

FMFM 8-2

**OPERATIONS AGAINST
GUERRILLA UNITS**



U. S. MARINE CORPS

OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS



Reviewed and approved for reprinting 24 June 1965.

This reprint contains effective pages only of the basic manual and changes 1 and 2. Upon insertion of change 3 the manual will be current as of 14 December 1964.

U.S. MARINE CORPS

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 August 1962

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

This publication, FMFM-21, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES, is one of a series of Fleet Marine Force Manuals expressing the tactics and techniques to be employed in operations and training by the operating forces of the Marine Corps. FMFM-21 has the following specific purpose: To present the tactics and techniques utilized by Marine Corps landing forces against guerrilla forces and to serve as a basic text for use in the Marine Corps educational system. It is made available to the other services for information and such use as they may desire.

2. SCOPE


This manual outlines the origin, objectives, and characteristics of guerrilla warfare as well as the tactics and techniques employed by guerrilla forces. It takes its departure from the U. S. Marine Corps publication, "Small Wars Manual, 1940," and places emphasis on the planning and conduct of operations against guerrillas by Marine Corps forces. Additionally, it considers the employment of friendly guerrilla forces in support of amphibious operations.

3. CHANGES

Recommendations for improving this manual are invited. Comments and recommended changes should be forwarded to the Coordinator, Marine Corps Landing Force Development Activities, Quantico, Virginia.

4. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.


WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff


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18 September 1963

Change 1 to FMFM-21

1. FMFM-21, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES, dated 14 August 1962, has been redesignated FMFM 8-2, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS.
2. Change FMFM-21, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA FORCES to FMFM 8-2, OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS on the cover, Foreword and page iii. Change FMFM-21 to FMFM 8-2, wherever it appears in the manual.
3. Make the following additional pen changes:
 - a. Paragraph 702b(21), page 51. Change reference to FMFM-24 to FMFM 3-3.
 - b. Paragraph 806c, page 64. Change reference to FMFM-15 to FMFM 2-2.
 - c. Paragraph 904a, page 69. Change reference to FMFM-20, Logistics, to FMFM 4-1, Logistic and Personnel Support.
 - d. Bibliography, page 127. Change reference to FMFM-24 to FMFM 3-3. Change reference to FMFM-15 to FMFM 2-2. Change reference to FMFM-20, Logistics, to FMFM 4-1, Logistic and Personnel Support.
4. Reviewed and approved this date.



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
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OPERATIONS AGAINST GUERRILLA UNITS

CHANGE 3

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SECTION 1: GUERRILLA WARFARE

101. GENERAL

◆ a. Throughout military history, guerrilla warfare has formed a powerful weapon in the hands of insurgent forces in their efforts to seize power from constituted authority. Given even limited popular support, numerically inferior guerrilla forces have the capability of defeating or greatly reducing the effectiveness of regularly organized military organizations unless the threat is met by positive counteraction. In weak or newly emerging nations, guerrilla warfare can effectively prevent such nations from establishing or maintaining stable governments. Instability in government is an invitation to the communist block to "fish in troubled waters." Inasmuch as there is an increasing number of nations who are going through the evolution from colonies to statehood, there is a greatly increased number of nations who are faced with this type of revolution. There is a growing need for a full understanding of the entire problem of subversive insurgency, and for a knowledge of the techniques involved in its defeat.

◆ b. It will be evident in such a study that counter guerrilla activity is a prime element of a comprehensive counterinsurgency program. It complements companion efforts to improve economic and educational levels, to stabilize and improve the political and psychological climate, to firm up the civic status, and to assist its armed forces in developing their own strength in order to contribute to national stability. These more peaceful actions, however, will often not be sufficient in themselves, and the task of meeting and defeating a guerrilla problem--created on the enemy's terms--may face our military forces. It is the purpose of this manual to outline the counter guerrilla tasks which are within the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force.

102. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

◆ a. Insurgency Defined--A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily

communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

▶ b. Counterinsurgency Defined.--Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

c. Application.--Although counterinsurgency extends into fields which are not primary areas of Marine Corps endeavor, Marine Corps forces must be prepared to undertake counterinsurgency operations when directed. Operations against guerrillas as treated herein, are a major element of counterinsurgent activity.

103. GUERRILLA WARFARE DEFINED

▶ Guerrilla warfare is defined as military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

104. GUERRILLA DEFINED

▶ A guerrilla is defined as a combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

105. TYPES OF GUERRILLA FORCES

a. Guerrilla Forces Emerging From a Defeated Military Organization.--As military forces of a recognized government are defeated or forced to withdraw, members of these defeated forces, local civilians, or both, organize as guerrillas to disrupt enemy operations. A military force assigned the mission of reestablishing the recognized government may operate in conjunction

with this type guerrilla force. See section 12.

b. Guerrilla Forces Opposed to the Existing Government.--Guerrilla forces may be formed to fight for a new political order through the destruction of the existing patterns of society. Guerrillas attempt to obtain popular support through passive consent or terror.

c. External Military Forces Introduced Into a Country.--Military personnel may come from another country to assist the guerrillas. This assistance may come in the form of individuals "volunteering" or in regularly organized military forces. Initially, individuals may furnish guidance on organization, tactics, and techniques, and may become key leaders. They can determine requirements for military equipment and for technicians who can be provided to operate or to instruct in the operation and maintenance of equipment unfamiliar to the guerrillas. Certain guerrillas can be evacuated to another country for specialized training unavailable in their locality. When guerrilla forces control a sufficiently large area to the extent that it can absorb additional forces, external military forces may be introduced.

106. EVOLUTION OF FORCES

a. Resistance stems from the dissatisfaction of some part of the population. The dissatisfaction may be real, imagined or incited and is usually centered around a desire for--

(1) Political change.

(2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression.

(3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation.

(4) Economic and social improvement.

(5) Religious expression.

b. Resistance movements may form locally or be inspired by "sponsoring powers." The evolution of the guerrilla force usually follows a sequence of events that form a pattern:

(1) The existence of a dissident group.

(2) The emergence of groups which are willing to bear arms.

(3) The appearance of strong, determined leaders to further organize and orient these groups. As members of underground organizations are identified and resistance grows, guerrilla bands form in secure areas to become the military arm of the guerrilla force.

(4) Initial successes are exploited to convince elements of the population to support an effective guerrilla organization.

(5) Seeking and accepting support from external sources.

(6) The employment of equipment and personnel furnished by external sources.

(7) The integration of the guerrilla forces into a regular military organization.

107. LEGAL STATUS AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949

a. The Law of Land Warfare.--The law of land warfare says

that members of organized resistance movements opposing our military forces are entitled to be treated as prisoners of war if they meet the following requirements:

(1) They are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates.

(2) They wear a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.

(3) They bear arms openly.

(4) They conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. Geneva Conventions of 1949

(1) If both sides in a civil war or revolt request and receive military support from foreign powers, the opposing foreign powers may not be at war with each other. In such a situation and when the belligerents have not been recognized as such, only Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 applies. Article 3 is quoted below:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum the following provisions:

"(1) Persons taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat (put out of the fighting) by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any

other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

"(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;

"(b) Taking of hostages;

"(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

"(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

"(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the international committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force by means of special agreements all or part of the other provisions of the present convention.

"The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

(2) The parties to such a conflict are the legally constituted government and the challenging insurgent force. Customs of war give other States the right to intervene in a civil war if cruelties not permitted by international codes are practiced by either party.

(3) Although the Geneva Conventions are binding only in the

Territories of the contracting nations, the provisions of Article 3 should be applied whenever adhered to by the opposing forces or when they can be carried out without jeopardy to the military mission.

108. CHARACTERISTICS

a. Characteristics Contributing to Successful Guerrilla Operations

▶ (1) Surprise.-- Surprise is the principle of war most essential to successful guerrilla operations. The guerrilla obtains surprise by operating in vast areas that offer concealment and freedom of movement and by conducting operations at night. Through surprise, the guerrilla seeks to overcome the enemy's advantage of numbers, organization, and supporting arms. He masses his forces at selected times and places to attack where defensive forces are weakest. Following the attack, he can quickly disperse his forces to designated areas.

▶ (2) Mobility.-- To achieve surprise and avoid fixed positions, the guerrilla relies on mobility. He obtains mobility afoot by being lightly armed, having detailed knowledge of the terrain, and by being relatively free of heavy logistic burdens. Mobility afoot offers advantages when operating in inclement weather, in reduced visibility, and in terrain which would be an obstacle to a more heavily equipped enemy. Even under adverse conditions, the foot-mobile guerrilla converges on a target, strikes unexpectedly, and swiftly disperses prior to the arrival of a stronger opposing force.

▶ (3) Civilian Support.-- The guerrilla seeks to obtain or maintain

the active support of the populace in his area of operations. This support will be forthcoming in direct proportion to the feeling that is generated by the effectiveness of the guerrilla campaign or the ineffectiveness of the opposing authority. If the guerrilla force cannot gain the active support of the populace, it still attempts to make them at least passive in their support of the opposition.

▶ (a) In general, the populace will probably contain three factions: guerrilla supporters; opposition supporters; and those who, for one reason or another, prefer not to become involved (neutralist). Among the active supporters there are guerrilla auxiliaries, collaborators, and informers. These supporters and the guerrilla force will attempt to achieve the support of the neutral group through the use of propaganda, economic assistance, and by making them indirect participants through the distribution of captured goods, food, and property. Terroristic methods such as assassination, murder, and the taking of hostages are often resorted to by some guerrilla units.

▶ (b) With civilian support the guerrilla force can solve many of its logistical support problems. The civilian population will provide manpower; specialists from the various professions, such as doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, and skilled technicians; food, clothing, and equipment; hiding places; arms and ammunition; and intelligence.

▶ (4) Area Familiarity.--If he is a native of the area, the guerrilla has three advantages over the opposition, first, when not fighting he can appear to be a harmless

civilian; second, he may have an intimate working knowledge of the terrain over which he operates; and third, he may have personal contacts with the population which may provide partial solutions to his problems of intelligence, supply and communications. If he is not a native, the guerrilla will seek to obtain these three advantages as rapidly as possible in the area in which his band has been assigned to operate.

(5) Depth of Operations.--Guerrillas frequently are organized into many small units which are dispersed over a large area. This provides depth to their operations, simplifies logistics, and makes it difficult to locate them. They attack flanks, rear areas, small or isolated outposts, lines of communications, poorly trained and armed village guards and similar objectives which are least prepared for or capable of combat.

(6) Favorable Terrain.--Mountains, swamps, forests, and jungles are favorable to guerrillas because their primary means of mobility is on foot. These areas do not favor a force that is dependent upon fixed lines of communications, extensive logistic support, heavy supporting arms, and mechanical means of transportation.

▶ (7) Intelligence System.--By establishing an intelligence system composed of indigenous military personnel and civilians who are employed by the opposition authority and its military forces, the guerrilla can acquire accurate and timely information.

(8) Communications.--Communications used by guerrillas may vary from complex communication-electronic equipment to

audio, visual, and messengers. Guerrillas will utilize the civilian communication system as well as fishermen, travelers, and workmen as messengers and observers. Every sympathetic civilian is a potential member of the communication system.

(9) External Support.-- The guerrillas can usually obtain food and light weapons from local civilian sources, but may depend heavily on external sources for communication equipment, technical personnel, weapons, ammunition, and medical supplies. External support greatly expands the potential of the guerrilla forces.

b. Characteristics Limiting Guerrilla Operations

(1) Lack of Mass.-- A limitation of the guerrilla force is its inability to achieve a final victory without external assistance. It is incapable of concentrating combat power for any extended period, unable to exploit success, and thus compelled to accept something short of victory.

(2) Lack of Means.-- Guerrillas must often depend on seized arms and equipment and are usually denied, by nonavailability of both equipment and technicians, the use of weapons other than small arms.

(3) Betrayal.-- The guerrilla is vulnerable to betrayal by members of his organization.

(4) Volunteers Without Contract.-- The guerrilla commander leads a band of people who regard themselves as patriotic civilians rather than soldiers. They have no contract to bind them to their duties and may at anytime consider family obligations, crop

harvests, or business to be more important than the overall guerrilla cause.

(5) Lack of Training and Discipline.-- Basically a civilian, the average guerrilla lacks the formal knowledge and the discipline which results from military training. This deficiency severely limits effectiveness, particularly during the early stages of guerrilla organization. Time, the will of the leaders, and imported military personnel and technicians may eventually lessen the seriousness of these deficiencies.

(6) Vulnerability to Psychological Warfare.-- The average guerrilla is susceptible to psychological warfare operations directed against him. The guerrilla may become disheartened and disillusioned with the guerrilla cause if skillful propaganda exploits his failures. For the most part, people become guerrillas because they are dissatisfied with existing conditions. To convince them that they no longer have reason to be dissatisfied is to remove their reason for being guerrillas.

109. OBJECTIVES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

a. The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to contribute to the defeat of the enemy. As most guerrilla forces possess certain limitations, their specific objectives cannot be decisive military action, such as seizing and holding terrain, until expanded and formalized to the extent of conventional forces.

b. The broad objectives of guerrilla warfare are to--

(1) Reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness.

(2) Delay and disrupt enemy operations.

(3) Weaken the morale and will to resist of enemy forces.

(4) Limit the enemy's development and exploitation of the territory it occupies.

(5) Develop and strengthen the will of the people to resist the established government.

c. To achieve these broad objectives, the guerrilla assumes the role of a swift, silent, disappearing combatant who selects the time and place of battle. His objectives are accomplished by--

(1) Attacking and interrupting the enemy's lines of communication.

(2) Inflicting casualties on and harassing the enemy's forces.

(3) Destroying enemy supplies and installations.

(4) Capturing enemy supplies.

(5) Terrorizing the enemy.

110. GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION, COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. Independence, varying size, and flexibility characterize the guerrilla organization. Some of the factors influencing organization and control are:

(1) The extent of ambushes and raids.

(2) Terrain and enemy capabilities.

(3) Requirements for mobility and surprise (which tend to restrict the size of weapons to be used).

(4) Conducting psychological warfare and political indoctrination--

(a) To ensure continued loyalty and proper political ideology within the guerrilla ranks.

(b) To gain or control civilian support.

(c) To demoralize and to cause the defection of the enemy forces.

(5) The manufacture, salvage and repair of small arms and demolitions.

(6) Training of new recruits.

(7) Providing for limited logistic support.

(8) Security of the guerrilla base.

(9) Guerrilla strength.

(10) Degree of outside support and control.

b. Guerrilla tactical units are usually small bands of 20 to 30 men; however, several bands may join together to form units of considerable size.

c. Guerrillas may employ young and old, male or female, in supporting organizations and hard core cadres that mend, repair, clean, cook, farm and perform other similar duties. The hard core cadres, properly led, are capable of achieving selected limited objectives

to regenerate support of wavering populace.

d. The guerrilla commander will establish succession of command and designate alternate base areas. Members of the organization normally do not question the commander's authority.

e. Widely separated small units operating over large areas necessitate decentralized control and provide operational latitude for the small unit commander. The commander provides the necessary guidance and direction to his unit commanders but normally leaves implementation to his subordinates. Exceptions to this general rule are:

(1) Emergency measures conducted against enemy forces which threaten the security of the guerrilla force.

(2) Targets assigned specifically to an area commander by the overall commander.

111. GUERRILLA WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

a. Guerrillas usually possess a variety of light infantry weapons. Rarely will they employ any weapon heavier than an 81mm mortar or a 75mm recoilless rifle. Demolitions are required for the destruction of rail lines, roads, and for making grenades and mines to use in raids, ambushes, etc. They improvise additional weapons such as hand-thrown fire bombs; sharpened sticks or nails set in ditches near ambush sites and trails; thin wires stretched across roads and trails at night at heights designed to decapitate vehicle drivers.

b. Equipment requirements vary according to the weather and

terrain. Shelters are usually made from available vegetation. A small bowl for eating and a pack are the usual equipment carried by the guerrilla. Leaders usually carry fieldglasses, compasses, and maps. Radios are used to contact external agencies.

112. GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. Planning Considerations.-- The guerrilla considers the size of the enemy forces, dispositions, and their movements. He obtains a thorough knowledge of the terrain, road nets, and trails before making a plan. Large-scale operations are avoided, unless tactical surprise and a highly favorable ratio of numerical superiority is assured. The use of small detachments to strike surprise blows at isolated installations, convoys, columns, or detachments is considered in each plan. Consideration is given to the withdrawal and dispersal of the force. Although all operations are normally conducted at night, the degree of visibility required at night may receive special consideration along with the weather.

b. Areas of Operation

(1) Guerrilla operations may extend throughout the entire area of conflict and can be divided into three general categories:

(a) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas.-- This area is usually characterized by extremely difficult terrain and is the area in which the guerrilla has his headquarters and camps.

(b) Area Controlled Effectively by Guerrillas' Enemy.-- Raiding operations in this area are executed only by small guerrilla units or by individuals.

▶ (c) Area Not Controlled by Either Force.-- This is the principal battleground for the guerrilla, and he will attempt to bring more of it under his domination. Large guerrilla forces enter this area and any enemy force is apt to encounter ambush or harassment.

(2) As the situation in a given area becomes more favorable to the guerrilla, the area controlled may expand to the extent that enemy forces find themselves in a virtual siege by the guerrillas.

(3) Areas of operation will normally be aligned within political subdivisions and placed under the jurisdiction of subordinate guerrilla commanders. They will exercise civilian control measures, conduct food and supply collection, levy and collect taxes, and carry out operations against the enemy.

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

▶ (1) Intelligence.-- Acquiring area operation intelligence is of primary importance to the guerrilla force and its external sponsoring forces. The guerrilla's existence will depend on his knowledge of the terrain, enemy strength, organization, movements, dispositions, armament and habits. In addition, the guerrilla may be the source of information for a sponsoring force. The close relationship between guerrilla units and the civilian populace affords many valuable contacts that may provide information of enemy operations, weapons, dispositions, habits, and morale. The relationship frequently extends to political, economic, administrative, or psychological processes.

(2) Counterintelligence. -- Guerrilla counterintelligence agents

are used to cover all areas of guerrilla operations. Because of the possibility of enemy infiltration and betrayal by his own guerrillas, he must continually seek out spies and informers. Personnel recruited for guerrilla forces are carefully screened before joining and closely observed after joining.

d. Covert Operations

(1) Civil Disturbances.-- While civil disturbances are not essentially military in nature, they can be an effective means to a military end. They are usually associated with urban areas, for they depend on population masses for effectiveness. To incite a major disturbance enables the guerrilla to achieve some of the effects of combat without actually engaging his forces. Civil unrest directed against the guerrilla's enemy causes that enemy to divert forces, change policies, and weakens his combat power.

(2) Sabotage.-- Sabotage is a most effective weapon of covert operations. Properly planned and carried out by both active guerrillas and sympathetic civilians, it affects all phases of the enemy war effort. Physically, it reduces his war potential, which reduces his morale. Sabotage causes the enemy to divert troops to security missions. The guerrilla's successes against the enemy tend to encourage civilians not previously active to commit acts of petty sabotage. These petty acts further harass and confuse the enemy. Successful sabotage results have tremendous propaganda value. These results are hailed as symbols of the resistance, serving to stimulate morale of the guerrilla movement.

(3) Terrorism.-- Guerrilla forces may terrorize to intimidate

or subjugate the civil population in order to ensure support. Acts of violence including murder, arson, bombings, and kidnappings are normally directed toward elements of the population who lack adequate protection or self-defense.

e. Overt Operations

(1) Ambush

(a) The value of ambush lies in the surprise and shock effect. In planning an ambush, the guerrilla commander has an advantage in selecting the terrain, position, and time, which enables him to employ a small force to achieve results. The ambush is employed against moving or temporarily halted targets to kill the enemy and to capture his supplies and equipment.

(b) Three conditions for an ambush are desirable: terrain of a constricting nature, a method of halting or sealing off the target, and the delivery of maximum firepower in a short period of time.

(c) The ambush force usually permits enemy security elements to pass through the main ambush area. Attack of the main body commences upon a prearranged signal and is normally of short duration followed by rapid withdrawal. If the enemy cannot react or reinforce, the guerrilla may stay long enough to salvage any usable equipment and destroy the rest. To cover movement to and from the ambush area, the guerrilla employs extensive security measures. To cover his withdrawal, the guerrilla may employ secondary ambushes to destroy or delay the enemy reinforcements.

(d) If the ambush fails, the guerrilla withdraws on prearranged signal and disperses in many

directions, falling back to secondary ambush sites to destroy or delay any pursuing enemy.

(2) Raids

(a) Like the ambush, the raid is dependent upon surprise for effectiveness. However, it is directed against stationary targets and is therefore more complicated and risky.

(b) The purpose of the raid is normally the destruction of key enemy installations or the capture of personnel, supplies or equipment. The side effects of harassment and reduction of enemy morale may prove as beneficial as the destruction of the target.

(c) Guerrilla raids differ very little from raids planned and executed by conventional forces. Three elements are generally required to accomplish the mission: a force designated to eliminate enemy security; a force to accomplish the mission; and a force to cover the withdrawal.

f. Security

(1) Because of his precarious position, the guerrilla must maintain strict security. His relatively weak forces depend almost entirely upon secrecy and deception for their existence. Security is the primary protective measure against surprise, espionage, observation, and interference by the enemy. Only those personnel actively involved in directing guerrilla operations are permitted knowledge of guerrilla dispositions. False information may be disseminated to deceive the enemy and to assist in covering security leaks.

(2) Measures adopted to maintain security include locating

the camp and its installations in difficult terrain, keeping these facilities mobile, and maintaining alternate locations in a continual state of preparedness. Radio and other communication facilities maintain strictest security and are frequently moved to avoid detection.

(3) Maintenance of adequate security control of the civil population is a pressing security problem. It requires the guerrilla to have continual knowledge of all personnel movement in his area and to maintain up-to-date information on known and suspected security risks.

g. Defensive Considerations

(1) Guerrilla units avoid defensive combat. Their relative lack of mass and means places them at a distinct disadvantage in static defense against regular forces. If forced to assume the defensive, the guerrilla takes every possible advantage of terrain and mobility to avoid being fixed in position.

(2) Encirclement is a major threat to the guerrilla force. The security system is oriented to provide warning of encirclement in adequate time to react. Plans are made and rehearsed that provide many alternate routes of egress from the installation or scene of action. The guerrilla leader, upon being encircled, has three possibilities for survival:

(a) Plan and execute a breakout at the earliest possible time.


(b) Dissolve his units and disappear on an individual basis, abandoning much of his equipment and supplies in order to survive to fight again.

(c) Hold his force together, find the nearest defensible terrain, and organize the strongest possible perimeter defense.

(3) The breakout is usually the most feasible course of action. If he chooses to dissolve his force, the guerrilla commander may lose much of his equipment and may suffer the loss of an organization which must be rebuilt. A breakout requires careful planning. The guerrilla force attempts to slip through existing gaps. When no gaps exist, the force seeks weak points in the enemy's encirclement. If it becomes evident the breakout will fail, the guerrilla commander divides his forces into small units to infiltrate enemy lines to predesignated assembly areas.

(4) Guerrilla forces exterior to the encircled area may be of great assistance to the encircled forces by executing diversionary attacks.

(5) When required, the short-duration defense of a position may be planned as an adjunct to other operations to gain time to accomplish a mission, to hold the enemy's main body while other units attack his flanks and rear, to allow time for reassembly of forces, or to protect their withdrawal.



SECTION 2: LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

201. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps forces may be called upon to participate in counterinsurgency operations in countries with which the United States has mutual security or other agreements or at the request of a country with which no prior agreement exists. A Marine Corps force may operate as part of a larger military force in counterinsurgency situations or it may be the only or principal U. S. force so engaged.

b. In countries with governments friendly to the United States, counterinsurgency operations of U.S. forces will be in accordance with the provisions of agreements between the United States Government and the government of the country concerned.

c. In some instances, U. S. diplomatic representation may not be present in the country where operations are to take place. Frequently, however, U. S. diplomatic and other agencies will be active in

the country. In such cases, military operations must be fully coordinated with those of other U. S. agencies involved.

202. MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES

A clear understanding of the relationships between the military forces involved and other U. S. agencies which may be in the country is essential in order that counterinsurgency operations of all concerned may be properly coordinated. Other U. S. agencies which may be involved include:

a. Chief of Diplomatic Mission.-- The chief of the United States diplomatic mission, the ambassador if one is designated, is normally the senior authority on foreign policy and the senior coordinator of the activities of all U. S. governmental agencies in the country to which he is accredited. The chief of the diplomatic mission does not command U. S. military forces operating in the country.

▶ b. United States Embassy.-- The ambassador's staff includes political, economic, cultural, administrative and armed service sections, staffed by officers trained in their specialty and with experience in the country to which assigned. They maintain contact with their counterparts, both in the local government and other U. S. governmental agencies. The chief of mission closely coordinates the activities of the U. S. Operations Mission (USOM), which is the country agency of the Agency for International Development (AID); and, the United States Information Service (USIS), the country agency of the United States Information Agency (USIA). The USIS office is concerned with the field of cultural, information, and educational exchange between the United States and the local government. This agency usually operates offices at the large population centers and under certain conditions, one-man offices in small towns of a host country. Within countries receiving U. S. economic aid, the aid program is administered by the USOM Director. While the Director is responsible to the Agency for International Development in Washington, his activities in the host country are coordinated by the chief of the diplomatic mission. The Director, AID, in Washington reports directly to the Secretary of State.

c. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).--Countries in receipt of United States military aid normally have a MAAG present to supervise and administer the military assistance program. MAAG activities are conducted under the direction of the Department of Defense, through the unified commander involved. MAAG relationships with the chief of diplomatic mission are usually prescribed in executive orders or other instruc-

tions. The chief of mission provides foreign policy guidance to ensure that MAAG efforts are in accord with the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Depending upon the mission of the particular MAAG, these activities assist the host government in such matters as reorganization, equipping, training and logistical support of military forces. They may be joint or uniservice.

d. The Country Team.--With many U. S. agencies operating in a foreign country, their areas of interest and responsibility often overlap. The best interests of the United States and the host country are served if activities of these agencies are well coordinated. The chief of the diplomatic mission may accomplish coordination in part through regular meetings of the "Country Team," a working group made up of representatives of all major U. S. governmental organizations operating in the country. In countries where U. S. military forces are based, the military commander or his representative normally participates as a member of this team.

203. COORDINATION PROCEDURES

a. General.--U. S. military forces operating in a foreign country fall within the chain of command extending from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commander to whose command the forces are assigned. Although the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, if present, is not in this chain of command, close coordination of military activities is effected with the diplomatic mission and other U. S. agencies. In some cases, relationships between the diplomatic representative and the military commander may be further delineated by executive order.

b. Staff Functioning.--Deviations from normal staff responsibilities, procedures and techniques within the landing force are avoided in dealing with outside agencies. Although one senior representative to the Embassy's liaison office or country team should be appointed, the general and special staff continue to supervise and coordinate matters within their usual areas of staff responsibility. The necessity for a controlled, coordinated effort by all elements of the landing force in dealing with outside agencies is analogous to the importance of the overall unity of effort of all U. S. agencies within the country concerned. Unilateral, uncoordinated action by landing force staff members is avoided. However, individual staff officers may work directly with U. S. agencies or local governmental authorities within the limits of established policies.

c. Landing Force-Diplomatic Mission Coordination

(1) The relationship between the landing force and the diplomatic mission is primarily one of coordination. Instructions concerning these relationships should be set forth in initiating directives. Coordination is facilitated by the establishment of formal liaison with the diplomatic mission and by participation of landing force representatives in the activities of the country team and civil affairs committees, if formed.

(2) Members of the diplomatic mission may not be familiar with landing force methods of operation. Orientation briefings for these officials should be arranged at an early date to avoid misunderstanding. Orientation briefings by the diplomatic mission staff for the

landing force are of equal importance. The landing force may develop and recommend procedures to the diplomatic mission as necessary for the conduct of business between the landing force and agencies of the local government.

d. Landing Force-MAAG Coordination.--Relationships between the landing force and MAAG are normally conducted on a basis of coordination as defined in directives from higher authority. The missions of these two military activities may differ greatly. The Chief, MAAG, can be of great assistance to the landing force commander. Being well established in the country, the MAAG will have working agreements with the local military commanders and will be familiar with conditions in the country as well as with the personalities involved both in the local government and U. S. Diplomatic Corps. Assistance from the MAAG in the initial days of operation will be particularly valuable.

204. STATUS OF ARMED FORCES AGREEMENT

Status of Armed Forces agreements are necessary when counter-insurgency operations are conducted within a friendly foreign country. If a status of Armed Forces agreement already exists prior to arrival of the landing force, its provisions may be extended to include personnel of the landing force. However, if no such agreement exists, one should be negotiated as soon as possible. This will normally be accomplished through diplomatic channels. The landing force may submit recommendations to the diplomatic mission as appropriate and assist the mission as required in drafting proposed agreements.

205. LANDING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES

a. General.--Prior to or immediately upon arrival of the landing force in the foreign country, the landing force commander should establish contact with appropriate officials of the foreign government. Contact is made initially through the U. S. diplomatic mission, if one is present, and may continue through the diplomatic mission during the early phase of the operation. When the landing force is firmly established and operating ashore, the defense ministry of the host government may become the principal point of contact for the conduct of routine landing force business with the local government.

b. Subordinate Military Commanders.--Subordinate military commanders assigned independent missions establish liaison with local officials in their area and, work through and cooperate with these authorities within limits established by higher authority. Detailed in-

structions should be issued to subordinate commanders concerning their relationship with local military and civil officials. At times it is advisable to assign diplomatic advisers to subordinate commands.

c. Participation in Governmental Functions.--A landing force involved in a counterinsurgency operation will not, as a rule, participate in local police, judicial or other governmental functions unless required by the exigencies of the situation. The landing force may reinforce local police and military forces in the suppression of dissident forces. One of the most important duties to be performed by a commander in an operation against guerrilla forces is to gain the cooperation and assistance of local police and judicial agencies. Police and judicial pressure in suppressing underground organizations, combating sabotage, controlling traffic in arms and ammunition, and enforcement of criminal and civil laws provide both direct and indirect assistance to the landing force commander.



SECTION 3: INTELLIGENCE

301. GENERAL

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential for successful operations against guerrilla forces. To conduct counter-guerrilla operations without sound intelligence wastes time, material, and troop effort. Guerrilla forces, employing highly effective intelligence and counterintelligence measures, are difficult to locate and identify, requiring a much greater intelligence and counterintelligence effort than required for conventional combat operations. The intangible aspects of guerrilla warfare, together with the civilian support normally provided the guerrilla force, create intelligence obstacles that can be overcome only by patient determination and the utmost resourcefulness.

b. Rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence is essential. The elusiveness and mobility of small guerrilla forces quickly outdates information concerning their location. Reaction time for the conduct of combat operations is a

critical factor and reactions must be based on reliable intelligence.

c. A larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel is required in counter-guerrilla operations than for normal operations. Special attention must be given to obtaining adequate interrogator-translator assets, and qualified interpreters.

d. Every Marine must have an understanding of the basic techniques and value of intelligence and counterintelligence in counter-guerrilla operations. This is necessary because of his own immediate requirements in many situations and because of the requirements of higher headquarters. Each man must be observant and alert to everything he sees and hears. He reports anything unusual concerning the civil population and the guerrilla force, no matter how trivial. Counter-guerrilla operations feature many small unit operations, and commander of such a unit must be prepared to process, evaluate and act promptly on the observations made by members of his unit.

302. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The guerrilla force, the civil population and the terrain are virtually inseparable factors in guerrilla warfare. To destroy the guerrilla movement and prevent its resurgence, detailed intelligence is required of all three as follows:

a. Guerrilla Force.-- The following intelligence is sought concerning the guerrilla force:

(1) Factors which caused the development of the guerrilla force.

(2) Relationship between guerrilla and civil population.

(3) Relationship with and support from any external sponsoring power.

(4) Capability of the guerrilla force to provide its own food, by growing, seizure, or civilian support.

▶ (5) Organization, composition, disposition, and identification of the guerrilla force.

(6) Capability of guerrilla forces to attack installations and disrupt lines of communications.

(7) Guerrilla force methods of operation.

(8) The strength and combat efficiency of the guerrilla force; to include status of training, effectiveness of communications, and morale.

(9) Location of guerrilla camps, assembly areas, rendezvous points and trails.

(10) Guerrilla force arms and armament.

b. Civil Population.-- Because of the inseparable nature of the guerrilla force and civil population which usually exists, much of the intelligence developed in one is applicable to the other. Intelligence concerning the civil population includes:

(1) Identification of hostile and friendly elements.

(2) Motivation and loyalties of various segments of the population.

(3) Size and proportion of civil population likely to engage in or support guerrilla activities.

(4) Effect of local authorities and police on civil population.

(5) Capability of the area to furnish food.

(6) Availability of water and fuels.

(7) Vulnerability of friendly civil population to terror tactics.

(8) Potential effect of civil population control measures such as relocation, search and seizure, movement restrictions, food control and curfews.

(9) Psychological vulnerabilities.

c. Terrain.-- An intimate knowledge of the terrain is necessary for effective counter guerrilla operations. Terrain information is continuously collected and processed, and the resulting intelligence is promptly disseminated. Up-to-date photo maps are prepared. Terrain models may be constructed

and used for briefing commanders, staffs, and troops. Particular effort is made to collect information concerning the following:

(1) Areas likely to serve as guerrilla bases or hideouts. Such areas usually have the following characteristics:

(a) Difficulty of access, as in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

(b) Concealment from aerial reconnaissance.

(c) Covered withdrawal routes.

(d) Located within one day's foot movement from small civilian settlements that could provide food, information, and warning.

(e) Adequate water supply.

(2) Roads and trails approaching, traversing, and connecting suspected or known guerrilla areas.

(3) Roads and trails in the vicinity of friendly installations and lines of communications.

(4) Location of critical fords, bridges, and ferries; information on the seasons of the year when the streams are at flood stage.

(5) Areas where drinking water is not available.

(6) Areas where foot travel is difficult or impossible.

(7) Availability and suitability of potential helicopter landing sites.

(8) Location of likely guerrilla or counter guerrilla ambush sites.

(9) Location of all small settlements and farms in and near suspected guerrilla areas.

(10) When guerrillas are known or suspected to have contact with an external sponsoring power; location of areas suitable for air drops, boat or submarine rendezvous, and roads and trails leading into external area of sponsoring power or neutral country friendly to the guerrillas.

303. INTELLIGENCE STAFF ORGANIZATION AND ITS FUNCTIONS

a. The nature of the enemy, the tactical deployment of friendly units, the presence of both friendly and hostile civilians, and the presence of indigenous military and para-military units, dictate modification of normal intelligence procedure. Intelligence section organization and functions are modified as required at all levels of command having an intelligence section. The criteria is the nature and extent of the intelligence effort required to support the mission, availability of qualified intelligence personnel within the landing force as a whole, and the personal preferences of the intelligence officer and the commander. Combat operations normally will require augmentation with interrogator-translators, air observers, counterintelligence personnel, order of battle analysts, interpreters, and possibly imagery interpreters, reconnaissance and surveillance specialists and technical intelligence personnel.

b. The intelligence section at landing force level may be organized by the establishment of special subsections to accommodate a special function and by creating one or more new subsections from conventional

subsections to reflect the emphasis on certain basic tasks. For example, a covert collection unit is usually required to supervise agent activities, and/or a records subsection may be created from conventional subsection to develop and maintain extensive records concerning the civil population and guerrilla force. The most important counter guerrilla intelligence functions, which may or may not be conducted by the organization of subsections for each, include the following:

◆ (1) Combat Intelligence.-- The primary requirement of combat intelligence is to locate the guerrilla force. Emphasis is placed on overt collection of information. Most of the functions of the conventional combat intelligence subsection are applicable. Special attention is given to the rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence. Careful attention to seemingly minor guerrilla preparations and activities, is essential to the development of meaningful intelligence on impending guerrilla operations.

(2) Clandestine Collection.-- Clandestine collection is extremely important in counter guerrilla operations. Every effort is made to infiltrate the guerrilla force and hostile civilian elements with reliable agents. Indigenous persons are usually capable of infiltrating the guerrilla force; they have an intimate knowledge of the local populace, conditions, and terrain, and often have prior knowledge of, or connections with, members of the guerrilla force. Potential agents are carefully screened to ensure that they are not double agents; their reliability is constantly checked. The recruiting, training and handling of agents requires highly trained intelligence personnel. Because of the sensitive nature of agent opera-

tions and the emphasis placed on clandestine collections, this function is usually separated from combat intelligence. However, the results of clandestine collection are given to the combat intelligence subsection.

◆ (3) Aerial Reconnaissance.-- Functions of the aerial reconnaissance subsection are essentially the same as for conventional operations. Special attention is directed toward preplanned and on-call reconnaissance and observation missions in direct support of widely separated battalions and smaller units. Included will be a continuing requirement to ensure, under various and differing tactical situations, compatibility of communications equipment and frequency assignments between supporting aircraft and supported ground element, particularly with regard to units smaller than battalion. See paragraph 703 for details on aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Psychological Operations.-- The added emphasis of psychological operations requires that all intelligence be evaluated in terms of psychological application. The efforts of the intelligence section and the psychological operations agencies are closely related. For example, the intelligence section is interested in the guerrilla food supply; whereas, psychological operations agencies are interested in whether or not appeals developed on a food theme would cause disaffection, or even surrenders. In addition to working closely with each other, intelligence personnel and psychological operations personnel provide mutual assistance in the execution of their respective tasks. See paragraph 405 for a discussion of psychological operations.

(5) Records.-- Records on guerrilla commanders and

members, and key members of the hostile civil population should be maintained. Frequently the operations or behavior of these individuals develop a pattern which, if recognized, may aid materially in the conduct of operations against them. The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable sources of information, and may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas. In communities friendly to the guerrilla force, some persons are responsible for collecting food and providing other aid for the guerrillas, such as relaying messages and providing temporary security. Every effort must be made to discover these persons. Instead of immediate arrest it is better to watch their activities and seek to apprehend the guerrillas contacting them. For developing guerrilla files a special effort is made to obtain birth, fingerprint, police, medical, church, school and prison records.

◆ (6) Interrogator - Translators and Linguists.--Fleet Marine Force interrogator-translator teams are limited in number and language spread, consequently, commands preparing for operations against guerrilla forces should utilize available personnel having appropriate language and document reading capabilities as intelligence augmentation personnel. These personnel must be afforded maximum possible combat intelligence training prior to embarkation. They are then integrated into the intelligence section and employed under the close supervision of the attached interrogator-translator team personnel. In the area of operations, landing force commands normally will employ indigenous personnel as interpreters and translators, however, it is essential that these

personnel be carefully screened and constantly supervised by qualified intelligence personnel.

(7) Counterintelligence. -- Guerrilla forces depend primarily upon secrecy and surprise to offset the superior combat power of the counter guerrilla force. Since the degree of surprise achieved will depend largely on the effectiveness of the guerrillas' intelligence agencies, intensive effort must be made to expose, thwart, destroy, or neutralize his intelligence system. To assist in achieving surprise in counter guerrilla operations and to counter the guerrilla intelligence system in general, the counterintelligence subsection emphasizes the following counterintelligence measures:

(a) Background investigation of personnel in sensitive assignments.

(b) Screening of civilian personnel employed by the military.

(c) Surveillance of known or suspected guerrilla force agents.

(d) Censorship or suspension of civil communications.

(e) Control of civilian movement as required.

(f) Checks on the internal security of all installations.

(g) Indoctrination of military personnel in all aspects of security.

(h) The apprehension and reemployment of guerrilla force agents.

(i) Security classification and control of plans, orders, and reports.

(j) Release information on a need-to-know basis.

(k) Organize on functional or area lines which will serve to limit the compromise of sensitive information through espionage, unwitting disclosure, or disclosure by POWs or defectors.

(8) Miscellaneous Functions.--Other functions, which may take on added importance in counter-guerrilla operations and require additional specialists, include such fields as communications, sociology, politics, and agriculture.

(9) Administrative.--Those functions handled by the administrative subsection are not unusual in counter-guerrilla operations, unless there is a requirement for large-scale maps in sufficient quantities for distribution down to and including the rifle squad level.

304. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING AGENCIES AND SOURCES

a. Intelligence collecting agents include trained agents, intelligence specialists, various civilian agencies and individuals, and troop units. Units and individual troops play a prominent part in the collection effort. All troops must realize the importance of reporting, as accurately as possible, every piece of information which they obtain about the guerrilla force, civil population, and the topography of the area.

b. The sources from which information is obtained include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Patrol Reports.--A primary source in the collection effort is the patrol reports regarding: food cultivation, food dumps, camps,

trails and roads, arms and ammunition, mines and explosives, equipment and tactics.

(2) Surrendered and Captured Guerrillas

A surrendered guerrilla is an extremely valuable source of information and can be of considerable use to both the intelligence section and tactical units. In order to obtain the best information, the following points are considered:

(a) The fact that a guerrilla is a prisoner must be kept secret in order to use his surrender to our advantage.

(b) Interrogation should be limited to as few people as possible.

(c) Operating unit commanders may hold prisoners for tactical reasons, but should report any lengthy retention.

(d) At times, the tactical commander who takes the prisoner can assume the responsibility of immediately using the guerrilla. A surrendered guerrilla should not be used on immediate followup operations if he is likely to be of greater value to the intelligence section (a surrendered guerrilla who is willing to go back alone to gain information or to solicit further surrenders).

(3) Captured Documents.--All captured documents acquired should be forwarded immediately to the landing force intelligence section for translation. When documents are found in packs, they must be retained intact.

(4) Dead Guerrillas

(a) Sometimes the identification of dead guerrillas will be the only means of identifying the organization in the area. Identification is best accomplished at the intelligence section. Deterioration of the body beyond identification can be prevented by--

1. Rapidly moving the body out of the area of operation and delivering it to the intelligence section. Owing to the speed at which bodies decompose, ground evacuation should be used only when the carry time will be less than 8 hours.

2. Using helicopters when the carry time is unacceptably long or there is urgency in obtaining identification.

(b) Identification techniques can be applied on the spot and include the following:

1. Photographs. -- For successful photography of the body, the face should be washed and the hair should be brushed back from the face. The eyes should be opened before photographing. A minimum of two full photos at short range should be taken.

2. Fingerprints. -- In fingerprinting, the main principle to be observed is cleanliness of both the equipment and the fingers to be printed.

3. Description.-- The following information is required for a description:

- a. Sex.
- b. Race.
- c. Apparent age.

d. Height, build, and facial features.

e. Teeth, scars, and deformities.

(5) Information Obtained From Civilians and Agents.--Unit intelligence sections should be notified of any civilian possessing information of intelligence interest. Agents are handled in accordance with procedures discussed in paragraph 303. Normally, subordinate units of the landing force should not develop their own agents or informers to acquire information.

(6) Captured Communications Equipment

(a) It is of great importance that all captured communication equipment be recovered for inspection. Units capturing guerrilla equipment should note the following:

1. Type of set; i.e., transmitter/receiver, transmitter or receiver.

2. Make, name, and number of set.

3. Location at time of capture.

4. Frequencies shown on dials at time of capture.

5. Direction of the aerial (including compass bearing).

(b) Captured equipment is expeditiously reported to the unit intelligence section. Frequency dials are carefully read before the set is moved and, if possible, locked to prevent change during transit.

(7) Monitoring

(a) Units receiving a signal of unknown origin should

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immediately report it to the intelligence section. This report includes frequency and call sign. All information obtained during the monitoring is sent to the intelligence center.

(b) Documents relating to communication and those found in proximity to communications equipment are sent to the intelligence section as quickly as possible.

(8) Food Cultivation

(a) Guerrillas may be forced to cultivate for food supply. If this occurs, either the crops are destroyed or used as lure to trap the guerrilla. Guidance will be necessary from experts to say whether the amount of cultivation is sufficient only for the local population, or if it is so large that the guerrillas may live off it as well.

(b) Units discovering cultivations will report--

- 1. Location.
- 2. Size.
- 3. Type.
- 4. Condition; e.g.,

- Stage 1 - Freshly cut
- Stage 2 - Cut and cleared
- Stage 3 - Prepared and hoed
- Stage 4 - Growing crops tended

- Stage 5 - Growing crops untended
- Stage 6 - Harvested
- Stage 7 - Disused and overgrown.

(9) Arms and Ammunition

(a) Units recovering arms and ammunition from guerrillas will report--

1. Description and identification of weapons.

2. Quantity and caliber of ammunition.

3. Date ammunition was manufactured and whether or not the ammunition is serviceable.

4. Whether or not the ammunition has been reloaded.

(b) All captured arms and ammunition will be reported to the unit intelligence section.

(c) All mines and explosives are recovered. Several of each type are turned in for technical examination. If this is not possible, a full report should be rendered stating whether the equipment was serviceable or not and listing any identification marks or numbers.

(10) Aerial Reconnaissance--Aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic is discussed in paragraph 703.



SECTION 4: OPERATIONS

401. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps experience and knowledge in planning for amphibious operations offer a distinct advantage in planning counter guerrilla operations. Those procedures, characteristics, and techniques involved in planning operations against guerrillas which are similar to planning the amphibious assault include the following:

(1) The concurrent participation of diversified forces, including nonmilitary agencies, requires close and continuous cooperation between all echelons of the forces involved. At higher echelons, parallel planning starts with the inception of the operation.

(2) The complex nature of counter guerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all echelons of command.

(3) Many unforeseen contingencies arise from the fact that contact with guerrilla forces does

not initially exist and is unpredictable during the operation. Accordingly, plans must be flexible and responsive to meet the problems of combat and make the most effective use of forces available.

b. LFM-02, Doctrine for Landing Forces, provides additional information concerning the landing force in counterinsurgency operations.

c. This section covers such features of counter guerrilla operations as area organization, combat forces, organization of forces, conduct of combat operations, and psychological operations.

402. PLANNING COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. General Considerations

(1) The establishment of strict control within the resistance area is required, particularly when a close relationship exists between the civil population and the guerrillas. Positive control is essential

in order to isolate guerrilla elements from each other, the local population, and support from external sources.

(2) A number of diversified actions such as tactical operations, psychological warfare, civil populace control, and civic action (political, social and economic) are conducted concurrently. This requires a single authority at each level of operation to assure agreement of purpose, coordination, and control.

(3) The establishment of an effective intelligence system is mandatory. Friendly troop deployments, the nature of the enemy, and the requirement for detailed information of the area and its civil population impose special requirements. Additional intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel are required.

(4) Specific strengths and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be determined so that operations will minimize the former and exploit the latter. The strength of the guerrilla force usually includes: motivation, knowledge of the area, and irregular tactics characterized by surprise, mobility, and offensive action. Weaknesses usually include: dependence on an unreliable supply system and general support of the civil population, and lack of good communications, air support, and heavy weapons.

(5) Although counter guerrilla operations differ from normal combat, the traditional principles of war must be considered in planning and execution. The most rigidly applied principle is the offensive; constant pressure is maintained on the guerrilla force. Mobility is largely achieved by well-trained, fast moving, unburdened infantry and by use of helicopters. Surprise is accom-

plished by superior mobility, offensive action, and good security, including deception. Mass is usually characterized, not by heavy fire power and large troop concentrations, but by sufficient forces at the right place at the right time. Economy of force is reflected in the organization of forces and organization of the area to assure that only essential forces are employed and that the most advantageous dispositions are made. Guerrillas rely heavily on surprise; good security will minimize this problem and at the same time enhance the achievement of surprise by counter guerrilla forces. Cooperation is carefully observed between counter guerrilla forces and with civil authority. Although the overall operation is complex in nature, simplicity, particularly in plans, is observed at the lowest echelons. Unlike normal operations, objectives essential to accomplishing the mission are seldom related to geographic features; in counter guerrilla operations the primary objective is destruction of the guerrilla force.

(6) The majority of counter guerrilla operations consist of small unit actions. Because of the nature of guerrilla warfare, small units are required to establish control over the area and to make contact with the guerrillas. Small units are capable of engaging most contacts because most guerrilla groups are small in size. In addition to providing detailed coverage of an area, small units have the degree of mobility to respond to guerrilla activity.

(7) The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The entire area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas



SECTION 4: OPERATIONS

401. GENERAL

a. Marine Corps experience and knowledge in planning for amphibious operations offer a distinct advantage in planning counter guerrilla operations. Those procedures, characteristics, and techniques involved in planning operations against guerrillas which are similar to planning the amphibious assault include the following:

(1) The concurrent participation of diversified forces, including nonmilitary agencies, requires close and continuous cooperation between all echelons of the forces involved. At higher echelons, parallel planning starts with the inception of the operation.

(2) The complex nature of counter guerrilla operations requires maximum attention to detail in planning at all echelons of command.

(3) Many unforeseen contingencies arise from the fact that contact with guerrilla forces does

not initially exist and is unpredictable during the operation. Accordingly, plans must be flexible and responsive to meet the problems of combat and make the most effective use of forces available.

b. LFM-02, Doctrine for Landing Forces, provides additional information concerning the landing force in counterinsurgency operations.

c. This section covers such features of counter guerrilla operations as area organization, combat forces, organization of forces, conduct of combat operations, and psychological operations.

402. PLANNING COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. General Considerations

(1) The establishment of strict control within the resistance area is required, particularly when a close relationship exists between the civil population and the guerrillas. Positive control is essential

in order to isolate guerrilla elements from each other, the local population, and support from external sources.

(2) A number of diversified actions such as tactical operations, psychological warfare, civil populace control, and civic action (political, social and economic) are conducted concurrently. This requires a single authority at each level of operation to assure agreement of purpose, coordination, and control.

(3) The establishment of an effective intelligence system is mandatory. Friendly troop deployments, the nature of the enemy, and the requirement for detailed information of the area and its civil population impose special requirements. Additional intelligence and counter-intelligence personnel are required.

(4) Specific strengths and weaknesses of the guerrilla force must be determined so that operations will minimize the former and exploit the latter. The strength of the guerrilla force usually includes: motivation, knowledge of the area, and irregular tactics characterized by surprise, mobility, and offensive action. Weaknesses usually include: dependence on an unreliable supply system and general support of the civil population, and lack of good communications, air support, and heavy weapons.

(5) Although counter-guerrilla operations differ from normal combat, the traditional principles of war must be considered in planning and execution. The most rigidly applied principle is the offensive; constant pressure is maintained on the guerrilla force. Mobility is largely achieved by well-trained, fast moving, unburdened infantry and by use of helicopters. Surprise is accom-

plished by superior mobility, offensive action, and good security, including deception. Mass is usually characterized, not by heavy fire power and large troop concentrations, but by sufficient forces at the right place at the right time. Economy of force is reflected in the organization of forces and organization of the area to assure that only essential forces are employed and that the most advantageous dispositions are made. Guerrillas rely heavily on surprise; good security will minimize this problem and at the same time enhance the achievement of surprise by counter-guerrilla forces. Cooperation is carefully observed between counter-guerrilla forces and with civil authority. Although the overall operation is complex in nature, simplicity, particularly in plans, is observed at the lowest echelons. Unlike normal operations, objectives essential to accomplishing the mission are seldom related to geographic features; in counter-guerrilla operations the primary objective is destruction of the guerrilla force.

(6) The majority of counter-guerrilla operations consist of small unit actions. Because of the nature of guerrilla warfare, small units are required to establish control over the area and to make contact with the guerrillas. Small units are capable of engaging most contacts because most guerrilla groups are small in size. In addition to providing detailed coverage of an area, small units have the degree of mobility to respond to guerrilla activity.

(7) The organization of the area and the organization of forces are interrelated problems that require particular attention in planning. The entire area of operations is subdivided into geographic areas

or areas coinciding with internal political subdivisions. Specific areas of responsibility are assigned to subordinate forces capable of conducting independent counter-guerrilla operations within their area from a base or bases established within or adjacent to the area. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the civilian attitude, the guerrilla activity, and the estimated guerrilla force. Organization will usually require the forming of battalion size task forces, which will be assigned an area responsibility.

(8) Terrain will influence the organization of the area, the size and composition of forces, and the tactics and techniques employed by the counter-guerrilla force.

(9) The extreme dispersion of units in operations against guerrilla forces places a heavy demand on the communications means throughout the counter-guerrilla force. Augmentation by communication personnel and equipment is usually required.

b. Specific Considerations

Planning for military operations against guerrilla forces requires a detailed estimate of the situation. Close attention is given to both the civil (political, economic, social) and the military situations. The following specific factors are considered in the commander's estimate:

(1) Terrain and weather

(a) Suitability of terrain and road net for both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations.

(b) Existence of possible guerrilla bases.

(c) Effect of weather and seasons of the year on both guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations.

(2) Inhabitants

(a) Loyalty of various segments of the population to the enemy and their morale, strength of will to resist, and willingness to undergo hardship. Particular attention is given to the following:

1. Farmers and other rural dwellers.

2. Criminals and "tough" elements.

3. Persons known to adhere to the ideologies of the guerrillas.

4. Former members of armed forces.

5. All persons with strong leadership capabilities or tendencies.

(b) Size and proportion of population likely to engage in guerrilla force and guerrilla support activities.

(c) Size and proportion of population likely to support our forces.

(d) Relative susceptibility of various elements of the population to enemy and/or friendly propaganda.

(e) Knowledge of the attitudes, customs, and traditions of the indigenous population.

(3) The resources available to the guerrilla force, including--

(a) The capability of the area to furnish food.

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(b) The capability of friendly forces to control the harvest, storage, and distribution of food.

(c) The availability of water and fuels.

(d) The availability of arms, ammunition, demolition materials, and other supplies.

(4) Guerrilla force relations with any external sponsoring power, including--

(a) Direction and coordination of guerrilla activities.

(b) Communications with the guerrilla force.

(c) Capability to send organizers and supplies to the area.

(5) The organization of existing guerrilla forces and their activities, including--

(a) Their origin and development.

(b) Their strength, morale, and status of training.

(c) The personality of the leaders.

(d) Relations with the civil populace.

(e) Effectiveness of organization and unity of command.

(f) Status of equipment and supplies.

(g) Effectiveness of communications.

(h) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence.

(6) The size and composition of friendly forces available for operations against the guerrillas, including--

(a) Own forces.

(b) Other military units available in the area if needed.

(c) Civil police, militia, and self-defense units.

(7) The existing policies and directives regarding legal status and treatment of the civilian population and the guerrilla force.

403. AREA ORGANIZATION, COMBAT BASES AND ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

a. General

(1) The operational area and military forces must be organized to provide--

(a) Unity of action and area administration with civil forces.

(b) Secure bases from which to conduct operations.

(c) Security detachments for protecting critical military and civil installations, essential routes of communication, and key communities.

(d) Forces for conducting tactical operations against guerrilla forces.

(e) Forces for civil populace control and tasks of a police nature such as road blocks and search and seizure.

(2) To minimize the requirement for military units, maximum use is made of indigenous

organizations and individuals, consistent with their reliability and capability, and policy agreements. Organizations such as village self-defense units, police, or friendly guerrillas may exist or be organized to provide local defense and to assist in establishing and maintaining civil populace control. Support for indigenous organizations, such as arms, ammunition, food, and communication equipment, is normally required. Individuals may be employed as laborers, informants, guides, interpreters, and translators. For detailed discussion, see section 10.

(3) Terrain will affect the organization of the area and the organization of forces. Area boundaries should not divide key terrain features. Guerrillas are likely to exist in areas of rugged or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps. Such areas are difficult to control and therefore may limit the size of the lower echelon areas of responsibility and influence the organization of forces as a result of the following:

(a) The requirement for extensive patrolling emphasizes the role of infantry.

(b) The use of combat support elements may be precluded or their effectiveness limited. This is particularly true in the case of tanks, trucks and certain artillery pieces.

(c) The importance of air support, particularly helicopters, is emphasized.

b. Area Organization

(1) The entire area of operations is subdivided into areas of

responsibility using clearly defined boundaries. Although it is desirable for areas of responsibility to coincide with political subdivisions to ensure maximum cooperation from civil authorities, in many cases boundaries must be dictated by overriding military considerations.

(2) Areas of responsibility are normally assigned to infantry battalions. Sectors of the area of responsibility may be further assigned to subordinate rifle companies. It may be necessary to further assign definite sectors to platoons.

(3) The size of the area assigned to a battalion depends on the terrain, the nature of the guerrilla activity, size of the guerrilla force, the forces available, and the mission. For example, if the area is heavily infested with guerrillas, sufficient forces are available, and artillery is assigned to battalions, the limits of their areas may roughly correspond to the range of artillery fire support. On the other hand, it is conceivable that battalions may be assigned areas as large as 300 square miles. Naturally, a battalion cannot expect to operate concurrently over an area that large. If the battalion commander cannot assign company sectors encompassing the entire area, he must divide the area into sectors and determine a priority for their occupation and clearance, coordinating with adjacent units, as necessary. In such cases, particular attention must be paid to the movement and regroupment of guerrillas from occupied sectors to cleared sectors.

(4) Area or sector boundaries should not prevent the pursuit of guerrilla forces into an adjacent

area or sector. Operation orders, SOPs, or other means of coordination should provide for this contingency.

(5) It must be realized there are no firmly established rules or principles governing area organization. The differences in areas, which are certain to exist, must be accommodated by flexibility in both planning and execution. Changes in the situation, or experience factors, will often produce changes to the initial area organization.

(6) For the benefit of troops and civil populace and for purposes of security, it is desirable to identify the degree of control existing in any specific area. The following designations based on traffic light colors may be used:

▶ (a) RED AREA.--Area under part-time or continuous control of guerrillas. Any persons therein are suspected members of the guerrilla force. Troops will maintain a combat status and vehicles must travel in convoys with an armed escort.

(b) YELLOW AREA.--Area in which guerrilla forces periodically appear but which is under neither friendly nor guerrilla control. Troops must carry individual weapons in such areas and must not move alone. Vehicles must have at least one guard, armed, riding in the open. Curfew and other population control measures are strongly enforced.

(c) GREEN AREA.--Area under positive friendly control. Stringent population control measures are lifted. Troops must not move alone. Vehicles may travel without guards.

c. Combat Bases

(1) Combat bases are established by battalions within or immediately adjacent to their area of responsibility. In some cases, particularly where the area is large, rifle companies may be required to establish combat bases in their sections. Patrols, operating from battalion or company bases, may establish temporary patrol bases to extend their operations. (See app. A.) A combat base is not a static installation; it is moved as often as is necessary for security purposes and to remain within effective striking range of guerrilla forces. When practicable, helicopters and ground vehicles are employed extensively for deployment and support of troops to reduce the number of combat bases.

(2) A combat base is the focal point for all tactical operations conducted in the area concerned; however, the base may also accommodate elements conducting non-tactical missions in the area. The size of the base will vary with the size of the unit and will be in response to security considerations.

(3) A combat base is located to facilitate its own security. The defense of the base is a major consideration since the majority of troops will be absent most of the time, conducting operations. Whenever possible, bases are established on the most defensible terrain in the area. Positions encircling the area are prepared and protective obstacles are employed. Outposts and listening posts are established well forward of the defensive positions and occupied at all times.

(4) The comfort and health of the troops are major considerations in the organization of a combat

base. Whenever practical, overhead shelter is provided. Messing facilities are established and operated to meet the irregular arrival and departure of forces. Either standard or field expedient showers should be constructed; this and other water needs require an adequate water supply. Some form of physical recreation is provided. Although the highest standards of discipline and sanitation are maintained in the combat base, troops not on guard should be made to feel that it is a place to rest and relax. To maintain good morale in his unit is one of the major challenges presented to a commander during counter-guerrilla operations.

d. Organization of Forces

(1) The flexibility inherent in the Fleet Marine Force for forming task groupments to conduct amphibious operations is readily adaptable to counter-guerrilla operations. The doctrine for organizing battalion landing teams is particularly applicable. It is not only significant that FMF units can be rapidly task organized for counter-guerrilla operations, but it is equally important that while so employed they retain the capability to revert quickly to the amphibious role for which they are primarily designed.

(2) The organization, training, and equipment of FMF units for helicopterborne operations in the amphibious assault especially qualify such units for counter-guerrilla operations.

▶ (3) The force initially committed should be carefully organized to effect destruction of the guerrillas. Insufficient combat power and faulty organization can only lead to a long frustrating period of inde-

cisive activity. Initial assignment of insufficient forces may ultimately require use of a larger force than would have been required originally. The size and composition of the force will depend on the size of the area, the topography, the guerrilla force, and the attitude of the civilian population. The fact that guerrilla forces usually operate in extremely difficult terrain and without air support, heavy caliber weapons, and armor, reduces the requirement for certain types of combat support forces and combat service support forces. On the other hand, the nature of guerrilla force operations usually requires that the counter-guerrilla force be provided with augmentation in such fields as psychological warfare, civil affairs/military government, intelligence, and communications.

(4) Whatever the size of the overall force operating against guerrillas, the formation of battalion size task forces will normally be required. The independent or semi-independent nature of the operations and the diversified missions normally require that a battalion receive augmentation and/or unit reinforcements prior to the conduct of operations. Reinforcements may include appropriate units of reconnaissance, artillery, tanks, motor transport, amphibian vehicles, and engineers. Augmentation may include intelligence, psychological warfare, civil affairs, communications, maintenance, military police, medical, and aviation.

(5) Battalion task forces must be prepared to revert to normal land combat operations under their parent regiments, when the hostile threat requires action by larger forces.

(6) Within the battalion task force and/or its subordinate rifle

companies, units are most frequently organized as follows:

(a) Patrols.--Patrols are extensively used and may vary in size from a squad to a reinforced company. Patrols must be specifically organized and equipped to perform one or more of a variety of missions, and if necessary, for extended commitment over a long period of time. Organization may include appropriate civilian augmentation to include local guides, trackers, and members of the civil police. See appendix A for a discussion of patrolling.

(b) Reaction Force.--A mobile reaction force is located at each combat base and is organized and equipped to rapidly engage reported guerrilla forces or reinforce other friendly forces. This force ranges in size from a reinforced platoon to a reinforced company and is capable of rapid movement by foot, surface vehicle, or helicopter.

404. CONDUCT OF COUNTERGUERRILLA MILITARY OPERATIONS

a. The doctrine for the conduct of counter guerrilla operations is based on both experience and theory. Experience has shown that there is no pat solution to the problem of defeating guerrillas, that variations in method of operation will be required with each new situation. Among other things, guerilla-counter guerrilla warfare is a contest of imagination, ingenuity, and improvisation by the opposing commanders. Commanders must be ever alert to change or adapt their tactics to meet the specific situation at hand.

b. In general, counter guerrilla operations are conducted in the following sequence:

(1) A commander assigned the mission of combating a guerrilla force moves his unit into the area, establishes subordinate areas of responsibility and combat bases, and employs appropriate security measures. Subparagraph 403c discusses combat bases, section 5 discusses troop and installation security, and appendix C deals with the security of transportation.

(2) Measures directed at populace control and isolation of the guerrilla force from all forms of support are initiated. Much of this effort is accomplished by police-type operations and conducted by either military or civil forces or a combination of both. For a discussion of civil populace control measures see appendix B. A discussion of search procedures is contained in appendix A. Military responsibilities in connection with the civil populace are discussed in section 10. Psychological operations are commenced to create civilian support for the counter guerrilla effort and civilian and guerrilla disaffection from the guerrilla cause. Paragraph 405 discusses psychological operations. Denial operations (discussed below) to deny guerrilla contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power, are initiated.

(3) Harassing operations, primarily patrolling, are conducted against the guerrilla force. Harassing operations in general are discussed below and the tactics and techniques of patrolling are discussed in appendix A. Reaction operations (discussed below) are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against the civil community or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Once a guerrilla force has been located and can be fixed, elimination operations (discussed below) are conducted against it.

(5) After the destruction of the guerrilla force, military forces may participate in the efforts to prevent its resurgence.

c. While the sequence above is considered normal, it is not intended to indicate that one step of the sequence must be successfully concluded before the initiation of the next. Conversely, the conduct of these steps should overlap in time, with police-type operations, psychological operations, and combat operations being conducted concurrently.

d. In general, the four types of combat operations normally conducted against guerrillas include denial operations, harassing operations, reaction operations and elimination operations. For a discussion of small unit tactics and techniques in connection with these operations, see appendix A. The four types of combat operations are as follows:

(1) Denial Operations

(a) Operations to deny the guerrilla force contact with, and support by an external sponsoring power are initiated early and conducted concurrently with other operations. Denial operations require effective measures to secure border or seacoast areas to prevent communications and supply operations between a sponsoring power and the guerrilla force. The scope of these operations will vary and will be determined by such factors as the extent of the border or seacoast

area, terrain, and methods and extent of external support.

(b) The method of contact and delivery of personnel, supplies, and equipment whether by air, land, or water must be determined at the earliest possible time. Border areas are secured by the use of patrols, static security posts, ground and aerial observers, and reaction forces. Extensive use is made of informers and agents. When time and resources permit, wire and other obstacles, minefields, and cleared areas are established along the border. Radio direction finding and jamming may be required. Ground surveillance radar is used. Interdiction by various fire support means may be employed and when appropriate, blockade operations by Navy ships and craft.

(c) The achievement of success in denial operations may be exceedingly difficult. External support is an important feature of guerrilla operations and as denial operations are intensified, hostile methods of contact will become more elusive, and often frustrating to a commander of a counterguerrilla force. Persistence and ingenuity will be essential to success.

(2) Harassing Operations

(a) Harassing operations are conducted night or day to prevent guerrillas from resting, conducting operations, and receiving support. Such operations will inflict casualties, and gain detailed knowledge about the terrain and the enemy. Harassing operations are executed primarily by extended patrols and larger combat units. Aviation elements and various fire support means will be employed as appropriate.

(b) Harassing operations are conducted primarily by the use of --

1. Aerial and ground reconnaissance to locate guerrilla units, bases, and camps.

2. Continuous aerial surveillance during daylight hours.

3. Extensive patrols and raids against guerrilla bases, camps, outposts, and supply caches.

4. Ambushes.

5. Air strikes and artillery fires.

6. Mining guerrilla routes of communication.

(3) Reaction Operations

(a) Reaction operations are conducted by mobile combat reaction forces operating from combat bases. Reaction operations are conducted in response to guerrilla activity directed against civil or military installations and forces, or when contact with guerrillas is made by patrolling or aerial reconnaissance. Reaction operations are often conducted in connection with denial and/or harassing operations.

(b) When a guerrilla force is located, the reaction force deploys rapidly to engage and destroy the guerrilla force. If the guerrilla force cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained, reinforcements are dispatched if needed, and the guerrillas are pursued. Reaction operations will often consist primarily of a pursuit. In such cases, efforts are made to envelop and cut off the retreating guerrillas. Once the escape of the guerrilla force has been

blocked, the attack is continued to destroy it. The mobility required to envelope and block is provided by helicopters, ground vehicles, and by accelerated foot movement.

(c) Throughout counter-guerrilla operations, commanders at all echelons continually locate possible targets at which the guerrilla might strike and prepare plans for decisive reaction. Guerrilla targets might include important road and railroad junctions, desolate stretches of road and railroad, bridges, key military and police installations, civilian communities, public utilities, public gathering places, and homes of important persons. Reaction plans for such situations are simple, prepared in detail, and rehearsed. To be effective, these plans must be based on the best possible intelligence of the area and the enemy force. Potential guerrilla targets should be carefully reconnoitered. To facilitate reaction to a guerrilla attack on such targets, each target and rendezvous points near the target are assigned a code identification. Whenever possible, helicopter landing zones or truck release points are used as rendezvous points. By use of a code designation for the potential target and rendezvous points, orders to the reaction force can be simplified.

(d) Since guerrilla forces are most active during the hours of darkness, reaction forces must be prepared to conduct operations under the same conditions.

(4) Elimination Operations

(a) Guerrillas not destroyed by denial, harassing, and reaction operations are often forced by such operations into situations which will require elimination operations aimed at their destruction.

Elimination operations are difficult to execute and, consequently, should be planned in great detail. Troops are thoroughly briefed and, when practicable, rehearsed. Deception operations are conducted to prevent premature disclosure of the operation. Elimination operations usually possess the following characteristics:

1. A guerrilla force is definitely located. This may be accomplished during the conduct of denial, harassing, or reaction operations. Forces conducting elimination operations are rarely committed to operations in suspected areas.

2. The guerrilla force is in a reasonably vulnerable situation, susceptible of being fixed in position, or engaged by surprise attack by the counter guerrilla forces.

3. The guerrilla force is most often of considerable size.

4. A force conducting elimination operations is normally much larger than the located guerrilla force. Depending on the size and location of the guerrilla force and the tactics to be employed, it will vary in size from a reinforced company to a reinforced division; however, one or two reinforced battalions will be most common.

5. As a prerequisite to destruction of the guerrilla force, every effort is made to contain it. In elimination operations, the degree of success is most often proportionate to the degree of containment. A frontal assault will rarely find an objective, because the guerrilla will seldom defend terrain, favoring withdrawal or escape to engagement. Efforts to fix or contain the

guerrilla force will include encirclement, double envelopment, blocking positions on routes of escape, use of supporting fires, or the convergence of two or more forces on the guerrilla force. If the situation does not favor or permit containment, it may prove successful to conduct surprise attacks against the guerrilla force, followed by aggressive pursuit.

6. The final steps taken to contain a guerrilla force, and all operations conducted against the guerrillas after containment, are accomplished during daylight hours. Escape is the normal guerrilla reaction to being contained, and darkness facilitates its achievement.

7. Mobility requirements suggest the employment of helicopterborne troops whenever possible. The use of helicopterborne troops allows a greater freedom of movement, more rapid execution, and an excellent chance of achieving surprise.

(b) The encirclement of guerrilla forces offers by far the greatest possibility for fixing or containing them and achieving decisive results. The remainder of this paragraph (404) discusses the considerations related to encirclement and the various destruction tactics used when encirclement is achieved.

(c) The terrain, size of the guerrilla force, and troop availability will determine the troop density of the encirclement. In turn, troop density will dictate the destruction tactics following encirclement. The encirclement usually requires a high relative preponderance of friendly troops; however, fire power, aerial surveillance, and the use of helicopterborne reserves can substantially lessen the troop requirement.

▶ (d) The planning, preparation, and execution of the operation is aimed at sudden, complete encirclement which will completely surprise the guerrillas. Surprise and security may be achieved by conducting the movement to encirclement during the hours of darkness. The encirclement should be completed during early daylight hours to permit good visibility for the remainder of the operation.

(e) Speed is emphasized throughout the early phases of the advance to the line of encirclement. Maximum use of helicopterborne troops will contribute speed to the early phases of the encirclement. The most critical period in the operation is the occupation of the line of encirclement. A guerrilla force may be expected to react immediately upon discovering that it is encircled. To attempt escape, the guerrillas will probe for gaps, attack weak points to force a gap, or attempt infiltration of the encirclement, individually or by small groups. Accordingly, every effort is made to simultaneously occupy the entire line of encirclement or if this is not possible, the most likely escape routes are covered first. In addition, upon arriving on the line of encirclement, units immediately occupy defensive positions, and deploy strong patrols to their front so that early warning of attempted guerrilla breakouts may be received.

(f) Aviation plays an important role in operations featuring encirclement. Attack aircraft are employed in a close air support role. Observation aircraft and helicopters are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and as a command vehicle for the commander to control his forces. Helicopters are used to rapidly transport troops to

the line of encirclement, or to shift forces from one area to another.

(g) Once the encirclement is established, the elimination of the guerrilla force is conducted methodically and thoroughly. This may be accomplished in any of the following ways:

1. The guerrillas are enticed to surrender by psychological warfare techniques such as loudspeaker broadcasting and use of leaflets. This technique has proven effective historically and should not be disregarded.

2. Operations may consist of a simultaneous, controlled contraction of the encirclement. As the line is progressively shortened, more units are removed from the line and added to the reserve forces. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by progressive contraction; however, against larger forces, it is more probable that at some point the contraction will reach a "critical mass," requiring some action other than further contraction.

3. Another technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerrilla force to divide the area, followed by the destruction of the guerrillas in each sub-area. This technique may also be used in conjunction with contraction of the line of encirclement, after "critical mass" occurs.

4. Another technique, usually employed after some degree of contraction, is to have a holding force on one or more sides of the perimeter while part of the line of encirclement forces the guerrillas against the stationary force by offensive action. Either element