

3 OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Indonesia

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Info

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INFO: Amembassy Kuala Lumpur 236 PRIORITY
London 1833 PRIORITY
Canberra 212 Priority
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CINCPAC for POLAD

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Authority STATE 5-28-75
By KR, NARS, Date 6-4-75

Department believes Sukarno position reported your 518 indicates he unable or unwilling recognize ~~this that~~ that existing situation is different from and far more serious than situation before Indos put forces into Malaya and publicly boasted they had done so. In Bogor meeting with Sukarno or soonest thereafter you should make following points, stating you doing so on instruction if you think this desirable:

1) By using force against Malaya, boasting about it and anticipating that they would continue (as Sudjarwo has done in SC) Indos have created new situation ~~which~~ which they must recognize as such.

2) Sukarno must be aware that ~~HMG~~ ^{GOM HMG} and ~~OCM~~ cannot indefinitely tolerate Indo military actinn against Malaysia and that Indo actions, if continued, may lead to situation where Sukarno finds himself in real

Drafted by: FE/SPA: DCCuthell/bmm 9/12
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Clearances: FE: W. P. Bundy (draft) S/S - Mr. Gordon
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Commonwealth.
hostilities with ~~BRMC~~. If this happens, given history of situation, he cannot expect USG to help him. (FYI: If you think Sukarno believes we can or will restrain British, he should be disabused of any such idea. End FYI).

3) We are glad he is willing resume negotiations, but believe it totally unrealistic expect GOM will be willing or able negotiate in present atmosphere. First essential is that Indos stop military action, and we cannot work to encourage further negotiation until this happens.

4) On other hand, if Sukarno genuinely wants to settle this issue peacefully he must find way to stop military action. If he does so, we will be glad to resume our previous policy of encouraging solution through negotiation.

GP-1.

END

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