

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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15. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a notebook, maintained by an unidentified individual of a ((VC)) PW camp ((possibly directly subordinate to the Enemy Proselyting Office, Political Staff Department, HQ, VC Military Region 5)). The notebook contains entries describing the author's daily activities during his assignment to the PW camp.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 15 March 1972 in South Vietnam (AS826282; RVN Military Region 2) by the 101st RF Co, RVN Military Region 2. The document was received at CDEC on 21 April 1972, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 48,709, dated 22 April 1972, under Item 2 of 2 items of CDEC Document Log Number 04-1527-72. Translation was initiated by CDEC.

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----- EXTRACT TRANSLATION -----

((TN: The preceding pages in the O.T., which are omitted in the translation deal with the author's movement to Ban Village)).

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((I)) was assigned by Comrade Thai, Unit Commander, to the staff of the PW Camp ((possibly directly subordinate to the Enemy Proselyting Office, Political Staff Department, HQ, VC Military Region 5)). I should strive my best to accomplish this new mission.

I departed for the PW Camp. I did not meet the postal-commo guide and had to go by myself. I arrived at Ty Village at night, where I slept in the same underground shelter with the Bóns.

From Ty ((Village)) to Comrade Thuong's station, a US sweeping force bivouacked in Tra Linh area on the right bank of Thu Bón River. During the night, I crossed the river under a barrage of fire. However, over 20 enemy troops had been killed by only five guerrillas.

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There are numerous mountains on the way to Tiên Lanh. We opened paths through the jungle. Men carrying supplies on their backs and on pack bicycles travelled merrily back and forth as if they were in a carnival. This scene proved that the enemy is obviously defeated.

Tonight, I had to spend the night in the jungle. I ate rice soup and rested in order to be able to depart early in the morning. At night, my mosquito net and blanket became wet from the rain because I did not set up my tent.

When I arrived at the station, Comrade But had gone to settle the problems concerning deserters. Comrade But is among the best station chiefs I have met on the ((commo-liaison)) route. He invited me for a drink, gave me rice, and wholeheartedly provided necessary guidance for those comrades who were newly assigned to the station for TDY. He won the sympathy of everyone. He strictly implemented the policy for the handling of wounded soldiers. We should follow his examples.

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On 13 Apr 68, I arrived at the ((PW)) Camp. Upon arriving at Tra My area, I ate "Viên" fish to my hearts content for two days.

On 25 Apr 68, I went to Dông Yên to harvest rice and did not return until 19 May 68.

((TN: The following pages in the O.T., which are omitted in the translation, deal with political reorientation for cadre and soldiers and contain self-critiques of cadre and soldiers during a meeting)).

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Comrade Thua: He was not enthusiastic in performing his task and balked at hardships. Sometimes he was jealous of the others and doubtful of our policies. Because of his rightist attitude and lack of sense of responsibility, the PW escaped twice.

((TN: The next paragraphs in the O.T., which are omitted in the translation deal with the self-critiques of the members of the author's unit)).

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Matters concerning PW's: Separate and isolate ringleaders ((meaning the most stubborn PW's)), win over black and Indian US PW's, and select receptive elements.

Method:

Hold meetings with cell leaders and black and uncommitted US PW's and motivate them to counter ringleaders.

Tell the uncommitted PW's that we promote equality among PW's.

The PW's must comply with our regulations. Escape means death. Give them more indoctrination on our policy. Incite them to denounce the ringleaders.

2. Force the PW's to plant vegetables, pick up firewood, and perform sanitation activities.

Organize black US PW cells.

Make them struggle against one another.

((TN: The next paragraphs in the O.T., which are omitted from the translation, deal with the activation of a security guard unit and its missions and political indoctrination)).

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Experiences gained:

It is very difficult for the wounded US PW's brought to the ((author's PW)) Camp to recover and survive. Only with a special diet and exceptional medical treatment could the wounded PW's be saved from death. Otherwise, even if the Camp works strenuously to provide these PW's with the necessary care they will die all the same, and the death of a US PW will seriously affect the morale of the other ((US)) PW's. As proof, of the four wounded ((US)) PW's recently evacuated to the Camp, three have died.

2. Finding adequate food for a US PW to have enough calories for his body is extremely difficult, especially in the jungle and mountains. Moreover, due to the bad weather of the jungle, the nourishment of US PW's is a most difficult and complicated problem. It is more difficult than the political indoctrination task. Thus, steps should be taken by higher echelons to remedy this shortcoming, or else the PW's health will decline rapidly, as will their morale.

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They will no longer believe in our lenient and humane policy and will become dismal and reckless at the thought of being maltreated and left to die gradually. Thus, the indoctrination of them will become more difficult.

3. Since US PW's are invaders and furthermore, are often lazy, unaccustomed to labor duties, and stubborn, and due to the language barrier, they are easily disliked and beaten by the entire Camp, which is contrary to the Party policy towards PW's. Therefore, we must exercise close control over the Camp. (Two incidents involving the beating of US PW's occurred in the Camp in 1968).

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4. Make everybody in the Camp (medics, female attendants, and supply personnel) fully aware of the policy toward: PW's. They should display correct conduct; not despise, neglect, or ridicule.

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the PW's; and should be able to convert them to our ways.

5. The US PW's usually suffer from diarrhea, dysentery, and scabies. They are bitten by lice, and their scratches are likely to become infected and gangrenous. We must have medical officers to take care of them, and the amount of drugs for treating them must be three times higher than that required for the treatment of Puppet PW's, especially drugs for internal diseases. (Adequate treatment of one or two sick PW's will make the PW's thoroughly understand our policy).

6. Motivate everyone in the Camp to strictly conform to the policy towards PW's, otherwise they will leave the treatment of PW's entirely to the director of the Camp, who will be indifferent to the illness and the food of PW's. Our personnel think that the ((US)) PW's used to have a high standard of living. Now, if they suffer physically a little bit, it does not harm them much.

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7. Ideological indoctrination should be given to the camp personnel so that they realize the importance of the task of handling the PW's and thoroughly understand the policy concerning this matter to effectively perform this task in order to defeat the US aggressors. They should also contribute to the improvement of the prisoners' health.

The messing and billeting of prisoners must be organized in such a way as to reflect the civilization, systematic organization, and discipline of the Front and of our people.

Indoctrination of the US prisoners

Criteria to be attained:

Comfort prisoners to rid them of any attempt to risk their lives ((meaning escape)), and to nurture in them a confidence in the ((NFLSVN's lenient)) policy.

Encourage them to observe discipline, hygiene and order and labor duties and to maintain proper routine activities.

Guideline: Indoctrination should be coupled with discipline. Motivate them to act properly, and pay

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attention to sick prisoners.

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Indoctrination materials: Use books, newspapers, and information bulletins in both English and Vietnamese languages as indoctrination material.

Give substantial awards to prisoners who enthusiastically perform labor duties.

Requirements to be attained by the PW Camp personnel:

1. Indoctrinate the Camp personnel to enhance their enthusiasm in executing the policy.

2. Adopt the slogan: "Make every effort to improve the prisoners' health."

Take this as a part of the emulation program.

3. Conduct cultural courses for illiterate personnel.

4. Promptly and regularly award and encourage personnel.

Train personnel to sing.

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Conduct a session of reading books and newspapers on Monday night.

Elect a committee.

Show US prisoners the messing and billeting facilities of the Puppet prisoners. Help the black US PW cells. Pay attention to Puppet PW's and to the balance of their food allowances and fortified diet allowances.

On 29 Jul 69, I participated in the meeting conducted by the Party Current Affairs Committee, Enemy Proselyting Office, ((Political Staff Department)), ((VC)) Military Region 5.

While we were indoctrinating the US PW's, the US sprayed toxic chemicals. They were promptly indoctrinated and warned of Nixon's crime.

((TN: The following paragraph and pages in the O.T., which are omitted in the translation, deal with VC morale)).

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On 9 Mar 71, enemy aircraft strafed ((the area)) and landed troops. I joined the security guards to bravely fight the enemy and secure the camp.

The US soldiers were bad fighters. After suffering two KIA's, they withdrew.

Members of our unit built houses and increased farm production. They cleared the ricefield and sowed 50 cans of cereal seeds each. We reaped a good crop; nearly 3000 cans of corn ((grain)) and thousands of ang ((one ang equals six kilos)) of unhusked rice. It is very cheerful.

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It rained for nearly one month.

The water current was swift and we were unable to carry rice. Therefore, PW's, cadre and workers could only eat one can of rice a day and sometimes half of a can without ((dried)) manioc roots. However, upon learning of friendly victories on the battlefield and the American people's movement against the VN War, we were all enthusiastic despite the ((lack of food provisions)).

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Critique of the security guard platoon.

All security guard personnel had a high morale. They did not fear the strong enemy, sacrifice, or war atrocities. They believed in the Party, clearly realized our victories, and were very enthusiastic. However, they still showed negligence in the implementation of our policy toward PW's. According to them, the mission of indoctrinating and feeding PW's was not theirs; and they often beat and threatened the PW's.

Mi Bi, Dang, Quay, and Long use to mistreat the PW's. They had a poor sense of observing the discipline regulations.

((TN: The following two pages in the O.T., which are omitted in the translation deal with the author and his comrades' enthusiasm when learning of the bombing halt over NVN)).

((TN: The preceding pages in the O.T., which is omitted in the translation deals with a rice transportation mission in Tân An, Quảng Ngãi)).

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To celebrate ((the formation of the NFLSVN)) on 20 Dec, I was given a meal with pork.

In the Trà Mi area, the US conducted repeated bombings, but it failed to hit an ((unspecified)) bridge on a strategic road. An old man complained that the US aircraft bombed his ricefield instead of its targets. How lucky

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I was! If I had come here 15 minutes earlier, I would have been confronted with danger. The enemy fired rockets and bombed a noodle shop close to a pagoda, killing three persons. The villagers deeply hated American aggressors, so they wrote a slogan opposing the American-type peace. I stayed at Dồng Yên area for three days in peace, although the enemy frequently fired at this area. I participated in farming activities, such as clearing forests and collecting corn, for two days. I also bought a radio for Comrade Toai. It was valued at 7,500\$ ((possibly SVN)) and was in good condition.

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At noon on 30 Jan 69, ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) Special Forces which came from Phước Lâm conducted random fire and captured one civilian. However, they failed to terrorize the people. On the way back to the unit, I collected grindstone and rattan.

On 1 May 69, higher echelons ordered the movement of the detention camp to another area because some members of units were reportedly captured by the enemy. All PW's and unit members moved in safety. As soon as we reached the destination, we had to concentrate every effort to arrange our messing and billeting facilities.

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Everything was done satisfactorily.

On 19 May 69, I completed arranging the billeting and messing facilities, established shelters, and thinned out rice plants.

In Dồng Yên, the enemy swept the area. He killed two buffaloes belonging to our unit, destroyed the production camp, burned 50 ang ((one ang equals six kilos)) of corn and 20 ang of rice, and damaged 400 ang ((sic)).

Enemy activities adversely affected the harvest.

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Situation of the unit at the end of the year.

((TN: The preceding pages in the O.T., which are omitted from the translation deal with political indoctrination)).

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Meeting held by the Party Chapter to discuss the problem concerning PW's:

The PW's were beaten because of a cat.

There were no methods of treating and nourishing the PW's who were sick and very thin, such as the wounded when they were first brought to the camp.

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The messing and billeting houses for PW's leaked, but no plan was drafted to repair them before the rainy season. Therefore, the PW's had no place to sleep when it rained at night.

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The attitude of looking down on PW's was still prevalent.

No positive efforts were made to treat the PW's or take care of them when they got sick at night. The reason is that the ((camp)) personnel were lazy or unable to treat the PW's. We did not provide enough food for PW's even though we could.

((TN: The following pages in the O.T., which are omitted from the translation, contain indoctrination notes which are of no intelligence value)).

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Difficulties:

The PW's were sick. They became wretched and desperate.

The PW's had to change their houses. Finding adequate food for the ((US)) PW's was extremely difficult. The farm production task was difficult.

Favorable conditions:

Party members had attended political reorientation courses. They realized the political missions of Party chapters and their own missions. Even civilians were thoroughly indoctrinated on the Party's policy ((concerning PW's)).

We found the ((harmful)) tendencies which impeded the accomplishment of missions.

We enjoyed the assistance from higher echelons in every aspect.

We must regularly indoctrinate the camp personnel on the Party's policy ((concerning PW's)) and must control the implementation of this policy.

We must eliminate individualism.

We must increase the sense of organization and discipline of the camp personnel.

The Party Chapter Committee and the Staff ((of the camp)) must work out a plan to implement the Party's policy ((concerning PW's)).

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----

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