

VIET NAM COURIER

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Comment

1974 was a year of important progress for the Vietnamese people in both North and South.

In the North, the majority of the production bases hit by the American bombing have been put back in working order, and in some branches the output is even higher than in 1964, the year before Johnson's air escalation.

Agriculture, especially, has benefitted from two excellent harvests and rice production increased by 20% over 1973. A whole province — Thai Binh — was able to harvest 7 tons of paddy per hectare on all its planting areas, and several other provinces obtain roughly 6 tons.

Most of the communication lines have been restored. Industrial production recorded an increase of 15% over 1973 while the main branches such as electricity, coal and chemicals overfulfilled the 1974 plans.

The numbers of those undergoing education are also significant: pupils and students totalled 7 million, or one-third of the population.

The preliminary results in the improvement of economic management have been positive and the DRVN will now embark with confidence on socialist construction on a larger scale at the same time as it fulfils its duty towards the South, whose people have waged a victorious struggle against US neo-colonialism. The US-Thieu scheme to erase the "leopard spots" and encroach upon the PRG liberated regions has failed ignominiously. Countering these encroachment operations, the liberation armed forces have taken back large territories illegally occupied by the enemy and liberated many district capitals. The battles fought in the Mekong delta since the beginning of December are signs of the change in the balance of forces in favour of

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the patriotic forces operating in that region of great strategic importance, the South's rice granary and source of manpower. The morale of the puppet troops is sagging; the lack of the support given formerly by the GIs, the reduction of US military aid, the defeats inflicted by an adversary who is continually gaining in strength — everything is moving towards the inevitable disintegration of the Saigon army.

In 1974, the economic situation grew from bad to worse in the Thieu-controlled areas: galloping inflation, rapidly rising prices, acute rice shortage and stagnating industrial production. In these conditions social conflicts have become sharper and, from August-September onwards, to the calls for an improvement in living conditions have been added political demands coming from the broadest sections of the urban population. With American support, Thieu hoped to suppress the third force, but in vain; that force has now made its entry into the political arena and is stronger than ever, fighting against corruption, against the suppression of democratic liberties among them the freedom of the press and against Thieu's dictatorial regime which they wish to overthrow and replace by an administration standing for peace, national concord and a strict implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Despite the repression which goes hand in hand with demagogic measures, despite the attempt of the pro-US elements to infiltrate the mass movement, the struggle of the urban population in South Viet Nam has developed in intensity and depth. In the present military and economic situation, which will certainly go on deteriorating even more quickly, Thieu's

position is tottering and the US attempts to cling to that puppet in order to maintain US neo-colonialism are doomed to failure.

In places where, unlike South Viet Nam, a peace agreement has been more seriously implemented, neo-colonialism is condemned to lose ground. Thus in Laos, 1974 witnessed a clear advance for the forces of peace and national concord. A Provisional Government of National Union, and a National Political Council of Coalition have been formed which have recorded many achievements in favour of Laotian independence, neutrality and democracy. The Lao people have enthusiastically welcomed the political programme put forward by the patriotic forces. The fight for its implementation is at the same time a struggle against the final attempt of the Vientiane ultra-rightists to preserve the interests of the American imperialists.

In Cambodia, the battle between the patriotic forces and the US puppets headed by the Lon Nol clique is continuing. A situation somewhat similar to that in South Viet Nam is to be found, with repeated victories being won by the liberation army in the dry and the rainy season, with an endemic economic crisis in the towns and cities under Lon Nol's control, and with conflicts from time to time erupting in the traitors' camp. The obstinacy of the US in continuing its military involvement and intervention in the internal affairs of Cambodia and turning down a settlement of the Cambodian problems on the basis of the March 23, 1970 proclamation of Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk can only prove detrimental to Washington: the Cambodian people will become

more and more politically conscious and the revolution in Cambodia can only be more radical.


The American authorities must be shortsighted not to adopt a more realistic policy in Indochina. Has not 1974 been a year in which the imperialist forces are declining all over the world? Inflation followed by economic recession, the growing antagonism between the various imperialist powers and, in the US, the fall of Nixon and the political difficulties besetting the ruling Republican Party which has lost control of the US Congress — all this does not augur well for Washington's neo-colonialist policy.

The world "after Viet Nam" is characterized by a new upsurge of the forces of socialism, national independence and democracy, in every continent. The oil weapon in the hands of the Arab countries, the recognition by the UNO of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the developments in Portugal, Greece, Cyprus — a long list can be drawn up of the blows inflicted in 1974 on imperialism with the US at its head.

The events in Indochina as well as in the world are a strong stimulus to the Vietnamese people in their struggle for the full implementation of the Paris Agreement. The DRVN has just commemorated the 30th anniversary of the founding of its People's Army. In 1975 it will celebrate the 45th anniversary of the founding of the DRVN and the 85th anniversary of President Ho Chi Minh's birth. 1975 will be a year of great events, and the Vietnamese people are resolved to carry through the fight for national independence and socialism.

December 25, 1974

VIET NAM COURIER



Celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Viet Nam People's Army on December 22, 1974. On this occasion it was awarded a Golden Star Order, the highest in the DRVN.

Photo: President Ton Duc Thang (centre) pins the Order on the military flag. (From left to right: Prime Minister Pham Van Dong; Truong Chinh, Chairman of the DRVN National Assembly; and Le Duan, First Secretary of the Viet Nam Workers' Party).

FACTS AND EVENTS

THREE Saigon dailies *Dien Tin*, *Dai Dan Toc*, and *Song Than* have been under trial since October last, accused of "libel against the Head of State". Their crime is the publication of "Indictment No. 1", the document put out by the Popular Movement against Corruption in September which attacked Nguyen Van Thieu by name, for embezzlement, malversation, corruption, misuse of power. Before the prosecution several issues of these dailies were seized. Then Thieu's Minister of the Interior brought the action in a civil case which has caused a great stir among the public. In the opinion of the president of the Committee for the Freedom of the Press and Publication, Thieu "has implicitly admitted his crimes" by forbidding the diffusion of the accusations against him. Many publicists feel that this trial is completely nonsensical: it's the role of the press to inform the public, and if someone has to be tried, it ought to be the author of "Indictment No. 1" rather

Trial of Three Saigon Dailies

than the journalists who simply publish it.

Writers and poets of various shades of opinion have promptly sided with the pressmen against Thieu's fascist measures. Lawyers volunteered to act for the defence of the accused dailies.

In face of the popular discontent, Thieu had to postpone the trial to November 28, 1974. On October 31, the Saigon journalists organized the "Victimized Press Day" with a mass demonstration attended by tens of thousands of people who expressed their solidarity with the persecuted papers. Police intervention caused some sixty casualties including priests, lawyers, and deputies.

This prompted a reaction from

the demonstrators who announced a new rally scheduled for November 28, the date of the trial itself.

Thieu banned that demonstration and at the same time decreed a curfew in Saigon and despatched up to 40,000 policemen in the hope of checking the meeting. Nevertheless the demonstration still took place at the date fixed with the attendance of lawyers, journalists, writers, deputies, students, schoolchildren, who all marched towards the court but found the entrance cordoned off by a thick line of policemen behind barbed-wire entanglements. When the trial started, twenty lawyers were there to defend the three dailies. Once again, Thieu had to adjourn the trial till February 20, 1975.

Viet Nam's Revolutionary Army



December 22, 1944: Vo Nguyen Giap reads out President Ho Chi Minh's instructions for the foundation of the Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Viet Nam.

ON February 3, 1930, the Founding Conference of the Indochinese Communist Party's Outline Programme, which provided, among other things, for the organization of a worker-peasant army. Later on, in various meetings of the Party Central Committee, this policy was put into practice by resolutions on the setting up of self-defence units and people's armed organizations. Thus, from its very beginning, the Indochinese Communist Party had realised that without armed struggle closely combined with mass political action a colonial people could not overthrow imperialist domination.

The first worker-peasant self-defence unit came into being during the upsurge of the Vietnamese people's political struggle in 1930-1931 which culminated in the creation of the Nghe Tinh Soviets. After that, other units were established: the guerilla units of Bac Son and Nam Ky (1940), the National Salvation

Units (1941), the Viet Nam Liberation Propaganda Brigade (1944), the Ba To Guerilla Detachment (1945). The setting up of the Liberation Propaganda Brigade on December 22, 1944 marked a decisive turning point... These first units were set up during the upsurge of the local people's political struggles. They were composed of Party members or revolutionary elements, highly conscious politically and carefully selected among the members of workers' and peasants' associations, the Communist Youth League and other revolutionary organisations. Their main activities consisted in carrying out armed propaganda and fighting the enemy to raise the masses' revolutionary spirit and encourage them to armed insurrection. As a result, in August 1945, millions of people rose up from North to South: with the effective help of guerilla and self-defence units established in many places, and relying essentially on political force in combination

with armed force, they succeeded in cowing the enemy troops and administration, overthrowing the Japanese fascist yoke and wresting back independence and freedom for the motherland.

The political strength of the masses who rose up in Autumn 1945 increased enormously during the resistance war against the French colonialist aggressors. The masses were now fighting in the favourable conditions of a people's state set up after the August 1945 Revolution and in response to the sacred appeal made by President Ho Chi Minh to the entire people to fight the enemy. "We would rather sacrifice all than lose our country. Never shall we be enslaved... Those who have rifles will use their rifles, those who have swords will use their swords, those who have no swords will use spades, hoes or sticks".

From that date, revolutionary armed forces were rapidly developed. The armed propaganda units of the pre-insurrection days were quickly turned into regular army units. On the Party's instructions, they detailed part of their strength to drill guerilla and regional forces; at the same time they trained themselves into mobile units which were eventually to fight decisive battles. In 1949, after the guerilla and regional forces had seen a vigorous development in manpower and fighting skill, the regular forces were regrouped into units and their numbers and strength increased. On August 28, 1949 the Vanguard Division — the first regular division of the Viet Nam People's Army — came into being, marking the outstanding growth not only of the regular army but also of the guerilla and regional forces. The three categories of troops: regular army, regional troops and popular forces — guerilla and self-defence units — constitute the armed establishment most suited to mobilise and organise the entire people to fight the enemy (1).

From 1950, these three categories of troops showed their worth by defeating the French aggressor troops in the Border Campaign (October 1950), the Hoa Binh Campaign (November 1951, February 1952), and the North-West Campaign (October 1952 — May 1953), liberating many vast areas. The 1953 land reform in




*Hanoi during the first days of the nation-wide resistance war against the French colonialists (December 1946).
"Death volunteers" using tripod anti-tank bombs to destroy French tanks.*

the newly liberated areas enhanced the people's political spirit, particularly that of the peasants, and so helped in the building and strengthening of the administration and the revolutionary armed forces and gave an impetus to the mobilisation of manpower and wealth for the resistance war. Thereafter the political and military remoulding of the army raised its class consciousness, national spirit and determination to win. This political and military

strength brought the people's war to a new stage and accounted for the mighty blows it inflicted on the enemy culminating in the great victory at Dien Bien Phu.

In the resistance war against US aggression, the Vietnamese people's political strength took the form of a determination to defend the socialist system in the North and to complete the national democratic revolution in the South. The achievements in the socialist building of the North in the political, economic, cultural, educational and social fields together with the wholehearted help of the socialist countries created very favourable conditions for the Vietnamese people to strengthen and develop their armed forces. The main force became a modern regular army, the regional forces were strengthened in manpower, fighting skill and equipment; the guerilla and self-defence forces, most numerous, better equipped and trained, became an armed network covering the whole country. The Party's slogan "The entire people armed and fighting the enemy" became concretised to an unprecedented degree.


In their harsh test of strength with the sophisticated US air force, the three categories of troops in the North wove a thick network of anti-aircraft fire, a



A surface-to-air missile unit.

barrage which covered every altitude, every direction and place, striking fear into the US air pirates with every sort of weapon from the rifle bullets of the militia and self-defence units to the shells and missiles of the anti-aircraft force. Joining the soldiers in the fight were the workers of state enterprises and handicraft cooperatives, the peasants of agricultural cooperatives, the pupils, the women, the old, all the people, in the streets, the fields or the highlands. They fought on their own, dug shelters everywhere, evacuated people and their properties and those of the state, helped the army haul and camouflage guns, gave first aid, carried the wounded, made good the enemy's destruction, repaired communication lines, captured shot down pilots and spies, kept order and continued production to ensure a normal life for the people.

The Viet Nam People's Army has attained a fairly high scientific and technical level, mastered the use of modern war means such as surface-to-air missiles, various interceptor planes, anti-aircraft guns of various calibres, electronic devices. In the B.52 blitzkrieg against Hanoi and Haiphong in December 1972, the US imperialists did their best to create a mighty "electronic battlefield" in the air and on the ground. They hoped easily to crush the budding Vietnamese




Ready for take-off.

anti-aircraft and air force, in order to cause the maximum amount of destruction and escape unscathed. But instead, the Vietnamese people's armed forces smashed to pieces 81 US planes including 34 B.52s (one-third of the US B.52s in Asia) and five F.111s (nearly half of the US F.111s in Indochina).

In South Viet Nam, the People's Liberation Armed Forces came into being during the concerted uprisings of the 1960s. Thanks to the experience of the nine-year-long first war of resistance and to the cooperation of

the South Viet Nam people and the ever increasing help of their northern brothers, the self-defence and armed propaganda units rapidly developed into three categories of troops. Together with the political army — a new form of political struggle in the South — they foiled all the US strategic plans and at last compelled the United States to withdraw its troops from South Viet Nam and recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. On January 2, 1963, at Ap Bac, My Tho province, 200 guerilla and local fighters smashed 2,000 Saigon puppet troops equipped with modern weapons and supported by tanks and planes. On December 4, 1964 the liberation armed forces and people of Eastern Nam Bo launched the Binh Gia Campaign, neatly wiping out regiment after regiment of the Saigon puppet troops and thwarting the US imperialists' "special warfare". Hardly had the US troops landed en masse in South Viet Nam when on August 8, 1965, a regiment of liberation troops and the people of Quang Ngai province smashed an operation of 10,000 US troops at Van Tuong on the coastal area 25 km north of Quang Ngai town. After crushing two US strategic counter-offensives in the dry seasons of 1966 and 1967 the people's liberation armed forces and the people launched a general offensive and insurrection in the Lunar New Year 1968, foiling the strategic "limited



Artillery in action

war" of the US imperialists. Thereafter the revolutionary army and people continued their attacks and uprisings so thwarting enemy "pacification" plans. The general offensive early in 1972 crippled the Saigon puppet troops and liberated vast rural areas. The US strategy of "Vietnamizing" the war had suffered a serious check and the United States was compelled to sign the Paris Agreement on January 27, 1973, withdraw its troops from South Viet Nam and recognize the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people and the right to self-determination of the people of South Viet Nam.

The history of the Vietnamese people's struggle over the past 30 years has reflected the fact that the Vietnamese people's armed forces came into being and grew up in the political struggle of the entire nation. It is a revolutionary army "strong both politically and militarily, the political strength being the basis of the military one." (1) While fighting it strengthens itself, tightens its links with the people, improves its fighting technique and skill, and modernizes its fighting means. This strength originates in the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist

party — the Viet Nam Workers' Party — which makes it possible for the "total force" of the entire people to be mobilized.

As President Ho Chi Minh said in 1964, on the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Viet Nam People's Army: "Our army is invincible because it is a people's army built up, led and educated by our Party". The Vietnamese people's struggle has indeed shown that in our era, when the position and strength of the revolutionary movements in the world are being consolidated and developed whereas those of the imperialist camp and the reactionary forces in the world are growing weaker, even a small nation which has high revolutionary determination and knows how to combine political struggle with armed struggle, how to build revolutionary armed forces, how to drive back the imperialists and win the support and aid of the socialist camp and other revolutionary and progressive forces in the world is fully capable of foiling all imperialist designs of aggression and defeating or rendering powerless the professional armies of the imperialist powers — even those of the US itself.

B.T.H.



Training in attacks with plastic charges.

(1) General Vo Nguyen Giap: « *Duong loi Quan Su của Đảng là vũ khí bất thắng của lực lượng vũ trang nhân dân ta* » (The Party's Military Line is the Invincible Weapon of Our People's Armed Forces), People's Army Publishing House, 1971, page 38.

(2) Le Duan "Cuu nước là nghĩa vụ thiêng liêng của dân tộc ta". (To save our country is the sacred task of our nation).

Coordinated infantry and tank manoeuvre.



One Hour

With General

Dam Quang Trung

Editor's note: Dam Quang Trung, alias Dam Ngoc Luu, was born in 1921 in Cao Bang (the northernmost province of Viet Nam). He was a founding member of the Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Viet Nam (forerunner of the present Viet Nam People's Army).

Today he is still strong and alert although on the wrong side of 50 and replied cheerfully and frankly to our questions on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Viet Nam People's Army (December 22, 1944).



Question: Could you please tell us why and when you joined the revolutionary movement?

Answer: I was born, the fifth of seven children, into a middle peasant family of Tay nationality in the mountain region. My village was only three kilometres from the Chinese border. My father died when I was 13 years old. As we had to pay for the medical treatment given to him in his last month, and to organize a big funeral according to traditional custom, our family got into difficulties and our life became precarious. After the third grade of primary education, I had to give up study and work on the fields to help my family. Still, we often ran short of food and clothing.

Our village of Soc Giang lay in a particularly important position. In front of it was the headquarters of the governor of Ha Quang district, guarded by two squads of Vietnamese militiamen. In our rear was the Soc Giang military post, where about 80 Vietnamese riflemen of the colonial army were stationed under the command of a French lieutenant and a number of French sergeants and corporals.

Every day I could witness French and Vietnamese mandarins bullying and manhandling our poor working people. And also scenes of poor "coolies" being forced to build the road from Nguyen Binh to the Tinh Tuc Tin Mine, suffering from

hunger, cold, disease and daily beatings by the Vietnamese village chiefs and foremen. "Coolies, foolies, they're gone, never to return!" goes the popular saying, forever engraved on my mind.

The district governor often had people arrested on the most trivial pretexts, such as forgetting to carry their head-tax cards, or he would accuse them of being bandits in order to extort money from them. Human life was then as cheap as water lentils.

I still remember the funeral of rifleman Nong Van Nga, a gentle neighbour of ours, who had been kicked to death, for no reason, by the French commander of the local post. He left behind several young children... In front of the watch tower of the district governor's office we could now and then see a severed head or a few slit-off ears, which the authorities said belonged to "bandits or communists"...

I bitterly hated all those mandarins, French and Vietnamese alike! One day, I chanced to see a bundle of lithographed documents hidden in a bamboo beam of my house. The documents were about driving out the French and protecting the poor people... Little by little I found out that my two elder brothers, Dam Van Ly and Dam Minh Vien (alias Duc

Thanh—he later died on the South Viet Nam battlefield in 1946) were engaged in revolutionary activities...

From 1937 onward, I served as messenger for Dam Van Ly and Le Quang Ba (who is now a member of our Party's Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Commission for Nationalities of the Party Central Committee). My brother Ly was later arrested, deported to Son La prison, and beheaded by the French after an unsuccessful escape attempt.

In 1939, I was admitted to the Indochinese Communist Party. In July 1940, I was jailed by the French in Cao Bang on the charge of "endangering public security." In April 1941, after my release from prison, I resumed my activities. Later I attended a four-day military-political course at Pac Bo, with Uncle Ho as principal teacher, and my elder brother Duc Thanh, as assistant-teacher. This was the first military-political course I attended.

Some time later, the Party created conditions for me and a number of other patriotic youths to undergo military training, with the aim of preparing cadres for armed struggle. During this period, I had the opportunity to meet comrades Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap and Le Thiet Hung (later a major-general in the Viet Nam People's Army).

Q.: Under what circumstances did you join the Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Viet Nam?

A.: On December 22, 1944, the Armed Propaganda Brigade—the first platoon of our people's armed forces—was officially founded, on orders from Uncle Ho, "at a time when the period of peaceful development of the revolution was over and the period of nation-wide uprising had not yet come." The struggle then had to move over from the political to the military form. The task of the Propaganda Brigade was to use armed struggle to develop a good political influence, thereby widening the revolutionary bases and developing the armed forces. Besides it was to

guide and help the regional forces to grow up.

Following our first two resounding victories at Phai Khat (December 24, 1944) and Na Ngan (December 25, 1944) when we captured a number of weapons from the enemy, I and some other comrades were entrusted with forming a company. It was late in December 1944 and I was then in charge of the National Salvation movement in Pa Quang canton, Cao Bang province, with the special mission of organizing and training "Tu Ve" (Self-Defence) fighters.

Q.: Could you please tell us your impressions in the first days of your activity in the Propaganda Brigade?

A.: About three weeks after its founding, our platoon-sized Armed Propaganda Brigade had grown into a company, made up of cadres and combatants selected from the armed units of various districts.

The ceremony for the founding of the company was held in a small valley in the rocky mountains of Thien Thuat canton. The valley was surrounded by high rugged mountains and dark jungles, where the only sounds heard were the chirping of birds and shrieking of monkeys. Hundreds of representatives of National Salvation Associations and of the local population attended the function. Under the red flag with its five-pointed golden star, we now had more men than before, with more guns and munitions, standing at attention, with shining bayonets. Cadres and combatants pledged themselves, together with the people, to fulfil their duties. The company sent the first sword captured from the enemy at Na Ngan as a present to Uncle Ho.

I was appointed leader of Platoon 3. This unit was made up of three squads, two of them composed of comrades from the Tay nationality, and the third of comrades from the Zao nationality.

Our armaments were variegated: flintlocks and muskets of World War I vintage with three or five-cartridge clips. We had no machine-guns. I myself had an American submachine-gun with

folding metal stock using Colt 12 cartridges. The whole company had 10 smoke grenades. One of them had been thrown as a test. The remaining nine were shared equally among the three squads. Each member of the platoon had a long narrow bag filled with rice or grilled maize, a small flask of salt and a section of bamboo or an empty gourd containing water.

For "uniforms," we put on anything we had. We tied the ends of our trouser legs and wore canvas berets. Comrade Van (General Vo Nguyen Giap) was the only one who had a hat, a shabby felt one.

All of us were barefooted. We

Q.: Under the Viet Minh Front's slogan "Drive out both the Japanese and the French!", the revolutionary forces rapidly grew up on a nation-wide scale, and made an important contribution to the victory of the Revolution of August 1945. How did your unit develop during that period?

After the Dong Mu battle, which took place on February 4, 1945, our unit received the order to move south and to fight while carrying out armed propaganda. We always bore in mind the view of the Armed Propaganda Brigade: political considerations must prevail over military considerations, propaganda is more important than actual combat. In military activity, our Propaganda Brigade

had nothing to eat but maize gruel and pumpkin-leaf soup. Water, very scarce, was mostly used for cooking and drinking. To care for our health and give us treatment there was a comrade of Zao nationality, who was armed with a flintlock and whose name I've forgotten, but we nicknamed him "y quan" (health mandarin). He was always seen carrying a small canvas bag in which he put all the medicines—herbs, fruit, dried wild roots and tubers.

At night, sitting around a fire, we tried to recite by heart the "10 Pledges of Honour" (1) of a revolutionary soldier, or told one another about our families, our hatred for the imperialists... We talked with one another in many languages: Tay, Zao, Nung, Kinh (the last being the language spoken by the ethnic majority of Viet Nam—Ed). The Kinh language was used in our meetings and other formal activities.

A well-known song at that time was "Pi noong oi" (Hey, Brothers and Sisters), a National Salvation song in the Tay language.

We would sit up till midnight, when Comrade Lam Kinh, then superintendent of our platoon (now deputy-director of our Army's Political Institute), used a spoon to rake up the hardened deposit of the maize gruel from the pan, grilled it over the fire and gave it first to little Hong, our messenger in both the Phai Khat and Na Ngan battles. The atmosphere in the unit was one of cheerfulness and solidarity. We all were bound together by a love and affection even deeper than that between brothers.

mostly fought minor battles where victory was certain in order to stimulate the revolutionary spirit of the masses, to replenish our forces, and to frighten the enemy. In several consecutive issues, the newspaper "Viet Nam Doc Lap" (Independent Viet Nam), the organ of our movement, carried special articles describing the battles fought by our unit. Alongside the reports on cleverly won battles

and on the elimination of cruel puppet administrators and traitors, stories of the exemplary conduct of revolutionary combatants towards the masses helped to heighten the prestige of the Liberation Army. Young members of the combat self-defence units in many localities asked to join the Liberation Army. Enemy officers and soldiers were filled with both admiration and fear...

In the high tide of the movement to "Drive out both the Japanese and the French," which became the movement to "Drive out the Japanese fascists" following the Japanese coup of March 9, 1945, many companies and bigger detachments of the Liberation Army were formed, with elements selected from the self-defence of various districts and cantons and armed with weapons captured from the French and Japanese.

Many combatants of my unit became commanders of newly formed units... From this time three kinds of troops took shape in the revolutionary armed forces: the regular army, the regional army, and the village militia and guerrilla forces. When our troops moved into Hanoi on August 26, 1945, I was appointed commander of a battalion of the Liberation Army.

The Viet Minh Front carried out a correct policy toward enemy troops, the overwhelming majority of whom were forcibly conscripted peasants. To illustrate that policy and to give you an idea of the prestige of the Liberation Army at that time, I would like to relate a battle that took place a few days after Dong Mu, when our unit had enjoyed their first victorious Tet (Lunar New Year's Festival) among the local population...

That day, the Company Command decided to send our unit to waylay the soldiers of Na Ngan post as they left on a raid to seize rice from the people (Na Ngan had been reoccupied by the enemy after it was taken by our forces).

I was then confined to bed with malaria so I was not allowed to go into battle but was left lying in a bamboo shack at our base. A local woman cadre, the wife of a member of my unit, prepared maize gruel for me and looked after me. A little after the departure of my unit, a woman cadre from a grassroots organization in

Kim Ma canton came and reported to me that 15 fully armed riflemen were taking a rest in a house in a nearby hamlet. Although my eyes were still dim and my temperature was high, I told the two women to follow me. Not far from my shack, I came across Comrade Hien, a native of Bac Son, a deputy squad leader, who had been ordered by Comrade Van to return home because he was suffering from malaria. My Colt .12 I had lent to a comrade, and I had only a dagger and two fountain-penlike pistols, of the kind used for secret assassination. Comrade Hien had a musket and a whistle. While marching, the four of us discussed ways to fight the enemy. We agreed on the following scheme: the "grassroots" woman would take a letter "from the Viet Minh" to the enemy squad leader, a sergeant. The letter, written by me, read: "We, the Liberation Army, are closely encircling this village. So you'd better give yourselves up and hand over your weapons. We will ensure safety for you. We all are Vietnamese, and therefore we are not trying to kill you." Signed: Dam Ngoc Luu, Commander of the Liberation Army Company.

If the sergeant asked, the woman would answer: "Sir, I was trying to catch some fish in the light of a torch when the Viet Minh told me to bring you this letter. At first I refused, but then I saw that the Viet Minh were very numerous. They formed a long line of men coming down from the mountains, with many, many guns and shining bayonets. I was so scared I was obliged to bring their letter to you. They have stationed a gun right at the gate of the village, a kind of gun standing on two legs, with a band of cartridges this long, pointing at this house."

Comrade Hien would stand at the gate of the hamlet with his gun pointing in the direction of the house. The woman would stand at another place, holding the whistle. When I shouted "Hands up!" she would blow the whistle, while Comrade Hien would yell: "The whole company ready to fight!"

Following the "grassroots" woman, I moved into the hamlet and climbed the flight of wooden stairs leading into the house. A sentry, who was standing on the bamboo floor of the house, took the letter to the sergeant. I

promptly followed the sentry and hid behind the door.

At the sergeant's question, the woman replied as had been planned. The sergeant and two corporals consulted one another. "To hell with them," said one of the corporals, "they're just trying to scare us!"

"What should we do if they get tough?" This question was flashing across my mind when the second corporal pleaded: "Don't kick up a row with them, please. Why should we be so silly as to get killed and never see our wives and kids again? The last time I ran into them, they treated me damn well. They only kill those who resist them!"

I stepped in, and shouted: "Hands up! Face to the wall!"

Immediately, the whistle blew, and a voice shouted: "The whole company, ready to fight!"

The fever had gone from me I knew not when!

The riflemen, most of whom were sitting round the fireplace while others were cowering in their blankets, promptly obeyed our orders.

I went on, speaking aloud: "We Vietnamese don't kill each other. But whoever resists us will be gunned down right away!"

The corporal who had advised against resisting us turned round, his hands still held up, and said to me:

"Comrade Mandarin, do you remember me?"

"You're from Na Ngan, aren't you?" I asked.

"Yes, I've told them not to resist, because I know that you, Comrade Mandarins, only want to capture enemy guns to save our country."

"Yes, yes, I remember you now," I replied.

Hien was already standing on the threshold, his gun trained on the prisoners. The two women comrades moved in to seize the arms and ammunition which they quickly carried away.

I told the riflemen to turn round, and said to them: "Our only aim is to capture weapons to kill the enemy and save our country. After that, each of you will be free either to return to

you family, or to continue serving the imperialist army. We only ask all of you to tell your relatives and co-villagers and friends that we Viet Minh are Vietnamese patriots. Those of you who've got enough money can go home on their own. Those who don't, I'll give them some. Sergeants, corporals, and soldiers, all will be treated alike."

Some of the soldiers who didn't have any money, except the sergeant, accepted the money I offered. I had then in my pockets 400 Indochinese piastres — the proceeds of my own share of land sold by my mother with the aim of buying me a gun. I gave each of them some money according to the distance he had to travel and spent 240 piastres altogether. I took out my notebook, and wrote a circulation permit for each of them. Most of them belonged to the Kinh (majority) nationality, a few of them were of the Tay ethnic group.

Just then, Comrade Hien came in and reported to me in a low voice: "It's been done." (meaning that the weapons had already been taken to the base area).

I told the riflemen: "You shouldn't leave this house before 8 a.m. tomorrow because there is a thick fog and there might be some misunderstanding on the part of the Liberation forces if you travel too early on the roads."

I added that they should stop calling us "mandarins", because we were patriots, and usually addressed each other as "comrades". "In our army, commanders and soldiers, all are brothers", I told them.

Both the riflemen and the corporals were very pleased. The atmosphere became completely relaxed, as all of us sat round the fireplace and talked with one another. The soldiers confided to us their miseries. One of them, with tears welling up in his eyes, promised to tell his dear ones and relatives what had happened and pledged never to serve the imperialists again... At daybreak, I shook hands with each rifleman, said good-bye to them, and wished them a good trip home. Back in my shack in the base, I had another fit of fever, I wrapped myself up in my blanket and fell asleep.

Q. : You said you were commanding a battalion of the Liberation Army which moved into Hanoi on August 26, 1945 following the victory of the August Revolution (August 19, 1945). Could you please tell us what tasks had been entrusted to you from then to the historic Dien Bien Phu victory (May 7, 1954), which ended our patriotic resistance to French colonialist aggression?

A. : When the Provisional Revolutionary Government with Uncle Ho as President took over the capital of Hanoi, I was entrusted with commanding the forces defending the President and the Party's Central Committee. In January 1946, I was named commander of the Hanoi Special Military Zone... I must confess that at that time I was uncomfortable in my work, because as early as September 23, 1945, the imperialists had already started hostilities in Nam Bo (Cochinchina)... and I twice asked for permission to go and fight in the South...

My request was accepted in April 1946.

In almost all units in the South I met again many comrades who had fought by my side in the Armed Propaganda Brigade and were now commanding regular army units. As Uncle Ho rightly put it in a directive he sent to the Propaganda Brigade, "Its initial size is small but it faces brilliant prospects. It is the embryo of the Liberation Army and can expand from North to South, throughout Viet Nam".

During the nine years' resistance against the French colonialists, I successively held the functions of regiment commander, front commander, interzone deputy-commander... and took part in many campaigns, from the plains

to the Central Highlands.

In 1950, I attended a military-political refresher course. When the Dien Bien Phu Campaign began, I was deputy-commander of one of the divisions which took part in that historic offensive against the enemy fortified position... On May 7, 1954, the day when the enemy surrendered at Dien Bien Phu, I was also present during the interrogation of defeated French General De Castries.

Everywhere, in whatever position we were in, one of the secrets of our success lay in the fact that we always preserved the basic qualities of a revolutionary army, and its traditions of struggle — an army which is created by the people, fights for the people, and fights together with the people.

We always kept close contacts with the people, protected the people, strictly observed discipline in our relations with the masses, and carried out our pledges of honour. With the confidence and love of the people, we can fulfil all our tasks... Apart from the political and military aspects, we also paid very great attention to building up logistic services and growing more food crops, in order to alleviate the contributions of the people and make it possible to wage a protracted resistance.

Q. : Over the 20 years since the restoration of peace (1954-1974), the Viet Nam People's Army has built itself gradually into a modern regular army. At the same time, it has successfully coped with the air and naval war of destruction of US imperialism. What difficulties have you met in carrying out your tasks as a commanding officer?

A. : From small armed units at first, our army has grown rapidly in all respects, and now contains many modern armed services... This makes it necessary for us, commanding officers, to study hard, to raise our cultural, scientific and technological level.

With regard to cadres with long years of revolutionary activity like ourselves, coming from working people, mostly with a low cultural level, the Party and Government have created conditions for us to raise our cultural standard and widen our knowledge... There is no other way

out if you want to meet the needs of the army. I myself have had to study hard, following the example of Uncle Ho and other veteran revolutionaries who never stopped studying even in imperialist prisons.

Besides, in face of a difficult situation, I always sought the

advice of other comrades, following a democratic work-style within the armed forces, and tried to solve problems through discussions. Officers and soldiers have always been of one mind, just as our army has always united with the people. That is why we have defeated all the strategies and tactics of US imperialism.

Q.: Would you like to give us your impressions on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Viet Nam People's Army?

A.: Thirty years have passed since the founding of the Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Viet Nam, the eldest brother of all Vietnamese armed forces, as Uncle Ho has described it.

From a 34-man platoon armed with rudimentary weapons, it has made leaps forward, as in the legend of Phu Dong (legendary hero of Viet Nam who grew overnight from an infant into a giant and drove out the foreign invaders — *Ed*). This tremendous advance can easily be seen when we compare the military parade to celebrate our victory over US aggression on May 1st, 1973, in Hanoi, in which tens of thousands of troops from all armed services — army, navy, air force and modern technical units — took part, with the first troop review of the Viet Nam Liberation Army in Hanoi on August 29, 1945.

I was entrusted with organizing and commanding the parade. There were altogether three infantry battalions selected from units of the Liberation Army freshly returned from the Viet Bac resistance base. We wore khaki uniforms taken from the stores of the Bao An Binh (Civil Guards under the Japanese — *Ed*), from which the epaulettes had been removed. A number of these uniforms were either too large or too small for our Liberation soldiers. For armaments, we had rifles, bayonets and some machine-guns. Before the troop review, I stood on a table in the yard of our barracks and showed our men how to perform a number of elementary movements for about half an hour... Then we moved straight onto the square in front of the Hanoi Municipal Theatre... Amidst the strains played by the military band, the spirit of our soldiers, men and women, was skyhigh, and our

compatriots in Hanoi were greatly moved at seeing their own national army for the first time. But anybody who watched closely enough could see that a number of our comrades did not march in pace with the others... Probably because the only thing they saw on that day was the clumsiness of our revolutionary soldiers in the matter of parade, the imperialists later disagreed with the views of some more or less unbiased military commanders, like General Leclerc, who called for a political solution to the Viet Nam problem... That was why they plunged headlong into military adventures which, as we all know, ended in great disaster for the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

The US imperialists later made the same mistake as the French, with the result that they had to sign the Paris Agreement of 1973 which compelled half a million US troops to withdraw from Vietnamese territory.

A Vietnamese proverb says: "When you drink the water of a stream, think of its source". Today, I'm thinking of Pac Bo. In our Tay language, "Pac Bo" means the mouth of a source. At Pac Bo, as I told you above, I had the luck to attend the first military-political course taught by Uncle Ho in 1941. At Pac Bo, Uncle and the Party created the Vietnamese people's armed forces, educated them and then led them to fulfil all tasks assigned by our people and history. I think of the many brilliant young men and women, the many dear comrades, who have heroically laid down their lives so that our motherland may be independent and free, as it is today. I can never forget those mothers in remote villages and hamlets in the high mountain regions who 30 years ago shared out to us each bowl of maize gruel, each bowl of

vegetable soup, each spoonful of salt, and who attended to us when we were ill.

Neither can I forget the devoted assistance, full of proletarian internationalism, of the cadres, army-men and other comrades of fraternal socialist countries.

Looking back on the road we have travelled over the past 30 years, I feel immense pride over the exploits and growth of our people's armed forces. I also feel absolute confidence in their "brilliant prospects", as beloved Uncle Ho wrote in his instructions to the Propaganda Brigade.

I firmly believe that under the leadership of the Viet Nam Workers' Party our armed forces will grow ever more powerful, to defend socialist construction in North Viet Nam and to give strong support to the struggle of the armed forces and people in the South, with the aim of attaining Uncle Ho's last wish that "our compatriots in the South and the North will certainly be reunited under the same roof."

December 1974

TRUONG DINH HUNG

(1) The 10 Pledges of Honour:

"I, member of the Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Viet Nam vow on my honour as a National Salvation fighter and under the red flag with its five-pointed golden star.

1. To make every sacrifice for our homeland, Viet Nam, to fight to the last drop of my blood to wipe out the Japanese fascists and French colonialists and the Vietnamese traitors, in order to turn Viet Nam into an independent and democratic country, standing on an equal footing with other democratic nations in the world.

2. To strictly abide by the orders of my superiors, and to try by all means to carry out quickly and accurately any order I receive.

3. Always to fight unrelentingly; never to complain about hardships and difficulties, however great they may be; never to fear death, to charge the enemy whenever I go into battle, and never to shrink back even if my head were to fall and my blood were to be shed.

4. Always to race with time, to be resourceful and to study hard in order to train myself into a revolutionary soldier, a worthy vanguard combatant in the fight against the aggressors, for national salvation.

(Continued on page 30)

Twelve Days of the Aerial Dien Bien Phu

A "Pearl Harbour" in Viet Nam?

UNTIL recently most American historians considered Tokyo's staging of Japanese-American negotiations before the Pearl Harbour attack the most perfidious political swindle in the first half of this century. In fact, in November 1941, a high-level Japanese diplomatic delegation was in Washington in order to "settle the serious dispute" between the two biggest imperialist powers in the Pacific. On November 20, the Mikado was still offering to hold talks with President Roosevelt on a ship in the middle of the Pacific Ocean even though, fifteen days earlier, the Japanese High Command had taken the decision to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour and destroy the US Pacific Fleet.

The trap was set, as everyone knows, on December 7, and the Americans, caught completely napping, lost nearly all their naval and air forces based there.

Thirty-one years later, it was Washington's turn to use the perfidious trick of its former adversary, in the belief that thereby they would deal the Vietnamese a crushing blow and seize the victory.

Let us recall the facts:

On October 23, 1972, Nixon gave orders to stop US bombing north of the 20th parallel. He hoped that this would lead to the signing of an agreement which would rescue the US and their puppets in South Viet Nam from their disastrous military situation caused by the PLAF strategic offensive launched six months before. Finally, after lengthy negotiations between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger, a draft agreement was reached. In a message sent to the DRVN government, Nixon said that the draft agreement was satisfactory and suggested that his special adviser should come to Hanoi to initial it.

But suddenly, he made an about-turn and demanded the modification of some provisions in the agreement. Meanwhile Kissinger was publicly declaring that peace was "at hand" and that the accord was 95 per cent ready for signature.

Then the talks in Paris continued...

On December 13, before leaving Orly for Washington, Kissinger confirmed to the press that the two sides were maintaining contacts and would decide whether a new meeting would be necessary.

On December 16, Kissinger reiterated that the agreement was 99% completed.

But what was brewing on the American side behind these reassuring statements?

Early in December, the US Pacific Command was preparing, with the utmost secrecy, a new deployment of its air and naval forces. A special task force was formed with the most efficient elements of the 7th, 8th and 13th air armies. The fleet of

KC-135s (tanker planes for refuelling bombers in the air) based in Thailand and the Philippines was strengthened. The number of aircraft-carriers operating in the Gulf of Tonkin ("Yankee" station) was raised to six. The two B52 bases at Guam (Anderson) and in Thailand (Utapao) were placed under the command of a new *ad hoc* headquarters.

From December 11 onward, the US Command intensified its reconnaissance missions over Hanoi and Haiphong.

The US Security Council, summoned by Nixon, secretly took the decision to unleash strategic planes in a crushing attack on Hanoi.

By December 15, a colossal force—the whole of the US air force in Southeast Asia—had been made ready for the great assault:

- 193 B-52 strategic bombers, or 46% of the total B-52;
- 1077 up-to-date tactical bombers including swinging jets or 31% of US tactical aircraft;
- 6 aircraft-carriers or 43% of the US total.

On December 18, at 4 p.m., Le Duc Tho, who had been carrying on the talks with Kissinger, arrived in Hanoi from Paris.

But four hours before, at noon on the 18th, Nixon had given orders to his B-52s to leave Guam for Hanoi with full loads of bombs.

The "September Plan"

ACCORDING to certain historians, in 1941, the Americans had foreknowledge of the Japanese scheme against Pearl Harbour and Washington had sent warning to the commander of the base several weeks before Admiral Nagumo's raid. Four hours before the appearance of the first Japanese bombers American vessels had detected the presence of unidentified submarines in the vicinity and the radar system had detected suspicious aircraft. Nevertheless the attackers were able to take the base completely by surprise.

In 1972, in North Viet Nam, things were quite different.

Early in August, the AA Defence Command and the Air-Force Command, implementing a directive of the Military Bureau of the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Workers' Party, worked out a combined plan to repulse an eventual attack by successive waves of enemy strategic aircraft. Meanwhile a training program was elaborated to prepare the AA defence and air force to carry out this plan. This was done two months before the DRVN delegation had handed the draft agreement, the object of the Paris talks, to the US delegation.

This combined plan was approved early in September by the Chiefs of the General Staff and the General Political Department. The Command and

the Party Bureau of the AA defence and air force were responsible for the execution of the program of preparation. By the end of the month, the preparatory work, the tactical and technical training, moral and political mobilization, preparation of the terrain, etc., had been successfully completed.

The main points in this September plan were as follows:

- *Target*: the enemy will launch massive raids by B.52s in coordination with tactical aircraft on the region north of the 20th parallel. General direction of the attacks: areas north and south of National Road No. 1, the cities of Thai Nguyen, Haiphong and Hanoi (the two latter being the major targets). Duration of the attacks: successive waves from 5 to 7 days.

- *Intensity of raids and forces deployed by the enemy*: about fifty B.52 sorties a day; on a given target about thirty sorties per day. Tactical aircraft: from 250 to 300 and even up to 350 sorties per day.

- *Tactics*: B.52s will concentrate on night attacks. Tactical aviation: night raids (combined with those of B.52s) and day raids (to complement night strikes).

The enemy will strengthen his tactical aviation and its fighter escort; it will intensify the ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) to "blind" us and disturb our liaison. Attacks will be stepped up against our surface-to-air missiles SAMs and our airfields before and during B.52 raids...

At the same time as measures were being taken for its execution, the September plan was being modified to make it more adapted to the concrete circumstances.

On November 16, the Hanoi defence set itself the eventual task of repelling a formation of 100 B.52s coming from three different directions.

We kept a close watch on the activities of the enemy such as the strengthening of the US strategic aviation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the direction of reconnaissance flights... The difficulties raised by the US side at the Paris Conference and at "private meetings" also induced us to heighten our vigilance.

In a directive sent on December 4 to the AA Defence and Air Force Command, the Chief of General Staff predicted: "Simultaneously with the use of fighters and tactical bombing, the enemy is likely to suddenly step up massive B.52 raids of a devastating character on such major targets as Hanoi, Haiphong and other populated centres, road junctions transshipment points, aerodromes, AA batteries, in order to bring the maximum pressure to bear on us..."

On December 14 there was a further instruction to redouble vigilance from the General Staff and the General Political Department. The AA Defence and Air Force Command assessed that the enemy was showing signs of being about to launch his air offensive.

The following day, our troops, alerted, were ready to give battle. Each arm had received clear instructions. The radar units, especially, must spot the enemy from afar and inform the combat units in time. Each member of the AA Defence and Air

Force Command headed an inspection team which went to supervise the execution of orders by various units and key-sectors.

On the night of December 16-17, the General Staff and the General Political Department gave new directives, emphasizing the seriousness of the situation. The AA defence and air force units were battle ready, the command and signal system was under control and a preventive dispersal of material and technical reserves, ammunition dumps and warehouses had been carried out. All missile pads and fighter squadrons were kept at the ready.

By that time the civilian population in urban centres and threatened areas had already been dispersed to the countryside and less exposed regions. In Hanoi, one-third of the population, including 300,000 children had been evacuated and so had old people and adults whose presence in the city was not necessary for the coming battle. A special organ was set up to mobilize all mechanical means of transport in order to carry to safe places stocks of foodstuffs, goods, materials and raw materials as well as part of the population to be evacuated.

In the countryside, the administrative authorities and the population had made preparations to receive their countrymen from the threatened areas.



Wreckage of a B.52 downed on Dec. 21, 1972

Everywhere, especially in urban centres, the Red Cross services, the voluntary ambulance workers' teams, the clearing brigades were ready to operate even in the most difficult conditions of a massive attack by successive waves of enemy planes.

Thus, on December 18, Hanoi, Haiphong and the other towns and cities in the DRVN were calm and serene, well prepared to face the enemy.

The First American Losses

○ N the morning of December 18, 1972, at 10.52 a.m. a pilotless spy plane skimmed over Haiphong, while another, coming from the mountains of Laos, flew over Hanoi. The AA Defence and Air Force Command, judging that a raid on the capital from the Northwest direction was impending, warned the AA batteries.

At 6.30 p.m. the long-distance radar system detected the presence of the first squadrons of F-111A swing-wing bombers. Alert : in AA defence units. Loud-speakers kept the population informed of the situation. All the launching pads kept their missiles at the ready. The gunners took up position by their batteries. A blue signal rocket was fired over the airfields where the MIGs were standing ready at the end of the runway, their pilots in the cockpits. At the Command Posts, officers and technicians were in their combat positions.

At 7.10 p.m. the first formation of B.52s appeared on the radar screens. The inhabitants of threatened zones were told to go into shelters.

Five minutes later, many squadrons were signalled in the coastal region, heading for Haiphong from the Southeast, behind a thick jamming screen. Some planes were flying at the 9,000 or 10,000 metres altitude, usually flown by B.52s. But our Command had detected the enemy's trick: these planes were "F" (tactical planes) hoping to be taken as B.52s so as to turn our attention away from our main objectives.

At 7.44 p.m. we launched the first SAMs to intercept the flight of the real B.52s which, despite their powerful ECM devices, could not escape the close watch of our radar. At that moment our MIGs also took off despite attacks by enemy fighter-bombers against our airfields.

At 8.05 p.m. the 59th Missile Battalion downed the first B.52: a huge ball of fire fell from 9,000 metres up onto a locality near Phu Loi, about thirty kilometres north of Hanoi. Immediately a senior officer was sent to check on the type of plane downed. On a metal sheet among the wreckage was found the SAC (Strategic Air Command) emblem and the number plate of the aircraft: it was a B.52 G.

At 1.30 a.m. on December 19, the rural militia-men captured some airmen who had managed to bail out: they were attached to a unit based at Guam. At 5 a.m. other fliers from Utapao and Guam were caught in the periphery of Hanoi, while a missile unit operating in the southern part of the DRVN downed a B.52 which was on its way back to Thailand after emptying its bomb load.

A few hours after the raid, the "Voice of Viet Nam" announced to the world the balance-sheet of

the previous night: 7 American planes including 3 B.52s were downed and 7 airmen captured. The Hanoi AA batteries had shot down 2 B.52s and 2 F.4s.

Thus from the first day of their attack the US failed at its main objectives: to take its opponent unawares, to pin their aircraft down and destroy them on the ground and to silence the Vietnamese people by destroying the broadcasting station of the "Voice of Viet Nam".

The losses of the US were dreadful: the ratio of downed B.52s (3 out of the 90 planes involved) was unbearable for an action which was to be continued for many days. An *ad hoc* commission was hurriedly set up by the SAC, headed by the deputy Chief of Staff and composed of aircraft technicians and experts of ECM manufacturing firms to study the causes of that catastrophe.

Still More Gloomy Days for the US Air Force

○ N December 19, the US Command sent in 93 B.52s and increased the number of tactical aircraft by 150% in its air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong. Our AA defence hit back vigorously and, in commemoration of the 26th anniversary of the beginning of the first resistance war, downed two B.52s over Hanoi and four fighter-bombers over Haiphong. In the day time, the AA defence and missile units held meetings to draw experiences from the night battles; this helped us improve our methods of fighting and our preparations for future engagements. It was resolved to do everything possible to punish the enemy even more severely so that he would not be able to continue his offensive by strategic planes at the same tempo.

Our December 20, Nixon sent a message to the DRVN which was nothing more than a summons to accept US diktat. At sunset, 93 B.52s and 151 fighter-bombers were unleashed against Hanoi. At 7.25 p.m. despite foul weather and the bombing of our airfields, our jet fighters took off to intercept a B.52 formation which they succeeded in driving away before the bombs could be dropped. That night proved even more disastrous for the enemy who lost 7 B.52s (5 crashing on the spot) and 7 fighter-bombers including such up-to-date models as the swing-wing F.111A, the F.105 "Thunderchief", the F.4 "Phantom" and the A.7 "Intruder". Twelve more B.52 crewmen joined their colleagues in the "Hanoi Hilton". The enemy's scheme to destroy the Yen Phu power plant, north of Hanoi, had been foiled.

On the morning of December 21, after hearing the report to the AA Defence and Air force Command, the Chief of Staff concluded: "We have waged a large-scale battle against the US strategic air offensive and won an initial success. The enemy's main target will continue to be Hanoi." And he gave these instructions: "The various arms must combine their efforts to create conditions for our air force to strike at the enemy from unexpected directions. This is a great difficulty. It should be overcome by whatever ways and means possible; if so, new prospects will be opened for the development of our air force. We must expect the enemy



An artillery site in Hanoi.

to hit hard at our missile units and take adequate counter-measures."

On the afternoon of December 21, enemy tactical planes attacked what they thought to be our missile positions. However these abandoned launching pads were a bait and the attacking plans were badly hit by our A.A. batteries and militia units.

Having received such heavy punishment on December 20, the following night the enemy visibly wavered. He sent only 24 B.52s and flew 36 sorties of tactical planes: 3 B.52s were downed, representing one-eighth of the strategic bombers used that night. These exploits shattered the myth of the invulnerability of the B.52s.

After that battle, the Command made a further assessment of the situation. Having suffered heavy losses after four nights of attacks on Hanoi, the enemy would probably change his target and hit at Haiphong. The following day our staff officers flew to the port city to popularize the experience gained in Hanoi. In those days of fierce engagements we did not forget to commemorate the anniversary of the foundation of the Viet Nam People's Army (December 22). There were no festivities but all of us were thinking of the memorable day and were anxious to bring the coming battles to a victorious end. Following the Viet Nam People's Army 28-year traditions of victorious struggle, the A.A. defence and air force entered the fight on the night of December 22 with redoubled vigour.

Haiphong shot down two B.52s and one A.6; in a coordinated action, the militia units of three factories in Hanoi downed one F.111 and captured its crew.

On the night of December 23, avoiding Hanoi and Haiphong, the enemy struck at Ha Bac, Lang Son and Bac Thai. On the morning of that day, the A.A. defence of Road 1-A had received orders to defend the highway and the three provinces had

been informed that B.52s would possibly strike at a number of their localities.

After that night a question was raised: would the enemy, who had shown signs after the night of December 22 of giving up Hanoi, attack the capital city again? Suggestions were made that missile units be moved out of the Hanoi area to check the incursions of B.52s elsewhere, but the A.A. Defence and Air Force Command was of the opinion that, though the enemy had been badly battered, he still had enough strength to go on with his adventure; he would not give up his policy of negotiating from a position of strength and Hanoi would continue to be his favourite target. The momentary disappearance of B.52s over Hanoi was but a stratagem aimed at inducing our forces to leave the Hanoi area after which the enemy would unexpectedly resume his air strikes against it.

Thus the defence of Hanoi was not only maintained, but strengthened with other missile units.

To hoodwink public opinion, Nixon declared a suspension of air raids on Christmas Day.

We knew that this was just a trick of the enemy to take breath and reorganize his striking force. We made use of this opportunity to draw experiences from the seven-day battle and to prepare ourselves for future engagements.

We calculated that the enemy would change his tactics and would direct fiercer attacks against our missiles so as to reduce his losses. Also that B.52s would strike still more fiercely at Hanoi.

Our guess proved to be correct. On December 26, from 1.0 to 1.40 p.m., the enemy flew 56 sorties of strategic planes to hit hard at targets north of the capital city, mainly the missile launching pads; the latter were efficiently protected by AA batteries and the air force in close coordination with the short-range firing network of the local armed forces.

VIET NAM COURIER

Remaining undetected by the enemy because of misty weather, 72nd Missile Battalion downed one F.4, thus defeating the enemy's scheme to clear the way for B.52 raids.

On the night of December 26, resorting to a ruse, the enemy changed the schedule of his raids and hit simultaneously at three cities: Hanoi, Haiphong and Thai Nguyen. Hanoi remained the main target with two-thirds of the 105 B.52s operating that day directed against it. The enemy believed that we would be taken by surprise, with our forces scattered after his diversionary operations. But he was once more mistaken. The enemy command was staggered at the news that seven more B.52s had been downed, including four on the spot (Western sources reported that nine B.52s did not return to their base).

However, in that night, the aggressors committed a most heinous crime with the carpet bombing by B.52s of Kham Thien street. This savage attack against the civilian population enraged all the armed forces, especially the AA defence and air force.

The air force made feverish preparations for its battle against B.52s on the night of December 27.

After receiving such hard blows on the previous night, on December 27, the enemy sent only 54 B.52s; of these five were downed including one which crashed on Hoang Hoa Tham Road in Hanoi.

The night of December 27 was an unforgettable

one for our air force, as it was the first time our jets downed one of these super-fortresses.

A Soviet Marshal, three times a hero of the Soviet air force, who had brought down 59 German fascist war planes, was full of praise for the glorious exploit of our fliers: "The difficulties I had to overcome," he said, "cannot be compared with those you are facing in the fight against the B.52s."

On the morning of December 28, the VNPA High Command gave the order: "The losses suffered by the enemy in the last ten days are so heavy that he will soon be forced to stop his strategic air attacks. Unleash all your forces for the coming fight."

On the night of the 28th, the activities of the enemy were limited to the periphery of Hanoi. Our missile units and jet fighters downed two B.52s, and enemy planes kept away from the capital on the following night.

In face of the heavy defeat of his strategic air force, Nixon could not, even to save his face, prolong his air strike till New Year's Day. He was compelled to stop his air offensive at 0 hour on December 30, 1972 and to accept the same conditions we had put forward before December 18.

After

Colonel NGUYEN XUAN MAU
and
DUC NGUYEN

FACTS AND EVENTS

Evasion of an Obligation by the US

ON December 3, 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared before the Senate Financial Committee that the US did not contemplate contributing in a foreseeable future to the reconstruction of North Viet Nam.

Thus after repeated violations of various provisions of the Paris Agreement, Washington has come to the point of repudiating article 21 under which it undertakes to contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and throughout Indochina.

In its spirit, that article constitutes a formal obligation for the aggressors — the US — to pay compensation for the havoc it has wrought on the people, society and ecology of Viet Nam. Ameri-

can bombs have completely or partly destroyed almost all the towns and cities of North Viet Nam and that between 4,000 and 5,000 villages have been bombed. The name of Kham Thien — a Hanoi quarter turned into rubble by B.52s in December 1972 — will stand beside such names as Son My and Con Son (with its "tiger cages") in the South forever in the memory of mankind as the symbol of US imperialist barbarity.

It is not a question of "humanitarian aid" granted by a victor country to a defeated one. It is a juridically well-founded obligation recognized by many international organizations and conferences such as the Bertrand Russell Tribunal (1967), the International Commission of Investigation of US Crimes in Indochina (1970, 1971, 1972), the

Symposiums on US Genocide held in Cuba (1966, 1968, 1972), and the various lawyers' conferences and meetings in Japan, the GDR, the USSR, Sweden, France, etc.

For the damage caused, it is only just that reparations should be made. Even if such an obligation was honoured, the losses and damage could not be entirely made up simply because human lives and sufferings, the delay in building the economy, the destruction of the environment — these are not things that can be repaired.

The strict and correct execution of the obligation stipulated in article 21 of the Paris Agreement is an imperative requirement of law, ethics and human conscience. This is a duty which the American Administration can never evade.

Further Strengthening of Agricultural Cooperatives

SINCE late September 1974, cooperative and district level congresses have been held by the co-op farmers to pave the way for provincial congresses and for a national congress which will take place in the first quarter of 1975.

The aim of these congresses is to discuss detailed statutes for high-level agricultural cooperatives and how they should be implemented. These detailed statutes will then be submitted to the national congress for approval.

The statute of low-level cooperatives (1) drawn up during the cooperativization of 1959 was effective in helping the cooperatives to stabilize their organization and management. Little by little, the cooperatives have matured in the course of many "drives for technical and managerial improvement" and 85% of them have become high-level (2) cooperatives. The statute of high-level cooperatives ratified by the National Assembly in 1969 gave a new impulse to the cooperatives and strengthened the socialist system in the North. Nevertheless this statute is still insufficiently worked out and its application leaves room for improvement. Now that peace has been restored, the draft detailed statute is being popularized among the peasants for their discussion. The aim is to further consolidate and perfect the socialist relations of production and meet the needs of agricultural development so as to take it step by step from small production to large-scale socialist production in accordance with the decisions of the Thai Binh Conference (3).

This draft detailed statute is based in the main on that of 1969, but amended on the basis of the experience gained in the course of agricultural cooperativisation. The new statute has been warmly welcomed by the co-op farmers. In their discussions, they have made frank criticisms and self-criticisms about the management of cooperatives. Eager discussions have been held on new methods of production, rearrangement of the fields, specialization of planting areas, planning of production, rationalization of the distribution of land to production brigades, restructuring of crops; expansion of the acreage under the winter rice crop, making animal husbandry a main branch of production, setting up a new division of labour, amending the system of work norms, technical planning, working out regulations on the protection of public property, etc.

"Collective Farmers Councils" from district level upward will be elected, whose task will be to popularize the Party and State policies and lines among the peasants, and to gather the suggestions and petitions of the peasants, and forward them to the Party and government; in this way they will be maintaining a close relationship between the collective farmers and the Party, the State and all the organizations which make up the Fatherland Front.

These discussions have further enhanced the co-op farmers' socialist consciousness and spirit of being collective masters. Their achievements in the resistance war against the US aggressors and in socialist construction have been confirmed. As a result, the reorganization of production and improvement of agricultural management have gained momentum.

(1) In the low-level cooperatives the co-op members share the profits according to the size of their former holdings, in the high-level ones the principal means of production are collectively owned and the members receive their pay according to their work-points.

(2) See the speeches of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong appearing in Vietnam Courier n°s 30 and 31.

(3) See Vietnam Courier n°s 30 and 31.

1966. While the US air escalation was at its height, Thai Binh, one of the main rice-producing provinces in the delta, obtained five tons of paddy per hectare (for two annual crops), over the whole of its planting areas.

This was a turning point in rice cultivation, not only for Thai Binh, but for the whole of North Viet Nam. This example encouraged other rice-growing provinces to move along the same "five tons hectare" road.

Production has continued to rise:


5.5 tons/ha	in 1967
5.8	— in 1971
6	— in 1972 (year of US re-escalation)
7.36	— in 1974

A coastal province in the Red River delta with a limited land area and a dense and rapidly rising population (leading to a gradual reduction in the per capita acreage of arable land: 900 sq.m. in 1960 and 700 sq.m. in 1973), an agriculture exclusively based on rice with low and unstable yields, Thai Binh apparently faced insuperable difficulties and seemed unlikely ever to be able to provide for the needs of its population.

Though the land of Thai Binh is fertile, the ground relatively flat and even and it has a long tradition of good farming, obstacles were also many: with forty kilometres of coastline and surrounded by three big rivers (Hoa River, Red River and Tra Ly River), 80% of its land consists of acid or alkaline soil, each year the low-lying land in the south suffers from floods while the elevated land in the north is exposed to drought: the great annual typhoons, insects and plant diseases cause serious damage.

These calamities were not being effectively combated. The peasants were mobilized to drain flood water or to irrigate dry ricefields using antiquated methods and instruments; for alkaline or acid soils which suffered from drought, the peasants would wait passively for rain, afraid that irrigation would evaporate the alkaline or acid substances which sear the riceplants. It was time to make a radical change in these old farming methods. From 1960, a series of measures were put into effect forming a system of combined techniques for the development of rice production.

Thai Binh, an Example of Intensive Rice Cultivation



Harvest time at Tan Phong cooperative, Tien Hai district, Thai Binh province.

Regionalization of Rice Cultivation

THE first thing to do was to divide the province into different planting regions, characterized by particular physical and mechanical features and soil possibilities in order to determine the orientation of production, the right proportion of each crop, the proper utilization of each plant, the efficient application of technical measures, the strict observance of cultivation timetable and the rational utilization of the labour force.

The regionalization of crops also facilitates the improvement of the soil and the arrangement of rice fields, thus allowing the draining of alluvial waters to elevated regions, manuring of low-lying lands and permanent supply of water to alkaline areas.

In each large region, it is also important to determine the rice-growing areas where the material and technical basis necessary for regional development and intensification of agriculture should be established: in the low-lying lands, the first necessity is the building of hydraulic works; in the regions of alkaline and acid soils, water-control works must be combined with a

greater use of lime; in the regions already served by an adequate hydraulic network and where fertilizers are already being extensively used it is necessary to replace the degenerate low-yield rice strains by strains of higher yield, while taking the necessary technical measures for their planting.

Thus, since the winter 1963-spring 1964 crop, the planting areas have already been divided into different categories to ensure more efficient use of the land: sandy and half-sandy soils are reserved for industrial crops and dry crops; to the heavy clayey soil traditionally reserved for rice but giving low yields sand is added to make it lighter and suitable for the planting of a supplementary sweet potato crop.

In the last few years, basing


ourselves on topographical surveys and studies of the physical and mechanical characteristics of the soil and of the rice yields obtained since 1966, we have moved on to a further regionalization: alkaline and semi-alkaline soil; acid-alkaline and alkaline-acid soil; acid soil; intensive cultivation region; low-lying region. For each of these five regions, there is a particular cultivation technique: for instance, for a region of acid soil, it is necessary to start ploughing immediately after the 10th lunar-month rice harvest in order to aerate the soil, to wash the soil two or three times so as to lessen its acidity before the cultivation of azolla, to frequently renew the water in the ricefields during the growth of the rice-plants, to manure with large quantities of organic fertilizers and to improve the soil with a sufficient quantity of lime (two tons per hectare).

Hydraulic Work

THE regionalization of crops has made possible the rationalization of hydraulics, which has always been a most important farming technique.

Thai Binh has a thick network

of rivers. Every year, considerable manpower was needed for the dredging of canals and repair of ditches and drains. Nevertheless, in the absence of detailed and rational hydraulic plans and projects



The Lan sluice.

for each region and of a comprehensive network coordinating various kinds of works, the rice crop is always exposed to flood and drought.

Hydraulic plans and projects have therefore been worked out for the whole province and for each region.

At the same time as major hydraulic works are being built, the main canals have been repaired for the draining of water from the low-lying land and the irrigation of more elevated land. After the building of the Lan sluice in the southern part of the province, the most important medium-sized canals were enlarged, dredged and rearranged to facilitate the drainage of water and make the utilization of big hydraulic works more effective.

Small and medium-sized irrigation works have been built to operate pump-stations in order to combat drought in the northern and flood in the southern part of the province.

The building of small hydraulic works has been stepped up through the formation, within the agricultural cooperatives, of hydraulic teams which rearrange the fields to facilitate irrigation and drainage.

Between 1963 and 1964, 54 million cubic metres of earth (or 45 cubic metres per head of population) were moved to build hydraulic works.

Since the winter-spring 1964-1965 rice crop, irrigation by gravity has been ensured for 30%

of the ricefields and by pumping for 11%. The northern districts no longer suffer from drought while in the southern districts waterlogging, reaching a level of 200mm, has been overcome.

In 1974, the water was brought entirely under control in 80% of the fields with spring rice.

At present Thai Binh possesses an extensive hydraulic network with thousands of kilometres of canals and ditches, two hundred major works built along rivers, two thousand sluices in the fields; 270 electric pump-stations, two thousand diesel pumps each with a capacity of 270-540 cubic metres hour and a thick network of drains.

For the growing of the 10th-month rice crop flood control remains the primary task. From

the 30,000 hectares of ricefields on low-lying land (about 40% of the acreage of 10th month rice), 10,000 hectares are still threatened with flooding in the rainy season.

Pending the completion of the drainage system, the cooperatives have grouped the fields into small zones where water can be stored before being drained toward the main canal according to a fixed schedule. During heavy rains the 270 electric pump-stations pump out the water over the tops of the dykes. Thus, 13,000 hectares of low-lying fields in the districts of Vu Thu, Dong Hung and Kien Xuong are divided into 36 zones separated by solid dykes to keep out the water flowing from higher areas. In Vu Thu district, the lowest part of the province, the cooperatives have moved 355,000 cubic metres of earth to build 174 kilometres of dykes around the zones and plots and they have divided the fields into 608 large plots for the distribution and storing of water. Kien Xuong district has completed the building of dykes, banks and small works to protect the seedbeds which are now concentrated in the higher ricefields and provided with a drainage system; this work required 43,000 cubic metres of embankment. Plans for the fight against typhoons and heavy rains have been worked out for the province and its districts to ensure that in a crisis, all the means are efficiently mobilized.

Work to complete the hydraulic system is being continued to enable Thai Binh to check drought and flood completely in the near future.

Manure

HYDRAULIC construction has facilitated the rational and efficient use of manure — mainly consisting of pigsty manure and green composts, particularly azolla. The utilization of chemical fertilizers is still limited (about forty thousand tons per year) as home production is not yet sufficient.

It is necessary to increase pig breeding both in cooperatives and in families. In 1973, there were 525,000 pigs against 377,000 in 1970. Cooperative pig breeding has made notable progress and now measures 27% of the total

in 1973 compared to only 8.4% in 1970. Many cooperatives have herds of hundreds, or even thousands, of pigs. However, pig breeding cannot be developed without increasing dry crops, particularly *sweet potato* which is their most suitable food. As a result, this crop makes up an important proportion, 30 — 40%, of dry farming which occupies about 10-12% of the yearly cultivated area. The development of pig breeding has made it possible

(1) This sluice was heavily damaged by US bombing in 1972.

to supply about 7 tons of pig manure (per crop) to each hectare of arable land.

The birth-place of *azolla*, Thai Binh is well known for the cultivation of that green compost which ranks second in importance after pig manure. Besides the winter *azolla* grown after the 10th-month rice crop, a summer *azolla* crop is now cultivated to manure spring-rice seedbeds. At present *azolla* is grown over 80% of the annual cultivated acreage which receives at least two layers of *azolla* buried in the fields.

Sesbania, also used to make an important green compost, is grown along ditches and irrigation channels: it accounts for 15-25% of organic fertilizers used for the 10th-month rice crop. To intensify the growing of *azolla*, nine seed-producing stations are supplying 300 tons of seed to the cooperatives every year.

Besides, the dredging of ponds, canals and ditches provides a large quantity of mud which, when dry, makes an excellent fertilizer.

Liming is a very effective method of improving alkaline acid soils but here Thai Binh experiences great difficulties due to the absence of limestone. However, great efforts have been made to bring limestone from distant provinces in order to produce 30,000 tons of quicklime per year, making it possible to provide 300 kilograms per hectare — moreover large amounts are bought elsewhere.

The stubble of the 10th month rice which is ploughed in during the winter ploughing is also an important source of manure. For the time being, owing to the lack of coal its use is still limited as it is used by the population as a source of fuel.

Great importance is attached to *manuring methods* which are applied according to the characteristics of each category of soil, the requirements of each variety of rice, and the stage of its growth. For instance, to obtain

7 tons/ hectare of paddy per year (two crops) or 3.5 tons per crop, 70-80 kilograms of nitrogen are needed per hectare per crop; to obtain 4-4.5 tons/ hectare, 80-100 kilograms of nitrogen are needed; from two-thirds to three-quarters of the nitrogen fertilizer should be employed before transplanting for lowlying fields, the quantity of superphosphate must be at least equal to that of ammonium sulphate and the 10th-month rice needs large quantities of phosphates.

The New Seeds

THE third component of the combined techniques is the *planting of new rice strains* with high yields and a short growing period. Thai Binh was the first delta province to adopt them over a large area. Since 1965 it has used for the winter-spring crop over 2,800 hectares the *Tra Trung Tu*, which yields as much as the 5th-month rice (2.4 tons per hectare). Before this is planted a crop of three-month *winter sweet potato* or of *azolla*; this requires a judicious choice of lands and seeds, an efficient irrigation system and adequate manure and manpower. This agricultural innovation enabled the acreage allotted to the new spring rice to be extended in the following years and the target of "five tons per hectare" to be exceeded in 1966 — a yield which was surpassed every year and reached 7.36 tons per hectare in 1974.

In 1965-1966 the aim was not yet to multiply crops, but gradually to substitute a high-yield crop for a low-yield one: the main emphasis during this period was still on improving the irrigation system and stepping up the production of organic fertilizers, in order to stabilize and raise, as much as possible, the yield of the 5th lunar month rice which was the most stable crop.

Since 1967, the *Tra Trung Tu* has been gradually replaced by the *Nong Nghiep 8* and *Tran Chau Lun*, new strains with higher yields, greater resistance to diseases and insects and less disposition to early lodging; in 1970, they already made up at least half the acreage of spring crop, yielding 5.7 tons per hectare (for two crops) that year. In the winter-spring 1973-74 crop, they accounted for 90 per cent of the cultivated acreage, principally the *Nong nghiep 8* which made up 80 per cent of the total and gave 4.478 tons per hectare on average, the *Tran Chau Lun* being reserved for the alkaline soils along the sea coast and yielding 3.714 tons per hectare on average.

The adoption of these new rice strains on nearly all the acreage, made possible by the completion of the irrigation system, by increased use of organic fertilizer and by soil improvement, has brought yields of 4.236 tons per hectare on average for the winter-spring 1973-1974 crop; several cooperatives gained very high yields: 6 tons per hectare in 9 cooperatives and 5 tons in 117 cooperatives (over 19, 217 hectares, i.e. 25 per cent of the acreage devoted to the crop); 4.945 tons over the whole acreage of Dong Hung district, and 8-10 tons on some private plots.



Tending azolla.

Since 1971, the *spring crop* has definitively taken the place of the fifth-month rice and become the main crop, the most stable of the year, providing 65 per cent of the annual paddy production. Its short growing period (3-4 months) is an opportunity for crop diversification and multiplication by applying two rotation formulae: 10th-month rice + winter sweet potato + spring rice for the ricefields on higher ground with clay and half-sandy soils, 10th-month rice + azolla + spring rice for the lowlying ricefields.

The new rice strains are more numerous for the 10th-month rice crop and, as a result of the sudden atmospheric changes — the heavy rains and violent typhoons — and the different levels of land, their introduction is more difficult.

They have, however, already been introduced for 11.4% of the acreage of the 1974 crop: the *Nong nghiep* 23 for the high ground rice fields where a winter crop is practicable, the *Nong nghiep* 8 and the *Tran Chau Lun* in the regions which have had success in growing these varieties, the *Nong nghiep* 22 for the intermediate ricefields, (situated between the high and low-lying ricefields), the *TB1* and *Nong nghiep* 5 for the low or relatively low ricefields. These new strains have given 2.8 tons per hectare on average for the 1974 harvest; 29 cooperatives which adopted them on 20 per cent of their acreage have obtained 3.6 to 4.3 tons per hectare, or 9 to

10 tons for the two crops, among them 7 cooperatives with over 10 tons per hectare. Moreover, their short growing period makes a third crop possible, the *winter crop* which is gaining ground (7,000 to 8,000 hectares, or 10 per cent of the winter-spring crop acreage) and the introduction of a new crop, the potato, intended to gradually replace the sweet

potato.

In a few years, by ensuring water control, Thai Binh will grow these new strains — mainly the *Nong nghiep* 22 and the *Nong nghiep* 5 — over one-third of the acreage reserved for the 10th-month rice crop. In the coming years this crop should be bringing in 3-4 tons per hectare (1).

Meticulous Care and the Beginning of Mechanization

INCREASE of rice yields requires much painstaking work and special attention to ploughing, otherwise the effectiveness of the other links will remain limited. In order to keep strictly to the cultivation timetable, particularly for transplanting, it is necessary to follow the work calendar and make rational division and use of manpower and land. This is all the more needful as an important part of the labour force has been mobilized for national defence.

This entails the reduction of the acreage allotted the 5th-month rice to devote part of it "to azolla, then to spring-rice, and to 10th-month rice (5-6 months)" or "to sweet potato (3 months), then to spring rice, and to short-term 10th-month (3-4 months)". This cultivation technique is made possible by the adoption of spring rice. The main thing is to ensure a balance between the acreage devoted to

"ai" (dry ploughing) and that allotted to "dâm" (wet ploughing): this formula allows crop diversification and multiplication which relieves the burden on manpower and draught force during cultivation periods. This has a treble result: paddy production has increased, the pigs have an abundant feed of sweet potato and give more manure and azolla production has risen.

Besides, to carry out repeated harrowings, two or three weedings, to observe the norms set for transplanting (32-36 tufts to the square metre), the norms of irrigation and manuring before and after transplanting and at each stage of growth and to combat insects and diseases such as chlorosis are all factors in the obtaining of high yields.

The improvement of farm tools has kept pace with semi-mechanization of work.

The widespread use of sickles for harvesting, and of boats, sampans and hand-carts for carrying paddy, seedlings and manure has markedly raised labour productivity.


An electric network covers the whole province. All the cooperatives are equipped with small multi-duty machines driven by 2,270 electric or diesel motors with a total capacity of 3,600 H.P.: each cooperative has four motors and three water pumps on average.

At present, there is one motor for 39 cultivated hectares and 40 HP for 100 hectares.

The mechanization of ploughing is only just beginning, existing for 12-15 per cent of the acreage.

Each district has a mechanical station for ordinary repairs and a tractor station.

(1) Each district has a station to select and multiply seeds.



At the Tay Giang cooperative, Tien Hai district, Thai Binh province.



*Transplanting spring rice seedlings at Dong Hoa cooperative,
Dong Hung district, Thai Binh province.*

Experimental Fields

ANOTHER experience of great practical value has been the introduction of *experimental fields* aimed at bringing the combined techniques of intensive cultivation to a higher level. These experimental fields are found in nearly all cooperatives. This new cultivation technique is now a mass movement which has allowed the peasants' long experience to be made full use of. From this experience valuable conclusions are drawn which are then applied on a large scale, and the weak links in the management work are detected. For example, to combat "chlorosis", less resistant degenerated varieties must be replaced by more resistant new ones; to carry out high density transplanting, great care must be given to ploughing and abundant manuring ensured; to help the rice grow adequately, it must be irrigated or drained at the right time and weeded by hoes instead of rakes. The improvement of alkaline soils with lime, the rational methods of manuring, the detection of pests on azolla, the cultivation of summer azolla are all techniques tested in the experimental field before becoming generally diffused.

Thanks to this movement, the leading cadres from the cooperative to the district and the province level have learnt to fulfil their managerial tasks in a concrete and realistic manner, by endeavouring to acquire agronomic and technical knowledge (beginning at the most elementary level) and showing a better appreciation of the possibilities and

difficulties of each cooperative and each region. They can no longer limit themselves to giving a general guidance and improvising but they must take part in the work, handle the farm tools, and think over their successes and failures. That is one of the best means — if not the best — to combat the bureaucratization of the leadership and the conservatism of the peasants.

The practice of experimental fields also constitutes the most effective and least costly way of bringing science and technique to the countryside; it is also a school to form technical and scientific cadres issued from the

masses.

During the 1965 winter-spring rice crop, 65 per cent of the cooperatives had 1,037 hectares of "high yielding experimental fields" making up 4.6% of the acreage and obtained 3.3 — 3.5 tons per hectare on the average (with a maximum of 4.75 tons per hectare), 42 per cent of the cooperatives with 2,600 hectares of "experimental fields to increase fields" obtained 3 tons per hectare on the average (with a maximum of 3.75 tons per hectare).

This movement, which brought great improvement to intensive cultivation, has continued in the following years and greatly contributed to the high yields obtained from 1966 to 1974.

Industrial Crops, Stockbreeding, Handicrafts

BESIDES rice, Thai Binh has industrial crops with high export value:

— *rush* cultivated on 2,208 hectares in 1974 (250 hectares more than in 1973) mainly in the coastal regions with a yield of 8 tons per hectare (an increase of 1.8 tons and a 30% rise in production. The movement "to gain ground on the sea" will expand this industrial crop to thousands of hectares of new land. And in the near future Thai Binh will be a "half-rice half-rush" province.

— *mulberry* cultivated on 1,500 hectares in 1974, mostly concentrated in Vu Thu and Thai Thuy districts, allows the development of silk-worm raising. 44 tons of

silk have been produced in 1974 as against 42 tons in 1973;

— *jute* concentrated in Hung Ha, Vu Thu and Quynh Phu districts. In 1974, the acreage devoted to this crop has risen to 2,678 hectares (an increase of 17.4 per cent as compared with 1973); the yield per hectare has gone up to 2.57 tons as against 2.14 tons; the total production has increased by 40.6 per cent.

The current regionalization and intensification of these industrial crops allows the development of such handicraft activities as tapestry - weaving, mat - making, basket - making, silk - spinning, etc. not only to absorb the overabundant manpower, but also to diversify the activities of

agricultural cooperatives, so as to raise their members' income.

The structure of crops has gradually changed, with rice slightly yielding place to industrial crops, especially dry crops:

Proportion of cultivated acreage devoted to each crop:

	1965	1972
Rice	89.2%	82.2%
Dry crops	7%	13.3%
Industrial crops	3.8%	4.5%
	100%	100%

As regards stock-breeding, the duck ranks second after the pig: in 1974, the State trading service collected 17.5 million duck-eggs and 270 tons of meat. There is a good future for this form of stock-breeding, for this rice-growing province can provide abundant feed for the duck.

Bee-keeping is developing: with 4,000 swarms, in 1974 state farms have produced 600 tons of honey and subsidiary products worth one million dong.

Problems of Organization and Management

The agrotechnical changes made over the last decade in Thai Binh could not have been carried out except on the basis of the transformation of the relation of production in the countryside, in agricultural cooperatives.

In 1974, 96.7% of the peasant households were members of cooperatives.

Following the merger of several small cooperatives into bigger ones at the level of one or several villages, at the beginning of 1974 there were 469 cooperatives (each with 196.1 hectares and 571 households on average), among them 194 cooperatives at village level, 15 cooperatives with 410-500 hectares each, 25 cooperatives with 351-400 hectares and 33 cooperatives with 300-350 hectares... These mergers facilitated crop specialization, the diversification of agricultural activities and the

(Continued on page 30)

Cadres

The application of science and technique to agriculture, chiefly to rice cultivation, requires an intensive training of cadres: at present, the province and its districts have 535 technical and scientific cadres with higher education and 2,000 cadres with secondary technical education. In this field, the agricultural cooperatives have made great efforts to send their members to technical schools: by

the end of 1974 they already had 5,541 technical cadres:

— for cultivation: 2,130 (22 with higher education)

— for stock breeding: 1,250 (11 with higher education)

— for economic management: 1,739 (13 with higher education)

— for mechanical and other trades: 422.

FACTS AND EVENTS

Admission by the Pentagon

THE US Department of Defense has acknowledged that its air force continues to fly reconnaissance missions over Cambodia and to give photos taken during these flights to the Lon Nol army (AFP, Nov. 25, 1974).

In its November 27, 1974 issue, the *International Herald Tribune* reported that these photos had been analysed by the US Support Activities Group at Nakhorn Phanom (Thailand) to determine bombing targets before passing them on to Lon Nol via the military attaché of the US embassy in Phnom Penh.

However, the US Department of Defense has only admitted part of the truth. There is no denying the fact that it was John Gunther Dean, the U.S. Ambassador in Phnom Penh himself, who sanctioned the formation of the present Long Boret government. He regularly convenes the Supreme Executive Council composed of the four topmost puppets (Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, Long Boret and Sosthene Fernandez) to give instructions to the puppet cabinet, presides over the meetings between the American advisers and the brasshats in the Phnom Penh army to work out military plans. He is the one who, through the agency of nearly four thousand advisers of all kinds, is deciding the fate of the "Khmer Republic" in all fields — military, political, economic, diplomatic, pacification. He himself has frequently made inspection tours of the areas still under Lon Nol control and everywhere he goes he is received with the honours due

to a "Governor General" of colonial times. The American advisers supervise the recruitment of soldiers, and nobody has forgotten that the American press denounced Major L. Ondecker, the deputy military attaché, for taking command of units fighting on the Kompong Cham front. The MEDT (Military Equipment Delivery Team) is doing the work of a military advisory group for "aims which have absolutely nothing to do with the delivery of war material". (October 10, 1973 report of the General Accounting Office to the American Congress).

Not only are American planes used in supply work or in reconnaissance missions; they are participating directly in the bombing of Cambodia as in Kompong Cham province in September 1973 and in the spraying of toxic chemicals over Takeo in December 1973 and the bombing on Piemchor, 112km south of Phnom Penh.

These acts run flagrantly counter to the provisions of the Paris Agreement signed on January 27 1973 and the June 13 1973 Joint Communiqué which forbid all outside interference in the domestic affairs of Cambodia. They also do violence to the US Congress resolution in July 1973, banning all US military activities in Cambodia.

Such activities have once again given the lie to the US government's declarations that it is eager to restore peace in Cambodia and Southeast Asia.

The Pacification of South Viet Nam

IN September 1974 the Saigon press announced William E. Colby's arrival in Saigon for his seventh visit since his appointment as head of the CIA.

Who is Colby and why is he so interested in South Viet Nam?

Born in 1920, Colby started working for the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) which later became the CIA, at the age of 23 as an intelligence lieutenant. Having served in Europe during the Second World War, after demobilization he returned to the lawyers' firm of Donovan, the former chief of the OSS. Then, when the CIA was founded in 1947, he became one of its most active employees. In 1950, the US began its intervention in Viet Nam, giving increasing aid to the French colonialists in their war against the Vietnamese people, and Colby was ordered to make a thorough study of the problems of Southeast Asia. He researched deeply into the history, civilization, habits and customs of the Indochinese peoples; he learned the Vietnamese language until he could speak and write it fluently. In 1959, he was appointed a political officer, then First Secretary of the US Embassy in Saigon; as such, he established relations with members of the opposition as well as numerous pro-government personalities. Returning to Washington for some time, he was again offered a diplomatic post in Saigon after Têt 1968 and Nixon, who had been elected President of the USA, named him deputy to Ellsworth Bunker, with the rank of ambassador. He combined this with the directorship of CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), the service in charge of pacification, after the

departure of Robert Komer in February 1969. In June 1971, Colby was recalled to Washington and appointed Director of the Operations Division of the CIA — that branch whose worldwide anti-revolutionary plottings had given the CIA such a bad reputation. Following the best traditions of the CIA, the director of "operations" will eventually become director of the CIA, as was the case of Allen Dulles, Richard Helms... Colby's promo-

tion took place in May 1973 when James Schlesinger, then director of the CIA, was promoted to the job of Defense Secretary.

This brief biography shows the extent of the present chief of the CIA's involvement in Viet Nam during almost all his career. Thus the important role played by this organisation in the war, particularly in the so-called pacification operations, should not surprise anyone.

The Pacification Theory

PACIFICATION has at all times been carried out by the invaders against the people who are victims of their aggression. It was vigorously conducted by the French colonialists during the 1950s when they succeeded in taking control of parts of Viet Nam's territory.

Having replaced the French in South Viet Nam, the American imperialists also paid great attention to pacification, considered as absolutely indispensable to cope with a war of resistance waged by the entire people. The scope of US pacification activities is clearly shown by the huge economic and technical potentials at the disposal of the US in their neo-colonialist enterprises in South Viet Nam.

Under Ngo Dinh Diem, pacification was carried through by establishing "strategic hamlets". According to the Staley-Taylor plan this should have been accomplished within 18 months. Yet the "strategic hamlets" — actually concentration camps — were unable to check the revolutionary tide. Then the US Expeditionary Corps was brought

to South Viet Nam. US troops were to "search and destroy" the "Viet Cong" regular forces, whereas puppet troops, with US support, were given the task of "pacification", baptized the "other war" aimed at "winning the heart and mind" of the population.

The whole theory of pacification underwent a complete revision with the coming to power of Nixon who appointed an Englishman, Sir Robert Thompson, notorious for his deeds in Malaysia, as his special adviser.

In Nixon's strategy, pacification was far more important even than military operations. The question, as always, was "to drain the pond and catch the fish." But, instead of hitting directly at the guerilla fighter, Thompson advised striking rather at those who maintained the guerilla, who were in liaison with him, protected him and helped him carry out his activities. For, as Thompson said, if we wipe out a guerilla, another will appear, but if we wipe out a revolutionary base, the guerilla war will be extinguished. According to Thompson, Johnson did not understand

the "insurrectional" nature of the Viet Nam war; he was too much occupied with attacking the enemy regular forces so as to eliminate them and control as much territory as possible, but he neglected the essential, the control of the population. It was necessary, on the one hand, to destroy the base organizations of the revolution, and on the other, to try, not to "win the heart and mind of the population" — which, given the ardent patriotism of the Vietnamese, was unrealizable anyway—but rather to place the population in a situation where there was only one possible way out: to live in the way US neo-colonialism wanted them to live.

Besides the theory of Thompson, we should also mention that of Huntington, a professor at Harvard where Kissinger, too, had taught. In order to prevent the

revolutionaries from "encircling the town by the country," Huntington advocated the "forced urbanization" of South Viet Nam. The rural population, fleeing from shells, bombs, and toxic chemicals, would resort to the towns and cities where they would live in the way chosen for them by the US-puppets and would be exploited by them for neo-colonialist ends, in the first place as a source of manpower for the war of aggression.

Pacification conceived in an offensive spirit, and not in a defensive one, as in Johnson's time, would be a long-term enterprise. Thompson found the 18 months of the Staley-Taylor plan and the two years of the McNamara — Nguyen Khanh plan too short. In his view pacification would take from 10 to 15 years.

it directed all other services, including the General Staff, the tactical regions and the provinces. Councils similar to the central one were also set up in the tactical regions and the provinces.

In principle, CORDS only "advised" and "helped" the Saigon Administration from the central to the base level in its activities of pacification. CORDS men were present in all four tactical regions, in all 44 provinces, and even in all the 242 districts of South Viet Nam. At the central level, before the conclusion of the Paris Agreement, the effective personnel of CORDS consisted of 6,457 Americans (2,427 officers and 948 civilians), 7,600 Vietnamese, and 118 men of other nationalities (South Koreans, Filipinos, etc...). 80% of this personnel carried out their activities outside Saigon.

The Pacification Machinery

FOR the application of these new theories of pacification, Nixon chose a man with a deep knowledge of Viet Nam and capable of setting up an apparatus which could combine the cruellest methods with the most treacherous manoeuvres. This man was Colby; the apparatus was the CIA.

In fact, the service responsible for pacification has existed since 1966, when, feeling the absence of an organization for coordinating the military and civilian activities of pacification, Johnson set up an "Office of Civil Operations" in the US Embassy in Saigon, and put it under the direction of Robert Komer, a former member of the US National Security Council. In May 1967, this office took the name of CORDS and was placed under the orders of the commander of MACV (Military Assistance Command Viet Nam). The fact that both Komer and later Colby combined the functions of director of CORDS with the post of deputy-ambassador shows the great importance of this work of coordination of the military and the civilian aspects of pacification.

According to US government regulations, all pacification programmes should be under the final supervision of the Defense Department and the CIA (they

were carried out by a multitude of different services apart from these two establishments). The nomination of Colby as director of CORDS underlined the special importance of the role played by the CIA in pacification.

Meanwhile on the puppet side Thieu had also instituted his own pacification organization. This was the "Central Pacification and Development Council" whose job was to work out plans and ensure that they were put into operation. The Council was presided over by Thieu himself and included a number of ministers and other high-ranking personalities. In the field of pacification,

On the average, CORDS had at its disposal 950 men in each tactical region, from 30 to 70 men in each province, and from 8 to 10 men in each district. This is not counting the Special Groups, the Mobile Training Teams, and the Combined Action Platoons for training the puppet troops and assisting them in pacification operations. There were 353 Mobile Training Teams in all, with 1,985 men who went down to the puppet units and trained them one after the other. The Combined Action Platoons, 114 in number, were assisted by 2,000 US marines.

The activities of "pacification" teams were supported by military sub-sectors scattered almost everywhere in the South Vietnamese countryside.

The Means Used

PACIFICATION requires the mobilization of various means, military and paramilitary, economic and social, propaganda and psychological warfare.

In the military and paramilitary fields, CORDS had to "help" Saigon form a "people's self-defence force" of over one million men, 400,000 of them equipped with M.16 rifles. The training of these "people's self-defence force"

units was ensured by US military men, but the CIA-controlled Green Berets also took part in it. The Saigon Police played an important role in pacification, with the assistance of the OPS (Office of Public Security), which itself was dependent on the AID (Agency for International Development). Saigon specialists in interrogation techniques, members of the special section of Thieu's

police, were the disciples of the CIA men.

Another division of the AID was responsible for the *social and economic* aspect of pacification. It strove to achieve "rural development" with the opening of schools and infirmaries, the introduction of new rice varieties, fertilizers, agricultural machines, radios, televisions, etc. For the population of South Viet Nam, whose gross national product was no more than a few billion dollars, getting used to these products of a "consumer society" meant leading a life that could no longer be dissociated from US aid: the new rice varieties required the use of US fertilizers and the agricultural machines operated only with US gasoline... Herein lay the cunning of the US method of pacification in its economic aspects. Under the AID cover, CIA men taught the rural population how to use this gadgetry; at the same time they could engage in spying and information activities.

The same was also true of those who, under the signboard of JUSPAO (Joint US Public Affairs Office), were carrying out propaganda and psychological warfare for pacification purposes. They had to follow a special Vietnamese language course, learning even slang and popular sayings as well as the habits and customs of the regions where they would come and work. They were introduced as engineers, doctors, professors, sociologists, geologists... but they did their best to undermine the morale of the population, to alienate the people as much as possible from the Resistance and to rally them to the Saigon regime. The JUSPAO also looked after the "Chieu Hoi" (Open-Arms) operation aimed at winning members of the Resistance over to the traitors' side. The "swans", recruited among girls of easy virtue and trained in art of spying, were often sent to the PRG-controlled regions where they got themselves work as cooks or typists in the services of the Resistance. They endeavoured to lead cadres astray so as to worm secrets out of them.

The formation of cadres for pacification fell under the exclusive competence of the CIA. It was

usually done at the school for "Rural Development Cadres" in Vung Tau. Thieu frequently came there to inspect the training of the pacification groups of 59 men each, all clad in South Vietnamese peasant black pyjamas. To see the extent of CIA control over that school, let us refer to the history of one of its chief directors, former deputy, Tran Ngoc Chau.

Chau was a former Resistance member during the war against the French colonialists who had switched sides in 1950 and entered the puppet Military Academy in Dalat. There he made friends with Nguyen Van Thieu, then an ordinary officer. From 1960 to 1963 he held the position of Chief of Kien Hoa province and, thanks to the support of the CIA, he established a far-reaching system of control over the population. This activity earned him promotion and, with the approbation of the CIA, of course he became head of the programme for the formation of pacification cadres. This was in 1966. In 1967 he was elected to the House of Representatives of which he became Secretary General. The US defeats and the Paris talks gradually opened the eyes of Tran Ngoc Chau and made him adopt a position rather inclined towards peace and national concord. In the House he was one of the most outspoken critics of Thieu's stooge, the big capitalist Nguyen Cao Thang, who had the job of buying votes for his master. Thieu seemed to be particularly angry at this criticism and, exploiting the fact that one of Tran Ngoc Chau's brothers was a member of the Resistance, accused him of "collusion with the Viet Cong." In Vung Tau, the very place where Chau was still in charge of the school of "Rural Development Cadres", he declared that: "Such deputies, the Army must behead them." Hoodligans were rounded up to demonstrate in front of the House and demand the abrogation of Tran Ngoc Chau's privileges and immunities. A petition signed by two-thirds of the deputies was lodged to condemn Chau and, on the basis of that, the House deprived him of his Parliamentary privileges. This decision was at variance with Saigon's Constitution itself, because from now

on deputies could stay at home and express their views by written messages to the Parliament.

Forced to take refuge, Tran Ngoc Chau communicated the secret functioning of the Vung Tau school to Daniel Ellsberg — the man who revealed the Pentagon Papers.

According to an *exposé* made by Ellsberg on May 13, 1970 at the US Senate (Foreign Relations Committee), Tran Ngoc Chau and the Saigon General Nguyen Duc Thang were officially entrusted with the programme of forming pacification cadres. "I thought that the CIA had given me a responsible post, but in fact it was Mr. D. and Mr. J., of the office of the Ambassador's Special Assistant (i.e. W.E. Colby), who took in hand all political and organizational problems, leaving me with only the technical aspects." Once, D. and J. openly told Nguyen Duc Thang: "We foot the bill, so you do what we tell you." Thang was a bootlicker so he yielded. One day, at a meeting of province chiefs of the Second Tactical Region, in the presence of the CIA's local representative, Thang called on the participants to recruit "capable men" to be trained into pacification cadres at the Vung Tau school. "If you send incapable men," he added "this gentleman (indicating the CIA agent) will send them back." Whenever the CIA men came to Vung Tau they were taken by special planes, Tran Ngoc Chau related, but he and Thang had to find their own means of transport... Chau remarked that most of the US "advisers" for pacification were inexperienced greenhorns, but "the province chiefs never dared oppose them, if only because they had dollars and guns."

Let us add that, later on, Chau fell into the claws of Nguyen Van Thieu. In spite of his claim to be a member of the third force, he was forcibly handed over, vigorously protesting, to the PRG at Loc Ninh. But the Saigon Administration had finally to bring him back to Saigon and set him free.

(To be continued)

NGUYEN HOANG

Recent Archaeological Discoveries in the North-West

THE North-West, which occupies an area of 36,750 square kilometres in the three provinces of Lai Chau, Nghia Lo and Son La, is one of the most mountainous regions of North Viet Nam, inhabited by many nationalities, the most numerous of them being the Thai, Meo, Kinh and Muong.

Traces of prehistoric man are to be found in many of the grottos in this region. But more work is still to be done; ethnography and linguistics, and perhaps also oral tradition could be used to supplement this archaeological data.

Over the past few years, as part of a vast programme of archaeological prospecting and excavation, teams from the Viet Nam Archaeological Institute have found many artefacts of stone, bone or bronze from various archaeological layers in dozens of caves among the limestone mountains running from the districts of Phong Tho and Tuan Giao (Lai Chau) to Phu Yen and Van Yen (Nghia Lo).

Hege II bronze drums found in pretty large numbers in the Muong country between Vinh Phu and Nghe An provinces have now been discovered in Chieng Khuong, Son La province.

In other places such as Moc Chau (Son La), Phu Yen (Nghia Lo), numerous bronze objects of the *Dong Son* culture (1) have been found. These mostly consist of axes and spears whose shape and decorations recall those of the heyday of ancient Van Lang (the first state of the Viet during the time of the Hung Kings and dating back to the first centuries

of the second millennium before the Christian era). An important discovery is that of two bronze objects of a type absolutely unknown up to now: a knife handle with a curved end rather like the handle of a walking-stick, and the end fragment of another knife handle, or possibly the top of a helmet, which is shaped like the head of a bird. These two pieces were lying together with bronze spears and axes from the Dong Son culture in the same Bronze Age tomb (dating back four or five thousand years ago) situated in Tham Khuong cave, Tuan Giao district, Lai Chau province.

In the Nam Tun cave (Phong Tho district) many vestiges of the *Phung Nguyen* culture (2) (which flourished about four thou-

sand years ago) have been brought to light. This culture is noted for its small stone axe-heads some rectangular, others triangular or square, all absolutely symmetrical and polished over the whole surface. Excavations carried out in some ancient burial grounds have revealed small cylindrical fragments of polished bone, painted at both ends, which were probably used as needles, pots with brushed decorations or geometric motifs, and Cyprae shells used as jewelry. The bones found in these burial grounds are preliminarily assessed as belonging to the ancient Austro-Asians, ancestors of the Viet and Muong peoples, and to some other ethnic minorities living in Viet Nam some five thousand years ago. Also found in the Tham Khuong



Lower jaw of a hominid and the handle of a bronze knife found at Tham Chuong and Nam Tun in Lai Chau province.

cave were a great number of almond-shaped or discoid pebble tools and short axes typical of the *Hoa Binh* culture (3) dating back to the mesolithic or the early neolithic age and axes with polished cutting edges belonging to the *Bac Son* culture (4). It is interesting to note that, although the human teeth dating from the *Hoa Binh* culture are generally fairly well-used, they are not nearly so worn down as those found in the corresponding layers at *Tham Khuong* and *Nam Tun*.

In the lower layers of the *Nam Tun* cave, over an area of 50 square metres, excavations brought to light hundreds of large, roughly worked pebble tools, chipped or hewn on only one side. Surprisingly, among these exceptionally large pebble

tools, which seem rougher than those of the *Son Vi* culture (5) there are to be found some almond-shaped and discoid tools of a *Hoa Binh* type.

The excavations made over the last few years in the North-West give an idea of the richness of the area in archaeological sites. The North-West will certainly contribute to the study of the *Hung Kings'* civilization of the period of the foundation of the Viet State. On the other hand these new discoveries will shed light on the origin and the evolution of the pebble-chipping industry into the stone-grinding techniques of the well-known *Hoa Binh* industry, a culture closely linked with the appearance of agriculture and the "neolithic revolution" in Southeast Asia.

(1) *Dong Son, a village in Dong Son district, Thanh Hoa province, is widely known as a cultural centre of the Bronze and Iron Ages.*

(2) *Phung Nguyen is a locality in Vinh Phu province where remains of an early bronze age culture were first found.*

(3) *Province of Hoa Binh, where many artefacts of the mesolithic age have been discovered.*

(4) *Bac Son, name of a district in Lang Son province where excavations have revealed traces of the early neolithic age.*

(5) *Son Vi, name of a village in Lam Thao district, Vinh Phu province, where many pebble tools dating back to the palaeolithic and early mesolithic age have been found on open sites.*

FACTS AND EVENTS

Who Is the Genuine Representative of the Cambodian People ?

It was on an American military plane that Long Boret, Prime Minister of the Phnom Penh government, was flown to New York to hawk his "initiative" on the unconditional negotiations between his clique of US henchmen and the Revolutionary Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC), the sole genuine representative of Cambodia. This "initiative" is part of a diplomatic plan worked out in Washington with the aim of maintaining the Lon Nol administration's foothold in the UNO and preventing the restoration of the legitimate position of the RGNUC in this world body.

In order to carry out this plan, the emissaries of Phnom Penh have made hasty visits to several countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East to enlist support for the proposal put up by the US and some of its satellites that the UN Secretary General should act as a middleman in the negotiations between the Phnom Penh puppet government and the RGNUC, and that the decision on who represents Cambodia at the UNO should be postponed for another year. On October 30, 1974, R. Miller, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, flew to Phnom Penh to see for himself the progress made in this diplomatic plan and to give it a new impetus.

Thanks to these actions and the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring of the US, the resolution put up by US side was passed after a lengthy debate (on November 27 and 28) with 56 votes for, 54 against and 24 abstentions (the Phnom Penh delegate voted for the proposal).

Delegates of many UN member countries regarded

this resolution as "ignominious" and running counter to the legitimate demand of the world people and a resolution was tabled by 33 countries — including all the socialist countries and a great number of nations of the Third World — demanding the expulsion of Lon Nol delegation and the recognition of the legitimate position of the RGNUC in the UNO.

Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk pointed out on November 28, 1974 that "that UN resolution is aimed at salvaging US neo-colonialism in Phnom Penh and its dirty creation — the phoney Khmer Republic — while preventing the Cambodian people from carrying through their mission of total liberation of the Fatherland." He resolutely affirmed that "the NUFK, the RGNUC, the Cambodian Liberation Armed Forces and myself have a sacred duty to completely liberate Cambodia".

The Cambodian problem is simply the question of US imperialist aggression. There is only one way to settle it — the way pointed out by Khieu Samphan, Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defence of the RGNUC and Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Liberation Armed Forces, in the November 1974 issue of *Le Monde diplomatique*: "When the US government ceases its intervention in Cambodia, stops all aid to the Phnom Penh traitors, withdraws all its military advisers from Cambodia and abstains from all other direct or indirect intervention, the Cambodian problem will be rapidly solved by the Cambodian people themselves, without outside interference. The fate of the Phnom Penh traitors is a matter which is strictly dependent on the sovereignty of the Cambodian people".



*Jute harvesting in
Tam Diep cooperative,
Hung Ha district.*

Thai Binh...

(Continued from page 24)

application of advanced technical measures; they also open the way to mechanization, of ploughing in particular.

A new "campaign to organize production and improve management" was launched late in 1972.

In Thai Binh, stress is first of all laid on the management and utilization of land by putting an end to illegal seizure and irrational use of arable land, and then on the expansion of the acreage by levelling the ground, on the multiplication of crops by introducing the winter crop and on land reclamation by "gaining ground from the sea".

Regarding work organization, a great importance is given to the division of labour by the creation of specialized brigades (ploughing, seed-preparing, irrigation, manuring), also to a more rational distribution of various categories of labour and manpower and to technical improvement.

As for the management of cooperatives, great attention is paid not only to working out plans of production, management and use of funds, material and equipment,

and plans of work administration so as to strictly observe the cultivation timetable and methods and cultivation techniques, but also to introduce book-keeping and more balanced management so as to get an economic efficiency and bring about a reduction of cost prices and production costs, an accumulation for a greater turnover and an improvement of the cooperative members' living conditions.

By the end of 1974, this campaign mobilized 85 per cent of the cooperatives in the province.

Together with the application of the "statute of cooperatives" now discussed in the cooperative members' general assemblies, it will help achieve new progress in agriculture and secure rice yields higher than those of 1974.

Many possibilities exist for the bringing of agriculture forward to large-scale socialist production in this rice-growing province.

December 1974

NGUYEN XUAN LAI

One Hour...

(Continued from page 12)

5. To keep absolutely secret about the activities of our armed force, their organization, and their commanders, and keep absolutely secret about all the National Salvation organizations.

6. To remain loyal to the cause of the liberation of our entire people, never to make confessions, never to betray our cause if captured by the enemy in battle, whatever physical tortures they may inflict on me.

7. To love and assist my comrades-in-arms, and to help others in normal conditions as well as in battle.

8. To take maximum care of weapons, never to let them be damaged, or fall into enemy's hands.

9. To obey these three prohibitions when making contact with the population: not to take anything from the people, not to touch the people, not to disturb the people. And these three affirmatives: to respect the people, to love the people, and to protect the people in order to win their love and confidence and achieve unity of action between the army and the people with a view to driving out the enemy and saving our country.

10. Always to show a high sense of self-criticism, to have an exemplary behaviour, never to do anything harmful to the prestige of the Liberation Army and the national dignity of Viet Nam.

CHRONOLOGY

(Continued from page 32)

— The Swedish press carried the news that the Swedish government has virtually severed diplomatic relations with the Saigon regime.

29. On behalf of 700 lawyers, the Association of Lawyers of the Criminal Court in Saigon and Hue issued a statement strongly condemning the repression of the lawyers on November 28.

— Quang Tri PLAF downed a pilotless plane over Dong Ha.

— A big ammunition dump at Da Nang airbase was blown up; the enemy took heavy casualties and many houses were destroyed.

— A financial protocol was signed in Paris between the DRVN and France.

30. Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk issued a statement rejecting the decision of the UN which, yielding to US pressure, passed a resolution on November 28 extending the credentials of the UN representation of the Lon Nol regime for another year.

DECEMBER

3. Ending of the visit to France begun on November 25 of the Viet Nam Workers' Party Delegation headed by Le Duc Tho at the invitation of the French Communist Party. A joint communique was issued.

4. A French economic delegation headed by François Missoffe visited the DRVN from November 30 to December 4.

— A Mexican Communist Party Delegation ended its visit to the DRVN (begun on November 27).

— Re-establishment of the Hanoi-Vientiane air line, inaugurated by a visiting airways delegation of the Kingdom of Laos.

— The National Political Council of Coalition of Laos met under the presidency of Prince Souphanouvong to discuss the proposal of the Provisional Government of National Union on the carrying out of the 18-point political programme and the regulations guaranteeing democratic liberties to the Lao people.

5. The spokesman of the DRVN Foreign Ministry issued a statement severely condemning US Secretary of State Kissinger for declaring on December 3 that the US did not contemplate fulfilling its duty to repair the war damage in the DRVN.

— The US Assistant Secretary of Defence and the Director of the Logistics Department of the US General Staff came to Saigon to study the possibility of increasing the strength of the Saigon army.

— The Saigon paper *Trang Den* reported that many American advisors had gone to various military sectors to help the Thieu administration collect taxes.

— The delegation of South Viet Nam PLAF hero units, heroes and elite fighters came to the North for a visit and attend the 30th anniversary of the foundation of the Viet Nam People's Army.

6. According to the Saigon paper *Trang Den*, Nguyen Van Hao, Vice-Premier of the Saigon administration, put out an 8-point economic programme which included the issuing of 5,000 and 10,000 piastre banknotes.

8. The Viet Nam Human Rights' Society in Saigon organized a meeting condemning Thieu for flouting human rights. The meeting was attended by over 300 personalities belonging to various anti-Thieu movements, social strata and mass organizations.

9. The DRVN government delegation headed by Vice-Premier Nguyen Duy Trinh ended its friendship visit to the Soviet Union. An agreement was signed in Moscow on December 8, 1974 on the economic and military aid granted by the Soviet Union to the DRVN in 1975.

10. 10th devaluation of the Saigon piastre since the beginning of the year: from 670, it is now worth 685 piastres to a dollar. This was immediately followed by a price rise of 20–25% in primary goods.

— The US aircraft carrier *Enterprise* and four destroyers illegally operated off the South Viet Nam seacoast between Da Nang and Binh Dinh.

— Signing in Vientiane of a concrete agreement on the DRVN economic aid and help to the Kingdom of Laos in transport and communications in accordance with the agreements and protocols signed in September 1974.

— Signing in Moscow of an agreement on aid from the Soviet Union to the Republic of South Viet Nam for 1975.

11. A loan of 7.4 million dollars was granted to the Saigon administration by the US-manipulated Asian Development Bank.

14. Thieu sued two other papers (*Tin Sang* and *Chinh Luan*) for "libel" and "injury".

15. Tran Van Huong, Vice-Premier of the Saigon administration, summoned Pham Kim Ngoc and Nguyen Duc Cuong, respectively ex-Minister of the Economy and ex-Minister of Commerce and Industry, before the Military Court for corruption.

— Communique of the enlarged meeting of the Presidium of the South Viet Nam NFL (held on December 13 and 14) to discuss the situation of the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the struggle of the South Vietnamese people in the towns and countryside and the external affairs of the Republic of South Viet Nam

CHRONOLOGY

(November 16 — December 15, 1974)

NOVEMBER

17. An economic delegation of the Provisional Government of National Union of Laos, led by Mr Soth Phetlasi, Minister of the Economy and Planning, left Vientiane on a series of visits to the socialist countries and many other European countries where it will hold talks on economic aid to Laos.

18. The South Viet Nam PLAF shelled Da Nang airfield, destroying 4 planes.

19. An agreement was signed in Hanoi on scientific and technical cooperation between the DRVN and Yugoslavia.

21. The Cambodian patriotic forces intercepted a convoy of boats carrying rice and ammunition up the Mekong River, sinking 4 boats, blowing up 600 tons of ammunition and wiping out 150 enemy troops.

22. A plan for cultural and scientific exchange between the DRVN and Romania was signed in Bucharest.

— An agreement was signed in Warsaw on economic aid, exchange of goods and payment between the DRVN and Poland for 1975.

— The PRG delegation at the La Celle Saint Cloud Conference dismissed Thieu's claim at the Conference of Asian Alliance against Communism held in Saigon on November 21 that he was "longing for peace" and "ready to discuss and solve immediately the political problem" of the Paris Agreement.

23. Saigon newspaper editors published a "white book" strongly condemning the whole of Thieu's fascist press regulations.

— On December 22 and 23, the Vientiane ultra-rightist elements bombarded many localities in Savannakhet province.

24. Thieu's men opened fire on 600 political detainees being transferred from Chi Hoa to Con Son, killing many of them.

— The Cambodian patriotic forces struck at enemy posts around Phnom Penh, Prey Veng and Takeo, overrunning three posts, wiping out 200 enemy troops and capturing a great quantity of weapons and war materials.

25. Mr. Salem Rubaya Ali, Head of the Presidential Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, ended his successful visit to the DRVN begun on November 23. A joint communique was issued.

— Nguyen Van Thinh, a Saigon army major, displayed a poster in front of the Saigon National Assembly demanding Nguyen Van Thieu's resignation.

— The Saigon Lower House approved the 1975 budget amounting to 770 billion piastres

of which 330 billion (nearly 50%) are earmarked for war expenditure.

— Saigon police cordoned off the "Pen Club". The Saigon newspaper editors' association held a press conference on the pavement near the club as a protest.

— AFP: The US Defense Department admitted that reconnaissance flights over Cambodia were continued.

26. A decree signed by Thieu banned all demonstrations on November 28, the day of the trial of three Saigon newspapers on charge of publishing Indictment No. 1.

— The first trade agreement between the DRVN and Australia was signed in Canberra.

— UPI: The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a bill granting an economic aid of 441 million dollars to the Saigon regime (the economic and military aid together should not exceed 1,267 million dollars), 100 million dollars to Cambodia (the ceiling figure for the two kinds of aid was 377 million) and 40 million dollars for Laos (the ceiling figure for the two kinds of aid was 70 million dollars).

27. The Coordinating Action Council of the Press issued a resolution calling on all newspaper managers, editors-in-chief and editorial secretaries, together with the 200 journalists in Saigon, to attend the session of the Saigon tribunal held on November 28 in support of the action for freedom of the press.

— Thieu decreed a 24-hour curfew on November 28, isolated 150 blocks of houses in Saigon, and called in 40,000 armed policemen to crack down on the demonstrators.

— DRVN Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh sent a letter to the Thai Foreign Minister pointing out that the stumbling bloc for the normalization of relations between the two countries is the fact that the Thai government is continuing to serve the US scheme of aggression and intervention in Indochina.

28. An SR-71 plane flew a reconnaissance mission over North Viet Nam.

— Over ten thousand Catholics, students, lawyers, journalists, writers and deputies demonstrated in front of the Saigon tribunal where the papers *Dien Tin*, *Dai Dan Toc* and *Song Than* were to be prosecuted. Violent clashes between the police and the demonstrators caused injuries to 40 people, including 4 lawyers and one deputy who were seriously wounded; many foreign correspondents were manhandled. Thieu declared a postponement of the trial till February 20, 1975.

— Saigon cabinet reshuffle: 5 ministers and 2 vice-ministers were discarded.

(Continued on page 31)