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INDICATE: COLLECT
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Author: STATE 6.4.75
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Mar 26 8 10 PM '65

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy DJAKARTA 1065
Amembassy KUALA LUMPUR 884
Amembassy TOKYO 2755

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Department's preliminary views on current Japanese initiative to bring about Sukarno-Tunku summit in Tokyo as follows:

We see no evidence Sukarno prepared drop confrontation or engage in serious negotiations with Malaysians to that end. Distinct possibility, however, that he may for tactical reasons agree attend Tokyo summit now that Tunku has endorsed idea. If summit is held, we would expect Sukarno to press for prompt establishment Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission without "preconditions", i.e., prior agreement to halt military or political confrontation while AACC does its work. Difficult to see at this stage whether he might agree to de facto cessation hostilities as precondition to setting up AACC if Malaysians insist on it or whether he would use this issue to break up meeting.

Seems clear that Sukarno objective in agreeing to summit would be to forestall or minimize humiliating defeat in increasingly likely event Malaysians are seated at Algiers conference. If summit did produce agreement to creat AACC or to continue negotiations along

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other lines, Sukarno could either (a) save face at Algiers by announcing to other AA's that, since negotiations underway, Indo is making grand gesture withdrawing objection to Malaysian attendance, or (b) attempt block Malaysian attendance by insisting that issue of seating Malaysia be shelved in order not upset course of negotiations. Should summit end in deadlock, he would presumably use Malaysian "intransigence" to reinforce Indo efforts keep Malaysia out of Algiers.

Malaysians will obviously be called upon for delicate footwork if these are indeed Sukarno's intentions. On balance, however, advantage clearly seems to lie in going along as far as summit, taking care to exude atmosphere of reasonableness and to insure that Sukarno gets minimum propaganda mileage out of situation.

Japanese desire make summit a success now that they have stuck necks out could, however, pose additional problem for Malaysians. If faced with early Indo-Malaysian impasse at summit, possible that Japanese would press GOM to make concessions damaging to its position. Thus seems particularly important for Malaysians and Commonwealth allies to insure that Japanese fully understand their position and rationale behind it.

We can see no useful role USG might play at this time. Believe we should confine selves to following:

1. Let Japanese know we agree that effort is worth making and wish them success, although we feel that chances favorable outcome problematical at best in absence any real signs Indos prepared abandon confrontation.

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2. Continue encouraging Malaysians to appear as responsive as their situation permits. If it appears necessary, quietly suggest - either directly or through Commonwealth allies - that they step up efforts brief Japanese on their position.

3. Take no initiative in Djakarta, but respond if queried with routine comment that we of course favor peaceful negotiations and hope they succeed in resolving issue

Appreciate action addressee comments foregoing.

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