With the United States Armed Forces)
at Subic Bay)
Rebublic of the Philippines)

8 July 1969

AFFIDAVIT

At about 2000, 3 June 1969, I acted as reporter of an interview of LTJG Ronald C. Ramsey, USN by Captain Clyde B. Anderson, USN, and Captain Horace N. Moore, Jr., U. S. Navy, who had been appointed as members of an informal preliminary investigation to collect and preserve evidence in connection with the collision between HMAS MELBOURNE and USS FRANK E. EVANS (DD-754).

I recorded the interview using the closed microphone technique. The document annexed as Attachment A is the verbatim transcription of the interview. It is, to my knowledge and belief, an accurate and complete record of the interview.

In the course of the interview LTJG Ramsey referred to a handwritten statement marked "3 June 1600" on the upper right hand corner of the first page and bearing the signature "Ronald C. Ramsey" at the bottom of the last page (page 6). At the conclusion of the interview he delivered this hand written document to Captains Moore and Anderson. That document is annexed hereto as Attachment B.

Winston I. Claiborne, Jr.
Winston I. Claiborne, Jr.
YN1, USN, 422 90 54

I, H. B. ROBERTSON, Jr., CAPT, JAGC, USN, the undersigned officer, do hereby certify that the foregoing instrument was subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of July, 1969, by YN1 Winston I. Claiborne, Jr., USN, 422 90 54, who is known to me to be a U. S. Armed Forces member on active duty. And I do further certify that I am at the date of this certification a commissioned officer of the grade, branch of service, and organization stated below in the active service of the United States Armed Forces, that by statute no seal is required on this certificate, and same is executed in my capacity as a judge advocate.

H. B. Robertson, Jr.
H. B. ROBERTSON, Jr.
CAPT, JAGC, USN, 447857/2500
Staff Judge Advocate
Commander U. S. Naval Forces,
Philippines

Exhibit 101

ENCLOSURE (101)

TRANSCRIPT OF AN INTERVIEW CONDUCTED WITH LTJG RONALD C. RAMSEY, USN, 3 JUNE 1969

CAPT ANDERSON: What we are trying to do is to make clear what our position is. I have been ordered, along with Captain MOORE, as an informal investigation to do nothing more than to collect facts for Admiral KING. We are not making any comments with regard to findings of fact, opinions, recommendations or anything but just collecting facts and determining who might have information that can be used later on. So that is our primary purpose. And what I would ask you to do is first of all, to give the yeoman your name and your position and then to relate to us anything that you can think of that would be pertinent to the incident that we are looking into.

A: Ronald C. RAMSEY, Lieutenant (jg), 705687, USN. I am assigned aboard the FRANK E. EVANS as Communications Officer. I was the Officer of the Deck at the time of the collision. Would you have speciric questions, sir?

CAPT ANDERSON: I would rather you first of all tell us whatever you want to say. That will cast some light on the incident. This may cause some questions to be raised, and when you are through with whatever you have to say, we might ask you some questions.

A: Okay. I prepared a little brief as I can recmember, the chronological sequences of the events. You mind if I just go ahead and read through this?

CAPT ANDERSON: Go ahead.

A: All right, sir. Mr. HOPSON, who was the Junior Officer of the Watch and I assumed the watch at approximately 1155 P.M.

Attachment A

I took the conn. Mr. HOPSON was the Junior Officer of the Watch. It was a very calm sea, moonlight night with overcast. The ships at 2000 yards could be seen adequately, but beyond that you had to use glasses. The ships in the formation 472.1 consisted of MELBOURNE, EVANS, KYES, LARSON, BLACKPOOL, CLEOPATRA. All the ships were at darken ship including no navigational lights whatsoever. I have a diagram here if you would like for me to go through that.

CAPT ANDERSON: Fine.

A: I will come to that a little bit later. The screen setup which consisted of five stations ahead of the carrier based on 180 or 185 remained the same throughout the watch. In addition to following zig-zag plan 17S, I kept various rudder angles on in a constant weave as well as various speeds, so the overall effect would be to patrol stations. The sea was very calm. We were streaming VDS. Base speed for the formation was 18 knots. I kept the ship at 20 to 21 knots to advance station and 18 knots to fall back.

I have a few comments on the watch. Most of the men on the watch were new seamen except for the boatswain's mate. They had arrived in Subic. Occasionally they would overshoot a rudder angle or misinterpret a rudder angle, so for the first two hours or so and we had a very busy time. And after that they could handle themselves pretty well, and they were pretty sharp. The only time that we would stray from course or take a station would be to proceed to a station perhaps about 80 degrees or more when the zig-zag called for. Other than that we had constant rudder

angle and constant maneuvering.

The first hour was fairly busy. As I said, I had the conn and the deck. We followed the basic zig-zag plan. The bridge was fairly quiet. Only one of three possible RT circuits were being used, and we had very clear communications on it, no static. According to the plan we were to change course about every four and a half minutes or so. About 0115 I saw that the plan would not be varying very much for about ten minutes ahead, so I had time to shift steering control to after steering and to change from the port motor and port cable to starboard motor and starboard cable that we had been on for some days. No other events or exceptions took place. We remained at station and no flight ops of any sort.

I gave the conn to Mr. HOPSON a little before 0200. I told him that I would like to have time to read through the message traffic and sort anything out on the boards. Mr. HOPSON has been on board almost as long as I have and is very knowledgeable about the deck watch officer. He probably will make Officer of the Deck very shortly. I then stood in the center of the open bridge. The three peloruses which I refer to, one right in the center of the open bridge, one on each wing. The pilot house was closed on the stern of the open bridge where the rest of the watch stood. I stood on the open bridge by the center pelorus and read the message traffic. Occasionally with the light from the center maneuvering board table, I called out the next course change, next zig-zag course plan to Mr. HOPSON, who would go back and forth behind me from side to side watching the carrier keeping

us on station. About 0300 I finished with the traffic. I looked at the scope to make sure that we were on station and told Mr. HOPSON that a course change was about to come up. The first signal came over for about at least an hour and a half from the carrier on PRITAC. At this time we were on a base course, leg of 230 at 18 knots, with a base course and our speed was 20 knots and remained 20 knots until the collision. When I checked to see if we were on station before I started helping Mr. HOPSON, we had the carrier bearing approximately 044 degrees true at about 3800 yards. The bearing limits of our station were 030 to 060, 3000 to 5000 yards. As the stations were set up on about a 185, BLACKPOOL had the center station with the same 30 degree bearing limitations and range limitations. We had the starboard wing, looking south, CLEOPATRA had the port wing. Right ahead of the formation approximately 7-10000 yards on outer stations were the KYES and LARSON, also based on 180 approximately. The sequence of RT signals which came over PRITAC were extremely critical. The first signal like I say at about 0300 or a little bit thereafter was a FORM 1, over. I answered ROGER OUT and took the signal to form a column in preparation of flight operations. Mr. HOPSON was on the starboard wing standing by the pelorus. I told him that we had been ordered to fall in astern of the carrier in preparation for flight operations. Since the base course was 230 we had two ships to our left, I told him to put slight right rudder on to take station. As Mr. HOPSON put on about right 10 degrees rudder, then progressed midway between points 1 and 2 which I have marked on this diagram, which is coming slowly right, I received the second signal from the MELBOURNE. My exact recollection of

how this was worded is not too clear. It can be worded several ways. It's just that I am coming left to 160. If he said MIKE CORPEN 160 or my course 160, I was thinking that he had executed and said, "Watch her, she is coming left." My reply to the RT was ROGER OUT. We watched, both of us from the starboard wing, moving to the center pelorus. At position number 2 we had come around to the ship's head of approximately 020 or 030 and the carrier, MELBOURNE, had yet to indicate that she was coming left. It looked like to me that she was still on a straight course at about 230.

At approximately this time she turned on her white lights, which illuminated the entire flight deck and I can't say for sure but I think she turned on her navigational lights. We still remained at darken ship. I assumed the great light display, I think confused Mr. HOPSON, that they were about ready to launch aircraft. At position 2 on this chart, the carrier was now about 05, no, I guess about 010 and our aspect would put us on her extreme port bow. She looked like she had a steady course and was about 1800 yards. And this was the time that we heard she was coming left, or just before this, and she had not come left. So in position 2 I recommended to Mr. HOPSON that we put left 10 degrees rudder to open range because she didn't look like she was coming around right away. Mr. HOPSON gave the helmsman left 10 degrees rudder and the helmsman answered and we started moving left to open range. So far up to this point it seemed like a normal approach. I made several and so did Mr. HOPSON. At position number 3, just after we had gone about 40 degrees towards

the left, with left 10 degrees rudder, range now about 1200 yards, as well as I can determine the carrier had not made any movement to come left or if she had she was only using about 10 degrees left rudder. We received a transmission from the MELBOURNE, quote, You are on a collision course, unquote. By this time all the lights were on, white lights on the deck and navigation. We appeared to be on her port bow about 45 to 50 degrees off the port bow. I could see her port running light quite clearly. When I received this transmission, I interpreted it to mean that she was steady on her course. I told Mr. HOPSON, she had said that we were on a collision course. Mr. HOPSON appeared to panic a little bit. He yelled, "She is on a collision course, but I don't understand." I think what he was referring to was her aspect, what her aspect was. I yelled to the helmsman, "Right full rudder." And the time left between when we heard, "You are on a collision course," and I yelled, "Right full rudder," was about 15 seconds. I assume that I did take the conn. The helmsman repeated the right full rudder and answered, "Right full rudder." We were still at 20 knots. I then picked up the RT and answered on the transmission, ROGER, MY RUDDER IS RIGHT FULL, OVER. She answered out, ROGER, OUT. About 10 to 15 seconds elapsed before the next transmission, which was extremely critical. I would like to backtrack a little bit. I based coming right at that point when we were, with our left ten on on several things. First of all, we had been coming left for some time and since she looked like she had not begun to turn, I assumed that this is what she meant by, "You are on

a collision course," but could have been a very slight right. The second reason and the most distinctive was to come right to pass under her stern, because she was a privileged vessel. She should hold course and speed. The left port light confirmed our position. As I say after I had told her that my rudder was at right full, it was about 15 seconds until the next transmission, which more or less sealed us. Her transmission was quote, MY RUDDER IS HARD LEFT. I didn't understand why she was coming hard left. I stood in the center of the bridge and tried to watch her relative bearing. Mr. HOPSON was on the starboard wing. As soon as she looked like she wasn't turning, I thought we could still make it. Up to this point she had been about 25 or 30 degrees on our starboard bow, presenting almost an abeam aspect and she started inch towards us dead ahead of us as we came right full. She made all the way to the left port bow, as far as our aspect on her, or her aspect on us. I still thought we could make it at that point. About 800 yards away, we noticed that the ship, MELBOURNE, didn't answer a hard left. And from this time on I think Mr. HOPSON was just a little bit paniced and he yelled several times, "She is going to hit us, she is going to hit us!" The only point which I can consider we could have possibly come left was when she gave us, "You are on a collision course." After the time that she gave us, MY RUDDER IS HARD LEFT, I doubt that any increase in speed or shifting of rudder - I'm not really sure if the helmsman was still there, there was quite a bit of panic at that time. A shift of rudder would possibly, since I say she had started drifting towards the port bow, it would stop the ship's

swing too late and it would have been a bow to bow hit. We had two knots better speed than she did. I figured that if anything she should take that rudder off and if anything if she did hit us, it would be almost astern at 4 or 5 knots relative speed. The last thing that I remember was the bow of the MELBOURNE moving in on the port side. I said I was on the port center of the open bridge and I could see her bow bearing down very rapidly. About 30 feet away it looked like it was going to strike right aft of the pilot house, which was CIC. After that I heard a very large explosion. I could smell sulfur or something to that effect as the steam was hitting the water. I was thrown off the starboard underwater debris. Part of the superstructure was thrown on top and pushed me under. I kept struggling to get to the surface and I finally broke surface. As I did, Mr. HOPSON came to my left and one of the signalmen which I recognized as being on the watch, came up on my right and we grabbed for a floating deck grate ahead of us and stayed on that grate until the boat came to pick us up. That's generally what happened.

CAPT MOORE: How clearly did you hear the carrier's transmission? Was there any doubt in your mind of courses, etc., that they were sending?

A: This is during the watch?

CAPT MOORE: During the watch and especially during the later part when they told you, I believe you said, MY COURSE 160?

A: Yes, sir. She said she was coming left to 160. It was absolutely perfectly clear. No trouble with communications. The diagram that I tried to create here, point 1 is where we started.

point 2 is where I noticed that she had not come left, that she indicated that she executed left, so I came left. Point 3 is where she gave us the signal which she said, "You are on a collision course," and I hit hard right rudder.

CAPT ANDERSON: Just to clarify for me if you would, this diagram a little bit. You had your screen axis at 180 you say?

A: I believe it was 185. We had ceased zig-zagging two or three times during the night and resumed zig-zagging and the last course, the base zig-zag course was 185. The screen never changed.

CAPT ANDERSON: I see. So you were on a bent line screen ahead, with a base course of 185 or 180?

A: Approximately, right.

CAPT ANDERSON: And this 230 was then one leg of the zig-zag?

A: Right.

CAPT ANDERSON: And the next course, the next leg was 260?

A: No, sir. When he was on 260, he gave the transmission, FORM 1.

CAPT ANDERSON: I see. Well, there was a zig-zag leg of 260?

A: Yes, right.

CAPT ANDERSON: Do you recall what the next phase of the zig-zag was supposed to be?

A: No, sir. I wouldn't. They would change about every - presumably to the left.

CAPT ANDERSON: Because 260 is about 90 degrees off the base course?

A: Yes. Sometime the variation between course changes was



2 or 3 degrees on the same, coming right, coming right. Sometimes it would be right-left, 10 degrees, sometimes a left-right, to get on the zig-zag plan. It seems to me if you are on 260 you are *not* going to go right.

CAPT MOORE: May I ask the signal plan, the zig-zag plan?

A: The zig-zag plan was 17C.

CAPT MOORE: SIERRA?

A: 17S, right. It's a three hour plan which was set up at approximately 2300.

CAPT ANDERSON: That transmission about 160. Is this after she had given you, FORM 1?

A: Yes.

CAPT ANDERSON: Well, let me ask a few other things, that this does bring up. In this entire - within the context of this incident, did you call the Captain at all?

A: No, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: Were there any instructions in the Night Orders that bore on the matter of calling the Captain when maneuvering or changing stations?

A: No, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: Neither in the Standing Orders or in the current Night Orders?

A: Well, there is a clause in the Standing Night Orders which I am sure that in any extremis you would call the Captain.

CAPT ANDERSON: Well, then is it correct to say, that you didn't feel this was a situation that warranted calling the Captain?

Up to the point of Point 2, no.

ANDERSON: And then - -

A: And then when I hit hard right rudder, at that time had there been time, I would have called the Captain. But within 15 seconds he had said hard left.

CAPT ANDERSON: You say that your communications with the MELBOURNE was good?

A: Yes, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: And he did give you a 160?

A: Right. Either my course is 160 or coming to 160.

CAPT ANDERSON: What course were you on when he gave this signal?

A: We had started coming around to the right. The rudder was on and the ship was pulling around to the right to come back at station to fall in astern when he came up with the transmission 160. I can't remember the ship's head. It must have been something like 280.

CAPT ANDERSON: That's not what I meant. What was the zig-zag leg at the time that he gave that 160?

A: About 260.

CAPT ANDERSON: You could come from 230 to 260?

A: About 230. I'm sorry.

CAPT ANDERSON: The base course he was on?

A: Yes. He always follows the zig-zag leg and I would weave in addition to following. So I wouldn't always be on. So he was 230 approximately.

CAPT ANDERSON: And when he was on the zig-zag leg, which

was 230, he gave - -

A: He gave a FORM 1.

CAPT ANDERSON: While he was on 230?

A: Right.

CAPT ANDERSON: After that he told you he was coming to 260?

A: 160.

CAPT ANDERSON: Oh, I see. Well we are going to have to get this zig-zag plan to see what it looks like. This was on what plan again?

A: 17S. It is in the OpOrder.

CAPT ANDERSON: How long have you been aboard?

A: About 21 months.

CAPT ANDERSON: And you had been qualified for OD for?

A: I stood OOD underway watches since we left the states on 29 March.

CAPT ANDERSON: And you said that Mr. HOPSON had been aboard about the same time?

A: Yes, sir. He had. He came aboard about two months after I did.

CAPT ANDERSON: And he was still a JO watch stander?

A: Yes, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: Were there anything unusual in the Night Orders for the night?

A: No, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: Just routine?

A: Yes.

CAPT MOORE: Was this your first sea duty tour, first ship assignment?

A: Yes, sir.

CAPT MOORE: Are you naval academy or ROTC?

A: ROTC, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: We have discussed rudder orders. Did you give any engine orders?

A: No, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: And you had 20 knots at the time of impact?

A: No, sir. Mr. HOPSON had the conn. He tells me, I don't know exactly when it was, but I remember him shouting it out sometimes probably almost to coincide with the transmission from the MELBOURNE that MY RUDDER IS HARD LEFT. I believe she said HARD LEFT. He gave an order to the leehelm, ALL BACK FULL.

CAPT ANDERSON: Now, sometimes previous to this you had given a rudder order.

A: That's correct.

CAPT ANDERSON: And presumably by doing this, you resumed the conn.

A: Yes, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: And do I infer then that Mr. HOPSON didn't realize that you had the conn?

A: No, he heard me give that order. I never said, I had the conn. He never said, "Mr. RAMSEY had the conn," or anything like this. It was just a split second.

CAPT ANDERSON: But he did give - -

A: Yes. He did give an order, ALL BACK FULL, after that. What I remember is the leehelmsman answering, "It's all back full." I don't remember him giving. I remember the leehelmsman

answering, "It's all back full." So I think it happened right about, almost the same time that that transmission came in. We had put hard rudder right on, right full. We were coming right.

CAPT ANDERSON: I see. Getting back to Night Orders. Do either the Standing Night Orders or any other Night Orders that you may have contain anything specific with regard to maintaining distances from other ships in formation, or special safety precautions to be taken or conditions under which you should call the Commanding Officer?

A: They contain orders, Standing Orders about contact CPA's. The Captain has put several times in the nightly Night Orders to approach no adjoining screen ship within 1000 yards without making moves to open the distance.

CAPT ANDERSON: Anything with regard to main body ships?

A: No.

CAPT ANDERSON: Anything with specific regard to changing station?

A: He has specified in the past a rule of not closing the ship ahead of you if you are following on a change of station, within 5 degrees of the port bow.

CAPT ANDERSON: Does he require you to call him when you change station?

A: No, sir. Well, yes and no. I can't really say he doesn't require it. He likes to know every time something happens. Should the entire screen changed, I would have called him. Should we had been assigned to swap station with the BLACKPOOL or something like this, I would not have.

CAPT ANDERSON: And going to plane guard you would not have?

A: No, sir. I think that was in the Night Orders, to expect plane guard.

CAPT ANDERSON: To expect plane guard?

A: Right.

CAPT ANDERSON: That you would go to plane guard station without calling him?

A: Yes, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: Anything that you can add that might be helpful or throw more light on it?

A: No. The ship had been maneuvering quite beyond its normal tactics with the KEARSARGE during the entire SEATO Exercise with the Commonwealth ships. They sharpened us up you might say. They like to do a lot of playing around, type flanking movements and we have very seldom if ever, gone through zig-zag plans and things like this. I can't say that it was new. We had been going through that for 3 or 4 days, these zig-zag plans. But it did make everybody a little bit tight. But what made me particularly tense was an 18 knot zig-zag plan, was the closeness of the [3000 to 5000 yards] screening station. Mr. HOPSON and I - when I had the conn the first two hours it was just constant change. I couldn't do anything else but watch the carrier. Mr. HOPSON was doing the same when he took it. As far as I know we had no CIC communications. Nothing had been passed out from Combat.

CAPT ANDERSON: How about your Combat and yourself? Does your Combat keep a plot to keep you advised of ship movements when you are going to a station change?

A: Yes, they do. They recommend course and station. They also - through all the zig-zag plans we have been going through, would recommend such and such a change because the main body has changed to starboard, and such and such a course at this time. When we first got the station assignment, I looked at the maneuvering board, as I can remember on 230, because I plotted her on 230 at 18 knots and I started to make out a solution against the radar and then I realized that it was too close to figure any kind of solution. And I just tried to eyeball the thing in and watch our turn.

CAPT ANDERSON: During this morning in question, did CIC at any time give you any comments with regard to closing to the carrier or dangers or anything of this sort?

A: No, sir. She passed out a time when the formation would change. Recommended - there were no contacts by the way. We were the only ships out there. That's another function that they carry out regularly is to pass out all the contacts.

CAPT ANDERSON: Do they keep the zig-zag plan in Combat?

A: Well, right. They have a copy of the OpOrder and they say, okay, this is time 23 on the OpOrder, she is coming hard right or ten degrees right.

CAPT ANDERSON: They didn't give you any opinions as to - did they give you any opinions as to which way you should turn to get to your FORM 1 station?

A: No, sir. They simultaneously copy all our tactical circuits on the bridge. They have a dupe circuit.

CAPT ANDERSON: Did you get any transmissions from Combat



at the time you started right until the time of the collision?

A: No, sir.

CAPT ANDERSON: Okay. Thank you very much.

(1)

The Watch

3 June 1969
1600 hours

Mr. Hopson and I assumed the watch on the bridge (the 1600W, 1 OOD) about 11:55 PM. I took the comm. It was moonlight but overcast and only the ships within 2,000 yards could be seen adequately enough w/o glasses to determine their aspect. All ships in 472.1 (Melbourne, Evans, Kyes, Larson, Blackpool, Cleopatra) were at darken ship showing no navigational lights. The screen setup (an attached diagram) remained the same throughout the watch. In addition to following zig-zag plan 17S, I kept various rudder angles on my constant course as well as vary speed so the overall effect would be to patrol station. The sea was perfectly calm. We were streaming VDS. Most of the men on the watch were new seamen (arrived on Subic), a little anxious, occasionally making rudder errors, but on the whole very attentive. We had to steer a straight course to station usually whenever the change in zig-zag plan exceeded 80°. Base speed was 18 knots; I kept the ship between 20-21 to patrol station

Attachment B

(2)

The first hour was fairly busy following the basic zig-zag. The bridge was quiet since only one of the 3 circuits was being used and we had loud and clear communications on it. Course changes about every 5 8 minutes

About 0115 I saw the plan would vary slightly for about 10 minutes and had time to shift steering control to after steering and then back to the bridge on the other (stbd) motor-cable combination. No other events of exception took place; not any flight ops. No other contacts other than the formation, throughout the night.

I gave the conn to Mr. Hopson (who had as much experience on the bridge as I, and we usually split the watch in conning) at a little before 0200. I then stood in the center of the open bridge, read through message traffic, and occasionally called out the next course changes on the zig-zag plan to Mr. Hopson. He moved back and forth behind me, to either wing, keeping us on the plan.

I finished with the traffic about 0300. About a minute later, while I was watching the scope and noting the next course change, the

first signal came over pri-tac from the Melbourne: "FORM 1, OVER". I answered "ROGER, OUT" and told Mr. Hopson, who was on the stbd wing standing by the pelorus, that we had been directed to fall in astern of the carrier, probably in preparation for flight ops. I recommended we come right ①. We were on station with M at about 044 3800 yds. Our speed was 20, and remained so until just before collision.

time about 0310

↑ 080°T



As Mr Hopson put on a right 10° rudder, ~~we received~~, and had progressed midway between ① and ②, we received the second signal from M: "MIKE CORPEN – or – MY COURSE – I can't remember which was

(4)

the exact terminology - 160". "ROGER, OUT." A told (yelled) to Mr Gleason "Watch her, she's coming left to 160°." We watched her from the after wing, A from the center reforms. At ② she



looked like she hadn't come around yet, so A heard Mr. Gleason give the helmsman "Left 10° rudder," and he answered it. We started moving left to open the range. So far, all was tense, but normal.

At ③ we received the transmission from the M: "You are on a collision course." By this time all her lights were on (she had her white lights illuminating the flight deck somewhere about ②)

(5)

and I could see her port running light and we appeared to be on her port bow, about 1200 yards. Mr. Hopson said "she read me on a collision course. I don't understand!" She appeared to game. I yelled to the helmsman "Right full rudder." which he repeated and answered. I then picked up the R/T and answered her transmission "ROGER. MY RUDDER RIGHT FULL." She answered "ROGER, OUT." About 10-15 seconds elapsed before the next transmission.

I based coming right on several things. First, we had been coming left for some time, and since she looked like she had not yet begun the turn, I assumed this is what was causing the collision course. Her bearing drift had been very slight right. The second reason, and most instrusive, was to come right and pass under her stern, since she was privileged ship and should hold course and speed. The red (port) running light confirmed our position.

Her next and last transmission was "My RUDDER IS HARD LEFT." I can't understand this. I stood frozen in the center of the bridge. Mr Hopson on the SAT nav. As soon as she

If I didn't think I didn't trust the helmsman to answer a shift in time, or even if he was there.

(6)

looked like she was indeed turning. I thought we could still make it. She was dead ahead now, about 800 yards, and turning left. Mr. Hopson yelled out several times "She's going to hit us! She's going to hit us!"

To increase speed or shift rudder now ~~looked~~ would only have made the approach bow-to-bow with a relative speed of 28 knots. I left the rudder right full ~~and~~ ~~[illegible]~~. [illegible] She looked like she finally answered the left full rudder and was coming left quickly. It still looked like we could make it, or at least if we hit we would be hit on the port quarter or stern at a relative speed of 2-3 kts.

The bow of H loomed on the port side. I could see it about 30' away through the port side of the open bridge. The next instant I heard a tremendous roar and was swept into the water. Some metal structure, cables, was above me ~~and I~~ I kept clawing away from the ship until I felt an opening and came to the surface.

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