

The Insider

(717) 993-5498
Michael Van Atta
P.O. Box 735
Stewartstown Station, PA 17363



The Insider



Volume XIV Issue 11

November 1995

Perception is Reality

The engineers and architects of a policy change which set a new direction in dealing with Vietnam on the POW/MIA issue were not the brain children of the Clinton Administration! While citizens protested, rallied demonstrators outside the Clinton White House, the Vietnamese Mission in New York and in Washington DC, to stop moves taken to improve ties between Vietnam and the United States until the last known alive U.S. POWs were accounted for, behind the scenes, obscured from view, was a plan that had been written and put into effect in October 1992, under the Bush Administration.

Although Vietnam Veterans, MIA families, and their friends held the Department of Defense publicly responsible, demanding that the "last known alive POWs" be accounted for first, before there were any moves to improve ties with Vietnam on an economical or political level, evidence has surfaced that the Department of Defense abandoned its responsibility to the missing men and its verbal commitments made to the MIA families by launching a COVERT program designed to brush aside the protester and put the POW/MIA issue "behind us," unresolved, so that relations with Vietnam could improve without achieving as full as possible accounting of the POW/MIAs as

was possible first.

Efforts to curtail the plan, staged by Vietnam Veterans, MIA families, and their friends in 1994 and 1995 produced minimal results because, as the following documentation will show, the arrangements were already made in 1992 when the Defense Department met with our former enemy in Vietnam and outlined the plan, the guiding Vietnamese required steps and actions to achieve the desired goals of both parties - renewed economic and diplomatic ties. The advocates of a full accounting of the POW/MIAs are in a predicament where there was not and is not much that can be done under the circumstances. There was/is complicity between those who were given the responsibility to search for the missing POW/MIAs (DOD) and those who withheld the information on their fate (Vietnam).

Basically, the Department of Defense complied and surrendered to Vietnam's long held demands to improve diplomatic relations and removed economic barriers imposed by the United States against Vietnam with the hope that these actions would encourage Vietnam to come clean with its knowledge as to what happened to the "last known alive POWs". All who think that the Clinton Administration "did the deed" are wrong, because "it was a done deal" in the Bush Administration. When former President Bush traveled to Vietnam in the summer of 1995, as the paid speaker for a U.S. bank, Bush acted as if he was demanding an accounting for the POW/MIAs, but the Vietnamese already had what they wanted and the Department of Defense already had what they wanted - a way



This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees and other officials understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive and taken prisoner (POWs), but who were not released.

Official Notice**1995 Evidence Kit**

A group of current and former intelligence officers has put together an educational package of material called the "Evidence Kit" written for educators and elected officials. With the "Evidence Kit" you can show history professors at Colleges and High Schools the evidence of live POWs, so they might teach their students about the POW/MIAs. With the "Evidence Kit" you can meet with your Congressman & Senator to show them the proof & evidence of live POWs. Included in the "Evidence Kit": 4300 live sighting reports; returned POWs debriefings; CIA & DIA reports; 309 discrepancy cases; select bio-sheets; how and where to get newly declassified POW intelligence reports. With the kit you can hold "show trials" to present the live POW data to the press and the public. Buy your history teacher, congressman, and senator a live POW "Evidence Kit".

To order, send \$25.00 for each "Evidence Kit" to:

**Michael Van Atta, Director
The POW Educational Fund
P.O. Box 735
Stewartstown Station, PA 17363
or phone
(717) 993-5498**

out of its responsibility to account for the missing and last known alive POW/MIAs.

A study of the rhetoric in public statements made by DOD officials clearly shows that Vietnamese efforts to resist being "fully cooperative" were hidden behind statements

by respected U.S. government officials that, "Hanoi was being fully cooperative in accounting for the POW/MIAs".

Who planned this COVERT OPERATION? Who wrote these DOD "talking points"? Who delivered this policy plan to the policy makers? Who at DOD decided to establish a cosy relationship with the Vietnamese? Who knows the answers? THIS IS THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE:

On letter head that reads-Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-International Security Affairs, dated October 7, 1992 RE: MEMO FOR Ron Knecht, Special Asst. to ASD/C31-"Ron, Mr. Ford asked that the attached copy of the draft talking points be passed to Mr. Andrews. This is a result of the Chaney/Eagleburger breakfast this morning MTG with SECDEF that Mr. Andrews and Mr. Ford attended." Signed Vic-Victor G. Raphael, Jr., LTC(P), USA, Military Assistant.

Attached to this cover letter were 4 pages marked classified, "SECRET-EYES ONLY 10/7 0900 HRS". The paper is titled "DRAFT TALKING POINTS FOR US/SRV POLICY-LEVEL MEETING"

-As you know, we have earnestly sought bilateral cooperation to resolve the POW/MIA issue as a matter of highest national priority for the United States.(1)

-To accomplish our POW/MIA objectives, we have sought means to reciprocate for your humanitarian cooperation by addressing your concerns within the context of our legal and policy restraints--agreements reached orally in our exchange since the mid-1980s.(2)

-In July, the President reaffirmed his willingness to continue improving bilateral relations in the context of our policy which was most recently outlined by Assistant Secretary Solomon in March of this year.(3)

-Despite oral agreements reached in

searching for MIAs but it appears that DOD is instead, looking for a way out. The real pornography of the POW issue is DOD's unwillingness to firmly and openly assert to U.S. law makers that Vietnam did, in fact, gather up captured American POWs and execute them in some silent grave, deep in the jungles of Vietnam, sentencing them in absentia.

Should diplomatic and economic progress in Vietnam be blocked because POW/MIA goals and objectives have not been met? Absolutely!!!

Please contact Senator Jesse Helms and support the blockade of funds and delays in appointment confirmations of diplomats who are designated to be assigned to Vietnam until Vietnam comes clean on what happened to the last known alive POWs.

Senator Smith (NH) responded to an advanced copy of this manuscript and adds that the document described herein first appeared in the U.S. News and World Report. Sen. Smith says, "I certainly share your outrage over this disclosure." He goes further to say, "Accordingly, I will continue to oppose improved relations with Vietnam until that country has been fully forthcoming in accounting for our missing personnel." In addition Sen. Smith says, "Both President Clinton and Vice President Gore had previously promised they would not normalize until they were satisfied Vietnam was no longer suspected of withholding information on missing Americans. By normalizing relations in this manner, President Clinton broke the solemn promises he had made to the POW/MIA families and our nation's veterans, and he instead put profit over principle."

Rep. Robert K. Doman (CA) adds these words: "The Clinton administration's appalling decision to normalize relations with Vietnam is based on non-existent progress in accounting for America's MIAs. In reality, the Vietnamese communists have yet to answer for some 300 Americans last known alive under their control in Vietnam and Laos. In addition, Hanoi has returned only three sets of remains out of 97 Americans known to have perished in captivity."

But alas, the document has been evaluated as a forgery by DIA, who says it is a

fake, most likely the work, similar to the style of Bob Keplinger. Given that this forged and/or accurate document has circulated widely should not eliminate reasonable debate by those who believe in the innocence of our government. The ultimate evidence has not yet been presented that these steps were not taken or that the U.S. government officials, as accused, are innocent without doubt.

Sincerely,

Michael Van Atta
717-993-5498
P. O. Box 735,
Stewartstown, PA 17363

**Prisoners of War
Missing in Action**

A group of current and former intelligence officers has established an educational fund to provide government officials and the general public with hard factual proof that Americans were captured alive, in war, and were not released. The group publishes a monthly newsletter called

The Insider

that reviews CIA documents and provides insight through review of POW sightings and discrepancy cases of captives who were not released. For subscriptions or information, please contact:

**Michael Van Atta, Director
The POW Educational Fund
P.O. Box 735
Stewartstown Station, PA 17363
or phone
(717) 993-5498**

This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees and other officials understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive and taken prisoner (POWs), but who were not released.

Cluster Map Now Available

Now you can have your own copy of the famous "Cluster Map" which reports on 928 sighting locations. This 11" by 17" color map was made with data taken from 16,000 source intelligence reports which have already filtered out all non prisoner or 'accounted-for' reports. All reports of Garwood, Kay, Gay, or Gougelman, as well as yachtsmen, smugglers, living freely, foreign nationals, dog tag reports, remains reports, and crash site reports have already been filtered out for you. The data is a picture of DIA's database with 928 live sighting prisoner reports, pinpointing their locations, current to April 8, 1992 sighting reports.

216 blue pins - 1970's eyewitness
484 red pins - 1980-1990 eyewitness
228 yellow - hearsay, date not reported

For your own copy send a \$10 contribution to:

The POW Educational Fund, Inc.
P.O. Box 735
Stewartstown, PA 17363

Chuck Trowbridge, the current head of investigations at the DIAs unit called the DPMO (Defense Prisoners and Missing Office). The cover letter is written by LTC Victor G. Raphael, Jr. The memo was written for Ron Knecht, a Special Assistant to ASD/C31. Those involved with meeting with the Vietnamese to present DOD's draft policy on the POW/MIA problem are: Carl W. Ford, Jr. the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Duane Andrews a DOD advisor, Dick Chaney the Secretary of Defense, and Lawrence Eagleburger an Assistant Secretary of State.

Other players in this policy change are Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Lt. General James Clapper, the head of

DIA, Gen. John Vessey, the Presidents special envoy to Vietnam and Senator John McCain (AZ) - a staunch and vocal supporter of normalized relations with Vietnam.

The Vietnamese officials who were involved in the game: Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, National Defense Minister Gen. Doan Khuc, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, and Deputy Foreign Minister Le Mai.

United States policy that seeks to involve those who we want to change to our way of thinking is a flawed policy when DOD outlines clearly that we would be willing to accept less than our stated public position - the fullest possible accounting - as a settlement of the POW/MIA issue, and DOD clearly outlined that rewards will be paid if compliance to a less than complete accounting of the POW/MIAs was adhered to. DOD, the U.S. policy makers, and the President must not be caught offering rewards for substandard results or performance, but this is exactly what has happened. Charges of an impropriety are no longer baseless.

DOD's actions such as these bring irritations and not smiles from the MIA families who placed their trust in DOD. It looks like the folks at DOD are communist sympathizers. The mysterious question is how DOD got involved in guiding policy. DOD has a liaison office on Capitol Hill and an agreement with the House and Senate that if any issue is to be brought up, that might effect DOD, the issue should be brought to DOD so that DOD can provide its views/comments in a position papers written by DOD for law makers who would be discussing the subject. In effect DOD has established an early warning system on Capitol Hill that allows DOD managers to draft "talking points" to be presented by military officers to elected officials in what is called an effort to educate, but in reality is a lobbying effort to present DOD's views to law makers, who will support DOD. A persistent myth is that DOD is sincerely

March and increased field activities, results from implementation of the five points has been minimal in terms of accounting for missing Americans.(4)

-We believe, and hope you agree, that it is the interest of both countries to get this issue resolved as quickly and fully as possible so that we can put behind the problems of the war and focus our attention on the future.(5)

-The recent hearings of the Senate Select Committee have generated more public interest than at any time since the end of the war. In this emotionally charged environment, results which have actually accounted for missing Americans have been negligible for well over a year, despite an increased tempo of field activities.(6)

-During this same period, your government has been sending clear signals that you can account for many more Americans, but perhaps may prefer a mechanism outside of, or supplementary to, the joint field operations which could accelerate actual case resolution.(7)

-The evidence which has come to our attention has reinforced our long-held view concerning the value of focusing on Vietnam's archival records and unilateral remains repatriation efforts by your government.(8)

-We had hoped that the information provided by Under Secretary Wolfowitz and Lt. General Clapper last May regarding our data base on your government's knowledge would prompt a consensus decision by your leadership to expedite results. It was intended to make our bilateral efforts more effective.(9)

-Whatever the channels chosen by your leadership, our governments now have an opportunity to agree upon how to handle the situation, provided we act quickly.(10)

-Due to the private nature of the channels selected and our legal requirements to inform the Congress and family members directly affected, prudence suggest knowledge of some of this information becoming public is probable.(11)

-Should this occur without immediate acceleration of unilateral Vietnamese actions, public opinion will certainly be hostile.

Demands created could make our current course untenable and delay mutually desired improvements in our bilateral relations.(12)

-We know you agree that this would not be in the interests of either country.(13)

-For these reasons, we have come directly to you in (Washington, New York and Hanoi) to try to work out a course of action and acceptable explanations from which both countries can benefit.(14)

-I would like to stop here and get your comments especially your thoughts on how we might proceed with a new initiative.(15)

(If prior set piece statements, such as SRV Foreign Minister just stated in New York, are made, react by stating that their response is unsatisfactory, and continue below).(16)

-We have considered plausible alternatives and have some ideas, but want to first assure you that our intention is not only to achieve our POW/MIA objectives, but recognize both countries' broader objectives as well.(17)

-Our suggestions were developed in an attempt to address what we believe may be some of your government's sensitivities and to rapidly achieve results in a way which

moves us forward.(18)

-At the same time, we believe this approach and anticipated results will minimize as much as possible public antagonism about the delay in receiving this information.(19)

-This initiative could begin with a public announcement by your government noting that for the last several months, Vietnamese officials had embarked on country-wide unilateral efforts to recover archives, records, photographs and remains of unaccounted for Americans.(20)

-While willing to continue the long-term joint field operations to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all missing Americans, adequate success has been achieved unilaterally to warrant Vietnam's publicly statement of its intention to begin immediately and officially providing the U.S. with the results of these efforts.(21)

-An announcement would be made concerning the unilateral recovery of numerous archival records, photographs and per-

This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees and other officials understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive and taken prisoner (POWs), but who were not released.

sonal effects of missing Americans which will be turned over to the U.S., along with a invitation for a team of U.S. research specialists to visit Vietnam at an early date to participate in analyzing further materials as they accumulate at both the central and provincial level.(22)

-Further, that rapid repatriation of the remains of all Americans depicted as deceased in the photographs, and those last known alive discrepancy cases that may have died. This should occur as quickly as mutually agreed upon arrangements can be made, followed by a public announcement of scheduled repatriations of additional remains which U.S. forensic experts will be invited to jointly examine.(23)

-In response, the U.S. would publicly commend Vietnam's actions and, once these actions have been taken, we would immediately announce movement into Phase III of the "road map" policy.(24)

-This would include completing all Phase II business related steps and working with other countries on a program to help Vietnam eliminate its arrears in the IMF.(25)

-Our announcement would also include a Phase III step: announcing that discussions would commence immediately on exchanging diplomatic liaison offices in each nation's capital.(26)

-You may have other suggestions, and we are certainly prepared to consider any alternative proposals; however, it should be recognized that time is crucial and the graphic nature of the evidence thus far provided represents both a danger to your interests and an opportunity.(27)

-In our terms, we believe the process we have jointly developed and implemented up to now is taking precedence over results. Such a course could not, in any event, proceed indefinitely, and the recent information makes a

reevaluation urgent.(28)

-I'm confident that you recognize that with the current visibility of the issue in the U.S. and the heightened political environment, all presidential candidates and the new Congress will have little choice in reacting to the event your government has provided.(29)

-We hope to work together to develop a positive approach in this new environment, one which will bring the results needed while moving us forward on broader bilateral objectives.(30) END

There are several ways too look at this diplomatic communication presented behind closed doors in a private meeting between Vietnam's Foreign Minister and DOD officials, but the following are some of the views of **The Insider**.

All outside indicators show clear that the arrow shot by DOD did not miss the mark, but hit a bull's eye. Nothing can generate a more visceral bang than to look at that facts.

BK1910155592 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 19 Oct 92 [Joint communique issued on 19 October in Hanoi by Vietnamese Government and General John Vessey special emissary of the U.S. President.]

-Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam and Gen. Vessey reviewed recent activities related to the humanitarian concerns of both countries.

-The two sides reached an agreement on an important new step which aims at accelerating results of the search for Americans missing from the war. The Vietnamese Government informed Gen. Vessey that, lately, Vietnam was unilaterally conducting a country-wide search, of all of its archives for

(Continued on page 5)

testified about his observations while he worked for U.S. teams doing field investigations in Vietnam with the JCRC and the JTF-FA from 1989 through 1994. During this time Mr. Janich states that there was lack of cooperation on the part of his Vietnamese counter-parts and in fact, in some cases, there was out-right obstruction of the POW/MIA investigation by the Vietnamese. Reports of substantial progress obtained as a result of giving Hanoi concessions (lifting the IMF loan band) (lifting of the trade embargo) (opening diplomatic offices) have encouraged Vietnam to do as little as possible on the POW/MIA issue. Vietnam is involved in intrigue and cover-up, helped along by DOD's silence about any failure on Vietnam's part to live up to its agreements or commitments to account for captured alive and missing Americans (POW/MIAs).

Reviewing history, this is what happened:

-On July 2, 1993 Hanoi was rewarded, the U.S. asked the IMF to allow Vietnam's delinquent IMF loan to be re-written.

-On July 20, 1993 The State Department posted three mid-level diplomats in Hanoi.

-On February 3, 1994 the U.S. im-

posed "trade embargo" against U.S. businesses trading with Vietnam was lifted.

-On July 11, 1995 the U.S. normalized relations with Vietnam at a formal ceremony at the White House-(no MIA families were invited to attend).

Now the DOD, State Department, and White House are looking for money and approval of diplomats for postings in Vietnam and Senator Jesse Helms, the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has halted all business meetings - holding 400 State Department promotions - blocking more than a dozen treaties - refusing to confirm 30 Ambassadors and an Assistant Secretary of State nominee. Helms has opposed dealing with Vietnam until they account for the last known alive POWs. While, DOD has pulled the wool over the eyes of the U.S.

Congress and Senate, the press, the American public, the MIA families, Vietnam Veterans and their friends (possibly President Clinton is unaware that DOD and Vietnam are sleeping in the same bed as friends and comrades).

If you would like to obtain a copy of the DOD/ISA document from which these facts and views are extracted please send me a self addressed pre-paid postage envelope.

The talking points were penned by

The Insider

Mail your check or money order for \$24.00 for a one year subscription (12 Issues) to:
Post Office Box 735, Stewartstown Station, PA 17363

Start My Subscription Tell me more I want to help!

Your Name _____

Address _____

Your City, State, Zip _____

Phone Number _____



Mail to: The Insider, P.O. Box 735, Stewartstown Station, PA 17363

This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees and other officials understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive and taken prisoner (POWs), but who were not released.

made in Hanoi!)

(21) DOD told Vietnam that adequate success has been achieved through bilateral efforts to warrant Vietnam's publicly statement that it will undertake unilateral efforts. DOD told Vietnam that it was satisfied with effort over results and that it was imperative to the plan to have Vietnam act independent of DOD involvement.

(22) DOD told Vietnam that an announcement should be made by Vietnam that unilateral recovery from numerous archival records, photographs and personal effects has been under way and that Vietnam will turned over to the U.S. research specialists at an early date materials collected. (Although this public announcement by Vietnam was made, no visual evidence has been presented or oral statements have been made by DOD supporting that "archival cooperation" has happened, other than the leaks of some of the photo archives to private sector individuals, who have put them on display.)

(23) DOD told Vietnam that public announcements should be made when additional remains are repatriated (but, this has only subtle and minimal happened on a small scale).

(24) DOD told Vietnam that the U.S. would publicly commend Vietnam's actions and, we would immediately announce movement along the "road map". (Although Vietnam has not, visibly proceeded along this path, the U.S. has continued to do so, without reciprocating actions by Vietnam.)

(25) DOD told Vietnam that business-related steps and working for Vietnam to eliminate its arrears in the IMF, would be actions that DOD would see to it were done (and they did).

Looking back in history to the time when Vietnam was permitted to bring its past due IMF loans current without a payment simply by agreement, on July 2, 1993 the

U.S. asked the IMF to allow Vietnam's delinquent IMF loan to be rewritten without any payment, bring Vietnam's loans current and making Vietnam eligible for additional loans.

(26) DOD told Vietnam that it would see to it that an exchange of diplomatic liaison offices would take place (and DOD did, because on July 20, 1993 the State Department posted three mid-level diplomats in Hanoi in a liaison office).

(27) DOD told Vietnam that the graphic nature of the evidence thus far provided represents both a danger to your interests and an opportunity. (Thus, DOD warned Vietnam that it would work on their behalf to keep a lid on the information - photos of dead GI's, etc. - that clearly showed that Vietnam knew more about the fate of several MIAs but that Vietnam had refused or failed to account for them physically.)

(28) DOD tells Vietnam that the "established process" has "precedence over results" and that it would not proceed indefinitely. This a most revealing revelation, because DOD has stated clearly the Vietnam's efforts have produced very small results, but that DOD was willing to continue the small results producing efforts, even though they were only marginally successful. No public testimony given by DOD officials has ever, once, hinted that acknowledgment of this failure to produce results was acceptable.

(29) DOD admits to Vietnam that public awareness and the political environment, presses upon DOD and Vietnam to produce results that can only be achieved if Vietnam cooperated in the outlined plan of "PERCEPTION IS REALITY".

(30) DOD tells Vietnam that some results are needed while we are moving forward to normalize relations (but, not a full accounting). So, where are the measurable results?

On June 28, 1995 Michael Janich

This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees and other officials understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive and taken prisoner (POWs), but who were not released.

Project: Unauthorized Entry

The Live POW Lobby of America sponsors trips back to Vietnam and Laos to look for the Americans who were captured alive but not released. We provide maps and put you with a team of searchers in an area where there are of live sighting reports. You stay in a hotel at night but search for POWs during the day. We have a search team advisory group that will help you with every detail. We have sent 16 teams in the last 2 years into Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Russia, and Cuba.

Ever thought of going to look for the live POWs?

Call us today, because you can help.

A two week trip costs about \$3500.

CONTACT

Michael Van Atta, Chairman
The Live POW Lobby of America
P.O. Box 735
Stewartstown Station, PA 17363
or phone
(717) 993-5498

documents, photographs, and other materials related to missing Americans and it will make all material available to the U.S. at its military museums.

-The two sides also reviewed the U.S.'s efforts to address Vietnam's humanitarian needs. Gen. Vessey informed Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet that the United States was making available immediately a new disaster assistance grant to help alleviate the suffering of residents of Quang Binh Province, which was affected by recent severe floods. Gen. Vessey also noted the recent U.S. contribution of two million dollars through non-government organizations to assist in Viet-

nam impacted by returning refugees, as well as the implementation of 17 Fulbright scholarships for Vietnamese students. Gen. Vessey further said that the U.S. would soon submit concrete proposals regarding U.S. technical assistance in Vietnam to address the important health issue of malaria.

-The two sides reaffirmed their governments' desire for early normalization of relations between the two countries. Gen. Vessey indicated that in the context of accelerated cooperation to resolve the MIA issue, the United States will move rapidly toward normalization of relations. END

Thus, Vietnam responded exactly as prompted and coached, based upon the "talking points" presented on October 7, 1992 by DOD to the Vietnamese. The "talking points" reveal several here-to-for publicly unknown factors that exceeding the understanding and expectations of the average American:

(1) DOD told Vietnam that bilateral cooperation (joint U.S. and Vietnam teams working together in the field to resolve POW/MIA cases) was working as requested by the U.S. This action started when the JCRC was established in February 1973 and continues today under the names of the JTF-FA (Joint Task Force for a Full Accounting) that was established in January 1992. DOD pushed Vietnam to allow joint investigations of POW/MIA cases and the process has been established.

(2) DOD told Vietnam that agreements reached orally were set in writing in a "road map" defining a Quid pro Quo process that basically says-you rub my back and I'll rub yours. If Vietnam would proceed down the path, so far, the U.S. would reward Vietnam if they proceeded with progress towards what DOD wanted. Basically, DOD would pay the bills.

(3) In March 1992 Secretary Solomon, received a commitment from President Bush to continue along the "road map" drafted under the Reagan Administration to solve the POW/MIA problem and to improve relations.

(4) Results have been minimal in accounting for POW/MIAs. Note that DOD's

(Continued on page 6)

public statements reflected rhetoric that maintained that Vietnam was being fully cooperative and removed from its public statement the term "minimal results".

(5) Quicken the pace can put the POW/MIA problem behind us. DOD told Vietnam that it was DOD's desire to put the problems of the Vietnam war behind them as quickly as possible, that include the POW/MIA problem.

(6) Results that have accounted for missing Americans have been negligible. DOD, again states that efforts have not produced results in accounting for POW/MIAs. It should be fully apparent to anyone who reviews DOD's public statements that the term "negligible results" was left out.

(7) Vietnam has signaled that they can account for many more Americans, outside of the formal mechanism.

-Based upon the testimony given to the Senate Select Committee by Robert Egan on November 23, 1992, in which he stated that before he left Vietnam on August 12, 1992, two communist party officials said, "We're going to release the pictures, helmets, and documents on some men who died in captivity. They are going to release lots of ID cards and artifacts with no admission and no proof, all pre-1973 stuff, to be released step by step." Egan claims that he was shown this material and it was offered to him, but he declined it, asking instead for live POWs.

(8) Vietnam's archival records and unilateral (not joint) efforts by Vietnam could help resolve many POW/MIA cases.

-Based upon archival records that were being collected by Ted Schwitzer who was part of an undercover private archival acquisition program funded by the DOD in 1992.

(9) In May 1991 Under Secretary Wolfowitz and Lt. General Clapper gave Vietnam copies of DIA's data base, on cases in which Vietnam's government had knowledge on

missing Americans it had failed to account for.

-Question-where is the Wolfowitz/Clapper list of individuals and the case study or back up material to support this DOD claim? Vessey produced his list which was made public information, but Wolfowitz/Clapper (Director of DIA) list has never been made public information.

(10) The channels chosen by Vietnam's leadership were not government-to-government, the Vietnamese supplied data from its historical archives-passed through a private channel.

-Ted Schwitzer cut a deal in 1992 to buy information from the Vietnamese Army on U.S. MIAs. Thousands of dollars was paid to gain access and copy photos of-mostly dead GI's, killed in battles that were photographed by Vietnam combat photographers, during the Vietnam War. Schwitzer is the back channel described in the "talking points", the private back channel through which the Vietnam choose to pass their war time archives. Schwitzer's dealings were presented by a former-CIA agent as a private effort acquired by the DOD, but the "talking points" tell a much different story-that the DOD may have set up the Schwitzer deal with Vietnam.

(11) DOD clearly states its legal requirements to inform the Congress and family members of data it collects on a specific MIA cases-a legal requirement that some MIA families say is not completely and totally followed by DOD.

(12) DOD requested Vietnam to embark on a unilateral journey, showing that Vietnam acted alone, without U.S. involvement, to resolve POW/MIA cases. To prove that Vietnam was being "totally cooperative" DOD ask Vietnam to take independent steps that could be used to support the, "being totally cooperative" argument or conclusion.

DOD in effect guided Vietnam to take steps that would be called "cooperation".

(13) DOD encourages Vietnam to see that their failure to act on their own would not be in the best interests of either country. DOD, in effect, guided Vietnam to take steps that would be perceived as "cooperation".

(14) DOD went to the Vietnamese, directly, to try to work out acceptable actions and/or acceptable explanations. If Vietnam choose not to act they could provide acceptable explanations which DOD outlined in advance. (This action of complicity is a clear mistake, for DOD to present that it would be willing to accept a simple "explanation" instead of action. In some MIA cases this is exactly what happened. Vietnam provided oral history recollection by former POW camp commanders and DOD "resolved" MIA cases, with no physical evidence, based only upon the verbal assurances by Vietnam.)

(15) DOD Requested that Vietnam state their position. The assumption that must be drawn here is that Vietnam stated its agreement, because the actions that followed bear out that the Vietnamese followed the steps outlined by DOD.

(16) DOD acknowledges that Vietnamese officials have given prior set piece statements that have no substance. Publicly DOD never has made the public or the MIA families aware that DOD considered Vietnamese actions to have "no substance". In fact DOD public statements have always masked its remarks about Vietnam in the policy statement that Vietnam was being fully cooperative, when in reality they were not.

(17) DOD tells the Vietnamese that they would consider plausible alternatives instead of physical accounting and assured the Vietnamese that our intention is to recognize both countries' broader-normalize ties-the main objective. Continuing on the same theme, DOD tells Vietnam that it would accept "plausible alternatives" or explanations instead of a physical accounting. DOD has never publicly stated that it would be willing to accept explanation instead of evidence.

(18) DOD recognizes Vietnam holds some sensitive records but by releasing them secretly Vietnam can achieve results that will

THE INSIDER newsletter started publication in January 1982 and is written by a group of current and former intelligence officers who set up an educational fund to provide government officials and the general public with hard, factual proof that Americans were captured alive, in war, who were not released. The group publishes a monthly newsletter called **THE INSIDER** that reviews CIA documents, interviews intelligence officers, provides insight through analytical review of Prisoners of War sightings and discrepancy cases of captives who were not released. **THE INSIDER** is available in hard copy format on a subscription basis at \$24.00 for 12 issues; or using personal computers via phone modem on the military affairs section on COMPUSERVE, the POW Computer Network and the National Forget-Me-Not Association Computer Network. For a hard copy subscription, write to:

Michael Van Atta,
P.O. Box 735
Stewartstown Station, PA 17363

move us forward without a full accounting. DOD encouraged Vietnam to "deal secretly" with DOD on sensitive material, so that it would not damage Vietnam's public image as being "fully cooperative" and helpful in accounting for POW/MIA cases. (If Vietnam had American POWs they executed in captivity, DOD would possibly help hide this information from the American public, the press and the MIA families.)

(19) DOD will minimize public antagonism towards Vietnam. DOD clearly states that it is willing to hide POW/MIA data that would put Vietnam in a poor light.

(20) DOD told Vietnam, to begin, they must make a public announcement that for the last several months, Vietnamese officials had embarked on country-wide unilateral effort to recover archives, records, photographs and remains of unaccounted for Americans. (This is exactly what happened as demonstrated below by public addresses

This information service is designed to help President Clinton's appointees and other officials understand that there are unresolved problems of Americans who were captured alive and taken prisoner (POWs), but who were not released.