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COMMANDER TASK FORCE NINETY and COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP ONE

OPERATION ORDER

2-54

REVISED NOV. 1954

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SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEXES

B - Concept

C - Intelligence

Appendix I - Aerological Plan
II - Climatology

D - Movement

Appendix I - Cruising Instructions

I - Embarkation (Shore-to-Ship)

Appendix I - Transport Areas
Tab A - Transport Area Diagram
II - Embarkation and Loading Plan
Tab A - Embarkation Control Plan
B - Ship Loading Capabilities
III - Availability, Employment and Control of Lighterage
IV - Debarkation Port Operations
Tab A - Unloading Facilities SAIGON

J - Heavy Weather Instructions

K - Administrative

Appendix I - Reports
Tab A - Reports Summary
II - Public Information

L - Logistics

M - Medical

N - Communications

Appendix I - MSTS Communications

X - Distribution

Authenticated

SOURCE: CINCPAC Annual Report - 1 Jul 54 - 30 Jun 55

Indo-China Evacuation.

Provisions of the Geneva Conference permitted residents of North Indo China, which was to come under the control of Viet Minh to migrate to South Indo China prior to 15 May 1955. Several hundred thousand Vietnamese indicated their desire to move. This number exceeded the shipping capabilities of the French and Vietnamese Government who therefore requested assistance from the U.S. Government to provide surface transportation. This lift was performed initially by units of the Amphibious Force, Western Pacific and later by MSTB ships. Command of the U.S. sea operations was assigned to Commander Amphibious Group ONE under the direct operational control of CINCPACFLT.

During the period 16 August through 15 November, when most of the amphibious units were replaced by MSTB shipping, 173,311 refugees, 28,102 tons of cargo, and 5,791 vehicles were transported by Pacific Fleet and MSTB ships to ports south of the 17th parallel in an operations which has become known as "Passage to Freedom". Upon termination of the operation in May 1955, totals for the evacuation lifted by U.S. ships were: 17,846 military, and 293,002 civilians for a total of 310,848 passengers, 68,757 tons of cargo and 8,135 vehicles.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

TASK ORGANIZATION

90 <u>Amphibious Task Force</u>	RADM L. S. SABIN (COMPHIBGRU ONE)
a. 90.0 <u>Special Operations Group</u>	RADM L. S. SABIN (COMPHIBGRU ONE)
b. 90.0.1 <u>Flagship Unit</u>	CAPT J. W. WATERHOUSE (D) CAPT M. A. PETERSON (R) (CO, ESTES)
c. 90.8 <u>Evacuation Group</u>	CAPT N. J. FRANK, JR. (COMPHIBRON ONE)
d. 90.8.0 <u>Headquarters Unit</u>	CDR C. E. OLSON (CO, BALDUCK)
e. 90.8.1 <u>Embarkation Unit</u>	CDR J. H. DAVIS
	(1) Ships Assigned (2) Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Detachment
f. 90.8.2 <u>Debarkation Unit</u>	CO, MSTs Office Saigon LCDR R. F. MURRAY

1. GENERAL SITUATION

In August 1954, as a result of conclusion of truce negotiations between French Union Forces and Viet Minh, the United States was requested by the French and Vietnam Governments to furnish shipping to aid in evacuating their forces with organic equipment, selected civilians, refugees and MDAP equipment from the HAIPHONG Area of INDOCHINA to SAIGON and other ports in INDOCHINA south of the 17th parallel.

COMPHIBGRU ONE OpOrder 2-54, derived from CINCPACFLT Secret message 080259Z of August 1954, was implemented, and shipping moved to the INDOCHINA Area. Between 18 August 1954 and 10 November 1954, this Task Force transported 166,110 passengers, 5429 vehicles, and 26,133 tons of cargo from the TONKIN DELTA Area to ports in SOUTHERN VIETNAM. COMSERVRON THREE provided the logistic support for this operation.

By November the civilian refugee influx into the HAIPHONG Area markedly decreased, and this together with the reduction

SECRET

1

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

in requirements for cargo lift plus the French capability, permitted a corresponding reduction in shipping requirements for the evacuation. This revision of COMPHIBGRU ONE OpOrder 2-54 is derived from CINCPACFLT Confidential message 271842Z of October 1954 and provides for the continued conduct of the evacuation, but with a reduced task organization.

a. Enemy Forces

See Annex C, Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) French ground, naval, and air force,
- (2) Vietnamese ground and naval forces.
- (3) United States forces assigned.

2. MISSION

This force will maintain liaison with French Union Forces in VIETNAM and will continue to embark, transport, and disembark designated personnel and equipment by means of administrative lift

in order to

assist in the redeployment of French Union Forces with organic equipment, selected French and Vietnamese civilians, and MDAP equipment; and to evacuate civilian refugees desiring transportation from the HAIPHONG Area to SAIGON or other designated points in SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. a. Special Operations Group and

b. Flagship Unit

Operate as directed by CTF 90.

c. Evacuation Group

- (1) Command overall local sea operation.
- (2) Prescribe local security measures as necessary.

d. Headquarters Unit

- (1) Operate as directed by CTG 90.8.

SECRET

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

e. Embarkation Unit

- (1) Operate as directed by CTG 90.8.
- (2) Maintain military control of the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Detachment.
- (3) Control and coordinate the loading and embarkation of personnel and equipment from HAIPHONG Area.
- (4) Sail ships with embarked personnel and equipment to SAIGON or other points in SOUTH VIETNAM.
- (5) Provide liaison personnel ashore to assist in coordinating the embarkation and loading.

f. Debarkation Unit

- (1) Effect close liaison with French authorities and MAAG personnel at SAIGON and other points designated by CTG 90.8 in SOUTH VIETNAM for planning details of debarkation and unloading.
 - (2) Establish necessary control to assist in the expeditious unloading and clearance of incoming ships.
 - (3) Control and coordinate all unloading and debarkation in SAIGON or other designated ports in SOUTHERN VIETNAM.
 - (4) Make arrangements for pilots for ships sailing between CAPE ST JACQUES and SAIGON.
 - (5) When unloaded, sail ships to HAIPHONG unless otherwise directed by CTG 90.8.
 - (6) Assign anchorages and control the movements of debarkation shipping.
- x. (1) This order cancels and supersedes COMPHIBGRU ONE OpOrder 2-54 and is effective on 15 November 1954, or as otherwise directed by CTF 90.
- (2) Classification of this OpOrder may be downgraded to Confidential upon removal of Annex C.
 - (3) For concept of this operation see Annex B.
 - (4) United States Navy ships maintain readiness for war status at all times and defend against air, surface and sub-surface attack. MSTTS ships operate in accordance with MSTTS instructions, or as directed by CTG 90.8.

SECRET

3

SECRET

Operation Order

COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

(5) In event of submarine contact, operate and report in accordance with CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION O3360.2B of 14 April 1953.

(6) Be alert to avoid mines. Destroy mines sighted. Observe precautions outlined in OPNAV INSTRUCTION O3371.1A when operating in mineable waters.

(7) In event of air or surface attack, take immediate and aggressive action and measures of self defense. Make reports concerning action, or threat of attack to CTF 90, info CINCPACFLT and COMNAVFE.

(8) United States personnel will not be allowed ashore in the HAIPHONG Area except that certain individuals may be designated to confer with the French authorities relative to embarkation and/or other pertinent problems. A maximum of 20 personnel are allowed ashore at one time, including the Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Detachment.

4. Logistics in accordance with Annex L.

5. a. Communications in accordance with Annex N.

b. Command relationships in accordance with NWP 22 and Annex B, Concept.

c. Embarkation in accordance with Annex I.

d. Use zone time -8 (HOW) for operations.

e. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CTF 90) in assigned flagship. Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) second in command and in command local sea operations.

L. S. SABIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

ANNEXES:

B - Concept

C - Intelligence

Appendix I - Aerological Plan
II - Climatology

SECRET

4

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

D - Movement

Appendix I - Cruising Instructions

I - Embarkation (Shore-to-Ship)

Appendix I - Transport Areas
Tab A - Transport Area Diagram
II - Embarkation and Loading Plan
Tab A - Embarkation Control Plan
B - Ship Loading Capabilities
III - Availability, Employment and Control of
Lighterage
IV - Debarkation Port Operations
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Tab A - Reports Summary
II - Public Information

L - Logistics


M - Medical

N - Communications

Appendix I - MSTC Communications

X - Distribution

Authenticated:


E. L. WELLS,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
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9 November 1954; 1200H

ANNEX B

CONCEPT

1. MISSION

This order provides for the continuation of an administrative amphibious evacuation of French Union Forces with organic equipment, selected civilians, refugees and MDAP equipment from the HAIPHONG Area of INDOCHINA, redeployment by sea, and debarkation at SAIGON or other ports in SOUTHERN VIETNAM. This is a revision of COMPHIBGRU ONE OpOrder 2-54.

CTF 90 (COMPHIBGRU ONE) continues as overall commander of the sea operation under CINCPACFLT. CTG 90.8 (COMPHIBRON ONE) is designated in command of the local sea operation.

2. FORCES AVAILABLE

a. Ships of the Amphibious Group Western Pacific and such MSTs shipping as required to accomplish the move have been made available for the operation. However, CINCPACFLT has approved the phase out of designated PHIBGRUWESTPAC and MSTs ships consistent with requirements, with the understanding that additional shipping may be provided if needed.

b. Shipping schedules will be arranged to provide for maintaining a minimum number of ships in the objective area at any one time. Ships will be loaded and sailed as directed by CTG 90.8.

3. EVACUATION CONTROL

Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) is in direct control of embarkation operations. CTU 90.8.1 will assist as directed by CTG 90.8.

4. DEBARKATION CONTROL

Commander Debarkation Unit (CTU 90.8.2) is directly responsible to CTG 90.8 for debarkation operations.

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

CINCPAC is in overall command of U.S. military operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

B-1

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

CHMAAG, INDOCHINA under CINCPAC is the local military coordinator between French and Vietnamese authorities and U. S. commanders.

L. S. SAEIN
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

AUTHENTICATED:

E. L. Wells

E. L. WELLS,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy,
Flag Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

B-2

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
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SAIGON, VIETNAM
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ANNEX C

INTELLIGENCE

PART I - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Maps and Charts: See paragraph 6.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. General

The cease fire agreement concluded at GENEVA 21 July 1954 provided for the termination of hostilities in NORTHERN VIETNAM on 27 July, and in SOUTH VIETNAM on 11 August 1954.

Under the terms of the agreement VIETNAM was divided into two zones by a Demarcation Line generally along the 17th Parallel (up the SON BEN HAI RIVER as far as BO HO SU and thence due west to LAOS Frontier). Forces of the VIET MINH (known as Democratic Republic of VIETNAM) are to be withdrawn to the north of this Demarcation Line and those forces under the command of the FRENCH are to be withdrawn to the south of the line. The agreement provides that movement of all forces into their respective zones shall be completed by 18 May 1955.

FRENCH and VIETNAMESE forces completed evacuation of the HANOI and HAI DUONG areas by the scheduled dates 10 and 30 October 1954 respectively without incident. The lifting of designated personnel and equipment from the HAIPHONG area remains to be completed.

b. Specific

(1) Political

For a detailed analysis of the political situation see COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Volume II. (Held by Group Commanders and Flagship Units).

(2) Naval Forces

(a) The VIET MINH have no naval forces as such. Various sizes and types of junks, both sail and motor powered, and a small number of fast vedettes make up the entire composition of VIET MINH vessels and craft. The preponderance of FRENCH naval strength in comparison to enemy naval forces available in the INDOCHINA area of

SECRET

C-1

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

operations is too great to encourage any VIET MINH naval operations other than mining, reconnaissance, and logistical support operations. It is known that the VIET MINH possess vedettes, but thus far their sole function has been to bring certain vital supplies through the FRENCH coast patrols. The characteristics of the vedettes in the hands of the VIET MINH are not known other than the fact that they are small motor boats of varying sizes and speeds and that their number is believed by the FRENCH to be small. The pattern of movement of VIET MINH junks and craft may be characterized as clandestine merchant marine operations, and not logistical operations of a naval nature. See COMNAVFF Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Volume III.

(b) Logistics and Operating Methods

The principal naval need of the VIET MINH is for effective water-borne logistical support, and it is to this purpose that all available junks and small craft have been assigned. Sea-borne logistic movements by VIET MINH small craft fall into three general patterns: (1) Movements from CHINESE COMMUNIST ports along the GULF OF TONKIN and HAINAN ISLAND to VIET MINH bases in NORTH and CENTRAL VIETNAM; (2) Movements from ports in THAILAND and MALAYA to VIET MINH bases in SOUTH VIETNAM; (3) "Distribution traffic" along the coast of VIETNAM between VIET MINH bases.

As of 9 November the following SOVIET and satellite merchant ships have been reported to be employed in evacuating VIET MINH forces and equipment from south to north. Also one NORWEGIAN ship as indicated below was reportedly so employed.

SOVIET: ARCHANGELSK *, STAVROPOL *, ZYRIANIN.

POLISH: KILINSKI *, GENERAL BEM, SKLOWDOSKA,
 PRZYJAZN NARODOW, KOSCIUSZKO.

NORWEGIAN: SUNNY PRINCE.

* Presence in INDOCHINA waters confirmed.

(c) Mine Warfare

Up to the 9th of November 1954 no floating mines to seaward have been reported. However, VIET MINH forces are believed capable of employment of floaters (downstream) against friendly forces. The VIET MINH have depended on the use of controlled mines almost exclusively, and have had some success with this type of

SECRET

C-2

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

weapon. These mines are found in rivers, canals and in shallow water areas along the coast. Native junks, sampans and other small craft may be employed by VIET MINH in mine laying operations.

(3) VIET MINH Air Power

(a) Up to the 9th of November no VIET MINH air activity has been reported over INDOCHINA. No aircraft are known to belong to the VIET MINH forces. A detailed study may be found in COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Volume III, Part IV, Section D, regarding enemy air facilities and forces in the area.

(4) Ground Forces

See COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study of INDOCHINA, Volume III for complete discussion of VIET MINH Ground Forces Order of Battle.

(5) Special Weapons: (Nuclear, Bacteriological Warfare)

(a) The VIET MINH are believed not to have atomic weapons and any employment of these weapons is considered unlikely.

(b) The employment of any bacteriological agents is improbable.

c. Enemy Capabilities

(1) Enumeration

Although present indications are that the VIET MINH will abide by the present terms of the armistice agreement, it is considered the enemy can, by reopening hostilities:

(a) Conduct air attacks on our naval forces, including merchant shipping enroute to or deployed in the objective area, employing light bombers (including IL 28's), torpedo bombers, jet and piston fighters from bases in SOUTHERN CHINA, HAINAN ISLAND and VIET MINH held territory.

(b) Conduct submarine attacks on our forces enroute to and while in the objective area, employing a limited number of coastal type submarines based in CHINESE ports at anytime in the GULF OF TONKIN, SOUTH CHINA SEA, EAST CHINA SEA and PHILIPPINE SEA.

(c) Mine the waters of the EAST CHINA SEA and FORMOSA STRAIT at any time employing aircraft, submarines, junks, sampans and other craft.

SECRET

C-3

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

- (d) Conduct small scale surprise attacks on our forces including merchant shipping, approaching, departing or deployed within the objective area, employing a limited number of light naval craft and such CHINESE COMMUNIST naval forces, including motor torpedo boats, as may be committed.
- (e) Mine the waters of the GULF OF TONKIN, using planes, submarines, junks, sampans, or a combination thereof.
- (f) Launch floating mines in rivers and in the coastal waters in the TONKIN DELTA area.
- (g) Destroy navigational aids and emplace waterways barriers, controlled mines, and booby trap mechanisms in and along all principal waterway routes in the objective area.
- (h) Conduct small scale amphibious operations in and near the TONKIN DELTA area over short distances from the coasts of INDOCHINA, HAINAN ISLAND and SOUTH CHINA during periods of darkness, employing junks, sampans and other small craft.
- (i) Overwhelm or destroy FRENCH and VIETNAM forces in the objective area, employing up to six VIET MINH infantry divisions and six independent infantry regiments supported by two artillery-engineer divisions and such CHINESE COMMUNIST forces as may be committed.
- (j) Prevent deliberate and orderly withdrawal by the use of created incidents, sabotage, strikes, infiltration of agents in a refugee status, propaganda drives, demonstrations and passive resistance to traffic and personnel.
- (k) By resuming guerrilla activity, harass friendly forces in the process of withdrawing from the objective area.
- (l) Conduct sabotage and other subversive activities, and land agents and guerrillas, in friendly held territory.

d. Conclusions

In the event of reopening of hostilities the relative probability of adoption by the enemy of the capabilities enumerated above is believed to be:

MOST PROBABLE

Capabilities (j) and (k), separately or together with any or all of capabilities (f), (g) and (l).

SECRET

C-4

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

NEXT PROBABLE	Capabilities (a), (c), (e) or (i) in conjunction with any or all of capabilities (f), (g), (k) and (l).
LEAST PROBABLE	Capabilities (b), (d) and (h).

2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATION

a. Weather

See Appendix I to this Annex.

b. Topography

Terrain studies of the HANOI-HAIPHONG and SAIGON areas are contained in COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Part I-6.

c. Hydrography and Oceanography

Details of Hydrography and Oceanography are contained in COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, Part I-D.

d. Port and Beach Studies

Parts I-F, I-G and I-H of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA, contain detailed information on landing beaches, ports, harbors, anchorages and special landing sites, cities, towns and villages in the area of operations.

e. Transportation and Communications

Studies of transportation and communications are contained in Part II of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA.

f. Political

The overall political situation is essentially that given in Part III-A of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA.

Currently, developments in SOUTH VIETNAM include a major internal crisis between the government and the army. Indications point to possible attempts to unseat the present premier, NGO DINH DIEM, and establish a military government. The VIETNAMESE National Army's overall significance as an effective force has deteriorated. The psychological setback from the VIET MINH victory, coupled with the current weaknesses of VIETNAMESE leadership, both in the government and in the army, have combined to substantially demoralize

SECRET

C-5

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

VIETNAMESE troops. This situation has been fully exploited by VIET MINH propagandists, and the desertion rate among VIETNAMESE troops has soared.

In the north, because of the provincial outlook of most VIETNAMESE, many have considered movement to SOUTH VIETNAM to be tantamount to emigration to a foreign land. In SOUTH VIETNAM, the removal of VIET MINH troops is expected to do little to upset the VIET MINH balance in that area. The VIET MINH already control large areas of SOUTH VIETNAM by political means, and their political cadres and underground are accelerating their subversion. Retiring VIET MINH troops could be expected to leave their arms and ammunition behind with pro-Communists. The factionalism of sects in SOUTH VIETNAM has weakened the position of the VIETNAMESE Government and has contributed to the continued weakness of the VIETNAMESE Army, so that the outlook is currently dark for national unity and progress of defense against Communism.

g. Sociological

Sociological factors involved in this area are found in Part III-C of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA.

h. Economic

The economic situation is included in Part III-B of COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA.

PART II - INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Will the enemy conduct air attacks on our forces, including merchant shipping, approaching or deployed within the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what number and types of planes? How will such planes be armed and equipped? Where will they be based?

Indications:

(1) Concentration of aircraft, particularly IL 28 jet bombers, on fields in SOUTHERN CHINA.

(2) Rehabilitation and/or construction of additional fields in SOUTHERN CHINA.

(3) Flights of CCF aircraft over the GULF OF TONKIN.

(4) Air attacks against FRENCH and VIETNAM land or naval units.

SECRET

C-6

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

b. Will the enemy conduct submarine attacks on our forces approaching or departing from the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what number and type of submarines? Where will they be based? How will they be equipped?

Indications:

- (1) Presence of enemy submarines at SOUTH CHINA ports or HAINAN ISLAND.
- (2) Presence of enemy submarines in the GULF OF TONKIN or adjacent waters.
- (3) Submarine attacks against friendly naval units.

c. Will the enemy mine the waters of the EAST CHINA SEA and FORMOSA STRAIT? If so, when, where and from what numbers and types of aircraft, naval ships and craft? What number and types of mines will be laid and in what patterns?

Indications:

- (1) Sighting of enemy aircraft, surface vessels or submarines apparently engaged in laying mines.
- (2) Sighting of mines, moored and/or drifting.
- (3) Friendly mine casualties in those waters.

d. Will the enemy conduct small scale surprise attacks with light naval craft on our forces, including merchant shipping, approaching or deployed within the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what number and type of naval craft? Where will such enemy craft be based? How will they be equipped?

Indications:

- (1) Concentration of enemy light naval and other small craft at HAINAN ISLAND or SOUTH CHINA ports.
- (2) Attacks against picket and unescorted ships by light naval units including motor torpedo boats.
- (3) Night radar surface contacts in the GULF OF TONKIN, particularly of craft with speeds of from 20 to 45 knots.

e. Will the enemy mine the waters of the GULF OF TONKIN? If so, when, where, and from what planes, ships or craft? What will

SECRET

C-7

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

be the number, type, and equipment of the planes, ships and craft so employed? What number and types of mines will be laid, and in what patterns?

Indications:

- (1) Flights of enemy aircraft over the GULF OF TONKIN.
- (2) Presence in the GULF OF TONKIN of enemy naval units, junks, sampans and other minelaying craft.
- (3) Presence of floating and/or moored mines.
- (4) Incidence of friendly mine casualties.
- (5) Stockpiling of naval mines at ports and airfields in SOUTH CHINA and on HAINAN ISLAND.

f. Will the enemy launch floating mines in rivers or in the coastal waters of the GULF OF TONKIN? If so, when, where and in what number? What types of mines will be so launched?

Indications:

- (1) Sighting of floating mines in the rivers and coastal waters of INDOCHINA.
- (2) Presence of suitable mines in enemy held areas of INDOCHINA.
- (3) Casualties to friendly craft and ships operating in the rivers and coastal waters of INDOCHINA.

g. Will the enemy destroy navigational aids or emplace waterway barriers, controlled mines, or booby trap mechanisms in and along the principal waterway routes in the operation area? If so, when and where? What number and types of waterway barriers, controlled mines, or booby trap mechanism will be emplaced? How effective will they be?

Indications:

- (1) Navigational aids destroyed, altered or moved out of position.
- (2) Activity of enemy craft in the waterways.
- (3) Discovery of electric cables extending from shore into waterways.

SECRET

C-8

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

(4) Activity of enemy personnel along banks of waterways.

(5) Presence of obstructions and/or mines in waterways.

h. Will the enemy conduct small scale amphibious operations? If so, when, where, and in what strength? How will enemy forces employed be armed and equipped? What types of craft will be employed?

Indications:

(1) Concentration of small craft and enemy ground forces on the SOUTH CHINA coast, HAINAN ISLAND and areas of INDOCHINESE coast under VIET MINH control.

(2) Radar contacts or sighting of a considerable number of small craft in a large group or groups.

(3) Training of enemy forces in amphibious operations.

i. Will the enemy overwhelm or destroy FRENCH and friendly VIETNAM forces in the operation area? If so, when, where, and with what forces? How will such enemy forces be armed and equipped?

Indications:

(1) Maximum concentration of VIET MINH forces in TONKIN DELTA.

(2) Introduction of substantial number of CHINESE COMMUNIST ground and air forces.

j. Will the enemy prevent a deliberate and orderly withdrawal of FRENCH and friendly VIETNAM forces from the TONKIN area? If so, by what means and employing what forces? How will such enemy forces be armed and equipped?

Indications:

(1) Increased pressure of enemy forces against friendly defense perimeter.

(2) Increased guerrilla and sabotage activity in friendly rear areas.

k. Will the enemy, by increasing guerrilla activity, harass FRENCH and VIETNAM forces attempting to withdraw from the TONKIN

SECRET

C-9

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

DELTA area? If so, when, where, and by what means? What forces will be employed? How will they be armed?

Indications:

(1) Increase of guerrilla activity including sabotage in TONKIN DELTA area.

(2) Increased boldness in guerrilla attacks.

1. Will the enemy conduct sabotage or other subversive activities against friendly installations employing agents infiltrating or landing in friendly held territory?

Indications:

(1) Damaging of vital equipment and machinery, disruption of communications.

(2) Assassination of friendly military and civilian personnel.

(3) Occurrence of riots and demonstrations within friendly held areas.

(4) Agents being landed in friendly held territory.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS

a. No requests to higher or adjacent commands are anticipated.

b. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units

(1) Underwater Demolition Teams

No reconnaissance or photographic missions are contemplated under the present situation.

PART III - SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS

5. CAPTURED PERSONNEL, MATERIAL, AND DOCUMENTS

a. It is not anticipated that enemy personnel will be directly involved.

b. Captured Material and Documents

(1) All documents belonging, or formerly belonging to the VIET MINH forces, falling into the hands of personnel of Task Force 90 will

SECRET

C-10

SECRET

Operation Order

COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

be delivered to CTF 90 by most expeditious means available.

(2) All military material and equipment belonging to the VIET MINH forces acquired by personnel of Task Force 90 will be referred to CTF 90 as soon as practical. Material and equipment so referred will be tagged with the name of the ship, unit, or organization.

(3) All personnel will be thoroughly indoctrinated regarding the collection of souvenirs and will be warned against the commission of any act which might be considered looting. Personnel legitimately obtaining items for retention as souvenirs will have these articles immediately cleared in writing through the CTF 90 Intelligence Officer. For current policies concerning souvenirs see OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5800.4.

6. GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE AIDS

a. Maps, Charts and Photographs

(1) All units are directed to procure and maintain on board materials required by List CHARLIE, CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 03840.1B. It should be noted that these are the minimum requirements. AMS maps may be drawn from the Air Navigation Office at Naval Air Station, ATSUGI, JAPAN.

(2) H.O. Charts for this area are contained in Portfolio 63. In addition H.O. Misc 15,551-25 series and H.O. Misc 15,551-50 series have been recently published. H.O. charts may be drawn from the Branch Hydrographic Office located at the Naval Air Station, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN.

(3) COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA contains numerous graphics covering the area of operations.

(4) Locations at sea shall be given by geographic coordinates.

(5) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Grid System will be used for locations ashore except where other specific instructions are given.

7. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

a. General

(1) The aim of counter-intelligence is to deny the enemy information of friendly organization, mission and plans. The

SECRET

C-11

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU CMT 2-54 (Revised)

necessity for guarding against sabotage, espionage and subversion is a command function that cannot be over-emphasized. Commanding officers must insure that security measure directives within their command provide adequate protection against the threat of sabotage, espionage and subversion. A message report will be made to CTF 90 of all acts or attempted acts of sabotage, espionage and subversion.

(2) Commanding officers exercise every precaution to prevent classified material from falling into unauthorized and enemy hands. Thoroughly indoctrinate all personnel against the dangers of discussing projected operations. The doctrine of "need to know" disclosure of classified information will be rigidly applied.

b. Captured Personnel

Personnel captured by the enemy when undergoing interrogation must give only their full name, rank or rating, date of birth and file or serial number. This information is contained on the Geneva Conventions Identification Card (DD Form 528). It is essential that no additional information be given. Commanding officers instruct all personnel accordingly.

c. Classified Material

(1) Carry only classified material absolutely necessary for the conduct of operations ashore or in aircraft. Closely safeguard all such classified matter. In event of danger of compromise or capture destroy such material immediately. Make reports of compromise or destruction in accordance with current instructions.

(2) Ensure that all personnel flying over, or travelling within or adjacent to, unfriendly or enemy territory are briefed only on items essential to accomplishment of their mission. Personnel with access to highly classified matter or broad knowledge of theatre plans or operations are not to be placed in a position where risk of capture by the enemy conceivably exists.

d. Measures for Handling Evacuated Friendly Personnel

(1) General

No firm figure is available as to the number of FRENCH and VIETNAMESE personnel remaining to be evacuated after 1 November, but is estimated not to exceed 4,000 persons per week.

(2) Relationship of Task Force Personnel with evacuees

SECRET

C-12

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

(a) All commanders will keep under observation all personnel being evacuated, in order to insure that security provisions are met, and will be especially alert to the possibility of VIET MINH infiltration and inspired incidents.

(b) It should be anticipated that agents of the VIET MINH may adopt certain tactics to impede and disrupt orderly evacuation. These may appear in the following forms:

1. Rumors

This is a tool used by subversives to incite panic, riot, and other forms of violence. Rumors must be stopped at their source. Liaison personnel can effectively control them by close supervision and prompt dissemination of information or instructions to evacuees.

2. Demonstrations

a. These could be a very effective means of hindering the mission of TF 90. Well organized and led, demonstrations involving men and women could be difficult to control if allowed to culminate.

b. Incidents involving arguments, heated discussions or fighting must not be allowed to continue after detection. FRENCH liaison personnel are embarked for the purpose of controlling evacuees and should take immediate action. U. S. personnel must not attempt to interfere and/or settle disputes, unless so directed by the commanding officer of the ship.

3. Fires

Sabotage by fire is a favorite method of saboteurs and it should be remembered that arson is comparatively safe, simple and easy. It is convenient to handle and conceal incendiary devices and material. Care should be exercised to be alert for the following evidence:

(1) Accelerants

Gasoline, kerosene, alcohol, benzine, turpentine, lighter fluid and similar products to accelerate a set fire are easily transported by individuals. These items will be removed from evacuees prior to embarkation and extra precautions should be taken due to their portability.

SECRET

C-13

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHTBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

(2) Mechanical Devices

Any articles of a suspicious nature in the possession of evacuees should be confiscated immediately by FRTNCH liaison personnel. Although it is difficult to totally confiscate matches, lighters and candles, it must be remembered that those and other innocent appearing articles can be arranged with effective time devices to ignite a fire hours or even days after emplacement.

4. Explosives

Special care will be exercised to prevent any explosives from coming aboard. Although evacuees will be searched prior to embarkation, smuggling aboard of explosive charges is a distinct capability. Guards and watches should be instructed to be alert for evidence of grenades, mines, bombs or other devices.

5. Theft or Destruction of Property

Theft or malicious destruction of property must be closely guarded against. Current instructions are contained in COMNAVFE INSTRUCTION 5511.2 relative to thefts of government property.

8. INTERPRETERS, TRANSLATORS AND SPECIALISTS TEAMS

a. U. S. military linguists have been assigned to group and unit commands of TF 90. Commanders are to interchange these personnel within their commands in any manner which will best suit their needs and expedite the evacuation.

9. REPORTS

a. Special reports will be forwarded as requested by CTF 90.

b. Subordinate commanders will make FLASH reports to CINCPACFLT, COMNAVFE and CTF 90 in plain language in the event of:

(1) Attack by hostile aircraft.

(2) Atomic attack.

(3) Biological or chemical attack.

(4) Submarine attack or initial contact with a submarine not identified as friendly (CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 03360.2B).

(5) Surface attack, amphibious attack or a combination of both.

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C-14

SECRET

Operation Order
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SECRET

C-13

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COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

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(3) Biological or chemical attack.

(4) Submarine attack or initial contact with a submarine not identified as friendly (CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 03360.2B).

(5) Surface attack, amphibious attack or a combination of both.

SECRET

C-14

81-3

SECRET

Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

(6) Mines or minefields not previously reported.

(7) Serious incidents created by embarked evacuees.

c. Amplifying details of these events will normally be classified and made as directed in paragraph 1400 - 1490, USF 70(B).

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Commander Amphibious Task Force
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APPENDICES

I - Aerological Plan (Confidential)
II - Climatology (Confidential)

Authenticated:

E. L. Wells

E. L. WELLS
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy
Flag Secretary

81-3

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C-15

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX C

AEROLOGICAL PLAN

Ref: (a) Chapter 34, USF 70(B), paragraphs 3400, 3410, 3430, 3432, 3435 and 3450(NWIP (16-1) when effective)
(b) H. O. Pub 206
(c) COMNAVFE Current Instructions
(d) Typhoon and Hurricanes, Aerology Series 10, NAVAER OO-80U-21

1. SOURCES OF GENERAL WEATHER INFORMATION

a. Fleet Weather Central, SANGLEY POINT, P. I. (NPO) and Radio, SAIGON (XVS) are primary sources of weather information for the operation.

b. Reference (b) contains schedules of transmissions for above broadcasts, available to ships. Particular attention is invited to section 370205, 360900, 270203, 270205 and 26092.

2. WEATHER FORECASTS BY ACTIVITIES ASHORE

Forecasts and advisories in plain language are issued by Fleet Weather Center, SANGLEY POINT, P. I., (NPO). For schedules, frequencies and areas covered see Article 370205 of reference (b).

3. WEATHER REPORTS TO ACTIVITIES ASHORE

a. The senior commander of individual units or tactical groups will make weather reports in accordance with references (a) and (c).

b. Attention is invited to paragraph 3432 of reference (a) which directs commanders of individual units or tactical groups to break radio silence and make weather reports when encountering unmistakable signs of a tropical storm. CTF 90 will be made information addressee on all such weather reports.

4. SMALL CRAFT AND STORM WARNINGS IN OBJECTIVE AREA

a. Small craft warnings will be issued by CTG 90.8 to all ships in company in the objective area whenever winds of over 20 knots occur. Storm warnings will be issued whenever winds greater than 30 knots occur or are expected to occur.

b. These warnings will be effective for a six hour period and will be either renewed or cancelled at the end of each six hour period after original time of issue.

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C-I-1

CONFIDENTIAL

Operation Order

COMPHIBGRU ONT 2-54 (Revised)

5. TYPHOON WARNINGS

a. Navy Weather Central, SANGLEY POINT, P. I., is charged with the issuance of typhoon warnings in the area covering 5°S to 25°N and 100°E to 130°E.

b. These warnings are transmitted to NTRK on the appropriate FOX schedule and also on the weather schedules given in section 370205 of reference (b).

c. All commanders and commanding officers will maintain a six hour plot of all typhoon and tropical storm warnings received. Reference (d) contains valuable information on determining the danger sector of typhoons and maneuvering to avoid this danger sector.

6. See Annex J for Heavy Weather Instructions.

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Flag Secretary

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C-I-2

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX C

CLIMATOLOGY

Ref: (a) COMNAVFE Special Intelligence Study, INDOCHINA,
Volume I of June 1954

1. CLIMATOLOGY (GENERAL)

a. The weather of INDOCHINA is dominated by the monsoon circulation. The southwest monsoon with its attendant high temperatures and humidity occur from June to September. The dry northeast winter monsoon is felt from October to March.

b. The climate of the entire INDOCHINA area may be classified as tropical with high temperatures and humidity. Rainfall at certain times of the year is great enough to hinder military operations with a large part of the country under extensive cloud coverage, but in contrast there are periods of fair weather when operating conditions are favorable. These extremes follow a definite pattern and are seasonal. Horizontal visibilities are seldom poor enough to limit operations seriously, except in heavy rainfall or during a fog, and drizzle conditions known as the "crachin" that occurs in the GULF OF TONKIN and TONKIN DELTA area from mid-January to mid-April and on the CENTRAL VIETNAM coast south of VINH from late October to February. Restrictions to visibility such as smoke, morning fog and haze are present in all seasons. Aircraft operations may be hindered by haze especially when it is worst over TONKIN from October to January.

c. The most frequent wind speeds throughout INDOCHINA are between 4 and 14 knots. In the morning and during the night there is usually no wind, except for light offshore breezes along the coast. Strong winds, more than 28 knots, usually occur during the northeast winter monsoon, in thunder storms, or during a typhoon.

d. Cloudiness and precipitation varies directly with the monsoon seasons. The rainy season commences in May in SOUTH INDOCHINA and TONKIN DELTA. October marks the end of the rainy season.

e. Typhoons strike INDOCHINA with a maximum occurrence between the months of July and November.

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COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

f. Details and statistics of regional climatology and military aspects of weather are contained in reference (a).

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C-II-2

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COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H.

ANNEX D

MOVEMENT

1. GENERAL

No specific or detailed task organization for this movement is prescribed herein. Normally, ships will be sailed on an individual basis as directed by CTG 90.8.

2. OPERATING AREAS

Operating areas extend from the TONKIN GULF Area as far south as SAIGON.

3. OBJECTIVE AREA

HAIPHONG is designated as the objective area. (See H.O. Chart No. 6407).

4. ANCHORAGES

a. Transport and LST anchorages for normal use in the objective area are shown in Tab A, Appendix I to Annex I.

b. Heavy weather anchorages in the objective area will be designated as necessary by CTG 90.8.

5. SORTIE AND MOVEMENT FROM OBJECTIVE AREA

a. It is envisioned that all embarkation shipping will be sailed independently as soon as loaded to SAIGON or other designated debarcation points.

b. In the event enemy air or submarine intervention makes it necessary to resort to the convoy system, air and/or surface escort as available will be furnished.

c. Cruising instructions for naval vessels are contained in Appendix I to this annex.

d. Ships enroute to SAIGON or other points south, move via usually travelled coastal route, but remain outside the 50 fathom curve as far south as possible. Minimum approach to HAINAN ISLAND, 25 miles.

CONFIDENTIAL

D-1

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

6. HYDROGRAPHIC AND PORT INFORMATION

a. Data with reference to navigational hazards, tides and currents are contained in H.O. Pub. No. 125, Sailing Directions for the Western Shores of the China Sea.

b. Port information on embarkation and debarkation ports appear in Annex C, Intelligence.

7. MOVEMENT REPORTS

Movement reports will be made by ships in accordance with NWIP 16-1.

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Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Amphibious Task Force
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APPENDIX:

I - Cruising Instructions

AUTHENTICATED:



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Flag Secretary.

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D-2

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX D

1. GENERAL

a. Instructions contained in this appendix apply to naval ships steaming independently or in company with other naval ships.

2. READINESS

a. Maintain minimum General Degree of Readiness IV at all times when at sea.

b. All ships maintain minimum Engineering Condition II unless otherwise directed.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Conserve fuel and water.

b. All ships prepare to tow or to be towed.

c. Heavy ships be prepared to fuel smaller ships.

d. Use navigational lights with caution as they may be extinguished, have altered characteristics, or be changed in location.

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D-I-1

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

ANNEX I

EMBARKATION AND LOADING (SHORE TO SHIP)

1. GENERAL

a. This annex with its attached appendices provides information and instructions for embarkation, debarkation, loading and offloading in order to carry out the mission as shown in Annex B.

2. EMBARKATION AND LOADING AREAS

Embarkation and loading will be conducted primarily from the port of HAIPHONG. Cargo and vehicles will be loaded at berths, and at landing slots at the BRIQUETTERIE and POSTE 6. Shuttle craft will be used to load cargo and vehicles in ships at buoys in river at HAIPHONG and ships anchored in DINH VU CUT. Only ships of less than 22 feet draft when loaded will be ordered up river to HAIPHONG and DINH VU CUT. Shuttle craft will be used to load passengers in ships at anchor in BAI DE LONG, and HENRIETTE PASS.

3. DEBARKATION AND UNLOADING AREAS

SAIGON will be the primary port of debarkation and unloading. Secondary ports such as CAP ST JACQUES, NHA TRANG, and TOURANE may be designated.

4. HYDROGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Hydrographic information on ports, channel approaches, beaches, and information on port facilities is contained in Annex C.

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and COMPHIBGRU 1

APPENDICES:

I - Transport Areas

Tab A - Anchorage area diagram of BAI DE LONG and HENRIETTE PASS

II - Embarkation and Loading Plan

Tab A - Embarkation Control Plan

Tab B - Ship Loading Capacities

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I-1

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

APPENDICES: (Cont'd)

III - Availability and Employment of Lighterage

IV - Debarkation Port Operations

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Flag Secretary.

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I-2

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Operation Order

COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX I

EMBARKATION AND LOADING PLAN

1. GENERAL

a. This plan provides for embarkation and loading in order to carry out mission assigned in Annex B.

b. Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) will coordinate embarkation and loading functions with the French and Vietnam officials.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) has overall responsibility for, and control of, all embarkation and loading operations.

b. Commander Embarkation Unit (CTU 90.8.1) is responsible to CTG 90.8 for:

(1) Loading and embarkation of designated troops, civilians and equipment.

(2) Transporting embarked personnel and equipment to port of debarkation.

(3) Having a representative present during the searching and screening process conducted by the French.

c. French and Vietnam officials have been and it is assumed will continue to be responsible for:

(1) Movement to and assembly of troops, civilians and equipment at designated embarkation points.

(2) Screening, selecting and control of all civilians to be embarked, and control of all other civilians in order that they will not interfere with redeployment operations.

(3) Providing personnel as required to assist in loading operations.

(4) Providing lighterage and stevedores for loading ships and shuttle craft at port of embarkation.

(5) Providing Commander Evacuation Group with passenger lists and cargo manifests for each ship loaded.

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I-II-1

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COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

3. LOADING INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Administrative loading will be employed.
- b. Ships will be loaded to maximum capacity consistent with the safety and seaworthiness of the ships.
- c. Employment of US merchant ship crews and special authorization therefore:

US merchant crews will be employed as stated in their charter. Emergency variation in employment of these orders may be ordered to meet the exigency of the situation in which case a separate letter of authorization will be issued to the masters of merchant ships by the Commander Embarkation Unit. In each case, Commander Embarkation Unit obtains prior approval by CTG 90.8.

d. SHIPS LOADING CAPACITIES

See Tab A to this appendix.

- e. It may be necessary to build topside sanitary facilities.
- f. No animals will be loaded.
- g. Weight limitation of baggage and/or personal effects carried by evacuees will be at the discretion of commanding officers and masters. However, CTG 90 desires that as liberal an attitude as possible be assumed.

4. CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT AND DUNNAGE

- a. In addition to ship's cargo handling equipment and dunnage, ships may request additional requirements from Commander Embarkation Unit who will obtain from French.

5. SHIPPING ASSIGNMENTS

As directed by Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8).

6. REPORTS

- a. All ships upon sailing from port of embarkation will report to Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) with info to Commander Debarbarkation Unit (CTU 90.8.2) as follows:

P - Time of Departure
R - Estimated SOA
A - ETA Point MIAMI (10°15'N 107°06'E) or UTAH (20°37'N 107°E)
Y - Number of civilian passengers embarked

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I-II-2

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Operation Order

COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

- L - Number of military passengers embarked.
- I - Number of vehicles loaded
- F - Short tons cargo loaded
- T - Is control team embarked

h. CTG 90.8 make message situation report periodically to CINCPACFLT, information to CNO, CTF 90, and other interested commanders.

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Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Amphibious Task Force
and COMPHIBGRU 1

TABS:

- A - Embarkation Control Plan
- B - Ship Loading Capacities

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I-II-3

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
Saigon, Vietnam
9 November 1954; 1200H

TAB A TO APPENDIX II TO ANNEX I

EMBARKATION CONTROL PLAN

1. GENERAL

a. Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) has overall control of loading and embarkation.


2. RESPONSIBILITIES

a. Commander Embarkation Unit (CTU 90.8.1) is responsible to CTG 90.8 for:

- (1) Coordinating all ship movements.
- (2) Assigning anchorages in the embarkation areas.
- (3) Preparing and issuing sailing orders to all ships in the embarkation areas.
- (4) Supervising the operation of all embarkation.
- (5) Arranging pilotage for incoming and outgoing ships in the HAIPHONG Area.
- (6) Informing French and Vietnam officials through MAAG representatives HAIPHONG of the projected availability of shipping.
- (7) Allocation of shipping to personnel or cargo and/or vehicles.
- (8) Requesting movement of personnel, cargo and vehicles to embarkation point.
- (9) Obtaining from French or Vietnam officials sailing rosters and cargo manifests for each ship.
- (10) Administrative control of Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Detachment.

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I-II-A-1

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC-12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

TAB B TO APPENDIX II TO ANNEX I

SHIPS LOADING CAPACITIES

1. GENERAL

The data herein is furnished for guidance in loading. Tonnage capacities for individual ship types are generally uniform and should not be exceeded except after receiving authority from the naval commander responsible for loading (CTG 90.8). Under adverse conditions, it may be necessary to load personnel in excess of the figures given.

2. SHIPS LOADING CAPACITIES

<u>Type Ship</u>	<u>Normal Load (Average Capacity)</u>		<u>Overload</u>		<u>Emergency Overload</u>	
	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>
AGC	198	--	370	--	1000	--
APA	1460	--	2000	--	5000	--
AKA	203	--	2000	--	4000	--
LSD	145	--	350	--	750	--
LST	170	--	600	--	1000	--
LCU	--	--	--	--	200	--
APD	161	--	300	--	400	--
Victory	30	8000 M/T	--	--	4000	--
Liberty	30	8000 M/T	--	--	4000	--
C-3	30	8000 M/T	--	--	4000	--
C-4	30	10000 M/T	--	--	5000	--
T-AP	3500	--	4000	--	5000-7000	--
CIMAVI	30	4000 M/T	50	--	500	--
FS (AKL)	10	--	20	--	250	--
Baltic Coaster	30	4000 M/T	50	--	500	--

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I-II-B-1

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

<u>Type Ship</u>	<u>Normal Load</u> (Average Capacity)		<u>Overload</u>		<u>Emergency Overload</u>	
	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>
BB	--	--	--	--	2000	--
CA	--	--	--	--	1600	--
CL	--	--	--	--	1400	--
DD	--	--	--	--	350	--
PF	--	--	--	--	250	--

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
U.S.S. ESTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX I

AVAILABILITY AND EMPLOYMENT OF LIGHTERAGE

1. AVAILABILITY OF LIGHTERAGE

a. Lighterage available consists of an indeterminate and varying number of French LSM, LCI and barges.


2. EMPLOYMENT OF LIGHTERAGE

a. Lighterage, after assignment by French, will be employed as directed by Commander Evacuation Group.

b. Lighterage will be employed in shuttle capacity from loading slots and berths, to ships at anchor at DINH VU CUT, BAI DE LONG, HENRIETTE PASSE, at buoys in HAIPHONG or as otherwise directed by CTG 90.8.

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
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U.S.S. LSTES (AGC 12), Flagship
SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX I

DEBARKATION PORT OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL

a. Commander Debarkation Unit (CTU 90.8.2) is responsible to Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8) for overall control of debarkation operations at SAIGON and other ports of debarkation.

2. a. Commander Debarkation Unit duties are as follows:

(1) Supervise and control all debarkation operations at SAIGON.

(2) Exercise control over all debarkation ports south of 15th parallel.

(a) Debarkation at TOURANE will be controlled by Commander Evacuation Group (CTG 90.8).

(3) Arrange pilotage for incoming and outgoing ships in the SAIGON Area.

(4) Notify south bound ships after they cross Latitude 15N concerning time of arrival at CAPE ST JACQUES and instructions as to pilotage and berthing.

(5) Assign anchorages south of Latitude 15N.

(6) Prepare and issue sailing orders to all ships leaving SAIGON.

(7) Establish liaison through CHMAAG SAIGON with French and Vietnam officials. Keep these officials informed in advance of the arrival of shipping.

3. REPORTS

a. Commander Debarkation Unit submit message situation report daily as of 1800 to CTG 90.8 info CTU 90.8.1.

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I-IV-1


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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

TAB:

A - Unloading Facilities SAIGON

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I-IV-2

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COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
Task Force and COMPHIBGRU 1
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SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

TAB A TO APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX I

UNLOADING FACILITIES SAIGON

1. GENERAL

SAIGON is located on the SAIGON RIVER about 50 miles from the SOUTH CHINA SEA. It is the best port in INDOCHINA and has a population of over 1,000,000 (including CHOLON).

a. Vessels with a draft of 28 feet can navigate the channel to SAIGON. The length of any vessel entering the port is limited to 694 feet, however, to permit turning in the river at SAIGON. Mooring buoys and dolphins provide berths at the port, and vessels can anchor anywhere in the entrance channel.

b. The port is divided into commercial and naval sections. The commercial section consists of 9 major wharves; only two being suitable to handle ships of the APA-AKA Victory types. These are the KHANH HOI WHARF and the MESSAGERIES MARITIME WHARF. All wharves are located on the west bank of the SAIGON RIVER.

2. DESCRIPTION OF WHARVES

Name	KHANH HOI WHARF	MESSAGERIES MARITIME WHARF
Location	West bank about 2100 feet below ARROYD CHINOIS	West bank below mouth of ARROYD CHINOIS
Construction	Masonry wall, solid fill	Open concrete pile, concrete deck

Dimensions:

Length	3445 feet	1425 feet
Depth A/S	24 to 30 feet	24 to 30 feet
Width	Open area	Open area
Handling facilities	6-1½ ton electric portal jib cranes	None
Type ships	5 Liberty types	1 Liberty type
Can berth	2 Cl-A types (Cimavi)	2 Cl-A types (Cimavi)

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I-IV A-1

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

b. Latest information indicates that a total of 5280 feet of pier space is available; average height of pier above low low water being 15 feet. These piers, mostly masonry, are in excellent condition.

c. There are a number of small piers suitable for LST and cranes are available.

d. A total of 23 large ships of about 10,000 tons displacement can be accommodated at piers and moored to pilings at SAIGON.

e. Additional handling facilities:


(1) Twenty-four mobile cranes 3 to 20 ton capacity, and two floating cranes (90 tons and 50 tons) are available. Two small pontoon cranes are available.

(2) There are about 114 lighters of 50 to 150 ton capacity.

(3) Ten tugs are available.

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I-IV-A-2

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Operation Order
COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

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CTF 90, Commander Amphibious
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SAIGON, VIETNAM
9 November 1954; 1200H

ANNEX J

HEAVY WEATHER INSTRUCTIONS

Reference: (a) Annex W, CINCPACFLT OpOrder No. 201-54

1. GENERAL

a. Heavy weather conditions exist when wind and sea reach such a magnitude that normal operations must be curtailed in the interest of safety. Heavy weather may vary between wide extremes of wind and sea. Conservatively, a Beaufort Force 6 wind is considered a small craft warning and may curtail small boating; while at the other extreme typhoon winds may vary from 65 knots to 150 knots and cause heavy damage to large combatant units.

b. Complete climatological data on the TONKIN GULF area is presented in Commander Naval Forces Far East Special Intelligence Study on INDOCHINA of June 1954.

2. TYPHOON CONDITIONS OF READINESS

The minimum requirements of reference (a) and subsequent heavy weather directions will be augmented as follows:

a. The existence of a Typhoon Condition of Readiness will be initiated by CTC 90.8. Upon receipt of same all ships will take necessary action.

b. During all Typhoon Conditions of Readiness maintain continuous watch on 277.8 MCS and on local harbor frequency.

c. Material Condition BAKER or YOKE as applicable will be set in Typhoon Condition THREE and maintained in Conditions TWO and ONE.

(1) Upon receipt of the existence of Typhoon Condition of Readiness THREE all ships will, in addition to the requirements of reference (a), take the following action:

(a) Hoist or send into a sheltered beach all boats not actually in use and reduce boating to a minimum.

(b) Be alert to place in effect Typhoon Condition of Readiness TWO.

(2) Upon receipt of the existence of Typhoon Condition of Readiness TWO all ships will, in addition to the requirements of reference (a), take the following action:

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J-1


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COMPHIBGRU ONE 2-54 (Revised)

- (a) On signal from CTG 90.8 cease loading and unloading and secure topside.
 - (b) Hoist or send into sheltered beach all remaining boats.
 - (c) Station special sea and anchor details and make all preparations for getting underway.
 - (d) Proceed to heavy weather anchorage as designated by CTG 90.8 or retire from area with Typhoon Evasion Group as directed by OTC.
 - (e) Be alert to place into effect Typhoon Condition of Readiness ONE.
- (3) Upon receipt of the existence of Typhoon Condition of Readiness ONE all ships will complete and maintain all requirements of Typhoon Condition of Readiness TWO and take appropriate precautions to minimize damage.
- d. Reentry to port and resumption of normal port operations will be made on signal from OTC Typhoon Evasion Group.
 - e. Typhoon Conditions of Readiness may be relaxed by prescribing a lower numbered condition.

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J-2