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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Authority **STATE** **5.28.75**
By **AR** **6.4.75**
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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy DJAKARTA PRIORITY

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Subject following comments and modifications, Dept willing go along with presentation as set forth numbered paragraphs in Sect 2 of your 1643.

1) Viet Nam: We entirely agree that current attacks reflect underlying split between US and Indos caused primarily by widely divergent foreign policies. We have never believed we could persuade Indos we are right in such cases as Viet Nam, but have hoped Indos would accept concept of "agreeing to disagree" rather than resorting to riotmanship as they are now doing. Specific causes of latest series of outrages are doubtless numerous, but our reactions against North Viet Nam obviously at or near head of list. Unless Sukarno takes preventive action, we assume that ~~if further~~ ^{Vietnamese events may lead to further} ~~Indos will resort to more violence.~~ ~~For this reason we~~ ~~continue believe that you should explain to Sukarno that what we~~ ~~are doing in Viet Nam is absolutely required of us in terms of~~ ~~checking Communist expansion. Even though he may not agree with~~

Drafted by: SPA:DCCuthell/FE:MGræn/ew	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy
Clearance: 2/22/65	

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AID - Mr. Poats
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us, we are not going to be deflected by pressure in Indonesia, and ~~XXXX~~ we would hope Sukarno would not put course of bilateral Indonesian-American relations in hands of Viet Cong. If you do not feel you can get this across to Sukarno you need not use para 3 and 4, Deptel 727, but we continue believe that it is wiser to anticipate that this problem will arise again and to head off any tendency on the part of the GOI to condone or deal inadequately with those taking action against our properties.

2) Re proposal numbered para 5 part two your 1643, we agree completely that you should try to elicit clearly what Sukarno wants and is ~~is~~ prepared to defend in form of US presence in Indonesia, but without implication that we can or will accept his position as determining factor. We trust that as a result of your conversation with Sukarno we will then be in a better position to judge how to deal with the question of continuing our USIS program including libraries.

, In discussion our programs it most important you avoid giving impression AID program at this point is subject to any appreciable negotiation in Djakarta. If Sukarno wants program terminated or substantially reduced we can accommodate him, but it is not at all clear now whether Congress will give us any discretion in this matter or whether we will be willing to continue if Indo treatment of our interests follows pattern of ~~xxx~~ past weeks. As stated in our 727, reductions in AID staff result from reduction in activity of program, which in turn

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results from both Indo actions against us and Indo restrictions on program. These reductions are not at this point intended to be punitive, but they are not/subject to negotiation with GOI.
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GP-3.

END

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