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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

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Origie

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Info

ACTION: Amembassy DJAKARTA 554 IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy KUALA LUMPUR 516 ~~XXXXXXXX~~ PRIORITY  
Amembassy LONDON 3921 PRIORITY  
Amembassy CANBERRA 476 PRIORITY

Dec 18 8 18 PM '64  
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LIDDIS

Authority STATE 5-28-75  
By KR, NARS, Date 6-4-75

Djakarta's 1144 (Notal)

Dept shares your concern over worsening situation in Indo and concurs your proposal for full review with Sukarno when you see him Dec 19.

We not optimistic that any initiative open to us at this stage will be sufficient induce Sukarno to ease confrontation or even refrain from further moves against US interests in Indo. Conceivable, although doubtful, that combination adroit handling and pressure of events could make him trim his sails at this point. In any event, we agree every effort must be made. We believe, however, that points made in Kuala Lumpur's 731 are valid.

Sukarno will certainly attempt exploit any initiative on our part and will do his best interpret it as sign other side is weakening.

One thing we must avoid is commitment to Sukarno (or proposal he would twist into commitment) which we cannot fulfill. We would also have to consult Malaysians and British before undertaking any

explicit

Drafted by: FE:SPA:ECIngraham:hst 12-18-64  
Telegraphic transmission and Classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy

- S - The Secretary (draft)
- M - Gov. Harriman (draft)
- FE - Mr. Green (draft)
- White House - Mr. Bundy
- S/S - Miss Moor

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explicit move aimed at reopening negotiations. Malaysians and British ~~would~~ almost certain reject out of hand any formula that would require them start substantive talks with Indos in return for moratorium on incursions limited to specific time period. Open-ended moratorium would probably be salable without further conditions (i.e., academic insistence on withdrawals) but we cannot guarantee this or give Sukarno grounds for claiming our guarantee. Following approach has not been discussed with British or Australians and we would not propose do so until Sukarno response known.

When you see Sukarno, you should proceed along following lines:

1. Tell him you have been instructed to convey following personal message from President:

a. President has noted with concern recent reports regarding Sukarno's health. He extends his best wishes for speedy full recovery and hopes current difficulties will in no way impair Sukarno's continued leadership Indo people. If Sukarno and his doctors believe it would be helpful, President would be pleased provide services of appropriate US medical specialist to travel Indo to assist in diagnosis. FYI You should take no initiative in offering US medical facilities. For various reasons, including responsibility for life of such a sick national leader, we prefer that Sukarno not repeat not come US for treatment. If specialist visits Indonesia, he will be similarly instructed. If Sukarno raises matter, however, you should respond that

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you would be happy inform USG of his interest and are confident USG would do whatever it could to be of help. END FYI.

b. President is concerned over present state US-Indo relations and is anxious reverse unfortunate trend of past few months. He understands Sukarno is considering visit to New York World Fair next spring. If so, and if conditions otherwise appropriate, this would provide excellent opportunity for friendly review our mutual problems. Sukarno might consider visit at time official Fair re-opening in order officiate at opening Indo pavilion. Following that, President would be happy welcome him to Washington for informal talks, subject to unforeseen circumstances which might affect schedule of either one.

2. In regard to Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, you should tell Sukarno (stating you doing so on instruction if you believe this useful) that we continue to be more than willing to assist Sukarno in finding honorable solution to the problem which exists between him and Malaysia. In our opinion, what is preventing negotiated solution at this point is fact that continuation hostile actions by Indonesia against Malaysia has led COM, HMG, GOA to believe that, despite public protestations to contrary, Indonesia does not really want to settle the problem. We feel that if Sukarno would quietly cut off hostile action a new atmosphere would be created in which hopefully we would be able to work effectively to encourage negotiations. We cannot estimate how long this would take, but would watch situation closely and plan to

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keep in touch with Sukarno on it. You should emphasize, however, that we are simply unable to encourage anyone negotiate in this situation under present circumstances.

GP-3.

END

BALI.

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