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TRANSLATION REPORT

ENEMY DOCUMENTS

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FULL TRANSLATION

[Page 1 of original text]

#14/TA
Copy #:

TO: U. Security Sections

Subject: Guard and close surveillance of prisoners

A study of U. and V. Security Section reports by T. Security Section shows a visible amelioration in the general situation of detention camps: interrogators, adjutants, instructors and wardens have made considerable efforts to fulfil their mission in spite of the personnel shortage.

However, the following deficiencies are still observed by T. Security Section:

1. Evacuation of prisoners:

Enroute, the prisoners are not properly tied and blindfolded, thus they are able to identify the route and locate the detention camp. Lack of vigilance resulted in prisoners' escape after disarming the guards (U.6). During an evacuation in U.2, four loosely tied prisoners took advantage of a stop-over in the house of a receptive civilian and the lack of vigilance of the guards to untie one another, seize 3 weapons, killed 2 (VC) soldiers, wounded 5 others and ran into the forest. Their resistance was very fierce and disturbed the whole area. Finally we captured one of the prisoners and killed the other three.

2. Detention camps are not secure and partitioned, thus enabling the prisoners to contact one another, or worse, male and female prisoners to even make love. Prisoners are allowed to work out of the camp five or ten men at the same time and freely sell their personal belongings while the few guards assigned walked carelessly among the prisoners.

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
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Some guards even led the prisoners deep into the forest for game hunting, got lost on the way back, slept in the forest and only came back the following day (10 To, U.1). Weapons were some times left unattended and within the reach of the prisoners, as in 10 To, Tu Khang, U.1 among other places.

3. Movements to and from the detention camps are still indiscreet, enabling the enemy to detect and hit the camps, as in Thanh Tri. U.2, U.1 and U.6 camps, inflicting heavy losses upon us.

4. In some detention camps, prisoners were not segregated and the assistant platoon leader was confused under enemy attack [Sic] and failed to properly implement the policy [toward prisoners]. Other camps let the prisoners go out at night and female prisoners commit obscenities with wardens and guards.

In order to correct the above deficiencies, T. Security Section has the following suggestions

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to U. and V. Security Sections:

- Prisoners must be evacuated at night, properly tied and blindfolded. Locations of the detention camps and routes must be kept secret. While enroute as well as during halts, vigilance must be heightened. The comrade in charge must notify the guards of the departure beforehand. Prisoners must be carefully blindfolded and tied and weapons must be kept ready to cope with any eventualities.


- Detention camps must be secure and partitioned, especially to keep male prisoners apart from female prisoners. It is strictly forbidden for prisoners to go out of the camp at night. Keys must be handed over to the camp commandant.

Prisoners working outside of the camp must be closely watched. They will not be allowed to approach arms storages. If feasible, a fence should be built around the camp to prevent the prisoners from going in and out at will. Tools used in the fence construction must be gathered and secured.

- Movements to and from detention camps must be absolutely secret. Unauthorized personnel will not be permitted to enter the camps. However, trails must be carefully camouflaged. When releasing the prisoners measures must be taken in such a way as to prevent them from locating the detention camp and to make them swear not to disclose anything seen or heard in the camp.

To ensure correct implementation of the policy and proper treatment of the prisoners, they should be segregated into A, B, C categories. The segregation, to be approved by the security section and competent Party Committees, is for proper handling of prisoners of each category in case the enemy lands his troops, conducts an operation, airstrike or artillery shelling right on the camp.

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Hatred of the enemy must be constantly maintained and vigilance heightened for cadre, personnel and guards of the camp. They must be made aware that the enemy prisoners are constantly trying to escape by all means and that a minute of inadvertence may result in disastrous consequences.

Though incomplete, the above suggestions may help various U's consider and adapt them appropriately with U. and V. detention camps in order to take corrective actions in time. Experiences gained should be forwarded to T. Security Section for dissemination ./.

TO:

- Security Section of 6 U's (for action)
- A-36 for study & implementation
- Research Coll of T. Security Section
- A-35 for file and follow up action

7 November 1965

For T. Security Section

A - 35

END OF TRANSLATION

CERTIFIED CORRECT TRANSLATION:

Grady J. Stewart
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USMACV Document Exploitation Center

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