

INTERROGATION REPORT

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SUBJECT	: QUANG TIN Provisional Military Proselyting Section and VC POW Camps	NIC CASE NO: 006/L/67
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At the central line camps, the prisoners and surrenderers from local or battle areas were classified and then sent to a provincial or regional POW rear base camp. At the rear base camp, prisoners were detained while being indoctrinated prior to their release. Source gave some details regarding the rations and billeting of rear base camp personnel. Source did not know the interrogation techniques used on POWs. Prisoners were the responsibility of the capturing agency and were strictly accounted for.

MAP REFERENCES:

- SGIF Series L605, Sheet 137E, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 6
- SGIF Series L605, Sheet 137M, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 6
- SGIF Series L605, Sheet 143W, Scale 1/100,000, Edition 2

The organization structure of the Proselyting Section was as follows: Chief, NGUYEN HIEM; Deputy Chief, NGUYEN NAM; Administrative Staff, THANH; and Printing Staff, SI. There were five or six additional personnel.

2. The Military Proselyting Section covered three main elements: propaganda, penetration, and re-comps. The propaganda element (composition unknown) shared the office with the Military Proselyting Section. Its responsibility was to produce leaflets and documents to indoctrinate people in liberated areas. Source did not know the cadre organization or activities of the penetration element.
3. The chief of the POW element was NGUYEN NAM (concurrently Chief of the Military Proselyting Section). This element established two kinds of POW camps: central line camp and rear base camp. The cadre organization the central line camp was not known.
4. The central line camp consisted of many mobile bases established near battlefields during the operations. These mobile bases were in charge of receiving prisoners and surrenderers from local or battle area. After classification (non-commissioned, commissioned, US or Allied troops, civilians, lightly wounded, suspects) prisoners and surrenderers would be sent to the provincial or regional POW rear base camps.
5. The rear base camp was located in a secure area. Here captured non-commissioned officers and soldiers were detained while being indoctrinated prior to their release. One rear base camp was built at coordinates AS 910910 in a dense mountainous area about a day's walk southwest of HAU DUC District (TRAM) and about 10 kilometers, southwest of BA Mountain (coordinates LS 040910).
6. The POW element was organized as follows:
 - A. Board of Directors

(1) Director	:	NGUYEN DAO
(2) Deputy Director	:	TRAM CANG
(3) Adjutant	:	VO XUAN CHI (Source)

(4) Political Instructor : NGUYEN TRUNG

(5) First Aid agent : ANH

B. Interior Guard Squad

(1) Squad leader : BINH

(2) Strength : nine personnel (HONG, THANH, HANG, ...)

(3) Weapons : nine Soviet modified rifles

(4) Task : protect installations and maintain security

7. The quartering location for the [REDACTED]

one or two personnel. Source arrived there in January 1968. However, he was unable to observe the VC installations as entries and exits to hamlets were restricted. In August 1968, this section moved to PHUOC CAM Village, about 100 meters from the route leading to Tai KY. There they were also dispersed among the populace.

8. One rear base camp was built at coordinates [REDACTED] at mountain area about a day's walk southwest of the [REDACTED] (TAI KY) about 10 kilometers southwest of DA Mountain (coordinates BS 040910). The rear base camp consisted of two 40 x 8 meters thatch buildings, about ten meters apart which accommodated 40 to 50 persons. In addition, there were two mess halls, one for POWs and the other for the Board of Directors. One building provided lodging for the guards. There was one reference room and one kitchen.

9. The rear base camp consisted of two 40 x 8 meter thatch buildings, about ten meters apart, which accommodated 40 to 50 persons. In addition, there were two mess halls, one for POWs and the other for the Board of Directors. One building provided lodging for the guards. These buildings were about 10 to 50 meters apart and were surrounded by a bamboo fence and protected by the guard unit.

10. The monthly ration for rear base personnel consisted of 15 kilos of rice, three kilos of sweet potato and 60 SVN piasters for food. The cadres and personnel ate together. The meals consisted of cooked rice and salted fish only, prepared by the guard section. The soldiers had to supplement their food by gathering mustard, banana buds and pumpkins. Sometimes, they went fishing with nets or grenades. They seldom had pork. Cadres and soldiers who had money could buy food in the lowland.

11. Each member of the unit received a monthly allowance of 20 SVN piasters. The Director received 40 SVN piasters per month. Money was given by the Military Proselyting Section to the Director who turned it over to the Adjutant to be doled to personnel.

12. Cadres and soldiers who had been neither NVN regular troops nor repatriates were issued yearly one suit of black peasant's pyjama or khaki uniform, one pair of shorts, one belt for containing rice, one blanket, one piece of cloth for use as raincoat, one rucksack (every third year) and one canteen. Repatriates had to use the clothing and equipment brought [REDACTED].

13. [REDACTED] The unit members suffered from malnutrition and all had malaria.

Medicines were available for malaria, dysentery, influenza and coughs. Antibiotics were used in treating wounds. Infiltrators brought enough medicine to last two years. If they became seriously ill, they were given shots. Depending on the seriousness of their illness, individuals were entitled to two additional piasters to purchase supplementary food.

14. From January to March 1966, the POW camp was involved in food and animal production. Rice and ten thousand manioc trees were cultivated. A 3,600 square meter paddyfield yielded about 1,000 kilos of rice per harvest. The cultivated area was located on a mountain slope approximately two kilometers south of the barracks. They raised four pigs and 30 chickens. The cadres and soldiers also participated in repairing barracks, digging trenches and carrying supplies.
15. In March 1966, Source and two comrades named MA NAM and THANH were transferred to the Military Proselyting Section and assigned to production in KY SOP Village, TAN KY District, QUANG TIN Province. After getting two buffaloes from the Military Proselyting Section, they cultivated about 10,000 square meters of paddyfield which had been abandoned by the local people. They cultivated 10,000 manioc trees and 720 square meters of sweet potatoes on the mountainside. In August 1966, before harvest time, Source went on home leave to BINH DINH Province, where he was captured on 7 October 1966.
16. Although Source was responsible for managing the POW camp he had not received instruction regarding POW transfers. His comrades told him several principles. POWs must be transferred from lower to upper agencies. Capturing POWs was the task of the battlefield agency which was comprised of operation units and village guerrilla troops. The battlefield agency surrendered them to the district agency (Military Proselyting Section). After classifying the POWs, the district agency would either transfer or keep them. The district POW camp was reserved for detaining regional and militia troops in the district. The provincial POW camps were either central line camps or rear base camps. The Regional Agency received the important prisoners, such as SVN non-commissioned or commissioned officers and US and allied troops. Source did not know they would be treated there. He was told that they would be liberated after a rather long indoctrination.
17. Each agency was required to have some personnel in charge of escorting prisoners. Prisoners traveled by foot to the receiving agency. The prisoners were neither handcuffed nor blindfolded during the journey.
18. The first responsibility of the agencies concerned was to put the frightened and confused prisoners at ease by explaining the VC line and policy. The prisoners must be told that after a period of necessary indoctrination they would be liberated. The belongings of POWs must be carefully kept and recorded. A receipt listing the amount of money and jewels was written clearly and the owner's signature obtained. If the prisoners were transferred, their belongings would be brought along with them. If they were liberated, their belongings would have to be given back to them.
19. All POWs were interrogated on the spot by the agencies in charge of capturing them. (Source did not know whether or not they later would be interrogated by the other agencies). Source learned that the interrogators paid the most attention to the biographics and occupations of prisoners. Source did not know the interrogation technique.
20. The agency capturing the prisoners had to provide food within one or two days. If prisoners were detained in a district over three days, the district agency would make a report to the province to claim expenses. The

general expenses for POWs in all of the province were given by the provincial Committee.

21. The monthly ration of each POW or surrenderer included 15 kilos of rice, a supplement of 3 kilos of sweet potato and 60 SVN plasters for food (fish sauce, salt and mustard).

