willing to "condemn the unjust and aggressive war that the United States is waging in Vietnam." At least some of these 368 prisoners were due to be "released in the near future to bring pressure to bear on the Nixon administration" and "to demonstrate our [i.e., North Vietnam's] good intentions in this matter." The other 837 American POWs, including 372 who were deemed to hold "neutral political views" and 465 who were classified as outright "reactionaries," were to be held back for future bargaining.[79]

The discrepancy between the statistics in the report and the figures that were made public by the North Vietnamese government was significant in its own right, but it took on even greater importance in light of a three-page memorandum accompanying the translation.[80] The memorandum was prepared by the head of Soviet military intelligence (GRU), Army-General Pyotr Ivashutin, who had the most sensitive information in the Soviet armed forces at his disposal. The memorandum clearly shows that Ivashutin regarded the figures in the translation to be accurate, that he believed "the U.S. government does not know the exact number of POWs in North Vietnam because the VPA command has kept this matter in strict secrecy," and that he was pleased by "the VPA command's success during the interrogations of the prisoners in extracting valuable information about the U.S. armed forces, about military technology, and about specific types of weaponry." In view of the close links between the Soviet GRU and the North Vietnamese intelligence organs, Ivashutin's acceptance of the higher totals of American POWs indicates that those numbers must be taken seriously.

The revelations in the document — both the translated report and Ivashutin's introductory memorandum — were of such obvious importance that Morris was initially inclined to go straight to the Western press. However, he readily agreed, at my urging, that he should first pursue the matter quietly in case the translation was accurate and some of the hundreds of unaccounted-for prisoners might still be alive. After returning to the United States at the end of January 1993, Morris contacted officials in the Clinton administration and traveled to Washington to discuss what he had found. These contacts yielded few immediately evident results, which is understandable for an issue that has been the object of so many hoaxes and unfounded claims. Skepticism would naturally tend to prevail, and the administration cannot be faulted for being wary of Morris's initial overtures. Having failed to make headway in Washington, Morris returned to Moscow in early April to pursue further research.

His return visit proved short-lived, however, as an international controversy soon erupted. Although Morris had not given a copy of the document to U.S. officials when he was in Washington in February and March,



ЕРАЛЬНЫЙ ШТАБ ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ СССР
ГЛАВНОЕ РАЗВЕДЫВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО
Экз. № 6

ДОКЛАД
МЕСТИТЕЛЯ НАЧАЛЬНИКА ГЕНШТАБА ВНА
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТА ЧАН ВАН КУАНГА
НА ЗАСЕДАНИИ ПОЛИТБЮРО ЦК ПТВ
15 сентября 1972 года

(Перевод с вьетнамского)

The document that caused the furor

his description of the report had prompted a few behind-the-scenes measures by the Clinton administration. Inquiries were made through an official U.S.-Russian commission that had been set up in mid-1992 to investigate the fate of American POWs and MIAs (soldiers Missing In Action) from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The panel, which was co-chaired by Volkogonov and a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Malcolm Toon, contacted the staff at TsKhSD and asked for a copy of the document. Toon himself paid a special visit to Moscow at the beginning of April to follow up on the matter, and a copy of the translated report was finally turned over to the commission on 8 April. The following day, through circumstances that are still unclear, news of the document was leaked to Valerii Rudnev, a reporter from the Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* who had been covering the activities of the POW/MIA commission since it was founded. Rudnev published a story about the Vietnamese report on 10 April.[81] Apparently, he did not yet have a copy of the document because he did not quote it directly, but he certainly was aware of the data about POWs, which he cited in his article.

Once this story appeared, the existence of the document effectively became public knowledge. Only then did Morris approach the Moscow bureau of *The New York Times* to discuss what he had found. A front-page story about the document, by Celestine Bohlen, was published in the *Times* on 12 April.[82] As soon as the story appeared, a lively and at times highly acrimonious debate arose about the implications of the translated report. Over the next few weeks, countless other stories and news broadcasts about the document ensued, temporarily derailing what had seemed to be steady movement toward the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations. To try to clarify matters, the Clinton administration asked General John Vessey, the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to travel on an investigative mission to Hanoi. Vessey met with General Quang (the purported author of the document) and other senior Vietnamese officials, all of whom insisted that the report was a forgery and that Quang had not been deputy chief of the General Staff in September 1972.[83] At the end of his trip, Vessey publicly averred that he believed there were significant inaccuracies in the translation.[84] He acknowledged that the translated version of the report was an authentic Soviet document, but he said he was unable to ascertain whether the Vietnamese original was authentic, much less accurate.

Those conclusions seemed reasonable for the most part, but even so, the purpose and value of Vessey's inquiry were unclear. Presumably, if a U.S. envoy had gone to Moscow in, say, 1950 to ask Stalin and Lavrentii Beria about the Katyn Forest massacres, the Soviet response would have been a vehement denial of any part in the murders. Surely no one in Washington could have expected that General Quang or other leaders in Hanoi would acknowledge that they had done something wrong in 1972, if in fact they did. Not until several generations passed and Communism was disintegrating did the

Soviet government begin owning up to some of its earlier misdeeds. No doubt, the same is likely to be true of the Vietnamese regime. This is not to say that attempts to follow up on the POW issue in Hanoi are pointless, but at least for now the chances of obtaining meaningful documentation are far greater in Russia than in Vietnam.

The potential value of materials stored in the Russian archives was demonstrated in September 1993, when a second document was disclosed that suggested the North Vietnamese authorities deliberately under-reported the number of prisoners they were holding in the early 1970s. This document was a translation of a report presented by a senior North Vietnamese official, Hoang Anh, to a plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Central Committee in early 1971.[85] The official claimed that Hanoi was holding 735 U.S. "pilots," but had published the names of only 368 as a "diplomatic step," adding that these 368 would be released as soon as Washington agreed to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam and started the withdrawal. Once the pullout was completed, the report went on, the remaining 367 captured pilots, whose names had not yet been disclosed, would be freed.

The figure of 368 in the report corresponded precisely to the number of U.S. POWs in a list that was turned over to two U.S. Senators in Paris in December 1970, a list whose accuracy was challenged at the time by the U.S. government.[86] The figure of 368 also was identical to the number cited later on by General Quang; and the total number of 735 "captured American pilots" (both acknowledged and unacknowledged) in the earlier report was nearly the same as the figure of 767 pilots that Quang provided. Still, the newly discovered document raised far more questions than it answered: For example, why did the earlier report refer only to "pilots" and not mention other types of POWs, as Quang did later in his report? Was the figure of 368 chosen simply because it was half the number of U.S. "pilots" who had been captured? Why had the figure of 368 not increased at all, and why had the other figure, of 735, barely increased (to just 767) when Quang delivered his report some 20 months later, by which time more Americans presumably had been captured? The answer to this last question may be connected with the fact that twenty of the prisoners included in the earlier totals were already dead and nine had already been released, but there is no way to be sure.

The answers to all these questions, unfortunately, may be a long time in coming. Only two pages (11 and 18) of the earlier translated report were released by the Russian government, to the American members of the joint POW/MIA commission, and it is not clear whether or when the rest of the document will be turned over. Even if the earlier report is eventually released in full, any hope of determining the accuracy of the two translated documents is going to depend on the availability of a good deal more evidence, including the original Vietnamese versions of the two reports (whether on paper or on tape recording), which are likely to be in the GRU archives. Some of these items may not exist in Moscow any longer, but other documents that bear on the matter are bound to turn up. In any event, the only way to know precisely what is available is to have qualified experts sift methodically through as many of the archives as possible.

Whether that will be practical in the near future is questionable, however. So far, employees of the Russian archives are the only ones who have been permitted to search for additional documentation. Their efforts are obviously crucial, but on a matter such as this, it is essential that outside experts, including experts from the United States, also be permitted to look for new evidence. If the matter is left solely to archival officials, there may be little way of ensuring that their search is as thorough as possible, and that they will release whole documents once they come across them, rather than just handing over scattered pages.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government's apparent failure to request broad archival access at the outset for independent experts and scholars may have been a lost opportunity.[87] At this point, any attempts to gain permission for American scholars to investigate the matter further at either TsKhSD or the Presidential Archive, not to mention the GRU archives, are likely to be complicated by the unexpectedly harsh reaction of the Russian archival authorities to the disclosure of Quang's translated report. Rather than welcoming the publication of such a controversial document and encouraging researchers to look for other items that would either corroborate or impugn the accuracy of the translation, Rosarkhiv officials did just the opposite.[88] They sealed off all holdings at TsKhSD and rescinded the access they had earlier extended to scholars involved with the Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project and other collaborative ventures. The reading room at TsKhSD was shut for the entire summer of 1993, and even before that a host of nettlesome restrictions were imposed on foreign researchers, many of whom were accused by name of working for nefarious "special services."[89] Among other things, foreigners were not permitted to obtain an entry pass ("*propusk*") to the reading room for more than two weeks at a time, they were prohibited from receiving any document files or microfilm reels, and they were forbidden from using laptop computers for any purpose unless they received explicit permission every day from the archive director.

The clampdown on scholarly access was accompanied by a shakeup of personnel at TsKhSD, most notably the replacement of Usikov by Prokopenko a week after the initial *New York Times* article appeared. At first, the dismissal was attributed to Usikov's purported failure to "enforce regulations on access to confidential material,"[90] but allegations soon followed that he had also been involved in shady financial dealings. Whether or not the latter charges had any merit—and the present author is not in any position to evaluate them—there was no truth at all to the specific allegation that Usikov sold the Vietnam document to Morris. As noted earlier, Morris's request for the document was handled routinely, and Usikov had nothing to do with it. At no point did Morris even meet Usikov, much less buy documents from him.

Furthermore, even if the new authorities at TsKhSD sincerely believed that the Quang document had been sold — and initially they may have — it would still be hard to explain why their reaction to the "Morris affair" was so much harsher than the brief periods of retrenchment that had followed previous scandals at the archives. After all, the controversy surrounding the POW document was hardly unique. Several incidents in 1992 had caused a comparable degree of embarrassment for the Russian government: the publication in Italy of an unauthenticated 1943 letter from the Italian Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, showing seeming indifference over the fate of Soviet-held Italian POWs; reports in Great Britain about "secret" contacts between Labour Party lead-

ers and Soviet diplomats (which turned out to be perfectly routine and above-board); and the unauthorized and misattributed publication in London of extracts from diaries by Josef Goebbels that had been stored in the Moscow archives.[91] After each of these episodes, Russian archival officials briefly enforced stricter regulations, but they did not abandon the general trend toward greater openness. The reaction to the "Morris affair" was very different insofar as it severely disrupted and reversed almost all the positive steps that had been implemented. Although the clampdown is not likely to be permanent, it was a disheartening step backward that threatened to inhibit the development of a sound archival policy in Russia.

The reimposition of a "strict regime" (*strogii rezhim*) at TsKhSD may also hinder any further clarification of the two translated documents, at least for some time to come. This is unfortunate for both scholarly and practical reasons. Western commentators have focused almost exclusively on the statistics in the translated reports or on the position that General Quang may have occupied in September 1972, but other aspects of the Quang document, particularly Ivashutin's introductory memorandum, are far more tantalizing. We may never know whether there was an authentic report in Vietnamese by General Quang, but we already know that Ivashutin's memorandum is authentic and that he regarded the figure of 1,205 U.S. POWs to be accurate. We need to find out why. Similarly, Ivashutin's memorandum has a handwritten notation on it from Konstantin Katushev, the CPSU Secretary responsible for ties with other ruling Communist parties, to Igor Ognetov, the head of the sector for North Vietnam.[92] Katushev instructed Ognetov to "prepare, on an urgent basis, a short note for the CPSU CC Politburo about the prisoners of war." The fact that Katushev, as the most senior official in Moscow with day-to-day responsibility for Vietnam, recognized the importance of Quang's remarks about the POWs should give pause to anyone who is tempted to dismiss the figures out of hand.

Another aspect of the Quang document that needs to be clarified is the brief cover sheet from Ognetov, which apparently is in response to Katushev's handwritten note.[93] Ivashutin's memorandum was prepared in late November 1972, and Katushev's notation was made on or about 1 December. Ognetov's typed message, dated 6 February 1973, merely observes that "the instruction [presumably a reference to Katushev's handwritten instruction] has been overtaken by events" and that "comrade K. F. Katushev has been informed."[94] This simple, two-line message raises a host of intriguing questions: Why did Ognetov wait more than two months before responding to Katushev's "urgent" order? Did Ognetov prepare a "short note" for the Politburo in the interim, as he was instructed? If so, what did it say and what happened to it? What were the "events" that Ognetov believed had "overtaken" the instruction from Katushev? Among the possible answers to this last question are: (1) the signing of the Paris peace accords on 27 January 1973, which provided for the release of all American POWs; (2) the issuance of lists that same day by the U.S. State Department and the North Vietnamese government of the 591 American prisoners who were eventually set free under Operation Homecoming; and (3) a top-level meeting of the Soviet and North Vietnamese Communist parties in Moscow on 30 January 1973, which involved both Katushev and one of his closest aides, Oleg Rakhmanin, along with all the members of the CPSU Politburo.[95] Are these the "events" that Ognetov had in mind, and if so, what bearing did they have on the much higher number of prisoners cited in the translated report? (The list of 591 POWs represented the 368 whose capture had been publicly acknowledged before September 1972, plus the 223 Americans who were taken prisoner after that date, mainly during the Christmas bombings of North Vietnam.) How much credibility did Ognetov attach to the higher figures?

Until these sorts of questions are answered, it will be impossible to arrive at any firm conclusions about the data cited in the two translations. Even if the figures of 735 and 1,205 turn out to be much too high, a smaller discrepancy would still be worth exploring, on the off chance that some of the POWs are still alive. Nevertheless, it will be extremely difficult to further investigate the matter so long as the clampdown at TsKhSD continues. One would need free access to such things as the "short note" to the CPSU Politburo that Ognetov was ordered to "prepare on an urgent basis," the Politburo's deliberations about the Paris peace accords, and the secret transcripts from the Soviet-North Vietnamese meetings of 30 January 1973. These and other documents must exist at either TsKhSD or the Presidential Archive. But rather than allowing outside experts and scholars to find materials that would shed greater light on the issue, Russian archival officials have taken the counterproductive and irrational step of trying to prevent researchers from doing their work. Unfortunately, the whole episode suggests we may have to wait years before a genuine archival system emerges in Russia. In a country where democracy is still so rudimentary and tenuous, the status of the archives is bound to remain problematic.

Methodological Pitfalls

Having been denied access to archival materials in Moscow for so long, scholars who are now finally being permitted to examine Soviet documents may be tempted to draw sweeping conclusions from what they find. In some cases these conclusions are likely to be justified, but a good deal of caution is in order. Part of the problem, as E. H. Carr noted more than 30 years ago, is the tendency of historians to be overly impressed by what they find on paper:

> The nineteenth-century fetishism of facts was completed and justified by a fetishism of documents. The documents were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent historian approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed tones. If you find it in the documents, it is so. But what, when we get down to it, do these documents — the decrees, the treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official correspondence, the private letters and diaries — actually tell us? No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought — what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought.[96]

There is a danger that scholars will become so engrossed by what they come across in documents marked with the "strogo sekretno" (strictly secret) or "sovershenno sekretno" (top secret) stamp that they will not approach these materials with the same degree of detachment they would exercise when considering most other forms of historical evidence. The novelty of looking through

People's Republic of China

Interview with Stalin's back channel envoy to Mao in 1948-50. (S.N. Goncharov, interview with I.V. Kovalev, trans. Craig Seibert, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 10:4 (Winter 1991-92), 45-76.) For a response from Mao's former interpreter, see Li Haiwen (trans. Wang Xi), "A Distortion of History: An Interview with Shi Ze about Kovalev's Recollections," *Chinese Historians* 5:2 (Fall 1992), 59-64.

Chinese Historians 5:2 (Fall 1992) also contains Zhai Qiang, "Britain, the United States, and the Jinmen-Mazu Crisis," 25-48; and Li Xiaobing and Glenn Tracy, trans., "Mao's Telegrams during the Korean War, October-December 1950," 65-85.

Account of PRC ties to Vietnamese communists during war against French, based on newly available Chinese sources. (Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-54," *China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993), 85-110.)

Analysis of mystery of Defense Minister Lin Biao's death in 1971 plane crash. (Alexander Chudodeyev, "The mystery of plane number 256," *New Times International* 32 (1991), 36-38.)

Review of early U.S.-Communist Chinese contacts. (Chen Jian, "The Ward Case and the Emergence of Sino-American Confrontation, 1948-1950," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30 (July 1993), 149-70.)

Advance notices circulating for biography of Deng Xiaoping written by his daughter, Deng Rong. (Nicholas D. Kristof, "Life of Deng, By Daughter, Diverts China," *NYT*, 8/18/93.)

A new group, the Society for Scholars of Sino-U.S. Relations has been founded in Beijing; the group, associated with the Chinese Association for American Studies, announces plans to hold a symposium on the study of Sino-U.S. relations in China; for further information contact:

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Publications: HUA Qingzhao, *From Yalta to Panmunjom: Truman's Diplomacy and the Four Powers, 1945-1953* (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993). William W. Moss, "Archives in the People's Republic of China: A Brief Introduction for American Scholars and Archivists" (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, June 1993).

Vietnam

See references in POW-MIA Inquiry section.

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POW-MIA Issues

Report on Soviet archives findings on Americans missing after April 1950 shoot-down of U.S. B-29. (Valery Rudnev, "50 Years After Tragedy Over Baltic," *Izvestia*, 8/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-173, 16-18.)

Several Americans held on Soviet soil after World War II were "summarily executed" on Stalin's orders, but none remain in Soviet custody, Yeltsin informs U.S. Senate panel. ("Yeltsin Aide Tells of G.I.'s Held in Wartime Camps," *NYT* 11/12/92; Thomas W. Lippman, "Stalin Executed Some Americans After WWII, Yeltsin Writes," *WP*, 11/12/92; A. Shalnev, "The Stalinist Regime Executed the Americans Without Due Process," *Izvestia*, 11/12/92, 4; text of Yeltsin's statement and other articles: Itar-Tass, 11/12/92, and *Izvestia*, 11/13/92, 4, in FBIS-SOV-92-220, 11/13/92, 18-19; also interviews with commission co-chair Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, *Izvestia*, 12/22/92, 3, in FBIS-SOV-92-246, 12/22/92, 16-17, and Moscow Ostankino television, 6/28/92, FBIS-SOV-92-125, 6/29/92, 14-16.) Russia provides additional archival documents on U.S. Air Force planes downed during Korean War. (Itar-Tass, 4/9/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-069, 4/13/93.)

Soviet downing of U.S. B-29 bomber in 1950 over Baltic Sea is recounted. (V. Rudnev, "In 50 Years After the Tragedy Over the Baltics," *Izvestia*, 8/28/92, 7.)

Citing declassified U.S. documents and interviews with ex-Soviet and U.S. officials, news organizations report that 138 U.S. military personnel were lost in spy missions over or near the Soviet Union during the Cold War. ("Special Report: Secrets of the Cold War," *US News & World Report* 114:10 (3/15/93), 30-56, and ABC "Prime Time Live," 3/4/93; "138 Reported Missing in U.S. Spy Flights," *WP*, 3/5/93.)

U.S.-Russian commission uncovers fresh details of Soviet downing of U.S. military aircraft on 2 September 1958; data on 11 missing personnel sought. (*Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta*, 7/23/93, in FBIS-USR-93-101 (8/6/93), 2-3.)

Russian-U.S. commission meets in Moscow, to continue work. (*Segodnya* (Moscow), 9/3/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-171 (9/7/93), 23.) Citing interviews and newly available Russian documents, U.S. tells Moscow it has evidence the USSR transferred "several hundred" U.S. POWs from the Korean War to Soviet territory. (AP dispatches in *NYT*, 9/27/93, 9/28/93, and *WP*, 9/27/93, citing State Department report, "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union."

North Vietnam held 1,205 U.S. prisoners of war in 1972, rather than the 368 publicly acknowledged, according to Russian translation of top secret Sept. 1972 report by Gen. Tran Van Quang to the North Vietnamese Politburo discovered in CPSU Central Committee archives in Moscow by Harvard-based researcher Stephen J. Morris. Critics, including Quang, dispute report, citing alleged errors in document. (*Izvestia*, 4/10/93; Celestine Bohen, "Files Said to Show Hanoi Lied in '72 On Prisoner Totals," *NYT*, 4/12/93; "North Vietnam kept 700 POWs after war," *Washington Times*, 4/12/93; "U.S. to Press Hanoi to Explain '72 P.O.W." and, reprinting document, "Vietnam's 1972 Statement on P.O.W.'s: Triple the Total Hanoi Acknowledged," *NYT*, 4/13/93; Thomas W. Lippman, "Soviet Document Indicates POW Deception by Hanoi," *WP*, 4/13/93; Jim Mann, "U.S. Checks Out Report Hanoi Lied About POWs," *Los Angeles Times*, 4/13/93; Philip Shenon, "A '72 Report on P.O.W.'s Is a Fake, Vietnam Asserts," and Steven A. Holmes, "Pentagon Is Wary on P.O.W. Text; Families See Proof of Lies," *NYT*, 4/14/93; Steven A. Holmes,

"Debate Rises on Hanoi P.O.W. Report," *NYT*, 4/16/93; Anthony Flint, "Harvard researcher defends accuracy of POW report," *Boston Globe*, 4/16/93; Stephen Engelberg, "Old M.I.A. Theory Is Given a New Life," *NYT*, 20; "Who Was Left Behind?" *Time*, 4/26/93, 39; Philip Shenon, "Hanoi Offers Documents on P.O.W.'s," *NYT*, 4/19/93, A13; Philip Shenon, "Vietnam Report on Prisoners A Fake, Reputed Author Says," *NYT*, 4/20/93, 1; William Branigan, "U.S. General Questions Alleged POW Document," *WP*, 4/20/93, A15; text of communique from Vessey visit to Hanoi, press coverage, in FBIS-EAS-93-074, 4/20/93, 55-57; Steven A. Holmes, "Envoy Says P.O.W. Evidence Undermines Old Russian Report," and Celestine Bohlen, "A Russian Assessment," *NYT*, 4/22/93, A3; Thomas W. Lippman, "Vessey Faults Russian Paper On U.S. POWs," *WP*, 4/22/93; Alexander Merkushev, "Russian archivist sacked over leaked POW report," AP dispatch in *Washington Times*, 4/23/93; Thomas W. Lippman, "A Researcher's Dream Find on U.S. POWs Turns Into a Nightmare," *WP*, 4/25/93, A4; William Branigan, "Vietnam Offers File on POWs," *WP*, 4/26/93, A13; Beth Brophy, "The Search for Truth about POWs Goes On," *U.S. News & World Report*, 4/26/93, 16; Nayan Chanda, "Research and Destroy," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 156:18 (5/6/93), 20-21; George A. Carver Jr., "Vietnam—the Unfinished Business" and "Needed: Authentication Commission," *Wall Street Journal*, 5/20/93, 16; Neil Sheehan, "Letter from Vietnam: Prisoners of the Past," *The New Yorker*, 5/24/93, 44 ff. Thomas W. Lippman, "Vietnamese Defector Cited 500 Additional POWs," *WP*, 5/27/93, A43.)

Russian archives officials hand over additional Soviet documents on disputed 1972 report indicating that North Vietnam held more U.S. POWs than acknowledged. (Celestine Bohlen, "Russians Give U.S. More P.O.W. Documents," *NYT*, 9/5/93, 6. A document from Russian military intelligence (GRU) archives, given to U.S. members of Russian-American commission, says North Vietnam held 735 U.S. "aviator" POWs, in late 1970 rather than the 368 figure publicly acknowledged. (Adam Clymer, "Soviet File Feeds Debate on P.O.W.'s," *NYT*, 9/9/93; Thomas W. Lippman, "Document Indicates Hanoi Held Additional U.S. POWs," *WP*, 9/9/93.)

For Morris's account, see Stephen J. Morris, "The Vietnamese Know How to Count," *WP*, 4/18/93, C7; "Quangmire," *The New Republic* 208:22 (5/31/93), 18-19; "Ghosts in the Archives," *WP*, 9/12/93, C3; and "The '1205 Document': A Story of American Prisoners, Vietnamese Agents, Soviet Archives, Washington Bureaucrats, and the Media," *The National Interest* 33 (Fall 1993), 28-42.

Vietnam agrees to show 229 archive films of POWs to U.S. investigators. ("U.S. Given MIA Materials," *WP*, 6/1/93; "Hanoi Provides MIA Documents, "WP, 6/2/93.)

Cuba

Three-part interview with Army Minister Raul Castro in *El Sol de Mexico* includes assertion that Moscow warned Havana in early 1980s that it could not save Cuba from a U.S. invasion. ("Moscow Said No to Cuba," *WP*, 4/23/93, A19; *Izvestiya*, 4/27/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-080 (4/28/93), 17-18.)

Cuban Missile Crisis

Ex-Soviet diplomats recall events. (Oleg Troyanovski, "The Caribbean Crisis: A Viewpoint From the Kremlin," *International Affairs* 4-5 (Apr.-May 1992); Anatoly Dobrynin, "The Caribbean Crisis: An Eyewitness Account," *International Affairs* 8 (Aug. 1992), 47-60.)

Soviet military officials recall Cuban Missile Crisis. (G. Vassiliev, "The Hedgehog in the Pants of Americans," *MN* 42 (10/18/92), 13.) Excerpts from memoirs of Soviet general involved in deploying missiles to Cuba in 1962. (A.I. Gribkov, "The Caribbean Crisis" (part one), *Military-Historical Journal* 10 (1992), 41-46; Gribkov, "The Caribbean Crisis" (part two), *Military-Historical Journal* 12 (1992), 31-37.) More analysis and documents from Soviet side of Cuban crisis. (Y.G. Murin, V.A. Levedev, "The Caribbean Crisis," *Military-Historical Journal* 11 (1992), 33-52.)

Excerpts of meetings between Soviet envoy A. Mikoyan and Castro in Havana, 3-5 November 1962. "Dialogue in Havana: The Caribbean Crisis," *International Affairs* 10 (Oct. 1992), 108 ff.

Latest accounts by Soviet and Cuban officials suggest that the danger of nuclear war was much greater than imagined at the time. Bernd Greiner, "Russisches Roulette" (Russian Roulette), *Die Zeit* 45 (10/30/92), 104.

Publications: James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993); Gens. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith: *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994).

United States

Clinton issues directive ordering review of classification system. (Tim Weiner, "President Moves to Release Classified U.S. Documents," NYT, 5/5/93, A18; (Tom Blanton, "Canceling the Classifieds," WP, 6/6/93, C2.) Gary M. Stern, "President Clinton Calls for New Executive Order on Classification," *First Principles* 18:2 (July 1993). Excessive secrecy assailed. (Tim Weiner, "The Cold War Freezer Keeps Historians Out," *NYT Week-in-Review*, 5, 5/23/93.)

Draft presidential executive order calls for automatic declassification of virtually all U.S. records over 40 years old; critics seek shorter wait. (George Lardner, "Draft of Secrets Disclosure Order Draws Mixed Reviews," *WP*, 9/30/93; Neil A. Lewis, "New Proposal Would Automatically Limit Secrecy," and Steven Aftergood and Tom Blanton, "Secrets and More Secrets," *NYT*, 9/30/93.)

CIA driector Woolsey vows to open agency historical records on key Cold War events. (CIA to Open Up Secrets, 'Warts and All,' Director Says," *WP*, 9/29/93, A6.)

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