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FULL TRANSLATION

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No. 71/C-E

DIRECTIVE

Face-to-face struggle against the US-Armed Forces  
 and organization of Political Struggle Section at  
 various echelons.

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The plenary conference of the Region Party Committee held in October 1965 observed that in spite of progress made since October, our movement fails to be developed proportionately to meet the new situation. They noted the great and successive military successes. They also observed that the deficiencies and weaknesses brought up by the October 1965 resolution on the political struggle movement have not been swiftly corrected.

Since October 1965, N.T. [possible NAM TRUONG] current affairs has urged us to step up the political struggle movement by issuing the following directives:

- Directive dated 4 October 1965 on the initiation of a movement against the Americans and their lackeys for their increased terrorism and slaughter of our countrymen with airstrikes, artillery shellings and toxic chemicals.

Directive dated 31 [sic] November 1965 on a number of problems in the rural mission, mentioning the organization of a permanent political struggle force.

Directive dated 5 December 1965 concerning the stepping up of political struggle and coordination of political with military attacks to gain greater victories.

Directive dated 25 December 1965 from the Region Current Affairs Committee concerning a number of problems in the urban mission, including political struggle in cities and municipalities in the new situation.

In addition, NT also sent to us the list of experiences of T5 in attacking the US aggressors on three fronts. Party Committee echelons-especially Province Party Committees must study these directives, require lower echelons to study them, and direct their proper implementation. Experiences of T5 will be studied within the Party and among the people.

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The above resolution of T. Party Committee Conference and directives of NT-Current Affairs Committee are brought to the attention of Province Party Committees and subordinate sections of T. These organizations must increase their awareness of the necessity to attack the enemy both politically and militarily and at the same time; the capability of defeating the enemy not only in a special war but also in open conflict; the fact that US troops play the key role in the enemy mobility. In addition Party Committees will review the political struggle movement in their respective areas, in order to swiftly correct the deficiencies and enable the movement to meet the requirements of the new situation.

In this directive, the Region Current Affairs Committee brings up two problems:

- The political struggle is to be conducted while the US and satellites increase their forces in SVN.

- Organization of the political struggle at various echelons.

1. Political struggle must be conducted while the US and satellites increase their forces in SVN.

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As mentioned in NAM TRUONG directive dated 5 December 1965, the recent victories of our army have driven the enemy into a very serious political, economic, and military crisis in spite of the US increase of war material and tens of thousands of US and satellite troops.

These victories were largely due to the fact that we have properly realized the necessity of simultaneous political and military struggle, the capability of defeating the enemy not only in a special war but also in an open conflict, and the fact that the US troops play the key role in the enemy mobility.

Though US imperialists has escalated the war and sent more troops to SVN, its political weaknesses are insurmountable and will lead to a more disadvantageous position in the aggression on our country. Instead of limiting the capability for political and military struggle, the sending of more US troops into SVN only increase it for the following reasons:

- Sharp contradictions between US imperialists and our people.  
- Increased contradictions between US Imperialists and their lackey.  
- The Americans must follow their neo-colonialist policy and, thus must be demagogues. Our people have been indoctrinated and are mature in political and military struggle, Therefore they are able to exploit the weaknesses of the enemy policy and demagogy to strengthen their struggle. Moreover, most US soldiers come from the working class. They are victims of the deception of the capitalist regime and were sent to Vietnam to serve as cannon fodder. The anti-war movement of the US people is being developed every day and has considerably affected the morale of US troops, Therefore, we have a good chance to proselyte them and urge them to sympathize with and support our people against the savage terrorism of the US aggressors.

The presence of many US troops in SVN creates many economic and financial problems, raises the cost of living, and makes life more difficult for RVN soldiers, civil servants and civilians living in enemy controlled areas.

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As a result, the masses will be more convinced to struggle against the enemy.

The US expansion of the war in SVN and the bombings of NVN have led to the indignation of the people of the US and the world. This further isolates the US imperialists.

Above are the conditions and capabilities of our political struggle movement as the US expands the war and sends more US and satellite troops into SVN.

[ Page 3 original text ]

In Eastern (Nam Bo) Region, US troops are stationed in some areas and start launching sweep operations in the surrounding areas. In some provinces there are more US than puppet troops. During their operations the US troops sustained heavy losses from our three types of troops. The movement of "seeking and annihilating the US troops" is being successfully carried out. However the political proselyting of US troops-especially the negroes -has not been duly emphasized.


It is the belief of some cadre that political struggle would be of no use against the US troops when they occupy areas in our region or when they were on operations. In T-5 when the US troops first arrived, the people were very embarrassed: they hated the Americans but they were also afraid of them and dared not struggle with them face-to-face because of the language barrier. In some liberated areas, the people fled upon the arrival of US troops thus enabling the troops to burn civilian houses and steal the people's property (South Ben Cat). However, the actual struggle in T5 and other occurrences around US locations in our region have recently showed that the people have successfully maintained their legal status and conducted face-to-face struggle against the US troops.


In the days to come, the US is expected to send more troops to SVN and some tens of thousands of them will be stationed in Eastern (Nam Bo) region. They will deploy in some areas and play the key role in enemy mobility. Therefore, if we fail to conduct political and military struggle simultaneously and to patiently promote 3 front attacks, the people will not be able to maintain their legal status and we will face many difficulties which may hamper future military victories. (we have many capabilities of proselyting US troops).

The important point is that Party Committees must realize that no matter how expanded the war is and how many US troops are sent to VN, the policies, guide lines and objectives of the SVN Revolution will remain the same.

In order to increase the political struggle movement to meet the new situation, it is necessary to grasp the above guide lines, strategy, capabilities and conditions/the same time indoctrination must be conducted within the Party and among the people on the experiences drawn from the 3 front, anti-US struggle in T5. Cadre must use their experiences in the previous anti-US struggles to remain close to the people and lead them in the struggle against the enemy. In the meantime we must be determined to wear down and destroy the enemy politically as well as militarily.

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2. Organization of the political struggle section at various echelons.

The political struggle movement in our region still has many shortcomings and fails to develop proportionately with the new situation, with successive military victories, with our new capabilities and conditions. The most important reasons are the failure to properly follow the guidelines and to set up a political struggle section.

Though these sections at various echelons have assisted Party Committees in leading the movement and forming a permanent force, their role and mission are not yet fully realized by Party Committees.

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The Party Committees, therefore, give little attention to this section and, in some areas, entrust this mission to the women's Executive Committee.

In order to put an end to such a situation, efforts should be made to improve the organization of village, district and province political struggle sections and specifically determine their mission, authority and working procedures.

a/. Mission and authority.

The political struggle section is a specialized section of the Party Committee like the security, economy, finance, military proselyting sections etc... with the following mission:

- Closely follow the political struggle movement, prepare and submit suggestions to Party Committee echelons concerning struggle plans and slogans for each area, each moment, each situation. Help the Party Committee echelons draft their reports on the movement.

- Study and follow enemy plots in the political, military, economic fields in the local area in a given period of time. Follow the ideology and morale of the puppet army and government personnel. Divide the troops into types such as American negroes, whites, satellite troops. Divide the government officials by rank such as district and province chiefs. Properly assess the ideology and aspirations of the masses.

The political struggle section at one echelon is not authorized to determine policies and slogans for lower echelons. (Example: Slogans for unified policy of struggle for the entire province or district).

- Help lower Party Committee echelons set up their political struggle sections.

Maintain relations with other organizations such as the women's Executive Committee to set up a permanent force for political struggle.

- Lead the political struggle sections at lower echelons in the organization of a permanent struggle force, improve the latter's tactics, techniques and arguments, consider its improvement as important as the improvement of the militia guerrilla, assume the direct leadership of some concentrated struggles to detect prospective key cadre and train them to become district and village cadre.

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Composition:

- 1 Section Chief
- 2 Assistants
- Members and cadre

The section chief has the rank of a Party Committee member. If many Party Committee members are on hand, one of them will be assigned to lead this section. In the opposite case, he will concurrently hold two positions, including section chief. However, the other branch he concurrently leads must relate to political struggle and his assistant must be a qualified cadre assigned to this mission on a full-time basis. The other assistant will be assigned from the women's Executive Committee.

All members and cadre of the section will be personnel assigned on a full time basis and will not be in charge of any other mission.

Party Committee echelons will be responsible for the organization of the political struggle section and selection of qualified cadre for this section. Cadre of province and district political struggle section must be able to study and grasp the plans of Party Committee echelons for application in villages.

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o/. Work procedures:

Following procedures are temporarily determined pending further amendments:

The province political struggle section will meet once a month and hold a conference with district sections once every three months to review the activities, organization, status of the permanent force, draw experiences, recommend awards, and draft future plans.


Each month, the situation will be reported to the respective Party Committee and to higher echelon political struggle sections and sent to lower echelons for information. Once a month the district and village sections will meet to review the political struggle movement and to build up a permanent force for political struggle.

Close coordination and relations must be maintained between various echelons. Swift communications must be ensured for the leadership. Radio must be used for communication between province and region on important and urgent problems.

The political struggle movement should maintain close relations with other branches of the same level to properly assess the enemy and friendly situations.

Political struggle sections must work swiftly, realistically. Especially village sections must remain close to the people and closely observe the enemy to lead the masses in their daily struggle. The (Party's) policy toward the masses must be strictly complied with while authoritarianism and bureaucracy must be avoided.

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Upon receipt of this directive, Party Committees will convene a meeting to review the political struggle movement in the province, the arrival of US troops and planned counter measures. Political struggle sections will be formed at province level first. Then these sections will gradually go to districts and villages to set up sections at these levels. Papers to delegate such authority from U Party Committee will be taken along. Reports on any progress made will be submitted to region.

25 December 1965


Region Current Affairs Committee

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