

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 967002  
 By WBD NARA Date 1/26/86

**CONFIDENTIAL**



MACJ213-1

HEADQUARTERS  
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
 APO US Forces 96222

RAND July 1970  
 JUL 24 1970  
 WASH. OFFICE

BULLETIN No. 35,864

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	DISTRIBUTION: III & IV CTZ Capture Data
07-1287-70	<p><u>SUBJ: (U) Development of Intelligence Nets, and Missions of the Strategic Intelligence Office, Military Staff Department, Headquarters, SVNLA, in 1970.</u></p> <p>(C) (7 pages, handwritten; B-3) Note, dated 30 Jan 70, incomplete, prepared by an unidentified individual ((possibly of the Strategic Intelligence Office)), pertains to an assessment of the situation in 1969, and the missions of the Strategic Intelligence Service in 1970. Document states that in 1969, the ((VC)) strategic intelligence agencies had been consolidated and developed. The ((VC)) communication lines and radio communications had been properly maintained, and the training of cadre had been improved. However, due to the poor vigilance and reaction against enemy ((FVMAF/RVNAF)) activities as well as the shortage of cadre and lack of coordination, the information ((on enemy activities)) provided by the Strategic Intelligence Service was of little significance. To cope with the Vietnamization scheme of the Americans, the ((RVN)) pacification program, and the protracted war caused by the partial ((US)) withdrawal, intelligence agents were urged to increase their activities in 1970 and surmount all difficulties to accomplish their assigned missions. Major missions of the Strategic Intelligence Service in 1970 are to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Discover US political and military plans concerning the situation in SVN, such as the prolonging of the war and the development of a political solution to the SVN war; the US plans for political and subversive activities after the war; the US intentions toward NVN, Laos, and Cambodia; all difficulties encountered by the US and Puppet ((Governments)) and the differences between US and Puppet ((political and military)) policies;</li> <li>(2) improve the management of cadre and agencies to heighten their political ideology and capabilities;</li> <li>(3) consolidate the communication and liaison network;</li> <li>(4) be alert to enemy counterespionage activities;</li> <li>(5) develop the Strategic Intelligence Service to insure the highest quantity of output; and</li> <li>(6) constantly improve leadership abilities with emphasis on the organization of Cum ((detachments)) and offices.</li> </ol>	<p>1 Jul 70                  WS845829,                  Kiến Tường Prov                  IV CTZ                  Kiến Tường Sector,                  RVNAF IV CTZ                  Batch No.                  1770/KITL 70                  Received CDEC:                  2 Jul 70                  Category: A</p>

THIS DOCUMENT IS RELEASABLE TO  
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND FREE  
 WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES.

GROUP 4  
 DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS  
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

JUL 9 1970

NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18 U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Postal Registry No. 58009

**CONFIDENTIAL**

BULLETIN NO. 35,864

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	DISTRIBUTION: III & IV CTZ Capture Data
	<p>To meet the requirements prescribed by higher headquarters, cadre were to emphasize the strong political background of their agents, consolidate intelligence organizations, improve their leadership abilities and political attitudes, and closely coordinate ((VC)) in country and foreign intelligence services. Every effort should be made to increase the number of professional agents by 1/8, the number of competent agents by 1/8, and the number of new recruited agents by 3/4. All Cum and nets were to be reinforced, and communication and liaison should be consolidated in every echelon, such as from nets to Cum and to TW ((possibly Strategic Intelligence Office, Military Staff Department, Headquarters, SVNLA)). Communication and liaison in urban areas should also be consolidated to improve the capabilities of cadre. Emphasis is to be placed on the activation of 20 or 25 intelligence nets which are to be capable of operating within two years, and of providing valuable information. Each net should have one qualified cadre, one or two secret agents, two or three informants, and a number of evaluators. Each cell should have an effective and flexible communication and liaison network through live letter drops ((operated by agents)) and dead letter drops operated by two or three communication-liaison cadre. The professional nets would be permitted to use radios in their communication system. In order to collect accurate information on enemy activities, eight to 13 ((VC)) intelligence nets would be planted in the ((FWMAF)) military high command (two or three in the RVNAF JGS, one to three in the RVN National Defense Ministry, four to six in the four RVNAF Corps Tactical Zones, one in US military agency ((meaning US MACV)), four nets in the key ((GVN)) political agencies, one in the ((RVN)) economic agencies, five in various ((RVN)) religious parties or ((RVN)) national parties, and two in the ((RVN)) Central Intelligence Office and the Directorate General of National ((RVN)) Police. Document states that cadre of the above nets are to penetrate at all costs the JGS, National Defense Ministry, III and IV CTZ's, Capital Military District (CMD), the US military agency, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ((RVN)) Assembly, the Presidency, Buddhist and Catholic organizations, and allied forces organizations.</p> <p>Nine Cum should be strengthened with two or three nets each. Each Cum must have 12 communication-liaison cadre, 12 live letter drops, six dead letter drops, and 50 to 60 secret agents or informants.</p>	

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

BULLETIN NO. 35,864

CDEC Doc Log No.	Summary	DISTRIBUTION: III & IV CTZ Capture Data
	<p>Document states that a Cum is a tactical unit responsible for securing the communication and liaison of intelligence services, safeguarding the base areas ((of intelligence nets and Cum)), and supervising espionage activities.</p> <p>Document also provides guidance on methods of operation, recruiting communication-liaison agents, and establishing live letter drops, and states that priority should be given to the selection of students in urban areas, areas surrounding the cities and "weak areas;" local residents who have relatives in the ((VC)) Revolution; Party members; Youth Group members; or local residents who were drafted by the enemy ((RVNAF)).</p> <p>As for the consolidation of former intelligence Cum, each Cum would be permitted to recruit one or two agents every three months. Education and indoctrination training should be given to these newly recruited personnel upon their assignment to a Cum. Preventive measures must be taken against the enemy's counterespionage scheme of planting ((RVN)) secret agents in our ((VC)) organization.</p> <p>(U) CDEC COMMENT: Document received under JGS Log No. 07-40018-70.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Alvin W. Lotz</i> ALVIN W. LOTZ LT, USA Dir, US Elm, CDEC</p>	

**CONFIDENTIAL**