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
ENEMY DOCUMENTS

USMACV DEC Doc Log#	Summary	Capture Data
01-1534-66	<p><b>Military Proselyting Situation Report</b></p> <p>Report, #11/8/BC, dated 2 August 1965, Military Proselyting Section of Nam Truong. Provides an analysis of the Military Proselyting situation in July 1965. In this month, emphasis was placed on sending 1/3 of the military proselyting cadre to the weak areas, to set up action teams and to reinforce the village military proselyting machinery.</p> <p>Advisory teams from COSVN were maintained in Region 1, Region 2 and U5 of Region 1 to participate in local operations, so that the action teams could gain experiences necessary for the general leadership.</p> <p>In region 1, ten (10) action teams were organized from district level and higher. Cadre were being trained by various Region and District action teams. Due to a change in the operational methods, U5 succeeded in using fifth columnists, in coordination with a military attack, to destroy two enemy platoons stationed in posts. Also captured 44 weapons.</p> <p>In Region 2, a Region Military Proselyting seminar is to be organized in August 65, one province has been selected as a pilot area. Two targets were under attack by two elements totaling 40 cadre.</p> <p>In Region 4, three (3) Region action teams, each with 4 cadre were activated. A number of District action teams were also set up.</p> <p>Region 3 was still in the planning phase.</p> <p>Region 5 has been directed to concentrate its military proselyting activities on the enemy main forces and in weak areas.</p> <p>In general, action teams were still in the activation phase, and the attack on the enemy was weak. However, the military proselyting task must be carried out urgently since there are</p> <p>"KIN IS A VIETNAMESE CLASSIFICATION EQUIVALENT TO <u>CONFIDENTIAL</u> AND WILL BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY"</p>	<p>10 Jan 66, XT627271, US 173d ABN Bde. Received DEC: 14 January 1966.</p> <div data-bbox="1218 1323 1380 1669" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; transform: rotate(-15deg);"> <p>GROUP-1 Excluded from automatic downgrade and declassification.</p> </div>

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	<p>many opportunities. Enemy soldiers and even enemy officers (1st and 2d Lt), are susceptible to revolutionary ideas and arguments. The enemy frequently moves his battalions around. If an action team follows a specific battalion, it would never gain freedom of action. When an enemy battalion moves out, the contacts in this battalion can be maintained through civilians, dependents or secret agents. The action team must stay in its area of operation to approach newly detected contacts. Only a number of cadre will be sent out to follow the targets when it deems very necessary. Long range fifth columnists also must be recruited among enemy key installations.</p> <p>For August 65, priority must be given to the activation of action teams, the training of military proselyting cadre, and the military proselyting attacks on enemy training and recruiting centers. Step up the disintegration of enemy units and sever their sources of replacement.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[No further exploitable information]</p>	
01-1535-66	<p>Document Routing Slip</p> <p>Document routing slip, #02/T, dated 4 Nov 65, signed by Ba Tien, of the office of Y.60, returning the following documents to HQ:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Correspondence #22 (C6 and Long An Unit attacking the enemy in Duc Lap)</li> <li>2. Correspondence #13 (report from Di an on friendly and enemy situation as of 26 Oct 65)</li> <li>3. Correspondence # 30, from Tu Thieu to the Command Committee.</li> <li>4. Correspondence # 15, from COSVN Anh Trong to Region 4.</li> <li>5. Correspondence #32, from Tu Thieu to the Command Committee.</li> <li>6. Correspondence #14 (report from #3 on friendly and enemy situation on 22 and 23 Oct 65)</li> <li>7. Correspondence #94, (Thu Duc Unit countering enemy operation in Truong Lau on 23 Oct 65).</li> <li>8. Correspondence # 6 (report from # 3 on the raid of the Special Action Team on Thu Duc town on 10 October 1965).</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;">[No further exploitable information]</p>	<p>10 Jan 66, XT657271, US 173d ABN BDE. Received DEC: 14 January 1966.</p>
01-1536-66	<p>Document Routing Slip</p> <p>Document routing slip, # 15, dated 29 Oct 65, from Ba Tien to Ba Xuan returning the following documents:</p>	<p>10 Jan 66, XT657271, C2/ 503, 173d ABN BDE. Received DEC: 14 January 1966.</p>

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