


MEMO: Memo File -- RICHARD BARKER
DATE: April 2, 1986
FROM: POC:bg
RE: Transcription of Richard Barker's Statement
(From his handwritten notes to me) - Confidential

In February of 1985 Robert Ketcheson informed me by telephone that he had been in contact with a man named Douglas Pierce from Austin, Texas. He stated that Mr. Pierce had lost his son during the sinking of the drilling ship the Glomar Java Sea in October of 1983. At the time, I was in Hawaii. I had two business partners, Pierre Michel from Kona, Hawaii and Robert Ketcheson who lived in Black Falds, Alberta, Canada. Bob stated that a letter should be sent to Mr. Pierce asking him if he would meet with us in order to fully explain his situation to see if we could be of any assistance to him. Pierre and I wrote Mr. Pierce a letter explaining our services and asking him if he would like to meet with us. A letter was sent in March of 1985. Bob then set a tentative meeting with Mr. Pierce in April of 1985.

Before April, Bob informed me that Pierre was carrying on illegal activities and that Pierre had tried to get him into these activities. He instructed me to tell Pierre that Mr. Pierce had refused to meet with us and that he (Bob) would take care of Pierre. At this time, Bob was in Alberta, Canada and Pierre and I were in Hawaii.

On April 4, 1985, I flew from Kona, Hawaii to Austin, Texas where I met Bob and we checked into the Ramada Inn near the

NATIONAL VIETNAM P.O.W. STRIKE FORCE
2615 WAUGH DR. SUITE 217
HOUSTON, TX. 77006-2799



University. Bob was coming in from Black Falds, Alberta. On April 5, 1985, Bob and I met with Mr. Pierce in his home on Club Court Street in Austin, Texas. Mr. Pierce told us and showed us the evidence he had that led him to believe that his son, John, was alive. He had run ads in Vietnamese newspapers, hired private detectives, personally spoken with Gene Kirkpatrick, the Vietnamese U.N. Ambassador, George Bush, National Transportation Safety Board, Soviet Embassy, KGB Agents Illack and Gorchoff, as well as several Vietnamese boat people. He stated that his son had abandoned the drill ship in a life boat and had gone ashore in Vietnam, just south of Hanoi, where his son was picked up by Vietnamese officials. He then stated that his son was seen by a Vietnamese refugee in a prisoner transfer station, along with six other Americans. He stated that the refugee who spotted him was not¹ in a refugee camp in the Philippines and the refugee did not want any money or assistance from him.

Bob and I stated that we were unsure of how we could assist him, except for verification of the veracity of his reports, and possible logistical aspects of transferring his son from Vietnam back to the United States. We asked him to put everything he said to us in a letter which he later did.

On April 6, 1985, I returned to Hawaii and Bob returned to Alberta. Several months passed. Bob remained in contact with Mr. Pierce. In time, Bob informed me that he had Pierre Michel² was arrested for transporting marijuana to Calgary, Alberta, and that

we no longer had to worry about Pierre screwing up our business with Mr. Pierce.

On August 1, 1985, Bob informed me that Mr. Pierce would like us to go to Los Angeles, California in order to check the veracity of Mr. Jimmey Cillpan of the Bamboo Cross International Church, because Mr. Pierce believed that Jimmey may be on the right track of getting his son and others released. I stated that we could not do this without at least expenses, because it would cost money to remain in California. Bob told me Jimmey wanted us to work on investigating the charges of Medi-Cal fraud brought against the Vietnamese medical community in California. He stated that Mr. John VanDeCamp, State's Attorney General, had arrested 52 doctors, only Vietnamese, and named this the Southeast Asian Project (S.E.A.P. Investigation). He stated a Dr. Nguyen Ghia Quynh would cover our expenses and we would be able to kill two birds with one stone.

On August 25, 1985, I flew to LAX where I met Bob and Mr. and Mrs. Quynh. We proceeded to Westminster (refer to SEAP Investigation report and 60 Minutes' reports). Mr. and Mrs. Quynh paid us \$1,000.00 per week which covered most of our expenses, food, car, gas, etc. Later Dr. Nguyen Dinh Bang also covered some of these expenses. We worked with Theo Engen of Engen and Kirkpatrick Law Firm in Pasadena, California on St. Robles Avenue.

Our investigation into the Southeast Asian Project, I believe, plays no role in this statement, other than background.

Jimney Cillipan stated to us that Ha Krong Boa had the arrangements in progress to obtain the possible release of John Pierce. We met with Krong for the next three months and then because of personal reasons, Bob returned to Alberta and I remained behind to continue. *

The following is a statement of events that led to my arrest in Great Falls, Montana.

The first meeting with Krong, he stated that his friend Vi Han had almost arranged a deal with Hoan Van Hoang in China, Peking, and that Vi was in China now getting the terms of Hoang's proposal, but that the deal he was arranging was the release of all Americans held in Vietnam and that the Chinese government had to agree to the proposal before anything could take place. At that time, he was awaiting the return of Vi so that we could start trying to meet his demands.

At that time Bob and I were working out of Alberta House in Los Angeles, which is a cover office provided by the Canadian Embassy in Los Angeles. Room 3333, 33rd Floor of the Crocker Bank Building, downtown LA, is used for intelligence gathering purposes by us.

At this time we were passing information on what we were learning back to Neil Kingdom, an intelligence officer stationed in RCMP headquarters in Calgary, Alberta. It is interesting to note that the DEA agent that arrested me in Great Falls stated that he knew Neil Kingdom and that he had worked with him many times

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before.

During this period (August to December) I personally spoke to Neil along with Carla Wicket, FBI in Los Angeles, and Patty Voltz, CIA in Washington, D.C., as well as other CIA, FBI and DEA agents^(MR JENNINGS LOS ANGELES D.E.A). Neil wanted us to contact the FBI in Denver, a particular agent, if we were arrested or got into any gun play in Los Angeles. Bob had that contact, not me, and we would be taken to a safe house and transported out of the country. ^{(we did not carry}
^{on person firearms)}

On one occasion in a confrontation with Jack Bailey and operation rescue, the situation almost escalated into me being shot, but I defused the confrontation.

Vi returned to Los Angeles near the end of September and Bob and I met with him, Krong, and Jimmey in Krong's house in Rosemeade, California. I provided Krong and Vi with a declassified listing from 1981 of all POW/MIA personnel, approximately 3,000 people complete with grid coordinates of capture, and categorized status of personnel. This listing belonged to the defense intelligence agency and was declassified in 1981 from secret, and in 1982, reclassified to top secret by the DIA, but it was a copy from the declassified listing. I also provided Vi with a copy of all information on John Pierce, and a copy of a communication from Averell Harriman to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, dated 1963 or 1964, stating that President Diem of South Vietnam can no longer be trusted, and must be sanctioned. Why Vi wanted it I do not know. Why he required this communication, as this top secret, now

declassified, communication is relatively known by most all governments. I also later provided Vi with a copy of the DIA's intelligence report manual on Soviet Battalion officers tactics and strategy, and a DIA manual on Soviet small arms recognition and parts breakdown. Also, a manual (Operations) on the HIND-24 Soviet jet helicopter by the DIA. I assumed that Vi was gathering this information for Hoan Van Hoang. I also provided them with a videocassette of the Senate Subcommittee Hearings on East Asian affairs, concerning POW/MIAs recorded from the July 1985 hearings. Testimony from General Thighe, State Department and DIA. Nothing that I passed to the Chinese was classified at the time.

The last week of September 1985, after turning over the documents and video to Vi Han and Ha Krong Boa at the meeting at the end of September, we requested the information on exactly what Vi had accomplished the previous month in Beijing (Peking). Vi, in a translation through Jimmey Cillpan and Ha Krong Boa explained the overall situation.

He stated that Hoan Van Hoang had left Vietnam in 1977 after a falling out with Le Duan, Nguyen Tho Thach, and Phan Van Dong that Hoang had always backed the nationalist ideals of Ho Chi Minh and did not want anything to do with the soviet communist party's aspirations in the area. He also stated that the Soviet Union had not lived up to agreements about rebuilding Vietnam and that the only thing that had happened was the overall occupation of Cam Ron Bay and the seasonal political invasions of Kampeachea fo

reasons of political proponganda against the horrors of Pol Pot and Prince Sihanouk. For these reasons, Hoan Van Hoang left for China and his allies in the Chinese communist party, without releasing control of the loyalty of the Vietminh or the Cadres controlling the POW/MIAs still remaining in prison camps scattered throughout Laos and North Vietnam.

At that time, Hoang agreed to act as Foreign Minister for Vietnam to the Peoples Republic of China, with whom he had had long ties. Vi stated that today the Vietnamese provincial chiefs, that had allowed the soviets into the country, were disillusioned with false promises of rebuilding by the Soviet Union. They were tired of the seemingly endless invasion of Cambodia. He stated that Hoang now had the backing of the provincial chiefs and the Peoples Republic of China to retake the government from the soviet puppetry of Le Duan and Nguyen Tho Thach. However, Hoang's plans were restricted by the Chinese government. The Chinese backing of arms and money would not be forthcoming without third party recognition and acceptance (of the proposed provisional government), and that this acceptance must come from the western world alliances.

Vi also stated that the United States government had been approached with Hoang's request by various organizations, but he had always received a negative response. Hoang was willing to arrange the release of approximately 475 prisoners of war in exchange for western world recognition of his government in exile, the coup and his proposed war against the Soviet Union.

At that time, Bob and myself proposed an attempt to obtain western world recognition of Hoang's government in exile from the Canadian government, a long time ally of the Peoples Republic of China. However, this would happen only if Hoang was willing to provide absolute proof of the number of prisoners under his control, and his ability to provide the delivery of the Vietminh and provincial chiefs. Vi agreed.

About two weeks later, Vi Han returned to Beijing. Bob returned to Canada and Ba Krong and I remained in California. Vi's mission was to coordinate Hoan Van Hoang's and the Chinese Communist government with our idea of Canadian support, and to get them to agree and accept Canada (as a western alliance supporter for the proposed government in exile). Bob's job was to bring in the Canadian government and get their acceptance of our plans. Krong's and my mission was to coordinate communication between Vi and Bob. Jimmey's mission was to bring in potential support and set up a meeting between myself, Krong, and representatives of President Tu, Coa Ky, KPNLF, and Khmer Rouge representatives across the United States, as well as religious support from other organizations operating currently within territorial Vietnam.

With Bob gone, I continued to work on the SEAP investigation as well as developing strategies for our continuing POW project. Vi reported back from Beijing on or about the end of the first week in October that the Chinese government and Hoan Van Hoang would fully accept Canadian involvement because of the long

standing trust between China and Canada, and because of the Canadian posture during the Vietnam conflict. Also, China was extremely interested in turning this situation into an asset as far as economic development of their country was concerned. They were also concerned with relieving their southern borders from soviet control. Vi reported that the Chinese were being completely surrounded borderwise, by the Soviet Union, and that China's national and economic survival was in danger. Burma, India, Afghanistan, Laos and Vietnam had all either signed pacts or were under insurgent influences by the Soviet Union. There was also the concern that the Phillippines were infested with Vietnamese military advisors, which would eventually lead to the overthrow of the Marcos regime and the eventual occupation of Soviet military advisors assisting the N.P.A. communist forces. The potential of this situation in the Phillippines would seriously damage the security of the Peoples Republic of China. Only the overthrow of the current soviet puppet Vietnamese government would stop the assistance provided by the Vietnamese to the communist N.P.A. forces.


Vi informed us that time was being wasted and that Canada must get on board quickly. I then pushed Bob as fast as possible. Bob stated that he had made contact with John Oostrom, member of Canadian parliament, and a member of the standing committee on the defense of Canada, and that Mr. Oostrom had approached Mr. Joe Clark, Secretary of State, but that more information was required

and that he (Bob) had provided Mr. Clark with written information and documentation concerning our project.

Bob also stated that Canada required time to verify our information before a written response to us could be made. (This response was to be passed to the Chinese government and Canada was aware of this fact).

It was not approximately the end of October. Having previously made contact with Bill Paul of the Wall Street Journal (notation - Bob had originally made contact with Mr. Paul in June or July of 1985. This contact was made when Douglas Pierce leaked information to Bill concerning the disposition of Mr. Pierce's activities surrounding his son). I decided along with Krong Boa that in order to secure the economic and political aspects of the overall operation, it would be imperative that a reporter of high caliber be brought into the overall picture. Also, Mr. Paul had been working for quite some time on the POW issue and was well abreast of the political ramifications which would occur within the United States government (if their numbers were confirmed and their release was brought up). Mr. Paul had been involved with the Bob Garwood issue and other State Department aspects.

We then corresponded with Vi and gained the approval of the Chinese and Hoan Van Hoang. China accepted our plan quickly, in part because the Wall Street Journal would reach the international business community and provide a potential for increased economic growth of China. Mr. Paul's involvement was



later to become a condition imposed by the chinese government. Near the end of October, I personally contacted Mr. Paul and brought him up-to-date on our information. Around the first week in November, Mr. Paul, after having checked his own sources, including General Thighe (ex-chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who was current on the POW/MIA issue) Bill Hendon, Pierre Cote, and others in the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bill was convinced that our plan was sound and he was very excited about the aspects of this operation.

For approximately the next thirty days, I awaited the response from the Canadian government. In the meantime, Hoang had stated to Vi that Hoang was willing to release a current two hour film of all of the live POWs, together with the names of the first POWs to be released. A man named Charles Alvin Dale, Col. United States Army, was the first to be released to the Canadian Embassy in Beiijing. I reported this information to Bob to report to the Canadian government, using a facsimile of the following code:

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	A	F	K	P	U	Z
2	B	G	L	Q	V	
3	C	H	M	R	W	
4	D	I	N	S	X	
5	E	J	O	T	Y	

I also reported this information to Bill Paul, using the same type of coding system. I verified the Colonel's identity on the master DIA list. Bill also dug up all pertinent information concerning the Colonel. We were now only awaiting confirmation of Canadian government involvement.

I was informed by Bob that Mr. Oostrom had gone to Washington, D.C. to verify our information with Canadian Intelligence and sleepers within the United States government. I do not know who he contacted. Mr. Oostrom then returned to Ottawa and then reported that our information concerning the U.S. government and the prisoners of war was sound.

On December 9, 1985, Bob received a letter from Mr. Joe Clark, Secretary of State of Canada, which he passed on to me and passed to Krong. This ended up in the hands of the Chinese government approximately two weeks before Christmas.

A week before Christmas, the Chinese indicated to us that the release might take place Christmas week, but due to uncontrolled circumstances the release was postponed, and Vi returned to California about the 10th of January, 1986, via C.A.C.C. airlines.

Vi informed me that everything was in place in China. Vi contacted Bob on or about the 10th and told him of the following logistical plan:

1. Myself, Vi and Krong had to leave as soon as possible for Beijing.

2. We would make contact with the Canadian embassy and the Chinese government as soon as we arrived.

3. We would also make contact with Hoang.

4. After satisfying the Chinese and Hoang that Canada was ready, the film would be given to me for delivery to Mr. Gorham at the Embassy.

5. Within days, the first POW would then be delivered to me for transport to the Embassy (Charles Alvin Dale). Bill Paul was then to come to Beijing to interview Chinese officials, Hoang and also Charles Dale.

6. Canada was to transport Dale to Vancouver, British Columbia.

7. The other prisoners were then to be released in groups of twenty to thirty, interviewed by Bill, and then be transported to the Canadian Embassy.

8. After all prisoners were released, and when the last bunch was in transit to Vancouver, Hoang and the previously mentioned groups would begin their coup in Vietnam.

9. Canada and China would then petition for recognition of the new government in Vietnam in the United Nations.

10. Hoang and the new Vietnamese Communist Regime would declare war against the Soviet Union.

The only problem we had at this time was financial. At this time Bob recontacted Douglas Pierce of Austin, Texas and explained the situation, and Douglas agreed to go along with us to China and cover all plane fares and expenses. He agreed because



had reports that the people from the Glomar Java Sea were reported to be mixed throughout the POW population.

On January 15, 1986, Doug Pierce arrived in Los Angeles. Doug and I then proceeded to the Peoples Republic of China Embassy in San Francisco on January 16. Vi had contacted the Embassy and we had our visa for permission to enter China within three hours. The visa was granted for a period from January 16, 1986 through April 14, 1986.

On January 17, Vi, Krong, Mr. Pierce and I flew CACC airline to Beijing via Shanghai. We arrived at approximately 12:00 p.m. on January 18, 1986. After landing at Beijing International Airport late Saturday night January 18, 1986, I contacted the Canadian Embassy and asked where we should check into a hotel. The desk stated that we were to go to the Lido Hotel.

On January 19, after a 26 hour plane ride, we were very tired and spent most of the day resting. On the 20th, Vi set up an appointment with Hoang and the liaison officer for the China offshore petroleum construction corporation. This meeting had to be made in order for the Chinese government to be reassured of the fact that Mr. Pierce understood the extent of the search undertaken by the Chinese government, and what China had done in advising the Atlantic Richfield Corporation and global marine corporation of the pending danger before the typhoon struck the Glomar Java Sea. Also, to prove to Mr. Pierce that China had told the drilling corporation to abandon the Glomar before the typhoon struck.

Meetings were also set with Zia Zhang, China's oil, foods, and cerial corporate economist, and the main leader of China's intelligence officer specializing in soviet affairs.

On Monday the 20th of January at approximately 3:00 p.m I reported to the Canadian Embassy in Beijing and met with Ambassador Gorham in his private office. We went over the logistics of the transport of the film and I was assured that the Ambassador had the power and the ability to arrange transport of the first POW on a moments notice. I then returned to the hotel and passed this information on to Vi, Krong, and Mr. Pierce. Mr. Pierce then informed me that he intended to change the plans and request the release of his son first. He also stated that the action would be taken by the Canadian government and Chinese government because he would be able to identify his son and he felt that Canada would not be able to realistically identify Charles Dale.

At this point I became extremely nervous. I felt that the Chinese were to find this out and take it the wrong way, the entire project would be in jeopardy. I informed Vi and Krong of what was happening that evening. Since Mr. Pierce did not speak Chinese or Vietnamese, and Vi did not speak English, Krong and I felt that we could handle the situation if we were extremely careful.

Our first meeting was set for Wednesday at 10:00 a.m. with the liasion officer of the Chinese offshore petroleum

construction corporation. Tuesday, Vi and Krong contacted the secret police and Chinese military officials and I stayed with Mr. Pierce. Mr. Pierce did not trust Vi or Krong, and felt that they may attempt to set us up or have us killed. He informed me that had an extensive network of checks and balances set up for his own protection, and then he proceeded to get intoxicated in the lounge of the Lido Hotel. During all this time and for the duration of the time we were in China, he acted as though the Chinese had been holding his son, and that Krong and Vi were responsible.

By way of additional explanation, Mr. Pierce had been acting as if he was paying us to complete this operation and that therefore he was in control. Actually, we received no money other than money for room, board and airfare to China. We received only expenses. The fact that Vi and Krong had gotten on the plane with one-way tickets and that we were there only on expenses seemed to escape him. You see Mr. Pierce had threatened to leave all of us in China, if his son was not released first.

Pierce related to me the story about now he had Illac arrested and then beaten while in jail on several occasions. I can relate this story if necessary. Illac was found hung to death in his cell in a federal prison in the USA in February 1986.

On Wednesday, we proceeded to meet with the liaison officer at 10:00 a.m. in his office. He related to us what China had done during the Glomar Java Sea incident, and how China was not responsible for this terrible accident. Mr. Pierce treated this man as if he was responsible for holding his son, and kept telling



and Chinese that they should release him. The liasion officer became very irritated and I motioned to Krong, and he spoke to Vi in Vietnamese. Vi then passed a copy of a correspondence to the liasion officer which was written in Chinese. (I do not know what was on that note). The tension stopped and the liasion officer took us for lunch in the Peking Hotel for Peking Duck and Rice Wine.

Krong started to play games at this point with Mr. Pierce in order to satisfy Mr. Pierce.

Our next meeting was set for Friday. Zia Zang, China's intelligence director specializing in soviet affairs, did not speak a word of English (female) and Vi and Krong therefore controlled the situation. However, Mr. Pierce told her that he was only interested in releasing his son and he strongly implied that he represented George Bush and the American government. Although Zia knew what was to happen, this statement scared her and she stated to Vi that evening that China needed to reevaluate the overall situation before the prearranged transaction was to take place. She instructed me that because of what Mr. Pierce had said, before they could complete our transaction, they needed more assurances that Canada was on-board. I reported this to Ambassador Gorham in writing and requested him to telephone the Chinese Foreign Minister and clarify any problems. The Ambassador was not in so I left him my letter.

The following week consisted of government tours and

and meetings with Hoang's people and several late night meetings by Vi with Chinese and Vietnamese officials. China and Hoang's people were ready to move, but for Mr. Pierce's attempt to change the nature of the agreement at this point. They were not prepared to effectively prove the existence of John Pierce, must less gain his individual release. They also required the Canadian government to reassure them again of their commitment.

I proceeded to the Embassy and defriefed Mr. Gorham, Jeffrey Charlabois, and a representative from Brian Pickford's provincial government. I advised them of the overall situation and almost begged them to respond to China's requests. The Ambassador and Charlabois instructed me to bring the Chinese into the Embassy, and they would give them reassurances, but that the Chinese had not delivered the film yet and it was the Chinese who must therefore make the first move. They also indicated that I needed to take a harder line with these people. They said that Mr. Clark had already responded on the December 9th letter and it was China's turn.

I felt that the situation was getting out of hand and I should contact Ottawa through Bob, so I did. Mr. Davidson in Ottawa instructed Bob via telephone that he would leave any decision up to Mr. Gorham and he would remain noncommittal on any decision to be made. I passed this information on to the Chinese, as I felt that in order to salvage the situation, we would have to be perfectly honest with the Chinese government for they held all the cards. (As I mentioned earlier, I was informed in December



of 1985 that all of the POWs were being moved to Yunnan Province in China, and that Charles Dale was working as a houseboy in Hoang's home in Peking. It was confirmed to me by the Chinese government through Vi and Krong that in fact they had been moved to China and the boxes of newspapers that Vi had taken to China in December had been given out. The POWs were also one of the reasons for running the superbowl game in China for the first time ever, in order to reacquaint them with current American events.

However, at this point I was informed by the Chinese that we should return home and acquire a letter of confirmation from the Canadian government that it knew what we were doing and that Canada was still on-board. Zia told Mr. Pierce that she personally would try and find out what had happened to his son. It was reconfirmed by Zia at this point that all the prisoners were gathered in December and placed in Yen Bai Prison Camp, and later transported to the Yunnan Province for medical attention and debriefing purposes.

On February 2, 1986 we left for Hong Kong on CACC airlines and from there we proceeded to Japan on JAL airlines. I Toyko I transferred to JAL, Honolulu bound, and then on Hawaiian airlines to Kona.

Pierce returned to Austin, Texas on American airlines and Vi and Krong went to LA on Korean airlines. All letters that exchanged hands between Zia and Vi, which were written in Chinese were given to me in order to prove China's commitment. Note



also that I personally signed in and out of the Canadian Embassy everytime that I met with Canadian officials in Peking.

Just before I left China, a message was passed to us verbally by Zia that China's house was full, and that Krong, Vi and myself had opened their door and Canada's door. But it appeared that Canada's house was empty and that we must therefore go home and fill Canada's house. Also, the message was that she would be in contact with us on or before the first week in March. She also told Mr. Pierce that she would do what she could about his son and contact him soon.

I returned home on February 2, 1986 and contacted Bob Ketcheson and informed him of what had happened to our project. I told him that between Mr. Pierce's interference and the refusal to contact China direct by External Affairs of Canada in Ottawa, and their policy with Gorham in China, the Chinese had become scared and postponed the project. I told him that if I was in China's position, I probably would have done the same thing. He told me that he would straighten this out and obtain the letter of confirmation necessary from the Canadian government. I told him that we needed to develop another method to confirm the plan, not using the Canadian government, just in case something was wrong in Ottawa. Bob then informed me that there was nothing to worry about and that Canada was on-board and that Brian Mulrooney was so confident that he had already made an appointment with President Reagan which had been set for the 16th and 17th of March.

Bob said that he could arrange the financial aspects of our next trip as well as obtain the letter of confirmation that we needed from Mr. John Oostrom, well before March 1.

Over the next few weeks I remained in Kona. I mailed copies of the documents that Zia had given to me to Bob, to be passed on to Ottawa. He mailed me the letter of confirmation that China required, which I then passed on to the Chinese to Han Vi. I was informed that the mistakes that had been made by Canada previously had been those of Mr. Davidson from External Affairs in Ottawa, and that Mr. Davidson had been reprimanded and posted as Ambassador to the Philippines. (This was just before the Marcos regime collapsed - two days before).

On or about the first week in March, I learned from Bill Paul that Zia Zhang had gone to Hanoi and was still there. She had not contacted us yet. Bob and I decided to go to plan "B", which entailed going to Bangkok in order to be closer to the overall situation. We felt that if we were in Bangkok we could contact Zia easier, and a trip of this nature would coincide with Mr. Oostrom's scheduled trip to Thailand, which was to take place from March 1 to approximately April 15, 1986. I had been informed by Bob and John Oostrom that they had scheduled this trip quite some time ago.

I told Bob that we still needed an outside source of assistance because I felt Canada had made mistakes before and we could not afford another error. Bob informed me of the Buddhist Monks missing in Vietnam (see supplement 5, Canadian Buddhist

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Association, John Lasard, Director of Catholic Relief Association, Bangkok). Bob said that the President of the Canadian Buddhist Association may be able to assist us with contacts in Bangkok in order for us to complete the project at hand with or without Canadian governmental assistance. *

I then called my brother Ken Barker in Paris, Ontario, and asked him to make contact with this organization and tentatively make plans to leave for Bangkok from Calgary on April 1, 1986. Ken gathered information from the President of the Canadian Buddhist Association and learned of our contact in Bangkok from him. Ken informed me the contact man in Thailand was John Lasard, Director of the Catholic Relief Association in Bangkok. Ken also told me that he had sent all the information along with the name of our contact to Bob Ketcheson in Black Falds, Alberta. This was on or about March 14, 1986.

The only remaining problem was money. In order to pay for our expenses in Bangkok, as our plan included a meeting of Ken, Bob and myself in Black Falds, Alberta on the 24th of March and then the trip to Bangkok on or about April 1. Also, a meeting was tentatively set with Ross Perot in Bangkok during the first week April. We intended to inform him of what was going on and to use him if possible to finance the logistical operations of the project if the Canadian government backed out.

But first we had to have the financing to get us to Bangkok. Bob told me, ^{on or about the 14th of March,} that he had made contact with a Dale

Peterson in Hawaii and that Mr. Peterson would cover the expenses to Bangkok in exchange for my personally transporting a package from Salt Lake City, Utah to Great Falls, Montana. Mr. Peterson was supposedly currently in Hawaii and would be contacting me on or about the 16th of March 1986.

I met Mr. Peterson at my house in Kona on the 16th of March. I had a general idea that the contents of the package to be transported must be sensitive, but I asked Mr. Peterson no questions about its contents because I assumed that I could handle this situation and that Bob would not have taken this secondary method of obtaining financing unless he was sure we would be able to transport this item. Mr. Peterson asked where he would be able to deliver this package to me near Salt Lake. I arranged a drop point in Ogden, Utah.

I departed for Salt Lake City from Kona on the 20th of March, 1986 and arrived in Ogden on the 21st. The package was delivered to me on the 22nd of March and I made the arrangements ^{6:15 PM} ~~22nd of March~~ for Bob to pick me up at the Great Falls Airport on the 23rd of March.

I felt that if something was wrong I would know within 24 hours, so I spent the night of the 22nd in Ogden. On the 22nd of March Bob said that he was to pick me up and take me to the Holiday Inn in Great Falls, Montana where Mr. Peterson would then meet us and then give us three airline tickets to Bangkok, Thailand and \$2,800.00 U.S. currency. Then we were to leave for Black Falls,



Alberta and arrange for my brother Ken to come to Calgary, have a meeting with us, and leave for Bangkok.

Needless to say, when I arrived in Great Falls I was met by DEA officers, arrested and transported to the Cascade County Jail. Bob never showed up at the airport. He was the only one who knew the time and the airline upon which I was arriving.

On the first of April, I was informed by my brother Ken by way of my lawyer, Pat Cotter, that John Lasard, our contact in Bangkok was killed March 30, and that Bob had disappeared and was nowhere to be found.