

Intelligence is a simple and self-evident thing. As an activity it is the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge; as a phenomenon it is the resultant knowledge.

Sherman Kent

The line of demarcation between friend and foe...passes a nonphysical, often ideological boundary, which must however be expressly delineated if we want to reach the adversary and to defeat him.

Roger Trinquier



Periodic Intelligence Report

MISSING AMERICAN POWs

What Happened?

by

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During the Korean and Viet Nam "wars" captured American soldiers were abandoned to their fate by the ruling elite (who consider us peasants anyway) and their Starred Toadies who were too concerned about making their *next* star to give a damn about the fate of their men. When next you read or hear a Starred Mouthpiece coo about America's "Partnership for Peace" with the Soviets, or "détente" with the Chinese, or "understanding" with the North Koreans, or "normal relations" with the Vietnamese, keep Mr. Douglass' article in mind. Then ask yourself: "The chain of command demands our trust—based on what precedent?" [SMB]

The single most basic principle of personal honor in America's armed forces is never willingly to leave a fellow serviceman behind... Something very real happened to each of those brave men, and our country will not be at peace with itself until we are morally certain we have done all we could to find out what.

Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, January 25, 1993

Over the past four years, the efforts of many years work by families and friends of missing American POWs has begun to bear fruit. Numerous researchers have combed the files and isolated critical and revealing information. Two Senate committees have helped declassify information and focus yet additional attention on the problem. Individuals with special knowledge have come forward and shared that knowledge. While much more work remains, the conclusions that have begun to emerge make the search now even more real and urgent than ever before.

We now know, without question, that Americans, both military and non-

military, were left behind following World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Hundreds were abandoned in Vietnam and Laos, thousands in North Korea, and tens of thousands in Russia following World War II.

In each case, there was clear knowledge that American men were being left behind. However, for reasons of "political expediency," U.S. government officials at the highest level chose to ignore these men and deliberately misrepresent the situation to the American public.

It also increasingly appears that, in direct and known violation of international law, hundreds of American POW/MIAs were moved from Korea and later Vietnam/Laos to other Com-

munist countries; specifically, to the Soviet Union and China.

Subsequent efforts of our government to learn what happened to missing American servicemen have been *and still are* dominated by duplicity and incompetence and by efforts to hide or sabotage information and stonewall efforts to obtain information that confirms the abandonment of American servicemen and the possibility that some are still alive.

There have been a steady progression of live sightings of American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia since 1973 and continuing up to the present. Unfortunately, U.S. intelligence efforts to pursue this and related data can hardly be called serious; rather they have been characterized as naive, gross negligence, and criminal neglect.

Beginning three years ago, a strange set of circumstances led the Conservative Research Center to begin its own investigation into the POW/MIA

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problem. Years earlier, a member of our staff had learned about some special experiments conducted on American POWs by Russian and Czechoslovak military intelligence doctors during the Korean War. When the POW/MIA search efforts gained publicity three years ago, the

potential significance of this information surfaced and we decided to return to the source of the information. What the source had to say was shocking—not only because of its clear relevance to the POW/MIA search but additionally because of efforts of elements within the U.S. government to discredit the source (without even knowing what the source had to say) and to suppress his information.

The source is Jan Sejna. General Major Sejna was a high-ranking official in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Army prior to his defection to the United States on February 25, 1968. Among the positions he held were Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense; member of the Minister's Kollegium; member of the Central Committee, the National Assembly, and the Presidium; member of the bureau at the Main Political Administration; first secretary of the Party at the Ministry of Defense; and secretary of the Defense Council. Incidentally, the Defense Council is the highest decision-making agency in the communist system in areas of intelligence, counter-intelligence, national security, deception, and the economy.

General Major Jan Sejna remains the highest level communist official ever to defect to the West. He was a member of the decision hierarchy with unparalleled access to the most sensitive defense and intelligence plans. He was there and in a position to know what was happening. His story is most sobering.

Because of the clear importance of this information to the POW/MIA search and because of the proven value and credibility of the source's information over the years'—indeed, it seems hardly likely that the Defense Intelligence Agency would have given him a staff position, let alone kept him on board and repeatedly sought his knowledge and advice for over fifteen years and continuing today, if he were not trusted—we decided to bring this information to the public's attention.

What Happened? An Overview

During both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, General Sejna explained, the Soviet Union, assisted by Czechoslovakia, used American POWs as guinea pigs in military medical intelligence experiments. Experiments were run to determine the limits of physiological and psychological stress the captive GIs could endure. The Soviets justified these tests to the Czech leadership on the basis of their need to determine how well the Americans could stand up to the rigors of all-out war.

American and South Korean and South Vietnamese POWs were exposed to chemical warfare agents and

biological warfare organisms to test their susceptibility to the different agents and organisms. The Soviets wanted to learn if the American GIs were any more, or less, vulnerable than the Soviet soldiers to the experimental agents they were developing. The Soviets also wanted to know if there were any differences between the races—black, white, Hispanic and Asian—in their biochemical vulnerability to the agents.

The captive GIs were also used as subjects in testing the effectiveness of military intelligence drugs, including a wide variety of mind-control and behavior-modification drugs, which, incidentally, were used during the Korean War to cause American servicemen to speak out on the evils of capitalism and on the benefits of communism.

The Soviets exposed GIs to atomic detonations to determine how much atomic radiation was needed to kill or incapacitate a man. Lethal doses were administered and then the GIs were watched to determine how long soldiers could function and to learn if there were any drugs that could be used to prolong their ability to perform military tasks before permanently succumbing to the radiation. Tests to determine the long-term consequences of sub-lethal dose levels also were run.

Experiments were conducted in military hospitals in North Korea during the Korean War and in military hospitals in Laos and North Vietnam during the Vietnam War. American POWs were also moved to the Soviet Union for experimental purposes from North Korea following the end of the Korean War and from Laos and North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

Finally, autopsies were performed on the servicemen who did not survive the experiments to determine ethnic differences in biochemical makeup and to verify the effects of different drugs and biological organisms on the body, the heart and brain in particular.

Korea: The Operation Begins

Czechoslovakia's participation in the Soviet medical intelligence operation began early in

the Korean War, when it was directed by the Soviets to build an experimental hospital in North Korea. The plans were drawn up by the Military Project Institute, which was part of the Construction Administration of the Czech Ministry of Defense (MoD). This Administration also contained a special depart-

ment that was responsible for secret projects, especially those in foreign countries, and that managed the construction of the hospital.¹

Ostensibly, the hospital was built to test new medical procedures for treating military casualties and

for training young military doctors. That was its cover, but not its sole mission. It also served as a special, highly-secure medical intelligence facility in which captured American and South Korean servicemen were used as guinea pigs in the types of medical experiments previously enumerated. The Czechs also built a crematorium in North Korea to dispose of the remains of those GIs who did not survive the experiments. What happened to the soldiers who did survive the experimental procedures for treating military wounds is not known. However, in light of the sensitive nature of the facility, it is doubtful that any were ever returned to the regular POW compounds, nor did Sejna recall any report or discussion that suggested that any of those GI patients were ever returned to the North Koreans.²

The overall operation in North Korea came under the authority of the Czech General Staff deputy director of military intelligence for strategic intelligence, Colonel Rudolf Babka. Babka was a hard-line Stalinist who had been brought in to replace a bourgeois general. Col. Babka was sent to North Korea under diplomatic cover as an official of the foreign ministry, which was only a deception. After the war, he was promoted to head of the General Staff Foreign Administration, which had both an overt and covert function. Overtly, the Foreign Administration negotiated foreign military assistance with various defense attaches. Covertly, it was a military intelligence front used to manage special clandestine overseas operations.

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The experimental Czech hospital in North Korea was designed to handle two hundred "patients." In actuality, the hospital was often overcrowded. One year, six hundred patients were treated. At times the hospital was so crowded that two patients were required to share one bed. The individual who actually ran the hospital was Colonel Professor Dr. Dufek. Dr. Dufek, a former Soviet citizen who had emigrated to Czechoslovakia, was a heart specialist in charge of research at the Czech Central Military Hospital in Prague.⁶ Sejna discussed the operation with both Col. Babka and Dr. Dufek, and was present when they briefed the Minister of Defense's Kollegium⁷ on the hospital and its operation.

Roughly eighteen Czech doctors were involved in the North Korean operation, and over twenty Russian doctors. In preparation for their assignment, several of the Czech doctors were given special training in atomic radiation and its effects on the human body at the Institute for Nuclear Medicine in Moscow. These were the doctors who conducted the radiation experiments in North Korea. Each of them was required to sign a statement saying that they volunteered for this assignment. For these experiments, radio-isotopes were brought to North Korea from the Soviet Union for use in radiating the GIs.

Experiments Following the Korean War

In 1954, after the Korean War armistice was in effect, the Soviets decided to terminate the operation and turn the hospital over to the North Koreans. This decision was made by the Soviet Defense Council and then coordinated with the Czech Defense Council.⁸ As indicated earlier, the Defense Council was the critical organization where issues in matters of intelligence, counter-intelligence, defense and strategic aspects of foreign and economic policy were decided.⁹ This Council was composed of a very select collection of the six most powerful strategic leaders.¹⁰

As part of this decision to terminate operations at the hospital in North Korea, the POWs who were of no further use—that is, those whose mental or physical impairment had significantly diminished their utility as good medical subjects—were killed and their

remains cremated. Those who were being used in experiments that were not completed or who were still of experimental value—roughly one hundred GIs—were shipped to the Soviet Union where the experimental work was to continue. For example, one of the experiments to be continued would determine the long-term effects of sub-lethal doses of atomic radiation. To the Soviets, "long-term" usually meant several decades; fifty years was typical. In the case of sub-lethal radiation effects, the Soviet interest included effects of radiation on the soldiers' reproductive organs and on their subsequent children and grandchildren.

The POWs were shipped to the Soviet Union by air in four roughly-equivalent plane loads.¹¹ They first stopped in Prague, where the GIs were given medical exams before being sent on to various experimental medical test facilities in the Soviet Union. The stopover typically lasted about a week. Its purpose was security—to "break the trail," so that the Soviets could subsequently deny any claims that POWs were shipped to the USSR from North Korea. That is also why the experimental hospital was a "Czech" hospital. These deceptions were all part of a carefully designed plan to mask the movement of GIs to the Soviet Union and to mislead people, including most of the Czech and Soviet participants, about what was really happening.¹²

In May 1956, Sejna was appointed Chief of Staff for the Minister of Defense. Shortly after he received this appointment, General Major Kalashnik from the Soviet Main Political Administration came to Prague to discuss the importance of non-military weapons. Sejna was present at the meeting when Kalashnik discussed five important examples of such weapons: ideological offensive, which meant good deception and propaganda; good foreign policy designed to split the West; isolating the United States; economic and social chaos; and a new view about drugs and other chemicals that can affect the minds and behavior of millions of people. Kalashnik's visit and lecture served as a

precursor for a Soviet request for the Czechs to provide medical support for the experiments that were being run in the Soviet Union on the American POWs. Kalashnik's mission was to explain the importance of this research and justify the need for Czech participation.

After General Kalashnik returned to Moscow, the formal request for medical assistance in the experiments came into the Czech Ministry of Defense from the Soviet Defense Council. The Czech decision in response was prepared by Sejna, working with Minister of Defense General Lomsky and under the guidance of the ever-present

Soviet MoD Advisor.¹³ The medical aspects of the plan and preliminary staffing recommendations were prepared by five specially-cleared officers at the Health Administration of the MoD's Rear Services Administration.

In assembling the overall plan for presentation to the Czech

Defense Council, Sejna personally reviewed the files and decision documents for the operation in North Korea, including the original Soviet Defense Council instructions that initiated the operation and those that terminated it. It was in the originating Soviet Defense Council order where the direction to conduct the operation so that "no one ever would know about it" was set forth. Sejna's review of this history was included as part of the plan.

When the Czech plan was completed, it went to Moscow for review and approval. The head of the Soviet military Health Administration personally brought the plan back to Prague. The only problem he had with the plan was its timetable. He wanted the process of selecting and clearing the doctors accelerated. All the doctors had to be specially cleared by both Czech and Soviet military counter-intelligence. The Czechs had wanted to avoid drawing any undue attention to the process for security reasons and, thus, avoided using any emergency measures to speed up the process. The Soviet official came to Prague to help them accelerate the process without employing any observable emergency measures. He came per-

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sonally because in very sensitive operations, such as was this one, telephone communications were not allowed.¹⁴

After the plan had received the Soviet blessing, it was placed on the Defense Council's agenda, which Sejna prepared as working secretary, for discussion and decision. The Council reviewed the Soviet request that had initiated the action, the seven projects the Czech military doctors and scientists would be working on, the administrative and security measures, and then approved the plan and the money for the project.

Once the plan was approved, the personnel selection process—mainly to select the doctors and scientists who would be involved—commenced. The task was one principally of the Czech military Health Administration, assisted by the Administrative Organs Department, which was the powerful Central Committee department that had authority over the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (Mol). Both Soviet and Czech military intelligence and military counter-intelligence were involved. Military intelligence had overall authority and military counter-intelligence, which was a component of the Interior Ministry, was responsible for security.

When the doctors and scientists had been selected and cleared, the list was submitted to the head of the Soviet military Health Administration, who was the individual personally responsible for the medical aspects of the plan. Following his approval, the list was sent to the Czech Defense Council for the final decision, which by this time was mainly a rubber-stamp approval. Roughly fifteen doctors and scientists were approved. The doctors came from the Central Military Hospital, the College for Military Doctors, and the Air Force Scientific Research Institute at Hradack Kralove where many of the experimental drugs had been developed. The scientists were from the Academy of Sciences.

The operation was top secret. Aside from the Defense Council and the doctors who were involved, very few people had access to the operation or knew what it was really about. Specifically, the only ones who knew were the Chief of the General Staff, Chief of Rear Services,¹⁵ and the heads of the Health Administration,¹⁶ Central Military Hospital, and Air Force Scientific Re-

search Center. The doctors went as a group to the Institute for Nuclear Medicine in Moscow. The doctor in charge was the head of the Air Force Science Institute. They were accompanied by a military counter-intelligence officer. Once in Moscow, they split into three groups. One stayed in Moscow at the Institute and the other two groups went to two different locations.

The Institute for Nuclear Medicine was the jumping-off point because of the political plan (that is, deception) that had been devised as a cover. The cover story maintained that the doctors had gone to Moscow as students to study the effects of nuclear war on soldiers. Everything was prepared for their courses—instructors, organization materials, schedules, and so forth. But it was all a fake, designed to mislead people about the real reason behind the doctor's mission, which was to investigate the effects of chemical warfare agents and drugs, biological organisms, and nuclear radiation on the captive GIs.

The results of the experiments performed on the captive GIs were presented during the annual review of the intelligence plan for the next year and in special, highly-classified reports. These reports discussed the improvements in chemical and biological warfare capabilities and knowledge of radiation casualties that had been achieved in the experiments. Sejna recalls one report on the tests that he read in 1959 or 1960. The tests were discussed in three categories: chemical warfare, biological warfare (including viruses), and radiation.

One of the discussions in the chemical warfare section was focused on the side effects of some of the drugs. In the drug research programs, for each drug under development, there was a parallel program to develop drugs that would reverse the effect (antidotes) and drugs that could defend people against the use of such drugs (prophylaxes). One of the more difficult problems in this search was caused by side-effects of the experi-

mental drugs. The side-effects were often irreversible and, in many cases, seriously debilitating. Where the prisoners were judged to be of no future value because of the side-effects, they were killed. Only a few were retained to see if ultimately the side-effects would dis-

appear. Sejna suspects those few were placed in mental institutions for long-term (that is, twenty to fifty years) observation.

In the radiation section, casualty exposure levels were discussed along with the results of the search for drugs that would, in effect, enable soldiers to continue fighting even after having received lethal radiation exposures. With the captive GIs in the Soviet

Union, these tests were not limited to the use of radioisotopes. The Soviets also used the atomic reactor at the Institute for Nuclear Medicine in Moscow to radiate the GIs.

Still further, the best and most relevant information was obtained by securing GIs at spaced intervals along the ground and then subjecting them to the full force and fury of actual atomic bomb explosions at Soviet atomic test ranges. In addition to their interest in radiation exposure, the Soviets also tested the effects of atomic bomb over pressure and thermal radiation on the GIs and the psychological effects of all three—over pressure, atomic, and thermal radiation—on the GIs. Based on the data thus obtained, the Soviets decided that the exposure level above which it became difficult for soldiers to function as a result of physical and psychological problems was 100 rem (roentgen equivalent man). The Soviets then exposed the GIs to radiation levels of 100 rem and higher and then tested the effects of different drugs on the surviving GIs, to learn if some of the radiation effects could be temporarily countered with drugs, thus extending the useful life of the soldiers, and to observe how long the soldiers who were exposed at the higher levels could survive.¹⁷

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Vietnam War: Setting the Stage

American POWs also were used for medical experiments by the Soviets and Czechs during the Vietnam War. The cornerstone for this activity was laid in 1960 when the North Vietnamese Chief of the General Staff (CoGS) and roughly ten senior officers visited Prague and Moscow in search of military assistance. The North Vietnamese believed that the only way to unify the country was through military action. They wanted military assistance to prepare them for a major offensive drive to capture South Vietnam. This was when the Soviets first agreed to supply the North Vietnamese with weapons. As head of the Defense Council secretariat, Sejna was their host and focal point for scheduling meetings and discussions.

During this visit, there was one particularly sensitive meeting. The only participants were the Vietnamese CoGS; his Czech counterpart, General Otakar Rytir; Czech Minister of Defense General Lomsky; Soviet Advisor General Aleksandr Kushev; and then-Colonel Jan Sejna. In this meeting, General Kushev, explained to the Vietnamese general how American POWs had been used for medical research during the Korean War and how valuable this use had been. One of the items of cooperation the Soviets would like to receive in return for providing military technology, Kushev continued, was more American POWs for medical experimentation. The Vietnamese CoGS agreed and used the opportunity to press for even more military assistance. Kushev then stressed the need to begin organizing immediately to use the captured American servicemen to avoid the types of delays encountered at the beginning of the Korean War.

The North Vietnamese general suggested that it would be a good idea to keep any Americans who were captured and selected to be sent to the Soviet Union separate from other POWs. General Kushev agreed and the decision was made: Soviet, Czech, and Vietnamese military counter-intelligence officers would meet and draw up plans for the secure management of American POWs who were to be sent to the Soviet Union from the instant of their capture until they were deposited in the Soviet Union. Military counter-intel-

ligence had the lead because it was responsible for security in the military. In the communist system, military counter-intelligence was generally a component of the Ministry of Interior, and as such was located outside the military system. In the Soviet Union, it was a component of the KGB. In Czechoslovakia, it was in the Ministry of Interior, which also was where civilian intelligence was located. As was typical in the communist system, everyone watched everyone else.

Work on the plan commenced immediately following the return of the Vietnamese CoGS to Hanoi. In Czechoslovakia, CoGS General Rytir was personally responsible for the effort. In the Soviet Union, that person was Marshal Matvey V. Zakharov, the Soviet CoGS. In Czechoslovakia, the officials under the CoGS who were responsible for specific areas were the first deputy to the Minister of Interior,¹⁸ the head of military counter-intelligence,¹⁹ the chief of military intelligence,²⁰ and his deputy for strategic intelligence.²¹ Similar officials from North Vietnam participated in the project.

The plan was completed in approximately six months, at which time Czechoslovakia received that portion of the plan which pertained to the Czech part of the operation. As set forth in the plan, the overall operation was the responsibility of Soviet military intelligence, or GRU. The individual in charge was the special deputy to the Chief of the GRU in charge of strategic intelligence. Similarly, in Czechoslovakia the plan was organized under the deputy chief of military intelligence for strategic intelligence, just as it had been in the Korean War.²² Security was provided by military counter-intelligence.²³

The security plan specified that the decision on which POWs were to be used for medical experimentation would be made as soon as they were captured. This process was initiated by a Soviet request in which they would identify the number of specimens desired. They also would specify race requirements and rank. In the latter case,

the Soviets were interested in older officers as well as younger officers because they wanted to test the effects of mind-control drugs on people from different age and rank categories. The older officers were generally regarded as the more "reactionary" and, as such, especially important subjects to test. Based on Soviet "requirements," the North Vietnamese military counter-intelligence would go into action and begin collecting appropriate new American POWs as candidates.

The potential candidates would be isolated from all other prisoners. As will be seen, at this point, the POW had received a one-way ticket to oblivion or to death. The next action was a joint Soviet-North Vietnamese psychological debriefing of the potential candidate to determine whether the candidate

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was the type of individual who might make trouble. If the POW was considered psychologically dangerous, then he was to be immediately liquidated. He was not to be placed in normal POWs compounds because that would risk security of the experimental program; better to simply kill him.²⁴

The plan also set forth the security measures for storage and transportation of the approved POWs, specified the clearances that were required for all personnel who would be working on the project (for example, guards, drivers, pilots, doctors, and so forth), described in detail the procedures for medical exams for prisoners en route to the Soviet Union (these were performed in Prague), and listed the names and ranks of all military intelligence and counter-intelligence officers who were cleared to work on the project.

One of the initial products of the plan by decision of the Defense Council was the establishment of a special MoD-Mol commission. Its purpose was to coordinate the various questions that different agencies wanted directed to the POWs and to issue integrated directions to military intelligence and counter-intelligence interrogators. The CoGS General Rytir headed the commission.²⁵ The interrogation instructions were split into two different com-

ponents—one for normal POWs and one for those POWs who had been selected for medical experimentation. Other countries, such as East Germany, were also involved in interrogations. This coordination was handled by the Soviets.

The pilot plan was placed in operation in 1961. The first Soviet request was for specimens of any age or race. The Soviets had run out of test specimens and wanted new ones so that they could resume their experiments as soon as possible. The first shipment of American POWs²⁵ occurred in August. It created an emergency situation because there was almost no advanced notice. The Czechs did not learn about the shipment until the plane carrying the POWs was in the air and headed toward Prague. At about 1:00 in the afternoon, the Soviet Advisor General Kushev brought a cable to Minister Lomsky, who immediately summoned Sejna to his office. As soon as Sejna arrived, Lomsky called President Novotny and told him that Sejna was headed over with an important cable. Sejna delivered the cable to Novotny and then proceeded to organize the quarters for the POWs and the North Vietnamese and Soviets who were accompanying the shipment. The POWs arrived at 3:00 p.m. the following day.

Included in this shipment were, as Sejna recalls, about four or five South Vietnamese, who were housed in the villa close to the castle, six or seven Americans, who were housed in the military intelligence villa on Sluna street, and one American, about 42 or 43 years old who was isolated from the other Americans and housed in the villa at Rusveltova #1. This was a quick in and out operation that lasted only two days. The plane waited at the military air base until the POWs had been examined and then flew them to the Soviet Union. This shipment was different from subsequent respects because of the South Vietnamese and the relatively large number of older Americans. This was the only time that Sejna recalls when South Vietnamese POWs were sent through Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. With respect to the American POWs, the Soviets were somewhat displeased with the shipment because there were too many older men. Their preference at that time was for the younger men.

[According to the U.S. government,

the first American POW was not captured until August 1964. This is more word games by U.S. officials, because this official position on the first POW deliberately ignores the civilians, CIA officers, and Special Forces advisors in Southeast Asia who were lost. The U.S. government policy is clearly revealed in the book *President Kennedy: Profiles in Power* by Richard Reeves. Military pilots were being recruited for service in Southeast Asia in 1961. They were asked to read and sign a statement whereby they acknowledged that they would be wearing civilian clothes and that their "government would disclaim any knowledge" of them if they were captured.]

This first shipment of POWs was accompanied by the Vietnamese deputy chief of the General Staff for military intelligence, General Major Quong.²⁷ He was accompanied by two staff officers and KGB (military counter-intelligence) escorts. This group went along with the POWs to make certain the operation was secure, and to quickly resolve any problems that might emerge on this maiden voyage. Sejna hosted the entourage. The North Vietnamese were housed at a special villa that was maintained by the Defense Council secretariat²⁸ for use of foreign dignitaries. The Soviet escorts stayed with their plane, evidently standing guard over other sensitive cargo that was being transported from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union. As soon as the POWs were processed, about two days, they were put back on the plane and whisked away to Russia. As Sejna recalls, the North Vietnamese stayed for five working days. He attended one meeting with Minister Lomsky that was held in Lomsky's office. Lomsky welcomed the North Vietnamese and instructed them to work directly with the Czech CoGS and chief of military intelligence to correct any problems. General Quong said he was pleased with the arrange-

ments that had been made and, especially, with the manner in which the operation had been organized so that participation by the normal bureaucracies had been eliminated.

The discussion then focused on the U.S. pilots and their importance. One of the points Minister Lomsky made was that the pilots were different from the ground forces in their ability to handle stress. Because of this type of difference, U.S. pilots were priority POWs for their research program. As an illustration of the problem the Soviets were about to have with the North Vietnamese, General Quong responded that if you do not think the U.S. pilots are nervous, "just wait until we finish with them." General Lomsky countered with an explanation that what he was referring to was the ability to handle natural stress, not un-

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The people who were present at the meeting, in addition to Minister Lomsky, Colonel Sejna, Soviet MoD advisor General Kushev, and General Quong, were the Soviet advisor to the Czech military intelligence, the head of Czech military intelligence,²⁹ and the Czech CoGS.³⁰ At that time, most of the Czech strategic leadership was on vacation at a special resort at Orlik on the Vltava River. A special meeting of the Defense Council was held at the resort, at which time Minister Lomsky informed the Council that the operation had begun and then described the preparations that had been taken.

Over the next two years, the operation was run as a low-level test program in which the procedures and plans that had been developed were tested and improved. The immediate objective was to get all the "bugs" worked out so that full-scale secure operations could be commenced quickly when the war expanded. The second shipment, which was even smaller than the first, came in the spring of 1962 and the third, Sejna believes, came in November or Decem-

ber 1962. The first large shipment of twenty to twenty-five captives occurred in 1963. This 1963 shipment was the first time the POWs were housed in the military counter-intelligence barracks, as will be subsequently described, rather than in the villas.

During this trial period it became clear to Sejna that Czechoslovakia was not the only Soviet surrogate staging area for the movement of POWs from North Vietnam to the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1962, Sejna attended a meeting of the Warsaw Pact military leaders¹¹ in Moscow where he learned that Vietnam War POWs were shipped from North Vietnam to North Korea, and thence directly to the Soviet Union. The Chief of Staff from North Korea was attending the meeting as an observer. During the discussion the North Korean general suggested to the Soviets that the experiments be performed on the American POWs while they were in North Korea to avoid having to fly them from North Korea to the Soviet Union. Soviet General A. I. Antonov, who was deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, declined the invitation, saying that such a practice would constitute an unnecessary security risk. If the experiments were run in North Korea, he explained, the Chinese were likely to learn about the tests and this was unacceptable to the Soviets. This meeting took place shortly before General Antonov's death in June 1962. It indicates that the plan for moving American POWs through North Korea likely was worked out at the same time that the operation for moving POWs through Czechoslovakia was planned and that it started at about the same time as the Czech-Soviet operation began; that is, in 1961.

Sejna suspects that East Germany may also have been involved in using American POWs in chemical agent experiments, although he had no direct knowledge. The reasons for his suspicions are clear. He knew the East Germans were involved in interrogations of American POWs using experimental drugs. They also were heavily involved in the development of mind-control drugs and chemical warfare agents, which he knew because of data sharing agreements the Czechs had negotiated with the Germans. East German security was even better than Czech security, including that of German military medical facilities. Finally,

The German Minister of Defense, General Hoffmann had discussed some of their experimental results with Sejna as early as 1964, indicating the Germans were involved well before 1964, and, when the Soviets presented drug experiment results, East German results were usually included.¹²

The importance of the drug development programs was also raised by the Soviets at the 1962 spring meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Commission (PCC). Alexei Kosygin, the Soviet President, gave a speech in which he emphasized the importance of new developments in drug technology and the possibility of testing these developments. He emphasized the need to increase funding in these projects and directed every country to take a careful look at their scientific capacities to identify additional scientists who could be put on the projects. He did not mention at this open meeting the use of POWs as the way in which the developments would be tested.

As their response, the Czechs conducted a thorough examination of their own drug efforts in preparation for the five-year plan which was being organized for approval in the fall of 1962. The Soviet guidance to them was quite specific. They were directed to expand their efforts. It was essential, the Soviets stressed, to be ready to exploit the supplies of American POWs that would accompany the growing war in Southeast Asia. There was no knowing how long the war would last. Hence, it was doubly important to make maximum use of the opportunity right from the start.

The Czechs examined the number and types of scientists and doctors who were available, how much money would be needed to expand their effort, what drugs were in development and the extent to which the development process could be accelerated, how long it would take to develop new drugs, and what possibilities were available to steal related technology through espionage. They then undertook a comprehensive assessment of what would be required to speed the process. In discussing the

possibilities with Czech President Antonin Novotny, the head of the Academy of Sciences complained bitterly. The Czechs could not do much more, he said, because the Soviets themselves caused most of the delays.

It took forever for the Czech scientists to obtain feedback from the Soviets on the effects the drugs had when tested on the POWs. Second, and even more serious, the Czech doctors and scientists did not have direct access to the POWs. All they received were the Soviet reports on the tests, and they considered those reports inad-

equated. They needed to be able to monitor the tests directly.

Novotny took these complaints and presented them in a letter to Khrushchev. The letter was prepared under Sejna's direction by his secretariat. The letter expressed the need to get results back quickly and allowed as how the Czechs would like to be more involved, but were constrained because they did not know the details of how the Soviets were using the POWs. We recognize, Novotny's letter continued, that Czechoslovakia is too small a country in which to do testing on the POWs, because they simply could not hide such work for ever. However, for Czechoslovakia to do more, the Czech scientists and doctors would need better access to the testing of drugs on POWs.

The problem was the Soviet KGB penchant for secrecy. They did not want anyone to know where the POWs were being held. Following Novotny's letter, the process did improve, but the Czech doctors still were not allowed to go to the locations where the POWs were being held. Rather, the POWs were brought to the Czech doctors so that they could observe the effects of the drugs first hand. Another problem that delayed the program, but which was not raised by Novotny in his letter, was the Soviet expropriation of the Czech ideas, and Soviet deception in reporting test results, particularly when they did not want the Czechs to know which drugs, or combinations, were the most effective—perhaps because the Soviets intended the drugs for use against all

It was essential, the Soviets stressed, to be ready to exploit the supplies of American POWs that would accompany the growing war in Southeast Asia.

potential opponents, including their own allies, a practice the Czechs would see pursued in the emerging Vietnam War.

Vietnam War: Transition From Pilot Program to Full Scale Operations

Preparations for expanding the war effort formally began toward the end of 1963 when the formal Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement for Warsaw Pact assistance was signed.

This Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement was presented to the Warsaw Pact officials who attended a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in late 1963 or early 1964. Sejna was present at the meeting. The Soviet General Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, personally attended the meeting and gave a talk during which he explained to the Committee officials that an agreement had been reached with North Vietnam. A top secret part of the agreement specified that all Warsaw Pact countries would negotiate separate bilateral agreements with North Vietnam.

Following this meeting, the Soviets individually instructed each of the Warsaw Pact countries as to what the nature of their assistance to, and agreement with, North Vietnam would be. The Soviet official in charge of coordinating these agreements was Leonid Brezhnev. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the formal notification came in the form of a letter from Khrushchev to Czechoslovakia's President, Antonin Novotny, as Sejna recalls, with the specific details contained in a separate lengthy communication to the Czech Ministry of Defense. In his letter, and in parallel discussions, Khrushchev stated that the American soldiers had been most useful in the past and that there were many new drugs and chemical and biological warfare agents under development that needed testing. It was in these communications that the Czechs were directed to negotiate arrangements with the North Vietnamese so that the medical experiments using American POWs could be continued.

The negotiations between Hanoi and Prague for Czech military assistance were completed in early 1964. The primary Czech official in the negotiations was Vladimir Koucky, who

was the Czech Central Committee secretary in charge of foreign policy. While the negotiations on the surface were conducted by the North Vietnamese and Czech officials, behind the scenes the Soviet advisors in Hanoi and Prague directed the Czech negotiators.

The use of POWs was a special part of the agreement, which was negotiated by the Czech CoGS, General Rytir. It included provisions for using American POWs for "medical research" in North Vietnam and the field-tested plan for exporting selected POWs to the Soviet Union via Czechoslovakia for research and for intelligence cooperation. The intelligence cooperation portion of the agreement referred to captured officers who could be persuaded to defect and to assist the Soviets in their analyses of U.S. military capabilities, technology, and war plans.

The agreement specified that the selection of POWs would be a joint Soviet-North Vietnamese effort. The North Vietnamese agreed to provide captured South Vietnamese as well as American soldiers for medical research in North Vietnam. This was done to enable the Soviet studies on ethnic differences and vulnerabilities unique to Asians to be continued. However, the agreement stipulated that experiments on South Vietnamese would be performed only in North Vietnam; that is, the South Vietnamese POWs would not be exported to the Soviet Union.¹¹ The Czechs and Soviets agreed to provide medical equipment, experimental drugs, biological organisms and viruses, and, naturally, doctors and medical support personnel.

The conditions in North Vietnam were quite different from those in North Korea because the North Koreans were surrogates controlled by the Soviets while, in contrast, the North Vietnamese were determined to remain in control themselves and not become either Soviet or Chinese puppets. When the Czech-Soviet military assistance programs expanded in North Vietnam in 1964, numerous disagree-

ments arose. Problems were encountered, largely because the Soviets pushed hard to expand their participation and exert controlling influences, while the North Vietnamese worked to block Soviet efforts to expand their presence. This was true in the POW medical research programs as well as in the more traditional types of military assistance. As an example of one problem in the medical research area, the North Vietnamese wanted final approval on the specific doctors who would participate, while the Soviets did not want the North Vietnamese to have any background data on the doctors that might reveal which ones were from military intelligence. As regards tradi-

tional military assistance, the Soviets and Czechs wanted to deploy "volunteer" officers, such as pilots, to the war effort so that they could gain combat experience. Additionally, where the Soviets provided military equipment, such as air defense missiles, they wanted to place technicians at those bases. The North Vietnamese strongly opposed these efforts. They wanted to limit the Soviet presence

because they were secretly sharing Soviet technology with the Chinese. Also, they wanted the defeat of the Americans to be a clear North Vietnamese victory.

The principal problem in the medical experiment program, from the Soviet perspective, was one of forcing the Vietnamese to accept a scientific approach to the experiments. The Vietnamese did not have the medical or scientific understanding needed to run valid and useful tests. The Vietnamese were, in the Soviet eyes, simply too crude. They were more interested in extracting vengeance than in conducting scientific tests. Furthermore, the Vietnamese were inadequately trained in psychology. While they understood the psychology of Asians very well, they did not have a good knowledge of the psychology of Westerners. This knowledge was crucial to the tests because many of the experiments were designed to test the effect of experimental drugs on the

...understanding the effects of drugs on soldiers under extreme stress—designed to simulate the stress levels expected in an all-out nuclear war—was one of the Soviet objectives.

American psyche. Moreover, they did not understand the importance of stress and its relation to the testing process. That is, understanding the effects of drugs on soldiers under extreme stress—designed to simulate the stress levels expected in an all-out nuclear war—was one of the Soviet objectives. This was one of the reasons behind the psychological and physiological stress experiments; namely, to enable testing the effects of experimental drugs on soldiers under extremely stressful conditions.

Another example was illustrated by a visit General Quong paid to Prague and Moscow in late 1964. Quong visited Prague and Moscow several times to deliver reports on the POW operations and to conduct planning sessions with the Soviets. On his visit in late 1964, he met with Minister Lomsky specifically to complain that the operation discriminated against the North Vietnamese. He believed more of the medical research should be done in North Vietnam and that the North Vietnamese should have the results of the research conducted in the Soviet Union. He also wanted to press for the opportunity to use POWs for strategic intelligence; that is, he wanted to hold POWs, turn them, and then return them as spies. The Russians opposed the idea because they would be unable to control the North Vietnamese in the operation, and, besides, they already had their own plan in operation, which was focused on recruiting American military personnel in South Vietnam and in Australia.¹⁴ They felt those were better places to recruit agents because the POW route was too obvious and too easy for the Americans to detect.

Regarding the Vietnamese interest in the experiments conducted in the Soviet Union, the Soviets were very careful not to let the North Vietnamese (or other allies) have access to much of their research, especially the research on mind-control drugs, which utilized POWs. The reason was simple: the Soviets planned to use the drugs against the North Vietnamese (and other allies) to help keep them under control. They also planned to use the confusion-producing drugs on the Chinese technicians who were in North Vietnam to steal the Warsaw Pact technology that was on loan to the North Vietnamese.

To resolve the many problems, a second agreement was negotiated in 1965.

These were difficult negotiations and required the personal participation in Hanoi of several high-level Czech officials. Specifically, even Josef Lenart, the Czech Prime Minister, and General Vaclav Pchlik, the chief of the Main Political Administration, went to Hanoi to conduct the negotiations, with the sensitive intelligence aspects handled by General Pchlik.¹⁵

The agreement that Lenart and Pchlik reached with the North Vietnamese dealt with many aspects of military assistance. Elaborations on the POW experiments were, as before, a secret part of this agreement negotiated by Pchlik. Under the "medical research" portion of the agreement, procedures for selecting the doctors were established. Additionally, the agreement stated that the experiments in North Vietnam would be run by the North Vietnamese doctors in their hospitals. Czech and Soviet doctors would participate by providing guidance (supervision) and all experimental data would be available to them for their use in monitoring the various tests.

Experiments on POWs in Laos and China

As soon as experiments on U.S. POWs had commenced in North Vietnam, negotiations were held with the Laotians to gain their participation as well. Sejna personally worked with General Sin Ka-po, who headed the communist forces, and General Kong-le, who headed the "neutralist" forces, on matters respecting Czech operations in Laos. The Czech/Soviet agreement for the use of POWs for medical experiments was negotiated with General Sin Ka-po. Laos was generally more complicated than North Vietnam because of the government instabilities. Thus, most arrangements were run through the Party system than through the government. Again, military intelligence was in charge. Two liaison officers from Laos were stationed in Prague to handle coordination. Laotian security was very good, Sejna recalls. The Laotian approach to security was quite simple. If there was concern

that someone was a security risk, that individual was killed.

In Laos, both Soviet and Czech doctors worked directly on the patients. There were two "hospital" facilities where experiments were performed in Laos. The Czech doctors described the conditions at these facilities as "primitive." This was not bad, reasoned the Soviets, because combat was often conducted in primitive conditions and, thus, operating under such conditions was good experience.

Generally, there were three Czech military doctors in Laos, five to seven in North Vietnam, and a larger number of Soviet doctors in both locations. All doctors who worked on this program first had to pass detailed special background investigations, involving both Czech and Soviet military counter-intelligence, before their participation was ap-

In addition to serving as guinea pigs for the Soviet medical intelligence program, the American GIs were also used by the Chinese.

proved.

In addition to their use as medical guinea pigs, American POWs were also used for testing the effectiveness of "interrogation" drugs. Interrogations of captive GIs were conducted in Laos, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Czech interrogations were run by military counter-intelligence, which was then under General Josef Stavinoha. The interrogations, like all other activities, were supervised and controlled by Soviet officers. Experimental drugs were used in interrogations. The East Germans were similarly involved. The East German Minister of Defense, General Heinz Hoffmann, once remarked to Sejna while the two were off on a fishing trip in 1964 that the new drugs tested on the Americans were "one thousand percent more effective than physical means of persuasion."

In addition to serving as guinea pigs for the Soviet medical intelligence program, the American GIs were also used by the Chinese. The Chinese had an experimental program as early as the Korean War. The North Koreans provided American POWs to the Chinese as well as to the Soviets. The Chinese and Soviets shared data on the various experiments and their results. The Soviets criticized the Chinese program as

being too extreme. That is, the Chinese were strictly focused on the use of weapons of mass destruction. In contrast, the Soviet interest was more focused on the development of new drugs and their use to triumph over the enemy without war.

Czech military intelligence was also aware of the continuation of the Chinese medical research using American POWs during the Vietnam War. Czech military intelligence had identified the movement of American POWs in Chinese trucks or buses headed toward the Chinese border. Additionally, a senior Czech military intelligence officer who was undercover in China as a military attaché reported on a Chinese request to share information on continued medical test programs. The Chinese official complained to the Czech "attaché" that even if there were developing antagonisms between their two countries, some cooperative activities should continue, for example, he suggested, the joint research on American POWs. We are continuing this research, he said, and asked, why don't we continue to share results of this research? There is no reason to keep your program secret. We know the American POWs are being sent to the Soviet Union for research. Information exchange on these research programs would be of use to both our countries.

Movement of American POWs to Russia

To complement the experiments run in Laos and North Vietnam, each year during the Vietnam War scores of selected GIs—those who were the most healthy—were shipped back to the Soviet Union for use in more highly classified, sophisticated, and long-term experiments, again through Czechoslovakia⁶ to break the trail. Up until his defection in 1968, General Sejna was knowledgeable about the shipments and personally supervised portions of the operation. There were generally two or three shipments of POWs each year, always by air. While the airplanes were manned by the Soviet military, for security and deception purposes the planes always bore the insignia of some country other than the USSR.; for example, Bulgaria, or Rumania, or Hungary.

The flights used the secure Czech military air base at Zatek, which was roughly forty kilometers from Prague. Special security measures were in ef-

fect when POWs were on the base. Military counter-intelligence took over base security. All unnecessary personnel were excluded from the base. Transportation to Prague was provided by the Ministry of Defense special transportation battalion. Special buses whose windows had been pained over were driven to the planes. The POWs were unloaded directly onto the bus(es). Once loaded, the bus(es) left the air base by a special entrance manned exclusively by specially cleared military counter-intelligence guards.

From the air base, the POWs were driven directly to highly secret military counter-intelligence barracks at Pohorele in Prague. Normally, twenty to twenty-five POWs constituted a "shipment," although, on one occasion, in the fall of 1966, there was a large shipment of about sixty POWs. As a cover story, the POWs were referred to as students or foreign soldiers who were visiting Czechoslovakia for specialized training. The barracks area, which was where foreign soldiers often stayed when in Czechoslovakia for training, was considered a very safe place to hide the POWs because they could be tightly secured yet their presence could be easily explained as just some foreign students temporarily in Czechoslovakia for training.

Often, a small portion of a shipment, say three or four POWs, would be separated from the main group and housed at the Defense Council secretariat villas on Rusveltova street and Korejska street. The military intelligence villa on Sluna street was also used when needed. Once, there was a special shipment of only two or three POWs who were also housed in these villas rather than the barracks and during the large shipment of 60 POWs in 1966, there were six or seven "special" POWs. These select POWs were usually ones who had decided to cooperate with the Soviets or who were sick and needed to be isolated. The cooperating GIs were selected from the POWs who were regarded as "progressive." In all cases, great care was exercised to isolate these people, not only from the main group,

but from each other as well. In the case of the 1966 shipment, Sejna recalls the problem they had finding enough villas to house these special POWs and keep them separated.

From his position as first secretary at the MoD, Sejna was present several times when the vans unloaded the POWs at the military counter-intelligence barracks and personally visited the POWs there and at the various secret villas to ensure that the operation was going according to plan. While most of the POWs were American, there were exceptions. Sejna recalls that, prior to his departure, two Australians were processed along with the American POWs and sent to the Soviet Union.

As was the case following the Korean War, Czech doctors participated in the medical experiments using Vietnam War POWs in the Soviet Union.

As was the case following the Korean War, Czech doctors participated in the medical experiments using Vietnam War POWs in the Soviet Union. The most important experiments were those dealing with the development of mind-control and behavior-modification drugs, the testing of biological warfare

organisms, and tests of the effects of nuclear radiation. Mind-control drug experiments were designed to examine the effectiveness of a wide variety of drugs that would influence human behavior and mental capabilities. The effect of such drugs under different stress conditions was also examined, as previously noted. The Soviets also conducted tests to determine how the effects varied according to age, race, and intellectual background. In the latter case, they wanted to know if the drug effectiveness when given to officers was different from what it was when given to soldiers. One of the more important findings that Sejna recalls was that the drugs that were used to influence beliefs were found to be more effective when used on men with higher educational achievements. That is, it was easier to mold the minds of the intellectuals than the minds of the "primitives," to use the Soviet expression. Special substances (drugs and well as biological organisms) designed for use as assassination weapons were also tested. One of the objects of these tests were to develop substances that would result in

the appearance of death from natural causes.

One of the highest priority biological warfare test programs was the testing of unique diseases for which there were no known cures and accompanying tests of experimental treatments. Efforts were also underway at that time to develop new strains of viruses that acted quickly and could disable groups of people within twenty-four hours of exposure. Off-site laboratory support for the various Soviet research projects, such as blood and tissue sample analysis, was provided by a variety of hospitals, including the Czech Central Military Hospital.

Experiments involving the physiological and psychological effects of electro-magnetic radiation—low frequency to microwaves—on the human specimens also were run during the Vietnam War era. In the late spring of 1967, the Soviets stressed the importance of this electro-magnetic research to the chief of the Science Administration of the Czech Ministry of Defense. The subject was so important that, upon his return, he gave a talk on the subject to a high-level group of Czech officials, which included the members of the Minister's Kollegium.

[It is interesting to recall that ten years later, U.S. news media began carrying reports that the Soviets had been deliberately bombarding the U.S. embassy in Moscow with low-level microwave radiation, and that this had been going on since the 1960s.¹² What they did not report was that the U.S. had conducted research into the effect of low-power microwaves in the mid-1970s. This research was motivated by the Soviet radiation. The tests that were run on laboratory animals, including primates, showed that such radiation could be used to impair short-term memory, totally erase task-oriented training, and induce a wide variety of physical effects such as heart fibrillation and cellular disorders.]

One of the reports that Sejna recalls reading in late 1966 was based on the POW experiments. Its subject was "the effects and improvements in special destructive weapons for use in preparation for war [that is, during peacetime] and during war." This report covered the results achieved roughly between 1959 and 1966. One of the principal topics was the analysis of autopsy results. The focus was on the

physical destruction of organs such as the heart, brain, nervous system, and so forth. The data base included two hundred to two hundred and fifty examples. How many cadavers this referred to Sejna could not recall. The effects of both chemical and biological agents on the destruction of organs were considered, and recommendations for further research were formulated. The principal recommendations were directed to the development of drugs and biological organisms that would destroy specific organs at a faster rate.

The most important findings were directed to the nervous system. There, the critical concern was to "gently degrade" an individual's ability to function, but not to destroy it. The idea was to sabotage an individual's ability, but not so much that the individual was taken out of his job, placed in a hospital, and then replaced by a new, fully-capable person. The report also discussed the problem of delivery of the chemical warfare drugs. There were two different targets: individuals and groups, which roughly meant officers and soldiers.

Those whose performance they wanted to degrade, but not so much that they were removed from their jobs, were the officers. The problem was how to separate the delivery of different agents. It was all right if drugs intended for officers were delivered to soldiers, but the reverse was to be avoided. What was especially curious in this analysis was the presence of experimental data that had been collected in operations run against U.S. military forces based in Germany and in Okinawa.

The American POWs were also used by the Soviets for testing new narcotic drugs. As indicated earlier, one of the most important Soviet and East European strategic intelligence operations was international drug trafficking. Czechoslovakia was one of the lead Soviet surrogates in this operation.¹³ The development of better drugs was part of the Czech chemical warfare program, where by "better" was meant drugs that produced better and longer lasting highs, drugs that were cheaper and easier to produce, and drugs that were more rapidly addictive.¹⁴ The ex-

perimental drugs developed in Czechoslovakia were first tested on prisoners, and then covertly field tested on university students, particularly those in West Germany. They were also tested on American POWs in the Soviet Union, which Czech intelligence preferred because it was operationally much easier than the university student approach.

As an indication of size, in the late 1960s roughly fifteen Czech doctors and about eight scientists from the Czech Academy of Sciences were involved in the POW research projects in the Soviet Union. The experiments that involved Czech doctors and scientists were carried out at roughly twenty different institutes in the Soviet Union. The medical experiments also involved a variety of East European doctors and scientists who, along with the Czechs and their Soviet counterparts, were

formed into project teams. This was common practice for scientific research in priority areas. To better focus their efforts and to improve security, the Soviets built a special institute in the Moscow area where the scientists involved

The American POWs were also used by the Soviets for testing new narcotic drugs.

in drug, chemical, and biological warfare research could be concentrated. There was a special department at the institute for POW research.¹⁵

Planning for Security In Anticipation of War Termination

There was yet another agreement with the North Vietnamese that was of special significance and that is particularly important in estimating what likely happened after Sejna left Czechoslovakia in 1968. In roughly 1967, the Soviets encouraged the North Vietnamese to open a second front; that is, a diplomatic front. At that time, the Soviets knew the war had to end sometime. They also recognized the political climate in the United States was growing opposed to the war. Accordingly, they concluded the time was ripe to begin planning for the end of the war. As part of their planning, the Soviets decided that if a cease fire were negotiated, all evidence of the experimental medical programs, and that included the POW subjects themselves,

had to be either destroyed or removed to the Soviet Union. Most of all, they wanted to make certain that any evidence that showed either the Soviet or Czech involvement in medical experiments was removed to the Soviet Union; for example, medical records and equipment such as that associated with the testing of biological organisms and viruses.

Again, they encountered strong North Vietnamese resistance. The North Vietnamese were not concerned about ending the war. They saw the war as a mechanism for destroying American imperialism and, thus, wanted the war to continue.

Tough negotiations were required to bring the North Vietnamese around to the Soviet view. The argument that won the North Vietnamese over was the problem of "stay-behind" agents. The United States could decide to end the war by pulling out at any time. When they did, the Soviets argued, there would be a large number of stay-behind agents that would be able to migrate to the North, and those agents might find out what had been happening.

The North Vietnamese agreed and the Soviets and North Vietnamese signed an agreement to begin planning for the evacuation of records, equipment, and specimens that remained at the end of the war. When the war would end was a North Vietnamese decision. Hence, the plan was keyed to the North Vietnamese decision to terminate the war. Until then, the experiments and related activities would continue.

This is when the planning for the eventual termination of the experimental programs in North Vietnam began. It involved very few people, but all the critical agencies were represented. "The Czechs were involved in these negotiations because the movements of material and people to the Soviet Union at the war's end was to be through Czechoslovakia.

As before, the critical aspect of the planning was security. All measures were employed to assure the secrecy of the operation. As originally stated by the Soviet Defense Council when the operation began in 1951, no one was ever to know about this operation. That was the guiding philosophy, from beginning to end.

Related Information

U.S. officials were expecting well over 2,000 POWs to be returned during Operation Homecoming in 1973. At that time, DIA listed 667 Americans as POWs and 1,986 as MIA, and many CIA and so-called "black" operations personnel who were missing were not included in the lists. Only 586 POWs were repatriated.

North Vietnamese and Russian documents and sources have now made it clear that hundreds of American POWs who were alive when captured were never returned. The fact that the numbers returned were far less than the numbers of POWs held is confirmed by a GRU document recovered in 1993. According to that document, at least 700 POWs were not returned. This general figure is also supported by three different North Vietnamese sources. This figure is within the range of the numbers that might have become medical guinea pigs as reported by General Sejna.

One of the more interesting accounts of what happened to American POWs is the testimony of the North Vietnamese Army doctor Dang Tan, who defected to South Vietnam in 1969. At a press conference on May 11, 1971, he said:

"American POWs... are being treated as commodities."

"Hanoi's representatives in Paris [state] that NVN now holds only 367 American POWs in captivity. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is untrue. I know that already by mid-1967, when I departed NVN, over 800 American POWs were then in captivity in NVN." [When pressed by news men, Tan stated that the official number used in Hanoi was 1000, but that he believed this was high. His estimate was over 800. Additionally, Tan stated that as many as 500 American POWs had simply "disappeared."]

"The Politburo policies require that these Americans be exploited, intensively as possible."

"NVN, in violation of the laws and regulations which apply to POWs,

has permitted other Communist bloc countries to exploit these American POWs including Communist China, the USSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and other countries."

"American POWs have been taken to other Communist countries."

"All types of methods are employed to extract information from the POWs. This goes beyond the normal brainwashing and political indoctrination and includes the use of different drugs to weaken their will"

"The ruthless interrogation and exploitation of American POWs is inhumane."

...POWs were removed from North Vietnam and sent to China and Russia for further exploitation.

His information, Tan explains, came from official briefings and discussions with officials and individuals who were directly involved in the exploitation of American POWs.

A CIA Saigon Station cable on Dr. Tan also identifies additional information from Tan that was reported in the *Chinh Luan* newspaper on March 20, 1971, sourced to Tin Viet News Services. That information included statements that the exploitation of American POWs was set forth in a North Vietnamese treaty and that POWs were removed from North Vietnam and sent to China and Russia for further exploitation.

Everything that Dr. Tan said as reported in the various CIA and State Department cables released by Senator John Kerry on May 26, 1993, provides support for the detailed account provided by General Sejna.

Additionally, during hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs that Senator Kerry chaired in 1992, several individuals, most notably Jerry Mooney and Barry Toll, explained that they had seen numerous classified documents on the shipment of American POWs by air from Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union. Both men had held sensitive intelligence clearances and were privy to various intelligence information in the early 1970s. Mr. Mooney, who had worked at the National Security Agency, testified that he had followed intelligence on American POWs who

were identified as "Moscow Bound." Mr. Toll, who had worked as special security officer in the CINCLANT emergency operations center, reported that he had seen CIA and JCS reports on Americans being shipped out of Southeast Asia and that in one special case, it appeared to him that an attempt was being mounted by the United States to force one of the planes down.

In all these cases, there has been clear negligence in tracking down the information, assessing its implications, correlating it with other data, and making the full record available to the public.⁴² Additionally, in the case of Dr. Tan's information, there is direct evidence of efforts to suppress the information on the numbers of POWs held and on the use of drugs to weaken the will of the POWs.⁴³

Lessons Learned

At the time of the Holocaust, there was information on what was happening, but no one wanted to listen, or take action. The use of American POWs as guinea pigs by the communists is no different. The information is abundant, the crimes are of the most heinous sort. But, no one wants to listen, or take action.

Based on the information returned by various individuals in their search for answers to the question, "What happened to all the missing American POW/MIAs?," it appears that either very little was learned from the Holocaust or the lessons are very selectively applied. Regardless of which is closer to the truth, the fact remains that the United States government has grossly failed to honor its obligation to the men and women in America's armed forces. And, as recognized by the Senate Select Committee in their final report, the problem will not go away—as much as all the U.S., Russian, Vietnamese, Chinese, Czech, and other former Soviet satellite officials might like it to go away. The U.S. Senators might be well advised to re-read their own words: "Something very real happened to each of those brave men, and our country will not be at peace with itself until we are morally certain we have done all we could to find out what."⁴⁴

While there is no accurate count of the number of Americans who ended up as Soviet guinea pigs, the number from the Korean War would approach if not exceed 1,000 and, from the Viet-

nam War, at least several hundred, likely over five hundred. How many from World War II met this fate and whether it would have been better or worse than those who perished in communist slave labor camps is anyone's guess. Russia isn't telling and the U.S. government isn't asking.

Are any missing American POWs likely still alive? The more we consider the above information, the more we believe that the possibility is very good that many more than a mere handful may still be alive.

Moreover, we believe that if there were serious interest, the search for American POW/MIAs could be far more effective than it has been.

Without serious question, the current search efforts are inherently designed to fail. No "cooperative" efforts, which constitute the essence—if not entirety—of the U.S. search efforts in Russia, Southeast Asia, and Korea, are likely to obtain confirmation, especially because it is equally clear that the U.S. officials in charge of the search do not want to find anything.⁴⁵

All the participants and officials of the participating countries know full well that the entire program was a serious and deliberate violation of international law and human rights, and as stated by General Sejna, they all knew it to be so. Many participants are as alive as General Sejna and many hold positions in the new regimes. No one and no country is about to admit that any of the events describe by General Sejna took place. With rare exception, all relevant files were removed and taken to Russia for "safe keeping" before the Iron Curtain was allowed to fall.

It is hard to conceive of a more disgraceful farce than these "cooperative efforts" that our American Senators and high-level government officials have praised—and which they all know to be a farce. None of them can be said to have a burning desire to learn what happened, or rescue any Americans who may still be alive and held captive or

who are too afraid to come home. Their only interest is in winning votes while trying to paper over the POW/MIA problem. The reasons are all too obvious: the lure of business profits to be made; the need to avoid surfacing the duplicity of hundreds of highest level U.S. officials going back forty years; and the continuing desire of the "establishment" to hide the evils and crimes of socialist regimes.

NOTES:

⁴²For example, the source was the first to identify the Defense Council and its importance, the role of the Soviet Union in sponsoring international terrorism, the role of the Cuban, Soviet, and East European intelligence services in narcotics trafficking, and the existence and particulars of a coordinated long-range plan to subvert and destroy Western industrial countries.

⁴³The fact that General Sejna is a DIA employee was made public by the Senate Select Committee.

⁴⁴The Administration operated under the authority of deputy minister of defense Ferdinand Seoboda. Its chief was Colonel Rohac.

⁴⁵The news of this hospital was also a surprise to the CIA and DIA when Sejna's information was brought to their attention in 1992. This also suggests that no POWs returned from it because had they, they would have reported on the hospital in their routine debriefings by U.S. intelligence. The existence of this hospital has now been confirmed by Czechoslovak authorities.

⁴⁶This type of background information is essential in planning a strategy to obtain more information. One of the mechanisms used by the Soviets to control countries has been to insert its own people into key positions in various countries. One of the best examples of this process is North Korea, as described in "How Russian Troops and Guns Help Kill Americans," *U.S. News & World Report*, May 28, 1954. This control mechanism is still important. While the Soviet Union no longer exists *as such*, the KGB and GRU are still very much alive, along with their ability to control people of influence through blackmail and intimidation, especially people who were, and still may be, important cover agents.

⁴⁷One of his key assistants was Dr. Plzak, who was in charge of neurological research

at the Central Military Hospital.

The Kollegium was a small group (ten in Czechoslovakia) of senior officials who acted almost as a "preliminary" Defense Council at the Ministry of Defense. The members were appointed by the Defense Council. The Kollegium was run by the Minister of Defense. Except for operations and intelligence, all issues that were to go before the Defense Council were first discussed in the Kollegium. The discussion on the North Korean hospital arose during a discussion of military field hospitals and the knowledge that had been gained about how such hospitals should be organized during operation of the experimental hospital in North Korea.

The Defense Council has operated under a variety of different names in different communist countries. In Czechoslovakia, the Defense Council was formally termed the Military Committee of the Central Committee from 1956 to 1969. Before that it was called the Council for the Defense of the Republic, and in 1969 its name was changed to the Highest Council for the Defense of the State. Henceforth, the term "Defense Council" will be used to avoid the confusion that is produced by all the name changes. Sejna drafted the charter and regulations for the Czech Defense Council in 1956 based on the secret Soviet Defense Council documents he was given by the Soviets. He was the working secretary of the Defense Council from 1956 to 1964 and, as such, in charge of its secretariat. The *ex officio* secretary was the Minister of Defense, who at the time was General Bohumir Lomsky. The Defense Council met every other week in the personal conference room of the First Secretary, on Tuesday afternoon. The meetings began promptly at 1:00 and usually ran until 5:00 or 6:00. The Soviet advisor was always present when events of international significance were discussed.

In cases of the utmost sensitivity, decisions were made by a subset of two or three members of the Defense Council, such as the First Secretary and Minister of Defense or Minister of Interior.

The members are established by law. During Sejna's time they were the First Secretary, who was the chairman, his deputy, the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Head of the State Planning Commission. In 1967, another official, the Chairman of Parliament, was added.

These are the POW shipments on which Sejna had knowledge. There may have been, and most likely probably were, other shipments to the Soviet Union that did not go through Prague and, hence, would not have been known to Czech officials.

In extremely sensitive intelligence projects, such as this one using American POWs, security measures were very carefully planned so that even the people who

were working on the project did not know its nature unless absolutely necessary. Cover stories were devised so that participants received enough information to do their jobs, but were misled as to the true nature of the project. The overall deception plan, or as it was usually called, the "political plan," in which such measures were set forth, was prepared as part of the decision process. This plan was reviewed and approved by the Defense Council as part of the process of making the basic decision. Even deception plans designed to protect the project in the event that security was breached or compromised were prepared in advance and approved by the Defense Council.

In this case, General Major Bojkov.

Coded telephone communications were used for normal administration functions, e.g. housekeeping. In this case code words were used to refer to the operation or location. Except in emergency, serious matters were only discussed in person, face to face.

General Lieutenant Evzen Chlad, another former Soviet citizen.

General Major M. Cerny.

As early as 1963, specialists within the U.S. Atomic Energy Community knew that the Soviet knowledge of the effects of high levels of radiation exposure on humans was greater than the U.S. knowledge. The unchallenged assumption was that the Soviets had gained this experience as a consequence of accidents and poor safety standards. While that may have been the case, it is now evident that there is another more reasonable explanation; to wit, their use of captive GIs in radiation dose experiments. Additionally, on March 20, 1994, 60 Minutes had a special segment on the Soviet use of civilian communities in radiation experiments in which the communities close to detonations were exposed to low level direct radiation and subsequent fallout to test the effects of nuclear war on civilian communities.

Josef Kudrna.

General Major Josef Stavinoha.

General Major Oldrich Burda.

General Major Vasil Lalo, another former Soviet citizen.

In 1961, this individual was General Major Lalo.

In the communist system (with the exception of Poland) military counter-intelligence, which was responsible for protecting the integrity of the military, actually came under civilian intelligence and, as such, served as an additional civilian watchdog, the other being the political officers associated with the Main Political Administration.

One of the great surprises when 586 American POWs were repatriated in 1973 was the absence of any amputees. The question Why? has never been answered. The explanation might be that such operations

were conducted in special military hospitals, the same ones in which various medical intelligence experiments were conducted. Any POW entering such a hospital logically would never have been permitted to leave because the risk that would pose to the operation. This also appears to have been the policy in the Korean War hospital from which no patients are known to have left alive, except those shipped to the Soviet Union for further experimental use.

Other members were the first deputy Mol, the chief of military intelligence, chief of military counter-intelligence, and chief of the 2nd Administration of the Mol, which was the Czech counterpart to the Soviet KGB intelligence.

Sejna does not recall whether this shipment was composed of soldiers or civilians. He personally observed the isolated American who was housed at the Russelova #1 villa. This individual, he believes, was an advisor.

Quong is the pronunciation Sejna used. The Vietnamese name can also be spelt Kwang, Kuang, and Quang. While Sejna believes Quong is the same individual as the one that has been highly publicized following the disclosure of the GRU document in 1993, he cannot be certain until he has the opportunity to review a photograph of "Quong" referenced in the GRU document.

There were five departments in Sejna's secretariat. The "Special Department" was most secret. It held all strategic plans and the correspondence between the Minister, the Soviet General Staff, and the highest Party leaders. The other four departments handled legislative and legal affairs, military discipline, entertainment, and hospitality. The hospitality department handled visiting foreign dignitaries, including the villas where they stayed.

General Oldrich Burda.

General Okatar Rytir.

Later, this group became known as the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact.

Additionally, in 1965 Soviet officials proposed a swap of American POWs for two Soviet spies. The same offer was repeated in 1966 by the German, Wolfgang Vogel. A repeat offer was made in 1967, at which time the POWs were said to be in an East German military hospital. See May 12, 1993 State Department cable traffic.

This only referred to the shipment of South Vietnamese POWs through Czechoslovakia. It was clear to Sejna that the Soviets had a plentiful supply of South Vietnamese for medical experiments in the Soviet Union. Reports on the effects of any drug tests, especially mind-control drugs that were only conducted in the Soviet Union, contained data on the results of tests on South Vietnamese.

Australia was one of the places that GIs went for rest and recreation. As such,

Czech intelligence was active pushing drugs onto the vacationing GIs and, where appropriate, attempting recruitment.

"Contrary to the conventional wisdom that sees the Military Political Administration (MPA) as simply an internal military political correctness institution, the MPA, particularly its top officials, had a leading role in intelligence operations, especially the design, deception components, security, and personnel selection. The "why and how" of intelligence operations of the highest sensitivity were regularly discussed by Sejna, who was also a member of the MPA senior internal advisory bureau, and General Major Prehlic with the Soviet head of their MPA, General Aleksey Yepishev and his top deputies, from whom Sejna and Prehlic received instructions on, for example, how to advise military intelligence officials regarding politically sensitive portions on intelligence plans. General Yepishev, incidentally, had been deputy chief of the MVD (KGB predecessor under Stalin). He had been placed in that position by Krushchev to keep watch over MVD activities. General Yepishev also headed the KGB portion of the intelligence task force under General Mironov during the Brezhnev strategy revision of 1956-57 previously described. Serge Petuchov headed the GRU sub-task force.

"And through North Korea and other communist countries such as East Germany.

"See: "Making Waves" and "The Microwave Furor," *Newsweek*, March 15 and 22, 1976.

"The development of this operation is described in detail in Joseph D. Douglass Jr., *Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America* (Atlanta, Clarion House, 1990). See also: Joseph D. Douglass Jr., and Jan Sejna, "International Narcotics Trafficking: The Soviet Connection," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy*, December 1986.

"By 1967, Czech scientists had developed several new "recreational" drugs that in their judgment were better than cocaine. The Soviet advisor directed them not to place it on the market because they had already succeeded in placing the blame for narcotics distribution on organized crime and the appearance of these new drugs might raise unwanted questions about their origins.

"Similarly, before Sejna left in 1968, the Czechs had appropriated the money for the construction of a new center in Czechoslovakia where the best minds involved in drugs, chemical and biological warfare, and nuclear radiation could be concentrated.

"Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Military Intelligence Administration, Air Force, Health Administration, Central Military Hospital, Administrative Organs Department, and military counter-intelligence.

"In a Letter to the Editor, *Washington Times*, March 19, 1994, Roger Hall writes:

"Information on prisoners of war and those missing in action in Vietnam is being withheld from the public in defiance of President Clinton's order that it be declassified by Veteran's Day 1993.

"The Library of Congress, which prints the Guide to Vietnam-Era Documentation Collection in Microfilm and converts the POW/MIA documents received from the Department of Defense (DoD) to microform, is not able to identify material from the National Security Agency (NSA) that DoD alleges was sent there. NSA has instructed DoD not to label any of the NSA material received from it as either NSA or CIA, and to disinform the public of its existence and how to access that information.

"According to DoD, the NSA documentation in question is available at the Library of Congress, but the material has been deliberately mislabeled and scattered into different categories. Those who wish access to these documents are thwarted by the deliberate and malicious concealment of information. There is no way for any average citizen—or expert—doing research on the POW/MIA issue to find this particular material.

"This documentation originally consisted of 150 boxes of NSA material that verified testimony by former Air Force and NSA analyst Jerry Mooney that there were Americans in captivity who were not returned. There are intelligence documents in those boxes that Mr. Mooney didn't know about that also verify his testimony.

"This information has been declassified; it is not the property of the NSA any more. The DoD is interfering with the property of American citizens and our right to know. This information was available during the Vietnam War and was not forwarded by NSA to the proper decision makers at the time (as Mr. Mooney's testimony before the Senate select committee on POWs/MIAs reveals), and it is being withheld again by deceit to prevent people from knowing the wrong that has been done.

"This denial of access is in deliberate defiance of the presidential order to declassify the materials, and those materials are being hidden by the very people entrusted to assist in making them available. This is being done to hide the fact that Americans were held when the public believes that all POWs were released.

"We don't want classified information on what the NSA is doing now. We want in POW information that has already been declassified and supposedly released to the public. The NSA is exerting control over information on abandoned U.S. military men who it could have saved. Because of NSA's arrogance, it failed in its responsibility, and now its interference with documents compounds the original wrong.

"Task Force Russia, the DoD group that is looking into the possibility of POWs hav-

ing been sent to Russia, was working under the assumption that Mr. Mooney's testimony was not credible because the records Mr. Mooney described could not be found. That information was found and withheld from the investigators looking for the link between Vietnam and the former Soviet Union. These investigators were trying to find out if specifically identified men were sent from Vietnam to the Soviet Union.

"In addition to this, Ed Ross, director of the Defense Department's POW-MIA office, misinformed Congress in his testimony before the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee on Feb. 10. He said that all POW/MIA information had been declassified and that more than 1.5 million pages of documentation were available to the public. The Library of Congress estimates that it had only 750,000 pages as of February [1994].

"There is much more that the president, Congress and the Public are being deceived about.

"This wrong must be corrected; our elected government should not be defied by government employees. The President has declassified these documents; the public has a right to know.

"Details on these allegations are presented in Joseph D. Douglass Jr., "Malfeasance in the Search for American POW/MIAs," *Conservative Review*, November/December 1993.

"U.S. Senate, Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, *Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs*, January 25, 1993, P.56.

"This is sad and deplorable, but nevertheless true. The deliberate efforts by U.S. officials to sabotage information and sources can be documented. Mid-level officials, including those within U.S. intelligence, have lied, misrepresented information, and falsified the record in an effort to sabotage information. According to the reports in *The New York Times*, this also appears to be true of State Department officials. See: Steven Greenhouse, "New Doubts Cast On P.O.W. Effort: Cable Says Russians Asserted U.S. Officials Discouraged Full Release of Data," *The New York Times*, February 18, 1994.