

Oral History - Mr. Hung Tri  
1274

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 FM CDR JTF-FA HONOLULU HI//J2//  
 TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:RSA/DPMO-RA/DPMO-RD//  
 INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC  
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//CA/DCS/CCS/EAP/VLC//  
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//OCJCS/J5/PW-MIA/J3-JOD//  
 RUHQHQB/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3/J30-M//  
 RUEKJCS/USCINCPAC LO WASHINGTON DC  
 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DEA/SEA/IB/DDO/EA/ICOG//  
 RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//  
 RUEHBT/USDAO BANGKOK TH//PW-MIA//  
 RUEHBT/CJTFFA DET ONE BANGKOK TH  
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 SECTION 01 OF 03  
 AMPN/SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI//  
 REF/A/FAX/DET 2/30DEC92//  
 AMPN SUBJ: (OHR-001-92) ORAL HISTORY REPORT--MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI  
 REGARDING CASE 1274 (PRIDEMORE) AND HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP//  
 THIS IS A RETRANSMITTAL OF A PREVIOUSLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGE, SAME

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SUBJ//

RMKS/1. SUMMARY: ON 26 DECEMBER 1992, DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN (R.J. DESTATTE) AND DET 2 ANALYST (SSGT W.H. NEWELL), ACCOMPANIED BY THREE MEMBERS OF THE VIETNAMESE OFFICE FOR SEARCHING FOR MISSING PERSONS (VNOSMP), INTERVIEWED MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI AT HIS OFFICE IN HANOI, VIETNAM. EARLIER INVESTIGATIONS OF CASE 1274 IDENTIFIED MR. TRI AS A FORMER CADRE OF THE HEADQUARTERS SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY'S (HQ SVNLA) U.S. POW CAMP DURING THE WAR. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE INTERVIEW WAS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION THAT MIGHT HELP RESOLVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FATE OF U.S. ARMY STAFF SERGEANT (SSG) DALLAS PRIDEMORE, WHO WAS CAPTURED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF SAIGON, ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1968. MR. TRI WAS VERY OPEN AND CANDID AND DEMONSTRATED A CLEAR AND ACCURATE RECALL OF WAR TIME EVENTS. HE WAS CERTAIN ALL AMERICANS CAPTURED IN HQ SVNLA'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (EXCLUDING MILITARY REGION NINE) WERE MOVED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP. HE RECALLED THAT THIS CAMP, WHILE MOBILE, REMAINED IN THE AREA ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER BETWEEN NORTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA. HE WAS CERTAIN HQ SVNLA NEVER HAD A POW CAMP IN SVAY RIENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA. HE WAS CERTAIN NO PRISONER NAMED DALLAS PRIDEMORE EVER REACHED HQ SVNLA'S

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U.S. POW CAMP. IN HIS JUDGMENT, SSG PRIDEMORE MUST HAVE DIED BEFORE HE COULD BE MOVED TO THE HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP. HE DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS PROCEDURES FOR EVACUATING U.S. POWS TO HQ SVNLA. HE IDENTIFIED TWO PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION REGARDING THIS CASE. HE RECALLED THE NAMES OF SEVERAL AMERICANS WHO WERE IN THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP AND WHO HE HAD INTERVIEWED, SEEN, OR HEARD ABOUT. HE SUPPLIED LIMITED INFORMATION CONCERNING UNRESOLVED CASES 0043, 0050, 0099, 1410, 1610, AND 9960.

2. SOURCE DATA:

NAME: NGUYEN HUNG TRI ((NGUYEENX HUNGF TRIS)).

AGE: 50 YEARS ((DOI: DEC 1992))

WAR TIME POSITION:

OCT '65-OCT '66, 2ND LIEUTENANT, PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN, INTERPRETER, U.S. POW CAMP UNIT TB-20, POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, HQ SVNLA, AKA MIEN.  
 CURRENT POSITION, ADDRESS, PHONE, FAX:  
 DIRECTOR, EXPORT DEPARTMENT, VIETNAM NATIONAL PETROLEUM IMPORT-EXPORT CORPORATION, NO. 1 KHAM THIEN STREET, HANOI, VIETNAM; PHONE: 84-4-268060, 84-4-

3. DETAILS:

A. MR. TRI IS A NATIVE OF NORTHERN VIETNAM. AS A 2ND LIEUTENANT IN THE PEOPLES ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN), HE DEPARTED HANOI IN MARCH 1965 AND ARRIVED AT HQ SVNLA IN JUNE OR JULY 1965. HE WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP FROM OCTOBER 1965 THROUGH OCTOBER 1966. MR. TRI RECALLED THAT WHEN HE JOINED THE CAMP, IT WAS KNOWN AS UNIT TB-20. HE SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS REDESIGNATED TB-21 UNIT AT SOME LATER DATE. FROM OCTOBER 1966 THROUGH THE END OF THE WAR MR. TRI WROTE ARTICLES FOR LIBERATION NEWS RADIO AND PRINT MEDIA. IN THAT CAPACITY HE VISITED THE U.S. POW CAMP OCCASIONALLY TO INTERVIEW U.S. POWS.

B. MR. TRI SAID HE WAS THE INTERPRETER FOR THE HQ SVNLA DELEGATION DURING TWO POW EXCHANGES. THE FIRST WAS ON 28 DECEMBER 1965; CASE 0024 (G. SMITH AND MCCLURE). THE SECOND WAS ON 1 JANUARY 1969; CASE 1173 (D.G. SMITH), CASE 1263 (T.N. JONES), AND CASE 1278 (J.W. BRIGHAM). MR. TRI GAVE THE DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN A COPY OF A BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH DEPICTING THE THREE U.S. POWS RELEASED ON 1 JANUARY 1969, FLANKED BY THE U.S. DELEGATE AND HIS INTERPRETER ON ONE SIDE AND THE HQ

SVNLA DELEGATE WITH MR. TRI ON THE OTHER SIDE. MR. TRI EASILY RECALLED ACCURATE DETAILS ABOUT PAVN MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TUOI ((NGUYEENX VAWN TUOOI)), KA BAY TUOI ((BAYR TUOOI)), A HQ SVNLA STAFF OFFICER WHO ALSO WAS INVOLVED IN THE 1 JANUARY 1969 EXCHANGE. ((FIELD COMMENT: JCRC SPECIALISTS AND THE DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN INTERVIEWED TUOI IN THE EARLY 1980S IN INDONESIA AND BELGIUM.))

C. MR. TRI SAID HE WAS ALSO PRESENT AT LOC NINH WHEN THE U.S. POWS WHO HAD BEEN HELD IN THE HQ SVNLA CAMP WERE RELEASED IN THE FINAL POW EXCHANGE IN EARLY 1973 ((OPERATIONS HOMECOMING)). ((FIELD COMMENT: DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN PROMISED TO GIVE MR. TRI SOME BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOS A U.S. ARMY PHOTOGRAPHER TOOK OF THE HQ SVNLA DELEGATION AT THE LOC NINH EXCHANGE.))

D. CASE 1274 (PRIDEMORE):

(1) MR. TRI SAID HE NEVER MET SSG PRIDEMORE. HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SSG PRIDEMORE OR HIS FATE.

(2) DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN SUMMARIZED THE LOCATION, DATE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF SSG PRIDEMORE'S CAPTURE, AND INVITED MR. TRI TO COMMENT ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF THE STORY.

(3) MR. TRI NOTED THU DUC DISTRICT WAS PART OF COMMUNIST

SUB-REGION IV IN HQ SVNLA'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. HE SAID ALL POWS CAPTURED IN SUB-REGION IV WERE EVACUATED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP.

(4) MR. TRI RECALLED THAT HQ SVNLA'S U.S. POW CAMP, WHILE MOBILE, REMAINED IN THE AREA ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER BETWEEN NORTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM, AND CAMBODIA. MR. TRI SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THAT HQ SVNLA NEVER KEPT ANY FOREIGN POWS IN SVAY RIENG PROVINCE.

(5) CITING SECURITY, ECONOMIC, AND SAFETY FACTORS, MR. TRI SAID HE WAS CERTAIN NO ECHELON SUBORDINATE TO HQ SVNLA COULD HAVE OR WOULD HAVE TRIED TO HOLD A U.S. POW FOR A LONG PERIOD. ((FIELD COMMENT: IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS INTERVIEW, HQ SVNLA ARMY WAS UNDERSTOOD TO INCLUDE COMMUNIST MILITARY REGION 6, 7, 8, AND 10, AND THE SAIGON, CHOLON, GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE; AND TO EXCLUDE MILITARY REGION 9, WHICH WAS THE REGION SOUTH OF THE MEKING RIVER.))

(6) MR. TRI SAID HE IS CERTAIN ANY AMERICAN CAPTURED IN HQ SVNLA'S AREA WHO DID NOT ENTER THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP ADMINISTERED BY UNIT TB-20/TB-21 DIED BEFORE REACHING THE CAMP.

(7) LTC PHAM TEO (MND MIA SPECIALIST ASSIGNED TO THE

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RUHVAAA/CDRUSACILHI HICKAM AFB HI//TAPC-PED-H//

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AMPN/SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI//  
VNO SMP) NOTED THE THU DUC DISTRICT SPECIAL ACTION UNIT ((BIEETJ  
DDOONGJ DDOOIJ)) CAPTURED SSG PRIDEMORE. IN RESPONSE, MR. TRI  
EXPLAINED SEVERAL FACTORS RECOMMENDED THAT ANY SEARCH FOR  
DOCUMENTS AND WITNESSES SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE CAPTURING UNIT.

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FIRST, GUERRILLA FORCES, SUCH AS A DISTRICT SPECIAL ACTION UNIT,  
ARE LEAST LIKELY TO HAVE THE RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND INCLINATION  
TO MOVE A POW TO THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON; THEREFORE, IT IS LIKELY  
A POW CAPTURED BY SUCH A UNIT WOULD BE KILLED OR DIE BEFORE HE  
REACHED THE NEXT HIGHER ECHELON--IN THIS INSTANCE PROVINCE LEVEL.  
MR. TRI STATED THAT PAVN MAIN FORCE UNITS, E.G., THE PAVN 5TH,  
7TH, AND 9TH DIVISIONS, WERE THE MOST LIKELY UNITS TO HAVE THE  
RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND DISCIPLINE TO IMPLEMENT POLICY TO MOVE  
U.S. POWS TO HQ SVNLA. LTC PHAM TEO INFORMED MR. TRI THAT FOUR  
SEPARATE JOINT INVESTIGATIONS HAVE FAILED TO LOCATE CREDIBLE EYE  
WITNESSES FROM THE CAPTURING UNIT.

(8) MR. TRI SAID HQ SVNLA RECEIVED DAILY TELEPHONE  
REPORTS THAT INCLUDED INFORMATION ABOUT POWS. HOWEVER, HE SAID  
IT WAS NOT UNCOMMON, AFTER WAITING A FEW WEEKS, TO INQUIRE ABOUT  
THE STATUS OF THE POW AND LEARN HE HAD DIED WHILE ENROUTE TO HQ  
SVNLA. HE SAID THAT FREQUENTLY REPORTS NOTED A SUBORDINATE UNIT  
HAD BURIED THE BODY OF AN AMERICAN; BUT DID NOT PROVIDE ANY  
INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIFIC LOCATION. HE SAID TYPICALLY COMMUNIST  
FORCES WOULD LEAVE A BODY WHERE IT WAS FOUND OR, IF THEY BURIED  
THE BODY, THEY DID NOT MARK THE GRAVE.

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(9) MR. TRI SAID THE NORMAL REPORTING CHANNEL FOR THE  
THU DUC DISTRICT UNIT WOULD BE THROUGH THE PROVINCE AND SUB-  
REGION COMMANDS TO THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT FOR HQ SVNLA.  
MR. TRI SAID REPORTS ON DECEASED AMERICANS WOULD NOT BE SENT TO  
THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP. HE SAID REPORTS ABOUT DECEASED  
AMERICANS WOULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE HQ SVNLA'S ENEMY  
PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT.

(10) NORMALLY, MR. TRI BELIEVED, THE THU DUC DISTRICT  
SPECIAL ACTION UNIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MOVING THE  
PRISONERS TO THE PROVINCE COMMAND. THE PROVINCE COMMAND WOULD  
HAVE SOUGHT INSTRUCTIONS FROM SUB-REGION IV. DEPENDING ON  
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUB-REGION IV MIGHT HAVE DIRECTED THE PROVINCE TO  
MOVE THE PRISONER TO SUB-REGION OR TO HOLD THE PRISONER PENDING  
ARRIVAL OF AN ESCORT TEAM FROM SUB-REGION. SUB-REGION IN TURN  
WOULD HAVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQ SVNLA. NORMALLY, FOR  
SECURITY REASONS, HQ SVNLA WOULD SEND A TEAM TO RECEIVE THE POW  
SOMEWHERE ENROUTE BETWEEN PROVINCE AND SUB-REGION.

(11) MR. TRI SAID THAT OUTSIDE THE LOCAL GUERRILLA UNIT,  
THE ORGANIZATION MOST LIKELY TO HAVE PRESERVED USEFUL DOCUMENTARY  
INFORMATION ABOUT SSG PRIDEMORE SHOULD BE THE HQ SVNLA ENEMY

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PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT.

E. POTENTIAL WITNESSES;

(1) DANG THUAN HOA ((DDANGJ THUUANJ HOAF)). INTERPRETER FOR HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE POW EXCHANGE ON 1 JANUARY 1969. HOA CURRENTLY WORKS IN THE HO CHI MINH COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS OFFICE ((SOWR THUOWNG NGHIEEPHJ)). ((FIELD COMMENT: VNOSMP MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVIEW SAID IT SHOULD BE EASY TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW MR. HOA.))

(2) LUU QUANG TUYEN ((LUWU QUANG TUYEENS)). THE CHIEF OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT, HQ SVNLA, FROM ABOUT 1969 THROUGH 1975. AFTER THE WAR HE BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF OF LONG AN PROVINCE. CURRENTLY RETIRED, HE NOW LIVES IN SAIGON. ((FIELD COMMENT: VNOSMP MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVIEW SAID IT SHOULD BE EASY TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW MR. TUYEN.))

(3) NGO DAT TAI ((NGOO DDAATJ TAIF)); AKA 10 TRAI ((TRAI)) AND 10 TAI ((TAIF)). CHIEF OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT, HQ SVNLA FROM ABOUT 1967 TO 1969. HE FELL VICTIM TO POOR HEALTH AND RETURNED TO NORTH VIETNAM IN ABOUT 1969. CURRENTLY RETIRED, HE LIVES ON ONG ICH KHIEM STREET ((PHOOS OONG ICHS KHIEM)), HANOI, VIETNAM. HIS PREDECESSOR, LE HOA ((LEE

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HOAF)) DIED OF OLD AGE IN ABOUT 1977 OR 1978. ((FIELD COMMENT: VNOSMP MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVIEW SAID IT SHOULD BE EASY TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW MR. TAI.))

(4) LE QUANG HUY ((LEE QUANG HUY)); AKA 8 HUY. COMMANDER OF THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP FROM 1967 THROUGH 1975. ((FIELD COMMENT: THREE DIFFERENT U.S. SPECIALISTS, INCLUDING DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN, HAVE INTERVIEWED MR. HUY. MR. HUY HAS PREVIOUSLY SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE A VERY VAIN AND UNCOOPERATIVE WITNESS. HIS ONE AND ONLY PREDECESSOR (1964-1967) WAS LE HUE ((LEE HUEEJ)), WHO IS DECEASED. ((FIELD COMMENT: AS COMMANDER OF THE U.S. POW CAMP, LE QUANG HUY COULD BE EXPECTED TO HAVE LITTLE OR NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ANY AMERICANS OTHER THAN THOSE WHO WERE UNDER HIS DIRECT SUPERVISION.))

F. ENEMY PROSELYTING AND MILITARY PROSELYTING. MR. TRI DEFINED ENEMY PROSELYTING ((DDICHJ VAANJ)) AS A FUNCTION PERFORMED BY THE MILITARY AND DIRECTED AT ADVERSARY MILITARY FORCES. HE DESCRIBED MILITARY PROSELYTING ((BINH VAANJ)) AS A FUNCTION CARRIED OUT BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY--IN THIS INSTANCE THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM ((COSVN)) AND IS DIRECTED AT MOBILIZING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY. STATED IN OTHER WORDS,

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ACCORDING TO MESSERS TRI AND PHAM TEO, ENEMY PROSELYTING IS A SUBSET OF MILITARY PROSELYTING.

G. THE 2ND OFFICE ((PHONGF 2)), AKA RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE ((PHONG TRINH SAT)), AKA MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ((QUAAN BAOS)) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERROGATING POWS FOR TACTICAL INFORMATION. THE ENEMY PROSELYTING ELEMENT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERROGATING POWS FOR PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PURPOSES.

H. MR. TRI RECALLED HAVING HEARD ABOUT, SEEN, OR SPOKEN WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING U.S. POWS, IN ADDITION TO THE POWS NAMED IN PARA 3B AND 3D, ABOVE:

(1) CAPTAIN (SIC) SCHUMANN (CASE 0099). MR. TRI RECALLED ((MAJOR)) SCHUMANN DIED IN CAPTIVITY. MR. TRI CITED THIS CASE TO ILLUSTRATE HIS BELIEF IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND GRAVE SITES OF THE MEN WHO DIED WHILE IN THE HQ SVNLA U.S. POW CAMP. MR. TRI NOTED THAT UNIT TB-20, THE UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAMP, MOVED THE CAMP FREQUENTLY. HE NOTED MOST OF THE ROUTES TRAVELED BY THE UNIT WERE NARROW FOOT OR BICYCLE PATHS CUT THROUGH THE JUNGL. HE RECALLED THE UNIT SELOM USED THESE PATHS LONGER THAN THREE MONTHS, AFTER WHICH THEY QUICKLY REVERTED BACK TO JUNGLE GROWTH. MR. TRI STATED FIRMLY HE BELIEVES IT WOULD BE

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 AMPN/SUBJ/INTERVIEW OF REQUESTED SOURCE, MR. NGUYEN HUNG TRI//  
 VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RELOCATE THE PATHS AND CAMP SITES WHERE  
 POWS DIED AND WERE BURIED.  
 (2) USMC CAPTAIN COOK (CASE 0050). MR. TRI RECALLED  
 CAPTAIN COOK WAS CAPTURED IN BINH GIA AND THAT HE DIED IN

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 CAPTIVITY. ((FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO REPORT 55 SUMMARY,  
 RETURNED POW DOUGLAS RAMSEY--WHO SPOKE VIETNAMESE FLUENTLY--  
 REPORTED THAT NGUYEN HUNG TRI TOLD HIM CAPTAIN COOK HAD DIED OF  
 MALARIA IN DECEMBER 1967 WHILE CAPTAIN COOK WAS BEING TRANSFERRED  
 BETWEEN CAMP SITES IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, SOUTHERN VIETNAM. SEE  
 3D1, ABOVE, FOR MR. TRI'S VIEWS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR  
 RECOVERING REMAINS.))  
 (3) CRAFTS (CASE 0049). MR. TRI RECALLED CRAFTS WAS  
 CAPTURED IN BINH GIA AND RELEASED EARLY.  
 (4) 1ST LIEUTENANT (SIC) JOHN DUNN (CASE 1093). MR. TRI  
 RECALLED ((CAPTAIN)) DUNN WAS RELEASED.  
 (5) CAPTAIN YOUNG (CASE 1610). MR. TRI MENTIONED HE HAD  
 INTERVIEWED CAPTAIN YOUNG, BUT DID NOT COMMENT ON CAPTAIN YOUNG'S  
 FATE. ((SEE 3D1, ABOVE, FOR MR. TRI'S VIEWS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS  
 FOR RECOVERING REMAINS.))  
 (6) CIVILIAN DOUGLAS RAMSEY (CASE 0234). MR. TRI  
 RECALLED RAMSEY WAS RELEASED IN 1973 AND THAT RAMSEY WAS A NATIVE  
 OF NEVADA.  
 (7) WARRANT OFFICER HESTAND (CASE 1727). MR. TRI  
 RECALLED WO HESTAND WAS A HELICOPTER PILOT AND THAT HE WAS

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 RELEASED.

(8) CAMACHO (CASE 0024). MR. TRI RECALLED WITHOUT  
 HESITATION THAT ((SFC)) CAMACHO ESCAPED FROM THE HQ SVNLA U.S.  
 POW CAMP A FEW MONTHS BEFORE MR. TRI ARRIVED AT THE CAMP.  
 (9) MURPHY (CASE 1410). MR. TRI RECALLED THAT ((SP5))  
 MURPHY WAS ONE OF THREE MEMBERS OF A U.S. COMMANDO ((BIET KICH  
 MY)) TEAM WHO WERE KILLED WHEN THEY WERE AMBUSHED BY PAVN FORCES  
 SHORTLY AFTER HELICOPTERS SHORTLY AFTER HELICOPTERS INSERTED THE  
 COMMANDO TEAM INTO A LANDING ZONE NEAR THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA  
 BORDER. MR. TRI RECALLED THAT ALTHOUGH PAVN FORCES WERE ABLE TO  
 RECOVER ((SP5)) MURPHY'S IDENTIFICATION CARD; U.S. AIRCRAFT  
 ATTACKS DESTROYED ALL THREE BODIES THAT THE COMMANDO TEAM LEFT  
 BEHIND WHEN IT WITHDREW. MR. TRI SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS COMMON  
 FOR U.S. AIR STRIKES TO DESTROY REMAINS LEFT ON THE BATTLE FIELD.  
 HE CITED THIS INCIDENT AS ANOTHER ((SEE 3D1, ABOVE))  
 ILLUSTRATION THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RECOVER REMAINS OF  
 MANY UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS.  
 (10) MCKINLEY NOLAN (CASE 9950). MR. TRI RECALLED THAT  
 MCKINLEY NOLAN HAD CROSSED OVER TO THE SVNLA. MR. TRI SAID NOLAN  
 WAS NOT A POW. MR. TRI SAID HE DID NOT HAVE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF

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NOLAN'S FATE; HOWEVER, MR. TRI HEARD THAT NOLAN STAYED IN CAMBODIA WHEN PAVN AND SVNLA MOVED BACK INTO SOUTHERN VIETNAM AFTER THE PARIS PEACE ACCORDS WERE SIGNED IN EARLY 1973. MR. TRI EXPLAINED THAT NOLAN'S WIFE WAS AN ETHNIC CAMBODIAN NAMED THAACH THI DEN ((THACHJ THIJ ZEEN)). MR. TRI SPECULATED THAT NOLAN'S WIFE MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCED NOLAN'S DECISION TO STAY IN CAMBODIA.

((11)) DAWSON (CASE 0043). MR. TRI RECALLED THAT A BROTHER OF AN MIA PILOT VISITED A TEMPORARY POW CAMP NORTH OF SAIGON. MR. TRI RECALLED THE BROTHER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A YOUNG WOMAN WHO ACTED AS HIS INTERPRETER ((FIELD COMMENT: A YOUNG EURASIAN WOMAN NAMED COLLETTE EMBERGER)). MR. TRI SAID HE LEARNED ABOUT THIS INCIDENT WHEN HE VISITED THE CAMP SOMETIME AFTER THE EVENTS IN QUESTION. DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN NOTED THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) GAVE THE BROTHER ((DONALD DAWSON)) AN ITEM OF PERSONAL FLIGHT EQUIPMENT THEY SAID BELONGED TO 1ST LT DANIEL DAWSON AND PROMISED THE NLF WOULD RETURN 1ST LT DAWSON'S REMAINS AFTER THE WAR. IN RESPONSE, MR. TRI SAID HE BELIEVES IT IS UNLIKELY THE ITEM BELONGED TO 1ST LT DAWSON OR THAT ANYONE IN THE NLF HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE LOCATION OF 1ST LT DAWSON'S GRAVE SITE.

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4. REPORT PREPARED BY MR. R. DESTATTE, DET 2 RESEARCHER/HISTORIAN, AND REVIEWED BY SSGT WILLIAM H. NEWELL, DET 2 ANALYST.//

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