

pressed to pay for the 66 teachers hired for the new schools. Mr. Hoang suggested that if assistance could continue in gradually diminishing amounts for five years, the provincial budget would be able to pay the entire amount thereafter.

"We are still waiting for 20,000 piasters which had been promised by the district to finish the roof of the school," Mr. Tin stated late in April. At that time, according to him, the workers' wages had already run to 40,000 piasters, none of which had yet been paid. The community had already done its part, he argued, citing the facts stated in the paragraph above. "Payment of workers can be postponed," he added, "and brick and lime can be bought on credit; but the wood to make the beams and the wooden framework must be purchased from people of other villages, who do not want to advance us credit. In addition to the promised funds from the district, we are also anxious to get the sum of 100,000 piasters from USOM to pay for our various purchases of materials made on credit." He added: "If all the money had come in time, this school could have been completed within a month."

The school was completed on June 15, and was awaiting provincial allocation of credit for the purchase of furniture and the recruitment of its teaching staff for the opening of the school year. For reasons still not known by the villagers of Ngoc Hoi, district funds had not been augmented by either the province or the national government: but their children would have a school nevertheless.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF SCHOOLS TO BE BUILT WITHIN THE FISCAL YEAR 1958

PROVINCE	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO. OF CLASSROOMS
(a) THE SOUTH		
Ba Ria	6	18
Bien Hoa	10	30
Cho Lon	5	15
Gia Dinh	8	24
My Tho	9	27
Tan An	5	15
Tay Ninh	8	24
Thu Dau Mot	7	21
Bac Lieu	2	6
Ben Tre	8	24
Can Tho	5	15
Chau Doc	16	48
Go Cong	1	3
Ha Tien	5	15
Long Xuyen	2	6
Rach Gia	4	12
Sa Dec	5	15
Soc Trang	7	21
Tra Vinh	3	9
Vinh Long	1	3
Vung Tau	1	3
Ca Mau	3	9
Moc Hoa	3	18
Phong Thach	5	15
Tam Can	5	15
(b) THE CENTER		
Khanh Hoa	22	66
Ninh Thuan	8	24
Phu Yen	29	87
Thau Thien	30	90
Quang Nam	19	57
Quang Ngai	64	192
Quang Tri	11	33
Binh Dinh	37	111
Binh Thuan	16	48
(c) THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS (PMS)		
Kontum	2	6
Pleiku	2	6
Donai-Thuong	4	12
Darlac	15	45
Dalat	4	12

APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT AGREEMENT NO. 30-64-152 (APR. 30, 1957)

A. GENERAL.

The expenditures estimated for the school building project in the fiscal year 1957 were divided into three elements: (1) Direct Aid (\$242,877 to be spent on the purchase of materials and equipment); (2) 57,785,070 piasters from counterpart funds; and (3) 60,745,500 piasters from national, provincial, village, and hamlet budgets.

The objective over a 3-year period was to build 1,800 schools (3,900 classrooms). The above figures were to cover the construction of 400 schools including

1,200 classrooms in 1957. The cost of each school was estimated at 50,000 piasters, half of which was to be advanced by USOM, the other half by the Vietnamese Government.

In addition to financial aid, USOM was also to provide technical aid, and, when necessary, send selected Vietnamese civil servants abroad for professional study and in-service training.

The Department of National Education and USOM each were to appoint an official to administer the project jointly. Decision on the location of schools was to be approved by both parties.

B. USE OF THE COUNTERPART FUNDS

After the building of a school was undertaken by a contractor or its equivalent, 20 percent of the total cost of the school was to be released by USOM.

C. THE PROJECT AMENDMENT

On November 11, 1957, USOM and the Government of Vietnam agreed to an amendment whereby a province could:

- a. Estimate expenditures and apply for the release of all sums allocated for the building of the school.
- b. After the school was built, estimate the cost and request funds for various school equipment and furniture, within the allocated limit.
- c. After the school was furnished, estimate requirements and request funds for the payment of teachers for the following six months.
- d. Request 100 percent aid by USOM if it did not possess sufficient means to carry out the building of the school. The number of schools receiving 100 percent USOM support was not to exceed 10 percent of the total number of schools provided in the project.

APPENDIX III

PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN AID FUNDS

Every month USOM earmarked credits from the counterpart fund deposited at the National Bank proportionally to the rate of the implementation and current development of each program, and consigned them to the Treasury. This enabled the agency responsible for implementing the program to obligate, and order the payment of, expenses involved in the program. This operation was called "release."

Upon receipt of the USOM reports of release, the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid issued a receipt order at the Treasury and, at the same time, transferred the released credits into the accounts of various departments at the Treasury.

The Machine Accounting Center at the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid issued monthly accounting reports on each program. On the basis of these reports USOM released credits for the program, taking into consideration the estimates as well as the balance resulting from the credits released during the previous months. In this way, it was not necessary for the departments to request credit release month by month, and the implementation of their programs continued automatically.

In addition to the monthly releases of credits, under exceptional or emergency circumstances, the disbursing agency could propose to USOM that extraordinary releases of credits be made. Reports of such actions were sent to the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid.

In general, releasing operations should precede obligating operations. A *Credit release (giai-ngan)* on the part of USOM was not the same as *Release for expenses (giai-toa kinh-phi)* in Vietnamese budgeting. In the national budget, releases for estimated expenses were made every fourth month, and the disbursing agencies obligated expenses in proportion to these releases. On the part of American mission, credits estimated under Project Agreements were considered as duly released and the disbursing agencies obligated expenses in proportion to the credits estimated under the Project Agreement. Thereafter, USOM released credits according to the procedure described above to permit payment of the obligated expenses. Therefore, disbursing agencies were not supposed to wait for credit releases to prepare obligated expenditure; on the contrary, the obligation of expenses was to precede the release of credits.

Developing In-Service Training Programs in Long An and Ba Xuyen Provinces

The establishment of an independent state in Vietnam was warmly supported by the many thousands of civil servants who had held subordinate positions during the French and Japanese occupations. Their enthusiasm all but matched the dimensions of the tasks of political and physical reconstruction that lay before them. What was lacking, however, were the reserves of technical and administrative skills necessary in a modern self-governing nation.

Under ancient mandarinal traditions as well as those of the French colonial civil service, administrators had been recruited and assigned according to their levels of education, which were formally equated with levels of pay and responsibility. Promotion depended largely on seniority, with no systematic attempt to adjust for personal ability or nonacademic experience or to provide on-the-job in-service training.

The need for reorienting competent civil servants to the needs of an independent state aroused President Ngo Dinh Diem's interest as early as October 26, 1955, when he stated, "The democratic form of government, more than any other, requires each of us to develop himself intellectually and morally." This applied at all levels, as the President reaffirmed on August 27, 1957: "In order to progress, government officers must constantly keep learning."

Early in 1956, an interministerial council was set up to consider the problem of improving the performance of the existing body of civil servants. The council, taking into account the traditional attitudes of civil servants, recommended that as a preliminary step there should be a special effort to popularize the concept of training within the civil service. The council determined that this effort to gain the understanding and cooperation of the civil servant should mark the first phase of a long-range program of in-service training. At the start, the propagation of the training concept was carried on mainly by the National Institute of Administration and by foreign technical advisors.

At the same time the popularization program was being implemented, some training was also under way. There were some developmental activities for executive level personnel. Specialist training of various kinds was also introduced or increased, especially for accountants, school teachers, statistical clerks, midwives, and other technicians. Aid grants for observation and study tours were increasingly used. And several individual government agencies organized and conducted training courses for their own personnel, offering general cultural and political information and instruction in certain clerical functions.

In spite of their relative isolation from the main currents of administrative reform, the provinces also became interested in in-service training. Presidential exhortation was an important factor in creating their interest. Moreover, as civil servants were transferred from Saigon to the provinces and as graduates of the NIA were assigned to provincial positions, they brought with them a sense of urgency in using systematic in-service training as a means of improving work performance.

Two of the first provinces to establish training programs were Long An in the summer of 1957 and Ba Xuyen a few months later.

IN-SERVICE TRAINING AT LONG AN

In the summer of 1957, parts of the Province of Cholon (Duc Hoa, Ben Luc, Can Duoc and Can Giuoc) and the entire Province of Tan An (Thu Thua, Tan Tru, Chau Thanh) had been merged to form the Province of Long An. The new province included 450,000 persons living in 101 villages and constituting 7 districts. There was no industry in Long An, but it was in a prosperous agricultural region. It was located one hour by bus from Saigon.

The new province chief, Major Mai Ngoc Duoc, formerly chief of Quang Ngai Province, began to express an enthusiastic interest in

developing an extensive program of social services for the public. He arranged for the daily distribution of milk to underprivileged children, encouraged nurseries and kindergartens, organized a school lunch program, set up a low-cost public cafeteria, and even began a public library. He placed a high priority upon improving the public relations of the provincial government. He organized a Civil Servants' "Eputation Movement" to denounce dishonest and unworthy people in the administration and to encourage adherence to the laws, and he placed suggestion boxes at many street corners in which each citizen could address petitions and complaints to the personal attention of the province chief (who alone kept the key to the boxes).

To improve the functioning of his administration he decided to open an in-service training course for his officers. He explained the need for an in-service training class as follows:

"Nowadays civil servants are no longer considered ordinary employees, as they used to be under the French domination. Now that our country is independent, civil officers need a new spirit, that of the responsible citizen. We must therefore help them understand our government policies, which they represent to our citizens. And in specialized and technical knowledge, we must recognize frankly that they need to learn much more."

All officials below the secondary level of education, regardless of their classification¹ (except laborers and messengers) could enroll in the training program. There were 80 applications, of which 46, including 8 women, were selected for the first class. Many of those chosen were considered the least able civil servants, but this was not the sole basis of selection: indeed, an effort was made to communicate a sense of pride in being chosen. According to the chief, there had been a unanimously favorable response to the program. He explained his approach as follows:

"We had to play a psychological game. The most important thing was to give civil servants a feeling of freedom in learning. Thus they were not required to participate in the in-service training program. Before informing them about the opening of the course, we did our best to make them feel the need for enlarging their knowledge."

The course was scheduled to last four months. Classes were held from 3:30 to 5:30 on Wednesday and Friday afternoons. The Tan An School for Girls served as the temporary training center for want of

¹That is, whether temporary personnel, daily employees, contractual workers, or under the cadre system.

other quarters. Mr. Le Phu Nhan, an NIA graduate who was appointed deputy province chief on July 7, 1958, was placed in charge of the program.

Long An began to consider establishing a permanent training center with facilities for housing and dining as well as classrooms, in the absence of lodgings in Tan An. To realize this project Long An proposed to budget 250,000 piasters from its own sources in 1959, provided the Department of Interior approved the plan. It also appealed for 400,000 piasters from the American-financed in-service training project, administered through the NIA. Its request was approved in December 1958.

In the meantime, the first course in Long An started on August 20, 1958. All civil servants were required to attend lectures in the following fields:

1. General civic education.
2. Political and administrative organization of Vietnam, with emphasis on the basic organization of hamlets, villages, cantons, districts, and provinces.
3. Human relations and public relations.
4. Correspondence and filing.
5. Security.
6. "Technical" lectures in economics, finance, or administration.²

The teaching was performed by the province chief and his deputy, chiefs of service, bureau heads, and special lecturers from the NIA. Placards bearing slogans were used as teaching devices, and the walls were decorated with mottos.

Much of the material presented in the lectures was new to the trainees, who encountered some difficulty in taking notes. Habits of obedience prevented them from complaining about the speed of the lectures at first, but later they requested mimeographed copies of lectures at the beginning of each course, and their request was granted immediately.

To ascertain the results of the course, Professor Cao Huu Dong of the NIA In-Service Training Section, visited Long An on October 23, 1958 and asked the trainees three questions in class:

1. Did the trainees understand all the lectures completely?

²A summary of the topics covered in these lectures appears in Appendix I.

2. Did the trainees receive lecture materials?

3. Did the lecturers assign homework?

For (2) and (3), all the responses were affirmative. For (1), however, some negative answers were given.

The trainees also supported the idea of establishing permanent quarters for the training center where they could live together and exchange ideas during the training period.

Long An also planned to offer in-service training classes for village officials as soon as funds and suitable location could be arranged.

IN-SERVICE TRAINING IN BA XUYEN

Ba Xuyen Province was formed by a merger of Soc Trang and Bac Lieu. On April 1, 1957, it included 700 hamlets, 66 villages, and 7 districts, making up a population of 535,000. Its principal industries were rice milling, fruit cultivation, and salt manufacture. Geographically speaking, Ba Xuyen is located 5 hours by bus from Saigon, with another hour or two usually lost at the My Thuan and Can Tho ferries. There are telephone connections between Ba Xuyen and Saigon.

In winter 1957, the idea of training was introduced in Ba Xuyen by Lieutenant Colonel Le Quang Hien, province chief. Thursday afternoons, which had formerly been reserved for political orientation courses, were now occupied with instruction in politics, administrative organization, and the discipline and status of civil servants. These were the first steps toward setting up an in-service training program. At the same time, Colonel Hien released a number of civil servants who were no longer qualified to serve the public, and employed in their place new recruits who could benefit from the training.

The second steps undertaken were the formal opening of in-service training courses for village officials on January 27, 1958. A special one-week course was offered thereafter for officials in charge of village finances, police, and public records, in turn. The brief period of one week was adopted both to conserve costs and to avoid long absences on the part of village officials. Each training section included 30 persons selected on the basis of their performance, their willingness, and their interest. Selection was thus a matter of pride.

The training program was discontinued when Colonel Hien was called to another province. In April 1958 he was replaced by Major Tran

Thanh Ben. Mr. Le Cong Chat was assigned the post of deputy chief, and the in-service training resumed. Major Ben followed his predecessor in sending a number of senior civil servants to the Central Government for reassignment. A refresher training course for village officials was opened on August 11, 1958 as the first of 8 sessions designed to train all 250 village officials of Ba Xuyen. Participants chosen by the district chiefs in sections of more than 30 received 4 days' training from Monday mornings to Thursday afternoons. This left the balance of the week for local duties and involved a minimum of interference with government operations. But it also reduced the training time available. In answer to a complaint about the shortness of the 4-day period, an official of My Xuyen Village said: "Training courses were organized according to a circular system. A participant was not limited to one course, but, like a revolving wheel, would have another chance when his turn came again. In my case, for example, last year I had the opportunity to attend courses three times. So far I have been in one section already and I am hoping to be able to join in another if possible this year."

In spite of its brevity, the program included both general and technical subjects.³ Soon after the opening ceremony, all participants were photographed and presented with identification cards which afforded both a souvenir of participation and a method of checking trainees' attendance. Every evening participants were invited to tea at the province chief's house, where they discussed the day's lectures. This served as a psychological incentive to those who wished to attract the chief's attention.

The chiefs of service and other provincial officials served as lecturers. An effort was made to present the lectures in a simple form so that they could be understood easily. A discussion period took place after each lecture, and teaching materials were distributed to participants in mimeographed form. Often these materials were borrowed by prospective trainees in order to prepare themselves in advance for the courses. The deputy chief suggested that second-year students from the NIA be asked to volunteer to serve on the teaching committee. (He observed, however, that in the past students who were sent to Ba Xuyen for practical work had been reluctant to leave Saigon.) He also suggested that, if possible, a group of professors be sent from the NIA to teach for a week so that other lecturers could profit from their method.

The chief intended to use the training period as an opportunity for village officials to meet each other, to live together, and to exchange experiences.

³See Appendix II.

The meeting place at Ba Xuyen had room for 300-500 persons. Trainees lived in a bungalow-hotel at no cost to themselves. In response to an appeal by the province chief, a few private families accommodated trainees at their own homes. Each trainee was issued 15 piasters per day for food. Though this amount was insufficient, the participants, many of whom belonged to prosperous families, did not complain.

Expenses were covered by the village and provincial budgets, more prosperous villages contributing larger sums to the financing of the training program. Ba Xuyen completely supplied and organized its program, resolving all difficulties within the capacity of the province. The deputy chief felt that the province could not afford to wait for help from the Central Government. "Our aim," he said, "is to accomplish our objectives within our own resources."

The training class for provincial civil servants began on September 15, 1958. It was of 2 weeks' duration, the civil servants rotating in groups. The least qualified were generally enrolled first.

The program included general and technical subjects⁴ in addition to visits and practical work assignments in appropriate offices during the afternoon. Trainees were examined at the end of the course. Floating and daily personnel who received high grades were to be promoted by the province itself, and officers of the cadre system who performed outstandingly well were to be recommended to the Central Government for promotion.

Within a matter of months after the introduction of in-service training in Long An and Ba Xuyen, other provinces in Vietnam were beginning to set up programs of their own. Whether Long An or Ba Xuyen would provide the pattern to future programs was not clear, but it soon became apparent that the provinces had much to learn from each other's experiences in in-service training.

APPENDIX

I. The technical lectures at Long An included the following topics:

ECONOMICS:

Land reform, cooperatives, activities of the National Agricultural Credit Office, antismuggling activities, the Five-Year Plan, transfer and settlement of refugees, exploitation of land, business activities.

FINANCE:

Budget, bargaining, auction, ordering and receiving of goods, verification of orders, and public lands.

⁴See Appendix III.

ADMINISTRATION:

Building permits, driver's licenses, cinema licenses, development of community activities, trade unionism, concession of public lands, vital statistics, law enforcement, and duties and responsibilities of village council members.

II. *The refresher training course for village council members at Ba Xuyen included these topics:*

Monday	Traitorous Communism in Vietnam Improving Vietnamese living standards
Tuesday	Policy of National Revolution Land reform Registration of deeds Government declaration of April 26, 1958
Wednesday	Problems of Vietnamese National Treasury Village security Youth activities Problems in taxation Problems in agricultural credit Anti-Communism denunciations Economic problems
Thursday	The citizen's duties and rights Police administration Vital statistics records Art of supervision Problems in finance

III. *In-service training for provincial civil servants at Ba Xuyen presented lectures on the following:*

General organization of public services
Economic principles
Provincial budget
Presidency, Ministries, and Regional delegations
Execution of the provincial budget
Principles of taxation
Judicial organization in Vietnam
National Assembly and the Constitution
Economic situation in Vietnam
Land reform
Local government: provincial powers
Village administration
Vital statistics
Village budgets
Tax collection
District and canton chief
Exploitation of village resources
Agricultural credit
Security
Working methods
Organization of hamlets
Hamlet welfare administration
Organization of self-defense militia
Correspondence and documents
Cooperatives
Improvement of living standards
Political education
Filing
Reconstruction of villages and cities
Registration of deeds
Treasury problems
Duties and rights of farmers
Civil servants' duties and rights

Exporting Fish From the Ca Mau Cooperative

The Ca Mau Fishing Cooperative was a strong and prosperous one. It was organized by the Directorate of Fisheries in August 1956 for the fishermen who lived in the marshy, malarial villages that surrounded the Ong Doc River on the eastern coast of the Ca Mau Peninsula. Because of recent occupation by Viet Minh troops, the area had been considered unstable and insecure until 1956. In spite of the rich resources in fish (polynemus, threadfins, and pomfret), the fishing industry was so disorganized that operations were unprofitable prior to the formation of the cooperative. Fresh fish were usually discarded except for the threadfin, the bladder of which was sold at 85 to 115 piasters per kilo. Dried fish were occasionally prepared and sold at marginal prices, but the absence of storage and transportation facilities made the sale of fresh fish impossible except for occasional smuggling operations with privateers from Singapore.

On his visit in August 1956, Mr. N.V.T., Chief of the Socio-Economic Service of the Directorate of Fisheries, decided that conditions of security were sufficiently restored to permit the formation of a fishing cooperative. This would, he hoped, increase production and advance the interests of the fishermen in other ways as well. "I had very carefully studied this question," he said, "and was able to explain to local authorities and fishermen how marine products could become a great resource for them and also bring important foreign exchange to the government.

So far as I knew, no one had showed any interest in organizing a company for improving the productivity of the fish industry or for exporting the catch, and I decided that with government assistance a cooperative could achieve the same results.

"At my suggestion, the Ministry of Economy approved the establishment of the Ca Mau Fishing Cooperative on August 8, 1956. An aggressive and active fisherman, Mr. H. V. D., was named first president. After he had learned what cooperatives could do, he expressed enthusiasm about its future prospects in spite of its modest beginnings (75 members and a capital of 12,000 piasters). Like some of the other fishermen, Mr. H. V. D. had at first feared that a cooperative might be only a means for establishing government control of the sale of fish so that heavier taxes could be extracted from the fishermen themselves."

The first important success of the cooperative was arranging a loan from National Agricultural Credit Office in 1957 of 1,500,000 piasters, and again in 1958 of 3,200,000 piasters, for the purchase of nets and boats. At the same time, the Department of National Economy instructed the regional customs service at the An Xuyen Province to assist the cooperative in facilitating export procedures. Mr. T. reported that "the loan to fishermen represented an important instrument for gaining their confidence. In a matter of only a little over two years the membership increased to 638, and the subscribed capital to 39,500 piasters. Much of this success must also be attributed to Mr. H. V. D., whose skill as a fisherman and whose personal qualities had won him the confidence of his fellows."

The organizing of a fishing cooperative did not at first solve the problem of marketing. Members continued to sell to private buyers until early 1957, by which time the Directorate of Fisheries was able to set up a contract between the cooperative and the Singnanhuat Fishing Industries of Singapore, a company which was introduced to the Directorate by the Vietnamese Consul. A contract was signed in April 1957. The contract with the Singuanhuat Fishing Industries set prices at 1.23 Straits dollars per kilo of threadfin fish and 1.30 Straits dollars per kilo for fresh pomfret. The company itself agreed to supply 25 boats to transport the fish between Singapore and the mouth of the Ong Doc River, and to advance 500,000 piasters to the fishermen against future catches. There was a loss of 200,000 piasters after the first year's operation, and the government had to subsidize operations at three piasters per kilo of exported fish. "This loss was caused by our lack of experience, the low price of fish, and the cost of setting up our equipment. Moreover, we

had to pay 6 percent production tax and 5 percent pacification tax," explained Mr. H. V. D.

In October 1957, the National Exchange Office made an important concession to exporters by Circular Letter No. 48, which authorized the exchange of foreign currency at 35 percent on the free rate, and 65 percent on the official rate.¹ This, in effect, brought an increase in price to the fishermen of over 4 piasters per kilo, more than the amount of the previous government subsidies.

The contract with the Singuanhuat Fishing Industries was renewed in 1958 at the same prices. Because of the exchange rate concession, not only were government subsidies dropped, but the cooperative had a 500,000 piaster profit. The 1957 exports of 228.8 tons brought in 230,570 Straits dollars, which had amounted to 2,601,381 piasters; but in 1958 under the new exchange rates the 490,508 Straits dollars received for the export of 398.78 tons brought in 7,596,822 piasters.

Later in 1958 two other companies, Koong Kwang and Heng Kee, began to express an interest in purchasing fish from Vietnam. These companies signed a contract with the Rach Gia Cooperative, a smaller organization near Phu Quoc Island, and about 17 tons of fish were sold under these contracts. These contracts were not renewed because of the small productivity at Rach Gia, and Mr. T. began to consider offering these companies a contract with the Ca Mau Cooperative.

The Directorate of Fisheries decided as a result of these expressions of interest that a single contract for 1959 should be let on the basis of competitive bidding. This would avoid creating a monopoly, the government hoped. Mr. T. suggested that bids be opened to any company which could supply a banking guarantee, professional references, fiduciary references, and a deposit of 1,000 pounds at the Vietnam Consulate in Singapore. At the same time, the government announced that the 5 percent pacification tax would be eliminated in 1959, which would further improve the earning capacity of the cooperative.

The bids were to be opened on December 11, 1958; but on that date only the Asian Produce Agencies, previously unknown to the Directorate, had submitted a bid. It was accordingly awarded a one-year contract which was signed on January 9, 1959. "This company had announced itself as having a capitalization of 100 million U.S. dollars, with activities in trading rice, rubber, and copra, throughout Southeast Asia. This was its first commercial relationship with Vietnam, and its first entry into the fishing business.

¹This meant that 35 percent of the fish could be exported at about 72 piasters per U. S. dollar, while the other 65 percent was exported at 35 piasters to the dollar.

"The decision to enter into competitive bidding was the occasion for optimism during the first weeks of 1959. The resulting contract with Asian Produce Agencies was for 1.25 Straits dollars per kilo for threadfins and 1.32 Straits dollars per kilo for pomfret, which looked very good indeed. In addition, the company offered to send a 100-ton refrigerated ship and six motorboats to collect the fish. The company also agreed that if it failed to provide adequate facilities to transport the fish during the surplus season it would accept dried fish.

"I was nevertheless greatly concerned about the contract," stated Mr. T., "because the Vietnamese Consul in Singapore had not reported on the company's credit rating. Moreover, I thought bidding should have taken place between August and September of the previous year in order to allow time for negotiations before the fishing season was upon us in January. I also felt that representatives of the cooperative should have been sent to Singapore to observe and control the bidding procedure, and that the company should submit a bond or warranty document from a reputable bank as well as a recommendation from the government at Singapore. None of these took place.

"The advance from the company, consisting of the 500,000 piasters required in the bidding, turned out to be a check issued on insufficient funds. As a result, I was not surprised when the Vice President and Secretary of State for National Economy had to call an interministerial meeting on January 31 with the Vietnamese Consul in Singapore, a representative of the Asian Produce Agencies, and a representative of the cooperative, all present. The Vice President announced his decision to nullify the contract. The Asian Produce Agencies representatives asked for a delay until February 3 for payment of the check, but this was refused as too great a risk at the height of the fishing season. At the same time, the Vice President invited the Singuanhuat Fishing Industries to negotiate a new contract on February 4, 1959, with provisions similar to those of the 1958 contract. Prices were less than the Asian Produce contract, but we reduced the risk of losing fish already on hand, since we knew that Singuanhuat was ready to begin operations promptly.

"Our first venture into competitive bidding was a failure because the company was unable to supply the financial guarantees. I hope, however, that this experience will not be repeated. I'm happy to learn the Vice President is considering sending cooperative representatives to Singapore next year to investigate thoroughly the credit and various guarantees of the bidders."

Resettling the Highland Tribes at Binh Tuy Province

The Province of Binh Tuy, created on January 24, 1957, was situated in a fertile region endowed with an abundant supply of fish in its rivers and coastal waters. Its wooded mountains enclosed a rich valley of 15,000 hectares washed by the La Nga River. These resources had been almost unexploited since Emperor Gia Long had used the valley 170 years before as a supply base in his historic battle against the Tay Son troops. Now, with an ambitious program for land development¹ occupying a high priority in the nation's political and economic aspirations, a systematic effort at exploiting the resources of Binh Tuy was in order.

Lieutenant Colonel Le Van Buong, the first province chief of Binh Tuy, estimated the population of the region at nearly 20,000 Vietnamese lumberjacks and fishermen and 6,000 nomadic Highlanders. The latter, an aboriginal people, subsisted on wild game and a primitive form of agriculture. The development of the forest and agricultural resources of the province required the conversion of tribal customs to some form of stable community life and the adoption of modern methods of cultivation.

The Highlanders lived in about 40 different tribal groups, each speaking its own language. Very few could understand either French or Vietnamese, and the literacy rate was negligible. Property ownership was unknown among them, their land boundaries being designated by the horizon. They measured linear space by walking while smoking, estimating the distances by counting the number of times they had to refill their

¹See "The Commissar and the Law," elsewhere in this volume.

pipes. Each year they burned over 66,000 hectares of forest to clear the land for one season's cultivation, using the ashy residue as a natural fertilizer. They carefully dug shallow holes in the ashes with wooden or stone instruments and planted their seeds. Six months later, they harvested their scanty crops and prepared to move to an unburned forest area.² "Their lives were plagued with hunger and disease," Colonel Buong related. "Their undoubtedly high mortality rates were never computed because they did not record or even count their ages. They were exploited by itinerant salesmen, who exchanged a pretty ring or bracelet for a fat pig; worse still, they were exposed to Communist propaganda against any of our efforts to better their lives."

It was clear that continued nomadic destruction by the highland tribes would eventually deplete the forest reserves of the province, while at the same time valuable human resources were being idly wasted by hunger, disease, superstition, and ineffective use of tribal labor. Economic as well as humanitarian reasons prompted the government to make every effort to resettle the Highlanders into land development centers in the fertile valley of the La Nga.

This was not a problem to which a military solution could be found. Apart from considerations of human decency which would have ruled out such a solution, strategically the Highlanders were almost impregnable, living in small, scattered temporary villages, armed by Communist guerillas, and naturally suspicious of any approach by outsiders. The Communist infiltrators "looked and lived like the Highlanders themselves, spoke their languages, and seemed content to leave their way of life unchanged so long as they were unfriendly to us," according to Colonel Buong. "It was the friendship of the Highlanders that the government had to win, not their fear. Nor were we trying to enslave them to any particular ideology. We wanted them to come freely to our centers, and freely remain. Yet we knew that even with this simple objective the government would be promoting the greatest revolution in the history of these people. We knew that their first reactions would be important. We wanted them to carry out the revolution voluntarily, not to be its agent ourselves.

"Probably my principal problem would be, in the broadest sense, communicating with them: not only telling them what I wanted them to do, but letting them know that our intentions were not to absorb or destroy them but to enable them to have a better life. Only 1 or 2 of my staff could speak any of the tribal languages, and even by using all our

²These forests replaced themselves every year thanks to favorable climatic conditions. The annual value of timber lost to the national forestry was 1,960,000,000 piasters, according to Col. Buong.

resources, we could communicate with only about 5 groups. This meant that we would have to visit each of the tribes regularly, give them medicine and foods, learn their customs and languages, and study their religious beliefs and social structure. While we were doing this, it was important that we try to gain their confidence and sympathy.

“One of the most significant things we found was their deep, superstitious belief that their ancestors controlled their destiny. This discovery was to provide a key to our approach. They placed their fortune their health, and even their lives, in the hands of their ancestors, who spoke through the tribal seer or shaman. His word was law, and could not be questioned in the slightest degree. He was the intermediary between the past and the future, the dead and the living. Once after months of persuasion we failed to persuade a tribe to move into the valley where they could easily raise pigs and grow rice, because they said their ancestors would not permit it, and would kill them if they went. They never mentioned the Communist propaganda that told them to ‘stay in the mountains and fight concentration in villages,’ but we knew this was an important force to deal with.

“We built a few experimental camps on the hillsides to attract their attention. We invited them to visit the campus, or to settle there temporarily, with the understanding that they could leave at will. We gave presents to the seers, and paid them special attention, urging them to support our invitation. Finally they did as we asked, and reported that their ancestors gave their consent to the experiment. It was almost like a miracle—half of our problem was solved.

“We tried two different approaches, both of which proved successful. Sometimes we invited whole families to come in and build houses and gardens on a community project basis. Sometimes we invited only the young men to come and do the building so that their families could follow.

“We found it best to locate the camps near the mountain places the tribes already knew, so that the sense of the unfamiliar would not overwhelm them. Sometimes we found tribal hamlets already in existence near suitable rice fields. We tried to make these model villages and invited other tribes to move in too. We learned that we could not mix the Highlanders with Vietnamese settlers because the latter were too often tempted to take advantage of the ignorance and backwardness of the tribes. We worked closely with the seers and the tribal chiefs, letting them participate with us in suggesting solutions to the problems. We plied them with gifts and succeeded in moving the ancestral spirits to the new

development centers. This eliminated the annual pilgrimages to tribal ceremonies in the mountains, which had lost time and exposed them to Communist propaganda. All of this took us about a year."

During the first year's experimental period of operations, Colonel Buong was trying not only to win the confidence of the Highlanders and the support of the seers but also to develop a cadre of qualified assistants recruited for the General Commissariat of Land Development. These were to work at each of the 4 highlander centers of 1,000 settlers that were being established in 1957-58. It was important, he felt, "to avoid the empty promises of the Communist propagandists. When we promised something, we delivered. We were on time for our scheduled visits; we brought the medicines or gifts we promised, and we kept our agreements. We felt that our actions spoke louder than our opponent's words.

"After less than a year (November 23, 1957) we were able to re-group the Highlanders into the first of the permanent settlements deeper in the valleys, where a decent livelihood was possible. From then on our problem was to teach them improved agricultural methods. We moved slowly, allowing them to mingle their old methods with the new, with innovations timed gradually so as to minimize the psychological shock. Their first rice crops were therefore smaller than those of the nearby Vietnamese centers. Teaching them to plow was a subtle and difficult process, for they believed that putting iron into the ground injured the spirits of their ancestors. Their simple wooden implements were ineffective, however, in the hard, unused ground near the resettlement centers. So we told them not to do the plowing themselves, but to let us do it. Then they predicted that our staff would die soon afterwards as punishment for stabbing the Spirit of the Land with a metal spear; but when nothing happened to our men they began to doubt their old superstitions (it's a good thing our staff members were healthy and didn't get sick at the wrong moment!)

"They were afraid of motor noises, so we patiently invited them to come and touch the vehicles. The braver ones came first, and it was not long after that before some of the Highlanders were asking for a ride. In some centers they are now driving the tractors themselves.

"Our success in changing the habits of these people is to the credit of the hard and patient efforts of our field staff. They worked 24 hours a day, learning the tribal customs and trying to serve as experts on everything, driving tractors, giving inoculations, farming, and administering justice according to the old tribal practices. With the help of the General Commissariat for Land Development we set up three-month literacy

courses offering vocational training for barbers, carpenters, tailors, blacksmiths, and clerks. Pregnant women, who had always gone alone to the banks of a creek to give birth unaided, gradually accepted care from our nurses, who with gifts and sympathy had won their confidence.

"We had some disappointments. We hesitated to introduce kenaf⁸ for fear the crop might fail and undo all our hard work. And even if it succeeded, we feared that the Highlanders' unfamiliarity with the uses of money would give them a feeling of uncertainty when they saw no rice or cereal crops that would be immediately useful. We dared not move too fast. Sometimes the young men who were released from the restraints of their matriarchal traditions began to lord it over their wives. We tried to implement the government regulations against drinking by not permitting Highlanders to keep rice in excess of basic needs; but we could not enforce universal military training or the new monogamous Family Law. And some families quit the centers and went back to the mountains; we let them go, as we had promised. And we are glad to report that some of them decided to return.

"Each family received one hectare of land, a house, a garden, and a buffalo, with papers of ownership to be delivered later. This replaced the old custom of ownership 'as far as the horizon,' but they seemed satisfied when we gave them government subsidies during their first six months (8 piasters and 500 grams of rice daily per person). They were paid extra for road construction work, and we protected them against carpetbaggers. Even after a year and a half we still keep four highland resettlement centers separate from the two Vietnamese centers. We allow the tribes to retain their own chiefs instead of appointing one for each center. Eventually this, too, will change.

"Our main hope is, of course, in education. The children are intelligent and will soon forget the ways of their parents and grandparents. Now they cut their hair and save their money for colored attractions. They are learning to read, and want to learn arithmetic. Some of the older ones are learning simple accounting and bookkeeping under the guidance of our field staff.

"Within two more years we hope to bring all the Highlanders together into a single city, with a modern market place and an airport. For a while we'll keep out Vietnamese businessmen, until the Highlanders are able to hold their own.

"In another generation the tribal customs of the Binh Tuy mountaineers will be only a memory."

⁸A fiber crop commonly used in land development centers. See "The Kenaf Fiber Case," elsewhere in this volume.

PART II

MATERIALS
FROM OTHER SOURCES

Indonesian Assignment¹

I.—INTRODUCTION

This case involves a decision by a junior government official at the American Consulate General in Indonesia in 1946. In reading the case, the following factors might be noted as of particular importance: the uniqueness of the post and its charged political environment; the close relationship between the official and his immediate superior, the Consul General—coupled with his remoteness from the parent central organization in Washington; and finally, the clear relationship between the official's background and principles, and his decision. These factors in the case may be useful in throwing light on the intimate connections and interplay between informal and environmental influences in the process of decision-making.

At the time these events occurred, the situation presented a real and embarrassing dilemma to the official, whose responsibility it was to make the decision; yet to the reader the decision may seem obvious, easy, or perhaps both. If this is the reader's impression, the writer can only plead that perhaps it is attributable to the anatomy of retrospection and

¹The following account is autobiographical. It is condensed from Harold Stein, Ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development*, Copyright 1948, 1949, 1959, 1951 by the Committee on Public Administration Cases, Copyright, 1952, by Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc. and reprinted with their permission.

to the web of words used to describe the case. For retrospection and description can at best only partly recapture the feeling of uncertainty and discomfort confronting the individual when a decision is taken.

II.—BACKGROUND

Indonesia in 1945

On August 17, 1945, three days after the Japanese surrender, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands. During the six-week hiatus between the formal surrender announcement and the arrival of British reoccupation troops to accept the Japanese surrender in Indonesia and release Allied prisoners, the Republican nationalists consolidated their forces. When the first British troops arrived, a Republican national administration was actively functioning.

The British reaction to this unexpected and unprepared for turn of events was confused and confusing. British relations with the Republic remained on an uncertain basis: the British sought to avoid antagonizing the Dutch or the Indonesians, while at the same time refraining from commitments to either. The Dutch reaction was initially one of incredulity, and later of hostility to the "Japanese-inspired" regime. After their severe deprivations both in Indonesia and Europe during the war, the Dutch longed for a return to the "good-o'd-days," a return which the Republic was dedicated to prevent. Even liberal Dutch elements, cognizant of the need for change, regarded the Republic as a menace to the kind of gradualism and moderation they had in mind. The Republican attitude at the time was marked by the deep-seated distrust of Dutch intentions, characteristic of the long-time nationalist movement; by uncertainty toward the British; and by a naive faith in the United States, attested to by the myriad quotations from Lincoln and Jefferson painted on signs and buildings throughout the capital city.

The interest and concern of the United States in Indonesia was economic and strategic. Indonesia was an area of past and potential American investment, a source of critically needed raw materials (including tin, copra, rubber, and sugar), and a strategically located military and naval installation in the Pacific. As with Britain, the speed of the Japanese surrender and our inadequate intelligence sources found us totally unprepared to enunciate and execute a policy in Indonesia for the protection of American interests and aspirations. The need for on-the-spot information and analysis was critical, if such a policy were to be formulated.

For the first six months following the reoccupation, disorder in Batavia was rampant. With British, Dutch, and Indonesian forces quartered near or in the city, skirmishes were frequent. The civil administration of the capital was partly handled by the military, under British-Dutch aegis, and partly by the Republic, which ran the electric, trolley, and telephone systems and maintained a large governmental staff in the city. Living conditions for the civilian population were bad; food was scarce, and where available, unwholesome.

The Consul General

The first American representative to arrive on the scene was the Consul General. He was 60 years old; he had served as Consul and Consul General in the Indies for 12 years before the war. Much of his life, his feelings, his values, and recollections, were inextricably bound up with the prewar pattern of colonial existence. His attitude toward the plight of the Dutch was naturally one of sympathy. Years of tropical service had taken their toll on him. Those who had known him before the war found him slowed down, his speech affected by a slight stutter. For these reasons, there had been considerable controversy within the Department of State at the time of his reassignment to Batavia in mid-1945. Some felt that his age and prejudices made his reassignment to an area of political unrest and uncertainty extremely unwise, and that a younger man was preferable. Others felt that his long experience and familiarity with the area and many of its key figures were such primary assets as to outweigh any other liabilities. Within the Department itself, jurisdiction over Indonesia was shared by the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs and the Division of Northern European Affairs. The former represented the "anti" faction, while the latter supported his appointment.

The Consul General's first month in Batavia was marked by severe personal hardship. The living conditions and diet treated him harshly and enervated him acutely. He was, moreover, severely overworked. With no staff whatsoever, and only the barest equipment, he prepared cables and reports to the Department of State alone: drafting, typing, coding, and logging messages, personally taking them to the telegraph office, and repeating the reverse process on all incoming messages. The burden would have been difficult for a much younger man to bear.

Quite naturally, the Consul General addressed strong pleas to the Department for staff assistance. His most immediate need was met in the middle of December, with the arrival of a code clerk from Washington. The strain eased somewhat, but at the same time the pressure of work was increasing. Negotiations between the Dutch, the Indonesians,

and the British were beginning, and political and economic conditions were becoming more and more uncertain as disorder spread from Surabaya, to Batavia, to Bandung, and to other British-held bridgeheads in the Republic. The Department's need and requests for political information increased. Besides the political negotiations, Departmental inquiries stressed the status and condition of American property, the availability of raw material stockpiles, and the outlook for new production. Concentrating on political matters, the Consul General was unable to address himself to these economic questions, and reiterated his pleas for additional staff. To meet these urgent pleas, the writer was appointed vice-consul in December 1945, and assigned to Batavia for economic analysis and reporting. A word about my own background, training and indoctrination in the Department should be included, insofar as they are germane to the problem of decision which the case presents.

The Vice-Consul

My academic training had been in economics, supplemented during 1943-1944 by an intensive program of work at Stanford in the Far Eastern Area and in the Malay and Dutch languages, in connection with the Army Specialized Training Program. My qualifications for the assignment thus were directly related to this training. After completing the course of study at Stanford, I had gone into the Office of Strategic Services, serving one year in Europe. I received my discharge in November 1945, and, apprised of the need in Indonesia through OSS and State Department friends, I was appointed to the Foreign Service Auxillary in December. Most of my ten-week indoctrination period at the State Department was spent going over material in the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs. There I learned of the earlier controversy over the Consul General's appointment to Batavia. My own hearsay-sympathies, inchoate as they were, tended to gravitate toward the Division's own stand on the matter. Moreover, my study of the prewar pattern of colonialism in Indonesia left me with marked sympathy for the nationalist cause.

At the end of February 1946, I arrived in Batavia to begin work. My initial meeting with the Consul General was cordial and friendly, though filled with innumerable admonitions about "caution," "danger," and "the need to move slowly." By this time, the prewar building of the Consulate General had been reoccupied, but aside from one typewriter and the Consul General's old teak desk, there was no office equipment, no stationery, not even chairs for the Chinese clerks to sit on! The Consul General informed me that all the office supplies were still down at the harbor of Tandjong Prior (where they had arrived three months

ago), and requested that I undertake as my first assignment to locate the supplies and transport them to the office, so that the Consulate could begin operation. Rummaging around disordered godowns for about two weeks, I located most of the 75 crates which had been dispatched to Batavia. By the end of March the office was ready to handle routine Consular business, and on April 1st we opened our doors officially.

My second assignment, inevitably, was to see and talk to the scores of visitors who swarmed into the Consulate asking for information concerning visas, relatives in the United States, and others just wishing to discuss their problem; and to answer some of the correspondence which had accumulated in Consular files, mainly from American firms wishing to explore trade opportunities even before the shooting had ceased!

Economic Reporting

With this backlog out of the way, I began my first economic reporting during May. In my economic work, I was responsible to the Consul General, who had to countersign all reports, airgrams, or cables I might draft to the Department. However, part of my indoctrination period in the Department had been spent talking to the International Resources Division and the Economic Development Division, so that I was reasonably acquainted with the type of information in which the Department was primarily interested. The decision as to subjects for reports, therefore, rested largely with me. The procedure evolved for me to discuss briefly with the Consul General a prospective project. He would make a few comments, indicate a few Dutch authorities who might help me; thereafter, the responsibility for finding, accumulating, analyzing, and interpreting the data was mine, until I presented the finished report to him for countersignature.

Initially, this procedure worked without incident. My first report dealt with agricultural prospects in the outer islands of Celebes, Moluccas, and the Lesser Sundas. These areas were already under Dutch control. The Consul General enthusiastically endorsed the subject. I proceeded to make contact with the Netherlands authorities concerned. My relations with them were friendly, and they not only gave me all their meager documentary material, but carefully answered even the most elementary questions which I addressed to them (I say "elementary," because my knowledge of tropical economy was spotty). The report was completed at the end of June. The Consul General commended me, and the Department added its approval several weeks later.

My second report proceeded along the same lines and with similar results. It dealt with the thorium content of Bangka tin ores, and while I came in contact with different Dutch personnel, their solicitousness and helpfulness duplicated that shown me in my first official contact with the Dutch.

A slight snag was struck in my next project. In response to a specific request from the international Resources people, I wanted to investigate the copra situation: the availability of stockpiles, and the condition of the coconut palms. In my preliminary discussion with the Consul General, I inquired about the need for consulting the Republican authorities in preparing the report, since a sizable part of the copra area was in Southern Sumatra, in Republican territory. His reaction was one of mild disturbance, and brought a strong restatement of the views he had expressed to me on my arrival: the need for "caution," the "ticklish political situation which you must take my word for," and the "need for waiting and moving slowly."

I took this as a clear negation of my inquiry, and therefore confined myself to talks with the Dutch Director of Economic Affairs and his staff. At the end of my report, I made a note to the effect that "it had been impossible for political reasons to consult the Republican authorities." I did this with a sense of personal discomfiture. The political implications of an inquiry concerning copra seemed to me tenuous. Moreover, I knew that through the Consul General our government was already in touch with the Republic, and my own informal acquaintance with Indonesian officials had given me a high regard for their discretion. I felt that the report clearly suffered from the exclusion of this possible source of information, and I handed it in with a feeling of dissatisfaction. The Consul General, however, read it closely and again responded enthusiastically.

Without going into details, I may add that my next project, dealing with the rubber situation, followed almost the identical pattern of the copra incident. Here again, extensive rubber areas were in Republican territory which were important to the completeness of the report. My suggestion of the need for consulting Republican authorities was, however, discounted and ruled out by the Consul General.

From my own point of view, the following was the situation when the problem of decision arose. I was, on the one hand, eminently gratified with the cordial relations built up between the Consul General and myself. Yet, I was acutely aware of the fact that the cordiality had a fragile base. The Consul General was explicitly sensitive to the great difference in our ages and perhaps implicitly to the difference in status

between a career Foreign Service Officer like himself and a Foreign Service Auxiliary Officer. I had no ties with him of age or career or general attitudes that would serve to cushion any disagreement between us over an issue like contact with Indonesian officials. The possibility of a cooling in our relations was ever present, and I could not face such a cooling without considerable uneasiness. In a distant field post, friendly relations between superior and subordinate assume an even greater psychological significance than they do at home. Furthermore, the Consul General was chief of the post, and his recommendation would, of course, be important to my future in the Foreign Service. Finally, I might rationalize that any shortcomings in reporting from the field were, formally at least, his responsibility, and not mine.

On the other hand, I had a persistent feeling that the Department required full reporting from both sides to make competent policy decisions in Indonesia; that competent and complete performance of my work required building sound contacts on the Republican as well as the Netherlands side. While I had learned to feel a certain admiration for the perseverance of the Dutch, and an appreciation of the cooperation they had shown me, my ideological sympathies for the Indonesian case had been reinforced by my experiences in the field.

III—THE PROBLEM AND THE ALTERNATIVES

In September 1946, a confidential airgram from the Department was received at the Consulate. It requested an extensive report on "economic plans and policies in Indonesia," with almost no specificity attached to these terms. It concluded with the observation that "if possible, and with the utmost discretion, Dutch, Indonesian, and British sources should be consulted as far as feasible."

This airgram was routed by the Consul General to my desk for action on the day following its arrival. I was, at first, both enthusiastic and elated to receive it. Its importance seemed obvious in view of the prolonged silence by the United States Government as to its policy, in the face of a continued complex political situation. Moreover, it clearly offered scope for originality and analysis, which was a welcome change from the relative tedium of the commodity reporting I had been doing. Further reflection made me feel that effective handling of the airgram required a basic decision. Was I to consult the Indonesian authorities in preparing my report? And if so, was this consultation to be extensive and on a high level, or simply confined to a cursory phone call to the Republic's Ministry of Economic Affairs? The airgram, from one point of view,

clearly carried a mandate for consultation with the Indonesian authorities, and equally clearly the demands of a complete and useful report also pointed in this direction. Yet just as clearly, on the other side, were the qualifications which the airgram had appended to its instruction: "if possible," and "as far as feasible." For either of these reasons, consultation with the Republic could be justifiably neglected, or at least treated in summary fashion. While my own inclination was (as it had been in the copra and rubber reports) to consult the Republic, I was keenly aware that (a) such action would be likely to vitiate my position with the Consul General, and (b) that if there were any mishap in connection with my action (e.g., a "leak" to the press), I could expect to be held fully responsible by the Consul General and the Department.

I think, in retrospect, that I was more or less clearly aware that the three courses were available to me. In the first place, I could approach the Consul General, as I had done on previous, though essentially different, occasions, and ask his opinion of the import of the Department's instruction, and his advice in the matter of whether to consult the Republic. I had, of course, good grounds for assuming that the response would be similar to his advice on the rubber and copra reports. But my own position would clearly be secure if there were any kickback by the Department, both because of the loopholes contained in the instructions, and because of the Consul General's own advice. Moverover, such a decision would clearly protect my relations with my chief.

Secondly, I could take my instructions from the airgram directly, consulting the Dutch and the British only, and relying on the vagueness of the instruction and/or the precarious political situation to explain my failure to consult the Republic, in a concluding paragraph of the report. Then, if the Department specifically desired such consultation, it could so direct in a subsequent instruction. From my own point of view, the advantages of this decision were the security of my position and the effect it would have on my already good relations with the Consul General. It would, in his eyes, clearly mark me as viewing the general situation as he did (a point on which he had expressed some concern more than once), and therefore would raise his opinion and trust of me.

Thirdly, I could consult the Republic directly in line with my own inclinations, and could rely on the implicit mandate of the airgram for justification. This would, of course, endanger my relations with the Consul General, and leave me open to subsequent blame in case of untoward results. It would, however, acquit me of a personal consciousness of responsibility for complete and competent reporting, and for giving the

Republican case at least equal treatment with that accorded the Netherlands. It might be mentioned, parenthetically, that if this were to be my decision, a further decision would have to be made: concerning the extent of my consultation with the Republic. I reached a quick decision on this point, that if I were to adopt this general position, my consultation with the Republic should not be cursory, e.g., confined to a single phone call, but should be as extensive as would appear feasible in the light of the reception I should receive upon approaching the officials concerned.

IV. THE DECISION

Before reaching a final decision, I spoke informally to the chief of the Republic's public relations office, whom I shall call Mr. Subandi. I had known of Subandi before coming to Indonesia, through mutual friends at Stanford, who had held a high opinion of his reliability. This impression was confirmed by me when I met him at numerous social functions in Batavia. I secured from him, without going into details, a guarantee that any inquiries I might direct to any Indonesian government office would be treated with the utmost confidence.

I thereupon decided on the third alternative: to consult the Indonesian Ministry of Economic Affairs directly, and fully (in addition, of course to my consultation with the Dutch and British). The results of the decision were singularly happy. I received a warm welcome from the Indonesians. My talks with the Minister were fruitful, and the Ministry staff supplemented these talks with the first documentary material on economic matters which the United States Government secured from the Republic. My report was drawn up, after several redrafts, in October 1946. The Consul General made several comments which required minor editing and revision, but countersigned it at the end of the month. There was, however, a noticeable cooling in our relations,² and prior to countersigning the report he remarked with no little asperity, "you had better watch your step in dealing with these Indonesians in the future." Nevertheless, even this ill-feeling did not seem to be permanent. When, three months later, I received a commendation from the Department for the report, the Consul General's attitude noticeably softened, though our relations were never quite as friendly as they had originally been.

²The Consul General had a long-standing custom, dating back to prewar days, of inviting some of his staff, and the top officialdom of Batavia, to his lodgings for mint juleps on Sunday mornings. After handing in my report, I did not receive another invitation to these get-togethers for five weeks!

Student Strike at an Asian University: A Case History¹

In 1953, the cross currents of the Burmese educational world were running in rough turbulence. As the monsoon rains petered out in late September and the sun emerged from grey hibernation to steam the water-soaked lands of Burma, another kind of cloud began to darken the University of Rangoon campus. The atmosphere became charged with an emotional touchiness of cumulative potentiality; a storm was brewing which would engulf the entire student body and its faculty. In the face of it the five American professors attached to the University under Point IV agreements would be helpless. Before it played itself out, classes would be disrupted, the entire learning program would stumble to a halt, and recovery would be impossible that academic year.

The academic year began inauspiciously at registration time, with student disobedience of University dormitory regulations. Registration had been unusually heavy, and dormitories were inadequate to meet the needs of the expanding student body. In the competition for space, a large number of students had simply pre-empted dormitory beds without leave from University authorities, and occupied them on squatters' rights. Repeated pleas and mild directives from the administration, requesting the squatters to relinquish their quarters and be assigned properly, along

¹By George Mannello, Jr. Adapted from *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, June, 1957, page 249, by permission of the author.

with the rest of the applicants, were ignored. Nevertheless, the authorities were loath to create an incident by taking more forceful action. There developed among the students a vogue of contempt for authority which eventually brought disrepute on the whole University and became a subject of severe censure from the newspapers and the general public.

II

During the time when student disobedience was becoming a major subject of discourse, Wally, a Point IV colleague of mine, gave a tea party. His pleasant bungalow was full of college instructors, both Burmese and American, who presented an interesting contrast of colorful longyi skirts and baggy white cotton slacks.

I turned to my neighbor, a Burmese professor of English, and raising the current campus topic, asked, "What's this I read about trouble with students in the dormitory?"

He appeared reluctant to answer. "Ah, Dr. Mannello, it is a difficult situation," he said, and then stopped.

When I saw he was going no further, I attempted to draw him out: "But doesn't the University have the power to make its regulations stick?"

Wally ambled over and declared, "If they tried those stunts at an American college, they'd be kicked out."

"But it's not so simple here," the professor of English explained. "The students are organized, and they can make a great deal of trouble."

"What are the students organized for—to make trouble?" I flung back and then, seeing the tightening expression on his face, was immediately sorry. "You see," I continued lamely, "what I mean is, the fact that the students have their own organizations is not bad in itself. We have student organizations in America, and we count them a good thing. Didn't you belong to a student organization when you went to school?"

"Yes," he admitted, "but at that time our country was fighting for independence. It was the organized students right here at the University who led the movement. Yes, I was proud to participate in that struggle. U Nu, himself, was a student then and led the University strike against the British." He stopped, and then added, "But now it is different."

"How so?"

"Now when the students go out on strike they do so against their own people."

I asked, "But how does U Nu look upon student lawlessness at the University?"

"Naturally, he deplores it," said a jovial-looking Burmese professor of history, who had caught a corner of our conversation and now sat down with us.

"Yet he does not denounce it too vigorously because of his own past?" I suggested.

"Partly," he said, "but if the students go too far and the government is threatened, he will not hesitate to act. As it is now, nothing important is at stake."

"I wonder," I said. "I am told that it is very difficult for a professor to introduce an innovation into his program without the approval of the students. What are their rights in this matter?"

"It is true," the professor history said. "We cannot do anything new in the classroom if the students are against it. This is not a matter of University policy, but a right the students have arrogated unto themselves. What is one to do." he threw up his hands, "if the whole class is against it?"

"But why do they object? What are their grounds?"

"Ha!" he snorted. "Grounds? They haven't any! Unless you call ignorance, or laziness, or caprice, grounds. Sometimes they object simply because someone else has told them to do so. Ah . . . we Burmese are an undisciplined lot."

"In other words, the only real hold you have over your students is the final examination."

"More or less; that, and of course the instructor's personal magnetism. Last year we did attempt to place some weight on regular class attendance and daily classwork in order to determine the student's final mark. It took us a long time to have this change accepted by the University Senate and the Rector and when, at last, it was approved, the students rejected it. Certain vocal student groups set up such a din that the Rector rescinded the new regulation, which assigned twenty-five percent of the final mark to class work. We went back to a pure examina-

tion system. So you see, not even the Rector is immune from student pressure."

I asked, "But couldn't anything be done to save the new University ruling on final marks? It certainly would be to the students' advantage."

"Which students?" laughed the History Professor. "Certainly not the students who prefer not to attend class and are good at taking final examinations. And those who feel that they stand to lose with an innovation are always noisier than those who feel that they may gain."

"Hmmm, I see your point. Yet you will admit that it would be to their advantage from the standpoint of learning."

He smiled patiently. "Of course, of course, Dr. Mannello, but the question is, do the students admit it? They do not . . . and we do not wish to increase the number of our revolutions. We have five currently."

III

As the Rangoon University Student Union elections drew near in mid-semester, the student body split towards two powerful foci, the Democratic Student Organization, a Socialist group supported by U Nu's party, and the Progressives, a Communist-dominated group that sought to wrest power away from the incumbent DSO's. The rumor circulated in private conversation that one of the government's leading politicians personally directed the DSO's; it was his way of recruiting deserving personnel for government posts. It also appeared that the Progressives were equally supported by off-campus political movements. Provoked and prodded by these outside ideological forces, the enmity between the two groups was bitter. As election day approached, the schism between the two competing groups deepened. Emotions were pitched as bands of students, yelling slogans and bearing placards, roved the campus. Rival motorcades, old lorries, and jeeps, crammed with students and covered with scrawly, flapping signs in the Burmese script, flew down the streets. At the evening rallies, the night air shook with chorused shouts that rolled out into the darkness.

In this setting, student government could serve no useful purpose. Certainly, the welfare of the University and its students was the last thing in the minds of these warring factions. Control, for whatever influence it might have over the minds of students for the later national struggles, was the dominating motive.

For all of its fanfare and for all the vituperation, election day came with a quiet orderliness. At nine o'clock, as I edged my jeep through the gathering campus crowds on my way to class, nothing extraordinary seemed to be happening. On the way back at noontime, I could see that the temper of the student body was changing, rumbling and growling. The votes began to show a decided trend towards the DSO's, and the Progressives, sensing defeat, took to shouting insults and hurling charges of fraud. Then, in the closing afternoon hours, the ballot box was seized by the Progressives and smashed, and the long expected violence broke. The election was a complete fiasco.

The University did not interfere. It met the issue of student elections by not noticing it; so no further elections were held that year.

IV

The next incident was tailor-made for conflict. It had to do with the mid-year vacation. As the first semester came to a close, a University directive went out, stating that the in-between-terms vacation, usually one month in length, would be shortened to two weeks. It was like pouring kerosene on a smouldering fire. The effect was immediate and universal. Almost every student, regardless of age, sex, and party affiliation, rose up to denounce it. The University administration had accomplished the impossible—it had welded together a broken student body. All parties vied in their intensity in denouncing the decision.

A committee with a high sounding name—Full Month Vacation Implementation Committee—was formed. An ultimatum was delivered: Close down for the full month of October or we call a token strike on September 29. In a counter move, the University decided, at last, to take a strong stand, and issued its own threat: Any student who participates in a strike will be expelled.

Despite this threat of expulsion, the one-day token strike was successful—too successful. The students stayed away from their classes almost one hundred percent.

When I reported for classes the following day, the atmosphere at the Faculty of Education had worsened considerably. Although most Education students were less ardent supporters of the strike than were those in other parts of the University, they felt compelled to acquiesce in the dictates of their more bellicose peers. Caught in the jaws of circumstance, they were most secretive. Small groups would gather furtively in the passageways and in the corners of the library, whispering seriously.

The approach of an instructor would be the embarrassing signal for the students to break up and hurry away.

The strike had unquestionably reached the point where governmental intervention was inevitable. It was no longer a local school tiff that could be resolved by educational authorities. The Prime Minister, acting on the authority of his honorary position as Chancellor of the University, took direct action to deal with the strike leaders. This account appeared in the Rangoon press:

“. . . Five students elected by the mass meeting . . . met with U Nu . . . The Education Minister was also present. Chancellor U Nu waited for the students to bring up the subject of the holidays. Then he told them in plain terms that the authorities were determined to uphold their position and that if the students did not give way gracefully, balefruit would knock against balefruit, meaning a clash or a conflict. The student leaders are reported to have expressed the sentiment that they might have been foolish in their past action, but as for the suggestion that they should return to the students and ask them to backtrack, it was out of the question, since a decision had already been taken, and they (the leaders) had come with no mandate to do anything else. Said U Nu, I give you till noon tomorrow. At that hour I shall notify the country of what we propose to do.”

The strike was on in earnest, the battle lines drawn, the strategy committed. Riding on the crest of a string of successes they had hit upon an issue that appealed to the whole student body, their power was already demonstrated in the one-day token strike, and the Prime Minister, himself, was forced to recognize them—the strike leaders jubilantly pushed their plans to tie up the University.

At the appointed time, the Prime Minister went to the people. In a radio address, he denounced the instigators of the strike, and promised to put an end to lawlessness at the University. He revealed that the University Council's decision to cut down the holiday period had been taken as a result of his own insistence, in order that the standard of university education be improved in Burma. He said that he was surprised to find that actual teaching at the University occupied only 118 days out of a possible 365. It was the fault of the British, U Nu claimed, who framed this educational system because they were not over anxious about the education of Burmans. Consequently, he had requested the Rector to step up the number of teaching days to at least 236. With the country in such need of trained and educated personnel, it could not afford to drag out the educational process with a great many holidays.

Besides, it was a shameful waste of the people's money for the students to study only four months of the year.

The agitation against this decision, which was so patently in favor of the students, could come from only one source—the Communists, U Nu asserted. The Communists, who had been working among all classes of people to create trouble, had found that they were losing support, and that the workers, the peasants, and the traders had become disillusioned with them. They therefore turned to the *phongvis* (Buddhist monks) and the students, among whom they hoped to foment agitation in order to cause unrest and lawless acts. "Judge the actions of the students within the last week for yourselves," was the Prime Minister's appeal. He cited the fact that while the University Council was in session they had kicked at the doors and created a disturbance; that they had manhandled members of a group that was trying to dissuade students from striking; and that when police cars came to the scene, they had stoned the cars, smashing their windscreens. Watch closely this new strategy of the Communists at the University, he warned. The government would do its part to maintain law and order. The Prime Minister ended his radio talk with a final plea for the students to behave properly, and he begged parents and guardians to dissuade their children from allowing themselves to be made the catspaws of the insurgent exploiters.

V

On the first day of the strike, I stopped by at the Faculty of Education, which was outside of the agitation. The building was almost deserted except for a small band of picketing students who had come over from another college. They were camped on the front steps, noisily singing songs, playing Burmese instruments, and dancing. This wasn't a picket line, their behavior mockingly proclaimed, only a roving band of minstrels. Whenever they located a professor attempting to hold class with his handful of students, they would stand beneath the window and loudly play and sing popular Burmese songs, with an especially spirited accompaniment on the long bamboo clappers, creating such a racket that it was impossible to lecture. As I approached the main entrance, they quickly stepped aside to let me in, grinning in the best of humor. I could not resist smiling back.

Inside, a few students sat in the lounge, while most of the instructors sat in the library, reading newspapers and chatting with one another, there being nothing else to do. I sought out the acting head.

"Well?" I asked, "what do we do? Are classes to be held?"

"No, Dr. Mannello," he said, "the dean said that the students could use this week to practice for the variety show they planned to give at the end of the term."

"I see," I smiled. "There's no strike going on here. The students have been let off for extracurricular activities."

"Yes. However, the dean wishes the teachers to report every day at the regular time. We are not sure when classes will be resumed. End-term examinations will be given next week in any case."

I said, "Tell me, how do the students at the Faculty of Education feel about this strike? Some of them sitting in the lounge look pretty forlorn."

"I do not think that many of our students really support it. We do not have many radical students in this school. I am sorry that you are here to witness this trouble. Last year it was not like this."

I asked "What about Communists? Are many Communists at the University, as the Prime Minister says?"

But this question pushed my inquiry too far, and when he answered with an I don't-know and then remained politely silent, I knew that it was time to talk of other things.

As I left the building, the musical picketers again gave way in friendly fashion, and I drove my jeep home via the main avenue of the University estate. Thousands of young men were standing around on the lawns and sitting on the steps, their collarless white shirts glaring in the sunlight. Here and there a dancing troupe entertained, or a roving student orchestra filled the air with raucous Burmese music. Caravans of cars careened down the highways, 50 to 60 vehicles in length, piled high with students chanting slogans, singing, and catcalling in gay derision. A holiday spirit pervaded the atmosphere, and this was truly the students' day.

But as I drove through the main gate of the University, I noticed certain ominous signs. Several fire engines, brilliantly red, were parked just outside; a number of police radio cars stood ready with their motors running; and a platoon of wide-brimmed, blue-coated policemen was forming at the entrance, armed with clubs.

VI

Early the next morning, the sound of roaring motors invaded our home, and running out to the highway to investigate, we saw a long line of

military vehicles pull up next to the University grounds. Military police, fully armed with rifles and bayonets, leaped out and formed at the main entrance. Some of the iron gates had been secured during the night by the strikers, who had bound them with heavy chains and locks. The police smashed through, using their trucks as battering rams.

All morning I stayed at home, catching sounds of the tumult, and when I could no longer restrain my curiosity, I jumped into my jeep and called to my wife that I was going down the road to see what was happening. When I arrived at the scene, the complexion of the strike had completely changed. The holiday spirit was gone. The main gate was seething with activity, as squad after squad of military police organized to invade the University grounds. The first department and a platoon of city police had already moved in, and were battling with the strikers, who had barricaded the student hostels. Frantic students, their faces full of apprehension, scattered in all directions. Shouts came from the inner campus grounds, but this shouting was not the good-humored slogans of the day before. They were the frightening roars of an infuriated mob.

I drove to a side gate, somewhat removed from this activity, but possessing the advantage of a wide road down which I could look into the heart of the rioting some one hundred yards distant, and I parked the jeep on a slight rise with motor running. Just as I parked, one of the fire engines in the midst of the fray, which I could see indistinctly, burst into flames, and the smoke rose straight up into the still morning air. A mighty cheer broke from the students around it. Then several pistol shots cracked out from one of the hostels, the first bullets to be fired. A few minutes later a military truck came grinding down the highway, carrying about twenty-five armed policemen, who were hastily fixing bayonets on their rifles. The truck swerved sharply through the gate where I was parked, roared down to the center of the rioting, and skidded to a stop. The police jumped out, immediately deployed as skirmishers, and began firing their rifles. The strikers ran for cover like quail, and for a moment all was quiet on the campus. The police were dead serious now, and the officers sent squad after squad in with fixed bayonets, moving relentlessly upon the strikers. Firing continued in a desultory fashion.

As I rode back to the house, much saddened by this useless strife, I passed bands of young strikers escaping from the University estate, jumping over walls and crawling through gates. Some of them attempted a bravado, aggressively grinning at the onlookers and cracking jokes

among themselves. It was no longer anything to laugh about; therefore one must laugh. When I returned to the house, my wife and the children were standing on the highway watching the activity from this distance. I told them what I had witnessed and expressed the opinion that the worst part was now over.

VII

The University strike was broken. The government, and the University administration under the prodding of the government, dealt with the student agitators with firmness and dispatch. Fortunately, only a few strikers were injured seriously and no one was killed, since the police had been ordered to fire above the heads of the rioters. Most of the leaders were jailed, the barricades were torn down, and the dormitories were searched. On the plea of personal safety, more than two thousand students applied for special leave to go home until it was no longer dangerous to attend classes, and the University granted it, thereby dissociating large numbers of students from the strike. A remnant of last ditch fighters paraded through downtown Rangoon with banners demanding the release of the imprisoned students, bolstering their forces with secondary school youths and even primary school children, who scarcely knew the words they were mouthing. The cosmopolitan citizens of Rangoon were hardly curious as they marched by.

The Prime Minister addressed a statement to the nation. Since they had broken the law, he said, many students and their leaders had been arrested. He drew attention to the fact that Burma was a democracy, and if anyone felt aggrieved as a result of executive action taken by the government, the newspapers were there to criticize and condemn. Furthermore, recourse could be had to the courts of law, whose function it was to right any wrongs committed. Addressing the jailed students, U Nu declared: "If you consider any arrests to be unfair, you may take your case to the Supreme Court and I promise, on behalf of the government, to provide you with the services of at least three leading counsels whom you may nominate. The government will also pay all expenses connected with the litigation." Thus the Prime Minister, ex-school teacher, lectured his people on the ways of democracy.

The Rector also made a statement. The University council had met, he said, and had adopted severe rules regarding disciplinary action against unruly students. They were:

1. No student will be readmitted to the University unless he signs

a statement, countersigned by his parents, to the effect that he will henceforth obey all University rules and regulations.

2. All students absent during the strike who did not apply for a leave of absence must submit to a questioning by University authorities.
3. All known leaders of the strike will be expelled from the University.
4. Other strikers will be dealt with in accordance with the seriousness of their involvement. Scholarships and stipends will be discontinued for this group.

VIII

"Well," I said, sitting on top of a desk down at Point IV Headquarters with my colleagues, "we can thank God that this strike hasn't taken an anti-American turn."

Wally said, "Yeh, but there's plenty of Communists in it. Did you hear what was found when they raided the student hostels the other night?"

"No, what?"

"A bunch of Communist papers propaganda pamphlets, letters, secret orders from the Communist party, diaries. One of the University dormitories was the secret headquarters of the whole Communist movement in Southern Burma."

To this question I found no answer.

The strike gasped in its death throes for a few more spasmodic days. A vestigial band of diehards moved around the halls begging, in spite of the Prime Minister's offer, for donations for legal fees to secure the release of the arrested ones. Attendance slowly increased as returning students crept back into their classrooms. There was no happiness during these convalescent days, and I felt a great compassion for these confused young people who stole in and out of their classes with expressions of guilt on their faces. They were rejected by their country and their Prime Minister, and worse, there was not the comfort of knowing that, no matter what the outcome, one had fought the good fight for right principles and high goals.

A Class Criticizes the Case Method¹

Prof. Bailey of the Harvard Business School describes a "rebellion" by 100 students in "Section E" at Harvard against the use of the case method, and shows how the instructor used the occasion to improve the class' adjustment to this new learning experience.

The following memorandum was condensed from some 10 to 12 pages of notes set down by me immediately after the close of the class session. The purpose of the memorandum was to report as literally, yet as briefly as possible, the principal ideas and feelings that had been expressed. The memorandum as here printed was shown later to nearly a score of those who became the active leaders of the hundred men who composed Section E, and they were asked to add whatever they felt had been omitted from this record of the session, or to strike out what was unimportant or misinterpreted in order to give the account the greatest

¹By Joseph C. Bailey Reprinted by permission from Kenneth Andrews, *Method of Teaching Human Relations and Administration*, copyright 1951, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

accuracy. Agreement was general that the reporting followed the themes of the discussion very closely; the only uncertainty expressed was whether the intensity of feeling on the part of the group or of most of its members was underscored sufficiently so that a reader might sense it.

Readers familiar with the case method of discussion do not need to be reminded that the apparent crisis exhibited in the memorandum is only one phase of a continuing process—the process of learning. Teachers learn to expect confusion, frustration, and hostility on the part of students when they are required to begin at last their own problem solving. Once they do begin it, usually after some incipient rebellion of the sort shown here, then a teacher is free, finally, to work with his students and to learn with them as an integrated team working together on common problems.

After experiencing the emotion, as facing the hard, intellectual fact that they are really on their own, students bit by bit relinquish their long conditioning toward a teacher as a person who has the authoritative answer for the problems presented by a case (which is, after all, a report on someone else's real-life problems). Bit by bit, in the slowly reassuring solidarity of other student weanings, case students move on to other phases in the process of learning and come to relish the challenge of doing the work themselves; come to regard the teacher as one who is able and willing to help them work out their answers, not give them answers which don't exist; and at last to take pride in their self-sufficiency and in what they have proved to themselves they are able to do. At this point they are free of a need for a teacher—as they should be—but there seems to be no way of gaining such freedom except by personally experiencing the struggle to attain it.

MEMORANDUM

On Wednesday, October 27, 1948, Section E in Administrative Practices, shortly after class began at 2:10 p.m., chose to launch an inquiry into the function or responsibility of their teacher, Bailey, to their class, Section E. As the inquiry was in full tide at 3:30 p.m., the bulk of the class, as well as I, elected to continue until 4:30 p.m., at which time substantially all the issues raised and feelings expressed seemed to have been sufficiently ventilated. Adjournment was by common consent.

The views expressed most frequently, when clarified, follow hereafter in summary form. Once these views were clarified and accepted by the student speaker or speakers, I then raised the unexpressed inference. The usual reaction was for a few students to fall silent, perhaps to think. A larger number would, almost as a reflex, embrace the inference raised.

The clear majority would mill about until a new issue was found and use it to return to their chief interest, my responsibility to them.

The view expressed
(by students)

1. Many students waste time in class with irrelevant or repetitious or mistaken contributions.
2. The class may leave a case with many points of importance undetected and undiscussed.
3. Class discussion often ends with our conclusions confused, scattered, unassorted.
4. We often may be reasoning wrongly and arriving at erroneous estimates.
5. We may be too inexperienced personally or without the learning needed to appraise the merits of the judgments we offer.
6. Your acquaintance with the pertinent literature is wider and sounder than ours.
7. Many students tend to express "feelings" about these cases, feelings we don't share, don't care to listen to, and often find annoying.

The inference unexpressed
(except by me)

- You (the teacher) ought to stop it.
- You should point them out to us.
- You should put them together for us.
- You should put us right.
- You should supply our short-comings from your superior knowledge.
- You should tell us what to read and what each reading is worth.
- You should stop them by pointing out that they are merely expressing personal feelings which most of us find tiresome.

In the periods of discussion that followed *after* the inference had been raised for them by me, the issue at hand was abandoned, usually after I had raised the further questions below:

1. If I tell a student (nicely, of course) that he is wasting class time and he tells me that *he* doesn't think so, what should I do next?
2. If I think the class has missed many points in the case that I consider interesting, should I say so when they think they are finished and ask them to begin again? Or, if I tell them what I think they missed, will they come to rely upon me to do this, and do they wish to so rely? Then upon whom will they rely for points missed in the day's problems following graduation from these ivied walls in June 1950?
3. If discussion often leaves cases scattered about in bits and pieces, conclusions uncertain and interpretations contradictory, who should put them together?
4. If you seem to me to be reasoning wrongly, should I merely say so? Or, should I then go on to reason correctly for you? What should I do if my reasoning fails to convince certain students, inform them they are wrong or, in the end, assure the others that my view is right?

5. If I have reason to believe you may attach more importance to what I say than my views merit stripped of the authority of the professorial chair, how am I to govern myself in case you remember my opinions after graduation, act upon them, and discover them not to be reliable in your situation? (a) Will you blame me for the consequences? (b) Will you blame yourselves for listening to me? (c) Will you blame yourselves for asking me to tell you?
6. If I am to put reading before you that may prove helpful, how should I do it? On a conventional reading list? (Widespread dissent.) I have already recommended five references I think applicable. How many men have looked at so much as one out of five? (Eighteen hands showed.) Do you wish me to reward these eighteen and penalize the rest?
7. If there is one lesson this section seems to agree on it is that you have learned from all the cases we are now reviewing that workers, and even executives, have feelings; that they want those feelings recognized and respected; that they wish to be treated as people of some value to the group with which they are working. Now, do you wish me to tell a student expressing feelings that seem important to him that he is wasting our time and we wish him to stop?

Additional issues raised are set forth below, not because they claimed less student interest, but rather because they were clarified by one or two students in place of one or two dozen. Thus, these were dealt with, as it were, in the interstices between the longer, louder discussions proceeding simultaneously on the more confusing issues.

The view expressed plus that implied

1. You possess "knowledge" invaluable to us. You probably have "the right answer" to every one of these cases. If you didn't, you wouldn't be up there on that platform. We've paid our money and are entitled to every grain of wisdom you possess, especially and specifically "the right answers" to our problems.
2. We're entitled to know what the faculty thinks about these problems and cases. You represent the faculty. It's your obligation to give us their opinions.

The response which returned the problem for the students' further reflection

Will students gain as much from whatever experience I may possess if I strive to convey it in the form of questions as if I put it into the form of statements, lectures, or answers?

What would this section think if it could oversee and overhear the faculty occupying the students' seats in this room, discussing one of their cases, expressing as much diversity of view, disagreeing as much over meanings, and arriving at incompatible interpretations of the meanings discovered? Would that reassure them?

As the session wore on toward its close certain students ventured expressions of faith that they were going to learn something, Dean David forewarned them of confusion coming, but thereafter, illumination; second-year men told them it would clear up one of these days; a reasonable number of students did seem to graduate annually; etc. Some men went further. One said he left the classroom with only questions in his mind, but that he liked that. Another confessed that he "felt scared." For sixteen years he had been told answers. He had big notebooks full of them, and bigger textbooks still fuller, and the teachers ready to supply anything he couldn't find. The case method was wholly unfamiliar and he didn't know what to hang on to. (Only fifteen men, it developed, had ever had even one case course before.) Though scared, he liked it and wanted to go on trying to puzzle out his own answers.

Judging from the tones of such comments that the vigor, not to say the rigor, of their inquisition was slackening, I concluded the session with the reminder that they, as executives and managers, would often find themselves in my shoes, a teacher and trainer to their subordinates. How did they propose to go about that task? Would they choose to "tell" their students the "right answers"? Or what?

At the following session of the class I began with the remark that we had explored, or started to explore, some very far-reaching questions. I felt that we had given them a good start, possibly as much as we were able to give just now. They would find, I thought, that some of the issues raised would develop in their minds in chain-reaction fashion. In any case, let's wait and see. Meanwhile I would put on the board a couple of my own overnight recapitulations.

*Function or
responsibility of the student*

*Function or
responsibility of the teacher*

The class had raised the first. I had raised the second, because the first could not be determined without inquiring closely into the second. Roughly speaking, there also appeared to be at least two types of educational endeavor distinguishable as follows:

Classroom Evaluation

TYPE OF SCHOOL:

A. Liberal Arts colleges: graduate and undergraduate

B. Professional schools: law, medicine, business, etc.

OBJECTIVES:

"Knowledge," learning, scholarship, etc.

Ways of solving selected kinds of problems. Useful ways of thinking

TECHNIQUES:

Lectures: teacher talks; student listens, takes notes, reads, etc.

Class discussion: teacher listens; student talks, pits his way of solving problems against classmates; teacher asks questions

TOOLS:

Textbook, libraries, research—individual work

Cases: Analysis and diagnosis thereof, in study groups, in classroom, clinic, or laboratory

PRODUCT:

Scholars, teachers, research workers, etc.

Doctors, lawyers, administrators, *et al.*: those who must prepare to accept responsibility for actions and decisions involving other people

EVALUATION OF PRODUCT:

Breadth and depth of "knowledge," learning, scholarship. Output of research inquiries. Training of younger scholars.

Skills, or the quality of performance, required to reach successful judgments and initiate successful action in problems involving other persons

I observed that most of the class seemed busy copying the equation and its accompanying classification while I was putting it on the board. We began, however, discussion of the next case as soon as I had finished writing.

The Teacher¹

IN WHICH SOCRATES EXPLAINS THE CASE METHOD
OF TEACHING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND ALMOST
BECOMES AN ADMINISTRATOR HIMSELF THEREBY

Nearly forty years ago the case approach to administrative behavior was introduced into the American classroom. Its principal characteristic was the careful examination of a single administrative decision or action, whether important or minor, and its principal value was in giving the students who used it a sense of participating in an actual administrative operation. The method was new, but its roots stretched twenty-five hundred years, to Socrates and his successors Plato and Aristotle.

Here is how Socrates might have introduced the method to his Athenian friends if he had happened to think it necessary to supplement the education of philosopher-kings with a little practical work in public administration:

SOCRATES: That was indeed an eloquent speech of Protagoras; yet I am not sure just what I have learned from him today.

GLAUCON, A STUDENT: You are not easily satisfied, Socrates. Is not Protagoras our most famous teacher of administration? Has he not written the most useful formulas for the organization of men? And are not his principles the most acclaimed of all the teachings of our learned men?

SOCRATES: That is true, and I may be at fault for not knowing how to master his principles and put them to good use.

GLAUCON: You would be the last man I should accuse of stupidity, Socrates.

¹By John D. Montgomery. This essay first appeared in the *Journal of Administrative Research*, published for the Association of Administrative Studies by the National Institute of Administration, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 1958. It appeared in the *Public Administration Review* Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Spring, 1958.

SOCRATES: So indeed I am.

GLAUCON: But what could be simpler than his advice regarding "span of control," or the "scalar principle;" or his teachings about the division between "line" and "staff"?

SOCRATES: Simplicity is indeed a virtue.

GLAUCON: I know what you are going to say, Socrates, and I will anticipate: that the truth is a greater virtue than simplicity.

SOCRATES: Will you then go further and tell me how we can learn the truth about the public administration?

GLAUCON: I have heard you too often not to have an answer to this question: you learn it by observing the works of good and bad administrators, and by deriving general principles which can withstand the criticism of thoughtful men.

SOCRATES: You have learned my simple wisdom very well.

GLAUCON: Now you are taunting me, Socrates. Do you not agree that Protagoras' principles are reasonable as well as simple?

SOCRATES: They are impressive when he teaches them.

GLAUCON: Your words are words of praise, but in your mouth they have a critical sound.

SOCRATES: Then I must speak further, so that you will not think me jealous of Protagoras, or that I do not prize his wisdom and eloquence. For I know that his lecture was a model of organization and presentation, and that what he has said is commonly thought about the sciences and arts of administration. And yet, as you have suggested, I am dissatisfied. For what have we learned from Protagoras? How will you prove these principles? Which of his students shall we rate the highest?

GLAUCON: These are many questions, Socrates, but I shall try to answer them honestly. First, we have learned the rules of administration. Second, we shall prove them as we apply them in our public careers. Third, we must finally rate highest the man who has achieved the greatest success as an administrator; and in the meantime we shall acclaim those students who have best learned the rules of administration.

SOCRATES: And how shall we be assured that those of his hearers who have learned the rules can best apply them? I see that this question displeases you; so let me ask another. How do we know that the rules themselves are wise?

GLAUCON: But this is administration itself: the rules agreed upon by wise men and preserved by the traditions of scholarship and inquiry. These rules are the alphabet of the language of administration.

SOCRATES: And does knowledge of the alphabet make a great poet?

GLAUCON: No, but there are no poets who are ignorant of the alphabet.

SOCRATES: Is this knowledge a part of poetry, or does it rather enable the poet to communicate his works to those who cannot hear him speak?

GLAUCON: We are straying, Socrates. Surely you are not proposing that an administrator should not trouble to learn the rules of administration.

SOCRATES: That is true. Just as the teachers of the alphabet are useful in society, so are those who explain to us the rules of administration. Yet the poet does not think of the alphabet at all as he works. Is not the administrator as well too busy to worry about the precepts of Protagoras? But I see you do not need to answer this question, for here comes Iphicrates, who has spent his life in the service of the state, and who can therefore answer these troublesome questions better than either you or I. Iphicrates, can you stop and talk with us a few minutes?

IPHICRATES: I will gladly talk, and still more gladly listen; but as I am nearly late for my next appointment, I must ask you to walk along with me while we converse.

SOCRATES: This is still better, Iphicrates, for we can in this way learn your principles of administration while you are at work.

IPHICRATES: I have no principles except to be on time.

GLAUCON: Is this the only advice you can give to me in preparing myself for the public service?

IPHICRATES: The only way to prepare for the public service is to work for the state. I myself have served that master since I was conscripted into the army many years ago, and there is no teacher—not even Socrates—who can equal experience as a source of wisdom and knowledge.

SOCRATES: Least of all, Socrates, I should have said: and Socrates would be the last to deny the pre-eminence of experience as a teacher of men. But not all men can have the richness of experience that you have enjoyed, Iphicrates; and fewer still can learn as much from it. Shall we not work to the end that Glaucon and others may learn from your experience, and from your ability to convert each experience into knowledge?