

If dates are taken into account, a sinister political pattern develops in communist economic relations with Yugoslavia. In 1955, after the death of Stalin, Khrushchev made a type of peace with Yugoslavia.

Tito, even according to Djilas, eased his drive for revisionism and trade resumed accordingly. Khrushchev showed his favor by lifting the economic blockade and giving solemn commitments regarding economic assistance to Yugoslavia without political conditions.

Blasts Heresy

This aid was in the form of a loan amounting to \$275 million, according to the Soviet Union and East Germany. First transfers of the loan were made in the spring and summer of 1956, when all was well in the communist world.

HOWEVER, in the autumn of 1956, came the Hungarian anti-communist uprising. Tito not only welcomed a quantity of Hungarian refugees, but he gave sanctuary in his Budapest Embassy to leaders of the revolutionary government. When the leaders, headed by Imre Nagy, were lured from the embassy through a Russian ruse, Tito sent a note of protest.

The relations between communist bloc nations and Yugoslavia started to cool from this period of 1956. The Russian aid program was slowed.

Then, in the summer of 1957, Khrushchev apparently made an effort to smooth over the troubles caused by Hungary. Economic and financial aid were again offered to Tito, and diplomatic relations showed a definite warming.

Next November, 1957, the Yugoslav Communist Party, meeting with other Communist Parties, refused to sign a common declaration of faith and purpose. The Yugoslavs reiterated their intention to retain sovereignty over their own national affairs.

Though angered, Russia did not indulge in power politics at this precise moment, waiting until May, 1958, for a full blast against Yugoslav «heresy.»

In May, **Pravda**, official voice of the government, commented editorially that ideological differences among Communist Parties, (and governments) would lead to differences of opinion on foreign policies, estranged diplomatic relations between governments and adverse economic influences. Tito was being warned that again his economic and financial aid from the communist countries was in jeopardy. And this was aid given «without strings.»

Yugoslavia did not choose to follow Pravda's advice and, as we know, rests today without USSR aid. At the time aid was definitely suspended, Yugoslavia did not remain silent, but publicly complained that the USSR was «infringing accords which have been in force.»

She commented that the «no strings» conditions promised by the Soviets, which made their aid offer so much more attractive than aid they were receiving from capitalist countries, had not proved to be true.

Perfidy

Though Yugoslavia was hard hit in its planning by the Russian renegade, it still can hope to put its internal affairs in order. The Yugoslav economy is a young one, not yet complex, and aid offers are always available from other than communists because of Yugoslavia's strategic position and unique role in world affairs.

Other countries, though, should study the example of Yugoslavia as concrete proof of Soviet perfidy. Implicit in this example is that communist aid means complete compliance eventually with communist wishes. Some nations which accept:

communist aid or trade programs may find, when confronted with the Soviet «change of heart» which struck Yugoslavia, that they were too dependent on Soviet aid, or that their economies were too intertwined with the communist world, to be able to afford independence of action.

Let all be aware of what befell Yugoslavia before being tempted to open doors to full scale communist aid and trade. The intent of this is always the same—subjugation, imminent or eventual!

C. — Trade With The Communist Bloc

In connection with Soviet economic aid, it is well to say a few words about trade exchange with communist countries. Within the Free World, three different stands on this matter exist:

1. Those staunch anti-communist countries which oppose communism in all fields — political, cultural, economic, military, etc., — consider trade exchange with the communist bloc as an indirect assistance to the communist cause. This is the firm stand of the APACL and also of the author of this booklet.

2. There are anti-communist countries that hold that the fight against communist ideology and the trade with communist countries are two separate questions, trade exchange with communist countries being only an economic formula to balance production and consumption and having nothing to do with politics.

This is the stand of economists and business-minded people. They want more consumers whether these are friends or enemies of their country. Hence often we see paradoxical sequences: They sell arms to enemies who kill their own countrymen or their allies.

3. Finally there are those countries which consider trade exchange with the communist bloc not only a means of trade expansion but also a way to compete with Russia in the international market.

Coincidentally, this is exactly what Russia and Red China want — but for a different purpose; they use foreign trade as a means for political infiltration, propaganda, subversion and seizure of power. We have had sufficient experience with their strategy in Asia, the Middle East and Europe. In fact, the communists think that trade exchange is the best and simplest way to achieve their aggressive objectives.

Appendix Two


Dr. Ku Cheng-kang, President APACLROC, presents his views on the opposition to Titoist Revisionism by Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung.

AUTHOR'S NOTE:

While writing this book, we asked Dr. Ku Cheng-kang — a fellow fighter of ours in Asia — to give his views on Revisionism.

Dr. Ku Cheng Kang, an experienced anti-communist leader of Nationalist China, is President of the APACLROC Chapter and one-time (1957-1958) chairman of the APACL Council.

To give our reader a broader view of the important question of today, we have the pleasure of reproducing in this appendix, Dr. Ku Cheng Kang's integral article which gives his personal opinion on Revisionism.



Dr. Ku Cheng-kang

Russo-Yugoslav relations have remained in a state of high tension these past ten years — ever since Stalin expelled Tito from the Cominform in 1948.

When Khrushchev came to power, he did not hesitate to purge Stalin in his endeavor to dissolve pent-up resentment both at home and abroad, and as a means to win Tito back to the Soviet fold.

To make up with Tito, he went out of his way to appease him. On September 27, 1956, Khrushchev, Bulganin and Tito met at Crimea for talks. This was the «high-tide of honeymoon» in relations between Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia.

Yet, at the time of the Moscow Conference in October, 1957, Tito pretended sickness and was absent. He even refused to sign the 12-nation Declaration. To the Kremlin's call for «solidarity among the socialist states,» he turned a deaf ear. Thus, the tie between Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia was formally broken.

On the occasion of its 7th National Congress, the Yugoslav Communist Party made public a «new-draft party program» which took a view contrary to that of Moscow.

In an article appearing in the sixth issue of the **Communist**, organ of the Soviet Party Central Committee led by Khrushchev, Messrs. P. Fedoseyev, I. Pomelov and V. Chep-rakow wrote a rebuttal criticizing the «Yugoslav draft party program,» charging that it followed a line completely counter to that of the Marxist Leninist tenets and Moscow.

Soon after, the Kremlin instructed all its satellites not to send their representatives to attend the 7th National Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

Then followed a heated debate on both sides, bringing the two countries' relations to such a state that the «honeymoon phase» came to a definite end.

The deterioration in relations between Soviet Russia and

Yugoslavia is, to all intents and purposes, a repetition of the Moscow-Belgrade rift in 1948. It is, withal, the first time since ascendancy of Soviet communism forty years ago, that interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory became a **bone of contention**. But, in fact, it miniatures ideological differences and discontent within the communist bloc of nations.

The «new Yugoslav draft party program» not only gave a different and revised view on such problems as theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, theory and practice of world communist movement, the current international situation and international labor movement, but also, refused to recognize Moscow as center of the international communist movement.

This was something which Khrushchev and his henchmen could not tolerate. The result was an intense theoretical debate. The «draft program of the Yugoslav Communist Party consisted of the following points :

(1) **Its view on capitalism** : The kind of proletarian class as conforms to the communist definition, pointed out the program, only exists in communist-dominated countries. Capitalist countries do not necessarily collapse as Karl Marx once predicted. In fact, capitalist countries are more like arbitrators whose position is above and beyond all classes. Thus, the theory of proletarian dictatorship cannot hold water.

(2) **The problem of transition from state capitalism to socialism** : The working class, pointed out the Yugoslav communists, can strive for its own interests in various forms. The form of struggle by the proletarian class has to be led by the communist party because, only thus, can the communist party monopolize all other forms that can lead to socialism.

Such a view is theoretically incorrect and practically harmful. It runs counter to the view expressed in the Moscow Declaration which not only held that through communist and workers' parties could mankind be led to the road of socialism but, also,

stressed the nationalist form. In view of this fact, it is also against internationalism and brotherly solidarity among communist states as advocated by Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung.

(3) Interpretation of the international situation :

The Yugoslav program disavowed that the capitalist world and socialist world stood opposite each other. Rather, for «sphere of influence» and «sphere of interests,» each of the two military-political camps strives for world hegemony.

The Soviet expansionist policy is the source which is responsible for open conflicts in the world. Thus, how to dissolve conflict between the two world camps lies in giving up this expansionist policy of political and military nature.

This is tantamount to saying that Soviet imperialism is not only contrary to Marxist-Leninist tenets but, also, to the appraisal and interpretation of the international situation enunciated at the Moscow Conference.

(4) Concerning socialist theory of state extinction:

The Yugoslav program quoted Marxist-Leninist theory on state extinction, took Stalin strongly to task for his rule by secret service, criticized the Soviet Union as a country trying everything possible to strengthen the power of state, also «does not draw a line between government and party.

In rebuttal, Russian communists defended the Stalin stand. As Khrushchev today has become Stalin II, it is only natural that he would not be willing to return power to the people.

(5) The problem of international proletarian class:

The Yugoslav draft program holds that as every country can go its own special road to socialism, it is therefore only proper to set store by its special conditions not subjected to the influence of «ideological monopoly» and «political hegemony».

The so-called «ideological monopoly» alludes to monopoly in interpretation of Marxist-Leninism in the Kremlin declaration.

The so-called «political hegemony» is a charge against the

Soviet Communist Party's exerting pressure on other socialist states.

It is a refutation to dogmatism and the idea of big nation chauvinism ; it disavows the right of Soviet Russia to lead other socialist states by totalitarian means.

The different views held by the Yugoslav communists on these various problems led the Kremlin to charge that Tito had gone heretic standing opposite to the fundamental road of Marxist-Leninism, weakening the solidarity of socialist states.

Khrushchev regarded it as a Tito challenge to the Kremlin's leadership. Thus, the Yugoslav form of revisionism was under strong fire. Furthermore, the Yugoslav communists were accused of «sitting on two seats,» «accepting the tainted goods of the West,» and being a group of rebels «who have been bought and corrupted by the capitalist imperialists.»

Soon after that, Nagy and others were executed as a warning to all rebels of Tito's brand.

The history of Stalin's period was thus re-enacted, and the relations between Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia irreconcilably broken up.

On basis of facts enumerated above, we wish to express our own views bearing on the real causes for the split in relationship between these communist countries :

(1) Khrushchev went out of his way to win back Tito to the Soviet fold (including political and economic inducements) primarily for the consolidation of his own personal power and solidarity of international communist parties.

For his own interest as well as those of Yugoslavia, Tito is naturally unwilling to be controlled in any way by an outside power. Under his neutralist guise, he obviously attempts to gain practical interests in the struggle between two world camps.

(2) From the lessons learned from Polish and Hungarian revolts and the persistence in following the Stalinist policy

of domination and enslavement, the Yugoslav communists in the name of opposition to dogmatism filed a kind of indirect protest against the personal dictatorship of Khrushchev and Big-Nation-Chauvinism of Soviet Russia.

(3) The publication of «The New Class» by Djilas exerted strong impact on Yugoslav communists. To win his own people's confidence, to consolidate his own rule, to strive for support of Polish and Hungarian people, Tito poses as a hero who opposes not only Soviet dogmatism but also Soviet imperialists' political hegemony.

Combining this individual heroism and nationalism, Tito aspires to realize his political ambition in the Balkan Peninsula. When Khrushchev and Tito held their last talks, the former conceded that Tito had the right to handle the Albanian problem. Here, we see Tito's ambition appear.

(4) The economic difficulties with which Yugoslavia has been confronted makes it impossible for Yugoslavia to give up economic aid from the West.

Though Soviet Russia promised to extend a loan amounting to 175,000,000 rubles, this has so far not been fulfilled. That reason may account for Tito's willingness to «accept the tainted goods from the West» and unwillingness to reply to «Soviet empty promises.» In so doing, Yugoslavia is prompted by practical considerations.

The theoretical controversy on Marxism-Leninism by both sides has only face value. In actuality, what really is involved in this irreconcilable struggle between them consists of «political interests,» «national interests,» «personal interests,» «economic interests» and «sphere of influence interests.»

The stand taken by the Chinese communists in the Russo-Yugoslav dispute fully proves that Peiping is thoroughly devoted to Moscow. Chinese Communist papers and magazines reflect in unmistakable terms the loyalty and allegiance which the

puppet regime pledged to its Soviet master.

Teng Hsiao-ping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, took up the problem of Yugoslav revisionism as the topic of his report at the second session of the National People's Congress on May 23. Mao Tse-tung obviously has in mind the following motives:

(1) Internationally, for the consolidation of his own rule and to promote solidarity of the Moscow-Peiping axis, Mao Tse-tung had to follow Kremlin footsteps; he launched scathing attacks against Tito for failure to abide by the resolution of the Moscow Conference, so as to curry favor of the Soviet master on the one hand, and on the other, to win more military and economic aid to tide over present difficulties.

(2) Mao Tse-tung has always questioned the policy of appeasement towards the Yugoslav communist by Soviet imperialists. He held that appeasement with Tito is at variance with the Marxist-Leninist tenets and would give encouragement to the split among the communist bloc of nations. Thus it harms the purity and security of the communist camp.

As a matter of fact, the intensity with which Chinese communist criticize and attack Yugoslav communists even goes beyond their Russia counterparts. Subjectively, the Chinese communists aim at correcting deviations in Russian policy towards Yugoslav communists.

(3) Ideologically, the Yugoslav line of 'modern revisionism' runs counter to the policy of brute force and the philosophy of revolutionary means and struggle to which communists pledge their allegiance.

In fact, this peaceful, evolutionary, cooperative line of thought is a great ideological handicap to the Chinese communists' Russification policy on the mainland. For this reason, such a thought has to be relentlessly stamped out.

(4) Politically, the struggle against modern revisionism

as unfolded by Chinese communists is a continuation of the »anti-rightist« struggle of last year. They were not able to extirpate all rightists on the mainland the past year. Now the rise of Titoist revisionism gives them golden opportunity to combine it with the anti-rightist struggle, thereby removing enemies within, purifying the rank and file of the party.

(5) Since the outbreak of the Hungarian revolt, the organization of the Chinese communists has suffered serious setback resulting from ideological wavering on the part of its members.

Despite a rectification campaign, it did not bring about the desired result. There are still traces of disintegration in the Communist party.

Thus, in the name of opposition to modern revisionism, the Chinese communists aspire to «consolidate their party organization» and bolster party leadership over other departments of the government, so as to accelerate production.

Judged by the intensity with which Khrushchev and Mao-Tse-tung expressed their opposition to Titoist revisionism, the weakness of communism has been fully exposed. Let us quote Yugoslav communists:

«The Marxist-Leninist ideas in the past few decades cannot keep abreast with the development of modern socialism. Refusal to recognize Marxism-Leninism is a guide to all countries.»

The challenge posed to Soviet political hegemony by Yugoslavia is a turning point which augurs well for the split of the communist camp.

Unless Soviet Russia gives up its expansionist policy and the idea of hegemony, there is no prospect for Russo-Yugoslav reconciliation. The time will come when all people behind the Iron Curtain, in striving for freedom and emancipation, will unite to challenge the Kremlin.

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