

~~TOP SECRET~~

66
Action
SS
Info

OO RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 1001A/1 17/0735Z
O 170717Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3423
STATE GRNC
BT

14784
065 APR 17 AM 5 55

I M M E D I A T E

002

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 17 SEONE OF TWO Authority NLS 84-86
By ies, NARS, Date 5-10-84

EXDIS
THIS MESSAGE UNDERTAKES TO SUMMARIZE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED OVER THE LAST TEN DAYS WITH REGARD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THIRD COUNTRY COMBAT FORCES AND TO DISCUSS THE PREFERRED WAY OF PRESENTING THE SUBJECT TO THE GVN.

AS THE RESULT OF THE MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS ON APRIL 1 AND THE NSC MEETING ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, I LEFT WASHINGTON AND RETURNED TO SAIGON WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE MARINES ALREADY ASHORE BY TWO ADDITIONAL BLT'S AND A F-4 CFN 3423 17 GVN 1 NSC DLT F-4

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1001A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
SQUADRON AND THE PROGRESSIVE INTRODUCTION OF 18-20,000 SUPPORT FORCES WERE APPROVED BY THAT DECISION ON THE SEVERAL PROPOSALS FOR BRINGING IN MORE US COMBAT FORCES AND THEIR POSSIBLE MODES OF EMPLOYMENT WAS WITHHELD IN AN OFFENSIVE COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE. STATE WAS TO EXPLORE WITH THE KOREAN, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND GOVTS THE POSSIBILITY OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF SIGNIFICANT COMBAT ELEMENTS IN PARALLEL WITH THE MARINE REINFORCEMENT.

SINCE ARRIVING HOME, I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS AND HAVE TAKEN THE INDICATED ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THIRD COUNTRY COMBAT FORCES.

APRIL 6 AND 8. RECEIVED GVN CONCURRENCE TO INTRODUCTION OF THE MARINE REINFORCEMENTS AND TO AN EXPANDED MISSION FOR ALL MARINES IN DANANG-PHU BAI AREA.

APRIL 8. RECEIVED DEPTTEL 2229 DIRECTING APPROACH TO GVN, SUGGESTING REQUEST TO AUSTRALIAN GOVT FOR AN INFANTRY BATTALION FOR USE IN SVN. WHILE AWAITING A PROPITIOUS MOMENT TO RAISE THE MATTER, I RECEIVED DEPTTEL 2287 DIRECTING APPROACH BE DELAYED UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS. NOTHING FURTHER HAS BEEN RECEIVED SINCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3423, April 17 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Saigon

APRIL 14. I LEARNED BY JCS 009012 TO CINCPAC OF APPARENT DECISION
CFN 18-20,000 6 8 GVN DANANG-PHU BAI 8 2229 GVN SVN 2287 14
JCS 009012

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1001A/~~TOP SECRET~~
TO DEPLOY 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE IMMEDIATELY TO BIEN HOA-
VUNG TAU. BY EMBTEL 3373, DELAY IN THIS DEPLOYMENT WAS URGENTLY
RECOMMENDED BUT NO REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED. HOWEVER, PARA 2 OF
DOC 152339 APPARENTLY MAKES REFERENCE TO THIS PROJECT IN TERMS
WHICH SUGGEST THAT IS SOMETHING LESS THAN AS AN APPROVED IMMEDIATE
ACTION. IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF ITS STATUS, I HAVE NOT
BROACHED THE MATTER WITH QUAT.

APRIL 15. RECEIVED DEPTTEL 2314 DIRECTING THAT EMBASSY SAIGON
DISCUSS WITH GVN INTRODUCTION OF ROK REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM AND
SUGGEST GVN REQUEST SUCH A FORCE ASAP. BECAUSE OF QUAT'S ABSENCE
FROM SAIGON, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO RAISE MATTER. AS MATTER OF
FACT, IT SHOULD NOT BE RAISED UNTIL WE HAVE A CLEAR CONCEPT OF
EMPLOYMENT.

APRIL 16. I HAVE JUST SEEN STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE DOD 152339
CITED ABOVE WHICH INDICATES A FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD SEVERAL
POSSIBLE USES OF US COMBAT FORCES BEYOND THE NSC DECISIONS OF APRIL 2.
I AM TOLD TO DISCUSS THESE AND CERTAIN OTHER NON-MILITARY MATTERS
URGENTLY WITH QUAT. THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS CABLE WILL BE ADDRESSED IN
A SEPARATE MESSAGE. I CAN NOT RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH QUAT WITHOUT
FURTHER GUIDANCE.

CFN 173RD BIEN HOA VUNG TAU 3373 NO 2 DOD 152339 NOT QUAT 15
2314 GVN ROK GVN ASAP QUAT NOT NOT 17 DOD 152339 NSC 2 QUAT NOT QUAT

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 1001A/~~TOP SECRET~~
FACED WITH THIS RAPIDLY CHANGING PICTURE OF WASHINGTON DESIRES AND
INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THIRD COUNTRY (AS
WELL AS US) COMBAT FORCES, I BADLY NEED A CLARIFICATION OF OUR PUR-
POSES AND OBJECTIVES. BEFORE I CAN PRESENT OUR CASE TO GVN, I HAVE
TO KNOW WHAT THAT CASE IS AND WHY. IT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO
GET READY CONCURRENCE FOR THE LARGE SCALE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN
TROOPS UNLESS THE NEED IS CLEAR AND EXPLICIT.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONF ID L 100000

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 3423, April 17 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Saigon

LET ME SUGGEST THE KIND OF INSTRUCTION TO THE AMB WHICH IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO RECEIVE FOR USE IN PRESENTING TO GVN WHAT I TAKE TO BE A NEW POLICY OF THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPATION IN GROUND COMBAT.

QUOTE THE USG HAS COMPLETED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN SVN BOTH IN ITS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS AND HAS REACHED CERTAIN IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS. IT FEELS THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN A SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE CHANGE IN THE OVERALL SITUATION AS THE RESULT OF THE AIR ATTACKS ON DRV, THE RELATIVELY SMALL BUT NUMEROUS SUCCESSES IN THE FIELD AGAINST THE VC AND THE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS OF THE QUAT GOVT. HOWEVER, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT, IN ALL PROBABILITY, THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE GVN AND THE USG OF CHANGING THE WILL OF THE DRV TO SUPPORT THE VC CFN GVN NOT GVN USG SVN DRV VC QUAT GVN USG DRV VC

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 1001A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

INSURGENCY CAN NOT BE ATTAINED IN AN ACCEPTABLE TIME FRAME BY THE METHODS PRESENTLY EMPLOYED. THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY SIGNAL SUCCESSES AGAINST THE VC IN THE SOUTH BEFORE WE CAN HOPE TO CREATE THAT FRAME OF MIND IN HANOI WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE DECISIONS WE SEEK. TAYLOR.

BT

CFN NOT VC

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 3:57 a.m., April 17.

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 4:35 a.m., April 17.

~~TOP SECRET~~