

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

0 2 3 1 2

Malaysia

75

SEP 3 9 25 PM '64

54

Origin  
IO  
Info  
SS  
G  
SP  
L  
H  
EUR  
FE  
P  
NSIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
DOD  
NIC  
DAC  
AID

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK PRIORITY ~~XXXXXXXX~~ 576  
Amembassy, KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 206  
Amembassy, LONDON 1541 PRIORITY  
Amembassy, DJAKARTA 227 PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy, MOSCOW 524

REF DEPTTEL 200 to Kuala Lumpur

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority STATE 5-27-75  
By LW, NARS, Date 6-5-75

1. We understand ~~FROM THE DELEGATION FROM MALAYSIA~~ Malaysian DEL has now requested SC meeting to consider INDO aggression and suggested that meeting be held next Monday or Tuesday, after arrival their Delegation from KL. Question then arises as to precisely what GOM should seek in SC. We note that in discussions in New York and KL thus far they have been thinking in terms of a resolution which would condemn September 2 air drop (and, if evidence is available, the raids on the mainland) as aggression, and call on GOI to cease and desist from any further such acts. It is too early to tell whether such a strongly worded resolution would draw a Soviet veto. About the cheapest kind of support they can give Indonesia is political support in the Council and we assume they will therefore veto anything Indonesia asks them to. ~~There~~ Therefore we doubt that

Drafted by: IO/UNP:WBuffum/ Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Harlan Cleveland

Clearances: HCleveland:mtb S/S - Mr. Mills

~~XXXXXXXX~~  
Cleared in draft with:  
The Secretary FE - Mr. Green  
The Under Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Lyndon B. Johnson National Security Files: Asia and the Pacific,  
1963-1969. A microfilm project of University Publications of  
America, Inc, Maryland

Reel 13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a resolution using word QTE condemnation UNQTE will get through, particularly since GOI appears to be denying any such incident took place.

2. One alternative for Malaysians would be to press for bringing a condemnatory resolution to a vote even if it is certain Soviets would veto on Indonesians behalf. This would have some merit if all non-communist SC members would vote for it, to dramatize fact that only communists are supporting Indonesian aggression. But some of the non-permanent members of SC would be less than enthusiastic about being caught in the middle in direct issue between Soviets on one side and Western Powers on ~~other~~ other -- even though USUN would of course be doing utmost to present issue as one between two Asian countries. Moreover, playing it this way would make it difficult or impossible to bring out of SC consideration some continuing and constructive peacekeeping machinery along lines paragraph 5 below. Finally, failure of Council to take any action at all would leave GOM in position of perhaps feeling constrained resort to retaliation to justify themselves, and might push UK in same direction. We note for example ~~that~~ Ghazali said if UN fails to act GOM would have to take some deterrent action.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. FYI A straight resolution of c ndemnation, declaring Indonesia as aggressor presents US with special problem: it might make mandatory Presidential action to cut off aid to Indonesia under Gruening amendment. To maintain some degree of flexibility, therefore, it might be well to use language referring to QTE armed attack UNQTE or QTE dispatch of armed bands UNQTE by Indonesia.

4. FYI. Alternative to condemnatory resolution would be a resolution that deplores armed attack or dispatch of armed bands, by Indonesia, and asks ~~for cessation of~~ further action likely to exacerbate situation. In the context, this would clearly be directed against Indonesia; explicit appeal to Indonesia might conceivably be formulated that would ~~back~~ <sup>get</sup> by Soviet veto. END FYI.

5. In addition to passing judgment on recent incidents and appealing for peace and quiet, we think SC should probably establish some kind of UN presence in Malaysia, designed as political deterrent to increase political cost of further Indonesian attacks, and, in event such attacks, assist Malaysians to produce credible evidence thereof.

6. While situation does not require full-fledged UN observation in the sense UN ~~presence~~ <sup>or</sup> operates in Kashmir/along borders between Israel and her neighbors, a type of UN presence

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

could indeed be helpful. What we would envisage if this is sought, to receive would be establishment of a UN presence office in KL ~~xxxxxxxx~~ complaints of any additional military activities directed against Malaysia. UN personnel could be despatched to scene any alleged incursion to verify on ex post facto basis what had happened to satisfaction international community. For example, in current situation UN REPS might usefully be present at interrogation of prisoners taken. Very fact they available for such purpose might help serve as partial deterrent to repetition of recent attacks on mainland at least. We think it would be awkward for Soviets to presence veto modest ~~presence~~ this kind because doing so would tend to establish presumption Indonesia is guilty and fears discovery. Such an operation would be relatively inexpensive; it could consist of merely half-dozen people and could be financed from SYG's regular contingency fund as he has now agreed do in case of new UN political presence in Yemen.

7. Because of fundamental political implications involved in establishing such office and fact it would be related to current dispute before SC, we certain SYG would insist on formal Council authorization before he would agree accept responsibility for establishing such presence.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. Addressee posts are requested comment urgently on ~~discuss~~ this line of thinking. You are authorized ~~discuss~~ UN scenario. preliminary along these lines, making clear this is ~~preliminary~~ thinking of DEPT and not yet a firm decision as to what US is prepared to do in SC. In discussing problem, posts should avoid discussing exact wording of resolution, which must be negotiated among UN delegations in New York in effort to attain both maximum solidarity and maximum support of Malaysians.

9. London's 1080 just received. Hope British and Malaysians clearly understand that any public threat to retaliate ~~END~~ in event SC action is unsatisfactory would be counter-productive. Such threat would undoubtedly cause some members SC to want to include in resolution language designed to deter Malaysians and British from military retaliation.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~